Counterterrorism as Risk Management Strategies

by

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Preface

My motivation behind this thesis was to examine how the counterterrorism measures that were implemented in Norway in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001 had been justified. I started to work on this thesis in 2006 and finished most of my data collection in 2008. As a PhD student in "Societal Safety and Risk Management", I was aware that events the researcher has no control over could influence the premises for the research. I knew, of course, that terrorism acts could happen in every country performed by various perpetrators, but the terrorist attack in Norway on 22 July 2011 came as a surprise. In the time since that event, I have been asked several times to comment on that event. However, I have felt that journalists and others have been trying to put my research in a perspective that was not intended. I even received feedback that my research was outdated, because it did not incorporate the event of 22 July 2011. I disagree with these comments, because I do not think that the event of 22 July 2011 have made the study of the already implemented counterterrorism measures less relevant. These counterterrorism measures are part of the worldwide campaign against terrorism, and the fact that Norway implemented these measures, despite Norway having been previously seen as a quiet corner of the world, makes Norway an interesting case. I think this thesis can contribute with essential knowledge to those who want to study the effects of the 22 July 2011 attack in Norway by saying something about how terrorism and counterterrorism were represented in Norway before this event. But the event on 22 July 2011 is not a part of this study.

The master and doctoral studies of Societal Safety and Risk Management are interdisciplinary studies. These studies were established based on the notion that risk management and safety-related issues were complex phenomena in theory and practice and that one discipline was insufficient for understanding these topics. During my time as a student in Societal Safety and Risk Management, I always thought that an interdisciplinary perspective gave me a wider and wiser perspective to my object of study than what most other studies could

provide. However, the interdisciplinary perspective has become a struggle for me in the work of writing this thesis. Friends of mine who were taking PhDs in the traditional disciplines of science told me that I should argue for, and position myself within, a specific scientific paradigm. The PhD program at the University of Stavanger is a fairly new study that builds on several disciplines and perspectives. Consequently, it was not obvious to me what kind of theoretical approach to apply when I approached the study of terrorism risk. As I see it, interdisciplinary research is an advantage, but it also involves challenges. My choice of theoretical perspectives rests on several different disciplines, among others: engineering, political science and psychology. In my opinion they are all important for understanding terrorism as risk management strategies, but there are other perspectives that also could have added valuable knowledge.

This is an article-based thesis that comprises six articles that together can be seen as one overall study. My intention was to get a broader and deeper understanding of Norwegian terrorism risk discourses than just viewing the articles as six separate and different studies. This implies that I see Part I of this thesis as an overall study of the Norwegian terrorism risk discourses. Consequently, I will not go into details in Part I about the theoretical perspective, methodological approach, gathering and analysis of empirical data, and result for each sector or article. This choice means that a comparison of the different sectors will not get much attention in this thesis. I do, however, think that the focus on the entire study provides more interesting knowledge, because by focusing on the overall study, it is possible to say something about the general changes in the terrorism risk discourses in Norway. I wanted Part I to represent a single document that could be read and understood on its own merits. As a consequence, there will be repetitions in Part I and Part II.

I want to thank several people for their contributions during the process of completing this thesis. First, I thank my supervisor, Professor Ove Njå, for his encouragement, help, and support. He taught me how to think critically and always believed in me during this process. I also thank my cosupervisor, Professor Tore Bjørgo, for useful comments and suggestions. I also thank the Deputy Director General, Geir Sverre

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My apologies go to all of you who have not been mentioned. I cannot mention you all, but I have not forgotten anyone. During my research, I have gained valuable and useful contributions from many people whom I really appreciate, among them colleagues at the University of Stavanger and my friends. You know who you are.

Finally, I thank my family for their encouragement and support. It would not have been possible to complete this thesis without the support of my patient and supportive husband, Torbjørn, and my two children, Jørgen and Frida. Thus, I dedicate this thesis to them.

Stavanger, 6. August 2012

Sissel Haugdal Jore

Summary

After the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001 (9/11), most Western countries, including Norway, implemented a multiplicity of counterterrorism measures. 9/11 seems to have lowered Western governments' threshold for introducing far-reaching measures in the fight against terrorism and heightened people's tolerance of such measures. The fact that countries that had not been targeted by terrorism on 9/11, such as Norway, also implemented a myriad of counterterrorism measures is not evident. European states had been dealing with the threat of terrorism for decades without finding it necessary to take such drastic steps as they did after 9/11. This implies that 9/11 might have changed the public's perception of the necessity of counterterrorism measures in society. This thesis has explored the changes in the terrorism risk discourses that laid the grounds for counterterrorism measures in Norway.

Scholars have claimed that counterterrorism measures should be seen as a part of the risk management culture that dominates contemporary society and that counterterrorism measures, in this respect, can be seen as terrorism risk management strategies. Following these scholars I claimed that counterterrorism measures can be seen as risk management strategies, and, subsequently, I sought to investigate the role of risk-based thinking in the public terrorism discourses.

My philosophical point of view rested on social constructivism, because I claim that terrorist attacks like 9/11 and other terrorist attacks are real, but their meanings and political consequences are constructed. The social constructivist view also had implications for how I viewed the concept of terrorism. Terrorism is not a neutral word used to refer to an independent, objective, ontological phenomenon; it is seen, rather, as a frame that shapes and constructs how individuals and society view a phenomenon of violence and associated threats. This means that what society perceives as effective ways to counter terrorism will depend on how society comprehends terrorism as a threat. In this process, I claimed that language plays a central part, because communication is

the medium through which individuals acquire knowledge and understand the phenomenon of terrorism risk.

My theoretical standpoint rested on critical perspectives to the study of terrorism, risk analytical and risk governance perspectives. Since these theoretical perspectives do not deal with the process of how a phenomenon is framed and defined as a risk in society, I suggested "Argumentative Discourse Analysis" (Hajer, 1995) as a perspective that can fill this gap. I saw this perspective as useful for analyzing the social-political processes by which terrorism was framed as a major threat to Norwegian society.

The following research questions have guided the analysis:

- How has the terrorism risk phenomenon been understood and conceptualized?
- Have the changes in the terrorism risk discourses contributed to legitimizing implementations of counterterrorism measures?
- What have been the arguments behind the implementations of counterterrorism measures?
- What role has risk-based thinking played in the public discourses on terrorism?

The assumption of this thesis was that how the phenomenon of terrorism risk is communicated affects how severely the public see the risk of terrorism and influences what counterterrorism measures are seen as adequate to meet the threats. By studying how the risk of terrorism has been communicated in different sectors between 1993 - 2007, I aimed to gain an understanding of how the risk of terrorism was communicated before and after 9/11, and I investigated if the changes in the terrorism risk discourses have contributed to legitimizing counterterrorism measures.

This thesis has seen the societal understanding of terrorism at a given time as being the product of different discourses in society. The four sectors this thesis investigated are the Norwegian terrorism research,

the Norwegian authorities' communication, media communication and the aviation sector. The empirical data this thesis was based on have mainly been written documents, and the methodological approach was mainly based on the tools of Argumentative Discourse Analysis.

The research in this thesis comprised six articles, in addition to the cross-case analysis presented in Part I. The first article was based on a literature survey to describe different approaches to terrorism risk assessment. Different approaches to risk have different implications for communication and actions in society. However, for the topic of terrorism risk, these approaches revealed clear limitations. Subsequently, the article concluded that the roles of risk management needed to be questioned in a perspective that recognized the role of power, institutional interests and the actors' agendas behind the use of risk analysis as decision support. Discourse analysis was proposed as a perspective that could meet these requirements.

Articles two to five were based on empirical data selected from the different sectors in society and focused on how the phenomenon of terrorism has been represented and how terrorism countermeasures have been justified. These studies revealed that the overall way the terrorism risk has been represented has changed drastically during the studied time period. Norwegian society in the 1990s was described as being geographically remote, homogeneous, including and transparent, all factors that appeared to make Norway less of a probable target for terrorism. During the studied time period, the country was increasingly described as more vulnerable and an attractive target for terrorists. Terrorism after 9/11 has been framed as a catastrophic risk that threatens democracy, national security and critical infrastructures, and, consequently, society needed to be protected. Even though there have been major changes in the way terrorism has been represented during the studied time period, the Norwegian understanding of terrorism was not uniform but comprised two different discourse coalitions that interpreted counterterrorism policies according to different sets of storylines. On the one hand, the "targeted political crime" set of storylines has described terrorists as political activists, where the best way to reduce the risk of terrorism was by dialogue and social justice. On the other hand, the "omnipresent societal threat" set of storylines

ignores terrorists' motivation and focuses on terrorism as a catastrophic threat towards the whole society on a scale where national security was threatened. By employing both sets of storylines, the Norwegian authorities could safeguard Norway's role as a peace-promoting nation by seeing terrorists as freedom fighters, but they could also protect society and participate in the military "war on terrorism" by employing the alternative set of storylines. The way counterterrorism measures have been presented in the public sphere in Norway has also changed during the studied time period. Counterterrorism measures have gone from being presented as threats against civil liberties in the 1990s to something that were required after 9/11.

The last article presented results from a study of the changes in the aviation security regime in Norway during the last two decades. It discussed the role of the security regime seen in the light of public discourses on terrorism and security. Before 9/11, aviation security was a national issue and not a topic generally debated in the public media. After 9/11, compliance with international regulations has been the main storyline for implementing security measures. This storyline made sense, because the threat was described as international. Thus, it was deemed reasonable that Norwegian airports should have the same level of security as other European airports. The perceived international character of contemporary terrorism and the storylines that described terrorism as a threat to everyone everywhere justified protection of small and rural airports in Norway. The data supported the trend towards seeing the terrorist threat as omnipresent and devastating.

Despite the fact that counterterrorism measures can be seen as an expression of the risk management culture that dominates contemporary society, risk-based thinking has not been part of the public discourses on terrorism and security. The empirical data have given a picture of implementations of terrorism countermeasures as a topic that is defined away from traditional normative risk criteria. Terrorism risk, as presented in the public discourses, seems beyond rational evaluations and assessments. Measures against terrorism have primarily been described as necessary independent of the risk, and arguments as precaution, compliance, solidarity and moral obligations have been the dominating underpinning arguments behind the

implementations. This approach to counterterrorism measures might open up further implementation of such measures, because there are neither criteria for further implementations nor criteria for removing existing measures.

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Part I

1 Introduction

There is a ubiquitous expectation in contemporary Western societies that authorities are responsible for protecting citizens from acts of terrorism. Although most citizens nowadays take this assumption for granted, this assumption is fairly new in a historical perspective. Until the early 1970s, there was little focus on terrorism in either research or the media, very few states had terrorism legislation, and there were few institutions in society that dealt with the topic (Crelinsten, 2009; Jackson, Lee, Gunning, & Smyth, 2011). This is in stark contrast to the current situation. After the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001 (9/11), most Western countries, including Norway, implemented a multiplicity of counterterrorism measures. 9/11 seem to have lowered Western governments' threshold for introducing far-reaching measures in the fight against terrorism and heightened people`s tolerance of such measures. The fact that countries that had not been targeted by terrorism on 9/11, such as Norway, also implemented a myriad of counterterrorism measures is not evident. European states had been dealing with the threat of terrorism for decades without finding it necessary to go to such drastic steps as they did after 9/11. This implies that 9/11 might have changed the public's perception of the necessity of counterterrorism measures in society. This thesis explores the changes in the terrorism risk discourses that laid the grounds for counterterrorism measures in Norway.

1.1 Motivations

In most industrialized countries, the end of the Cold War marked a change in security focus away from preparedness for war to an increasing focus on civil society's own vulnerabilities and safety. This situation led to the construction of a new security concept in the Scandinavian countries, including Norway (Olsen, Kruke, & Hovden, 2007). The concept of "Societal Safety" reflected the perception of security after the end of the Cold War when no concrete enemy was in sight. The concept was not connected to any particular threat or crises, but it described society's ability to handle all types of strains and hazards. Societal Safety was defined by the Norwegian authorities as

"*society's ability to [….] maintain critical social functions, to protect the health of the citizens and to meet the citizen's basic requirements in a variety of stress situations"* (Ministry of Justice and the Police, (2001-2002):4) While the concept originally focused on unintentional accidents, there has been a shift in the concept towards more emphasis on intended accidents, e.g., terrorism and organized crime (Ministry of Justice and the Police, 2006).

When I started the Master's study in "Societal Safety and Risk Management" in 2004, one of my expectations was to learn more about the risks that Norwegian society was concerned with, including terrorism. To my surprise, the study did not focus on terrorism at all. I could not help wondering how a study in Societal Safety and Risk Management could totally ignore a threat that was daily debated in the media, that most Norwegians were concerned with, and that the Norwegian authorities were emphasizing in the Societal Safety concept. While learning about risk analysis models and theories for handling risks, I kept asking myself if the same models were transferable and applicable for terrorism preparedness. When I wrote my Master's thesis in 2006, I choose to focus on the topic of risk assumptions in terrorism research to learn more about the phenomenon. During the work of my Master's thesis, it became clear that traditional risk-based thinking was insufficient to understand how society dealt with terrorism. Risk-based thinking did not seem to be a big part of the foundation for the implementation of counterterrorism measures. There was relatively little debate about the necessity of the implemented counterterrorism measures in Norwegian society after 9/11, and it seemed that no one was questioning whether or not these measures actually had a risk-reducing effect. The counterterrorism measures implemented in Norway seemed to be a result of society's perception of the threat, rather than risk evaluations and traditional decision making. Consequently, for this PhD thesis I wanted to explore the role of risk-based thinking in the terrorism risk discourses and to investigate if there had been changes in the way terrorism as a risk to society was framed that had justified counterterrorism measures.

1.1.1 Counterterrorism as risk management

Risk management is described as a management process where the ability to describe what may happen in the future, to assess associated risks and uncertainties and to choose among alternatives is essential (Aven, 2003). The assumption is that risk assessments should be a part of the decision support in a decision-making process in order to make optimal decisions about how to make a safer society. This process is what I will refer to in this thesis as risk-based thinking.

Governments in Norway and other Western countries have highlighted risk management as a tool in terrorism prevention, especially after 9/11. In the USA, as well as in Norway, risk-based thinking has been suggested as a key tool to Homeland Security: *"Risk management, a strategy for helping policymakers make decisions about assessing risks, allocating resources, and taking actions under conditions of uncertainty, has been endorsed by Congress and the President as a way to strengthen the nation against possible terrorist attacks."* (United States Government Accountability Office, 2005:3). A risk-based approach to terrorism conceptualizes terrorism risk as a manageable phenomenon and, subsequently, a risk that could be minimized with the right prevention measures. Additionally, this approach to terrorism has an underpinning assumption that rational decision-making in society can reduce either the probability or the consequences of a terrorist attack.

Since 9/11 an eclectic body of literature has recognized the relevance of risk management and terrorism in multiple disciplines (Heng & McDonagh, 2009; Lund Petersen, 2011). There have been some questions as to whether or not terrorism is a risk that can be mitigated by utilizing rational analysis (Beck, 2002; Ericson, 2006; Slovic, 2002). For example, Ericson (2006) claims that terrorism strikes at the foundation of the "risk management culture" that dominates contemporary Western societies, because it is a stark reminder of the limits of risk management: "*It brings home the potential ungovernability of modern societies and how those with little power can work cheaply and effectively to destroy"* (Ericson 2006: 347).

Some scholars have claimed that terrorism risk management is highly problematic. Amoore and de Goede (2005) discuss the effects of risk management principles used in the attempt to manage terrorism risk. They argue that after 9/11, risk management has opened the door to more pro-active forms of surveillance, leading to a surplus of data and an overprediction of threats (Amoore & Goede, 2005, 2008; Aradau & Van Munster, 2009; Mcculloch & Pickering, 2009; Mythen & Walklate, 2008; Stern & Wiener, 2006; Zedner, 2006). Those scholars claim that, although attempts are being made to make terrorism risk manageable by the use of risk analysis, risk analysis in itself is threatening civil liberties (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2006; Heng & McDonagh, 2009; Salter, 2008a). These scholars call for more scholarly attention on the use of risk management techniques in terrorism mitigation.

What these scholars have in common is that they see terrorism countermeasures as a broader part of the risk management culture that dominates contemporary societies (Beck, 1992, 1999; Giddens, 1984; Power, 2004). Power (2004) states that contemporary societies are obsessed with taming and controlling risks. Risk management is applied by different organizations and authorities to create an illusion of a safer society. Risks must be made auditable and governable, because there are functional and political needs to maintain myths of control and manageability. According to Power, "*risk management organizes what cannot be organized, because individuals, corporations and governments have little choice but to do so*" (Power, 2004:10). Conversely, accidents and disasters still happen; consequently, the assumption of an uncontrollable world is simultaneously upheld.

Heng and McDonagh (2008) also claim that the measures implemented after 9/11 should be seen as an extension of the risk management culture that dominates contemporary society. Following Power, who claims that risk management thinking expands into new areas and sectors in society, these scholars claim that the counterterrorism measures should be understood as terrorism risk management strategies, because they are attempts to manage the risk of terrorism. The notion that the counterterrorism measures can be seen as risk management has been noted by other scholars as well (Beck, 2009; Heng, 2002, 2006; Heng & McDonagh, 2009; Lund Petersen, 2011;

Stern & Wiener, 2006). In this thesis I will follow these scholars who claim that counterterrorism measures can be seen as risk management strategies. I claim that all measures implemented in society to prevent terrorist attacks from happening or to reduce the consequences of a potential attack can be seen as risk management strategies.

Acts of terrorism are obscure, low-frequency events where strategically calculating human beings are the ones who possess the threat. Terrorists can strike suddenly, without warnings and cause enormous damage to society. In order for a terrorist attack to be effective, the terrorists must keep a low profile; thus, a terrorist threat will be secret by nature and, therefore, to a large degree not knowable by those who are responsible for the securing of society (Aradau & van Munster, 2011; Daase & Kessler, 2007). The goal of a terrorist attack is not only to cause damage but also to produce a signal effect of meanings. Thus, terrorism is also a crime against the mind (Burgess, 2011). Subsequently, activists can gain extensive attention with threats only, and it is hard for society to assess what plans and capability actually are behind the threats. Given the nature of terrorism risk as a threat that comes from calculating human beings who can adjust their plans in accordance with the implementation of terrorism measures, it is not evident that terrorism is a risk that can be managed with counterterrorism means and risk-based thinking. According to Beck, states are forced to take precautionary actions against terrorism even though the authorities do not necessarily have the corresponding tools at their disposal (Beck, 2009).

1.1.2 Counterterrorism measures and civil liberties

> Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.
>
> -Benjamin Franklin-

There is no such thing as absolute security. Security measures can reduce but not entirely exclude a risk. Additionally, the implementations of security measures always involve trade-offs. The trade-offs can be costs or inconvenience, but in the case of terrorism

countermeasures, the trade-offs might be decreased civil liberties, because terrorism countermeasures often involve increasing the power of the state at the expense of the individuals. Specific terrorism legislation threatens legal protections and security under laws by shifting the burden of proof to not focusing on specific acts by an individual but on the intention of an individual and allowing the state to investigate or punish individuals with intent to do a specific act (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2006; Halliday, 2002; G. Mythen & Walklate, 2006a; Olivier, 2004; Van Munster, 2004). Security measures as seen in aviation are threatening freedom of privacy by giving security guards allowance to strip search travelers and treating every traveler as a possible perpetrator until the contrary is proven (Adey, 2004; Salter, 2008b; Salter, Zureik, & Aas, 2005). Security measures in ports and protection of critical objects in society involve decreased accessibility in the public arena and involve costs that cannot be defended from a cost-benefit perspective (Akhtar, Bjørnskau, & Veisten, 2010). Databases storing of information about citizens such as the EU`s Data Retention Directive or the PATRIOT act in the USA are claimed to threatening freedom of privacy (Comfort, 2005; Mythen & Walklate, 2006c). Moreover, counterterrorism measures such as profiling target minority groups or the whole population as possible suspects, and threaten legal protection and freedom of privacy (Amoore & Goede, 2005; Aradau & Van Munster, 2007; Mythen & Walklate, 2008; Zedner, 2006).

Although several scholars have claimed that terrorism countermeasures involve giving up civil liberties, there are also other counterterrorism approaches that do not imply doing so. Terrorists can be convicted by using ordinary legislation punishing the physical act independently of whether or not the act can be classified as terrorism, and terrorism can be fought by means such as focus on root causes, social justice, democratic development or dialogue. Given that approaches to counterterrorism also exist that do not necessarily entail giving up civil liberties, there could have been alternative ways to counter terrorism also after 9/11. Moreover, one could expect that citizens in countries that had not been the target of terrorism on 9/11 would protest against giving up civil liberties. The ambitions of this thesis are to investigate why people in a liberal democracy like Norway seem to have accepted

counterterrorism measures when the trade-offs are being paid in relinquishing civil liberites that citizens have paid with their blood through revolutions and wars to gain and that, under most circumstances, would not be something citizens would give up willingly.

Weinberg, Eubank and Francis (2008) have shown that there generally is no relationship between the number of terrorist attacks in societies and the level of civil rights, political rights and democracy. This means that the assumption in Western societies after 9/11 about the necessity to sacrifice civil liberties in order to achieve greater security can be questioned. The questionable side effects of counterterrorism measures and the missing link between the number of terrorist attacks and the level of civil rights and democracy make it plausible to assume that the initiation, implementation and sustainment of such measures in a democratic society would imply a widespread public consent and acquiescence. This consensus has to be built on two conditions. Firstly, in order to perceive the counterterrorism measures as necessary, there must be a perception that Norway is under a terrorist threat. Secondly, there must be an understanding in society that counterterrorism measures will reduce the risk of terrorism and protect society. This means that in order to understand why people are willing to give up civil liberties, the rationale behind terrorism as a threat must be investigated.

Different understandings of who potential terrorists are, what their political motivation might be, their target selections, and if the terrorism threat is something from which society can be protected, are a result of political discourses constructed by actors in society. In a world of multiple threats, the fact that terrorism is seen as posing a major security threat in Norway is due to the construction of a discourse of danger. I claim that terrorist attacks like 9/11 and other terrorist attacks are real, but their meanings and political consequences are constructed. Subsequently, this thesis holds a social constructivist philosophical point of view. However, terrorism risk discourses are not only social constructs; they have different and real implications for how society structures itself against terrorism that can lay the grounds for

diminished civil liberties, more state power and even war (Jackson, 2005; Lewis, 2005; Nilep & Hodges, 2007).

1.2 Research questions

Even though the terrorism threat has been framed by several scholars as a global threat since 9/11, states are still the ones responsible for securing their citizens. States have also responded differently to the perceived international threat of terrorism since 9/11 (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Hamilton, 2005; Hainmuller & Lemnitzer, 2003; Wenger & Zimmermann, 2003; Zimmermann & Wenger, 2007). This implies that states have their own unique, historical understanding of security and how to deal with perceived security threats. This is also true in the case of the threat of terrorism. The way societies respond to the threat of terrorism is, to a great extent, determined by how terrorism is constructed historically, culturally and politically (Burgess, 2011; Crelinsten, 2009; Duyvesteyn, 2007).

In Norway, the terrorism countermeasures that were implemented after 9/11 marked a new era of counterterrorism policies (Nyhamar, 2007; Rykkja, Lægreid, & Fimreite, 2011). Several counterterrorism measures were implemented after 9/11, among them; new terrorist legislation, resources were re-allocated, the mandates of security agencies were revised, and technical, operational and organizational security measures were implemented in different societal sectors. Despite this, the media debates regarding counterterrorism measures in Norway have been moderate (Rykkja, Lægreid, & Fimreite, 2011). Several studies have revealed that Norwegians generally are supportive of counterterrorism measures even if they threaten civil liberties (Norwegian Social Science Data Services, 2008; Rykkja et al, 2011; Rykkja, Lægreid, & Fimreite, 2011; Teknologirådet, 2007). In this thesis, I will investigate why citizens in a country with relatively no history of political terrorism and with a strong democratic tradition willingly would give up civil liberties. The aim of this thesis is to obtain an understanding of how Norwegian society came to perceive terrorism as a major risk. I claim that in order to understand how the public conceives of terrorism as a risk to society, it is necessary to investigate how the terrorism risk has been communicated in the public

arena. This thesis investigates the overreaching rationality regarding terrorism by studying the discourses on terrorism risk in Norwegian society. This is done by analyzing the ways in which certain understandings of terrorism have been represented and in which social coalitions on meanings have emerged.

The aims of this thesis are to study the changes in how the phenomenon of terrorism has been represented, and how the terrorism countermeasures that were implemented in the aftermath of 9/11 were justified in the public domain. In order to understand the terrorism risk discourses after 9/11, I argue that it is necessary to also investigate how the phenomenon of terrorism risk was understood prior to this event. By studying how the risk of terrorism has been communicated in different sectors mainly between 1993-2007, I will aim to gain an understanding of how the risk of terrorism has been represented on the ideational level and investigate if the changes in the terrorism risk discourses have contributed to legitimizing counterterrorism measures. Additionally, since several scholars have claimed that counterterrorism measures can be seen as terrorism risk management strategies, I will investigate the role of risk-based thinking in the public terrorism risk discourses.

The following research questions have been developed in order to provide direction for this thesis:

- How has the terrorism risk phenomenon been understood and conceptualized?
- Have the changes in the terrorism risk discourses contributed to legitimizing implementations of counterterrorism measures?
- What have been the arguments behind the implementations of counterterrorism measures?
- What role has risk-based thinking played in the public discourses on terrorism?

1.3 Limitations of this thesis

The main topic of this study is how the risk of terrorism has been understood in the historical-political context, as demonstrated by how the phenomenon of terrorism risk has been represented. However, this study is not a risk perception study where individuals are asked about how they perceive terrorism. Neither does this study differentiate between different groups' risk perception of terrorism. My intention with this study is to understand the overreaching rationale about the nature of terrorism that has legitimized the counterterrorism measures implemented in Norwegian society in the aftermath of 9/11. My overall aim is, thus, not to say something about how the public perceive terrorism but to understand what kind of terrorism risk discourses have been present in the public arena in Norway. This means that I will study the risk of terrorism on the ideational level and not on the level of individuals' risk perception, although these are strongly related. Although I focus on how the phenomenon of terrorism has been represented in the public arena, I do acknowledge that there might have been powerful discourses within governmental bodies not open for review. However, since my aim is to study the public discourses, discourses not open for review are of minor interest for this study and are, thus, not a part of the empirical data material in this study.

As such, my object of study is how terrorism is represented in society. This study should, thus, not be understood as a study of the risk picture in Norway. Neither is this a study of terrorists, the causes of terrorism, or concrete decisions in society. Since I investigate how terrorism has been represented through secondary sources, these are the premises on which the conclusions of this thesis are based. This also has implication for how the terrorism countermeasures described in this thesis should be seen. The terrorism countermeasures outlined in this thesis are not to be understood as a total overview of Norway's counterterrorism measures. I have based this study on open sources, and many of the counterterrorism measures that have been implemented have probably not been publicly discussed. The data material has defined the counterterrorism measures that this study outlines, and, thus, the counterterrorism measures I have listed should not be seen as an exhaustive overview of counterterrorism measures in Norway.

In this thesis, risk-based thinking plays a central part as the underpinning theoretical foundation, and I set out to investigate the role of risk-based thinking. However, this thesis will just be able to deal with the topic to the degree risk-based thinking is a part of the empirical material.

1.4 Structure of the thesis

This thesis comprises two parts. Part I gives an account of the theoretical and methodological approach this thesis is based on, and presents the main findings of the entire study. Part 1 of the thesis I see as a cross-case analysis of the different sectors where the aim is to investigate the general trends in the Norwegian terrorism risk discourses. Thus, the focus in Part 1 is not on the individual articles but on the overall study. As such, Part I attempt to synthesize the findings of the articles.

Parts II contains the research articles included in the thesis:

1. Jore, S. H., & Njå, O. (2010). Risk of Terrorism: A Scientifically Valid Phenomenon or a Wild Guess? The Impact of Different Approaches to Risk Assessment. *Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis across Disciplines*. Vol 4 (2): 197 – 216.

2. Jore, S. H. (2007). The Norwegian research on terrorism 1996-2006: paradigms and attitudes towards security measures. In T. Aven & J.E. Vinem (Eds.), *Risk, Reliability and Societal Safety. Proceedings of the European Safety and Reliability Conference 2007.* (pp. 2579-2586), Taylor and Francis, London.

3. Jore, S. H., & Njå, O. (2009). Terrorism risk as a change stimulus to Norwegian society. In R. Briš, C. Guedes Soares & S. Martorell (Eds.), *Reliability, Risk and Safety. Theory and Applications* (pp. 2265-2274). Taylor & Francis, London.

4. Jore, S. H. (submitted). Norwegian Media Substantiation of Counterterrorism measures.

5. Jore, S. H., & Njå, O. (submitted). The Norwegian Official Communication on Terrorism.

6. Jore, S. H., & Njå, O. (2012). A discussion on small countries' adaptation to globalised security in aviation. In the proceedings of *The International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management 2011 and Annual European Safety and Reliability Conference 2012*. Helsinki, Finland.

2 Setting the Scene

What a society considerers to be a security threat is partly historically determined. Consequently, Norwegian ideas of security are bound to a certain set of traditions, a distinct historical experience, and a repertoire of ideas, customs and values (Burgess, 2011). The topic of this thesis is the terrorism risk discourses in Norwegian society that justified the counterterrorism measures that were implemented in the aftermath of 9/11. However, discourses do not arise in historical vacuums. Their content will be influenced by how similar phenomena have been dealt with in the past (Hajer, 1993). This means that, in order to understand Norwegian terrorism risk discourses, it is necessary to reflect upon the historical premises prior to the 1990's when this study starts. This chapter also outlines terrorism trends and political violence in Norway up to the starting point of this study and the role of terrorism in the Norwegian conceptualization of security. The international influence on the Norwegian arena is not reflected but is merely accepted through the Norwegian perception of security and terrorism. The aim of this chapter is, thus, to draw a background for this study. This chapter is not a complete overview of Norway's security political history or a full overview of the history of terrorism in Norway. I selected the events and circumstances that are presented in this chapter, because I consider them relevant for the topic of this thesis. This chapter especially focuses on the main institutions in Norwegian society that deal with security; the Norwegian armed forces and the Police Surveillance Service[1] because these were the institutions in Norwegian society that were responsible for security at the time and that operated in the public arena. The powers of these institutions are seen as particular representations of how society understands threats to security (Hajer, 2009).

[1] Before 2002 called the «Politiets overvåkningstjeneste [Police Surveillance Service]" , after 2002 called the "Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste [Police Security Service]" cf. http://www.politiportalen.no/artikler/36/politiets-sikkerhetstjeneste-pst/

2.1 The case: Norway

Norway is a small country with approximately five million inhabitants. Norway has a strong democratic tradition with a multiparty democratic system. Despite that Norway historically used to be a relatively poor country of farmers and fishermen, Norway has, for the last decades, scored high on the measures of per capita income and abundance of resources. Norway has relatively strong collectivistic and egalitarian values, is consensus-oriented and has a low level of internal conflicts. The government is generally well regarded, and support for democracy and the level of trust in public institutions is generally high (Christensen & Lægreid, 2004, 2006). This is the current situation in Norway. However, in order to draw a background for this study, I will present some of the historical premises for this study.

2.2 The Norwegian construction of security

In 1905, after almost 600 years of unions with Denmark and Sweden, Norway regained its full independence. Since then, the main lines in Norwegian foreign policy have been simultaneously Western oriented, outward-looking and isolationist. The Western orientation line can be seen in the light of Norway's geographical position: surrounded by seas in the north, west and south, where both industrial policy and foreign policy have been based on the natural recourses of farming, fishing, hunting, marine and maritime transport and, later, the petroleum industry (Eriksen, Hompland, & Tjønneland, 2003). Conversely, Norway's geographical position as a peripheral country, away from the economic, cultural and political centers of power in the world, has also led to isolationism as a foreign policy. A striking feature of Norway's foreign relations over the last 100 years is the lack of political involvement in European affairs. The legacy from the Danish and Swedish unions contributed to a skepticism among the Norwegian people toward any agreement that would entail giving up Norwegian self-determination to supernational bodies or unions (Udgaard, 2006). This is reflected in the fact that Norwegian citizens have twice through referendums turned down membership in the European Union. The slogan "The different land" was the dominating slogan for those who were against EU membership. This slogan illuminates that many

Norwegians understand themselves and still want to be different from the rest of Europe (Eriksen, Hompland, & Tjønneland, 2003). Since Norway has placed itself on the sidelines in Europe, it has been important for Norway to find arenas where it is possible for a small state to accomplish where superpowers and big unions stagnate. The Norwegian identity as a peace negotiator is connected to the belief that Norway is value neutral and that, as a small country with only five million inhabitants, other parties will see Norway as a country with no self-interests in international conflicts other than building peace and security around the globe (Tvedt, 2003,2005). However, Norway's desire to be a neutral, peace-promoting country had to be put aside because of Norway`s need for military protection.

2.2.1 Norwegian security prior Second World War

Since gaining independence from the Union with Sweden in 1905, Norway has based its security policies on the leading Atlantic powers. From 1905 to the beginning of the Second World War, Norway pursued a neutral and rather isolationistic policy orientation that rested upon an implicit security guarantee from Great Britain. This implicit security guarantee implied that if Norway was attacked by foreign troops, Great Britain would provide military defense (Knudsen, 2000). Norway wanted to stay out of international politics and hoped that conflicts could be prevented through the newly established League of Nations. This never became a reality since the League of Nations was hampered by the fact that neither Germany nor the Soviet Union were members and that the United States did not support the League of Nations in the way that Norway was hoping for. At the time, Norway reduced its armed forces. Despite the fact that Norwegian authorities wanted to stay neutral, they were not really unwilling to build up the armed forces, but it was easier to save on the defense budget than many other places. The idea was that the military capacity would be rebuilt if there were signs of upcoming wars in Europe. At the end of the 1930s, Norway tried to rebuild the armed forces, but the time constraints were too narrow and the defense budget too tight. When Germans troops invaded Norway on 9 April 1940, they defeated the military forces in a few months. However, the King and the government, who had fled the country, continued the resistance throughout the Second World War;

because of this, Norway could join the victors after the war since it was regarded a part of the resistance (Engdal, 2000; Thompson, 2004).

2.2.2 Norwegian security after the Second World War

Norway, along with the other Nordic countries, followed what was called a "bridge building strategy" in the years 1945-1948, which aimed at lowering the tension between the Soviet Union and the West (Rieker, 2002). Norwegian authorities hoped for Nordic defense cooperation, but this hope vanished when Finland signed an agreement with the Soviet Union. The coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 was seen as an expression of the Soviet Union's desire for further expansion. Norway went into the NATO alliance, and this time Norway pursued a policy based upon an explicit security guarantee from the USA and NATO. Because of the Norwegian isolationist tradition, membership in the transatlantic alliance was not an easy step for Norway to take. This membership also destroyed the Norwegian dream of being a neutral small state functioning as a bridge builder between the East and the West. Two factors made membership in NATO more acceptable to the public. Firstly, Norway was committed to collective self-defense based upon the military command structure of NATO. Secondly, Norway would not allow foreign military bases or nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil. These double-edged policies contributed to a very high degree of public support for the NATO membership in Norway and low military tension in the area, which was important because of the Soviet Union's establishment of a military base on the Kola Peninsula (Knudsen, 2000; Udgaard, 2006).

The will to rebuild the armed forces after the Second World War was strong, since it was no longer believed that Norway's neutrality would guarantee peace if a new war emerged in Europe (Knudsen, 2000). After the Second World War, the slogan was "never again 9 April". At the time, the structure of the Norwegian military forces was reset, and this structure was relatively stable until the 1970s. The rebuilding of the armed forces was economically financed by NATO and the American Marshall Plan's assistance. The armed forces were rebuilt upon a "total defense" concept. The intended purpose of the total defense concept

was to enable Norway to mobilize all national resources and unite military and civilian assets in times of crisis and war (Jakobsen, 2006)

2.2.3 Norwegian security during the Cold War

During the Cold War, issues concerning security included almost exclusively the military protection of nation states, and security-related issues were classified matters that were related primarily to the military protection of state borders. Since Norway had joined NATO and the Soviet Union had showed that it was heading for expansion, the major security threat against Norway was perceived to come from Communism, represented by the military invasion by the Soviet Union. Territorial defense and the need for Allied assistance in the case of an invasion governed Norwegian security and defense policy, where NATO and Article 5 were the cornerstone in Norwegian security policy at the time (Græger, 2007). In this security political landscape, security was something that was dealt with primarily by the Norwegian armed forces and Intelligence services. Security was considered a classified issue since it was a matter of national security. The situation in Norway during the Cold War was characterized by a lack of openness and of intelligence services operating under cover, fearing that Communism could gain a foothold in Norwegian society (Lund, 1996).

Even though the time period of the Cold War was characterized by a clear enemy threatening Norwegian society, and a military invasion was perceived as the primary threat, that did not mean that the structure of the armed forces was set. The armed forces underwent several reorganizations during the Cold War. In 1970s a new generation of Norwegians who had not experienced the Second World War took over the political power in Norway. Simultaneously, the decrease in foreign subsidies made it difficult to maintain the size of the defense organization. The mismatch between structures and budget became more visible in the 1980s and 1990s, with serious structural imbalances (Knudsen, 2000).

2.2.4 The end of the Cold war

The end of the Cold War marked a change in the security political situation in Norway. For the first time since 1949, the invasion threat from the Soviet Union was no longer a security threat. Forty years of the perception of a relatively stable and predictable threat landscape was replaced by the perception of uncertainty about the security political development (Rieker, 2000). The end of the Cold War entailed a change in security focus away from preparedness for war to an increasing focus on civil society's own vulnerabilities. This was leading to a focus on society's need to be resilient against all kinds of threats and hazards. This situation opened up the security concept, because it was no longer obvious who the enemy was and whether or not society should take any precautions to protect itself. This situation led to a knowledge demand for evaluations and research about where contemporary society was vulnerable, and research projects dealing with this subject were established at the Norwegian Defense Research Institute in order to define the future threat landscape of Norwegian society (Ministry of Justice and the Police, (2001-2002)).

At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, there were no states or ideological enemies threatening Norwegian security. This created challenges for the authority bodies dealing with security. The security providers in society, such as the armed forces and the Police Intellegence Service, had to justify their existence. It was also a period strongly influenced by new public management that led to the focus on cutbacks and efficiency in the public sectors, including the official bodies that dealt with security related issues (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Lægreid & Serigstad, 2006).

2.2.5 Counterterrorism during the Cold War

During the Cold War, protection from terrorism and political violence was not an extensive debated topic in the official arena in Norway. Annual assessments about terrorism made by the government or security authorities like there are today did not exist, and there were no public claims for an official terrorism assessment since the imminent

threat was perceived to come from a military invasion from Russia or a Communist coup in Norway.

It has generally been agreed in Norway that terrorism was a police task, although in the time period after the Second World War, the Defense Intelligence Service was a rival in this area. Since the form of the intelligence services was set in 1955, the Police Surveillance Service has had the main responsibility for terrorism in Norway (Bergh & Eriksen, 1998).

The international tension in the years before the Second World War was the reason for why Norway got its own police agency responsible for national security. The Police Surveillance Service was established as a national police agency in 1937, and its authority was to detect and prevent espionage and intelligence operations by foreigners and Norwegians in the tense time period from the fall of 1939 until the German occupation of Norway. During the war and in the years after the Second World War, the agency was not in operation in Norway. The growing tension between East and West after the end of the Second World War, and the uncertainty regarding international communism and its Norwegian supporters, was the basis of the argument to restore the agency in 1947. It was, thus, the Cold War that recreated and shaped the agency. International and national Communism was the threat that more than anything was the task of the Police Surveillance Service, as it was rebuilt after the war. The reason for establishing the agency in 1947 did not only come from the perceived need to counter the threat from Communism. Other factors were just as important, such as getting an official Norwegian alternative to the foreign, private and party political intelligence organizations operating in Norway after the Second World War. Simultaneously, other NATO countries were building up their intelligence organizations and had targeted Communism as the major security threat; thus, there were international expectations that European countries would handle the threat from Communism in that manner. The coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950 resulted in allocation of recourses to the agency, and the agency was integrated into the Western collaboration of intelligence services (Bergh & Eriksen, 1998).

The first decade after 1945 was characterized by extreme secrecy, and the structure and mandate of the Police Surveillance Service was not under any public scrutiny or a topic for public debates. Although there was more critical public focus on the agency in the 1960s and 1970s and more focus on control of the agency, this was of a limited degree until the end of the Cold War, when the media critically questioned the mandate and role of the Police Surveillance Service as well the military intelligence services. The Labor party was the political party in the government during most of the Cold War, and historians have pointed out the tight bonds between this political party and Police Surveillance Service and also the Military Intelligence Service (Bergh & Eriksen, 1998; Bye, 1987; Bye & Sjue, 1995; Hammerstad, 1997; Johansen, Jørgensen, & Sjue, 1992; Riste & Moland, 1997).

Compared to other European countries, the Police Surveillance Service was late with its focus on terrorism. Security police agencies in other countries Norway collaborated with had started to give terrorism more attention in the 1970s. It was hard for the Police Surveillance Service to ignore the threat, since Norway would not risk being seen as the weak country in the collaboration (Bergh & Eriksen, 1998). After the terrorist attacks in 1972 in Munich, the head of Police Surveillance Service tried to convince the government that it was necessary to also have terrorism preparedness in Norway. The European Union (EC) had also debated the need for terrorism measures, and international cooperation and border control related to possible terrorists. The head of the Police Surveillance Service claimed that Norway could become a free haven for terrorists if Norway didn't have the same level of terrorism preparedness as other countries. In the 1970s, several commissions were appointed to discuss the need for terrorism preparedness in Norway and to enhance aviation security and control of travelers to Norway. Several measures were also implemented to secure the prime minister, the members of the government, the government buildings, embassies, offshore oil installations in the North Sea, and important industrial enterprises. In 1976 the government decided to establish the emergency troop that had the responsibility to protect the oil installations in case of terrorism (Ibid).

Since the Police Surveillance Service was focusing on international terrorism, cooperation with other countries was deemed important by the agency, despite the fact that the parliament was reluctant to do this. In 1977 Norway became a member of the EU's Western Europe Security Network. The Nordic countries also developed cooperation on terrorism during the 1970s. Norway also collaborated with Israel, Great Britain, West Germany and the USA regarding terrorism, especially concerning terrorist groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA). In the 1970s and 1980s, other countries' intelligence services with which the Police Surveillance Service cooperated were concerned about states that were supporting terrorism, such as Libya, Iran and Iraq. In the 1980s the head of the Police Surveillance Service claimed that Iranian and Palestinian groups were a terrorist threat against Norway. At that point, terrorism became a more important topic for the agency, which acquired more resources and upgraded its antiterrorism work. Up to this point, counterintelligence had been the main concern of the Police Surveillance Service, but now it became a widespread perception in Norway that the Cold War was gradually coming to an end. In this security political situation, Police Surveillance Service focused on terrorism threats from Palestinian sympathy groups and from right wing extremists.

The Police Surveillance Service's cooperation with other countries' intelligence services has been a disputed topic in the government, parliament and in the media. The relationship between the Israeli intelligence service, the Mossad, and the Police Surveillance Service has especially been the subject of much media discussion in Norway. In 1973 the Mossad executed an innocent man in Norway, because they thought he was an Arab terrorist. That case led to the Police Surveillance Service's role and its cooperation with the Mossad being questioned. In 1990s during the first Gulf War, North African immigrants were coming to Norway, and the Police Surveillance Service was concerned that some of them could be terrorists, so they allowed a Mossad agent to examine asylum seekers without Norwegian representatives present. When this was revealed in the media, a commission was established to investigate, and the media criticized the Police Surveillance Service for giving the Mossad too much freedom

on Norwegian soil. As a consequence, the government and parliament wanted the agency to be under more official control. Additionally, the intelligence services in Norway were accused of carrying out illegal surveillance of Norwegian citizens during the Cold War. These accusations were confirmed by an official commission in 1996 (Lund, 1996). Subsequently, the mandate and even the existence of the Police Surveillance Service were publicly-disputed topics after the end of the Cold War.

2.3 Terrorism as a security threat in Norway

This section deals with acts of political violence or other acts that can be denoted terrorism, such as sabotage in Norway up to the beginning of the 1990s when this study starts. Even though the Police Surveillance Service cooperated with other countries' intelligence services on terrorism, that does not mean that Norway had experience with terrorism. Norway does not have a database or a systematic overview of incidents of political violence (Engene, 2012). However, it is generally agreed that Norway historically has not been targeted by acts of political violence as have several other European countries, including Spain, Germany, and Great Britain (Nordenhaug & Engene, 2008). Since the Second World War, Norway has not experienced any major terrorist attack until 2011, and Norway has generally been considered a peaceful and safe outpost in Europe.

Most incidents of political violence in Norway have been related to domestic groups, and most of the incidents of domestic political violence in Norway come from right wing extremist perpetrators (Nordenhaug & Engene, 2008). Bookstores in Bergen and Tromsø were bombed in 1977. There was a bomb attack against a 1 May parade in 1979. A reception center for asylum seekers and a mosque was bombed in 1985, and several other reception centers and immigration offices were the targets of failed bomb attacks. During the 1980s, three right wing extremists were sentenced for bomb attacks against a mosque, for a bomb threat against the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony and for planning to bomb an asylum facility. There were also several racially-motivated acts against asylum seekers and refugees in Norway (Ibid).

Political violence performed by perpetrators other than right wing extremists have also occurred. Left wing activists attacked the Yanks Thanks exhibition in 1967 with fire bombs (Brandal & Rognlien, 2009). Minor sabotages from Laps during the debates about the Laps' access to natural recourses in northern Norway have also occurred (Bergh & Eriksen, 1998). Animal rights groups have also carried out acts of sabotage, especially targeting the whaling industry. The anarchist group, Blitz, gained media attention for civil disobedience during the 1980s and 1990s.

Perpetrators without known political motives have also carried out violent attacks in Norway. In 1965 several grenades were placed in different locations in Oslo by an unknown perpetrator. In 1982 a bomb went off on a train station in Oslo killing one person; the person who was convicted claimed his motive was blackmail. One person was sentenced for burning down several churches in Norway in the 1990s. A perpetrator without political motives was also behind the bombing of a newspaper company in Kristiansand (Engene, 2012).

Acts of international terrorism have also occurred in Norway. Acts of violence targeting specific people occurred in 1973 when one person was killed by the Mossad, and in 1993 William Nygaard, the Norwegian publisher of Salman Rushdie's novel, was the intended target of assassination (Nordenhaug & Engene, 2008). Additionally, Norway experienced hijackings in 1979, 1985, 1993, 1994, and 1996 (Engene, 2012).

Terrorist plots have also been revealed in Norway. In 1973 there was a plot against an oil refinery and a dam facility. In 1979 Libya was planning attacks against the Egyptian and Israeli embassies in Norway after the Camp David agreement. In relation to the Laps' dispute about their access to natural recourses in Norway, the activists were offered assistance by the IRA, the ETA and West German activists, but they rejected those offers (Lia & Nesser, 2003).

The extreme right wing groups and other activists were not defined as terrorists by the Norwegian authorities. The EXIT project, which helped juveniles leave radicalization, was highlighted as a successful

way out of radicalization and extremism (Bjørgo, 1998; Bjørgo & Carlsson, 1999, 2005; Bjørgo, Halhjem, & Knudstad, 2001). Those juveniles were not denoted terrorists by Norwegian authorities, but they were portrayed as restless youths who had been radicalized and then redirected onto the right path by the use of dialogue and early intervention.

2.4 Reflections on the context

This study starts after the Cold War, when the security political landscape in Norway was characterized by the lack of an imminent enemy. At the time, the official bodies in Norway who dealt with security were struggling with budget cuts and lack of legitimacy. The security concept had, up to that point, been related to the military defense of Norway's territorial borders. Despite the fact that Police Surveillance Service had participated in international antiterrorism forums, Norway had relatively little experience with terrorism. Although Norway had had ambitions to be a neutral, peace-promoting country, the history of German invasion during the Second World War, had entailed that Norway chose to join the NATO Alliance. All these factors are an important background for understanding the Norwegian construction of security in which terrorism became a major threat.

Because of Norway's close geographical proximity to the Soviet Union, Norway occupied a strategically important position during the Cold War. With the new world order after the end of the Cold War with one superpower and a Europe that attempted to cooperate on security related issues, Norway found itself geographically remote from the rest of Europe. With clear ambitions about being a neutral, peace-promoting country with NATO membership and no EU membership, it was not evident what trajectory the future Norwegian security policy would take after the end of the Cold War. All these factors have probably influenced the Norwegian perception of security threats and the direction of security policies in Norway.

3 Theoretical approach

This chapter outlines the main theoretical perspectives on which this thesis is based. I will discuss some insufficiencies with terrorism definitions, and discuss the state-of-the-art of terrorism research. Thereafter, I will describe some risk management perspectives that could be used for risk-based thinking about terrorism risk. I will discuss weaknesses with these approaches in the light of the terrorism risk. Finally, I will claim that Argumentative Discourse Analysis (Hajer 1995) is a perspective that can contribute to filling some of the areas in risk research and terrorism research that need more scholarly attention. By doing this, I will not position myself theoretically in any specific scientific paradigm. Studies on terrorism, risk and risk analysis were topics that used to belong to different scientific disciplines, but during the last decade they have become topics with which several different disciplines have been concerned (Lund Petersen, 2011). This illuminates the fact that the topic of terrorism risk is too complex to be narrowed down to one academic discipline or perspective.

3.1 Terrorism as a social-political construct

The definition of terrorism has been the subject of extensive academic discussions. The fact that terrorism researchers found over 100 definitions on the concept and the saying "one man's terrorist is another man's freedoms fighter" have become clichés in terrorism research (Bjørgo, 2005). There is no commonly accepted definition of terrorism in academia. Schmid and Jungman (1988), who tried to analyze the concept of terrorism, found some common features among the academic definitions of terrorism. Based on these common features, they suggested a consensus definition:

> "Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or

> symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought" (Schmid & Jungman, 1988:28).

This definition has been criticized for being so complex that it is unusable in practical research; a criticism academic definitions of terrorism often meet. Academic definitions of terrorism are primarily designed to fit incidents into various statistical models. They are often lengthy, overly complicated and defy common usage (Badey, 1998).

Because of the criticism of the complexity of terrorism definitions, Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler (2004) tried to make a simpler consensus definition that could be used in research: "*Terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role"* (Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004:786). This general definition does not say anything about whether the perpetrators are individuals, groups or states, and what their motives are, neither does it describe the victims. This definition does not say anything about the intent of terrorism to intimidate or create a state of fear or that terrorism often implies the use of tactics commonly viewed as criminal acts. These are just some of the shortcomings with such a general definition. This definition illustrates that the price of consensus often is to reduce the complexity of the phenomena of terrorism, which has led to some researchers claiming that a consensus on the definition of terrorism is impossible (Laqueur, 1986).

Scholars concerned with the problem of defining terrorism often focus on how terrorism overlaps with other phenomenon of political violence, such as guerilla war, sabotage, hijacking, kidnapping etc., whether or not only civilians should be considered victims of terrorism, and whether or not terrorism is a group or a state activity (Schmid, 2004; Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Weinberg et al., 2004). However, there are also several other reasons for why terrorism is such a challenging concept to define that are, in my opinion, just as important to

emphasize, which implies that any definition of terrorism should be approached from a critical point of view.

Firstly, the concept of terrorism is inherently subjective. By using the concept, there is a subjective condemnation of the group or activity being described. This is best illuminated by the fact that hardly any actors call themselves terrorists. The terrorist label is typically imposed by its opponents to condemn forms of political violence as illegitimate and immoral (Gunning, 2007a; Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning, & Smyth, 2011; Smyth, Gunning, & Jackson, 2009). The use of the term "terrorism" is a form of labeling that implies a political judgment about the legitimacy of actors and their actions. Different naming of an event of political violence might generate different perceptions and responses, and to classify an act of violence as terrorism or a group as terrorist is not to describe but to judge it.

Secondly, the terrorism concept is not static, and the meaning of the concept has changed over time, which implies that a definition of the terrorism concept made today would probably just cover the current understanding of the topic. The concept of terrorism is usually dated back to the French Revolution. However, the meaning of the concept was different then from what it is today. The terrorism concept during the French Revolution referred to actions undertaken by the state against dissidents in their own population; it did not include the negative, pejorative connotations that today are inherent in the concept (Halliday, 2002; Thorup, 2010). Today, terrorism is often described as a group activity, and by removing the focus away from state terrorism, the state is described as a victim of terrorism rather than a perpetrator. The historical changes in the concept are not only related to the general usage of the concept of terrorism, but are also applicable to specific actors. Four Nobel Peace Prize winners were once labeled terrorists by their opponents (Gunning, 2007b; Zulaika & Douglass, 1996).

Thirdly, the concept of terrorism has different content in different sectors in society (Schmid, 1992). The concept of terrorism is used differently by different actors, and the content of the definitions often reflects the agenda of those who have the power to define terrorism. While academic definitions of terrorism have been criticized for being

too complex, terrorism definitions produced by authorities, as in legislation, for example, have tended to overgeneralize and to include ambiguities so the authorities can have maximum flexibility in applying the term to different activists and situations (Badey, 1998).

The changes in the meaning of the terrorism concept and the political aspects behind the definitions highlight that what is perceived as terrorism is contingent on historical, cultural and political framing; consequently, the terrorism concept cannot be separated from the context. In this thesis I will see terrorism not as a neutral word used to refer to an independent, objective, ontological phenomenon, but as a frame that shapes and constructs how individuals and society view a phenomenon of violence and associated threats. In a world of multiple threats, the fact that some groups are defined into the security agenda as terrorist against the Norwegian society is due to a social-political construction of specific groups of activists being framed as an extraordinary type of risk that has another dimension other than just being political activists or criminals. In this process I claim that language plays a central role, because communication is the medium through which individuals or a society gain knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism.

Despite the controversies over the definition of terrorism in research and between governmental bodies and international organizations such as the UN, Bjørgo (2005) claims that there is a growing consensus on the meaning of terrorism among researchers and governments. Bearing in mind that Scmid (2004) has claimed that a definition of terrorism reflects the interests of those who have the power to do so and that a successful definition of terrorism sets the parameter for debates and shapes the policy agenda, a growing consensus on the definition of terrorism should not merely be accepted. A growing consensus on the meaning of terrorism should be further explored in a perspective that recognizes the role of power and the political aspects inherent in the definitions of terrorism.

3.1.1 Assumption of terrorism defines counterterrorism measures

This approach to the phenomenon of terrorism also has consequences for my view on the legitimacy of counterterrorism measures. Crelinsten claims that "*How we conceive of terrorism determines to a great extent how we go about countering it, and what resources–money, manpower, institutional framework, time horizon–we devote to the effort"* (Crelinsten, 2009:19). According to this perspective, what society perceives as effective ways to counter terrorism will depend on how society comprehends terrorism as a threat. If terrorism is presented as a kind of evil, states will eradicate it through any means (Jackson, 2005). If terrorism is perceived as a type of crime, appropriate means will be policing and criminal justice. If terrorism is seen as a result of oppression and political injustice, dialogue, political reforms and conflict resolutions will be appropriate means (Crelinsten, 2009). This means that I will not see the terrorism countermeasures implemented after 9/11 as neutral ways to deal with the terrorism threat. These counterterrorism measures are related to how terrorism is understood and perceived. This view on counterterrorism measures has implications for how I will study them. Since it is not given what constitutes a counterterrorism measure, I will use an open approach and let the empirical material define the counterterrorism measures.

Since I claim that what is considered to be terrorism is dependent on a historical-political way of seeing, this is also the perspective through which I will approach the state-of-the-art of terrorism research.

3.1.2 The study of terrorism

A cultural bias has been present in the establishment and the development of the terrorism studies. According to Jackson, Lee, Gunning, & Smyth (2011), terrorism studies emerged in the state-based contexts of defeating insurgency and political violence, and they have since worked within a broader strategy of Western states to maintain their dominance and defeat groups that could challenge their powers.

Originally, political violence performed by states or non-state actors was studied as a part of war and insurgency studies, and acts of political violence were simply denoted assassinations, bombings, hijackings, or kidnappings (Zulaika & Douglass, 1996). Studies that specifically dealt with the topic of terrorism started in the 1960s and 1970s when Western states started to refer to guerrilla warfare and revolutionary groups related to communism or anti-decolonization as terrorists. As a consequence of urban guerrilla warfare against Western states in the 1970s, Western scholars who had previously dealt with counterinsurgency studies directed their attention to what was referred to as acts of terrorism with the aim of strengthening counter-insurgency and to help to design counterterrorism measures (Schmid & Crelinsten, 1993; Schmid & Jongman, 1988). Subsequently, the study of terrorism emerged in the context of Western states' attempts to decrease political violence that could threaten their security or challenge Western hegemony (Crelinsten, 1998). Because of this, terrorism studies have been accused of being biased against focusing on groups that are in direct conflicts with the West. The central role of the Western states in terrorism research is also visible in the links that have been pointed out between the terrorist scholars and the Western states. Many of the leading experts in the field and several of the research institutions such as the RAND cooperation have links to the state in terms of funding, institutional positions, and as policy advice channels (Herman & O'Sullivan, 1989; Miller & Mills, 2009; Ranstorp, 2007; Reid, 1997).

The dominance of Western perspectives in terrorism research was also visible after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 when terrorism research received a boost after scholars from all kinds of disciplines turned their attention to Islamic-motivated terrorist groups (Ranstorp, 2007; Silke, 2004). In the aftermath of 9/11, major research programs dealing with terrorism and security have been initiated both in the USA and in Europe. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)[2] aims to provide timely guidance on how to disrupt terrorist networks, reduce the incidence of terrorism and enhance the resilience of society in the face of the terrorist threat.

[2] START can be viewed on http://www.start.umd.edu/start/research/

Several of the projects are directed at estimating the risk of terrorist attacks and gauging the success of countermeasures. In Europe, research is carried out within the seventh frame program, which includes security[3]. Security calls for emphasis on technological aspects, for example, technological solutions for civil protection, increasing the security of infrastructures and utilities, intelligent surveillance and border security, and restoring security and safety in the event of crisis. Much of this type of research seems to take for granted that terrorism exists as an ontologically stable, identifiable object and that counterterrorism measures are the correct way to meet the terrorist threat.

Terrorism researchers have given little attention to the social political processes that facilitate what is perceived as terrorism and to which groups denoted as terrorists are seen as risks to society (Jackson, 2005; Lewis, 2005; Nilep & Hodges, 2007). Moreover, minor attention has been paid to the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures. Lum, Kennedy and Sherley (2006) discovered an almost complete absence of research that evaluated counterterrorism measures. From the evaluations they found, it appeared that some interventions either did not achieve the outcomes sought or sometimes increased the likelihood of a terrorist attack. Bearing in mind that many scholars have claimed that counterterrorism measures can be seen as risk management strategies, the lack of studies with the intention of evaluating the effects of counterterrorism measures are remarkable.

By seeing counterterrorism measures as risk management strategies, the theoretical perspectives from risk management and risk governance can contribute with knowledge about how decisions regarding counterterrorism could have been made if they were based on risk-based thinking, because risk studies have, for several decades, developed normative frameworks for how to make "good" decisions in society.

[3] EU's 7th frame program: http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/security/home_en.html

3.2 Risk management perspectives

The literature dealing with risk management falls into two major categories based on the notion of the risk concept: the classical positivist view and the constructivist view (Braut, Rake, Aanestad, & Njå, 2012). The positivist view on risk conceives of risk as a physical attribute where objective facts can be explained, predicted and controlled. Positivist perspectives consider risk evaluations as value-free, independent of methodological value judgments. Constructivism, on the other hand, sees risk as socially constructed phenomena dependent on the value judgments of the people who assess the risk (Bradbury, 1989; Scrader-Frechette, 1991; Renn 1992).

The development of the statistical method to calculate probabilities spread the idea of risk as a manageable object into numerous sectors in society (Renn, 1998, 2008b; Zinn & Taylor-Gooby, 2006). These risk analysis perspectives were based on a positivist ontology that regarded risk as an objective characteristic or property of the activity or system ("world") being analyzed. The positivist approach to risk and risk analysis is based on the idea that risk exists objectively, and the risk analysts see the analysis as a tool for producing estimates of this objective risk. The objective risk is expressed by probabilities and expected values. A probability is interpreted in the classic positivist sense as the relative fraction of times the event occurs if the situation analyzed is hypothetically "repeated" an infinite number of times. Models are often introduced to estimate the risk. Estimating the terrorism risk in this perspective means, for example, to construct a fictive population of infinitive typical system years exposed to terrorism attacks. The two levels of uncertainties involved are the relative frequency interpreted probability reflecting variations in the fictional population (aleatory uncertainty) and the subjective probability reflecting the analysts' uncertainty (epistemic uncertainty) about the models, probability assignments and consequence assessments (Apostolakis 1990, 1993; Aven, 2003). In every conceivable situation, these uncertainties will be very large when it comes to estimates of terrorism risk.

The positivist risk analytical perspectives have been criticized by the social sciences because of the positivist ontology and the reductionist

line of thinking about risks (Adam, Beck, & Loon, 2000; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Freudenbueg, 1988; Shrader-Frechette, 1991; Tierney, 1999; Zinn & Taylor-Gooby, 2006). Approaches to risk management also exist that are more compatible with a social constructivist perspective on risk. The Bayesian predictive approach regards risk as a measure of uncertainty, taking into account not only the quantitative aspects of risks that can be expressed through probability assignments but also the explicitly present uncertainties and limitations with the available knowledge upon which the risk assessments are based (Aven & Renn, 2010). This approach sees risk assessment as a debate over safety and security related issues and not as a representation of truth (Watson, 1994). The focus is on observable quantities that are uncertain at the time of the analysis but might become known in the future. According to this perspective, risk represents someone's expression of uncertainty about whether a specified terrorist act will occur or not within a defined time frame (Aven, 2003, 2008, 2010). In this case, the risk analysts expose themselves to criticism and reflection about the models and arguments used to arrive at their terrorism risk pictures. It is meaningless to speak of truth in this perspective, and the models, the background knowledge and the data provided determine the quality of the analyses. In the Bayesian predictive approach, risk is a judgment, not a fact. Professional risk analysts do not have an exclusive right to say what the risk is. Risk analysis methods and models are seen as nothing more than useful instruments for getting insights about the world and supporting decision making.

In the Bayesian predictive approach, decision making is seen as a rational, step-by-step routine (Banfield, 1959). Figure 1 describes the basic structure in the decision-making context.



Figure 1: Basic structure of the decision-making process (Aven, 2003)

The starting point is a decision problem, e.g. securing a critical infrastructure from possible acts of terrorism. According to this perspective, several alternatives are often present, and by going through the steps of analysis, reviews and discussions, the process will lead to an optimal, final decision regarding how to secure that specific infrastructure. Transparency in the management process, dialogue between stakeholders, continuous improvement and collection of new knowledge are important factors for making optimal decisions. This perspective acknowledges that people participating in the decisions-making process can be affected by values and personal preferences, but the perspective sees these as biases that can be handled by involving a sufficient broad group of people in the management process and by involving experts (Aven, 2003).

Even though this perspective acknowledges that risk assessments are not objective reflections of the true risk and that value judgments play a part in decision-making, subjective assessments and values should not be considered a source of error. Furthermore, counterterrorism measures are not just neutral decision alternatives for handling terrorism. They are related to how terrorism risk is conceived of as a

threat and can imply decreased civil liberties. Thus, more attention must be paid to the square in the right corner in Figure 1 that I have shaded. Subjectivity, values and actors' goals are important areas that are left uninvestigated in the risk management perspective. The political game in which the decisions are made, the power aspect and the value judgments that are the basis for the decisions remain a "black box" in this perspective.

3.2.1 Risk governance

Risk management perspectives have been criticized for being too narrow to be capable of covering the multiplicity of actors and processes of governing risk. The risk governance framework has been introduced as a framework for decision making that attempts to meet this critique (Renn, Klinke, & Van Asselt, 2011). Although the term was first introduced around the Millennium change, it refers to a body of scholarly ideas on how to deal with demanding public risks based on 40 years of interdisciplinary risk research. This body of knowledge provides a convincing, theoretically demanding, and empirically sound basis to argue that many risks cannot be calculated on the basis of probability and effects alone and that regulatory models that build on this assumption are inadequate and an obstacle to responsibly dealing with risk (Van Asselt & Renn, 2011).

In the last decade, the term governance has gained popularity within several disciplines, including risk research. The term governance describes the multitude of actors and processes that lead to collectively binding decisions. The term risk governance translates the core principles of governance to the context of risk-related policy making. (Braithwaite, Coglianese, & Levi-Faur, 2007; Hutter & Jones, 2007; Renn et al., 2011; Renn & Roco, 2006; Van Asselt & Renn, 2011). Risk governance denotes both the institutional structure and the policy process that guide and restrain collective activities of a group, society or international community to regulate, reduce or control risk problems. This perspective acknowledges that decisions regarding risks in society are influenced by the interaction of a variety of actors involved in the decision-making process. These actors might be governmental or administrative actors, scientific communities, cooperative actors or the

public. All these actors have limited capacity for influencing the decision making, and it is the interplay among these actors that make up the risk governance perspective. This interplay can be unfolded beyond the borders of countries, sectors, and scientific disciplines (Aven & Renn, 2010; De Marchi, 2003; Klinke & Renn, 2010; Renn, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Rosa, 2008). The framework has an organization whose purpose is to help improve the understanding and management of potentially global risks (http://www.irgc.org/). The goal of this organization is to work for the principles of integrated risk governance become accepted and implemented at the very highest levels of decision making.

In the risk governance framework transparency, stakeholder participation, accountability, and policy coherence are key principles. The framework builds on a logical structure of four consecutive phases: pre-assessment, appraisal, characterization/evaluation and management, where risk communication accompanies all the four phases. Within each phase, specific activities are listed that are deemed essential for meeting the requirement of "good" governance. The framework describes two major challengers in making optimal decisions about risks; to generate and collect knowledge about a risk and to making decisions about how to handling risks. These two challenges are represented by the two horizontal activities; appraisal and management. Additionally, in the two phases of pre-assessments and characterization/evaluation, knowledge and values are intertwined. Figure 2 illustrate the process and phases of risk governance.



Figure 2: The risk governance phases (Renn, 2008a)

Central to the risk governance framework is the recognition that there are various types of risks. The risk governance framework suggests that risk decisions should be handled differently in accordance with the different states of knowledge of the various risks in society, c.f., Figure 3 (Klinke & Renn, 2002; 2008b).



Figure 3: Stakeholder involvement (Renn 2008b)

For simple risks, the cause for the risk is well known, the potential negative consequences are obvious, the uncertainty is low and there is hardly any ambiguity with regard to the interpretation of the risk. Simple risks are recurrent and unaffected by ongoing or expected major changes. Consequently, statistics are available and the application of statistics to assess the risks in statistical terms is meaningful. Risk governance draws attention to the fact that not all risks are simple: they cannot all be calculated as a function of probability and effect. Such risks are called systemic risks. The term systemic describes the extent to which a risk is embedded in the larger contexts of societal processes. The management of systemic risks requires a more holistic approach to hazard identification, risk assessment, and risk management because investigating systemic risks goes beyond the usual agent-consequence analysis. Systemic risks are not confined to national borders or a single sector and do not fit the linear, mono-causal model of risk. They are complex (multi-causal) and surrounded by uncertainty and/or ambiguity (Renn et al., 2011). Risk governance provides both a conceptual and a normative basis for how to cope with such risks. When there is considerable uncertainty and disputes about values or

consequences of a risk, it is convenient to arrange debates in a participative discourse. Terrorism is a complex, ambiguous and highly uncertain phenomenon and, thus, according to the risk governance framework, it should have been a type of risk that ought to have been openly debated.

3.2.2 Reflections on the risk management and risk governance framework

Risk management and risk governance perspectives acknowledge that decision making is a complex process and that this process should be based on knowledge from different actors and different scientific disciplines. Such integrated frameworks offer the advantage of appealing to risk policy makers, researchers, and managers at all levels of society from various different sectors (Rosa, 2008). The concept of risk governance is based on a normative belief that the integration of knowledge and values can best be accomplished by involving those actors in the decision-making process who can contribute all their respective knowledge, as well as the variability of values necessary to make effective, efficient, fair and morally acceptable decisions about risk. Although this perspective acknowledges that different groups in society can have different perceptions of what the risk problem really is, the description of the process is still based on a normative rational decision-making perspective, where the role of power and actors agendas is not taken into consideration.

The risk governance framework rests on the idea that debates will eventually lead to consensus in policy making, based on the exchange and comparison of objective and subjective knowledge. However, studies have shown that scientific claims are often intermingled with policy claims (Jasanoff, 1990; Wynne, 1996). Furthermore, decisions about risks and safety are often just minor aspects in a decision-making context. In many contexts, there are many attributes that are valued more than safety and security (Njå & Solberg, 2010). Even though the risk governance perspective acknowledges that decisions regarding risks in society are the result of different perceptions of risks and are the products of the bargaining between different stakeholders in

society, this perspective does not take into account the power aspect and the process of why something is or is not defined as a risk.

The risk-based approaches presented in this chapter show a strong belief in decision making as a rational planning process in which consensus can be met as long as different actors with different perspectives on the risk participate in the decision-making process. Despite the fact that the approaches are founded on openness, transparency and debate in the management process, the prerequisite risk management regime is instrumental in seeing decision making as a rational analytical process. Decision making is seen as a process with formal decision and risk analyses providing decision support, followed by an informal managerial judgment and review process that results in a decision, cf. Figures 1 and 2. The strength of these perspectives is that they are based on rationality; if these perspectives were followed in terrorism mitigation, one could expect the countermeasures to be in line with the assessed risk picture. Another positive element with these perspectives is that they are based on a concept of "deliberative democracy", in which transparency and openness are the basic requirements. These are, of course, a great challenge in terrorism risk management, but they are major goals in democratic societies. Normative theories about decision making are seldom compared to how decisions on risks actually take place. These normative perspectives are mostly taken for granted (Flyvbjerg, 1998). Consequently, how the decision support system actually works and what role risk evaluations and discussions actually play in decision making is often not questioned.

The risk-based approaches claim that the best argument will win if certain rules are followed in decision making. This understanding of decision making has great limitations, because it fails to recognize that what is considered the best solution to handle a problem or a risk in society is not an absolute truth that actors can agree on after a discussion. Reaching consensus will depend on terrorism being defined as a problem worth handling and being discussed in the first place. The best argument will, therefore, be just one of several social realities.

3.2.3 Different rationales for thinking about risks

Risk management and risk governance perspectives bring logic, reason, and scientific arguments into the decisions-making process. In contrast, risk psychologists have focused on risk as feelings referring to the fast, instinctive, and intuitive reactions to danger (Slovic, 2004). According to Slovic (2004) and Sunstein (2002, 2003a), affect plays a central role in what have come to be known as dual-process theories of thinking, knowing, and information processing These scholars claim that individuals understand reality in two fundamentally different ways. Risk as feelings perceive risk in intuitive, automatic, natural, non-verbal, narrative, and experiential ways that encode reality in images, metaphors, and narratives to which affective feelings have become attached. The rational system, on the other hand, is a deliberative, analytical system that functions by established rules of logic and evidence (e.g., probability theory).

Holistic	**Analytic**
Affective: Pleasure-pain oriented	Logical: Reason oriented (what is sensible)
Associationistic connections	Logical connections
Behavior mediated by "vibes" from past experiences	Behavior mediated by conscious appraisal of events
Encodes reality in concrete images, metaphors, and narratives	Encodes reality in abstract symbols, words, and numbers
More rapid processing: Oriented toward immediate action	Slower processing: Oriented to-ward delayed action
Self-evidently valid: "experiencing is believing"	Requires justification via logic and evidence

Table1: The dual-process theories of thinking, knowing, and information processing (Slovic 2004)

By distinguishing between risk as rational reasoning and risk as feelings, risk psychologists have illustrated that terrorism is not only

understood as functions of probabilities and outcomes. These scholars acknowledge that terrorism is about taking strategic actions that incite terror and fright in civilian populations. Terrorism is about making ordinary people feel vulnerable, anxious, confused, uncertain and helpless. The power of terrorism lies precisely in its pervasive ambiguity and in its invasion of our minds (Zimbardo, 2006). This implies that logical, rational decision making is just one of several ways people can perceive terrorism risk. People perceive risk in other ways than in just strictly probabilities and consequence (Kasperson, Pidgeon, & Slovic, 2003; Renn, 2008b; Slovic, 2002, 2004). Even though the probability of a terrorist attack is perceived as minor, citizens might still feel a state of fear. When strong emotions are involved, people tend to focus on the badness of the outcome rather than on the probability of the outcome occurring (Sunstein, 2002, 2003a). Consequently, it is not evident that the rational perspective is the lens through which terrorism risk is seen.

The alternative system suggests that people perceive risks in a holistic process in which narratives and attached feelings play important parts. Slovic also adds a third aspect to risk, risk as politics. However, this is not a topic that risk psychologists deal extensively with; consequently, risk perception research lacks a proper theory for why society sees something as a risk. Risk governance perspectives have, to a large extent, acknowledged that how risks are dealt with is a result of different stakeholders operating on different levels in society, but they do not elaborate on the political aspect. Renn (2008b) claims that the study of risk needs to acknowledge that framing plays a part in what actors label risk problems. He describes framing as the selection and interpretation of phenomenon as relevant risk topics, but he does not account for how this process of framing actually occurs. In my opinion, there is a need to add a perspective to risk research that acknowledges that what is perceived as a public problem or a security threat is not automatically given but rather a result of how a phenomenon is framed by actors in society.

3.3 Approaching the field of Discourse Analysis

Risk analytical and risk governance perspectives see decision making as a process of finding acceptable solutions to a given risk problem like terrorism. However, several scholars have claimed that risk problems and political problems are not predetermined but should be seen as socially constructed (Hajer & Uitemark, 2008; Rosenthal, Boin, & Comfort, 2001). The social constructivist element is embedded in how people make sense of phenomenon as terrorism. Destruction of infrastructure or dead people are not social constructs. The social constructivist aspect is how people make sense of such horrible actions and how, based on these experiences, they assess the terrorism risk. In this respect, there are many possibly explanations that can be meaningful.

Both within the linguistic and the social sciences there has been an increased focus on the role of language in the process of constructing meaningful realities. These approaches acknowledge that language does not only describe the world; language is also built up as a system and does not correspond to the reality "out there" (Saussure, 2006a, 2006b). The meaning people attach to words is not inherent in them but is a result of social conventions whereby people connect certain meanings with certain words. Language also gives meaning to the world and can create new realities (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). This constitutive view of language is in contrast to how language is viewed in the risk management and governance perspectives. In these perspectives, language is a neutral means that actors use to present their perception of the risk of terrorism. Conversely, a constitutive perspective sees language not only as a means but also as an integrated part of reality that can constitute new realties. This means that the study of language is crucial in order to understand how terrorism became perceived as a major threat towards Norwegian society. It was through language that the public got the idea of terrorism as a threat towards Norwegian society, and it was also through language that the counterterrorism measures were justified.

This constitutive view of language has consequences for how I see the descriptions of the phenomenon of terrorism, The categories used in society and the typologies found in research that are used to describe

terrorism are not neutral reflections of the phenomenon of terrorism but are a result of power structures in society (Foucault, 1979; Foucault & Gordon, 1980; Jackson, Lee, Gunning, & Smyth, 2011). This means that the theories and typologies in terrorism research should not be taken for granted but should be analyzed as specific ways to conceive of terrorism. An example of this is the theories about the "new terrorism" that gained popularity toward the end of the 1990s. These scholars argued that society is facing a new type of terrorism. The perpetrators of the new terrorism act transnationally in loosely organized networks, inspired by religion and with the intent to physically attack as many people as possible with weapons of mass destruction. Their victims are not carefully selected, their targeting is indiscriminate (Hoffman, 1998; Kegley, 2003; Laqueur, 2003; Lesser, 1999; Simon, 2003). The terrorist attacks in the USA on September 11, 2001 (9/11) and the following terrorist attacks in Spain and England are recognized by many as the evidence for the emergence of a "new terrorism" (Duyvesteyn, 2004). The interpretation of 9/11 has been seen as the "new age of terror" rather than an extraordinary event. The category of "new terrorism" has the inherent idea that terrorism has changed and that our previous knowledge about the phenomenon is no longer relevant.

3.3.1 The power of discourses

An essential feature of the social constructivist perspective is the belief that people cannot perceive the world as it really is. The world is only accessible through representations, and people use mental models to make sense of reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1988; Burr, 2003). Accordingly, language is structured into different categories and patterns of meaning, that is, the discourses. This means that in order to analyze how terrorism has been framed as a risk towards Norwegian society, the analysis must go beyond the merely linguistic components and analyze the discourses in society.

Discourse analysis has come to mean different things in different disciplines (Drake, 2007; Fairclough, 1992; Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). These controversies between discourse analytical approaches stems from the fact that they have different views on what a

discourse is. Drage (2007) distinguished between discourse approaches that see discourse as a process and approaches that see discourse as a field. Linguistics approaches to discourse see discourses as a process of ongoing communication and use the concept of discourse to refer to elements with texts that are larger than a sentence. Social scientific approaches see discourses as a macro-level formation, and some of them do not consider interaction at all. Fairclough (1992) distinguishes between critical approaches and non-critical approaches to discourse. Critical approaches differ from non-critical approaches in that they focus on how discourses are shaped by those in power in society and aims to reveal suppression in society. This perspective is ideologically based and sees language as a means of manipulation (Dijk, 2008; Drake, 2007). Even though this perspective aims to be critical, it does not have the same critical view of the ideological basis behind its own approach, and it lacks a perspective to deal with the reality outside the linguistic analysis (Drake, 2007).

In this thesis, I will move beyond the mere linguistic approaches to discourse and include in the analysis the broader context and the institutional practices where discourses are produced. I claim that an analysis of discourse should not only look for linguistics components in a text. In order for a text to give meaning in a wider context, I argue that it is necessary to look for argumentative structures in texts, investigate how texts are situated in particular contexts and how language shapes reality. In contrast to the approaches that see discourse as an ongoing process of communication, I claim that the analysis needs to go the ideational level. I will see discourses as particular systems or frameworks of assumptions, conceptual associations and beliefs. Such an understanding of discourse is in line with Foucault, who claimed that there exists a set of rules in a society that is historically conditioned and that decides which arguments are seen as meaningful. Foucault considered discourses to be the macro level formation of specialist knowledge that determines what can be said or thought about a specific subject (Foucault, 1979; Foucault & Gordon, 1980). This view on discourse differs from the critical approaches to discourse analysis, in which language and discourses are seen as means to manipulate the world. Discourses in Foucault`s tradition, on the other hand, are seen as a part of reality.

Hajer (1993, 1995) proposes an Argumentative Discourse Analytical approach that builds on the tradition of Foucault but offers more middle range concepts to analyze discourses. Hajer defines a discourse as "*an ensemble of notions, ideas, concepts and categorizations through which meaning is ascribed to social and physical phenomena, and that is produced and reproduced in turn of identifiable sets of practices"* (Hajer, 2009:60). The notions, ideas, concepts and categorizations that constitute a discourse can vary in character; they can be normative or analytical convictions, they can be based on historical references and they can reflect myths (Hajer, 1993). In Argumentative Discourse Analysis, discourses will provide perspectives and the context in which the phenomenon of terrorism risk is understood. In this respect discourses to a large degree predetermine how the phenomenon of terrorism as a risk to society is understood.

Hajer criticizes Foucault for omitting the role of human agency, and he claims that despite the fact that actors are subjected to discourses, it does not mean that the actors do not have strategic behavior. Actors sometimes try to impose their view onto others through debate and persuasion, but also through manipulation and the exercise of power. This means that power is seen in several dimensions in Argumentative Discourse Analysis. Actors can use power to impose their views on others through manipulations, persuasions or debates (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970; Lukes, 2005). However, the power of the discourse is on the ideational level. Power is responsible for how the phenomenon of terrorism is perceived. From this perspective, power is thus both a productive and a constraining force (Arendt, 1998; Giddens, 1984; Neumann, 2001; Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

3.3.2 Storylines and discourse coalitions

According to Hajer, people draw on different discourses when they communicate and define phenomena. This implies that when different actors speak about terrorism, they will draw on different discourses to make sense of what kind of risk terrorism is. Accordingly, how the risk of terrorism is understood will be made up of many different discourses, because to discuss the phenomena of terrorism will involve such complexity that, for example, one scientific discourse cannot

satisfactorily explain either what terrorism is or how the threat should be met. At best, it makes a statement that explains one element of the issue.

Since individuals draw on different discourses to understand terrorism, the political power of a text is not derived from its consistency but from its multi-interpretability. To be able to analyze this interdiscursive communication, Hajer builds on the work of the social psychologists Harré (1993) and Billig (1996) and introduces the concepts of storylines and discourse coalitions as concepts that can illuminate how discursive orders are maintained and transformed. Hajer defines storylines as "*narratives on social reality through which elements from many different domains are combined and that provide actors with a set of symbolic references that suggest a common understanding*" (Hajer, 1995:62). Storylines fulfill a particularly significant role in political processes where policies must be determined by a group of actors who do not share the same frame of reference. In such settings, storylines give an impression of a shared understanding of what the risk of terrorism is. The storylines of the "new terrorism" will for example give an impression of a new situation, where new means and resources are necessary to meet the "new" risk of terrorism. Despite the fact that storylines insinuate a common understanding, they derive their political effect from the fact that different actors can have different readings of the storyline. Even though the risk of terrorism is described as "new", actors can have different understandings of the severity of the threat and what dangers this risk represents to specific objects in society. Through storylines, actors are provided with a symbolic reference that suggests a common understanding. This means that the introduction of a new terrorism storyline may alter actors' perceptions of the risk of terrorism and how to handle it; this may create space for unexpected political coalitions.

Discourse coalitions are actors who develop and sustain a particular way of talking and thinking about terrorism as a risk towards Norwegian society. These coalitions are not actors who have agreed on a specific strategy but are actors who group around specific storylines. Despite the fact that the actors share the same storylines, they might have different interpretations of what kind of threat terrorism poses to

society and how the threat should be met, and they might each have their own particular interests.

3.3.3 Discourse institutionalization

When many people use a discourse to conceptualize the world, it will solidify into an institution. In the case of terrorism risk, discourse institutionalization will be the practices of how to deal with terrorism such as, for example, negotiation with, or imprisonment of terrorists or military operations. Discourse institutionalizations facilitate the reproduction of a given discourse. Actors who have been socialized to see terrorism in a specific framework reinterpret the phenomenon of terrorism within this framework. In this perspective, counterterrorism measures will not only be seen as means for coping with the threat of terrorism but as concrete discourse institutionalizations that support a specific view of the phenomenon of terrorism.

Institutions in society that deal with terrorism can also be seen as discourse institutionalizations. This means that the institutions in society that deal with security are particular representations of the way the society comprehends threats and how to handle them. The power of these institutions has been acquired over time and is the product of the discourses in society. This implies that the institutional authority is conditional (Hajer, 2009). If terrorism policy is enacted well, it will be widely recognized to be the legitimate way to handle terrorism.

3.4 Theoretical implications

The managing of risk always involves predicting the future. To assess risks is not to predict something that will happen in the future, but to predict something that might happen in the future (Adam et al., 2000). This means that risk is not an ontological entity but a social construction about possible future outcomes. Since risk assessments are social constructs made by humans, these will be dependent on socio-cultural discourses. In order to investigate how terrorism has been framed as a major risk against Norwegian society, I will utilize Argumentative Discourse Analysis (Hajer, 1993, 1995; Hajer &

Wagenaar, 2003). Argumentative Discourse Analysis builds on a governance perspective on policies, and this approach represents a perspective that can provide a framework for how to analyze how terrorism became perceived as a risk against Norwegian society in the first place. Following this approach, I will build this thesis on a social constructivist viewpoint, wherein the power to define reality is based both on the structural level of discourse and on the political discursive battle among actors in society.

The social constructivist perspective will influence how I see the phenomenon of terrorism risk. I will see terrorism risk discourses not as a reflection of a real threat but as a product of how the phenomenon of terrorism risk is communicated and embedded in the public arena. This does not mean that I reject that terrorism represents a real danger. There are terrorists who represent a threat to society, and terrorism countermeasures might be reasonable if this is what the public desires and the positive and negative sides of the countermeasures are accounted for.

I have presented risk management perspectives and the risk governance perspective as additional theoretical foundation of this thesis. These are the perspectives to which I will refer as risk-based thinking. However, these perspectives lack proper explanation on how some risks are framed to be seen as major hazards and threats in society while other risks are not. This does not mean that I reject the use of risk analysis in terrorism risk management, but there is a need to investigate if this really is the lens through which terrorism risk is seen. How does risk-based thinking fit into how actors in society actually communicate the terrorism risk? If the counterterrorism measures are not based on risk-based thinking, then on what kind of rationality is the implementation of counterterrorism measures based?

This thesis take a different point of departure than the risk management and risk governance perspectives that see terrorism decision making as finding acceptable solutions to preconceived problems. By using Argumentative Discourse Analysis, I will include the framing process in the analysis by including the representations and discourses in the study of terrorism risk. I will see the concept of terrorism as a frame

that shapes and constructs how individuals view the risk. This means that what society perceives as effective ways to counter terrorism will depend on how society comprehends terrorism as a threat. In so doing, I seek to show how social constructivism and Argumentative Discourse Analysis can add essential insight to the understanding of terrorism risk management by seeing discussions regarding terrorism risk not as a conflict over which sort of actions should be taken but as a conflict over the meaning of the phenomena of terrorism itself.

4 Methodological approach

This thesis explores the changes in the terrorism risk discourses that have laid the grounds for counterterrorism measures in Norway. The assumption of this thesis is that how the phenomenon of terrorism is communicated will affect how severely the public will see the risk of terrorism. The following research questions were outlined in chapter 1;

- How has the terrorism risk phenomenon been understood and conceptualized?
- Have the changes in the terrorism risk discourses contributed to legitimizing implementations of counterterrorism measures?
- What have been the arguments behind the implementations of counterterrorism measures?
- What role has risk-based thinking played in the public discourses on terrorism?

In this chapter, I will describe the research design and the scope of this thesis as a whole. I will not elaborate on the different designs I have used in the articles that constitutes Part Two of this thesis, but I will focus on the overall research design of this thesis.

4.1 Approaching the field of terrorism risk discourses

My theoretical point of view and the social constructivist philosophical viewpoint are important to take into consideration when choosing the thesis' research design, which is the overall plan for relating the conceptual research questions to relevant and practicable research (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2002). Chapter 3 accounted for the theoretical background for this study. Since terrorism research and the risk-based frameworks do not deal with the process of how risks like terrorism are framed and socially defined, I have suggested Argumentative Discourse Analysis as a perspective that can fill this gap. I see this perspective as useful for analyzing the political processes in which terrorism was framed as a major threat that had to be met with several

countermeasures. In Argumentative Discourse Analysis individuals are not totally free in their categorization of the world but are subjected to the discourses in society in the historical time period in which they are living (Foucault, 2002; Hajer, 1995). Consequently, this thesis sees the societal understanding of terrorism risk at a given time as partly being the product of different discourses in society. By studying how actors in society communicate the terrorism risk, it is possible to get a picture of their representation of the risk, which can give information about the frames or the discourses within which the terrorism risk is interpreted. The study of language is essential to study these representations and discourses. Language is not a neutral descriptive system, it is a system that provides people with categories within which they can understand the topic of terrorism, and since language has a constitutive character, new meanings can be given to the phenomenon of terrorism risk. However, it is not enough to study language. The historical-political context in which the statement is uttered in also needs to be analyzed in order to understand the meaning of a sentence. The argumentative meaning will be lost without knowing the context.

Terrorism and language have been studied by several authors (Jackson, 2004, 2005a; Lewis, 2005; Nilep & Hodges, 2007). However, these scholars have to a large degree focused on how language has been used for manipulation, and they have not focused on the discursive battle in society that occurs during the process of giving meaning to the concept of terrorism risk. Additionally, these perspectives have been centered on the American discourses on counterterrorism and globalization of threats. However, the counterterrorism measures implemented after 9/11 were also implemented in small countries like Norway where the authorities had to justify these measures to the public. Since the topic of this thesis has not been studied before, an explorative research design seemed appropriate. The characteristic of explorative studies is to build rich descriptions of complex circumstances that are unexplored in research (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). My intention in choosing an explorative design was to have an open approach to investigating how different actors have given meaning to the phenomenon of terrorism risk and how these changes in meanings have developed over time.

Four different sectors in society were selected to study how terrorism risk has been understood and conceptualized: terrorism research, official communication, media and aviation. These sectors were selected because I considered them to have a large influence on the public's perception of the risk of terrorism. The research sector was selected because researchers are considered experts on the topic, and knowledge based on research has a high creditability in modern societies (Feyerabend, 1993; Foucault & Gordon, 1980; Herman & O'Sullivan, 1989). Official communication on terrorism was seen as influential, because it is the authorities that are responsible for securing society against terrorism and for assessing the threat level (Branscomb, 2004; Jackson, 2004; Perryn & Lindell, 2003). The media were selected because the media are the window through which most people receive their knowledge about terrorism (Lewis, 2005; G. Mythen & Walklate, 2006b; A. P. Schmid, 1989; Sjøberg, 2000; Wilkinson, 1997; Zulaika & Douglass, 1996). Aviation was picked as a sector for analysis because several scholars have claimed that this sector has undergone a security paradigm shift since 9/11, both internationally and in Norway (Engen & Olsvik, 2010; Pettersen, Aven, & Engen, 2010; Roberts, 2009; Salter, 2008a).

The aims of this thesis are to gain an understanding of the terrorism risk discourses in society and to investigate what role risk-based thinking has played in the public discourses. I have approached the four sectors I have selected for analysis with different intentions in the "puzzle" of describing the discourses on terrorism risk, c.f. Figure 4.



Figure 4: Overview of the relationship between the studied sectors

Risk-based thinking has been the theoretical perspective through which I have aimed to see all the articles. The study started out with a literature survey on how risk and terrorism were dealt with in different disciplines. The first article established the theoretical background for my study, as well as outlining challengers with these approaches. Consequently, this article provided the background knowledge and was the perspective from within which I designed the research questions and the design of this study. This article was the perspective from which I wanted to explore the empirical data.

The intention with the studies of terrorism research, official communication and media was to gain an understanding of how different actors have communicated terrorism risk and whether or not there have been changes in the way terrorism risk has been represented.

These studies are focused on the language in which terrorism risk has been described and the assumptions regarding terrorism risk in the historical-political context. These studies also dealt with the attitude towards counterterrorism measures and outlined different discourse coalitions and different sets of storylines.

Hajer (1993, 1995, 2009) has claimed that if many people use a discourse to conceptualize the world, it will solidify into an institution. Through the case of aviation security, the intention was to investigate the institutional practices of the terrorism risk discourses that were identified in the research, official communication and media studies. Aviation was picked as a case, because this was a sector that has undergone major changes in the security regime since 9/11, and it was also a sector where citizens concretely and directly encounter the counterterrorism measures through the security checks at the airports.

The studies of the sectors were each presented in one article, except for the media sector, which was a topic for two articles. Each article was written as a separate piece of work and provided insight and new research questions for the next article. The different sectors were analyzed independently to understand the specific cases; thus, the articles can be seen as separate within-case analyses. I see the thesis as a whole as a cross-case analysis, wherein the aim has been to obtain knowledge about the discourses on terrorism risk in society of which the citizens in Norway have been a part.

This thesis starting point was to investigate the terrorism risk discourses that legitimized the counterterrorism measures in the aftermath of 9/11. In order to understand these discourses, it is necessary to understand how terrorism as a risk to Norwegian society was dealt with before 9/11. The data this study was based on covers mainly the time period from 1993-2007. I started the work on this thesis in 2006, five years after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Since 9/11 was considered to be a crucial moment for people's perception of terrorism risk, it was convenient to study as many years before as after this event. The data collection for the article studying the risk communication of Norwegian authorities ended in 2007. Even though I also wanted to study the same amount of year before and after this

event, the empirical material disclosed that several official documents referred to a document published in 1993. I thus chose 1993 as the starting year for the authority study. The articles about terrorism risk discourses in media had the same starting point, which was done so the different discourses within the different sectors of society could be compared and understood in relation to each other. The collection of data for the aviation study ended in 2012, and since its study covered a longer time span than the others, I chose to go back to the beginning of the 1990s so that I would cover the same time period before and after 9/11. The main reason why the articles have not covered the same time frame is that, while my original intention was to look at a certain amount of years before and after 9/11, I realized during the research process that it probably would have been more natural to start this study at the end of the Cold War, since this characterized a new security political era.

4.2 Data collection

Discourse analysis deals with the study of language. This does not mean that the research must be limited to the study of written documents. Other kinds of empirical data, such as interviews or television programs, can also be easily transferred to written texts (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). However, since all the sectors already offered existing written documents that I could easily retrieve from databases, I chose to focus on already existing texts. Since the aim of this thesis has been to investigate changes in the societal discourses over time, written documents provided an essential insight into how the phenomena of terrorism risk was communicated at a specific point in time. The intention of this study has not been to investigate if the representations of terrorism risk in the public arena have been in accordance with how terrorism really was dealt with at the time; thus, I saw it as sufficient to study written documents. The four sectors I selected for analysis offered different kinds of empirical data, and the empirical data within each sector have different relevance in the public discourses on terrorism risk. Subsequently, I had to select data in each sector that I thought would be relevant for answering my research questions.

The study of the Norwegian terrorism research started out in the work on my Master's thesis. At the time, I had recently entered the study of terrorism risk. I had no expectations about what kind of data I wanted to include, so I simply included all kinds of research publications that I could retrieve from the Internet, the databases at my university, and publications I got information about from the terrorist researchers I interviewed. Research publications on the topic of terrorism vary from small texts to large books, and scholars who deal with the topic come from several disciplines. There are clearly big differences in how influential the different research publications are on the Norwegian terrorism risk discourse. The research publications that are a part of the Norwegian "Consortium for terrorism research" will be much more influential because these researchers will get funding from the authorities and will have formalized channels for presenting their results to official bodies. Some of the research projects are also initiated by the authorities, and these research projects will have more influence on the discourses, because they can influence practical policies.

For the media articles, I selected to study the two largest daily newspapers in Norway with national distribution and readership. Aftenposten is mainly a subscription newspaper, while Verdens Gang relies on single-copy sales. These are the top selling newspapers in Norway, representing 284 414 (Verdens Gang) and 372 363 (Aftenposten morning and evening editions) daily quantities[4]. Given that the total Norwegian population is five million and that a paper is normally read by more than one person, these two newspapers' range covers a significant number of Norwegian citizens. Thus, I assumed that they were quite influential in the public's understanding of terrorism risk. Articles from these two newspapers were available from the database retriever (http://www.retriever-info.com), and I used search words related to terrorism, risk and security to narrow down the search. Newspaper articles are often small texts compared to the other types of documents in this study and are characterized by multiple actors that express their view on terrorism. The media are also

[4] Daily quantities in 2008.
http://medienorge.uib.no/?cat=statistikk&page=avis&queryID=190

important actors, because journalists frame news stories in a certain way and should not be seen as neutral reporters of objective facts (Lewis, 2005). The media are also a channel in which the public or other actors can present their views. A clear limitation of choosing newspapers articles as a source of empirical data is that, since the newspapers consist of texts, other media channels like the Internet and television have more powerful tools of communication when it comes to provoking fear in the public by showing live pictures from the scene of terrorist attacks.

The authorities produce several types of documents. Since I was interested in the overall official communications, I chose to focus on official documents published by, or on behalf of, the parliament and government. Official reports published by the parliament and government are big documents that go through extensive political bargaining and debate before they are published. Consequently, such documents have already been through a discursive struggle before they are published and will represent the authorities' official view on terrorism risk at the time they are published. I assumed that these kinds of documents would not be so ad-hoc and influenced by party political views as the study of political speeches or policy debates would have been. I searched in the parliament's database (http://stortinget.no) using the search word *terrorism*. The government's database (http://www.regjeringen.no) was used as a supplementary search source. The extent to which the different publications dealt with the topic of terrorism varied, but I chose to include all the publications in the study, because even if policy papers do not present new storylines or proposals, they still play a role in preserving the prevailing view on terrorism. Nevertheless, some documents dealt more with the topic than others and thus were more important for identifying terrorism storylines. Documents dealing with the topic of terrorism as a threat to Norway were considered core documents for this study.

I selected the aviation sector as a case, because I assumed that since the public actually encountered the terrorism measures in the security checks at the airports, this sector would be influential on the public discourses. In addition to the security checks, the security regime in aviation includes several other measures that are invisible to the public.

However, I chose to include all the measures in the study of aviation security, because even though several aspects with the security regime are not visible to the public, these measures say something about the amount of personnel, resources and regulations that are seen as necessary to cope with the threat of terrorism. The study of the aviation sector was done in cooperation with the SORISK-project[5] at the University of Stavanger. This project offered nine interviews that I chose to include in the study. These interviews gave valuable background knowledge regarding how security had been dealt with in aviation before and after 9/11. However, I found these interviews difficult to work with, because several times follow-up questions I thought would have been natural to ask were not asked. In the selection processes of written documents, I tried to get access to as many laws, regulations and official documents as possible. This was done both by searching databases and by making direct requests to the aviation authorities in Norway. After studying these empirical data, I concluded that I did not have an impression of what measures actually had been implemented, so I chose to do a focus group interview with security personnel who had been working with security for a long time at an airport that was already cooperating with the research project. Even though this airport was chosen because of easy access to the field, I think it is representative of the airports at the biggest cities in Norway and, thus, can say something about the general discourse institutionalizations in the aviation sector in Norway.

The data collection took place primarily within the time frame of 2006 - 2008. The articles are based on data collection from open data, such as the Internet, library or data bases, except for the research article, where I also read some classified reports written by the Norwegian Defense Research Institute. Since I was not allowed to take copies of the reports back to my office, those reports were not influential on the conclusions of the study, because I had no opportunity to return and check my claims with the classified reports.

[5] http://www.prio.no/Sorisk

A common feature of all the data that have made the empirical foundation for the articles is that there is a significant increase in empirical data regarding terrorism after 9/11. The significant difference in number of documents before and after 9/11 illustrates that terrorism has become a much more significant topic in society. However, attention should be drawn to the development of worldwide webs, political trends, etc. The public has been given easier access to official documents. An overview of the empirical data is presented in Table 2.

	Article 1	Article 2	Article 3 and 4	Article 5	Article 6
Sector	Theory	Research	Media	Authorities	Aviation
Time period		1996-2006	1993-2007	1993-2007	1990-2012
Main research data	Literature survey	146 research documents 4 interviews	753 newspaper articles collected from the two major Norwegian newspapers	698 official documents published by the Norwegian authorities	One focus group interview 9 interviews 177 official documents National and international regulations
Selection criteria	Scholarly literature dealing with risk and terrorism	Publications published by Norwegian researchers, and interviews with three terrorism researchers who had studied terrorism also in the 1990s and one representative from the authorities	Media articles that described terrorism as a threat against Norway or described counterterrorism measures	Documents that dealt with terrorism, described terrorism as a threat against Norway or described counter-terrorism measurers	National or international documents that were dealing with aviation security in Norway, interviews with central actors in the Norwegian aviation system and security personnel that had been working with security since the 1990s

Table 2: Overview of the empirical material

4.3 Data analysis

The Argumentative Discourse Analysis has proposed that the examination of argumentative structures in documents or other written and spoken statements provides insight into the interplay of how a phenomenon like terrorism risk has been conceptualized and changed meaning (Hajer, 1993). Argumentative Discourse Analysis offers useful tools to analyze how certain relations of dominance are structured and reproduced. Even though the perspective proposes concepts for analysis such as storylines and discourse coalitions, actors' representations of terrorism risk, storylines and discourses cannot be directly observed in the documents, but have to be interpreted. Additionally, my theoretical perspectives and the research questions have directed how I have analyzed, coded and interpreted the empirical data.

This form of scientific analysis is what Danermark (2002) calls abductive analysis. Abductive analysis is when the intention of a study is to say something about the overall context and ideational structures in society, such as discourses. Discourses are not directly observable, so in order to study them, it is necessary to have theories or models that offer concepts that can be used to interpret and code the data. Abductive inquiry is different from deduction (to start with a theory, make observations and infer a result) and induction (to start with observations and generalize to a wider population). The abductive inquiry can go in one of two directions. The first deduction is to start with a theory, make observations and draw some inferences about observations consistent with the theory. The second direction is to make an observation and state a theory in order to infer a result. Subsequently, in abduction observations are related to a theory (or the theory is related to the observations) and result in an interpretation. This means that the theoretical perspectives I have presented and the empirical data will be analyzed and coded as a constant back-and-forth between theory and empirical data, wherein the aim is to gain an understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism risk discourses.

Argumentative Discourse Analysis offers concepts that can be used to interpret the discursive struggle in which meaning is given to the phenomenon of terrorism risk. This perspective holds that in the struggle for discursive hegemony, coalitions are formed among actors who might perceive terrorism risk according to different discourses but who share a set of storylines. Discourse coalitions are defined as the ensemble of (1) a set of storylines; (2) the actors who utter these storylines; and (3) the practices on which this discursive activity are based (Hajer 1995).

The discourse coalition approach applied to the topic of terrorism risk		
1. Storylines and the language of terrorism	2. Social coalitions of meaning	3.The practices of discourse
How is the terrorism risk represented? Who are described as terrorists? What are the terrorists' motivations, targets, and weapons? How is the terrorism threat against Norwegian society described? What means are considered to counter terrorism?	Identification of: Key actors What are the storylines that these actors agree on?	Identify discursive institutionalizations such as counterterrorism means or institutions in society responsible for handling terrorism.

Table 3: The main steps in the analysis of the empirical data:

In the analysis of the empirical data, the texts were systematically scrutinized by close reading (Kain, 1998). Close reading means to annotate the text, look for patterns in the texts and ask questions about the patterns. Close readings of texts involve observing patterns in a text both on the detail level and on the overall level. The empirical data were interpreted in line with an abductive line of inquiry that involves a constant back-and-forth between theory and empirical data.

Firstly, I looked for how the risk of terrorism was described in the documents. Risk descriptions could either be risk assessments of the threat or qualitative descriptions about terrorism risk that could be a threat towards Norway. Such qualitative descriptions could include who were described as terrorists, what were the terrorist's motivations for selecting Norwegian targets, what would be their potential weapons, what targets were deemed vulnerable to terrorism and should be protected. An important aspect in Argumentative Discourse Analysis is that a statement cannot be understood without knowing the historical-political context in which a statement was uttered. In the analysis of the empirical data, I have tried to understand the social backgrounds and the social effects of specific modes of talking about terrorism. I tried to make sense of the regularities and variations in what was being said about terrorism as a risk to Norwegian society. Since discourses govern what can be said about a subject, I have also looked for arguments that are not a part of the discourse. I identified not only changes in concepts, new concepts, and concepts that disappeared, but also arguments and assumptions about terrorism risk that changed, because they contributed to saying something about changes in the representation of terrorism risk. The aim was to get an understanding of how terrorism was understood in the historical-political context and what kind of threat the risk of terrorism represented.

Secondly, I tried to identify storylines and discourse coalitions. Based on Argumentative Discourse Analysis, my assumption was that in the discursive struggle of the meaning of the phenomenon of terrorism risk, coalitions would be formed among actors who would use different discourses to conceptualize what the terrorism risk really is. What would unify these coalitions would be the shared set of storylines that would allow the actors to communicate despite their different perspectives. Storylines were identified by looking for phrases and statements used within the communication of terrorism risk and counterterrorism that were shared by actors, that were stable over a certain time period and that were found in a substantial number of different texts.

In articles 4 and 6 (cf. figure 2 p. 63), I tried to detect both an overview of the counterterrorism measures and the arguments behind the

implementation of counterterrorism measures. I did this because according to Argumentative Discourse Analysis, powerful discourses will solidify into institutional arrangements if many people use it to conceptualize the world. This would imply that a specific view on terrorism risk and how to counter it has been translated into concrete policies. A discourse can be considered authoritative if a certain view on terrorism risk has led to implementation of security measures or the establishment of new institutions that deal with terrorism. I looked for arguments behind the implementations of security measures. Such arguments could be either concrete risk evaluations or more implicit phrases and assumptions about the nature of terrorism or counterterrorism measures that were considered relevant. Such statements offered insights not only into the arguments behind the counterterrorism measures but also into how terrorism as a threat to society had been described during the studied time period. In the categorization of counterterrorism measures, I chose to have an open approach to what a counterterrorism measure could be. The aim was to let the empirical material define the counterterrorism measures. I thus chose not to use predefined categorizations of counterterrorism since the intention was to investigate what measures were described as countermeasures in the Norwegian discourses.

After doing the studies in the different sectors, I aimed to do a cross-case analysis to say something about the changes in terrorism risk discourses in Norwegian society. In the analysis of the cross-case study, I tried to look for the overall patterns and trends in the way terrorism risk had been represented, the common storylines and the common arguments that had justified the counterterrorism measures in the different sectors.

4.4 Research quality

Numerous concepts and definitions of criteria exist for evaluating the quality of research, and they vary according to scientific traditions and paradigms. Historically, most criteria within qualitative research, such as reliability, validity and objectivity were borrowed from quantitative research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Silverman,

2011). In 1985 Lincon and Guba addressed several questions regarding the trustworthiness of qualitative research, and they suggested alternative concepts for evaluating qualitative research and a set of procedures to help ensure standards for good research. Such canonical standards, as the very notion of putting forward research criteria, were challenged within the postmodern turn in the social sciences.

Both the conventional terms of validity and reliability and Lincoln and Guba's terms of creditability, dependability, conformability and transformability focus on the research design, and the assumption is that the research results will be strong and credible by focusing on specific design criteria. Such criteria in qualitative research involve determining the degree to which researchers' claims about knowledge corresponded to the reality (or to the research participants' construction of reality) being studied. This approach assumes, to a large extent, that qualitative research can be more credible as long as certain techniques, methods, and/or strategies are employed during the conduct of the inquiry. In other words, techniques are seen as a medium to insure an accurate reflection of reality (Cho & Trent, 2006). The discussions about research criteria are part of a larger epistemological discussion of the character and status of scientific knowledge. In positivistic epistemologies, it is assumed that knowledge can reflect reality without bias, and the criteria are developed to ensure such a reflection. This assumption is rejected in social constructivist research and in discourse analysis, but there is no agreement on what criteria to apply instead (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

The object of this study is to investigate the Norwegian terrorism risk discourses. In other words, it is the representation of terrorism risk that this study tries to say something about. In my opinion, discourses should be seen not merely as a social construct but also as "real" phenomena in the sense that they reflect people's understandings of terrorism risk and how to counter it at a given point in time. Discourses on terrorism risk are real in the sense that they provide a frame in which the phenomena of terrorism can be understood, and they have a reality-making effect, for example, through the implementation of counterterrorism measures. Consequently, I will claim that the concept of validity can be used as long as validity is used to determine the

degree to which my claims about the discourses on terrorism risk correspond to how terrorism risk is represented in the data material. Because of the abductive line of inquiry in this study, I will claim that it does not make any sense to assess the validity out of the criteria of true or false. Validity should be assessed in relation to whether the conclusions of this study seem reasonable or plausible (Danermark, 2002).

Objectivity and trying to reach reality are, in my opinion, good standards for research. Even though the constructivist point of view has made great contributions to the limitations of objectivity and the truth, these goals are important standards by which researchers should try to live. Without these standards for research, the knowledge-claim of a scientist will not be more valid than any other knowledge-claim. Not all research results are equally good, and to have some criteria for evaluating research will enhance the creditability of the research. Subsequently, I will discuss my findings in relation to Lincoln and Guba`s research criteria in the way I consider relevant for this study.

Credibility refers to whether or not there is confidence in the findings of the study, meaning that the study is carried out in a way that enhances the probability for the findings to be found credible and that credibility is demonstrated by having the findings approved by the people studied (Lincoln & Guba, 1985a). I started this study in 2006 and have invested several years of my life to the study of terrorism risk discourses. An important factor in the Argumentative Discourse Analysis is the acknowledgement that the discursive struggle must be seen in its historical-political context. Consequently, I have tried to get knowledge about the historical-political premises for the empirical data. The study is based on a great number of different documents covering multiple sectors in society. By studying multiple fields in society, I have tried to ensure that how terrorism risk is understood reflects several different sectors in society. Even though all the sectors are approached from an Argumentative Discourse Analytical Perspective to some degree, the analytical designs of the study are not equal. I have discussed the research process with other researchers and my advisor, and I have presented the findings to reviewers in international conferences. In the aviation sector study, where I conducted a focus

group interview, the résumé of the meeting and the article were sent to the people involved to see if they had comments on the summary and conclusions of the meeting.

Transferability refers to whether or not the findings are applicable in other contexts or in the same context at another time (Lincoln & Guba, 1985a). Lincoln and Guba claim that researchers should provide detailed and rich descriptions of the setting studied to ensure transferability, so others can make their own judgments about whether the findings can be transferred. I collected data from various sources to be able to provide a rich description. When presenting the data in the articles, I tried to incorporate the historical-political context in which the texts were written. I have based this thesis on a great amount of data, and when defining storylines, and changes in the conceptualization of terrorism risk and counterterrorism, I have looked for argumentative structures that occurred over time and could be found in several different documents. The documents were collected from different sectors in society, because I aimed to investigate the understanding of terrorism risk in society at the defined time period.

Dependability refers to consistency of the research process, its stability over time and across researchers and methods (Lincoln & Guba, 1985a). Even though the data analysis was mainly done by analyzing texts, I also conducted interviews in some of the studies. By using different data collecting methods, I was able to check whether the data collected through one method corresponded to data collected by another method. Since I studied different sectors, I could repeat the data collection and analysis in different settings, although the data analysis process was not identical, since different research questions were asked in the different articles. My intention was to give an account of the research approach, the analytical perspective that guided the study, the methodological approach, the data collection, and how the data led to the conclusions. I have tried to account for the premises of my research, the theoretical perspectives that have guided the analysis, and how the data analysis of the texts has been done. I have especially attempted to gain consistency between my research questions and my theoretical and methodological perspectives. By accounting for these factors, the study can be further tested or continued. The aim is that other researchers can

draw the same conclusions based on the same empirical data on which this study is based, if the same theoretical perspectives are used.

Confirmability refers to whether or not the findings are determined by the people studied and not affected by researcher bias (Lincoln & Guba, 1985a). The aim of this study has been to gain an understanding of how terrorism risk has been communicated in Norwegian society. The empirical data has mostly consisted of texts written during different time periods. In my opinion, the texts gave me essential insights about how terrorism risk was conceived of in those different time periods, because the text was not changed or reinterpreted within new discursive contexts like information from an interview could have been. Since most of the empirical data are based on written texts, these are the premises for the conclusions. However, by studying different sectors I have seen that the way terrorism risk has been conceptualized is broader and not being limited to just one sector in society.

Even though I have argued for validity in my study, I realize that the social constructivist point of view and the abductive line of inquiry will have implications for the study's validity. The results of this study, as with deduction, do not necessarily follow from the premises but, rather, constitute a plausible interpretation of a phenomenon (Danermark, 2002). Abductive inference is, thus, a matter of interpreting a phenomenon in terms of some theoretical frame of reference, one in which the outcome does not constitute the only 'true' interpretation of terrorism risk discourses, but, rather, constitutes a possible and meaningful interpretation of the phenomenon of terrorism risk.

5 Results

I see this thesis as a cross-case analysis of the different sectors where the aim is to investigate the general trends in the Norwegian terrorism risk discourses. Thus, the focus in this chapter will not be on the individual articles but on the overall study. As such, this chapter attempts to synthesize the findings of the articles. I will give a short presentation of the articles on which this thesis is based, but the main focus will be on the overall framing of terrorism as a risk to Norwegian society. This means that I will not go into details about the differences in how terrorism has been represented in the different sectors. For further presentation of the empirical data and the results of each individual article, please consult Part II of this thesis.

Even though the main goal of this study has been to investigate how the terrorism risk discourses have changed during the studied time period, the articles cover different aspects of the research aim and answer different research questions. Table 4 provides an overview of the research questions in this thesis and which articles that answer each question.

Research question	Article no.
How has the terrorism risk phenomenon been understood and conceptualized?	1,2,3,4,5,6
Have the changes in the terrorism risk discourses contributed to legitimizing implementations of counterterrorism measures?	1,2,3,4,5,6
What have been the arguments behind the implementations of counterterrorism measures?	4,5,6
What role has risk-based thinking played in the public discourse on terrorism risk?	1,2,4,6

Table 4: Relation between articles and research questions

5.1 Results from the articles

The first article was based on a literature survey to describe different approaches to risk-based thinking that could be used for assessing terrorism risk. Different approaches to risk had different implications for communication and actions in society. However, these approaches revealed clear limitations for the topic of terrorism risk. The article subsequently concluded that the roles of risk management needed to be explored in a perspective that recognized the role of power, institutional interests and the actors' agendas behind the use of risk analysis as decision support. Discourse analysis was proposed as a perspective that could meet these requirements.

Articles two to five were based on empirical data selected from Norwegian terrorism research, the Norwegian authorities' official communications and the Norwegian media's communications. These articles focused on how the phenomenon of terrorism had been represented and how terrorism countermeasures had been justified. These studies revealed that the overall way the terrorism risk has been communicated had changed drastically during the studied time period. Norwegian society was described in the 1990s as geographically remote, homogeneous, inclusive and transparent, all factors that appeared to make Norway less of a probable target for terrorism. During the studied time period, the country has increasingly been described as more vulnerable and an attractive target for terrorists. Terrorism after 9/11 has been framed as a catastrophic risk that threatens democracy, national security and critical infrastructures; consequently, society needed to be protected. The way counterterrorism measures have been presented in the public arena in Norway has also changed during the studied time period. Counterterrorism measures have gone from being presented as threats against civil liberties in the 1990s to something that was required after 9/11.

The last article presented results from a study of the changes in the aviation security regime in Norway during the last two decades. It discussed the role of the security regime seen in the light of public terrorism risk discourses. Aviation security was a national issue before 9/11, and not a topic generally debated by the public. The aviation security regime at the time was characterized by full security checks on

international flights and limited security on domestic flights. This reflected the fact that terrorism was more of an international, not a domestic, problem. The predominant view was that the threat of terrorism was so slight that counterterrorism measures were not justifiable. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 seem to have changed the public perception of what terrorists were capable of doing and the role of civil aviation as a target. Terrorism was described as a global threat, and thus national risk factors specific to Norway lost relevance. Aviation security in Norway after 9/11 became a supranational issue, not a national one. Compliance with international regulations has been the main storyline for implementing security measures, and this storyline made sense because the threat has been described as international; thus, it has been deemed reasonable that Norwegian airports should have the same level of security as other European airports. The results of the study have supported the trend towards seeing the terrorist threat as omnipresent and devastating.

5.2 The overall study of terrorism risk discourses

Together, the articles have formed the foundation for this entire study. The aim of this thesis has been to gain knowledge about the general changes in the terrorism risk discourses in Norwegian society. Thus, the further presentation of the results of this study will present the results of the entire study of the Norwegian terrorism risk discourses. The presentation of the results will be structured in line with the research questions outlined in Chapter 1.

5.3 How has the terrorism risk phenomenon been understood and conceptualized in the Norwegian context?

The overall framing of terrorism as a risk against Norwegian society has changed drastically during the studied time period. Even though there have been major changes in the way terrorism has been represented during the studied time period, the Norwegian understanding of terrorism has not been uniform but comprised two

different discourse coalitions that interpreted counterterrorism policies according to different sets of storylines. I will first give a presentation of the general changes in terrorism risk discourses during the studied time period. Thereafter, I will give a presentation of the discourse coalitions' descriptions of the terrorism risk against Norwegian society.

5.3.1 The overall trends in the framing of terrorism risk

At the beginning of the 1990s, the terrorism risk against Norway was not really a topic in the media nor were the authorities or scholars concerned with it. Terrorism was primarily presented as a political problem in countries other than Norway. If terrorism was discussed as a threat in Norway, it was often related to big arrangements where foreigners who could be a target for political assassination were present. Acts of terrorism were understood as a means of communicating political messages, and the main storyline at the time was that *"Terrorism is political violence*". That storyline was upheld by authorities, researchers and the media. The political agendas of terrorists dictated which people or objects were deemed potential terrorist targets. The terrorism concept in the media, research and the official documents in the 1990s covered many different groups of perpetrators. The terrorists' weapons were mostly related to criminal activities, such as assassination, civil obedience or bombs. Counterarguments against why Norway would be considered a legitimate terrorist target existed in the media, in research and official documents in the 1990s.

Some scholars and official bodies started to claim that terrorism could become a threat against Norway by the end of the 1990s. At the time, terrorism became a topic that was more publicly discussed, especially in relation to the mandates of the Norwegian Armed Forces and the Police Surveillance Service. These actors claimed that Norwegian society was vulnerable and that terrorists could exploit those vulnerabilities. Accordingly, terrorism would change character in the future to a more dangerous kind that would target civilians and use weapons of mass destructions if they had the possibility. All these elements were incorporated in the storyline of "*the new threat*

landscape", around which several actors in research and official documents were grouped. The storyline of "*the new threat landscape*" was describing the new security political era after the Cold War and described terrorism as one of the threats that could be a reality in the future. However, there was no clear picture of who these possible terrorists actually could be and what their motivation would be for choosing Norwegian targets. Terrorism was mentioned as one of many potential threats that could appear in the future.

The attacks on 9/11 led to an enormous increase in attention to the topic of terrorism in the media, research and official documents. The type of terrorism that had attacked the United States was described as a threat against all democratic societies, included Norway. The media, research and authorities had a clear picture after 9/11 of potential perpetrators against Norwegian society. The terrorism concept was narrowed down to exclusively include Islamic terrorism, and it was the motivation, target selection, and potential weapons from these perpetrators that were in focus. The threat was described as international, but with the presence of a Muslim population in Norway in which some of them openly supported violence as a means in political communication, the threat could also come from inside Norwegian society. Target selection was no longer related to the terrorists' political agendas. Terrorism was described as a threat that would target civilians, aiming to kill as many people as possible, even with weapons of mass destruction. After year 2001, only arguments for why Norway could become a terrorist target were present in the discourses. No one was denying or arguing against the idea that Norway could become a terrorist target. Subsequently, there was no focus on factors that could contradict that Norway was a potential terrorist target.

Even though terrorism has been described as a more severe threat in all the studied sectors, there are differences in how terrorism has been represented in the different sectors of this study. Even though all sectors had a clear picture of possible perpetrators after 9/11, the sectors differed in how severely the risk of terrorism was described. Researchers and the official authorities described the risk of terrorism in Norway as low in the first years after 9/11, and questioned whether Norwegian targets really were potential targets for Islamic terrorists.

The media, on the other hand, described terrorism as a threat that could become a reality in Norway and focused on the idea that Norwegian society did not have a sufficient level of security.

5.3.2 The discourse coalitions

The development in the overall framing of terrorism as a risk to Norwegian society has been a long, argumentative journey in which several actors have played different parts. Although the risk of terrorism after 9\11 has been described as more severe, the Norwegian understanding of terrorism has not been uniform but has embraced two discourse coalitions that have interpreted terrorism risk utilizing different sets of storylines.

Set of storylines	**The targeted political crime**	**The omnipresent societal threat**
Main storylines	Terrorism is political violence. Terrorism is a result of political injustice. Terrorism can only be defeated by focusing on root causes behind terrorism.	New forms of terrorism are threatening civil society with new weapons. Terrorists will exploit vulnerabilities in society and target important systems society relies upon. Terrorism is a threat to national security and to essential values such as democracy and freedom.
Who are the terrorists?	Rational actors fighting for a just cause.	New types of terrorists with global or international motives.
The assumption of the nature of terrorism	Political message, criminal activity.	A threat against national security, a manageable risk.
What/who is the terrorist's target	People or objects selected in accordance with the terrorist's political motivation.	Critical infrastructures, the civil society, democratic values.
What are the terrorist's weapons?	All kinds of methods that can attract attention to the terrorist's political agenda.	New weapons not yet seen, e.g., weapons of mass destruction; aim is to kill as many people as possible.
Appropriate counter-terrorism measures	Treat terrorism as a type of crime, decrease social injustice, conduct dialogue.	Both national and international measures including war. Since terrorism is not a domestically isolated threat, international measures are necessary.

Table 5: The two sets of storylines regarding terrorism

The "targeted political crime" set of storylines has highlighted terrorism as an extreme form of political communication. Terrorists have been described from this perspective as political activists fighting for what they consider to be justice. Terrorists have been framed as rational actors who have lacked or been unwilling to use democratic means and, consequently, have used political violence to draw attention to a political issue. Terrorism would have disappeared, from this perspective, if there was no longer injustice in the world.

The "omnipresent societal threat" set of storylines has, to a lesser degree, been concerned with the political motivations behind terrorism. Terrorism has been highlighted, from this perspective, as a major threat with catastrophic potential and has been framed as a threat either to

society's core values, such as democracy and freedom, or to the infrastructures society relies on. Consequently, terrorism has been described as a threat to the very functioning and existence of contemporary society. This approach to terrorism has focused on new forms of terrorism that could threaten civil society in the future. Target selection has not been described as related to political agendas and killing as many civilians as possible has been described as the motivation behind acts of terrorism. Since terrorism has been framed as a threat that could kill "everyone everywhere", no one could feel safe from terrorism, and the threat became omnipresent.

In the studied sectors, different actors used different sets of storylines, and the sectors also varied to the extent that the actors employed particular sets of storylines. Media have, to a large extent, tended to present terrorism as an omnipresent, devastating threat during the whole time period and have speculated on whether or not the terrorism threat will increase in the future. The official documents and the research documents have shown a tendency towards using the omnipresent societal threat set of storylines in documents that have dealt with terrorism as a threat to Norwegian society. This approach existed prior to 9/11 in research published by the Norwegian Defense Research Institute and in official documents published by the Military defense and Police authorities. This approach gained a stronger hold after that event, when counterterrorism became a major policy issue in Norway and in other Western countries.

The targeted political crime set of storylines is the traditional way in which research and the authorities have seen terrorism. However, after 9/11, this set of storylines has mainly been used for how to deal with international terrorism outside Norway or terrorism in other countries.

5.4 Have the changes in the terrorism risk discourses contributed to legitimizing implementations of counterterrorism measures?

In order to discuss whether the changes in the terrorism discourses have contributed to legitimize counterterrorism measures, I will discuss the

changes in risk descriptions in relation to whether or not the discourses have been institutionalized. When a discourse solidifies into particular institutional arrangements, then Hajer (1995) speaks of it as discourse institutionalization. Discourse institutionalization can be used for measuring the influence of a discourse. I will first discuss how the overall changes in the description of terrorism risk have justified counterterrorism measures. Thereafter, I will discuss the institutionalization of the two discourse coalitions.

5.4.1 Institutionalization of the overall framing of terrorism risk

As concluded in the above section, the way terrorism risk has been described by central actors in Norwegian society has changed drastically during the studied time period. In the 1990s, there was no clear picture of possible perpetrators and no clear picture of motivations. The risk of terrorism was described as a risk in line with ordinary crimes or political activism. Consequently, there was no need for extraordinary measures to meet the risk. Countermeasures were, at the time, described as unnecessary, not in line with the risk picture in Norway and as threats against civil liberties.

When terrorism risk became a more frequently discussed topic in official documents and in research at the end of the 1990s, terrorism was described as a devastating risk on the scale where national security was threatened. Despite the fact that the risk of terrorism was described as more severe, there was no clear picture of possible perpetrators or associated motivations for attacking Norwegian targets. Terrorism as a threat towards Norwegian society did not get much media attention, nor did this description of the terrorism risk lead to any major changes in Norwegian terrorism policies or the implementation of new terrorism measures. However, at the time there was clearly a knowledge demand about terrorism as a risk, which manifested itself in the research projects at the Norwegian Defense Research Institute, where projects that dealt with vulnerabilities in society and terrorism as a potential threat were initiated by the Norwegian authorities. Additionally, several official reports dealt with this topic.

Terrorism was described as an international threat after 9/11. The media, research and official documents presented a clear picture of potential perpetrators and their motivations. The risk of terrorism was no longer described as crime or as activism but was described as omnipresent and a threat against national security. This description of the risk of terrorism presented a risk that was unacceptable for society, because it was framed as a threat against national security and towards the whole society. Consequently, no one could feel safe from terrorism. This description of the risk of terrorism described terrorism as a risk that society had to avoid with every possible means. Terrorism countermeasures were implemented after 9/11 in several different sectors of society to cover a multiplicity of different means. The assumption was that terrorism was such a major threat that it had to be met with a variety of measures. Since the terrorism risk was described as an international threat, there was no longer any reason for Norway to have another level of terrorism countermeasures than other countries.

5.4.2 Institutionalization of the discourse coalitions

Even though the overall framing of the risk of terrorism has been legitimizing the implementation of terrorism measures, the Norwegian understanding of the terrorism risk has not been uniform but has embraced two different discourse coalitions that have interpreted the risk of terrorism in accordance with different sets of storylines. These two framings of the risk of terrorism have different implications for how the risk of terrorism is understood. The two framings of the risk of terrorism will probably entail a different level of fear in the population and, by this, affect the acceptance of counterterrorism measures differently.

The targeted political crime set of storylines described terrorists as political activists. Inherent in this description of the terrorism risk was the assumption that terrorists were rational actors; consequently, it was possible to understand the motivations behind the acts. In this respect a terrorist could have been seen as a victim of injustice imposed by a state or other political actors. Even though the risk was unacceptable, it was not made an extraordinary type of risk, and by focusing on the

political agenda of terrorism, the act gave meaning in a political context.

The omnipresent societal threat set of storylines focused on terrorism as a major threat against society that would exploit the vulnerabilities of contemporary society and attack civilians with weapons of mass destructions if possible. Society was the innocent victim from this perspective. This set of storylines presented a risk that was unacceptable for society, because it described a risk with major consequences for the civil society. The weapons that were described were devastating with major catastrophic consequences, and since the aim of terrorism was presented as killing as many civilians as possible, no one could feel safe from terrorism. This description of the risk of terrorism describes terrorism as a major existential risk consisting of perpetrators that operate on the other side of the moral index than the rest of society. This understanding of the risk has to be eradicated with every possible means.

Although two discourse coalitions have existed, only one has solidified into discourse institutionalization in the Norwegian context after 9/11. The target political crime set of storylines has been present during the whole time period in research and official documents. Terrorism is a form of political activism from this perspective, and counterterrorism measures like dialogue and social justice are measures that are in accordance with this perspective. Even though this perspective has been dominating the explicit Norwegian foreign policy, this perspective has not manifested itself within the domestic context. However, there is also one other plausible interpretation of this set of storylines. Since this perspective does not describe terrorism risk as something extraordinary, the institutionalization of this perspective can actually be to not have measures that are directed at countering terrorism but instead to treat terrorism as an ordinary type of crime and rely on the legislation and societal institutions that deal with crime and emergency management.

The omnipresent societal threat set of storylines, conversely, have been institutionalized in the legal measures that have treated terrorism as an extraordinary type of crime, in the mandates of the official bodies that

have seen terrorism as a threat against national security, and in the case of aviation security where even rural and small airports in Norway have been put under the same security regime as giant airports in other countries. Since terrorism has been presented as a national security threat, war has been an adequate measure, and since terrorists aim to attack critical infrastructures where they are vulnerable, preventive measures and damage mitigation measures are legitimized in several sectors in society. Consequently, the measures implemented in Norway after 9/11 seem to be institutionalizations of the omnipresent societal threat set of storylines.

5.5 What have been the arguments behind the implementations of counterterrorism measures in Norway?

A multiplicity of counterterrorism measures was implemented in Norwegian society after 9/11. These measures covered several areas, such as events and celebrity protection, infrastructure and key object protection, legal and regulatory changes, authority strengthening measures, damage mitigation measures, and international measures. The explicit arguments that were dominating the justification of counterterrorism measures were compliance, solidarity, moral obligation and precaution. These arguments said nothing at all about the risk picture in Norway. This type of argumentation just stated that Norway should follow what other countries did, or that if terrorism could happen in the future, then society needed to make the necessary efforts to avoid the threat.

There have also been implicit arguments that have justified the counterterrorism measures. The phrase "the terrorism threat" has been used as an argument for counterterrorism measures in Norway. This phrase appeared after 9/11 and just stated that there was a terrorist threat against Norway, as if this was a brutal fact. The storylines regarding terrorism have also functioned as legitimizing arguments behind the implementation of counterterrorism measures. The storylines of the "new threat landscape" and the "new terrorism"

described the security political situation in Norway as "new" and, consequently, have laid the grounds for new terrorism policies.

5.6 What role does risk-based thinking play in the public terrorism risk discourses?

Even though the Norwegian authorities have claimed that risk and vulnerability analysis should be the underpinning decision criteria for protection of critical infrastructures in Norway, this cannot be traced in the official discourses. Risk-based thinking has not been part of the terrorism risk discourses in the studied sectors at all. No alternative solutions have been accounted for, no evaluation of measures have been presented, and no open and transparent risks assessments or management processes can be traced in the public discourses.

The only actors in the official discourse in Norway who have presented terrorism risk assessments have been the Police Security Service (before 2002 called Police Surveillance Service). These assessments have been vague, and the premises for the conclusions have not been accounted for in the public arena. It has frequently been claimed by actors in media that security measures have been implemented in line with the threat assessments done by that Police Security Service in situations where the media have questioned whether or not Norway had the necessary preparedness. However, these evaluations of the risk have never been accounted for to the public. This implies that there seems to have been a general assumption in society that the Police Security Service has had the exclusive right to make threat assessments and that these risk assessments should not be transparent.

Even though the phrase "the terrorist threat" has been used since 9/11 as an argument for implementing counterterrorism measures, no quantitative or qualitative assessments of the threat have ever accompanied this phrase. This implies that the societal discourses have not framed terrorism as a threat that can be described in terms of probability or consequence assessments. The underlying assumption has been that if the threat existed, than it was intolerable for society no matter how low the probability was of a terrorist attack.

6 Discussion

The purpose of this thesis has been to study the changes in the understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism risk and to investigate the arguments behind the implementation of counterterrorism measures and the role of risk-based thinking in the public discourse on terrorism risk. As described in Chapter 5, the six articles on which this thesis is based reveal a consistency in the way terrorism risk has been framed in society, even though two different discourse coalitions are present in the Norwegian context. In this chapter, I will discuss the levels of the discursive power seen in the Norwegian context, and if the omnipresent societal threat set of storylines is a reflection of changes in the terrorism threat. Thereafter, I will discuss Norwegian terrorism risk discourses in a broader context, as well as the role of risk based-thinking and the future trajectory of the Norwegian terrorism risk discourses. Finally, I will reflect on my methodological perspective and on some of the assumptions of this thesis.

6.1 The power to define terrorism risk

Citizens' acceptance of counterterrorism measures is not a straightforward process in which the public passively accept the media's or the government's presentation of the threat. The public's attitude towards counterterrorism measurers is a complex combination of fear, trust, political factors and attitude towards civil liberties (Rykkja et al., 2011). The sectors I have studied in this thesis will just represent some of several different discourses that influence how individuals perceive risks (Kasperson et al., 2003; Lemyre, Turner, Lee, & Krewski, 2006; Renn, 2008b). However, I think the sectors I have selected for analysis are quite influential in how the public conceives of the terrorism risk and, consequently, these sectors can say something about what kind of discourses the citizens of Norway have been part of during the studied time period.

I have claimed in this thesis that there is a need for a perspective that acknowledges that the meaning of terrorism risk is not set and that the terrorism concept is a powerful labeling tool and frame that shape how

people see the risk and subsequent ways to counter the threat. There has definitely been a change in the presentation of the severity of the threat that has shaped perception of the risk of terrorism. The omnipresent societal threat set of storylines has described terrorism as a catastrophic omnipresent threat. However, there has also been another set of storylines present in the public arena that has another view of what the substance of the terrorism threat has been and in what ways it should be met. Official bodies have given different meanings to the concept of terrorism that have been in accordance with their mandates, and different official bodies have employed different sets of storylines. In this respect, the actors have used their power to frame the risk of terrorism and to impose their definition of the phenomenon on others.

However, according to Argumentative Discourse Analysis the power aspect is not only related to the actors' strategic behavior, but it is also present at the discursive level. The power of the discourses are that discourses provide people with a frame within which the phenomenon of terrorism risk can be interpreted; thus, discourses steer what definition of the risk of terrorism is seen as meaningful. In this respect, discourses predetermine how people perceive the risk.

Although the omnipresent societal threat set of storylines probably provoke fear, the existence of the alternative set of storylines will be a powerful counterbalance in the Norwegian discourses on terrorism risk. The targeted political crime set of storylines has been the traditional Norwegian way of seeing the phenomenon of terrorism risk, and this perspective has been in accordance with Norway's ambitions about being a neutral, peace-promoting country. Historically, Norway has strived to be a neutral, peace-promoting country, although this did not become a reality during the Cold War, since Norway perceived Communism and Soviet expansion as a major threat and, thus, could not risk staying neutral. The USA and NATO were the cornerstone of Norwegian security policies for more than 40 years, so it was important for Norwegian authorities to declare solidarity with the USA after the terrorist attacks by participating in the USA-led international campaign against terrorism. This was done by implementing security measures dictated on the international level. Even though many of the terrorist countermeasures were implemented because of compliance with

international regulations, they had to be legitimized to the public. In this way, it is possible that the attention on terrorism countermeasures has contributed to giving the Norwegian population a feeling of being under a terrorist threat. Instead of critically questioning the arguments of compliance, the media have been focusing on the fact that Norway did not have a sufficient level of security and that Norway could become a target for terrorism. Additionally, the framing of several counterterrorism measures as international decisions with which Norway had to comply, rather than as national ones, might have made counterterrorism measures something Norwegian citizens and politicians felt that they could not influence, whether they found the measures useful or not.

The counterterrorism measures implemented after 9/11 were to a large extent dictated on a supranational level where the USA was the major initiator. In this respect, the measures might reflect the official American discourse on terrorism rather than the Norwegian one. The American official discourse has been characterized by describing terrorism as a type of warfare, the nature of terrorists as evil, and the motivations behind acts of terrorism as hate against freedom and democracy (Jackson, 2004, 2005a). This means that, even though the targeted political crime set of storylines has been the traditional Norwegian approach to terrorism and still is present, this discourse on terrorism has not been institutionalized, because most of the counterterrorism measures have not been initiated on a national level.

An important claim in Argumentative Discourse Analysis is that discourse institutionalizations, such as counterterrorism measures, will facilitate the reproduction of a given discourse; actors who have been socialized to see terrorism in a specific frame will reinterpret the phenomenon of terrorism within this frame. This means that the counterterrorism measures implemented in the aftermath of 9/11 have probably functioned to sustain the perception of terrorism risk as an omnipresent, devastating threat. That terrorism is a globalized, catastrophic threat has been repeated so many times in official documents, research and the media, it has, therefore, been acted upon as if it was a brutal fact. Through the counterterrorism practices in society, for example in the current security regime in aviation, this

"truth" of the great threat posed by terrorism against contemporary society has become a concrete, living reality. When people meet the security regime in aviation every time they enter the aviation system, they have been inclined to assume that such an extensive security system would not be necessary if terrorism had not been an existential threat. In this respect, the counterterrorism measures have functioned to sustain the image of terrorism as a threat towards society.

This implies that the power to define the terrorism risk can be seen in several dimensions. The power to define the terrorism risk lies at the actor level, the Norwegian discursive level, the international discursive level, and at the level of implemented counterterrorism measures.

6.2 Is the omnipresent societal threat set of storylines a reflection of changes in the terrorism threat?

The omnipresent societal threat set of storylines relates terrorism risk to critical infrastructures and vulnerabilities in society, and claims that terrorists in the future will use new, more lethal weapons. Moreover, the omnipresent societal threat set of storylines focuses on Norway being part of an international threat landscape because of globalization.

After 9/11 domestic terrorism was not labeled as terrorism in the Norwegian discourses. While extremists from the political right were considered terrorists in the 1990s, these groups were no longer labeled terrorists but extremists during the first decade of this century and were no longer considered a security threat. The image of the threat from Islamic terrorism has been even more clearly marked in recent years. The Police Security Service stated in its annual threat assessment for 2011 that it was Islamic extremists who were the main threat to Norwegian security and that activists from the political right would not pose a serious threat (Police Security Service, 2011). Bearing in mind the right-wing political orientation of the perpetrator of the 22 July 2011 attacks in Norway and his obsession with what he considers to be negative characteristics of Norwegian society, it seems appropriate to question whether the authorities, with their concentration on global terrorism, might have overlooked the possibility of a threat from a local

terrorist with a political agenda rooted in Norwegian society. The Norwegian terrorist did not attack vulnerable systems in society, and he used conventional terrorist methods. This is also true of other countries, where terrorists have not used new weapons to deliberately target critical infrastructures. International terrorism statistics show that terrorists are very traditional in their choice of methods and that target selection does not appear to be related to vulnerabilities in society (Coolsaet, 2008). Moreover, most terrorist attacks from Islamist groups happen outside Western society, so to claim that Islamic terrorism primarily is a threat against the Western way of living and democracy can be questioned (ibid).

The two identified sets of storylines are in many ways similar to the distinction between new vs. old terrorism found in the research (Chrenshaw, 2008; Duyvesteyn, 2004; Tucker, 2001). This conceptualization has been criticized by scholars who argue that religiously motivated terrorism has always existed; that increased frequency of mass casualty attacks is due to other factors; that traditional terrorists were also indiscriminate in their targeting; and that there is nothing new about terrorist attempts to use WMDs or horizontal terrorist networks (Kurtulus, 2011). Although the distinction between new and old terrorism has been questioned, the "new terrorism" storyline is a powerful storyline, because it claims that the character of terrorism has changed and, consequently, calls for new measures.

6.3 Norwegian terrorism risk discourses in context

This study has investigated the terrorism risk discourses in Norway in the time period before and after 9/11. In the Norwegian case international or American perspectives on the terrorism risk and how to counter it, have had an enormous impact the implementation of counterterrorism measures. There are differences in terrorism risk discourses that are utilized in the USA and Europe (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Hamilton, 2005; Jackson, 2007). European states have focused more on the root-causes of terrorism than the USA. European states had been dealing with the threat of terrorism for decades without finding it

necessary to go to such drastic steps as they did after 9/11. This implies that American discourses also have had a powerful influence on counterterrorism policies in other European countries. Since 9/11 changed the attitude to implement counterterrorism measures in most European countries, the result of this study might be generalized to other Western countries.

Although the Norwegian authorities historically have highlighted the necessity of following international laws and regulations, the will and speed to do so was dramatically increased after 9/11 (Nordenhaug & Engene, 2008). The Norwegian authorities' discourse on terrorism is in many ways similar to the EU's discourse on terrorism. However, both the US and the EU's official discussions on terrorism encompass a ubiquitous moral discourse, in which terrorists are frequently described as 'evil', 'inhuman', 'barbaric', 'savages', 'faceless killers', a 'cancer' on the human condition and a modern 'scourge' (Jackson, 2007). Such metaphors and characteristics of terrorism are rarely found in the Norwegian discourses. Additionally, even though Norway participates in the military campaign against terrorism the term "war on terrorism" is not often used in the Norwegian discourses. This is probably caused by that the targeted political crime set of storyline has been the traditional way for Norway to conceive of terrorism.

6.4 Reflections on risk-based thinking and terrorism

Based on the notions of several scholars (Beck, 2009; Heng, 2002, 2006; Heng & McDonagh, 2009; Lund Petersen, 2011; Power, 2004; Stern & Wiener, 2006), I have argued that counterterrorism measures can be seen as risk management strategies. Despite the fact that the counterterrorism measures can be seen as an expression of the risk management culture that dominates contemporary society and that it is plausible to assume that the measures have been implemented in order to reduce the risk of terrorism, risk assessments has not been part of the public discourse on terrorism and security. The decision criteria for implementing counterterrorism measures have been based on compliance, solidarity, moral obligations or precaution. Terrorism risk has not been publicly represented by logical, rational analysis. The

communication of terrorism risk has been pictured terrorism as what Slovic (2004) calls risk as feelings. Since terrorism risk provokes fear, terrorism must be avoided with any possible means.

The arguments of compliance, solidarity and moral responsibility do not provide any criteria for when to implement measurers. The argument of precaution, on the other hand, is a risk criterion used in risk-based thinking. The Precautionary Principle holds that uncertainty is no excuse for inaction against serious or irreversible risks, that absence of evidence of risk is not evidence of absence of risk, and that rather than waiting for evidence of harm to be demonstrated before acting, the burden of proof should be shifted to require sponsors of a risky product or activity to demonstrate that it is safe or else be subject to regulatory restriction or ban (Stern & Wiener, 2006). Several scholars are skeptical to the use of precautionary principle in terrorism prevention. They claim that any action taken to reduce the risk of terrorism always poses the introduction of countervailing risks. Moreover, a precautionary approach to terrorism is likely to entail taking action based only on worst-case thinking which can introduce unforeseen dangers and costs (Sunstein, 2003b; Stern & Wiener, 2006). In real life, it is not possible to secure everything that could become a target of terrorism, or have damage mitigation for every possible scenario. Consequently, the precaution principle is an open-ended approach because there are no criteria for implementation, removal or evaluation of measures. The consequence of viewing the terrorism risk this way is that decisions regarding terrorism countermeasures are left to those with power to make the decisions about which security measures should be implemented, whether or not these are other states or actors in Norwegian society. The knowledge gained from risk research should, rather, be used to evaluate the counterterrorism measures and see if those measures are risk-reducing, flexible, cost-effective and in line with the threat situation.

The normative models for decision making described in the Bayesian Predictive Approach and the Risk Governance framework, built on the assumption of liberal democracy in which the public should engage in decisions concerning risks. Consequently, if these frameworks had reflected how decisions regarding terrorism risk actually were carried

through, it would be reasonable to expect that some of these processes could have been found in the public discourses. There is no trace of risk assessments, decision alternatives, evaluations or public participation in the public discourses. This could imply that these normative frameworks do not explain how real decision making in the context of terrorism take place. Given the results of this study such normative frameworks can be questioned. These normative frameworks should be further explored in real decision-making contexts to see if this really is the way decisions regarding risks actually are taken. Furthermore, it is reasonable to question if risk scholars who aim to develop more sufficient risk analysis methods and frameworks for managing terrorism risks should rather consider if these tools are compatible with how terrorism risk is perceived in society.

6.5 The trajectory of the Norwegian terrorism risk discourses

The Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg's message immediately after the 22/7 attacks and through the first month was that Norway would meet terrorism with more openness and democracy but not with naïveté. This statement can be viewed as an argument against implementing more counterterrorism measures, because these measures can infringe civil liberties. However, by adding that "we must not be naive", further implementations of counterterrorism measures are opened up. Such rhetoric lays the foundation for the implementations of terrorism measures, because it is added that we should not be naïve despite the fact that the Norwegian approach is openness and democracy.

The extent to which the 22/7 events will lead to further implementations of counterterrorism measures still remains to be seen. Since compliance with international terrorism policies has been one of the major arguments behind the justification of measures, it is doubtful that the terrorist attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011 (22/7) will lead to a new direction in counterterrorism policies in Norway. This does not mean that further implementation of counterterrorism will not take place in Norway. Since precaution and compliance have been two

major arguments behind implementation of counterterrorism measures in Norway it is likely that Norway would implement counterterrorism measures initiated on the international level. The EU already has several ongoing projects that aim to develop new security technologies (Amoore & Goede, 2005). This study has revealed that Norway has a history of implementing terrorism countermeasures that are in line with international regulations. This means that it is plausible to assume that more terrorism countermeasures will be implemented in the future. Bearing in mind Powers' (2004) notion that risk management will spread into new areas and sectors, this may very well be the case for terrorism countermeasures in Norway.

6.6 Reflections on the Argumentative Discourse Analysis

Argumentative Discourse Analysis has offered the concept of storylines to describe and study the interdiscursive communication in which the meaning of the phenomenon of terrorism and its inherent risk occurs. This perspective has been useful, since it sees phenomena like terrorism as interdiscursive, and by this the meaning of the phenomena of terrorism is not set but is in a constant discursive battle. However, even though Hajer states that storylines are the means by which the researcher can understand the argumentative game and study the processes of discourse change, in practical research the concept of storylines has been difficult to grasp. Hajer himself uses the concept both to describe the plot in the different narratives and to describe metaphors used as shortcuts in political discussions. There is also a distinction between his older works, upon which this thesis is based, and his newer work. In this thesis, I have used the term "storylines" to describe the plot upon which the actors agree. These plots are sometimes metaphors, sometimes not.

There is also a degree of interpretation and subjectivity in the process of identifying storylines that could have been avoided to some extent if the concept of storylines had been better defined. The documents this study are based on cover a myriad of different topics related to terrorism and security, and the storylines I have chosen to focus on are

selected from many other storylines present in the empirical data. This means that the storylines I have seen as essential are related to my research questions and theoretical perspectives. However, I do think the storylines I have selected are essential in the public discourse on terrorism risk in Norway, because they are covering essential topics discussed in relation to terrorism risk by several different actors at a specific point in time.

6.7 Reflections on the assumptions of this study

The research questions of this thesis have been based on theoretical perspectives on terrorism and risk. In the process of studying the empirical data, I have found that some of the research questions were easier to answer than others.

The process of studying the arguments was not as easy as I had anticipated beforehand. The counterterrorism measures were not accounted for in a logic rational way, and in the media article where I intended to outline the counterterrorism measures, the newspaper articles were vague on which measures actually had been implemented. I was aware that several types of measures, like physical securing of infrastructure, probably would not be public topics, but I would have anticipated other measures, such as implementation of terrorism legislation, would have been accounted for in the public arena. Although terrorism risk and counterterrorism measures have been major topics in media, research and official communications after 9/11, little concrete information has been given to the public about what measures actually have been implemented and what the arguments are behind these measures. This is probably related to the fact that there seems to be an assumption that terrorism measures should be left to the official institutions that are responsible for security. However, there is a need for a certain amount of transparency in the process, because these official bodies are also the same authorities that are responsible for making the threat assessments that are not open for public review. This actually means that those responsible for securing society and who have the exclusive right to make threat assessments have self-interests in upholding the threat in order to get financial resources.

The research questions of this thesis have been based on the assumption that how terrorism is understood in society will influence what measures are seen as relevant for countering the threat. This study reveals that the relation between the conceptualization of terrorism as a threat and counterterrorism means are far more complicated than that. Firstly, the Norwegian understanding of terrorism is not uniform but embraces two main discourse coalitions that have different approaches to what kind of threat terrorism represents to society and how the threat of terrorism should be met. Moreover, these two discourse coalitions are not stable, and the storylines that the coalitions have used have changed over time. Additionally, there might also be other sets of storylines in play, for example within the classified world, that this study has not been able to reveal. Secondly, even though Norway historically looked upon terrorism as political violence, the will to implement counterterrorism measures changed immediately after 9/11. Despite that the will to implement counterterrorism measures changed, it is probably unlikely that a terrorist attack in the United States totally changed the Norwegian view on terrorism countermeasures almost overnight. It is more likely that other powers were in place, such as the will to show solidarity with Norway`s security guarantor that is also the world's only superpower.

7 Conclusions

7.1 Overall conclusions of the studies performed

The way the terrorism risk has been described by central actors in Norway during the studied time period has changed drastically. In the 1990s, there was no clear picture of possible perpetrators, no clear picture of motivation, and the weapons and descriptions of terrorism were in line with ordinary crimes. At that time, terrorism as a risk against Norwegian society was not a topic with which the public was concerned. This is in stark contrast to the situation after 9/11, in which there has been a clear picture of potential perpetrators and associated weapons. The political aspect of terrorism has disappeared and, instead, the motivation behind terrorism has been portrayed as killing as many civilians as possible.

The Norwegian understanding of terrorism risk is not uniform but embraces two different discourse coalitions that interpret the risk of terrorism in accordance with different sets of storylines. Although two discourse coalitions have existed, only one of them has solidified into discourse institutionalization since 9/11. The target political crime set of storylines has been present during the whole time period in research and official documents. Terrorism has been seen as a form of political activism from this perspective, and dialogue and social justice are appropriate counterterrorism measures. Even though this perspective has dominated the explicit Norwegian foreign policy, this perspective has not manifested itself within the domestic context. It is the omnipresent societal threat set of storylines that has been inherent in the legal measures that treat terrorism as an extraordinary type of crime, in the mandates of the official bodies that have seen terrorism as a threat against national security, and in the case of aviation security where rural and small airports in Norway have been put under the same security regime as giant airports in other countries. Since terrorism has been presented as a national security threat, war has been an adequate measure, and since terrorists aim to attack critical infrastructures where they are vulnerable, preventive measures and damage mitigation measures are legitimized in several sectors in society. Consequently,

the counterterrorism measures function to sustain the perception of terrorism as a major omnipresent threat.

This thesis has questioned the normative risk analytical tools that are a major element in several scientific disciplines and has concluded that this way of reasoning has not been a part of the public discourse on terrorism risk. If these frameworks are not applicable in real decision making, then the benefits of developing better frameworks can be questioned. Despite the fact that the counterterrorism measures can be seen as the risk management culture that dominates contemporary society, risk-based thinking has not been part of the public discourse on terrorism and security. Counterterrorism measures as presented in the public discourses seem beyond rational evaluations and assessments. Measures against terrorism have primarily been described as necessary independently of the risk, and arguments of precaution, compliance, solidarity and moral obligations have been the dominant underpinning arguments behind the implementations. This approach to counterterrorism measures might open up for further implementation of measures in the Norwegian society.

7.2 Future research needs

The findings of this study have raised several questions that future research should address.

The conclusions of this thesis should be seen in light of the data on which this thesis is based. There might be a long way between how policies are communicated to the actual implementation of the same policies. The conclusions of this thesis should be further tested by studying how the decision-making processes behind the counterterrorism measures actually have been implemented. Interviews with central actors will provide valuable knowledge to the conclusions of this study. If possible, the discourses in the public sphere should be compared to the discourses not open for public review. Important decisions and risk assessments have been taking place in the classified world and gaining access to this sort of information could add valuable

knowledge about the premises for risk assessments and how these have affected decisions regarding security measures.

The conclusions of this study are based on the sectors that are studied in this thesis. Further research should examine other sectors to see what counterterrorism measures have been implemented, what the arguments behind the implementation have been, and the role of risk-based thinking. The study of aviation security revealed that the security staff was critical to whether the measures would reveal a terrorist, and they suggested a more flexible system. Further research should examine if this is a widespread perception of security measures for those who work with security. Future research should critically question the effects of the counterterrorism measures and see if they are effective or not. Future research should also address whether or not these measures contribute to building a culture of fear (Furedi, 2005, 2006) or if they make people feel safer.

The role of risk-based thinking in counterterrorism should be further investigated. Future research should study if risk management perspectives and the risk governance framework really are compatible with actual decision making. If the public does not see decisions regarding terrorism mitigation as rational decision making, then how can the counterterrorism measures be evaluated?

Norway is just one of many countries that have implemented counterterrorism measures since 9/11. Thus, this study can provide knowledge about the political processes and the social construction of meanings that made terrorism a major threat in a country that had not been targeted by terrorism. Future research should address if the framing of terrorism and the arguments behind the counterterrorism measures are dominating in other countries besides Norway and if other countries have other cultural-political understandings of the meaning of terrorism.

This thesis has studied the changes in the discourses on terrorism that contributed to legitimizing counterterrorism measures in Norwegian society. This thesis is also a contribution to understand the Norwegian attitude towards terrorism and counterterrorism. The 22\7 attacks in

Norway will probably entail future studies that will address how this event has affected the public opinion on the substance of the phenomenon of terrorism and the attitude towards counterterrorism measures. This study can provide knowledge about the historical premises that were present before that attack.

Despite the fact that social constructivist perspectives have been a part of risk research, there has been a lack of perspectives that incorporate the political process of defining what society perceives as a risk and that recognize that the process of framing risks is strongly related to power structures in society. The Argumentative Discourse Analytical approach is one that can further be developed to fill this gap. This is a perspective that can also add valuable knowledge in terrorism research. The results of this study point in the direction that the political aspects and the power aspects should be further explored in both disciplines. Risk, risk analysis and terrorism have been topics that scholars from several disciplines have focused on in the last decade, and the need for a common research agenda has been acknowledged (Lund Petersen, 2011). Power, language and the political processes by which something is defined as a risk or terrorist threat are important aspects that should be included in this platform. Studies should further develop these perspectives in order to understand how some risks are framed into the security agenda and others are not.

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Part II

List of Articles

Article I: Jore, S. H., & Njå, O. (2010). Risk of Terrorism: A Scientifically Valid Phenomenon or a Wild Guess? The Impact of Different Approaches to Risk Assessment. *Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis across Disciplines*. Vol 4 (2): 197 – 216.

Article II: Jore, S. H. (2007). The Norwegian research on terrorism 1996-2006: paradigms and attitudes towards security measures. In T. Aven & J.E. Vinem (Eds.), *Risk, Reliability and Societal Safety. Proceedings of the European Safety and Reliability Conference 2007.* (pp. 2579-2586), Taylor and Francis, London.

Article III: Jore, S. H., & Njå, O. (2009). Terrorism risk as a change stimulus to Norwegian society. In R. Briš, C. Guedes Soares & S. Martorell (Eds.), *Reliability, Risk and Safety. Theory and Applications* (pp. 2265-2274). Taylor & Francis, London.

Article IV: Jore, S. H. (submitted). Norwegian Media Substantiation of Counterterrorism measures.

Article V: Jore, S. H., & Njå, O. (submitted). The Norwegian Official Communication on Terrorism.

Article VI: Jore, S. H., & Njå, O. (2012). A discussion on small countries' adaptation to globalised security in aviation. In the proceedings of *The International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management 2011 and Annual European Safety and Reliability Conference 2012.* Helsinki, Finland.

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