

The Construction of Europe in Dutch History Textbooks



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Introduction

In 2005 the Dutch people voted against the proposal of a constitution for the European Union. Listening to debates, discussions and speeches, we hear a lot of scepticism. Arguments like the lack of democracy within the EU structure, the fact that EU rules do not take into account the local circumstances and the fear of being effected by other member states' economic troubles, are not uncommon. There are however, also clear advantages connected to the EU membership. How then, do the Dutch people relate to an integrated Europe?

In the European context the Netherlands has a central position, on various levels. Economically and infra-structurally it is, and has been for a long time, an important junction. Moreover, the Netherlands took the lead, together with five other Western-European countries, in bringing about closer ties in the post-war years and thus laying the foundations for an integrated Europe.

The Netherlands is therefore a classical example of a country at the heart of a united Europe, should such a thing exist. The question of whether a united Europe is desirable or even realistic has been a much discussed topic, specifically the last years. Politicians have had their say, academics have also given their professional opinion. The question that remains however, is what the society as a whole thinks. What is the society's attitude towards Europe? This thesis is an attempt to give an example of how such an attitude is expressed, by looking at the way the topic is presented in history textbooks. In other words: which European history do we teach our children? The research question this thesis will try to give an answer to is the following: *Do Dutch history textbooks present a united or a divided Europe?*

To answer this question, the idea of a united Europe, or of a European identity, is analysed by discussing ten historical themes and their potential to function as a *European memory*.

The first step will have to be to give an account of previous research and to give a theoretical background, with the intention of clarifying the main concepts: Europe, a common identity and the idea of a European memory. Before the account of the analysis of the textbooks can be given, a full explanation of the methods used is necessary.

The analysis will be in three parts. Firstly it is important to establish if it is Dutch -, European – or World history the textbooks present, as this means a lot for the point of view from which the various themes are presented. The second part is a thorough analysis of the ten potential European memories, how the text books present them and what that means for the research question. Lastly we will examine the bigger picture and look at the narratives that go through all of these themes, drawing conclusions as to what these narratives tell us about the Europe that is

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created here: a united or a divided one.

Theory

Europe in other works of research

There is no lack of reflection on the idea of a united Europe. In light of the events after 1945 and specifically 1989, that is not surprising. Much of Europe's history is characterised by conflict, both within and between states. After World War Two it seems Europe decided that it had now suffered enough, or at least the Western-European countries among themselves did. A united Europe was by no means a new idea, for the first time however, it looked like the idea actually had a chance of success.

Countless of articles and books have been written since, considering this idea and its chances. A very thorough collection of essays has been published as recently as 2010 on the topic of European memories (eds. Pakier & Str ath, 2010). In 2002 a book, also made up of various essays, was published under the title of *The Idea of Europe* (ed. Pagden, 2002). There is no doubt that attempts have been made create something we can call a common European identity. What remains the big question however is how far this idea has actually reached 'the Europeans in the street'. From the participation in elections for the European Parliament, we can conclude that there is little interest in the goings-on in Brussels among the European citizen.

As for the idea of a united Europe in history textbooks, very little research has been done on this topic. Those few articles written about this topic that I have encountered, still have very much a national focus, looking at the place of Europe internally in that particular society. These are thus not relevant for this research. An example of this is the article written by Evguenia Davidova (2006): "Re-packing identities: history textbooks, European travel and the untarnished Bulgarian 'Europeaness'".

The place united Europe has in the field of education has been research in more general terms. A prominent example of such a project is Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal's article from 2002 with the title *Locating Europe*. She says the following about her research in the introduction:

I do this through a preliminary investigation into the nature and scope of Europe as an identity category or position as it is built in educational spaces ... The dataset for the broader project is constructed by sampling the history and civic textbooks and curricula in four European countries (Germany, France, Britain and Turkey) at three time points – the 1950s, 1970s and 1990s – when major educational reforms took place. I also examine public debates and convicting claims on national curricula and education. (p. 269)

Like she says, Soysal uses parts of the textbooks as examples for the points she makes about Europe in educational texts. Her research is not a thorough text analysis. The emphasis is more on the comparative aspects of both the four different countries and the various points in time.

What this thesis contributes to the field of research, is a thorough analysis of a view of Europe presented in an educational context. Soysal (2002) says about the value of analysing textbooks: *school books and curricula are important not as texts themselves but for what broader social and political debates, struggles and orientations they represent.* (p. 280) This thesis provides a review of which picture of Europe Dutch textbooks present to the pupils. Thus it gives an example of how Dutch society views the idea of a united Europe.

What is Europe?

To all questions there are both simple answers and answers that are more complicated. The question of this section ‘*What is Europe?*’ certainly has many different answers, some of which would make up a whole book. The easy answer, one would think, is: Europe is one of the seven continents in which we have divided our world. Even with this answer however, there are difficulties. For it poses another question: what is a continent? In his essay *Some Europe’s and Their History*, Pocock (2002) uses the following definition of the term ‘continent’:

A landmass of very great size, possessing a well-defined maritime perimeter, and linked to other continents either by a single narrow isthmus ... or not all. (p. 57)

Pocock states that the idea of a world divided into continents is a European notion, yet according to this definition, Europe does not qualify as a continent: there is no clear division between the continent of Europe and that of Asia. Not only is there no ‘water mass’ to divide the two continents, like we see in the case of Australia for example, there are no other natural frontiers between Europe and Asia that could provide a clear division. The frontier between the two has therefore shifted and moved over time.

Why is this significant? That Europe and Asia are two separate continents is a fact that not many people think over much. The absence of clear natural frontiers suggests therefore that there must be other specific characteristics that provide an explanation as to how this division came to be and has remained uncontested. If not concrete geographic boundaries, then what is it that defines Europe? As said earlier, there is not one answer to this question. Pocock mentions the difference between Europe as a continent and Europe as a civilization. He continues by stating that the roots of Europe as a civilization lie in the period *after* the fall of the Western Roman Empire. (Pocock, 2002) The building stones of this European civilization are, however, made with Roman imperial clay.

Pagden, in the same book, discusses in his essay *Europe: conceptualizing a continent* the role of Roman Law. He cites the Italian Republican Carlo Cattaneo, who in 1835 noted down the four features that unite Europe: the power of the former imperial authority, the Roman Law, Christianity and the Latin language. (Pagden, 2002, p. 44) After the collapse of direct Roman

influence in the western part of the empire, the system of law implemented by the Romans continued to exist, and we still base our laws on this system, many say. When, a little later, Christianity gained influence, this added the uniting factor of religion and the Latin language that came with it.

This sounds straight forward enough. Both Roman and Christian influence, however, was not limited to what we now call the continent of Europe. Christianity has its origin in Asia and spread to Africa as well as to Europe. The same goes for Roman Law: the larger part of the Old Roman Empire lay in Asia and Africa. The arrival of the Islamic revolution changed this, Pocock (2002) says. What started with the collapse of the Western provinces of the Roman Empire, was reinforced by the spread of Islam. It was then that the borders of the European *continent* were established.

The geographical concept of “Europe” has moved West, to the point where it defines an Atlantic peninsula by calling it a continent. Similarly the historical concept of “Europe” has migrated, to the point where everything we mean when we say “the history of Europe” refers to the history of political and religious culture ... that arose in the far-western Latin-speaking provinces of the former Roman empire. (p. 60)

This dividing line was made more or less definite by the expansions of this far-western culture that Pocock (2002) characterises as *feudal, papal, monastic, Latin*, towards the east and south. We can say that the European culture spreads from the Atlantic in the west and the Mediterranean in the south to the line in the east where the influence of Christianity and the influence of Islam met and halted. From the eleventh and twelfth century this Latin culture, as Pocock (2002) calls it, spread to what we now call Central and Eastern-Europe. There is a grey area however, where the Latin culture did not root as deeply, as it did in for instance the Polish and the Czech lands.

These peoples exist in close proximity with other people – Russians, Ukrainians, Serbs, Greeks and Turks – whose history is not Latin and whom we may think of as Europeans or not as we choose. (p. 61)

This absence of distinct boundaries leads Pagden (2002) to the same conclusion as Pocock: that Europe is a culture rather than a place. (p. 46)

This debate is still very relevant, especially in the light of the fact that the Turkish wish to join the EU. As Blair says in *The European Union since 1945*, besides the practical and principle sides of the discussions around Turkey's membership, there is the question whether Turkey lies in Europe or in Asia. (Blair, 2010, p. 108)

There is still no agreement on what defines European culture and where it begins and ends. We can only speak of vague characteristics. These are easiest identified when compared to an 'other'. In

Europe's case it most logical to compare the cultural unity that is Europe (if we accept that there is such a thing) with that of Asia. As mentioned, the lack of physical boundaries means we will have to define the two continents in terms of separate cultural identities. Montesquieu (1752) wrote already in 1748 that the distinct contrasts between Europe and Asia are due to the differences in landscape. In Asia, with larger areas of open plains and barriers easier to cross than in Europe, large empires developed. In contrast, Europe was made up of smaller nations, easier to manage. Asia's large empires, Montesquieu says, needed despotic rule in order to ensure order. Europe was made up of much smaller political unities which meant that their populations enjoyed the freedom the people of Asia were withheld. European nations were ruled by laws, not by a single despotic ruler.

Much of these specifics have become outdated, but Montesquieu's argument still is relevant for our discussion: it partly explains why Asia and Europe developed in different directions. This freedom Montesquieu speaks of played a great part in the development of the supposed European identity. (p. 296) The existence of such a European identity is discussed in the following chapter.

A European identity

Group identity exists on many levels and in many forms. The easiest to understand is the identity of a group where all members know each other and have a clear relation to each individual within the group. Examples of such identities can be seen everywhere around us: families, school classes, work places, local political parties, groups of friends. The list is endless. All of these groups have traditions and memories that all members can directly relate to. The scene we observe when members of such groups look at old photographs together is illustrative.

It becomes more complicated and harder to define, once we look at larger groups. The concept of a common identity within a group where the members do not directly know each other is and has always been somewhat of a mystery. Yet, this type of group identity is as much a part of our everyday life as our family identity. It is important to note the difference between what Müller (2010) calls collective memory on the one hand and individual mass memory on the other. Individual mass memory, he says, refers to *the memories of participants in actual historical events*. Whereas collective or national memories are narratives that *nations or other groups tell about themselves*. (p. 29) It is these types of narratives that form an essential part of the creation of a collective identity.

The creation of such an identity happens more or less spontaneously, but it can also be constructed deliberately. Klas-Göran Karlsson (as cited in Stugu, 2008) differentiates between existential use of history and instrumental use of history. Existential use of history happens when an individual or a group feels the need to remember or to forget. Instrumental use of history is used to accomplish a

goal, for instance to legitimise a political situation. The difference between these two is not always clear; existential use of history can easily and often be turned into instrumental history. A memory that already exists is then amplified or adapted, depending on what the goal is. This goal is often to create or amplify a common identity of a larger or smaller group of people.

Agreeing with John Stuart Mill, Stugu (2008) states that memories and history are essential elements in the creation of identities. When many individuals have a parallel memory, Stugu says, this memory becomes a collective property.

We see collective memories in groups of many different sizes and structures. These groups may be confined to a certain geographical area, as seen in national identities, or they may not, as is the case for certain ideologies for instance. In Europe the national identity has become significant: the common identity of a nation. As Anthony Smith (1992) says, national identification has become the norm in Europe, *transcending other loyalties in scope and power.* (p. 58)

There has been much discussion about the meaning of the word nation, the conclusions of which, more often than not, has been that it is not possible to formulate a proper explanation of the term.

Hobsbawm (1990) explains that, in spite of the claims of its members, *no satisfactory criterion can be discovered for deciding which of the many human collectivities should be labelled in this way.* (p. 5) He points out that the concept of 'the nation' is based on criteria that are themselves so dynamic and changing that it is not surprising that it is difficult, if not impossible, to give a definite description of the idea.¹

Exactly what the term nation entails is not so important. What *is* important in this discussion is the fact that most historians have come to the conclusion that nation does *not* correspond with what we have come to call a state. A state in the modern, Western meaning refers to a political community. A nation means, in most contexts, a group of people that share the same cultural background (what this background might be is not easy to define, as we have seen). The word nation is thus more closely related to the concept of ethnicity than it is to the concept of a political state. In some discussions 'the nation' is synonymous to 'ethnic group'. Smith (1992) names some of the characteristics that are often associated with the concept of 'the nation', at the same time stressing that these are mere assumptions and no definite qualifications:

We may define the nation as a named human population sharing a historical territory, common memories and myths of origin, a mass, standardised public culture, a common economy and

¹ For an account of the origin of the word nation, see Hobsbawm, E. J. (1990), *Nations and Nationalism since 1780.* (University Press, Cambridge)

territorial mobility, and common legal rights and duties for all members of the collectivity. (p. 60)

The question we must ask ourselves is whether Europe can be said to be a *collectivity* with a common identity. In other words, is there such a thing as a European identity? This will lead us eventually to the question of how and if such an identity is presented in Dutch textbooks.

Karlsson (2010) speaks of three waves of Europeanisation. The first one is economic integration, and is for the most part complete. The second wave, political unification is much more difficult, as was proven by among other things, the failure of implementation of a European constitution. The last wave is the cultural unity of Europe. It is this that would define a European identity. As Karlsson (2010) says, *the task of cultural Europeanisation is far from simple.* (p. 38)

Enlightened philosophers, prominently Rousseau and Montesquieu, argued that a united Europe, with the separate countries as provinces, indeed was possible, and desirable. We must see these claims in the light of the time period. This was the age of, as it is called, the European superiority complex. It was a common belief among intellectuals at this time that Europe sat itself apart from the rest of the world by its leading position in the fields of economy, science and politics. (d'Appollonia, 2002, p. 174-175)

This view is held by very few nowadays. Those in favour of a culturally united Europe generally wish to combine European unity with national interests. An argument that is often heard is that Europe is characterised by its diversity. Indeed, Miall (1993) says that it is Europe's divisions that makes it stronger. It was, and is, the dynamics between the towns and the agricultural society, between countries competing for trading routes, that stimulated progress. (p. 7)

The question this poses, is whether we can speak of a European identity then. Historians who are sceptical to the existence of such an identity say that these vague characteristics of a European culture are not to be compared to the historically rooted national identities. Essential to developing a collective identity as we see in nations is, Smith says, the pre-modern past. The common culture of a nation is based on a common past. It is this common past that Europe lacks, claims Smith (1992).

Above all, [Europe] lacks a pre-modern past – a 'prehistory' which can provide it with emotional sustenance and historical depth. (p. 62)

Not everyone shares this opinion and that is the starting point for this thesis: which views are represented by Dutch history textbooks? Do we see such a common 'prehistory' presented in the books, and if so how?

Those who agree with Smith claim that this lack of a common 'prehistory' is partly due to distinct

divisions we see within Europe. The most prominent one we see to this date is the east/west divide. To this date we see striking differences between Eastern-Europe and Western-Europe. Hitchcock (2004) describes these as follows:

The newly liberated countries of Eastern-Europe remain far behind their wealthy neighbors [sic] in per capita GDP, in living standards, and in economic opportunities. (p. 5)

The direct cause of these disadvantages is clear: the Cold War. However, we see distinct contrasts between east and west already before the Cold War. There is no agreement on how far back these inequalities go and where the line can be drawn between Eastern-Europe and Western-Europe. For this thesis that is less important than observing that these differences exist and have existed for the past few hundred years. The significance of this division is not only the fact that these parts of Europe underwent different processes and historical events. On top of this, and as a result of, we see that people in east and west have a rather different perception of those events that they have in common.

We also see, to this day, the remnants of religious schisms. The most obvious is the schism of Western Christianity into the catholic and the protestant church. We also still see the divide between those parts of Europe that were influenced by Islam, and the rest of the continent. In the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia for instance.

These are all divisions that more or less can be connected to certain geographical areas. There are also those differences that span across class divides or ideologies.

For all its talk of unity, contemporary Europe remains divided along lines of race, ethnicity, cultural identity and wealth. (Hitchcock, 2004, p. 5)

Sceptics to the concept of a culturally united Europe draw on these differences to illustrate the impossibility of finding a common background for a community so clearly and persistently divided as Europe.

As we have seen, those historians that argue for the possibility of a united Europe do not deny the existence of these distinctions. On the contrary they use them in their arguments for the existence of a European identity by saying that it is exactly these contrasts that define Europe. In their eyes national identity and a common European culture do not exclude, but rather reinforce, each other. This works in both ways. The great variety and richness of cultural identities we see in Europe is what identifies and sets apart Europe. Turning this process around, we see that the European idea that sovereignty must lie with the people within ethnic groups, stimulates the creation of nations and nationalism.²

² Nationalism in the neutral meaning of the word, indicating a feeling of belonging to a nation or ethnic group. For an account of the idea of nationalism see, among others, Anderson, B. (2006) *Imagined Communities*. (Verso, London)

About one thing most historians agree however: a European identity or culture cannot be created from above. If such an identity exists, it must come from below, from a feeling of belonging to a group that can truly call itself European. As d'Appollonia (2002) puts it:

European identity must reside in the concrete and symbolic realities created by centuries of history. (p. 172)

While she does not give concrete examples of which historical events or processes might contribute to a European identity, this thesis will. We will therefore first give an account of which historical events, or memories, are generally said to be a part of a common European historical culture.

A European memory

As we have seen, most academics agree that a European culture or identity must be built on the firm foundations of historical narratives, or common memories. On a national level we see countless examples of such memories, some of which are the basis for countries' national holidays. The classical example is of course the storming of the Bastille in 1789. The question is now whether it is possible to find a similar event that could function for the whole of Europe. As of today, no such historical event has received the same type of 'status' as 14 July has for France (to stay with the same example).

There are however less concrete memories one can name as a memory the whole of Europe shares. Jaraus (2010) puts it this way:

Connections that transcend boundaries and form a shared underpinning in Europe. (p. 317)

Here he mentions, among other things, visual and musical culture that travelled freely and were not connected to specific countries, ideologies such as liberalism and socialism that spread from country to country and revolutionary outbursts in years such as 1789, 1814, 1918 and 1989. To these European-wide trends we will come back in the analysis, discussing how these are presented in the textbooks and what that means for the picture of Europe that is created.

Are there clearer cut events that must be named in this context? Looking through the book entitled *A European Memory?*, we see that after the 'theoretical framing', the second part of the book is divided into four sections: the Second World War, the Holocaust, Europe's communist past and Europe's colonial past. These are all distinctly negative memories. In the introduction of the book Pakier and Str ath (2010) address this fact:

The Holocaust, the atrocities of the Second World War beyond the Holocaust, the Stalinist gulags, colonialism and imperialism are often forgotten or repressed when the key question

about the origin of Europe and its telos are posed. (p. 2)

They continue by saying that a far simpler task is Europeanisation of positive sides of the European background.

It is easier to find a common European dimension when references are made to the positive sides of an argued European heritage, as is the case of the Enlightenment. Although in one sense the Enlightenment references a French core ... figures such as Kant, Vico, Hume and Smith go beyond this core to develop a European dimension. (p. 2)

We see then that European memories, assuming there is such a thing, can roughly be divided into two groups: positive memories and negative memories. The various 'connections that form a shared underpinning in Europe' that Jarausch (2010) mentions, form a collection of phenomena connected to events that would come under the heading of 'positive' memory. The forming of ideologies such as liberalism and socialism is one of them, the cultural expressions of the Enlightenment is another. Characterising historical events like this does not do justice to the complexity of either historical 'truth' (or rather: truths), nor to the complicated idea of a common memory. It does however, illustrate the difficulties connected to the remembrance of the more distinctly negative memories, such as the Holocaust.

Both the Second World War and the Holocaust have often been named as the reason behind European integration and a reference point for what is right and wrong. Immediately after the end of World War Two there were calls for closer European ties in order to prevent such horrors from ever happening again, as we see in Churchill's speech in 1946 in Zürich.

What is the sovereign remedy? It is to re-create the European family, or as much of it as we can, and provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe. (Address given by Winston Churchill, n.d.)

Yet, the first steps of European unification after the war were not towards a political community, as the word state suggests. Rather it took the form of economic cooperation. Stefan Berger (2010) says about this:

The way in which a united Europe initially took shape was through an economic alliance. The European Economic Community (EEC) was meant to overcome the serious problems of reconstruction. (p. 132)

Since, many have draw on the Second World War to add a cultural dimension to this economic unity. There is no doubt that many have referred to World War Two as a common European memory. The great paradox here is of course the fact that World War Two was, as the name suggests, a world war. *The Second World War had global dimensions which cannot be reduced to Europe*, as Berger puts it. (Berger, 2010: 135) How can an event with such global indications

function as a European memory?

As with the Second World War in general, but more specifically in relation to the Holocaust, the first step of Europeanising such a memory is an open discussion that does not omit the painful, controversial sides of European history.

European integration in the years following the Second World War was a Western-European process. It was here that the war and in particular the Holocaust were named as pillars for the unification of Europe, as a reference point. A zero hour as Pakier and Stråth say (2010, p. 3). The conclusion Jarausch (2010) draws from this is less favourable. He calls the EU an insurance policy against the repetition of prior problems rather than a positive goal. These negative memories are *based on experiences of suffering that are likely to diminish in time and are unlikely to serve as a lasting bond.* (p. 316) Whether this is indeed how it works and what the consequences will be if these memories fade we can only wait and see.

Stokholm Banke (2010) takes a different view. She says that *it is through negative examples that we can become aware of the characteristics of European civilisation.* (p. 168) The Holocaust serves then to show us how we must build today's Europe.

There is another trouble in using the Holocaust as such a distinctive memory. Some have gone as far as to say that the Holocaust is EU's creation myth. The mere fact that the Holocaust has received a name of its own that sets it apart from other genocides (for reasons not entirely clear) is illustrative. This is very much a Western-European way of thinking however. The question is if it is possible to adapt the Holocaust memory to fit the modern EU, including the Eastern-European member states. There is no doubt that Eastern-Europe experienced a very different Holocaust, and indeed World War Two, than the west has. Whitling (2010) argues against trying to find a common European identity using just this argument:

The politics of remembrance can operate according to diverging multiple narratives. For instance, the Holocaust is interpreted and perceived in clearly different ways in Germany and Poland to the extent that they appear to be 'two different Holocausts'. (p. 92)

More realistic is to build Europe on the basis of diversity and mutual understanding, he says.

Karlsson (2010) draws in the traumas Eastern-Europe has gone through after the end of World War Two. For countries that came under Soviet rule, especially those where nationalisation has been strong, these traumas present a much stronger memory than the horrors of the Second World War. This is in some cases justified by the number of victims, but more important, he says, is the fact that these memories are fresher than those of the war of sixty years ago.

Looking at the matter from the opposite angle, Karlsson (2010) points out that Soviet crimes are not as easily recognised in Western-Europe, due to the positive associations of communism, not hampered by the memory of the Soviet communist atrocities.

Colonialism in particular is a part of national pasts that has long been repressed. There seems to be more focus on this side of various national histories the last few years. However, these processes seem to be very individualistic from country to country. This is mainly due to the contrasts between the ways colonial empires disintegrated over the course of the post-war years. Also the aftermath, specifically the migration from the former colonies to Europe, has different patterns from former colonial power to former colonial power. Jansen (2010) comes to the following conclusion:

Presently, a cross-national memory of Europe's colonial past would appear to be unattainable ... Despite its huge importance in European history, imperial expansion cannot be considered as a specifically European fact. (p. 291)

Colonialism is a global phenomenon and discussions about it should include all parties. Moreover, only a small part of Europe has the memory of actively being involved in Western colonialism.

All of these themes mentioned now will be discussed in the analysis. After which we will be able to draw a conclusion as to how the account of these memories in the textbooks contribute to the picture they create of Europe.

Methods

Methods

Every research project starts, or at least works towards, a question that is to be answered. This question never contains just *one* question however, it has to be divided into several questions, addressing different aspects of the topic of research.

Formulating these questions is a process that can be said to have the shape of an hourglass. We start off with a vague idea, a general area that we wish to look at: the top on the hourglass. In the case of this thesis this vague idea is the concept of a united Europe.

The next step is then to narrow down this very broad and vague topic; the hourglass becomes more and more narrow towards the middle part. The first, and rather significant specification that should be mentioned is that these two topics will be addressed from a historical viewpoint. This does not mean that the present day situation is not relevant. On the contrary, what we will be looking at is the significance of historical processes, events and developments, for the situation today. To what extent can we speak of a Europe that is united, and what role does history play in such a concept? Can we speak of a common European identity? Identifying that, also considerably narrows down what we will be looking at.

Along with these questions we need to ask ourselves two more basic questions before we can really address the actual topic of research: 'What do we consider to be Europe?' and 'What do we mean when we speak of identity?' There is no lack of published work concerning either of these topics. In the introduction to the actual research report it will be necessary to address both these questions and clarify what we mean when we use these terms.

We still have not reached the most narrow part of the hourglass. The question *Can we speak of a common European identity?* is, can we say, the backdrop of this master thesis. Which historical aspects contribute to such an identity, and which have the opposite effect? For a small research project as this is, that focus still is too broad. Europe of course is very large and cannot be covered in a context such as this one. Unfortunately that means that it is necessary to narrow down the focus, to a specific area or country, rather than look at Europe as a whole. This thesis will describe the situation in the Netherlands. There are several reasons for this choice. The Netherlands has a central place in the EU and to a certain extent also in the wider Europe. The Netherlands is a relatively old country, but is not one of the classical great powers. It has also been a part of the EU and its forerunners from the very beginning. This means that the country can function well, as an example of how the notion of a common European identity might be viewed. There are more practical reasons too: As a Dutch citizen, I know the Netherlands well and speak the language.

We will then, look at Europe and the question of identity, through Dutch eyes. The Dutch society

will work as an example of one of the many ways to look at this question.

'Looking at a society' is a far from easy task however, and that is where the empiric data comes in. How do we get an idea of which events and processes in a society's history the society chooses to remember and which it chooses to forget? Museums give a fair representation of this, newspapers is another option. It does not get much more concrete than *textbooks* however. What better way to look at a society than to look at what they teach their children? The contents of textbooks has to meet certain criteria, as schools base the choice of which textbook to use partly on how well they meet the goals set by the government. These goals reflect the 'official standard' of what the Dutch people ought to know about *our* history. Thus textbooks are a fair representation of a society's common views. Moreover, they also *create* views. A school plays an important part in the forming of its pupils critical views, especially because of the position of authority it holds in society. The pictures of Europe created in these textbooks will have an impact on the pupils' attitude towards Europe and the EU. The empirical data chosen for this thesis is therefore secondary school history textbooks and the question that will be answered is: which picture do they draw of Europe and the question of identity?

Similarly it is necessary to set a frame for the time period that will be analysed. The time period chosen is the time period from the Enlightenment until today. It was during the time of the Enlightenment that the concept of the nation became more common in Europe. As the idea of a common European identity is based so firmly upon the concept of a national identity in most discussions of the subject, this period is the most significant for this thesis. There are historical processes that took place before this time period that are of importance for this discussion. Notably the reformation, but also the crusades and the reign of Charles V (to name a few). Due to the limited size of this thesis however, it was necessary to limit the period we will discuss.

Now we can say we are getting close to the narrow part of the hourglass. One possible research question would then be:

Do Dutch history textbooks present a united or a divided Europe?

As said in the beginning of this draft, in order to be able to work with a research questions such as this one, it needs to be divided into several questions addressing the problem in more detail. The act of questioning leads us to question further. In this case there are two types of questions that spring for the here formulated research question: clarifying questions, that provide the background for this thesis and questions concerned directly with the empirical data, with the textbooks.

The two most obvious questions of the first category I have mentioned already:

- What do we mean when we speak of Europe? and
- How do we define identity?

A third question that has to be added to these is: How does the phenomenon of identity manifest itself in the European context? In other words:

- Which memories have the potential to serve as common European memories?

When looking at the empiric data the following questions can be of importance:

- How is the balance within the textbooks between topics concerning primarily the Netherlands, topics concerning Europe, global themes and topics addressing processes outside the influence of European society?
- Which topics have the authors chosen to present and how do those topics relate to the question of a united or a divided Europe?
- Which topics have obviously been omitted and how are they significant in relation to the question of a united or a divided Europe?

We then move to the lower part of the hourglass and answer the question:

- Which conclusions can we draw from the answers to the last two questions: is the Europe presented in the textbooks a united or a divided one?

Before we can try to get an answer to this question however, we need to draw a picture of what a united Europe looks like. What does it mean to be *united*? What makes that we feel we are European citizens? And what makes that we feel we are not?

As an example of this theoretical part of the thesis we include the beginning of a discourse about the idea of Europe. This is a reflection on various books, essays and articles written on the different ways in which Europe can be viewed.

Analysis

The school system in the Netherlands differs from those in other countries. The most important difference in secondary school from other countries is that secondary school in the Netherlands is divided into three levels, which all qualify for different forms of higher education. In order to have the most balanced and advanced material to work with, I have chosen to use textbooks for the last

three years of the highest level, pre-university secondary education (VWO in Dutch). I have selected two of the more widely used textbooks. *Feniks* is structured and concrete, and is as such less detailed. *Sprekend Verleden* (literally translated: speaking past, afterwards referred to as *SV*) is more advanced and the language can, according to teachers, be difficult for the pupils. It is less practical than *Feniks*.

In the analysis it is necessary to look away from certain aspects of textbook analysis. Even though these are two rather different textbooks the main focus will not be on comparing them, as this is not the purpose of the study. The thesis will not be concerned with the didactic side of teaching history. The sole purpose of using textbooks is, as explained, to get a picture of what view of Europe they represent.

This is a case study based on text analysis. Text must be seen as more than a written explanation of the past here. Also included in the analysis are the pictures that accompany the text and the questions and assignments the pupils work with. For the analysis only the actual textbooks are used, and in the case of *Sprekend Verleden*, the workbook. *SV* has a separate book with assignments, while *Feniks* has the assignments in the textbook following every paragraph. The teachers' guides have not been used. This could have been an asset to the analysis, but it is necessary to limit the amount of text that is to be analysed, due to the size of this project.

The first stage of the analysis is to determine where the focus of the books lies. The question that is to be answered here is whether the books tell Dutch -, European – or world history. In this chapter we will go through the chapters in the book that fall within our time period and systematically look at all the topics determining from which angle there are presented. This also gives a summary of the topics that the books present to the pupils.

The next step is to determine which topics are particularly relevant for the research question. These topics form the 'analysis categories', the basis for analysing the content of the books. First a short presentation is given of how these topics relate to the question of a united or divided Europe. The chapters that follow will present each topic and the way in which it is presented in the textbooks. This will be done starting with the most recent topic, so that we will work our way 'through time' backward. This has a very specific reason. The purpose of this study is to determine how all of this affects the European society today. It is therefore important to present the textbooks' stand on what Europe looks like today. The first of the analysis categories is 'Present day Europe and the European Union'. There are ten analysis categories. In a separate chapter an explanation is given as to why these themes are relevant to the research question.

One of the difficulties one faces, when analysing Dutch textbooks is that parts of the text quoted in the analysis have to be translated. These are not official translations, the purpose only is to quote from texts in the textbooks. Within the textbooks there are a number of primary sources that are quoted. In the analysis, these are quoted from the textbook, not from the original source. This is for two reasons; the first is due to fact that it is difficult to locate the original texts, which were translated into Dutch, and the other reason is that we wanted to accurately present the contents of the textbook. The pictures that are referred to in the analysis will not be in the text. This is due to copyrights. The pictures will instead be described.

As explained above, after this thorough text analysis, some conclusions must be drawn as to what this means for the bigger picture of Europe these textbooks represent. This will have something to say about what the pupils using these textbooks learn about Europe. Which view do we teach the next generation: that of a united or a divided Europe?

Analysis

Do the textbooks tell Dutch -, European - or World history?

Feniks

The newer of the two textbooks is divided into ten chapters, each about a different time period. As the chosen time period for this thesis is the period from the Enlightenment to today, we will look only at chapters five to ten. The time periods discussed in these chapters are the following:

- Time of Explorers and Reformers : 1500-1600
- Time of Merchants and Monarchs: 1600-1700
- Time of Wigs and Revolutions: 1700-1800
- Time of Citizens and Steam engines: 1800-1900
- Time of World Wars: 1900-1950
- Time of Television and Computer: 1950-present

By looking at the names given to these time periods, some conclusions can already be drawn. The question that needs answering is *Which part of the world do these time periods refer to?* The 'explorers and reformers' of the fifth time period are European people. At the first glance, one might conclude that the merchants and monarchs of chapter six are too. The way this time period is presented in *Feniks* however, suggests otherwise. From chapter seven onward, it becomes more and more difficult to determine which part of the world the authors look at. Europe's influence started to reach far beyond the boundaries of the continent and was likewise affected by these other cultures.

To get a good idea of which historical themes, processes and events are being presented in the textbook we will now go through the chapters and see how the focus is: Dutch, European or global.

Time of Explorers and Reformers – A new world

This chapter is divided into five paragraphs. Paragraph 5.1 tells the pupils how Europeans started their exploration of the rest of the world. Although we can say this is a European process, it does not include the whole of Europe as it were only the western European countries that were part of this process, at least at that time. This occurs throughout the whole book: sometimes only a part of Europe is the subject of the topic discussed, and in those cases it is almost exclusively western Europe. From the time of the Renaissance, the cultural, political and economical centre of Europe started moving, westwards. It might therefore seem natural to emphasise those parts of history that concern Western-Europe. It does not, however, do justice to the complexity of the past and

memories of the wider Europe. For instance, it took a long time for products and other influences from the newly discovered continents to reach the more eastern parts of Europe. As did many other developments said to be 'European'. The conclusions we can draw from this will be discussed later.

Paragraph 5.2 is concerned with the European world view and developments in the drawing of maps. We can be fairly sure that this world view spread throughout the whole continent. The development and use of maps at that time was, however, so clearly connected to the discovery of 'the new world', that very few other countries than Portugal, Spain, England and the Republic are mentioned in connection with this.

Humanism and the Renaissance are discussed in paragraph 5.3. On the whole this is very much a European topic. In the textbook they speak of the humanist and renaissance ideas spreading rapidly across the continent. As an example of the humanists and their way of thinking, they describe Erasmus and his ideas. More than half of the paragraph is exclusively devoted to him. However influential Erasmus was, this specific focus on him must be seen as a distinctly Dutch twist to the topic.

Of paragraph 5.4 we can say the same. The Reformation of the Catholic Church is described entirely from the view point of Calvin. Martin Luther is mentioned, but no more than that. Even though the Reformation affected the whole of Europe, the sole focus on Calvin makes that this paragraph focuses on Dutch history, rather than European. In European history Martin Luther had at least as much influence as Calvin. Zwingli, even though he played a significant part, is not mentioned at all in the textbook. The Netherlands became prominently Calvinist during the Reformation, hence the focus on him in the textbook.

The fifth paragraph is devoted entirely to the Dutch war of independence against the Spanish. This tells the pupils much about the extraordinary position the Low Countries had at that time. The reasons why the wish for independence was strong enough to cause such a war, the way it was won and the way the independent Republic of the Seven United Netherlands was organised, show this. However, in European history this process is not as central as it is presented in this textbook.

Time of Merchants and Monarchs – The Republic in Europe

We can say exactly the same about the entire sixth chapter. The time period it corresponds with is the one of merchants and monarchs. The title of the chapter is 'The Republic in Europe'. Europe is a central aspect of the chapter, in the sense that the history of the Republic is described as a part of the continent. The Republic developed in a profoundly different direction than most of Europe. If we take a look at other books that give a summary of European history, we get an idea of how central the Republic was in Europe. John Merriman has a chapter in his *A History of Modern*

Europe entitled 'Seventeenth-Century England and the Dutch Republic'. According to Merriman England distinguished itself from the rest of Europe just as much as the Republic did. There were distinct similarities between the way society was organised in England and the in the Republic, and they were the cause of similar conditions. It was no coincidence that the English approached William III and caused the Glorious Revolution. There were of course also very distinct differences.

The authors of *Feniks* have, however, chosen to devote an entire chapter to the Republics position in Europe. Europe, and parts of Europe, are frequently mentioned in the chapter, but always in relation to the Republic. Very little is said about England.

The time of Wigs and Revolutions – Dusty wigs and bubbling ideas

This chapter has four paragraphs, all concerned with rather radical changes. Both paragraph 7.1 and 7.2 are centred around western Europe. The first paragraph tells the pupils about the change from colonialism to imperialism and how these two differ. These processes are presented from an entirely Western-European view point. We can also say this of paragraph 7.2. It discusses the Enlightenment and its mayor thinkers. It is debatable how far Enlightened ideas spread and where. In *Feniks* however it is presented as a Western-European phenomenon.

Paragraph 7.3 gives examples of enlightened despotism, which was seen throughout Europe. It also compares enlightened despotism with the way the Republic was governed, a distinctly Dutch topic.

Paragraph 7.4 is exceptional in this context as it covers the American Revolution. This can be considered a Western-European theme, for two reasons. First of all because of the obvious imperial ties, as the war of independence that followed was a war against Great Britain. Secondly, the revolution was based largely on Enlightened thought, coming from Europe. On the other hand, this is the first and most important step in the 'de-europeanisation' of the United States. The US might originally be a European creation, but from the beginning it has had very distinct features that make it more than a group of Europeans who settled in 'The New World'. Here we see how complicated it can be to distinguish the geographical centre of a topic. What is of importance here of course, is the way in which the topic is presented in the textbook. Reading the paragraph thoroughly we see that it is written mainly from the colonists point of view.

At the very end of the paragraph the authors mention the French revolution, the way Napoleon came to power and the results this had for the weakened Republic. The American and the French revolution are often paired up, as there are obvious connections. The fact that the American Revolution is the main focus of this paragraph is remarkable.

*Time of Citizens and Steam engines – On steam*³

This chapter is concerned with the so-called 'Industrial Revolution' and its side effects. As the first three paragraphs cover the beginning of the industrialisation process and the consequences for the social situation, these clearly cover almost exclusively Western-Europe. When discussing the social consequences the authors mention that problems of a similar kind were seen throughout Europe and that they were dealt with in various ways. On the whole however, this theme is clearly presented as Western-European history.

This is different with paragraph 8.4 on the emergence of isms. Here they do cover the whole of Europe. The main focus is on liberalism and socialism and on the year 1848. On the topic of liberalism they seem to have looked mainly at England. Classical liberalism can be said to have originated in the United Kingdom, although whether this is a perception that holds depends highly on interpretation. The rest of the paragraph, the revolutionary year 1848, Marx and the different forms of socialism do concern the wider Europe.

The part on emancipation, paragraph 8.5, again is written around the developments in Western-Europe. As examples the authors describe the processes in the Netherlands. There is a definite Dutch angle to this paragraph.

There is a clear English angle to the last paragraph on the democratisation of politics. On the whole this chapter has a profound focus on western Europe, with the weight on England. For this stage in European history this is logical.

Time of World Wars – Poisonous gasses and falling bombs

The name World War obviously suggests that this whole chapter deals with world history. It is not that simple however, and in reading the chapter we come to a different conclusion. As said before, what is important in this context is not so much what is presented, but the point of view and the perspective from which the story is told.

The first paragraph tells the story of World War One, the roles of Russia and of the US and compares World War One with World War Two. This comparison is made to create a picture of World War One, not of World War Two. Even though World War One had a very different character from any war before then, and despite the fact that its influence spread wider than ever before, it still was primarily a European war. The textbook shows this within expressly naming it. The intervention of the United States was both due to a European (German) provocation and was limited to aiding European (English and French) armies.

The depiction of the Interwar Period also shows us mainly the European side of the story:

³ The title of this chapter has in Dutch a double meaning and can not be properly translated into English.

the rivalry between Germany and England, the consequences of the war economy in Europe during the World War One and Germany's war reparations. The Great Depression is mentioned in the very last sentence and described as an economic crisis in 'the western world'. In the review of the totalitarian ideologies that came to the surface in this period, the authors describe these as movements that spread through the whole of Europe.

There are three paragraphs concerned with World War Two and each presents a separate aspect and each has a different focus. The propaganda and the use of mass communication in Nazi Germany are described. This paragraph is entirely concerned with the Third Reich and the way Hitler used propaganda to extend his power. In the paragraph on the new technology that was first used in World War Two, the authors describe the use and consequences of these new weapons in almost every part of the world. The last of these paragraphs is a presentation of the holocaust and is therefore concerned with Europe. The authors devote one paragraph to the situation in the Netherlands during the occupation.

The last paragraph of this chapter is more difficult to determine. This paragraph is concerned with the consequence of World War Two: the growing resistance against the western European imperial powers. This is at once a very European subject, as imperialism was a European project, and a global one, as this was the colonies' resistance against the weakened western powers. We must also consider the difference between the Asian colonies and most of the other colonies. In this context, decolonisation immediately after World War One, the Asian colonies play a prominent role. Most African and Latin American colonies gained independence a while later. Risings against colonial powers immediately after World War Two are therefore almost entirely limited to Asia, which makes it not a real global topic either. We can say that this paragraph is concerned with Western-European history on the one side and Asian history on the other. As an example the authors point mostly towards the process in Indonesia which gives this topic a Dutch turn.

Time of Television and Computer – Freedom and minefields

In the second paragraph of this chapter the authors come back to the topic of decolonisation. Now the wider topic is discussed and we can say that this paragraph is concerned with global history, with the same exception we saw in the last paragraph of the previous chapter: special is paid to of Indonesia and the Netherlands. The first paragraph also has a global theme, that of the Cold War and the closer bonds between the nations in the west.

The paragraph about the making of the EU obviously is interesting in our context. As the EU started as a Western-European project, thus the beginning of this paragraph is focussed on these countries. As the authors move through the history of the EU more and more of Europe is discussed, logically. The focus then shifts to the east and how these countries joined the EU after the fall of the

Berlin Wall.

The very last paragraph of the book is concerned with the growing living standard. This paragraph focuses almost entirely on the Netherlands, only a couple of times looking at Western-Europe or the entire Western world. It seems that as these processes in what we call the Western world, are so strongly integrated that to look at one of them, is to look at the others. The authors have chosen to look at what is closest home: Dutch society.

Sprekend Verleden

Sprekend Verleden is organised in a very different way than *Feniks*. The authors of *Feniks* have chosen to present the material in chronological order. They still pay attention to the longer lines in historical processes and look beyond the time period covered by the chapter. However, the ten chapters represent ten chronological periods, from prehistory until today.

SV also keeps to a chronological order but the authors have chosen to look at certain aspects more closely. The book is divided into fifteen chapters. Chapters one to nine discuss general history in chronological order from prehistory until World War Two, with the exception of chapters six and eight. Chapter six explains the emergence of political ideologies: it tells the pupils about democracy and the various 'isms'. Chapter eight tells Germany's history from 1870 until today.

After chapter nine we get a series of chapters that present a specific theme or country. Chapter ten, one of the longest ones, is about the history of the Netherlands from prehistory until today. In the same way the pupils are taken through the history of the United States and the history of Russia. Chapter thirteen picks up the chronology where it was left off, and presents the time of the Cold War. Chapter fourteen then tells the story of the western colonisation of large parts of the rest of the world and the decolonisation process that followed. In the last chapter the authors present Asia's growing influence after the end of World War Two.

The following Chapters cover our period, from the Enlightenment until today:

- Changes in the Early Modern Period (Europe ca 1500 – ca 1800)
- Industrialisation of the West (from ca 1800)
- Democracy and isms: the concepts remain, the contents change
- The First World War (1914-1918): causes, course and consequences
- Germany 1870 – today
- The Second World War (1939-1945): causes, course and consequences
- From Dolmens to today, a history of the Netherlands
- From Wigwam to Skyscraper, a history of the United States

- From Tsar to 'Tsar', a history of Russia
- The time of the Cold War
- Colonialism and de-colonialism
- The rise of Asia

Highly significant for our research is that the titles of some of the chapters reveal whether they are about Dutch, European or World history. More than in *Feniks*, *SV* is divided into territorial areas, rather than historical periods. It is therefore not necessary to go through the chapters as thoroughly as done with *Feniks*.

As a generalisation we can say that chapters one to nine discuss European history. In the title of chapter four it even says so directly. Looking at that chapter we see that specific countries or areas are sometimes used as examples or mentioned as the 'birthplace' of a certain development. Throughout the book we find text boxes presenting a specific detail about the topic that is discussed, as an example. In chapter four we find one on catholic and protestant churches in the Netherlands, to illustrate the differences between Catholicism and protestantism. The authors try to pick subjects that are recognisable for the pupils and therefore these often have a Dutch theme. Overall however, chapter four discusses developments that concerned and concern Europe as a whole.

In the title of chapter five, Industrialisation of the West, we also find a very clear indication of which area this theme covers. The subject, the beginning of the industrialisation process, very specifically points towards the technological developments in *our* age and the authors draw these lines. This means that some parts stretch further than simply to the narrow meaning of the term West: Western-Europe and North America. These become global themes. We also need to consider that The West is not a clear cut term, even though it is often used that way. The West is best understood as the area primarily influenced by a culture based on Greco-Roman civilisation and its later developments. In this sense The Western world changes constantly both in range and in character. This is a complex question that is not discussed in the text. Many examples of developments, mainly economical and social in nature, help to give the pupils an idea of where they developed and how they spread. The bulk of the chapter still keeps to the early developments and we can therefore say that this chapter covers the Western world as it was 150 years ago.

Chapter six does not cover a time period in the same way as the previous chapters do. The authors have chosen to devote a whole chapter to the emergence of political ideologies. This fits in with the time line. The function of this chapter is first and foremost to explain the concept behind each individual movement. Reading through these explanations however it becomes clear that the chapter is based solely on developments in Europe. According to the book, and there is no real

arguing against this, movements like liberalism, socialism and confessionally are European in origin. Especially significant for our research question is the paragraph on nationalism, this we will come back to later.

The chapter on World War One is, like it is in *Feniks*, a very European affair. The authors explain why World War One is referred to as 'world war': there were more soldiers involved, more countries and the fighting was more widespread than ever before. This they say, is the reason why we speak of a World War even though outside of Europe very little actual fighting took place and even parts of Europe stayed out of it. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 125) More than in *Feniks* the authors pay attention to the situation in the Middle East and the role of the Ottoman Empire. This still must be seen in the light of events rooted, deeply, in Europe.

In between the chapter on the two World Wars the authors have written a chapter devoted entirely to Germany in the period from the unification in the 1870s to today. The reasons behind this and the consequences for the picture of Europe that is created in the book, will be discussed later. This chapter mainly discusses national affairs and when Germany's international relations are discussed, notably during World War Two, this is done from the German point of view.

Chapter nine covers World War Two. One paragraph is specifically about the occupation of Netherlands. Otherwise the authors present a balanced description of the war, emphasising the war in Europe as a catalyst but drawing the picture of a world war, referring the most important aspects worldwide.

The next three chapters, chapters ten, eleven and twelve, each discuss a specific country: the Netherlands, The United States of America and Russia. As with the chapter about Germany, we will come back to the significance this has in our specific context: How does the choice to look at these three countries more closely, contribute to the picture of Europe that is created here?

One thing can be mentioned already. Very little attention is paid to the history of these countries before they emerged as an independent state. The chapter about the Netherlands starts with a few sentences about what 'preceded the Netherlands'. According to the authors the Netherlands emerged as a nation when the Peace of Münster was signed and the northern Netherlands became an independent republic. In the same way do the authors mention very little about the history of the territory that is now the United States before the struggle for independence started. Even the discovery of the continent by Europeans is mentioned only briefly, as they come back to this in the longest chapter of the book, the chapter on colonialism. We also see this in the chapter about Russia: it starts with an explanation about how the Russian state was formed around 1500 when the Grand Duchy of Moscow expanded and became known as the Tsardom of Russia. This tells us something about the way the authors understand the term nation. What they present

here as a 'country' or 'state' is mostly a political entity, rather than a cultural one. This also shows in the text, as the main focus of all three chapters is on political developments. It is mainly the story of the leaders that is told, much less that of the people.

In the explanation of how the Cold War came to be, in chapter thirteen, the authors obviously mention the 'Western powers' Britain, France and the US and their troubled relationship with Russia. This is then, mainly a European problem, as it originated there. The Cold War, in all its complexity, is a global theme however. As we read on, the pupils learn how the Cold War 'spread' to large parts of the rest of the world. As we get to the end of the Cold War however, the authors zoom in again on Europe; the consequences of the fall of the Soviet Union for Europe are discussed. All in all can we conclude that the Cold War certainly is presented as a global theme, but definitely from a European view point.

The last paragraph of this chapter is devoted to the economic integration in Europe and the realisation of the European Union. The question, what the consequences are for the nation states as political entity, are discussed. We will come back to that later.

The subject of chapter fourteen, colonialism and decolonisation, is without doubt a global theme. The chapter can be divided into three parts. The chapter starts with a description of the 'old cultures' of America, Africa and Asia. The second part describes colonialism and decolonisation in more general terms. The authors try to answer the question of what changed for these cultures when the Europeans arrived from the 15th century. These changes were caused by the actions of the colonists, it is therefore their motivations that the authors describe. It is however the consequences for the native population that is central here. In the third part of this chapter the authors look more closely at colonisation and decolonisation of various areas: Latin America, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa and India.

The subject of the last chapter is the rise of Asia on a global level. It is therefore per definition a global subject. Attention is paid to the internal affairs of various countries, but the authors always come back to the overall theme: what does this mean for international relations? However, these international relations are rarely relations with other actors than 'the western world'. One can argue that this is a logical choice, as the subject is a predominantly economic one and the west still has a leading role in international economic proceedings. Despite this we can not deny that this is a somewhat limited picture of 'global'.

Conclusion

To come to a conclusion about what the books present: Dutch -, European – or world history, the two textbooks will be compared, as there are profound differences between them. The first difference is that *Feniks* is shorter than *SV*, which means that *SV* covers a lot more than *Feniks* does. Another difference is already mentioned: the way the books are organised into chapters. Both these differences have the consequence that *SV* has a broader focus than *Feniks* does. The focus of both these books is Europe, but in very different ways. We can picture this 'focus' as rings in a pool we have just dropped a stone into. The smallest ring in the middle is the Dutch focus, the next ring is Western-European, the ring enclosing that one is the wider Europe and the largest ring is the global focus. The history told in *Feniks* is rooted in the smallest ring. The pupils learn about European history, but the authors always refer to how this history is significant for the Netherlands as a country. *Feniks* looks at all four rings, whenever this is relevant for Dutch history.

In the same way we can say that *SV* is rooted in the second ring. *SV* teaches the pupils about European history, global history and the history of specific parts of the world, when this has relevance for Western-Europe. On a much smaller scale than in *Feniks* do the authors of *SV* refer to Dutch history, this with the purpose of illustrating certain developments or situations.

What we must not forget is that both these books are written for Dutch pupils. The reason that *SV* mainly focuses on Western-Europe, is still that this is what is most relevant for Dutch pupils. What we will look at in the analysis, is what it is that these Dutch pupils learn. We have now gone through the different themes the books take up. The next step is to look at how these themes are presented and what this means for the picture that is drawn of Europe: a united or a divided one?

Analysis categories

The following themes have been chosen as analysis categories. In this chapter we will go through why it is these themes that bear specific relevance for the research question.

Present day Europe and the European Union

The European Union is in some perspectives the very manifestation of European unity. There is one international relations policy, a joined environmental policies and the attempts have been made at creating a constitution. This show that the European Union has become much more than the European Coal and Steel Community that was its starting point.

However, there is also the unmistakable dividing factor that is in fact the result of this unity: if there is an 'us', there is also a 'them'. We see the clear divide between members and non-members. There are those countries that wish to join the EU family, but have not yet been permitted to do so. Of the eight official candidates and potential candidates, six are former Soviet states, as are all of those European countries that are not EU members or have official cooperation agreements similar to the EEA community. This deepens the division of Europe into east and west.

Furthermore: despite the extensive cooperation and regulations within the EU, the question remains whether this has strengthened the *historical and cultural* ties between European countries, or whether this cooperation merely is an economical and political one. What kind of European Union is presented in the textbooks?

The Cold War

The most pronounced and the most recent division of Europe was the, in many cases physical, division of the continent into two blocks, from the end of the Second World War until the fall of the Soviet Union. In many aspects this division is still seen, felt and resented. When we speak of *Europe's time of growth* after the War, *Europe's period of social unrest* in the 60s and 70s, *Europe's closer ties*, what we actually mean is not Europe, but what has become known as 'the Western world'. This *Western world* does not include the whole of Europe, not even today, neither is it limited to the European continent.

From which perspective is the Cold War presented in the textbooks? Which role is given to Western-Europe, the Soviet Union in particular, Eastern-Europe as a whole and the United States? Is the focus on the political conflict or on the way the Cold War affected everyday life? In other words do the textbooks present only the dividing factor of the political and ideological conflict, or do they also speak of the common experience that all of Europe had in the face of, among other things, the nuclear threat?

Communism

Communism, like so many other terms, has nowadays many different meanings and definitions. The question of which interpretation of the word is presented has a great deal to say about which view of Europe is presented. As a result of the Cold War period, the first association many people have with communism is exactly that: the situation in the east of Europe during this period. This obviously is a dividing factor. Communism can also be presented as Marx' original theory and represents then a strong uniting factor, that of the call for workers all over the world to unite.

Colonialism and imperialism

The global character of colonialism and de-colonisation makes this a complex theme within the 'European question'. However, the practice of 'acquiring' overseas colonies and creating an empire is an almost exclusively European phenomenon (at least if we limit the discussion to *Western colonialism*⁴). From the beginning of the new imperialism, which was radically different from the 'old' colonialism, the United States took part as an imperial power. For all intents and purposes however, the U.S. was at that time European.

Apart from riches, a radical change in diet, a wider range of products to choose from and knowledge about the rest of the world, within Europe colonialism and imperialism created rivalry between states. Specifically the position in which Germany found themselves as a young nation, and their struggle to get in league with England and France is interesting to look at.

Probably the most prominent dividing factor of colonialism is the difference in the way countries developed. From approximately 1600, those countries with colonies developed in a distinctly different direction than those who did not have overseas colonies. Of the countries who did *obtain* colonies, Spain developed rather differently than France, England and the Netherlands did. Where especially England and the Netherlands underwent drastic economic and social changes, the first signs of capitalism, Spain held on to 'old' values and ways of living.

How much of this do we see in the textbooks? Do they address the consequences of the rivalry and the differences in development for the future of Europe?

World War Two

The World Wars obviously created deep scars of mistrust between the states of Europe (and the world). As mentioned earlier however, the Second World War is, by some, indicated to be the very reason for the creation of a united Europe. There is also the uniting factor of the threat of a common enemy; the classical picture of two opposing enemies has another dimension to it: that of the common enemy of war itself. The fear of the recurrence of the horrors of the war has a uniting

⁴ For a more thorough presentation of this term, see the chapter about colonialism

factor as well as a dividing one. Quite apart from the fact that the clear cut image of two enemies physically opposing each other has very little to do with World War Two.

What do the textbooks emphasise? Is the focus on the general horrors of the period and the way the war affected everyday life, or on the politics behind it?

The Holocaust

In the discussion on the east/west divide in Europe, the different perceptions of the holocaust play a significant role. Many say that for Western-Europe to understand the difference in character and magnitude of the holocaust between the east and the west of Europe, is of vital importance for east and west to come closer together. (Leggewie, 2009) In this context it is relevant to draw in the Gulags and possible links with the Holocaust. Due to certain parallels between the two repression systems, the Gulag network both intensified the experiences of the Holocaust and at the same time put it into perspective. The picture of the Holocaust as the single most horrifying episode in world history, as seen in Western society, is not shared by Eastern Europeans. Even though, looking at the facts of what happened during the holocaust, they have all the more reason to hold such a view.

On the other hand, there are also historians who say that the holocaust is one of the few experiences that all Europeans have in common, one of the rare true common memories. Arguing this way, it is less important how the Holocaust was experienced in different parts of Europe. What is important is the fact that all Europeans have this memory in common. Everyone has an association with the word 'holocaust'. Klas-Göran Karlsson (2010) notes that in recent years the Holocaust has for some become the very foundation for a united Europe:

The Nazi genocide of European Jewry serves as a combined founding history and a basic value system for the European Union. (p. 41)

Some say that modern European moral values are rooted in the common memory of the Holocaust. It shapes they say, our idea of right and wrong, of good and evil. Karlsson (2010) also points to arguments to the contrary however. Differences in how the Holocaust is perceived in different countries divides Europe, most notably into east and west. In Eastern-Europe he says, it is the horrors of Soviet communist terror that have rendered Nazi terror rather less prominent. In turn, the political left in Western-Europe continues, Karlsson (2010) says, to link Stalinism to an essentially progressive ideology. Thus Hitler's almost mythical role as the ultimate personification of evil, cannot be applied to Stalin to the same extent⁵. Here we have come to a quote from Tony Judt (2005) that applies to this thesis as a whole and defines very accurately the questions that we are trying to answer:

Europe might be united, but European memory remained deeply asymmetrical (p. 826)

⁵ These points are discussed more thoroughly in the theory section

How does all this apply to the textbooks? The first thing to note is if they create a picture of the Holocaust as a European phenomenon, or if they account for differences between various parts of Europe. Are these differences emphasized or do the authors describe the Holocaust as a 'project' that affected the whole continent?

Another interesting question is how the Gulags are described. Do the textbooks compare the Holocaust and the Gulags, and if they do, what is their conclusion? In other words do the textbooks support this popular idea of the Holocaust as the single most evil act ever committed in European history?

World War One

Not all of Europe was involved in World War One in the same way as it was during World War Two. If only for this fact it cannot function as a common memory like World War Two is claimed to do. The question is what the textbooks say about this. Another significant question for our thesis is whether World War One had the same aftermath as World War Two: a strong wish to prevent such a war from happening again. While those same sentiments certainly were there, it does not seem to have had the same effect. The Versailles Treaty is important here, specifically in the light of the question of Germany. We can safely say that during the Paris Peace Conference it was Germany against the rest. Who 'the rest' was tells us much about Europe at the time. The goal of the conference was to reform Europe in such a way that peace was ensured from that point onwards. This was not done however by Europe as a whole, but by 'the big four': France, England, Italy and the United States of America. This representation did, to a certain extent, do justice to the balance of power during the years of war and to the outcome. It was not of course a fair representation of Europe. Partly as a result of this, the way Europe was 'cut up' did not take into account the question of ethnicity, with disastrous results. How much of this is mentioned in the textbooks and to which extent is the Versailles Treaty presented as a European project, rather than a project of the main victors of World War One?

The emergence of isms

The emergence of groups based on ideology, or isms, can work both to divide Europe and to unite it. The forming of political groups with rather different points of view created tension; it divided Europe. The revolutions of 1848 prove that these new ideologies could lead to rather hostile conflicts. What should be noted however, is that these divisions did not coincide with national boundaries. For what was possibly the first time in history, Europe was divided into ideologies that spread throughout the continent. Thus classes all over Europe united to stand stronger in their demands. When looking at 1848 specifically, and maybe at the emergence of isms in general, we

see that the whole of Europe was united in the idea that 'something had to change'. Of course, there was no agreement on what had to change and how, but the wave of revolutions shows us that there was a general dissatisfaction among many groups throughout the continent.

The subject of nationalism is of specific importance in this study as it is so closely related to the concept of identity and thus to the research question. As we have seen in the theory section, nationalism can be seen as both contradictory and complimentary to European identity. The question is how nationalism is presented in the textbooks. We can safely say that nationalism as a movement spread through the whole of Europe, roughly from the 1830s. In that sense it is a phenomenon that united Europe in a common development. Moreover, national minorities saw the protection of Europe as the force that would help them gain independence. What picture of Europe the textbooks present depends greatly on how nationalism is described. Is the idea of a pro-European nationalism mentioned at all or is nationalism purely a dividing factor? Another dimension of nationalism is the more aggressive form we see a little later in European history. Nowadays that is what most people have in mind when speaking of nationalism: the aggressive and more violent form that is often combined with racial ideas. How do the textbooks discuss this narrow understanding of the term in relation to the broader meaning we have discussed above?

The 'Industrial Revolution' and social change

A Europe divided into isms is mentioned already. The emergence of these social and political movements has to be viewed in the broader picture of the changes that were seen in Europe at the time. Change in organisation and scale in agriculture and other production processes, growing population, better living standards, urbanisation, change in the social order, the emergence of the newspaper, social unrest and the development of more distinct ideologies, are all connected. The chicken and egg question is not relevant here as neither is either egg or chicken.

Overall, we see a trend of a more interconnected Europe, divided along the lines of social class and political view, rather than along national borders. There are however significant differences within Europe; these processes are most outspoken in the west. When it came to the living standard, change in the social order and changes in agriculture, Eastern-Europe followed a slower, if not altogether different, course. How outspoken are the books about these differences? Is the focus mainly on the changes in the west, or do they give a broader picture?

The Enlightenment

However one looks at it, at the time of the enlightenment France was a leading power. Even though the focus of the Enlightenment lay in France, it has to be viewed as a broader movement. Already here however, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, we see the pattern of the east/west divide.

Certainly, the Enlightened ideas reached Russia, but as the literacy rate was so much lower in the east, the enlightened ideas did not have the same impact in the east as they did in the west. The same goes for the very south of Europe. As so often before, see we therefore a factor that brings together parts of Europe, also leaves other parts out.

The different aspects of the enlightened philosophies had different effects in different countries. Whereas the idea of political reform had a great impact in France, the religious aspect was more prominent in the Netherlands. It is clear however that 'the new way of thinking' united Europe in a movement of major cultural, political and religious change.

We still see much of the Enlightened philosophy in today's society. That is the strongest uniting factor of this period: not how far it spread and how significant its influence was at the time, but how significant its influence is *today*. Those who argue for the existence of a European memory and a common background, point out that Europe today is built upon the foundations laid by Voltaire, Kant and Montesquieu (to name a few). Many say that enlightened values together with our common Christian culture is the basis for modern European society and that that applies to Europe as a whole. How much of this do we see in the textbooks? And how much do they emphasize the similarities and the contrasts that occurred at the time of the Enlightenment?

In the next ten chapters we will discuss the way these themes are presented in the two textbooks. Conclusions will be drawn as to how this affects the picture of Europe that they create.

Present-day Europe and the European Union

Feniks

In the introduction to chapter ten, the time from the end of World War Two to today, the authors name, as one of the five features of this time period, *the unification of Europe*. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 300) In the introduction they also describe the beginning of European cooperation as a means to put a stop to the rivalry between European countries. From this we can gather that the authors look at Europe as a united entity and that there is a political motive behind this unity. The way they describe it, economical and later also political cooperation was a constructed unity designed by leaders. The ECSC was, they say, an economic community that was from the beginning meant to lead to further political cooperation. Here they add a quote from the treaty signed at the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951:

By creating an economic community laying the foundations for a larger and stronger community of peoples that previously have been divided by battle. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 313)

A little further on the same page, Winston Churchill is quoted from his famous speech about the unification of Europe in 1949. Particularly the last sentence of the quote is interesting:

We have to create a sort of United States of Europe. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 313)

The choice of these quotes tells us a lot about the way the authors want the pupils to look at Europe. Both these quotes create a very distinct picture of what the best course is for the future of Europe, the pupils do not get the context however. Both the treaty and Churchill's speech are from the years immediately following World War Two, a time mainly defined by fear of such an event ever repeating itself. The public opinion at that time was completely different from today's. By not putting these quotes into the context of the post-war period the authors do not do justice to the present day climate of Euroscepticism.

A term used by the authors is worth mentioning: the phrase *the European Family of States*. This definitely sets the tone for the way the present day Europe is being presented. The word 'family' has a strong symbolic meaning. The way it is used here as a metaphor, creates an image of close links between the members, on various levels. Links that are there naturally and without condition. It also suggests a common past, a common memory. To speak of a European family suggests similar ties within the European community. In a European context can we speak of natural, unconditional links between the members, can we speak of a common past and memory? That is exactly the question that we are trying to find an answer to here. The authors of *Feniks* certainly seem to think we can.

The third paragraph in chapter ten is devoted to the EU and European integration. An important part is where the authors describe the process the EU went through, from a primarily

economical community to a political union. The economical cooperation they say, keeps expanding with free traffic of all people, goods and services and the arrival of the Euro. To come to political agreements proves to be more difficult however. Governments of individual countries as well as citizens are sceptical towards more political integration. The authors blame this on the way the EU is organised and the 'lack of democracy', not on scepticism towards the idea of a united Europe. We have seen that they have a positive view of this: 'we are creating a European family'.

A cartoon used in the text is interesting in our context. It shows two identical groups of men that are different only because of their clothes and their garments. The expressions on their faces are exactly the same, but the one group is dressed as medieval knights, the other as modern politicians or businessmen. It is debatable what the cartoonist meant to say with this drawing. The caption in the textbook says: 'European relations have clearly improved'. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 313) That is one side of the story, certainly arguing about laws or business deals is an improvement from smashing in each other's heads. On the other hand, the men's facial expressions have not changed in the slightest. The way conflicts are solved has changed, the cartoonist seems to want to communicate, but attitudes have not. The caption in the book is a rather more positive explanation. The pupils get a question about this picture too. They are told that the cartoon shows both a continuity and a discontinuity in European relations and are asked to describe what these are. As a cartoon of this kind almost always has a critical undertone, we can assume that the cartoonist wished to point out not the discontinuity, but the continuity in these relations.

Prominent in the paragraph is the differences between Eastern-Europe and Western-Europe. The integration of the Eastern-European countries into the EU after the fall of the Soviet Union is called 'problematic'. They also mention the skilled and motivated Eastern-European worker as a reason for people from countries with a higher living standard to be sceptical about the EU, because it makes it possible for these 'Polish plumbers' to move to the countries where the wages are higher and 'take all the jobs'. *Feniks* has a strong focus on the differences between east and west, both before and after the fall of the Soviet Union. What does this mean for the picture of Europe that the authors want to present?

Sprekend Verleden

As opposed to *Fenisk*, *SV* does not present the emergence of the ECSC as a project to insure peace in Europe. The authors mention the prevention of further wars in Europe as a result of the economic cooperation, but not as a reason behind it. Neither do they say that the political ties were a goal from the beginning of the ECSC. Economic integration was the result of, among other things, the Marshall Plan after the war, that forced the western European countries to work together when

using this money. The authors also point out that the eastern European countries under Soviet influence refused help, a situation that deepened the divide between east and west. Almost as a bi-product of this they describe how the common threat of the Soviet Union and the Cold War worked as a stimulant for more cooperation between the countries in the west.

Just as in *Feniks*, the authors of *SV* compare economical integration with the political cooperation in Europe. They come to the same conclusion: that the EU economically has come far and that the member states agree on most issues here, but that political integration is less easy to establish. Unlike *Feniks*, *SV* does mention the trouble in the agricultural sector however. With this example they show how the national interests are put first in case of a conflict between national and European interests. They also point out however, that where the EU members themselves, both citizens and politicians, are sceptical about a politically united Europe, from outside the EU very often is perceived as a unity.

The authors of *SV* speak of the EU in a different tone than the authors of *Feniks* do. To illustrate this we look at the way they formulate the following statement:

Those in favour of a strong EU point out that important issues like the high unemployment in the EU, environmental problems and the increased immigration can only be solved on the European level. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 253)

Important here is of course the beginning of the sentence, 'those in favour of a strong EU'. In *Feniks* this is never presented as a question. It is not said directly but the tone in *Feniks* tells the pupils that the EU is positive development that will lead to a Europe that is more and more integrated.

The last part of the paragraph on Europe and the EU in *SV* is a very interesting one for our context. The authors discuss the question: what is the role of the nation-state in the EU? The different interpretations of the term nation-state are being discussed as well as the position of various minorities in countries like France, Spain and the Netherlands. Unlike *Feniks*, *SV* touches here at the question of cultural unity in Europe. From what they say about the different minorities living in European countries the pupils can deduce that to belong to a 'group with the same cultural background' as they call it (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 253), can have a very strong affect on people. In this context they mention language as an important factor. They only use these words in the context of minority groups. The question of whether we can see similar features on a large scale than that of minority groups or the nation-state, is not asked. In other words the authors do not take up the question of a common European cultural identity.

The authors then proceed to the statement that *the nation-state loses significance in Europe.* (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 253) They draw the picture of a Europe where the nation-state's power is eaten up both from 'the bottom' and from 'the top'. With this they mean that both the smaller regions within the nation-state gain more power at the cost of the nation-state and that international

organisations like the UN, NATO and the EU take over responsibilities that previously were managed by the national governments. In a text box about *the national state versus internationalisation* (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 252), the authors speak of self-determination and how the wish for self-government caused so much trouble. They mention the emergence of organisations as the UN and the EU as a solution to this, but also as the possible reason behind the new upswing in the focus on national interests. As an example for this they describe how many countries, including the UK and the Netherlands, wish to emphasise national history rather than European, let alone non-western history, in their curriculum. The history that is conveyed in schools and museums gets more nationally orientated. The authors take a rather critical tone here. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 252)

We also see this in the two pictures in the paragraph on the EU. The first one is an old cartoon about the European Community. It illustrates the fact that the EC and now the EU, is mainly build on economic cooperation and not on political unity. The cartoon shows a dinosaur with a large body, a long neck and rather a small head. The dinosaur is the EC, on the body the cartoonist has written 'economic', on the neck, right behind the head is written 'political'. A group of people, presumably politicians, are looking up at the head and saying to each other what a cute little head it is. They seem oblivious to the fact that the head is rather too small for such a large animal.

The picture in the box on national states and internationalisation shows the goddess Europa as she is usually depicted riding on a bull. She is carrying the EU flag with the circle of yellow stars. Around her stand little figures holding flags of the different countries and signs saying either yes or no. Counting them shows that there are rather more 'no' signs than 'yes' signs. It seems that however energetically the different countries wave their flags and brandish their 'no' signs, Europa is not willing to turn or alter her course.

Conclusion

In *Feniks'* description of Europe, in the light of the question of a united or divided Europe, we see some inconsistencies. On the one hand, mainly from the tone of the text we gather that the authors see Europe as a whole, as, like they say, a family. They do not give any explanation however for this mention of the *European family of states*. From the rest of the text about the present day Europe we do not gather any supportive features to underline this choice of words. Especially the way the differences between east and west are emphasised, do not fit into this picture. The divide in east and west is, as said, the most pronounced and the most prominent division we see in Europe today. If only we look at the way the last century is remembered in eastern European countries compared to how the west perceives the same events, it becomes clear that we face enormous differences in perspective.

As mentioned above the only way unity within Europe is defined in *Feniks* is in economic and political terms. This does not coincide with the picture we get from the tone of the text. The use of the word family, the choice of quotes at the beginning of the paragraph and the way questions are asked, create the picture of a Europe that is much more than just economic agreements. This picture is not supported by any facts.

SV seems less uncritically positive towards a united Europe than *Feniks* does. The impression one gets reading the part on European integration in *Feniks* is that the authors take closer European ties for granted, where as the authors of *SV* have a more critical tone. We can say that *Feniks* keeps to the objective facts, where *SV* expresses, if not an opinion, certainly clear scepticism. The objective facts presented in *Feniks* however, are rather selective, the authors stick to those facts that favour a stronger Europe, but without expressing an outright opinion.

That Europe has created very close ties of economic cooperation comes forward clearly when reading both textbooks. That regular attempts are made to create closer political bonds and that this has had little real success also becomes clear. The rather more interesting question for our research is that of a cultural or historical identity. *Feniks* does not mention this question at all. *SV* does but not in connection with a united Europe. This is highly significant. The authors briefly speak of the nation-state and national identity and then move on, not to identity on a larger scale, but quite the opposite: the identity of minority groups within a nation-state. When pointing out that the nation-states in Europe start to lose influence to both smaller and larger entities, to the regions and to the international organisations, they speak of cultural influence in connection with these smaller regions and of political and mainly economic influence on the international level. What we seem to be moving towards, according to *SV*, is stronger cultural ties, not beyond national boundaries on a larger scale, but rather on a smaller scale. If we can believe the textbook, regions of cultural bonds become smaller rather than larger.

The Cold War

Feniks

Paragraph 10.1 in *Feniks* has the title Divided world. In this paragraph the authors describe the aftermath of World War Two and they explain the meaning of the name Cold War. The development of the Cold War is described roughly until the moment the tension reached its peak: the Cuba Crisis. The topic of Eastern-Europe and the Iron Curtain is taken up again in paragraph 10.3 where the authors describe how communist rule started falling apart and ended in the fall of the Berlin Wall. The topic of the Cold War is thus divided over two paragraphs.

In the introduction to each paragraph the authors describe what the significance is of that topic for us today. The significance of the Cold War is, according to the authors of *Feniks*, primarily the development of more advanced and dangerous nuclear weapons. The Cold War, they say, did not result in a third world war, but the nuclear threat is not yet over. There remains the danger that nuclear bombs are used in international terrorism or by unstable and aggressive powers. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 303) However ominous this threat might be, it is certainly not the only result of the Cold War. As mentioned in the description of this category of analysis, the division of Europe into east and west is the most prominent and pronounced division we see today. This division did not suddenly appear out of nowhere at the start of the Cold War, the differences in economic, and also social, cultural and religious development are much older. There is no doubt however that the rift between east and west was etched in more deeply than it had ever been before, by the political tension of the Cold War period. How effectively this rift has been evened out by now is debatable.

The fact that the authors of *Feniks* do not mention the division into east and west as being significant today is worth noticing. One might conclude that this means that the authors feel much has changed since 1989 and that the nuclear threat *is* more prominently present in our lives today than the differences between Eastern- and Western-Europe. This does not tally however with the rest of the chapter. Specifically important here is one of the assignments that follow this paragraph. The pupils are asked to comment the following:

Even though Europe saw many changes in the second half of the twentieth century (geographically), the division into east and west remained - explain this statement
(Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 306)

It is not very clear which time period the authors are aiming at here. As there is no specific point in time mentioned it seems most logical that 'remained' refers to the present. The authors clearly feel that there still is a division to a certain degree, otherwise they would not have asked the question

this way.

An equally vague statement is made in paragraph 10.3, where the topic of 'the eastern block' is taken up again. In an explanation of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 the authors make the following statement:

That the Western countries did not come to the aid of the insurgents with military power, was a sure sign that the division of the European House was definite. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 314)

Again it is very unclear what is meant by 'definite', as no time perspective is given. Here it seems however that the authors refer to the situation at that time without a necessary reference to the present day situation. The emphasis on the political, social and economic differences is nevertheless significant. In a quote from historian and Balkan expert M. Mazower in his book *Dark Continent*, the enormous economic differences between east and west are described, with specific reference to the heavy industry. The tone of the quote creates a picture of Eastern-Europe of total devastation. The word *disaster area* is used. By using this quote the authors implicate that during the Cold War the economic and social conditions in the east were incomparable to the situation in the west. Mazower speaks of dying rivers, barren woods and sickly people. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 316) Again no time frame is given but Eastern-Europe is compared to the EC which means Mazower must be speaking of the time after 1958, and before the fall of the Berlin Wall as he speaks of East-Germany. If the pupils think logically about this they must come to the conclusion that the consequences of such an economic disadvantage persist for many decades afterwards and they still create a rift between east and west today.

Thus the text creates a different picture than the introduction suggests. Where nothing of a rift between east and west is mentioned as a consequence of the Cold War, throughout both paragraphs we see strong implications of this rift all the same. Moreover, in the paragraph on the EU and European integration, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the authors describe the differences between east and west as being problematic for the creation of a united Europe. They name specifically the economic and social differences and how these create conflicts between EU countries and those who wish to join. All in all, even though they do not explicitly draw the line from the Cold War conflict to the present day Europe, everything certainly points towards the Cold War having serious implications for Europe as a whole, to this day.

There also is the question of the point of view from which the Cold War in its totality is described. The tone of the chapter when it comes to this question is set already in the introduction of paragraph 10.1. The authors refer to Truman's speech of 1947 and his statement that *every country had to choose between two alternative ways of life, one based on oppression or one based on freedom.* (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 303) Through this reference at the very beginning of the paragraph the

authors of *Feniks* explain what the essence of the Cold War was. The authors choose to start by presenting the point of view of the United States. They end the introduction by stating that this speech essentially was a 'Cold War declaration' from the US to Soviet Russia. A little further on another famous speech is quoted, namely Churchill's Iron Curtain speech of 1946:

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent... this is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up. Nor is it one which contains the essentials of permanent peace... Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organisation intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytising tendencies. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 303)

Both these references clearly represent the Western point of view and a distinctly hostile attitude towards Soviet Russia. When speaking of the reasons behind the Marshall Plan the phrase 'communist virus' is used (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 304). Even though this is presented as Marshall's reasoning, and not the authors, the Russian views are not presented in the same way. Thus the authors create a sided picture.

All this leads to the conclusion that the Cold War is presented from a purely Western point of view. We see this throughout the text. What does this mean for our research question: does this create the picture of a united or a divided Europe? It does not speak directly of a divided Europe. What we see here is not the representation of a certain attitude, one can actually say that an attitude is *created*. By giving such a sided picture, the authors of *Feniks* are a part of creating the idea of a divided Europe. The historical situation of the Cold War is described but it is also re-enforced and confirmed as something that we still see today. We see it, in fact, in this very textbook. The west is, in the way Europe is presented here, the *us* and the east is *them*.

Sprekend Verleden

In contrast with *Feniks*, *Sprekend Verleden* presents the Cold War as a global conflict. Where *Feniks* focuses on the political and military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, and on the division of Europe by the Iron Curtain, *SV* gives the full picture that also includes the spread of Communism to primarily China, Korea and Vietnam and the influence of the conflict in the Middle East and Africa. The way the Cold War manifested itself in Europe has a less prominent place, even though the part about the time of the Cold War is considerably longer in *SV* than it is in *Feniks*.

In the same reflected way, *SV* gives an account of the Cold War viewed from *both* sides. There are many examples that show this. The authors explain why the Western Allies and Russia went from being allies to being each other's enemies. About this they say the following:

The West had no consideration for Russia's need for security ... Russia had no respect for the

Western ideals of self-determination and democracy. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 233)

Throughout the chapter we see that the authors of *SV*, in the text and the pictures, show both the Russian and the Western side of the conflict. *SV* uses many cartoons to illustrate the processes they describe. In the case of the chapter on the Cold War we see just as many cartoons that are critical towards the west, as ones that are critical towards the Soviet Union.

Unlike *Feniks* then, *SV* does not reinforce the picture of 'us' and 'them' by paying no attention to the Russian point of view. This does not mean that the picture created by *SV* is that of a more united Europe. It becomes very clear, also in *SV* that there were enormous ideological differences. Apart from political conflicts, mostly economic differences are mentioned. The mention of how the Marshall Plan deepened the gap between the economic development in the west and the lingering poverty in the east is an example of this.

Towards the end of the chapter when the authors describe how the Cold War ended, we get a glance at what implications the Cold War has had for Europe today. The authors point out that the relationship between east and west steadily became better, mainly because of concessions from Russia, but note that the differences did not just disappear. As remnants of the Cold War conflict, they mention the fact that Russia still is not happy about Eastern-European countries joining NATO and the way Europe was divided again during the Yugoslavian War, with Russia supporting the Serbians. That is where it stops however. As mentioned in the previous chapter *SV* does not mention the east/west divide in connection to the present day Europe.

Like in *Feniks* however, the pupils cannot really get around the fact that differences as deeply rooted as those between east and west cannot just be smoothed out in a couple of years. Especially because the authors start their description of the Cold War period by telling the pupils that these differences did not just pop up in the aftermath of World War Two. They do not go back as far as this topic could have justified; to time of the Enlightened. They do however draw lines to the beginning of communist rule in the Soviet Union and name several moments when the SU and the other Allies took separate decisions. The peace agreements between Russia and Germany in World War One, as well as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of World War Two are mentioned. The reason Russia and the other Allies found each other again during World War Two was, as the authors say, not due to internal agreement but to external pressure. In other words, even though Russia was one of the Allied powers, this does not mean that they had put aside their differences. The conflict between Western-Europe and Russia goes thus much further back than the Cold War.

Conclusion

Neither *Feniks* nor *SV* is very explicit about the effects the Iron Curtain and the Cold War has had on the unity or division of Europe today. The closest we get to a direct mention of what remains of

Churchill's famous metaphor, is the difficulties the EU is facing now Eastern-European countries with less developed economies have joined the ranks.

When describing the developments during the Cold War, both books focus mainly on the political and ideological conflict. These are disagreements that can easily be put aside once circumstances change. The differences that are less easily solved are the economic and social ones. It is these differences that are important in our context, for two different reasons.

Firstly because it is this we still see the effects of today. Conflicts between governments can be solved relatively easily and they do not directly affect the population. A country's economy is not as easily fixed. It is this that Eastern-European countries struggle with to this day and that creates a divide.

Secondly, the social and economical differences are more significant specifically for Europe because in the political side of the conflict, European governments played only a minor role. It was primarily a conflict between the two *great powers*, the US and the SU.

Social differences between east and west are hardly mentioned at all in the textbooks. One specific aspect has to be mentioned that the books do not mention at all: the way the two sides perceive the two world wars. Specifically of World War Two the east and the west have completely different perceptions. Or rather, the west still has very little notion of the proportions of the atrocities Eastern-Europe went through. We have discussed this in the theory section. The economical situations in east and west are named, though not very thoroughly. *Feniks* elaborates more on this than *SV* does. Both however emphasise how significant this gap was and how it became ever more pronounced over the course of the Cold War. The poverty in the Soviet Union and its satellite states is named as one of the reasons for the end of the Cold War. Another sign that economical problems have singularly more bearing than do any ideological or political arguments.

The way the Cold War conflict is described in the textbook points clearly to a pronounced and almost physical divide of Europe into two distinctly separate parts. Despite the absence of direct implications that we still see this divide today, the authors create a very strong picture that the pupils cannot misread: that of a Europe divided along the full length of the Iron Curtain.

Communism

Feniks

In *Feniks*, the authors draw two separate pictures of what communism is. In the chapter about the nineteenth century, there is one paragraph devoted to liberalism and socialism. In this paragraph Marx and Engels are named as the fathers of socialism. Their ideology is explained by referring to one specific part from *The Communist Manifesto* (1848):

[The communists] declare openly that their goal can only be achieved by violently overthrowing the present social order. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 236)

They continue by explaining Marx' idea of the communist revolution and the classless society and end with the conclusion that Marx was predicting heaven on earth.

Socialism or communism is here explained as Marx and Engels' ideology. It is however, if not negative, then certainly a sceptical description. The authors have chosen a quote from the *Manifesto* that underlines the violent side of Marxism, rather than the aspect of equality. The choice of words in the ironical 'heaven on earth' also suggests scepticism towards Marx' ideology. Otherwise the description of socialism and Marxism is quite straight forward.

In the chapter about the two world wars another picture of communism is given. Throughout the chapter the authors refer to communism and fascism as different manifestations of the same phenomenon: the totalitarian regime. When describing how these regimes came to power, how they were organised and what made them totalitarian, communism and fascism are mentioned as the two examples. The way Stalin is described as a leader says much about what picture is drawn of the Soviet regime:

A dictator of the worst kind who did not hesitate to have a family member or friend murdered if he doubted their loyalty to himself or the communist doctrine. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 264)

Already in the introduction of the chapter, communism is mentioned as a totalitarian regime, together with fascism and national-socialism. The time period's main characteristics are summarised in eight bullet points, with totalitarian ideologies as one of them:

The totalitarian ideologies communism and fascism/national-socialism were put into practice. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 254)

Also in the introduction, the authors give a list of definitions of key concepts. Here communism is described as a *political movement based on equality and shared property.* (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 255) These two descriptions, that of a totalitarian ideology comparable with fascism and that of a socialist political movement, are given one right after the other without an explanation of how they relate. The authors describe the process of the coming to power of the

communist party in Russia and the creation of the Soviet Union, without explaining how this relates to Marx and Engels' original ideology. The term 'communism' is used in both contexts but the authors do not explain how these two types of communism relate or how the terms socialism, Marxism and communism are used through time and in different contexts. The word communism is used as a synonym of 'Soviet regime'.

This combined with the less than favourable depiction of communism in the previous chapter, creates a sided picture of what communism is. Communism has a lot of different meanings in different settings. The explanation in *Feniks* does not do this justice and focuses strongly on Stalin's version.

'Stalin's version' of communism, or more accurately said 'the *Soviet* version' of communism, is an aspect in European history that, as mentioned earlier, helped create a rift between east and west. It is therefore a strongly dividing factor. The aggressive character, apart from turning inward and creating a highly oppressive regime, turned outward and quite literally built a wall between them and the capitalist enemy. Communism presented in this way creates a picture of a Europe divided in east and west, not, as it could have, a Europe united in a wish to create equality.

Sprekend Verleden

Sprekend Verleden has a chapter devoted entirely to isms and how they emerged, roughly in the nineteenth century. In this chapter the authors give an objective account of how socialism emerged and how Marx and Engels defined their version. Marxism is described as the most prominent, but not the only, form of socialism that developed. They also explain how Marxism developed in two different directions when the standard of living of the lower classes improved instead of deteriorated, as Marx had predicted. Two forms of communism developed from Marxism, they say:

At the end of the nineteenth century all large European Marxist parties chose the way of parliamentary democracy. This amendment of Marxism – evolution instead of revolution – has become known as revisionism. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 111)

The other movement that developed from Marxism they say was the movement of Lenin: Marxism-Leninism.

After World War One this became the official doctrine for most of the communist parties in the world. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 111)

With this explanation the authors ensure that the pupils see how *communism* developed from Marx' original theory and how the word communism can mean many different things.

A very important moment in this account is the description of how communism did not develop exactly how Marx and Engels had predicted. With regard to how communism developed in

Russia and several other countries they say the following:

Marx had not counted on his doctrine being misused later by leaders like Stalin and Mao.
(Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 112)

This clarifies immediately the way communism developed very differently in different countries and the complicated meaning the word 'communism' has nowadays. A little earlier in the chapter they explain the changing meanings of the terms Marxism, socialism and communism:

During most of the nineteenth century Marxist and socialist meant the same thing. When the large Western-European Marxist parties at the end of the nineteenth century favoured revisionism they became known as socialists or social-democrats. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 112)

When communism is mentioned further on in the book, in the chapters on Russia, the account of the world wars and the Cold War, the authors are careful not to mention communism as synonym of various regimes that used communism as a cover for their authoritarian rule. In the case of the Soviet Union, the authors of *SV* use the word Russian or Soviet when they speak of the regime. The authors of *Feniks* often speak of 'communist'.

All in all, we can say that *SV* gives a full account of what communism entails and how it developed. *Feniks* does as said, give a sided account focussing mostly on the Russian version.

As opposed to *Feniks*, *SV* is very clear about what the different meanings are of the words communism, socialism and Marxism. This means that they describe both the uniting character of Marxism and the dividing factor of Soviet communism. The lower classes in Europe were strongly united in their wish for better living and working conditions and more equality.

SV also gives a very accurate description of Soviet communism during the Cold War however. Which, as mentioned before, is the strongest dividing factor in recent European history.

Conclusion

The Cold War is a dividing factor for Europe from whatever way you look at it. Communism as an ideology is not. Marxism is a strong uniting factor, as is socialism in general. The emergence of ideologies such as liberalism, conservatism and socialism meant a profound change in the way Europeans saw the world. Where Europe before was divided into communities, regions and countries, now the divide went not only along boundaries, but along political and ideological movements as well.

Communism is in two ways special in this context. Firstly socialism, Marxism or communism is the movement of the working class, the proletariat. Where the higher classes always had looked beyond regional and national boundaries and connected with those of their own class, this was a new way of thinking for those of the working classes.

Secondly, communism has, because of the way it was used by certain regimes to justify oppressive measures, become strongly associated with such totalitarian and violent regimes. The way communism is described can thus make a significant difference in how the pupils view Europe.

In *Feniks* this last description of communism, that of oppression and violence, is the most prominent one. Communism is described briefly neutrally as a form of socialism. However, they move quickly and without explanation to the type of communism we all know from the way Stalin and others used it.

The way *SV* depicts communism is more reflected and clear. In the paragraph on socialism they have a small section to specifically explain how the three different terms, socialism, Marxism and communism, are used. They are also careful to avoid linking the word communism too much to the regimes we have seen emerging before and during the Cold War.

We can thus conclude that the communism we see in *SV* can definitely be considered to act as a uniting factor in European history. For the first time the focus of 'the people' shifted from their region and their nation to beyond national boundaries. *SV* also describes very specifically Soviet communism and its violent sides. This means that we need to see these two separately when discussing how they influence the picture that *SV* draws of the Europe we live in.

The way communism is described as an ideology creates a picture of Europe in the nineteenth century where the working class in all countries fought under the same flag, Marx', for a better life. Communism is a memory that all European countries have in common. Marx and Engels, almost everywhere, appealed to the lower classes, although not to the same extent throughout the continent, as the group of unskilled workers was not equally large everywhere. Soviet communism had a strongly dividing quality, as we have seen.

When looking at *Feniks* we do not need to look at these two separately. When it comes to communism, *Feniks'* focus is so prominently on the Soviet Union and the Cold War that the meaning of the word communism, in a more general and neutral context, is quite lost. The picture of Europe in the nineteenth century, when communism and socialism drew bridges over national boundaries and united the workers in a common goal, is absent in *Feniks*.

The Holocaust

Feniks

In the introduction to the chapter about the two world wars, the authors explain the difference between the genocide on the Armenians in 1915 and the holocaust. The difference does not lie in the character or the motivation, but in the reactions to these cruelties in the aftermath:

The murder of the Armenians lead to reactions of horror and some international commotion, but those responsible were not punished. This is one of the reasons that Hitler thought he could get away with the genocide of six million Jews. History has proven him wrong. Not only did the genocide of the Jews get a name, Holocaust, an attempt was made to prosecute the perpetrators. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 254)

Because the Holocaust is set apart from other genocides based on the way it is perceived, not on what actually happened, this view underlines the idea of the Holocaust as a modern European *creation myth*.

Paragraph 9.6 is titled 'Genocide as a result of racism and discrimination'. In this paragraph the authors explain the Nazi's racial policies. They mention the position of the Slavs as second-class citizens. However, when describing the 'industrialised murder' ordered by the Nazi leaders, the authors keep speaking only of the murder on the Jews. They start each paragraph with a question and this paragraph they start as follows:

How did racism and anti-Semitism under the national-socialists lead to the genocide of the Jews? (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 278)

By concentrating so thoroughly on the murder of the Jews and not mentioning other groups that were prosecuted in the same way, although not to the same extent, the authors emphasise the mythical status of the Holocaust.

Besides this emphasis on the Holocaust as a myth, we also see a different picture in *Feniks*: that of the Holocaust as part of a broader movement. In *Feniks*, fascist and national-socialist rule is compared throughout the chapter to Soviet communism. They are described as two rather different ideologies but very similar regimes. A quote from a book comparing Hitler's Germany with Stalin's Russia, illustrates the way the authors see these two regimes as a phenomenon inherent to that period in European history:

Legislation, jurisdiction and ethics became instruments in the battle against the enemies of state, the so-called counter-revolutionaries in Russia, the enemies of race and nation in Germany. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 267)

It is very clear that the authors see the period of the two world wars as a period in European

history when totalitarian regimes with dictatorial leaders determined to destroy their 'enemy', were the rule. It was part of the *Zeitgeist*. Both the Holocaust and the Gulags were a result of this *Zeitgeist*. The authors explain the name Gulag and give a description that does not leave much to the imagination:

In Stalin's (died 1953) Soviet Union opponents were executed or sent to concentration camps in Siberia: the Gulag. There they worked as slaves in factories and mines, until they dropped dead. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 264)

The use of the word concentration camp will immediately create a connection with the Holocaust.

Feniks does not compare the Gulag system to the Holocaust. It does however, as mentioned before, name them both as a result of the same phenomenon. Indirectly the authors point out parallels between these two repressive systems. The chapter about the two world wars does not leave the reader with the impression that these two have the same 'status' however. The Gulags are described as a horrific way of oppressing political opposition, implemented by the Soviet regime. The Holocaust is described as a horrific way to dispose *entirely* of racially inferior groups, implemented by the Nazi regime.

Like we have seen, the Holocaust also has a full paragraph to itself that explains in detail the ideas behind and methods used during the Holocaust. Thus, in *Feniks*, the Gulag system does not have the same *status* as the Holocaust. This confirms the status that has over time developed around the Holocaust in Western-Europe. This status includes the idea that the Holocaust was a *European* phenomenon: the Holocaust was a traumatic experience for *entire Europe*, period. Also, the fact that Russia does only to a certain extent belong to Europe, could contribute to the Holocaust getting more focus in a purely European context.

Feniks does not address the differences in scale and cruelty between the Western and the Eastern experience. This again emphasises the myth the Holocaust has become.

What does this mean for Europe today? We see two different pictures here. In the beginning of the chapter we see this statement that defines the Holocaust as an episode in European history that *sets itself apart* by the way we look back on it today: we have given it a name that defines just that single event. However, the Holocaust is also described *as part of* a phenomenon that affected the whole of Europe: the rather aggressive and hostile totalitarian regimes. The authors explain the term 'totalitarian' and say:

With the help of enthusiastic supporters the ideas of communism and fascism were put into practice, often forcefully and with disastrous consequences. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 264)

Europe as a whole went through this experience and its consequences. In other words, it is

described as something all Europeans can relate to.

Even though the holocaust is presented as just a part of this *period of dictatorship*, that does not mean the idea of the Holocaust as creation myth is not relevant. On the contrary, if the Holocaust is something we can all relate to equally, that makes the creation myth all the more relevant, for all Europeans.

Sprekend Verleden

The first thing we must note here is that the word Holocaust is not used in *Sprekend Verleden*. The genocide on the European Jews during World War Two is mentioned of course, but the authors do not use the name Holocaust to refer to it. This is significant. The fact that this particular genocide has over the years received a name of its own, illustrates the special place it now has in European history, it supports the idea of the 'creation myth'. The authors of *SV* choose not to use this name and with that they dismiss this theory.

There also is the matter of how we define the Holocaust. The authors of *Feniks* give a very clear definition in the quote mentioned earlier: there is no doubt that the Holocaust is the genocide on the European Jews, not on any other groups. *SV* does not present the murder of the Jews as an event separate from the genocide on other groups that were deemed inferior by the Nazi's. We see that in several places. When the authors explain the idea behind the 'Endlösung', they list the different types of camps the Nazis had in operation. They describe the extermination camps as follows:

Camps where the purpose was to kill as many Jews and gypsies as possible by leading them into the gas chambers.. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 143)

A little further on they state that Germany fought an 'ideological war' that led to mass murder on *millions of Jews, Polish and Russians*. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 155)

In most cases the Holocaust is defined as the genocide of Jews and does not include the murder of the other groups the Nazis did not tolerate in their perfect, Arian world. If we use that definition, *SV* does not only omit the word Holocaust, they omit the Holocaust itself, in the strictest sense of the word. The murder of all those European Jews was not an isolated event, it was part of a larger scheme that involved many others. Overall, the description in *SV* of the Holocaust, even in the wider sense of the word, is more vague than in *Feniks*. It is less prominent and less outspoken. This does not support the idea of the Holocaust as the basis of a common European memory.

Neither of the two books address differences between east and west when discussing the Holocaust. What *SV* does do is point out that World War Two caused immeasurably more damage and killed an

incomparably higher number of people in Eastern-Europe than in the west. As mentioned above, they also include the Polish and Russian victims into the genocide committed by the Nazis. The pupils will pick up on the fact that the war, and in particular the prosecutions, hit the people in Eastern-Europe a lot harder than they did the population in the west.

The fact that the word Holocaust is not mentioned in *SV* says a great deal about which picture is created here. The authors do not underline the Western-European idea of the Holocaust as the single most cruel crime ever committed. Neither do we see the picture that is created in *Feniks*: of an event every European can relate to. In *SV* the Holocaust does not serve as atrocity that triggered the building of a united Europe.

Conclusion

Feniks and *Sprekend Verleden* yet again represent two rather different views. *Feniks* supports the almost mythical status that the Holocaust has developed, at least in Western-Europe. The picture the pupils get does indeed support the idea that the horrors of the Holocaust unite Europe in that one conviction: *never again*.

The picture drawn of the Holocaust in *SV* is not less horrific. It is however, more levelled and less prominent. The Nazis did away with anyone they saw as a threat to the society they wished to build, whoever they were. This was not the first time, neither would it be the last time such crimes were committed. In *SV*, the Holocaust is not presented as an event that were to create a united Europe, several decades later, nor as something that deeply divided Europe. It seems that *SV* represent the more moderate view that sees the Holocaust as one of the many genocides we have seen in European history.

In the eyes of the authors of *Feniks* the Holocaust functions as a common memory for the whole of Europe, a memory that unites the continent. The authors of *SV* try to undermine this idea, a fact that is illustrated by the omission of the word Holocaust.

The statement that the Holocaust serves as the ashes from which the re-born phoenix, Europe, rises, is a slightly controversial one. There is no doubt that the Holocaust has received the qualities of a myth for some. Whether the idea really will come to serve as a European creation myth as the description in *Feniks* suggests, or whether the idea is already starting to get outdated as we can conclude from *SV*, is hard to say.

World War Two

Feniks

As we have seen when going through all the chapters in the two textbooks, the authors of both books have a strong focus on political history, more than on economic or social history. We also see this in *Feniks* in the chapter about the time of the world wars. As the cause of World War Two they name only one thing directly: German aggression.

In the years leading up to World War Two political leaders and diplomats (mainly from Great-Britain and France) had done everything to try and prevent a conflict with Germany. Hitler's aim had been war almost from the moment of his coming to power. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 257)

We see that *Feniks* lays the blame of the outbreak of the war solely on Germany and the Nazi's.

They indirectly name other factors that influenced World War Two. However, these causes are to explain why the conflict became as widespread as it did, not why it broke out in the first place. As we have seen, Hitler gets all the honour for that. In the introduction they go through the process leading up to World War Two and name the Versailles Treaty:

But the dominant conception was that a world war should never occur again. Special treaties, of which the Versailles Treaty is the most famous, were to avoid this. Unfortunately the clauses in these treaties seemed to almost guarantee new international conflicts. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 254)

A little further on they mention Germany specifically in connection to the Versailles Treaty:

Germany had to pay war reparations to France, Belgium and Great-Britain ... This sum could partly be payment in kind, but was absurdly high. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 261)

They also name the forming of alliances between different countries, as an explanation of why so many countries got involved in both the World War One and the World War Two conflicts.

We see that all these causes have a political background. The authors do mention the economic crisis in the years leading up to the war. In connection to the world war that followed however, it is only mentioned indirectly, as a condition that helped totalitarian regimes to power:

After World War One there were many demotivated groups in various European societies, from farmers and soldiers to the upper classes. In this time of crisis they looked for simple solutions and communism and fascism seemed to offer order in the chaos. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 264)

World War Two is thus presented to have primarily political causes. It is explained as a conflict between states, mainly between England and France on the one side and Germany on the other:

Hitler however did not keep to his side of the agreement. In the spring of 1939 he conquered Czechoslovakia and then it became clear to England and France that it was impossible to make agreements with this German leader. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 258)

This clearly divides Europe into two 'camps'. It will be clear to the pupils that Europe was divided into blocks with Germany and Italy on the one side and England, France and Russia on the other. The fact that Hitler and his Nazi-Germany are presented as 'the guilty one' only increases this idea. It makes the conflict easier to understand and more clear cut. More clear cut than it really was, in fact. The Versailles Treaty is mentioned, but only in general terms. There are no lines drawn to Germany's actions in the run up to the war, nor to France's and England's role in creating a treaty that made Germany into an even fiercer enemy, instead of into a cooperative ally. This does not tally incidentally, with the fact that one of the pictures on the opening pages of this chapter, is a cartoon of Hitler coming out of the Versailles Treaty. The intention of this cartoon is not explained anywhere in the chapter.

What about the social consequences of the war? When discussing the differences between World War One and World War Two, they explain that in World War Two many more civilians were affected. A fact that makes that World War Two has the potential to work as a common European memory. The pupils get the following assignment, using two maps about the course of the world wars:

b. Explain that civilians were not affected directly, but that they were indirectly affected during World War One.

c. Explain that the situation during World War Two was very different. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 258)

In the paragraph with the title *Destruction on a larger scale than ever before*, the authors explain that it was mostly new technology that was the cause of this. The bombing of cities is one of the main reasons why civilians were so much more directly affected by the war, on both sides of the conflict. They name London, Rotterdam, Dresden and Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The following paragraph is the about the Holocaust. This is also an example of the civilian population being directly affected by the conflict, and here there were also victims both on the side of the Allied and of Axis powers. As the authors do not address the differences in ferocity of these actions between Eastern-Europe and Western-Europe, World War Two can be seen as an experience and memory that nearly all Europeans have in common. Functioning as such, a common memory can be said to work as a reference point for Europe as a whole.

Moreover, the authors start the paragraph about the occupation of the Netherlands with the following statement:

The events of World War Two have become a reference point for what is right and what is wrong.
(Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 284)

This certainly fits very well with the idea of the experiences during the war functioning as the basis of our modern moral values. We have to note two things however. This comes from the paragraph on World War Two in the Netherlands and it does not become entirely clear if the authors refer to Europe as a whole or not. Also, the authors do not elaborate on this. They do not explain more thoroughly what they mean by this. It seems that the point is to emphasise how important the war is in Dutch history, without going into detail about this statement.

The idea of World War Two as a common European memory is reinforced by the fact that the authors of *Feniks* say very little about World War Two in the rest of the world. From reading *Feniks* the pupils will be left with the impression that very little of the war was fought outside of Europe. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is one of the few times involvement outside of Europe is mentioned. Even the United States are mentioned only occasionally. We see this confirmed by the pictures shown on the opening pages of the chapter about the world wars. The pupils are shown six pictures and there is one quote. Of these seven sources there is one about World War One, the rest are from World War Two. Among these there is a picture that shows the mushroom cloud above Nagasaki caused by the nuclear bomb. All the rest show different aspects of World War Two in Europe. Two cover the holocaust, among which the one larger picture. This focus on Europe can be said to reinforce the idea of the war as common European memory.

Summarising, we see two pictures here again. The one of a political conflict that deeply divided Europe into two camps, and that of the common memory of the horrors of this conflict that united Europe in the conviction that this was never to be repeated. The first impression one gets from *Feniks* is that of a World War Two that created a strong division in Europe. The idea of a common memory and the goal never to repeat this again does not come across as clearly as that of the armed conflict that tore apart the continent.

However, that is before the pupils come to the paragraph, a good while later on, about European integration. This we have discussed before and we see that World War Two together with World War One, is presented as the reason for European integration and ultimately the creation of the EU:

Shortly after 1945 the wish grew in Western-Europe for European integration. The main reason for this was the strong wish to prevent a recurrence of the devastating world wars.
(Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 313)

Even though it is not mentioned directly in the chapter about the world wars, *Feniks* does present

the view that World War Two ultimately led to a united Europe.

Sprekend Verleden

This is not the case for *Sprekend Verleden*. Neither in the chapter about World War Two, nor in the paragraph on European integration do the authors name the horrors of the world wars to be the direct cause for the development of the EU or European integration in general. In the paragraph about the consequences of World War Two we read the following:

Pacifism received less support than after World War One. And few Western states were inclined to remain neutral. Most states wished to help to avoid war by military cooperation. That is how in the Western world, the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was created (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 163)

The authors also name the UN in the same paragraph. In this context, they do not mention the EU or the ECSC.

Looking at the paragraph about European integration we see the same thing. As mentioned before, the Marshall plan is described to be a direct cause for closer economic ties within Europe because the countries had to cooperate when spending the aid money. The fact that economic integration helped prevent further conflict is only mentioned as a by-product of this integration, not as the reason behind it:

The common management of coal and steel prevented excessive armament of one or more of the members of the ECSC. A new war between these countries could thus be prevented. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 250)

This does not support the idea we have seen in *Feniks* that the common European memory of World War Two forms the basis for a united Europe.

Furthermore, the Cold War is mentioned as a possible consequence of the war. Again in the paragraph about the consequences of the war, they say the following:

Due to the opposition between the US and Russia the world was divided into two blocks: the communist block led by Russia and the Western block led by the US. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 163)

We see then that the authors of *SV* present World War Two to have led to global integration rather than European, and to division in Europe in the form of the Cold War.

How does this correspond with the rest of the chapter about World War Two? Is the war itself presented as a common European memory or as something that divides us? The first thing we notice is that far more than *Feniks*, *SV* addresses the world wide character of the war. The opening pages

of the chapter show two maps, one titled *World War Two: South-East Asia*, the other *World War Two: Europe and Northern-Africa*. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 148-149) The starting point for the pupils is thus already different than that in *Feniks*, where we have seen that the opening of the chapter is, like the rest of it, devoted almost entirely to the war in Europe.

As an example of this we look at the paragraph about the occupation of the Netherlands. The authors have added a box about a camp in the Dutch colony Suriname where Germans and Dutch people who sympathised with the Nazi's, were 'put away'. Not only does this illustrate the fact that colonies were drawn into the war, it also emphasises that it was not only the axis powers that committed the atrocities.

Was this Surinamese camp a concentration camp? That depends on the definition used. It was at any rate a camp where a large group of people was held captive without a form of process and treated contrary to Dutch law. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 160)

What the pupils learn here is that the war was not as simple as we sometimes wish to believe.

An other example is the mentioning of the millions of Chinese that were killed during the war with Japan: it was not only in Europe that World War Two caused a loss of lives at a scale that was never recorded before.

All in all, we can hardly say that the pupils get the idea that the war was a European affair. The question is whether World War Two can then still function as a European memory, if it includes events so clearly outside the range of European influence.

Looking at the way the authors describe the war fought in Europe, we note that at the beginning of the chapter the authors present three different theories about what, or rather who, caused World War Two, without giving an opinion about which of these is the most accurate:

- *Mostly Hitler, but also France, England and Russia*
- *Mostly France and England*
- *Hitler and his NSDAP the cause* (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 151)

The pupils are encouraged to form their own opinion. What is important for us is the fact that these causes are all of a political nature, emphasising the differences rather than the uniting aspects of this war.

Reading on however, the pupils are presented with a wide range of World War Two aspects that affected the civilian population: the choices that civil servants had to make when asked to carry out Nazi doctrine, a lack of food, weapons that did not differentiate between military and civil targets, the loss of one or more family members etc. Civilians on all sides of the conflict were affected by the war. As we have seen in *Feniks*, this can support the idea that World War Two is an episode in

history all Europeans have in common. It does not however in *SV*, because of two reasons.

First of all, the authors include also here those parts of the world outside of Europe that were affected by the war. As mentioned before they name the Chinese victims of the war with Japan:

In Asia, the war Japan fought against China (1931-1945) cost the lives of millions of Chinese civilians. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 157)

We can ask ourselves again the question: can World War Two, with its worldwide character function as a common European memory?

Secondly there is a great emphasis on the differences between Eastern-Europe and Western-Europe. They explain that the purpose of occupying Western-European countries was rather different than the purpose of occupying Eastern-Europe. There is a section in the text headed *Occupation in Western-Europe aimed at 'Gleichschaltung' of the population*, and another section with the title *Occupation in Eastern-Europe very cruel*. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 153) This is very significant for the picture that the authors create here: Western-Europeans and Eastern-Europeans have very different memories of World War Two.

The authors also mention the many people in Eastern-European countries that were forced to leave their homes:

The populations of certain areas in Eastern-Europe were forced to leave, partly or in their entirety. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 155)

As mentioned in the chapter on the Holocaust, the authors name Jews, Poles and Russians as the main victims of the Holocaust, something that underlines the fact that the Holocaust specifically and World War Two in general, hit Eastern-Europe a lot harder than it did Western-Europe.

Thus it seems difficult to argue that World War Two can be a common European memory when the war by no means is limited to Europe and when there are such major differences within Europe as a whole.

Conclusion

The fact that the World War Two conflict divided Europe into two camps, becomes clear from both textbooks. Both books name politics as the main cause for the war to start and create a picture of two ideological camps intent on stopping each other at any cost. This aspect of the conflict is a clear dividing factor in European history.

Looking at the consequences of the war on a more individual level we see that civilians everywhere were affected by the war. In almost every respect World War Two caused a loss of civilian lives on a scale never seen before. This the books also agree on. They do not however agree on the meaning this has.

Feniks presents World War Two as an experience that unites Europe as a whole. They refer to the war as a basis for our present day idea of right and wrong. In the paragraph about European integration they say directly that the memory of the two world wars was the reason for the start of European unity. First on an economic level in the form of the ESCS, later on a much broader scale. Especially now that also Eastern-European countries are ready to join, the European family starts to really take form.

The way the loss of civilian lives is presented, creates a picture of World War Two as an experience all Europeans can relate to: a common memory.

Sprekend Verleden comes to a different conclusion. As there are such significant differences between east and west when it comes to how World War Two was experienced, it is difficult to claim that the war functions as a common memory for us all. Eastern-Europe and Western-Europe remember a very different war. Thus *SV* does not give World War Two the role of starting point for an integrated Europe. Economics they say was the reason for the ESCS to be started, not politics.

Moreover, it is difficult to argue that a conflict that was as widespread as World War Two functions as a European memory.

Colonialism and imperialism

Here we are in need of a working definition. Unlike 'World War Two' or 'the Enlightenment', 'colonialism' can mean a great number of things. The Britannica online encyclopedia distinguishes Western colonialism from other meanings of the word:

A political-economic phenomenon whereby various European nations explored, conquered, settled, and exploited large areas of the world.

(Western colonialism, n.d.)

In the article, the 1500-1900 period is named as the time frame for Western colonialism. This then is the phenomenon we discuss in this chapter: the exploration and exploitation of large parts of the world by certain European nations in the time period between the 1500 and 1900.

There is no agreement about the relation between colonialism and imperialism. By some the period of imperialism is considered the last stage of Western colonialism. Others clearly distinguish between the two, colonialism meaning that the relations between colonies and the colonial powers was based on trade, imperialism meaning that the colonial powers made 'their' colonies part of a vast empire that was a political unity. Neither of the textbooks gives a clear definition. What must be pointed out is that *Sprekend Verleden* includes the political situation in the Middle East in the chapter about colonialism, discussing the period from the beginning of Islam until World War One. With this they greatly extend the period connected to colonialism. In our discussion we do not include these historical moments, as they have limited relevance for our discussion and go beyond the period we discuss.

Feniks

The topic of colonialism is the one topic that gives, in the textbooks, an unambiguous picture when it comes to the question of whether it unites or divides Europe. Colonialism has served very clearly as a dividing factor in European history.

There are two aspect that seem to be of importance here. Firstly, owning colonies meant power and riches for the coloniser. Similarly, these countries needed a certain level of economic and military power in order to be able to obtain colonies in the first place. This meant that the leading powers in Europe reinforced their position and the differences between European countries deepened.

Secondly, colonialism meant rivalry. The struggle for the most profitable areas led to violent clashes between the colonial powers and tension in the relationships between countries in Europe.

This first aspect is most prominently seen in the beginning of the period we are discussing. *Feniks* does not mention the economic and social differences that came to light in Europe in connection to

colonialism. When explaining the time of the explorations and the way various countries created a large overseas empire, they do not address why these countries in particular developed this way. They do speak of the leading position of various countries however:

Spanish cargo ships regularly sailed from Peru and Mexico transporting resources from overseas to Spain ... This became the lifeline for the Spanish domination in Europe. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p.130)

In the same way, the authors address the decline of Spain and Portugal and the rise of England, The Republic and France. To the development of the Republic the authors dedicate a whole chapter. They explain that the Republic was ahead of its time both economically and politically. *Feniks* presents the Republic as a well organised modern country that stood out from the rest of Europe. They do not mention England in this context. Where many historians compare England and the Republic, as both developed in a different direction than the rest of Europe, *Feniks* does not draw this in. They do, as indicated, compare the Republic to Portugal:

In the wake of Da Gama and Columbus, the Amsterdam tradesmen sent ships to the Indies themselves to procure these resources ... The Portuguese held a monopoly position in the European spice trade until the end of the sixteenth century. Due to inadequate organisation and a limited fleet however ... they could not meet the European demand (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 163)

They say the same about England and France:

In Central and North America they acquired a leading trading position, mostly at the expense of Spain and Portugal.(Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 190)

What we see then, is that the authors explain that there was a connection between being a colonial power and having a certain level of modernisation. They do not however, address the divide this caused in Europe as a whole and how this divide deepened as a result of these colonial activities.

The only time they refer to this is when they quote the French politician Jules Ferry, who said the following in 1882:

Obtaining colonies is for France a matter of life and death. France has to establish a large colonial empire in Africa. Not to do so will make of France a second class country, like for example Greece and Romania. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 226)

This statement is not further explained in the book.

The second aspect is clearer. There is no doubt that colonialism created great rivalry between states and that *Feniks* presents this very clearly. In the beginning of the period we discuss here, it concerned mostly Spain and Portugal:

Because both the Portuguese and the Spanish tried to expand their overseas territories there were often disputes between them. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 130)

In many places in the book such conflicts are described. Prominent among these hostilities was of course the scramble for Africa. The authors use the conflict between France and Great Britain over Fashoda in 1898 as an example. They quote from a book by Wesseling, from 1991, about this episode:

Two European countries that were in many ways related, reached the brink of war over an area that Salisbury had called a 'country of swamps and fevers' and that Hanotaux had described as 'a country inhabited by monkeys and blacks that are worse than monkeys'. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 226)

The authors ask the question why countries colonised areas that were of little or no use to them and answer by explaining that it was all about power. The rivalry had become such that economic goals were no longer an issue.

The authors go on and explain that many see these rivalries as one of the causes of World War One:

Partly because of these clashes, the mistrust between European states grew. Modern imperialism thus certainly played its part in the rising tension that in 1914 led to the outbreak of World War One. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 226)

Another strong indicator is the fact that the authors link imperialism with nationalism in the following assignment:

Explain in your own words the connection between imperialism and nationalism. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 229)

There is no doubt then, about the dividing character of colonialism and imperialism in Europe.

Sprekend Verleden

In *Sprekend Verleden* it becomes even clearer that colonialism created discord in Europe. Important to note is that *SV* by no means presents colonialism as a European phenomenon. *SV* has an entire chapter that discusses colonialism and decolonisation and this chapter is written solely from the colonies' point of view. The chapter starts with a description of the ancient cultures in America, Africa and Asia, so that the pupils get a more complete picture of the background of these continents and place the events surrounding colonialism into this context. For instance, with regard to China they say the following:

The Chinese were surrounded by peoples with less developed civilisations and had therefore the impression that they lived on a cultivated island in a sea of barbarians. They considered China

the centre of the world. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 258)

This account of the ancient cultures in the areas that later were to be colonised by European powers, does not only make the pupils understand that there was more than one side to this process of colonisation, it also gives them a more reflected picture of the world and its history in general.

This chapter shows the way colonialism affected those areas that became colonies, rather than what colonialism meant for the colonial powers.

In America the Indians lost their political independence almost everywhere. They became second class citizens in their own country. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 261)

When discussing the circumstances that stimulated decolonisation they speak of *internal circumstances* and *external circumstances*, meaning processes from inside the colonies and processes outside. As one of the *external* causes they name growing realisation among the colonial powers that the time of colonialism was coming to an end:

Due to the developments mentioned above, countries like Great Britain, France and Belgium came to understand that the era of colonialism was drawing to a close. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 263)

Thus *SV* creates a picture of colonialism that is not centred around Europe, but gives a broader perspective and draws in the colonies' view point. Where *Feniks* presented colonialism as a European project, *SV* has a global view of the matter. Not only is colonialism presented as a dividing factor in European history, in *SV* the focus is drawn away from Europe entirely.

Otherwise we see the same patterns in *SV* as we have seen in *Feniks*: colonialism divided Europe both because of the enmity it caused between the colonial powers and because it emphasised and deepened the differences between these powers on the one side and the countries that did not have colonies on the other.

Like in *Feniks*, this last aspect is not referred to directly. Several times the authors refer to the colonial powers as 'Western-European' or they name the countries that were most prominent in the colonisation process. They are not consequent in this however and also just refer to Europeans.

Throughout this century several European states acquired a large colonial empire. The most important among these were England, France and the Netherlands. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 101)

It becomes clear however that the authors of *SV* consider colonisation to be rooted in Western-Europe when they look at the process from a rather different perspective, namely that of the Turkish Empire. At the same time that Western-Europe went through a cultural and economical upswing, the Turkish Empire (as the Ottoman Empire is called in *SV*) experienced decline.

Art and culture did not get much chance to develop under Turkish rule. It was a different matter in Western-Europe ... the Western-Europeans would dominate the world for a while to come. The Turkish empire included. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 269)

We see then that *SV* clearly indicates that not all of Europe took part in this colonisation process. That this created even greater economic and social differences between European states is not mentioned however. In the chapter about 'The industrialisation of the west' the authors do name these differences, but they never link this to colonialism, not as a cause nor as a result, although both can be argued for.

The fact that colonialism caused enmity and conflicts, mainly between the respective colonial powers is referred to many times, both in the chapter about colonialism and in other moments in the book, especially when discussing the rise of nationalist movements throughout Europe:

A large colonial empire contributed significantly to national pride. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 101)

Like in *Feniks* the authors of *SV* link colonialism and the rivalry it caused, to the outbreak of World War One. The following comes from the paragraph about the causes of the war:

France and Germany did not want to accept England's leading role in the non-Western world. A scramble to obtain as much territory in Africa as possible was the result ... Between England and France it came to a reconciliation in 1904. Between England and Germany it did not. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 123)

They also name the grudge that the young Germany felt at lagging behind in international politics:

The German government aspired Germany to gain more influence in the world ('Weltpolitik'). The German state had been established far later than some other European states. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 123)

What we see here then is that the relatively small quarrels over territory caused, or at least emphasised, deep-lying mistrust between states and could lead to serious conflicts. In other words it deeply divided Europe.

Conclusion

The conclusion of this chapter is fairly straightforward then. In several different ways colonialism caused divide and conflict in Europe and both textbooks emphasise this. There is nothing in either of the textbooks that points towards colonialism or imperialism creating a common memory for Europe.

Both textbooks point out in several places in the book, the competition between the colonial powers and the struggles this caused. It also becomes clear from both textbooks that only a small part of

Europe was active in this greatly criticized episode in European history. Even though neither of the books say directly that this led to even more pronounced differences between these countries and the rest of Europe, many pupils will make that connection, especially because this inequality is described other places in the books.

The one thing that sets *SV* apart from *Feniks* is the angle they take when discussing colonialism, imperialism and decolonisation. By taking the situation in the colonies and not in the colonising countries as a starting point, they emphasise that this is a global phenomenon. This makes it even more clear that we cannot, in any way, speak of a common European memory.

World War One

Feniks

Feniks has less focus on World War One than they do on World War Two. The Netherlands remained neutral during World War One and traditionally there is more focus on World War Two in Dutch history.

Similarly to the description of World War Two, World War One is presented as a political conflict between nations.

The imperialism of the nineteenth century, growing nationalism, the arms race and the alliances are often named as the deeper causes of World War One. When on the 28th June 1914 the Austrian crown prince Franz-Ferdinand and his wife Sophie were murdered in Sarajevo, this was just the spark to the tinder. Underlying, simmering conflicts broke out. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 254)

Like World War Two, World War One divided Europe into two camps. The alliances that caused the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia to spread to other parts of Europe are presented as an important factor. Looking at this political aspect of the war, there is no doubt that it caused, or was the result of, strong enmity between various nations. We can only see that as a dividing factor in European history.

The aspect of World War Two that can be said to work to unite Europe, that of the wish to avoid such a conflict to break out again, does only partly apply to the World War One. These sentiments certainly were a part of the public opinion after the war, they did not however led to the same result as after World War Two.

But the dominant conception was that world war should never occur again. Special treaties, of which the Versailles Treaty is the most famous, were to avoid this. Unfortunately the clauses in these treaties seemed to almost guarantee new international conflicts. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 254)

The Versailles Treaty was based more on the wish for revenge, than on the wish to keep such a war from repeating itself.

Germany as the losing party was punished with an enormous sum of war reparations to the victors. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 260)

Then there is the question whether World War One can be seen as a common European memory. At the beginning of the war all parties had the same attitude towards the coming war: that of

enthusiasm and a great faith in their own superiority. In a strange, slightly ironic way this can be considered a common memory: all were united in the same belief that the opponent did not stand a chance.

Checking the historical sources we find no fear for the war; only optimism about a quick and certain victory. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 256)

This common belief disappeared quickly however and was replaced by horror.

Moreover, for a historical event to function as a common European memory, it is necessary that the whole of Europe played a part in it. Of World War One, this is only partly true. Only certain countries were directly at war with each other. The authors of *Feniks* however, point out that people in large parts of the world were confronted with both World War One and World War Two, if not directly then indirectly. As an example from World War One they name the Netherlands, who remained neutral but were affected by the war all the same:

The Netherlands remained neutral during World War One, but our country was faced with thousands of Belgian refugees who sometimes stayed for years ... Furthermore, the Dutch army had to mobilise and ten thousand young men had to be ready to go to war, during all four years of the war. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 256)

In the introduction the authors also explain that in World War One civilians were affected more by the war than was the case during previous wars. As one of the characteristics of the time of the world wars they name:

Destruction on a scale never seen before caused by weapons of mass destruction and the involvement of the civil population in the war. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 254)

In the case of World War Two the authors come back to this statement later on in the book, while in connection to World War One they do not elaborate on this.

Thus the authors say that the whole of Europe was affected by the war one way or the other. Accordingly it has the potential to function as a memory all Europeans have in common, even though the book does not say this directly. Still, the focus is far more on the dividing character of the war.

Sprekend Verleden

Unlike *Feniks*, *Sprekend Verleden* pays a lot of attention to the Versailles Treaty and its consequences. When it comes to the question of World War One functioning as a common memory in Europe, the picture drawn in *SV* is even less favourable than in *Feniks*.

As with World War Two, the chapter on World War One is largely dominated by the political side of

the war. When addressing the causes of the war the authors start with explaining that nationalism was one of the deeper lying causes for World War One to break out. They mention the conflict between France and Germany over Alsace-Lorraine as an example:

In France the nationalists wanted revenge for the defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), when they lost Alsace-Lorraine. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 123)

In addition they name imperialism as a cause, as we have seen in the chapter about colonialism and imperialism. All these different conditions leading to the outbreak of the war were intensified by the fact that they made governments feel the need to find allies.

Nationalism, imperialism, militarism and the arms race increased the fear European states had for each other. This caused governments to look for allies ... But the existence of these alliances only increased the chance of a large conflict. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 123)

The authors of *SV* see political and military conflicts as the primary cause behind the outbreak of the war. As said before this can only be seen to have divided Europe into camps. The willingness of the people to mobilise and go to war to serve their country indicates that it was not only the politicians who stood behind the conflicts between states. Also the people held these nationalist beliefs. In *Feniks* this is not mentioned directly. In *SV* however the authors show a drawing from the French magazine 'Le Petit Journal', showing 'Marianne' urging the leader of the socialists, Jean Jaurès, to remember the Franco-Prussian War and to take revenge. The authors explain that Jaurès chose to try and avoid war and urged all European workers to boycott the call to mobilise, and strike.

But there was hardly any strike. On 31 July [Jaurès] was murdered in Paris by a young French nationalist. The next day the French mobilisation started. The French socialists joined the war. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 123)

This is one of the significant differences between World War One and World War Two, significant in general but specifically in the context of our research question. The conflict of World War One was not merely one between political leaders, it extended to the masses as well. *SV* shows a picture of women wishing French soldiers good luck as they are on their way to war. The general mood in Europe was one of optimism at the start of The Great War. At the start of World War Two the masses' primary sentiment was one of fear and great scepticism.

This public opinion in 1914 was greatly influenced by the new phenomenon of mass propaganda, that had to convince the people of the cruelty of the enemy.

Both sides deliberately presented the biggest lies about the enemy as fact. In the German press stories appeared about the most gruesome crimes committed by Belgian civilians against the German soldiers. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 129)

Such stories had to help up-hold the civilian population's support for the war.

Feniks leaves room for the opinion that World War One could function as a common European memory. *SV* does not. When explaining why World War One is considered to be a world war they point out that this does not mean that the whole world was involved but merely that it was a war on a larger scale than ever before. Fighting was largely confined to Europe and then only to certain parts:

Most of the fighting was situated in Western– and Eastern-Europe. But many European countries, among which the Netherlands, were not involved. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 125)

Even though the civilian population was united in their fear and horror about what was happening around them, this was only the case for people in certain areas. This the authors of *SV* point out to the pupils:

Civilians were much more involved in the war than they had been the case in previous wars ... However, there were differences in how the civilians were confronted with the war. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 127)

We cannot say then that *SV* presents World War One as an episode in European history that unites the whole continent. We can see that clearly in the countries that remained neutral during World War One, where variations of Victory Day are celebrated in connection with World War Two and not with World War One.

As said before, *SV* addresses the consequences of the war thoroughly, with much focus on the Versailles Treaty. From the paragraph about the consequences of World War One we can conclude that the situation hardly improved after the end of the war, despite Wilson's efforts. The peace treaty reflected the conflicts from before and during the war, rather than solve them. *SV* describes the great resentment among the English and French diplomats present at the peace conference.

What mattered for Wilson was future peace and safety. The others were more interested in securing a stronger position for their own country, and in the question of who was guilty and claiming repayment from them. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 130)

The authors point out that the peace treaty did not secure peace, but rather led to more conflict. They explain that the way the borders between countries were now drawn, created not only new countries but also new minorities who felt misplaced.

The Allied powers were unable or unwilling to draw the borders meeting the wishes of all of the people living in the area. Moreover, self-determination did not apply to the defeated. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 131)

This view is illustrated with a cartoon that appeared in the American 'Daily Herald' in 1919. The cartoon shows Clemenceau, nicknamed 'The Tiger' leaving after the Versailles Treaty was

signed. He is accompanied by Wilson, Lloyd George and Orlando (Italy). Out of sight of the gentlemen we see a small child crying, labelled '1940 class'. The caption reads *'Peace and future cannon fodder'*. Underneath the picture is written *"The Tiger: 'Curious! I seem to hear a child weeping!'"*. The Versailles Treaty lies at the feet of the child. The cartoonist apparently foresaw already in 1919(!) the disastrous consequences the Versailles Treaty could get: the children of 1919 would in 1940 be the soldiers who would be shipped off to a new war. That the authors agree with the cartoonist in that the Versailles Treaty caused more trouble than it solved becomes clear from the assignment connected to the cartoon:

In the explanation beside the picture it says that, looking back on the situation, the cartoonist had a better understanding of the implications of the treaty than most European politicians. Give at least one explanation of this. (Buskop et al., 2009b, p. 95)

It is very clear what the authors of *SV* think of the consequences of World War One: the enmity between European states had deepened. England and France felt resentful towards Germany because they put the blame for the outbreak of the war entirely on them. Germany felt resentful towards England and France because of that same reason.

Before, during and after the war, Europe was divided by multiple conflicts and the book gives no indication that there is any reason to believe that any aspect of World War One could work as a common memory for the continent as a whole.

Conclusion

It seems that both books present a picture of World War One that divided Europe even more than did World War Two. The main difference being the consequences. Yet, because *Feniks* does not say nearly as much about these consequences as *SV* does, this picture is not as strong. *Feniks* gives an account of the war and the schism it created in Europe. However, as the book also presents the war as an episode that affected everyone all over Europe, one can argue that it has the potential to work as a uniting factor in the long run. Moreover, in the paragraph about the unification of Europe, the authors claim that the experience of both the Second and the First World War led to the founding of the ECSC.

This conclusion cannot be drawn from the description in *SV*. For a historical moment to function like that it has to have a significant resonance throughout the whole continent. *SV* specifically says that this was not the case for World War One. In *SV* World War One is presented as a dividing factor then, with no indication that the war can in any way function as a common European memory.

The emergence of 'isms'

Feniks

In the chapter about the nineteenth century *Feniks* addresses various movements throughout the chapter, with emphasis on liberalism and socialism. Most focus is on the differences between them. The fact that these movements spread through much of Europe and thus worked as links between the different countries is not directly mentioned. Thus, the emergence of isms is presented as a phenomenon that divided, more than it united Europe.

This becomes clear when we look at why, according to the authors of *Feniks*, liberalism and socialism emerged. Both are a consequence of the industrialisation of society, they say:

Factory owners and workers (capital and labour) needed each other in the nineteenth century; they did not, however, have the same interests ... From both groups emerged a political movement. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 235)

It becomes clear from the text in the whole paragraph that factory owners and their workers had conflicting interests; what was good for the workers was usually expensive for the factory owners. This is also explained in the introduction:

Owing to liberalism, that was largely based on the idea of 'liberty', the will of the factory owners was law. The socialists, for whom 'equality' was the key principle, tried to undermine the position of power of the liberals. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 216)

This does not encourage the view that these movements drew connections across Europe between countries.

Also other movements had interests that clashed. That becomes clear in the following assignment, based on a text explaining the catholic view on women working in factories:

Explain, based on source 49, that there were major differences in opinions between socialists and feminists on the one side and confessionals on the other. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 242)

Thus we see a great emphasis on the dividing qualities of these movements for Europe.

Another important question is whether these developments actually were a European phenomenon. When addressing the revolutionary year of 1848 they speak of 'the whole of Europe'. To what degree these protesters were organised they do not say, but that the ideas of socialism, liberalism and nationalism had reached other countries than England, France and the German states is clear. The year 1848 illustrates that the emergence of these movements, based on an ideology and ignoring national boundaries, was something that the whole continent was a part of.

In 1848 ... there was unrest everywhere in Europe. People of the bourgeoisie, workers, liberals

and nationalists marched against the establishment. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 236)

Right away however, they point out again that these movements often opposed each other and by no means had the same objectives.

Because their interests were too contradictory however, the bourgeoisie and workers could easily be played off against each other. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 236)

For our context this passage gets a dual meaning then. On the one hand, it clearly underlines the fact that these developments affected Europe as a whole. Yet again, there is so much emphasis on the significant differences between them that they divided Europe as much as they united it.

Feniks is much more explicit about the conflicts that existed between these groups than they are about their international character. This was a relatively new phenomenon in Europe, specifically for the lower classes, which had very rarely looked beyond regional, let alone national boundaries. The only place where the authors directly point this out is in a different chapter and a rather different context. They quote from an article in a Dutch history magazine (*Historisch Nieuwsblad*) about Mussolini, explaining why Mussolini went from being an outspoken socialist, to an outspoken nationalist as a result of World War One:

After the outbreak of the war in 1914, Mussolini's conviction to socialism was shaken. The ruling conviction of the radicals was that workers did not have a homeland: the class struggle went across all countries and was supposed to unite the proletariat. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 268)

This quote is part of an assignment, not of the actual text, and as previously mentioned, it is from a different topic all together. The question is whether the pupils make the connection with what they have learned in the paragraphs about the topic at hand: the emergence of isms.

One movement has not been mentioned at all yet and that is because the book does not say anything about it: nationalism. Nationalism is not mentioned in this paragraph, other than when the authors sum up all the ideologies that were active during the revolutions of 1848 (see quote from page 236). Otherwise, the only context in which the authors discuss nationalism is imperialism. In the passage about the struggle for Africa they explain France' motivation:

For the French it was difficult to accept that they now played the second fiddle in Europe. They wanted to uphold their leading position by creating a large imperial empire. The French government excessively stimulated nationalism (preference for one's own country). (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 226)

This link between nationalism and imperialism that the authors present here is confirmed by the following assignment:

Explain in your own words what the connection is between modern imperialism and nationalism. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 229)

Nationalism is here linked to something that we nowadays have a distinctly negative perception of: imperialism. This also becomes clear from the way the authors speak of the rivalry between European countries that stimulated this frantic struggle to gain as many colonies as possible.

We see then that the references to nationalism have a rather negative undertone and that nationalism does not come back in any other context. There is no mention then, of a nationalism where Europe can be a supporting factor.

Feniks' explanation of nationalism is not a favourable one for a united Europe. The 'classical' explanation, that nationalism and the unification of Europe are opposing ideas, is confirmed by *Feniks*. Many agree now that it is not necessarily this black and white, but this view is not represented in *Feniks*.

The uniting factor of the other isms we have described does not have a very prominent place in *Feniks* either. The main emphasis is, as mentioned before, on what sets them apart.

Sprekend Verleden

Sprekend Verleden dedicates an entire chapter to the emergence of isms, with the title 'Democracy and isms'. The first question to be addressed is which part of Europe, or the world, this topic applies to. While the authors do not answer this question explicitly, they indicate that the emergence of ideologies, or isms, in this time period was a European phenomenon.

In the first half of the nineteenth century the political conflict at hand in many European countries, was whether the power was to be held by the king or the parliament. The conservatives defended the king, the liberals the parliament. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 108)

Several other places throughout the chapter they mention Europe in this general way without really explaining why, indicating that the discussion is centred around Europe as a whole.

Like in *Feniks*, the differences between various isms are the main focus in *SV*. They explain the phenomenon of isms or ideologies by explaining that democrats are divided into groups with different ideas:

The democrats argued for equality before the law and equal chances for everyone. But among them surfaced different opinions about the measures that were to be taken to obtain this equality in practice. They also had different ideas about how far the ideal of freedom should reach and how this was supposed to work in everyday life. Also about the pace at which changes had to be made they had different ideas. Some wanted to apply these changes to the whole world, some only focussed on what they considered to be their homeland. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 107)

Here we see that the authors sum up the most important isms without naming them directly. This

suggests that the way these isms came to be is through disagreement among those who wanted change. As in *Feniks* we see a dual meaning here. On the one hand, this group that the authors refer to as democrats was united in a wish for change. They were however strongly divided when it came to how, when and where. Which characteristic is more prominent? That question is of course highly significant for our research question. In *Feniks* we saw that there was most emphasis on the differences. We see the same in *SV*. In the following sentence it becomes clear that there are fundamental differences between socialism, liberalism and conservatism.

When it came to the social question too... the conservatives opposed the liberals, as well as – for very different reasons – the socialists. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 108)

This means that what is most important, or at least most prominent, is that Europe was divided into isms, not that it was united in a movement for change.

The ideology that had the strongest international focus was socialism. Workers in all countries had to work together to win their struggle against the capitalist factory owners. However, *SV* points out that even socialists did not always show solidarity with workers in other countries:

According to Marx, workers would no longer follow capitalist orders when asked to join in battle against each other. During World War One however, most workers and also most socialist parties chose their own nation and joined the war. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 112)

Thus, even groups that were supposed to have one and the same objective throughout Europe, and even the world, opposed each other and put their own country first.

In the chapter about the emergence of isms there is a whole paragraph about nationalism. Unlike *Feniks*, *SV* does discuss nationalism in this context. They give the following definition:

A feeling of solidarity among a group of people who together form a state or wish to form a state. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 116)

This is a neutral explanation of what nationalism implies. It does not say anything about whether or not nationalism is, as many believe, an idea that opposes the idea of a united Europe. Certainly *SV* sees nationalism as something that gained momentum throughout the whole of Europe, from the beginning of the nineteenth century.

In the beginning of the nineteenth century nationalism spread through Europe. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 117)

However, there are two questions connected to this statement that clearly point out that there were differences in the way nationalism developed:

- *What caused nationalism to grow considerably stronger in Western- and Central-Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century?*
- *What caused nationalism to grow considerably stronger in Eastern-Europe in the nineteenth*

century? (Buskop et al., 2009b, p. 80)

This suggests that even if nationalism could work to unite Europe in the same way as other ideologies did, there were considerable differences in the way nationalism manifested itself in different parts of Europe.

Then there is the question of whether *SV* presents this nationalism to be a threat to Europe as united entity. When we read on we first come across a passage that does point in this direction. The authors explain that one of the things to awaken people's national pride was Napoleon's domination of Europe. The people in the countries that were conquered by Napoleon wanted to be independent nations, not ruled by a European force.

A little further on however, we find support for the opposite view, namely that Europe as a whole can protect nations' self-determination. They explain the terms self-determination and democracy:

All nationalities must have the possibility to form their own state and the right to choose their own government. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 119)

It is not this but the passage that follows that is significant in this context. There they explain that this understanding led to various countries gaining their independence, helped by other nations:

In the first half of the nineteenth century two national groups managed to form their own state (1830): the Greeks (with help from England, France and Russia) and the Belgians (with help from France). (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 119)

Thus Europe functions as a protector of the right of self-determination. There is a strange paradox here: the idea of self-determination that swept through Europe as a whole forced the continent to be divided even further, at least geographically.

If we look at the paragraph about nationalism as a whole we do, however, see a picture of a movement that affected Europe as a whole and not as something that caused rivalry. *SV* describes a rather pro-European type of nationalism.

That must be the conclusion for the whole chapter: the isms that surfaced in the nineteenth century, each for themselves had the effect of making people look beyond national boundaries. Reading this chapter there is no doubt that these movements spread through the whole continent.

Looking at the picture of the idea of isms as a whole, *SV* emphasizes the pronounced differences between them.

Conclusion

Can this phenomenon of the emergence of political movements be said to function as a common

European memory? That question does not have a simple answer. Both *Feniks* and *SV* point out that the whole of Europe went through these changes around the same time. Especially the year of 1848 can be seen as an historical event that left an impression on all Europeans. Even though very few Europeans today have an association with the events of this year, the movements connected to it still play a major part in our political perspective.

The main focus of the textbooks however, is on the differences between them. Can a development that created so much tension, still play the role of uniting factor or common memory? In their wish for democracy and their dissatisfaction with the establishment, Europeans were united across national boundaries. In the place of the divisions between countries however, there came division into political groups. This does not create a picture of a united Europe.

Then there is the question of nationalism. Here *Feniks* and *SV* represent rather different views. *Feniks* has a negative approach to nationalism; first linked to imperialism and the accompanying rivalry, later on linked to fascism and World War Two.

SV presents a positive, pro-European nationalism in the chapter about the emergence of isms. This fits in with the picture of the isms functioning to draw connections across Europe. As we have seen this goes for all the ideologies.

The industrialisation of the West

Feniks

When looking at the process of industrialisation in our context there are roughly two questions that need answering. The first one is concerned with the differences in how this process developed in various European countries. Eastern-Europe developed differently than Western-Europe did. *Feniks* does not mention this. The book is very vague about which parts of Europe or the world they include in the text about the Industrial Revolution. It is clear that the main focus is on Europe. However, the fact that the differences between east and west, in economic and social development, increased considerably during both the first and the second 'wave' of industrialisation they do not mention.

The second question is a matter of where the emphasise lies in the book: on the fact that Europe, and the rest of the world, got more and more interconnected, or on the way the differences between classes became more pronounced. The advances that were made in communication and transportation as a result of various inventions, and Europe becoming more and more interconnected as a result, is not mentioned in *Feniks*. However, differences between classes and the poverty among the working class are.

In order to properly answer the first question we must first establish which parts of Europe the authors include in their discussion. That does not become clear from the text. In the introduction to the paragraph headed 'The Industrial Revolution' the authors say the following:

The eighteenth century saw two important developments, starting in England, that turned the economy upside down. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 218)

The rest of the paragraph explains the why and how of these developments in England. Also the assignments in this paragraph are either about England or address general aspects of industrialisation.

What does this mean for our discussion? As the authors leave out the fact that Eastern-Europe developed rather differently than what they describe here, the pupils can come to the conclusion that all of Europe followed this route to industrialisation in this same period. On the other hand, the authors do not say anything about the rest of Europe in this context and with that, set apart England from the rest of the continent. Neither of these images is very realistic. How the pupils interpret this depends on the rest of the chapter. In the paragraph about modern imperialism the authors link industrialisation to the expansion of overseas empires. Here they speak of Western-Europe.

The production increased during the Industrial Revolution . The problem was that after a while

the production transcended the demand ... There also was a shortage of raw materials ... In the second half of the nineteenth century the Western-European countries cast therefore a covetous eye at Africa and Asia. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 224)

This suggests that at that time only Western-European industrialisation had developed this far. Still, the authors do not explicitly state that this deepened the schism between east and west.

As to the question of where the emphasis lies, it is already mentioned that the book does not say anything about better communication and the fact that within Europe there was more contact and over longer distances than ever before. This aspect of the age of industrialisation does not play a part in *Feniks'* discussion of the topic. There is however a great deal of emphasis on the growing gap between rich and poor. The authors give several quotes from reports from that time that describe the working and living conditions of the working class.

Our normal working hours were from five o'clock in the morning until nine or ten o'clock in the evening. On Sunday we often had to come back to clean the machines. We were not given time to eat breakfast, during dinner we were not permitted to sit down and there was no time for supper. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 232)

There are several such quotes, either from someone from the working class talking about what life was like for them, or from someone who was concerned with the working class' fate. This gives a strong picture of the down side of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation. Already in the introduction of the chapter the growing difference between the lower classes and the rest of society is stated:

The gap between factory owners (who were in charge) and the workers (who had a subordinate position) increased significantly. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 216)

The pupils will thus get a picture of a Europe that was divided along class lines. The fact that countries and regions became more interconnected would in our context, have changed this image perceptibly. Pointing out this aspect of industrialisation would have presented a Europe that was more divided according to class, but also a Europe where more and more people had contact with others further and further away.

This is not the case however. This fact together with the indirect mention of Eastern-Europe taking a different course, ensures that the pupils will see the industrialisation of the West as a historical moment that deepened already existing gaps: the gap between classes and the gap between east and west.

Sprekend Verleden

The two questions we looked at in *Feniks* apply to *Sprekend Verleden* as well. When it comes to the where and how, *SV* is much clearer about when industrialisation developed in different parts of Europe and the world. They point out that there were significant differences.

As for the question of where the focus lies, there we see differences between *SV* and *Feniks* too. *SV* does not stress the poverty of the lower class as much as *Feniks* does. At the same time they do focus on the advances in communication and the mobility of more and more people.

The title of this chapter, 'The industrialisation of the West', is taken from *Sprekend Verleden* which has a chapter with the same title. *SV* immediately explains to the pupils what industrialisation entails and how and where it developed:

Great-Britain was the first to develop an industrialised society. Here industrialisation already started in the middle of the eighteenth century. On the mainland Belgium followed the English example around 1800 and later in the nineteenth century also the other Western-European countries and the U.S. At the end of the nineteenth century the industrialisation of Eastern-Europe and Japan started. In the twentieth century the industrialisation of the rest of the world came about. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 91)

The pupils will realise before they really have started on this topic that different parts of Europe underwent different processes, or at least with a different time frame. Thus the industrialisation cannot function as common memory. It was not an exclusively European process, neither does Europe as a whole have a similar memory of it.

Most of this chapter is devoted to a description of various developments and inventions during the industrialisation of the West. They also pay attention to what the consequences were of these inventions. They point out that more contact was possible over longer distances as a result of inventions connected to communication and transport. A box about new methods in the production of newspapers explains how more and more people were interested in and could afford newspapers:

During this time multiple inventions made the newspaper less expensive ... Over the course of the nineteenth century education was improved and expanded ... As a result the number of people who were interested in and able to afford newspapers grew steadily. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 93)

Thus, more and more people were able to follow what was happening in the world around them, a world that was rapidly expanding for people of the lower classes.

The same goes for mobility. The book gives various examples of new machines that were applied to transport people or goods over long distances and at a pace incomparable to what people

were used to. Also more and more people came to use these methods of transport.

From the second half of the eighteenth century existing transport routes were improved and new ones were made. In addition to this, new ways of transport were developed and improved. Traffic over land, water and sea increased spectacularly in the nineteenth century. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 95)

As an example the authors describe the results of this improved mobility in the Netherlands and say that it helped the unification of the Netherlands:

The improved connections helped the unification of the Netherlands: people from different areas had more contact with each other. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 94)

As the same process, that of more and more frequent contact between regions, is also described on the European level, the pupils will no doubt come to the conclusion that industrialisation also helped the unification of European society, at least at a certain level.

As mentioned earlier, the authors of *SV* do not stress the differences between classes as much as *Feniks* does. Only when we come to the paragraph about 'the social question' do the authors name these problems:

The industrialisation for a long time went hand in hand with deep poverty for part of the population in the cities. The fact that poor people had to rely on private, mostly ecclesiastic charity, was considered normal by most people for a long time. (Buskop, 2009: 100)

The book further focuses more on the way this problem was solved in the end, than on the living and working conditions of these poor.

This then leaves the pupils with an impression of Europe united and not divided by the industrialisation. United because of the tighter networks created by better, more efficient and cheaper ways of 'staying in touch'. A Europe divided by class differences is not highlighted in *SV*.

As we have seen this chapter starts with an explanation of the contrasts between various parts of Europe in the way and the pace at which they developed towards an industrialised society. No matter how interconnected the industrialised countries were, the countries that had not evolved as far were always left out.

Conclusion

All in all, both the pupils who use *Feniks* and those who use *SV* will see industrialisation as a process that deepened gaps, as said when discussing *Feniks*.. There is the gap between east and west and the gaps between social classes.

The pupils will not fail to notice that countries such as England, France, Italy and the German lands have leading roles in the history of Europe, after the end of the Middle Ages. Why

this was is not part of this discussion. The pupils will then see that this pattern repeats itself in various contexts. Both *Feniks* and *SV* emphasise this in the context of the industrialisation of the West, *SV* more directly than *Feniks*.

In *Feniks* the gap between the working class and the higher social classes comes in addition to the gap between various countries. In *SV* it does not. We have seen that, apart from the fact that there were differences between various parts of Europe, *SV* presents industrialisation as a process that also brought countries closer together. Thus *SV* creates a picture of industrialisation as a process that helped the unification of Europe. In *Feniks* the focus is more on the gap between rich and poor, while in *SV* it is on the advances in transport and communication that enabled people of all classes to stay in touch with the rest of the continent.

Enlightenment

Feniks

In the beginning of the paragraph about the Enlightenment, the authors of *Feniks* hint towards the idea that enlightened thought forms the basis for our social, cultural and political standards today. Every paragraph starts with an explanation why the topic is relevant today. For this paragraph the authors give an account of how today's society differs from the medieval one. First the pupils get a short summary of the main points of enlightened philosophy in the introduction. This is followed by the passage 'Relevance of this topic'; here the same main points are repeated, but with the angle of what society is like today, compared to how things were before the Age of Enlightenment.

Nowadays, people worldwide want to decide themselves how they are governed. The violation of human rights is generally condemned. No scientist or journalist will deny that a claim has to be supported by proper evidence. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 194)

The authors do not add a sentence to explain the connection here. It is clear however what they are getting at and the pupils will draw these lines.

Thus *Feniks* presents the opinion that the foundations of our society were created in the enlightened era. Throughout the chapter the pupils come across ideas that will sound familiar to them.

[The philosophes] believed that one should not judge people by their descent, skin colour or sex, but by their character. Every person was after all an individual. This was at that time a most revolutionary idea in Western-Europe. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 195)

The authors address mainly those ideas that we today still hold as principles. *Feniks* does not mention for instance, the subordinate position of women that prevailed in the Age of Enlightenment. This only strengthens the idea of the Enlightenment as the birth of our modern values.

When it comes to how wide the ideas of Enlightenment spread at the time, *Feniks* is not very precise. They use the term Western-Europe several times in connection with enlightened philosophy, like in the passage on page 195 quoted earlier. Also in the introduction the authors speak of Western-Europe.

While at the other side of the Atlantic slaves laboured at the plantations⁶, people in Western-Europe became fascinated by a new, intellectual, movement: the Enlightenment. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 194)

However, not much further the authors add to this:

⁶The paragraph in *Feniks* that comes before the one we are discussing is about imperialism.

At the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century the Enlightenment flourished: an intellectual and cultural movement that spread through all of Europe.
(Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 194)

Thus the pupils will conclude that the Enlightenment started in Western-Europe but found resonance throughout the whole continent. There are no indications in *Feniks* that suggest that various parts of Europe experienced a different Enlightenment than others did.

Thus we can conclude that the picture created in *Feniks*, even though they do not say so, supports the belief that the Age of Enlightenment marked the beginning of our modern society. The enlightened philosophies, *Feniks* seems to say, are the basis for a common European set of moral values.

Sprekend Verleden

Sprekend Verleden is not this outspoken. There is no passage to indicate the 'relevance of this topic' in *SV* that points towards the significance of the topic of Enlightenment for Europe today. Neither does *SV* say anything specific about how the ideas of the philosophes were received in other parts of Europe than where they originated.

Like in *Feniks* however, the pupils will recognise structures and ideas from what they see around them today. The following pronouncement about freedom for example:

Freedom was for [the enlightened philosophers] the most important point: freedom to say what you want (freedom of speech), freedom to publish your thoughts (freedom of press), the freedom to believe or not to believe what you want, the freedom to do trade with whom you want. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 79)

There are several passages like this one describing values that the pupils will realise are still very relevant today.

The authors do indirectly point towards the fact that enlightened ideas were picked up in the wider Europe when they explain how Catherine the Great introduced enlightened culture in Russia:

She had Western-European architects build palaces and theatres in Russia. After Western-European example there came an Academy of Science, and education was further developed. But as a ruler she remained all-powerful. She would hear nothing of Montesquieu's separation of powers. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 81)

Here they only point towards one country however. This can be explained in two opposite directions. Going in one direction the pupils will come to the conclusion that the Enlightenment was limited to Western-Europe and that occasionally individual enlightened despotic rulers introduced some of the social or cultural ideas brought to the by the philosophes. Concluding more or less the

opposite, the pupils will see this as an indication that slowly the ideas of the philosophes made it towards other parts of Europe and rooted there. However, as the four sentences about Catherine the Great, at the end of the paragraph, are the only time that Eastern-Europe is mentioned, it seems unlikely that the pupils will draw any fundamental conclusions from this.

It seems that, like with the isms, the authors of *SV* have concentrated on the characteristics of the Enlightenment, rather than the question of where and when. By doing this they do not stress the contrasts that were created within Europe. On the other hand, they give no indication that Europe's system of values today is largely based on the ideas first made public during the Age of Enlightenment. Thus *SV*, yet again, does not stress either the dividing or the uniting factor of the historical moment in question.

Conclusion

Again, we see that *Feniks* and *Sprekend Verleden*, represent rather different views. In *Feniks* the Enlightenment is explained as a development that still is highly relevant today for the whole of Europe. Thus this can be said to be a common memory for Europe. If the ideas of the enlightened philosophers did not reach all parts of Europe at the time, they certainly did over the course of the centuries afterwards, as *Feniks* indicates.

SV does not express this view. They do not say the opposite either. Like in the case of the chapter on isms, they stick to the characteristic of the movement and do not elaborate on the context around it. Thus they do not represent any view, at least not about the topic of a united or divided Europe.

The topic of the Enlightenment is probably the least complicated and easiest to understand in this context; unlike for example the Holocaust, there are very few painful memories or difficult disagreements connected to the Enlightenment. We still see much of what was developed during this period and we see it throughout the continent. We see this in the text in *Feniks*, but less in *SV*. This might be because the authors assume that the pupils will make the connection with our society today on their own, or because they choose to present the Enlightenment from a different angle: that of content rather than context.

Prominent themes omitted in the textbooks

Not only those things the pupils do learn is important, just as significant is what they do *not* learn. There are various historical events that are generally considered to be of importance within European history, that have not found their way in one or both of the textbooks. Also these 'absent' themes have a great deal to say about the picture of Europe that the authors create.

The wars in former Yugoslavia

In the process of finding a historical moment that can take the role of a European memory, certain memories are suppressed. Traumatic or controversial events in Europe's past are ignored if they threaten the idea of a united Europe. A very recent and therefore all the more painful example of this is the wars in Yugoslavia. About this Müller says the following in *A European Memory?*:

An 'overlapping moral consensus' seems to have emerged that Europe betrayed its own liberal ideals in its reluctance to intervene (Pakier & Stråth, 2010: 29)

In the Netherlands the topic is a specifically difficult one because of the Dutch role in the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. The area stood at the time of the massacre under the protection of 400 Dutch UN soldiers. The guilt question has been prominent in the discussions that last until this day.

Perhaps it is because of these controversies that the topic of the Yugoslavian Wars is absent from both textbooks. *Feniks* presents the creation of an integrated Europe and the European Union as a reaction to World War Two. They present the EU and also the UN as organisations that want to play an active role to prevent further conflict. This is in contrast with the attitude of appeasement in the run up to World War Two. This attitude of active interference is, as Müller says, important in the new European identity, created after World War Two and extended after the fall of the Soviet Union, to the east. The only time this attitude was seriously challenged on European soil was with the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. One of the conclusions we can draw from the fact that the wars are not mentioned in *Feniks* is the pro-European tendencies in the book; the authors want to uphold the idea that European integration is the result of, and helps prevent a repetition of, World War Two. Another option is that the authors feel that it is difficult to have enough perspective on the events, because the memories are still so fresh.

This 'European identity' of taking action is less present in *Sprekend Verleden*. *SV* is much more sceptical towards the EU and the UN than *Feniks*. About the UN they say, for example:

In many member states human rights are violated without the UN being able to prevent this. (Buskop, 2009: 229)

The massacre in Srebrenica is also mentioned as an example of the UN not being able to fulfill the

task they have set themselves.

The Yugoslavia wars are absent as a topic also in *SV*. However, with the tone of the text already expressing scepticism towards both the EU and the UN, and the way these two work together, this gets a very different meaning. It cannot be said that the authors try to avoid the topic, because they use it to illustrate weaknesses in the UN, as previously mentioned, and the EU. About the political effectiveness of the EU, they say the following:

During the war that broke out in 1991 in former Yugoslavia, all of the EC countries had their own policy towards the belligerent. (Buskop, 2009: 251)

The authors do not avoid the topic then, neither because of the sensitivity of it, nor because it undermines the idea of a united and strong Europe. Why is it not in the book then? It is after all not an insignificant part of recent European history. It seems that the authors have chosen not to include this in the book because it has to make space for other topics; topics outside of Europe. The last two chapters of the book both have subjects that reach well outside the European continent, 'Colonialism and decolonisation' and 'The rise of Asia'. In the former the authors pay much attention, as mentioned earlier, to the history and the perspectives of the colonies. This chapter has a strong global character. The chapter about the rise of Asia obviously is centred there, on the Asian continent. Both chapters are relatively long, especially the one about colonialism which is the longest chapter of the book. It is the longest chapter precisely because it covers nearly the whole world.

Also this has implications for how the pupils will perceive Europe. Although the starting point of the book still is Europe, or maybe even the Netherlands, the authors certainly do not limit themselves to European history. This takes the focus away from Europe, indicating that many of the processes seen in Dutch or European history have a wider focus, with influences both ways, beyond the boundaries of the continent. It raises the question of how significant European unification is.

The unification of Italy and Germany

This topic is discussed in *Sprekend Verleden*. It is not in *Feniks*. These two processes are of course part of the nineteenth century wave of nationalism and the movement away from vast empires fragmented in multiple ethnic groups. One can argue that nationalism works against the idea of a united Europe. However, that does not apply entirely in this case. Firstly, this type of nationalism often requires if not active support, then at least consent from the rest of Europe. Secondly, we have to see this 'wave' as a European process, an idea that spread through the whole continent. An account of nationalism and the more or less neutral meaning it has in the context of this period, is not given in *Feniks*. In *Feniks*, nationalism is only represented in the negative sense and the context of the time of the world wars. Thus the pupils working with *Feniks* will associate nationalism with

aggression against anyone who does not belong to the same nation and not with a neutral sense of belonging. A sense of belonging that does not necessary clash with a united Europe and can even be seen as a notion that emerged throughout the whole continent and thus means a shared historical moment.

Other 'missing' topics

Apart from these two historical themes, there are a few minor topics that the authors have chosen not to include in the books. Both books say nothing of the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s, presumably because these events were eclipsed so thoroughly by the world war that followed it.

Sprekend Verleden says almost nothing about the revolutions that surrounded the emergence of political ideologies, focussing instead on the characteristics of these ideologies.

As mentioned in the chapter about World War One, *Feniks* gives almost no information about the Versailles Treaty. Instead it presents Hitler's actions rather than the decisions taken in the aftermath of World War One, as the causes for Word War Two.

The bigger picture

Do Dutch history textbooks present a united or a divided Europe?

Many have tried to find an answer to the question whether Europe can boast to have a memory shared by all. Answering this question is not an easy task, nor will everyone come to the same answer. As mentioned earlier, such a memory can function in different ways. A clear cut memory, that all inhabitants have a similar attitude towards, like the memory of the storming of the Bastille in France or the signing of the constitution on 17 May 1814 in Norway, is not easy to find in a European context. There certainly are historical moments that apply to the whole of Europe, such as the Holocaust and the Enlightenment.

As becomes clear from the discussions of these themes however, there are several reasons why they cannot be referred to as a 'common memory' in the same way as the French memory of the storming of the Bastille. Memories such as the Holocaust have a uniting factor not because they evoke a certain sense of pride as most national memories do, but rather because of the opposite: their distinctly horrific character unites people in a desire never to let such an atrocity happen again. Thus these type of memories have a very different atmosphere around them and have much more complicated backgrounds; the idea that the Holocaust formed the basis for our moral values is by some considered controversial and wrong. Additionally, although shared by much of the European population, such memories have very different implications in different parts of the continent. This also makes it a controversial subject, as the way some Europeans look at the matter can be insensitive towards others. This applies for example to World War Two, and to the Holocaust.

The memory of the Enlightenment is again a different matter. The Enlightenment is not significant so much because of the way it spread through Europe at the time, but rather because of the implications it got later on. The development of the Enlightenment had a very asymmetrical character to it, as is the case with so many other events or processes in European history. The core of the movement of course was rooted in France and even though the ideas spread rapidly through entire Europe, they had distinctly contrasting implications in different areas, mostly as a result of the differences in the social structure of society. The reason the Enlightenment has such a central place in European history is the resonance the enlightened ideas have to this day. One has but to look at the modern model of governance in most European nations.

As we have seen in the theory section, there are many different views of this matter. There are those who say that these traumatic memories work as a reference point for a united European society, but there are also those who feel that it is wrong to build Europe on such negative memories. Some look at those cultural characteristics that they feel are the European heritage, others see the many differences that divided the continent.

Some then, use these arguments to point out that a common European memory does exist, although maybe not in the same sense as we see in the classical nation-state. Others choose to focus on the difficulties with such a claim: controversies and contrasts that emerge when one looks closely. The most obvious contrast being the one between the east and the west. To stick with the examples of the Holocaust and the Enlightenment, we see that both these topics bring to light major differences between Western-Europe and Eastern-Europe. The name Holocaust does not have the same meaning in Eastern-Europe as it does in the Western-European countries. This is discussed in theory section and in the chapter about this topic. The Enlightenment was a movement of the cities. Eastern-Europe with its predominantly agricultural society was at the time not influenced by the enlightened ideas in the same way as the west did, simply because few people were confronted with them. We see this throughout both of the books: the reappearance of the east-west conflict. Besides the East-West question we can distinguish three other threads running through the analysis of the different themes: the contrasts between positive and negative memories and what this means for the picture of Europe, the question of nationalism and the idea of a European identity.

The East- West question

Europe has been and still is divided into east and west in various ways. Miall (1993) claims in *Shaping the New Europe* that this division goes as far back as the Middle Ages. Already then he says, Western-Europe started to move away from the east and develop feudalism and a distinct urban culture, Eastern-Europe being hampered by among other things, invasions from the east, that Western-Europe did not have to deal with. Through time, Miall (1993) says this division was confirmed when Western-Europe went through transitions as the Renaissance, Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. (p. 6)

Going through the textbooks we have seen this east-west divide coming back in different ways. In contexts as the Enlightenment and Industrialisation the pupils will see, in some places more clearly than in others, that Eastern-Europe did not go through the same developments as Western-Europe did. Neither *Feniks* nor *Sprekend Verleden* says this explicitly, but often in these contexts they speak of Western-Europe when explaining the development of the processes in question. From both books it becomes clear that there are distinct differences between the ways Eastern-Europe and Western-Europe developed. The fact that the terms Eastern-Europe and Western-Europe are so frequently used, in the books but also generally, confirms this. Of the themes we have discussed, these contrasts are shown most clearly in the discussions of the Industrial Revolution (or 'Industrialisation of the West' as the authors of *SV* have called the chapter) and colonialism and imperialism. These two combined create a clear picture. In both books the connection between industrialisation and the

creation of a large colonial empire is emphasised. It were the Western-European countries that went overseas and created, first a worldwide trading network and later large colonial empires. Both books explain clearly the connection between the process of industrialisation and these colonial developments, and with that reinforce the picture of two distinctly contrasting developments in Europe: the west moved more and more away from the east.

The Cold War of course is the ultimate manifestation of the divide between east and west. The question is whether the pupils will see this as part of a bigger picture or if they see the Cold War and the tension between Eastern-Europe and Western-Europe as a solitary phenomenon. Nothing in the text indicates that the schism that after the Second World War became even deeper and was dubbed 'the iron curtain', has a history that goes much further back. Even though the authors do not expressively say this, the east-west divide is a theme that comes back throughout both books. For the pupils who look closely, the bigger picture is visible. As we have seen, *Feniks* does not only explain the way Europe was divided into east and west during the Cold War, they confirm this themselves by concentrating solely on the Western-European side of the conflict.

We have not said anything about the world wars yet, or about the Holocaust. This is because the differences between east and west are of a rather different nature. Whereas the contrasts we discussed above are mostly of economical and social nature and are caused by complex structures that we will not discuss here, the differences we see mostly in connection with World War Two and the Holocaust are less complicated. The main cause for the difference here is Hitler's doctrine of superior and inferior ethnicities. The scope of both the Holocaust and other World War Two atrocities have completely different implications in Eastern-Europe than they do in Western-Europe. This is visible through the sheer number of victims, but also in the nature of the crimes and atrocities committed, as is described in the theory section.

These facts plus the horrors associated with Soviet Russia and the Cold War, add another dimension to the east-west question. This dimension is presented in *SV* but not in *Feniks*. Whereas the economical contrasts between east and west are discussed in *Feniks*, the different experiences Eastern-Europeans had during the war, compared to those of the people in the west, are omitted. *SV* does include this aspect in their explanation and that is one of the reasons why *SV* does not present World War Two as a common European memory.

This last fact has clear implications. To see these we need to look at the paragraph in each of the books that discusses European integration today. As we have seen, *SV* is rather sceptical towards the prospects for a Europe united on a political and cultural level. This is supported by the explanations

throughout the book of how east and west developed in different directions.

A much stronger indicator however, is that *SV* does not present the EU to be, as Jarausch (2010) calls it, 'an insurance policy against the repetition of prior problems'. (p. 314) They do not claim, as many do, that the wish to prevent a third world war is a crucial part of the European identity. The background for this we find in the chapter about World War Two. The authors emphasise, as *Feniks* does not, that the war in Western-Europe cannot be compared to the war in Eastern-Europe: how can a war that has left such distinctly contrasting memories be the foundation for a united Europe?

As these contrasting memories are not mentioned in *Feniks*, the idea that World War Two and the Holocaust in particular, function as a common memory and the birthright for a united Europe is a plausible one. The authors choose to present it that way. They are much more positive towards the idea of an integrated Europe, also on a cultural level. Certainly, the contrasts between east and west are mentioned, also in the paragraph about the present day Europe, but the authors seem optimistic that these differences can be overcome and that now Eastern-European countries have started joining the EU, the process towards a European family can really begin.

Positive versus negative memories

When one looks at the historical moments that are by many said to function, or at least have the potential to function as a common memory for a united Europe, these memories have a tendency to have a distinctly negative undertone. Jarausch (2010) says about this:

The dominant strands of transnational memories in Europe therefore seem to have an almost nightmarish quality ... This nightmare memory is based on experiences of suffering that are likely to diminish in time and are unlikely to serve as a lasting bond in the future. (p. 316)

The historical experiences that Jarausch is thinking of here are World War Two, the Holocaust in particular, communists crimes in the Soviet Union and imperialism. These are all rather recent memories, memories that will lose their significance over time according to Jarausch. How is the balance between positive and negative memories in the textbooks? If we look at the historical moments we have discussed, then we do indeed see that the most recent are all negative memories.

We see a distinct difference here between *Feniks* and *SV*. Where both describe the conflict and the suffering connected to these memories, they have a different *attitude* towards the uniting character. This difference in attitude is visible throughout the books and is a central point in our discussion. Both books can describe more or less the same thing but from a very different angle or in a very different tone. We see this for instance in the description of colonialism. When discussing colonialism both point out that colonialism and imperialism created a lot of enmity in Europe. The

point of view from which these processes are described are very different however. *SV*, as we have seen, looks at colonialism and imperialism mainly from the view point of the colonised countries. *Feniks* takes only the colonisers position into consideration. Even though *Feniks*, like *SV*, presents many factors connected to colonialism that created deep rifts in Europe, they also present it as a distinctly European phenomenon. Thus they give not so much a very different picture of colonialism itself than *SV* does, but they display a very different attitude. They display an attitude that tells the pupils: Europe is the centre of *our* world.

Something similar can be said of World War One. This topic is also very clearly one that was the cause of major conflicts within Europe, something that becomes clear in both books. What caused the most disastrous conflicts however (if it is possible to compare such things) is the aftermath. *SV* leaves no doubt about this and describes thoroughly the implications of the Versailles Treaty. The authors of *Feniks* have much less focus on this part of the war. The Versailles Treaty is named but only indirectly. It is not mentioned in connection with the causes of World War Two. Here again, the overall impression of the topic in *Feniks* is not favourable for the idea of a united Europe, yet the authors attitude towards the topic is.

The difference between *Feniks* and *SV* becomes even clearer from the descriptions of the Second World War and the Holocaust. *SV* gives no indication that supports the theory that World War Two and the Holocaust have become the foundation for a united Europe. The fact that the word Holocaust is not used in *SV* illustrates this. A strong part of the mythical status that the Holocaust has received over time, is that it has gotten a name of its own. It is no longer 'the genocide on Jews during the Second World War' it is now *the* Holocaust. The authors of *SV* try to counteract this tendency.

In the same way they do not present World War Two as the main reason behind the creation of the EU. As mentioned several times before it is the economical reasons that the authors emphasise, not the politics. They make the same point as Berger does, as we have seen in the theory section. By doing so they ignore what so many have said about the EU being built upon the lessons learned from World War Two. Müller (2010) puts it this way:

The EU itself is a peculiar kind of monument to the Second World War – not a monument that commemorates battles, but an institution edifice whose foundations contain the very lessons learnt from the experience of totalitarian war, subjugation and European-wide genocide ... The fact that these memories often remained hidden behind the language of technocracy and economic benefits does not detract from the actual motives of the founders (and subsequent re-founders) of the European Union. (p. 30)

The authors of *SV* are of the opinion that these economic benefits *are* the main reason behind the

existence of the EU, and not what Müller calls the 'actual motives': keeping the peace in Europe.

Feniks represents Müllers opinion however. The authors quote a part from the treaty that founded the ECSC that suggests that the ultimate goal with the economic cooperation was to prevent future wars. Similarly they confirm the Holocausts mythical status by making it the main focus of the chapter. As mentioned in the discussion about World War Two, there are six pictures on the front page of the chapter about the time of the world wars, one about World War One, the other five about the World War Two, of which two are connected to the Holocaust, one showing an Auschwitz registration number and the largest of all the picture showing 'the last meters to the gas chamber'. That illustrates how this chapter is balanced and the prominent place the Holocausts has.

We have now looked at the negative memories. What then about the positive ones? The last three themes can be said to be positive memories. The use of the word 'positive' here needs to be specified. It is maybe more accurate to say 'progressive'. This is best illustrated by taking industrialisation as an example. Industrialisation was and is by no means an exclusively positive development. As we have seen, for many it meant poor working and living conditions, not to mention poverty and starvation. However, industrialisation does not come under the same heading as occupation, genocide or slavery. Industrialisation is not primarily destructive, even though it was by some experienced that way. We use the term 'positive memories' then, to illustrate the contrast with the 'negative memories'.

We have seen that *Feniks* has a more positive attitude towards the idea of a united Europe than *SV* does. This is shown again in the discussion of the Enlightenment. The introduction to the paragraph in *Feniks* about the time of the Enlightenment tells us much. As we have seen, the authors discuss, as they do for every paragraph, the relevance of the topic at hand. In the case of the Enlightenment they merely sum up a range of basic values that are central in our society today. They name these same values in the passage before, but then they present them as the main ideas of the philosophes, the enlightened ideas. The message then is: the enlightened philosophers laid the foundation for our system of moral values. This is why many name the Enlightenment as a memory that is shared by the whole of Europe, even though it does not function as a memory in the same way as we have seen with the Second World War, the holocaust or imperialism. It is not so much the 'memory' as it is the 'heritage' of the Enlightenment that bears meaning here. *SV* focusses on the characteristics of the philosophes' theories, rather than on the implications they had or have. Thus they say nothing about the link between the enlightened ideas and our society today. They do not support the idea that the moral values of the united Europe are based upon Locke's, Rousseau's and Montesquieu's ideas.

The term positive memories has nothing to do with whether this memory has the potential to serve as a common memory for Europe or not. It seems that both *Feniks* and *SV* present the view that 'the emergence of isms' as well as 'industrialisation' work just as dividing as they work as a uniting factor, if not more so. Both positive and negative memories can thus function as a uniting *or* as a dividing memory. However, fact is that the one memory that goes back longer than the last century *and* that is presented as supportive of a united Europe, at least in one of the textbooks, is also a positive one: the Enlightenment. Is it true then, that negative memories lose their significance over time, as Jarausch (2010) suggests? Will the memory of the world wars fade overtime and with that the supposed foundations for European integration? That is something we will have to see.

Nationalism

We have now seen two distinct lines that go through the textbooks: the east-west conflict and the question whether a memory has a negative or a progressive background. Another theme that we see coming back, and which is particular significant for our thesis is that of national interests.⁷

Nationalism has a rather different meaning in the two textbooks. Or rather, in *SV* it has multiple meanings, in *Feniks* only one. In the chapter in *SV* about the emergence of isms, the authors give a definition of the word 'nationalism'. This is a neutral definition that has nothing to do with the violent and negative meaning the term has received over time. The authors explain that nationalism implies a *feeling of solidarity among a group of people who together form a state or wish to form a state*. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 116)

Feniks on the other hand only refers to nationalism in the negative sense of the word, in connection with the world wars and imperialism. What they seem to say is that nationalism is only a means to exercise power over an empire, used as propaganda by dictatorial rulers. The fact that nationalism can be a sentiment without violent implications among the inhabitants of a country, is not mentioned in *Feniks*. It is reduced then to a totalitarian ideology inherent apparently to the twentieth century, but something that Europe has out grown. The authors consequently do not address the tension between nationalism as a neutral feeling of belonging, and the idea of a united Europe. The authors of *Feniks* do not seem to think that the idea of nationalism is relevant today and thus do not include this in the discussion about a united Europe, even though this type of nationalism can certainly undermine a united Europe.

In *SV* they do. They mention the conflicting interests these sentiments can cause when it meets an institution such as the EU. The authors ask the question 'has the nation-state had its day?'. The answer to that question is partly yes. This does not mean however that the authors think this is

⁷ The background for this discussion is given in the theory section of this thesis.

only because of the EUs influence. It has just as much to do with decentralisation as with internationalisation they say. Since the 1960s there has been a tendency to give more power to the regions and to minorities. The power of the nation is compromised from below, by the cultural identities of smaller region and minorities. About the power of the EU they say that this is still mainly a matter of economical regulations. Politically the EU proves to be a problematic project.

A European identity?

That is where the greatest contrast lies between the two textbooks: the description of the EU and European integration today. This attitude is also reflected throughout the books. *Feniks* speaks positively about the integration of Europe and underlines the success of the EU. They blame the fact that political integration proofs difficult, on the organisation in Brussels and on the national governments, not on the resistance from 'Europe itself'.

As we have seen, this attitude comes back in many places. Behind this lies the idea of a European identity. The authors display an attitude that is positive towards the idea of a European identity. The absence of a description of nationalism and its conflicts with European integration is illustrative. The Cold War is described with all its dividing factors, but the authors give it a positive turn when they describe the eagerness with which former Soviet countries joined the EU. The economical gap is then forgotten. The two most prominent topics when the idea of a common European memory is discussed, the Second World War including the Holocaust and the Enlightenment, are presented as exactly that: a common European memory. The Second World War is mentioned explicitly as the main reasons for the 'founding fathers' of European integration to found the ECSC. The authors also say that the events of World War Two have become a references frame for what is right and what is wrong. When it comes to the Enlightenment the authors make the link between the time of the Enlightenment and today, without actually mentioning this. It seems that they feel this is so obvious that they do not need to explain this explicitly. They express an attitude of 'where would we be today without the philosophers of the Enlightenment?'

The things that the authors have omitted also point towards a positive interpretation. The most prominently absent are the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Whether the authors decided that they did not have room for this topic or whether they have chosen not to present it because it undermines the ideals of the European Union, we do not know. Fact is that the topic does not disrupt the picture of the European family the authors create.

Also absent is the Versailles Treaty. The authors try to blame the Second World War on Germany and thus reduce it to being 'the idea of a mad man', instead of the consequence of all that was wrong in Europe at the time, documented in the Versailles Treaty.

Thus we see that the idea of a united Europe goes through the whole book (at least the part

we have looked at). On the whole, the book is much more focussed on Europe than *SV* is. The authors say little about the global aspects of especially World War Two, the Cold War and imperialism. Even though these are topics with a distinctly global perspective, in *Feniks* it is mostly the European side that is presented, thus giving the impression that Europe is the centre of the world.

SV is much less positive towards the idea of a European identity. Looking at the paragraph about European integration we see a lot of scepticism. Again this is due more to the way in which the authors describe things, than to what they actually say. The title of the paragraph is 'Gradually more economical cooperation in Europe'. That sums up accurately what it is the authors say in this paragraph: economically European integration has been a success, politically it has not. Unlike *Feniks*, the authors of *SV* seem very sceptical that this will ever change.

If we look again at these two main 'common European memories', World War Two and the Enlightenment, we see that there is nothing common in the way the authors describe them. In both themes we see the east-west divide more prominently than in *Feniks*. About the Second World War and the Holocausts *SV* says specifically that Eastern-Europe went through a very different experience than Western-Europe did. The difference between east and west is more prominent in the chapter about the Enlightenment too.

Another aspect about the Holocaust that is relevant here is the name 'Holocaust'. As we have seen the authors of *SV* do not use this word and merely speak of 'the genocide during World War Two on groups deemed inferior by the Nazi's'. By not using the word Holocaust, the authors deny the mythical status the Holocaust has for some. They also deny the Holocaust's status as European memory.

Contrary to *Feniks*, *SV* has an elaborate description of the Versailles Treaty and its consequences. As said above, the Versailles Treaty can be seen as the very manifestation of everything that went wrong in Europe during that time. Where *Feniks* describes World War Two as the consequence of the success of totalitarian regimes, *SV* shows the pupils a picture of Europe where relations were fraud and many felt displaced. This is a much less favourable picture than we see in *Feniks*. It fits in with the rest. Even now that the relations definitely have improved, these wrinkles have not quite been smoothed out yet.

Finally there is the matter that is already mentioned above, the global focus in *SV*. Like *Feniks*, *SV* tells European history. *SV* however, sees Europe in a much more global perspective. The best example of this is colonialism. As we have seen *SV* pays a lot of attention to the countries that became colonies, to their history before, during and after colonisation. This gives the pupils a more complete picture. It also avoids the impression that *Feniks* gives by not addressing the global

perspective: the idea that Europe is the centre of the world.

We see two contrasting views then: a pro-European view and a view of Euroscepticism. What does this mean for the status of national identity, and the conflicts this creates with a European identity? As we have seen, to define the concept of a European identity is not an easy task. Consequently there is no agreement on whether something of the sort exists. The question we have before us here, is to what extent the two textbooks present a common European identity.⁸

The authors of *Feniks* try to create a European identity in the book. This is most clearly illustrated by the term 'European family'. *Feniks* attributes qualities to Europe similar to those seen in families: a common background, traditions and shared memories. *Feniks* also has a strong focus on the Netherlands as a country however. They have one whole chapter about the special position the Republic had within Europe in the seventeenth century. This time period has an important place in Dutch history and provides the Netherlands with proud common memories. The national anthem, the national colour of orange, not to mention the Dutch identity of tolerance stem from that time. Also in topics such as colonialism and the First and Second World War, the authors concentrate on the role of the Netherlands, in addition to the wider European view. This does not clash with the idea of a united Europe it seems. As Miall (1993) says, the richness of national identities is what makes Europe unique.

The authors point out that European political integration is difficult, but as we have seen, they blame this on the internal organisation of the EU and the 'lack of democracy'. (Venner&Haperen, 2007, p. 314) The general positive approach of the idea of a united Europe suggests that they expect that these problems can be solved. It also gives the impression that the authors of *Feniks* see possibilities for a culturally united Europe and a European identity. They say nothing about the possible clash with national identities. This we have seen, is connected to the fact that the idea of national belonging, a positive form of nationalism, is not mentioned in *Feniks*.

SV has a rather different view on identity. In *SV* Europe is divided into three concentric circles. The outer one is Europe as a whole, the middle one the nation and the innermost one represents 'the region'. The outer circle, the authors of *SV* say, is a community of economical cooperation, where political cooperation proves difficult to realise. On the economical level, Europe as a whole is united. It is not on other levels however. After having established this they continue with the question of 'the nation'. They give a definition of the term 'nation-state' that they immediately dismiss again in the European context:

A nation-state is considered to be a state where the population is homogeneous and shares the

⁸ For a general account of European identity see the theory section of this thesis.

same feeling of national belonging.

In Western-Europe one generally assumes that it is not possible to draw boundaries so that they correspond with the homelands of the peoples with the same cultural background. In this view the nation-state is a political community where the population feels at home regardless of cultural background. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 253)

SV presents Europe as an economical community and the nation as a political one. The regions are then cultural communities:

A region is considered to be an area where the people form a group that shares cultural and ethnic bonds. (Buskop et al., 2009a, p. 253)

This is the way *SV* presents the phenomenon of identity: a European *economical* identity, a national *political* identity and a regional *cultural and ethnic* identity. Here we see Karlsson's three waves (see the theory section). However, where Karlsson describes these as waves that occur over time, *SV* presents them as different forms of unification, each with its geographical focus. It is this last form of unification that carries most meaning. The first chapter of Benedict Anderson's *Imagined communities* (1983) (after the introduction) is called 'cultural roots'. (p. 9) Anderson (1983) also points out that, although the main topic of the books of course is *nationalism*, these imagined communities can be any size or political construction. (p. 6)

Conclusion

Comparing the images of Europe created in the two textbooks we see that these point in rather different directions. *Feniks* represents the view that a culturally united Europe is possible and that we are on the way to a United States of Europe. *SV*, as we have seen, represents the opinion that Europe is united on an economical level but not otherwise. In fact, according to *SV* Europe is culturally moving towards a more decentralised entity.

Do Dutch history textbooks present a united or a divided Europe?

The answer to this question is a dual one then. The textbook called *Feniks* present a Europe that is united by common memories. They take the unity of Europe for granted as they do the existence of the European Union. The book *Sprekend Verleden* creates a picture of Europe as an economic unity but with no common memory to build a cultural identity upon. The core of group identity lies, they say, in the regions and ethnic groups.

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