Being Young and Out of Place

An explorative study on the everyday practices of educational provision in the humanitarian operations in Kakuma, northwestern Kenya

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Abstract

The scope, scale, and duration of contemporary complex emergencies have given rise to a new humanitarian paradigm in which the deontological principles of traditional humanitarianism have been challenged, and the dichotomy between relief and the protection of human rights revisited. Within this 'new' humanitarianism, Education in Emergencies (EiE) has surfaced as a field of practice, policy and principle. It is increasingly becoming recognized among policy makers, UN communities, and INGO practitioners that education accomplishes both life-sustaining and life-saving protection objectives in humanitarian operations, and has therefore rightfully earned its place as the fourth 'pillar' of humanitarian assistance.

This thesis is an explorative study into the everyday practices of providing education for refugee children in the humanitarian operations in Kakuma Refugee Camp, northwestern Kenya. Research is based on fieldwork conducted in Nairobi and Kakuma Refugee Camp from late January to early March 2014. Empirical data has been collected from various INGOs with an education mandate in the camp. The study has sought to address how EiE activities in the camp are designed and implemented in order to meet the benchmarks of 'do no harm' in humanitarian aid. Using normative theoretical perspectives related to crisis management, bottom-up implementation of humanitarian aid and cognizant approaches to the unintentional side-affects outside assistance may have, the thesis discusses how EiE programs are adapted to the contextual setting of Kakuma, and how community-involvement underpins the practical unfolding of education as a component of the humanitarian response.

Key findings from the study suggest that the extent to which EiE programs are responsive to the protection needs of refugee children is compromised by the resource-based reality of a rights-based approach to education. Access to education is limited and uneven, and too many children find themselves out of the protective structures that EiE is argued to provide. Findings also illuminate that community-participation is unevenly dispersed throughout the program cycle: active involvement in implementation, but nominal participation in decision-making processes and program design. Consequently, the voices of those with closest relational proximity to children's needs have a tendency of remaining unheard if they do not conform to pre-determined operational priorities.

Preface

This thesis marks the completion of a post-graduate degree in Societal Safety and Risk Management at the University of Stavanger. It also marks the end of an exhausting, but amazing journey that has enriched my life in so many ways. Though there were times it felt like a lonesome road, I always knew I was never alone. I would therefore like to express my gratitude to a handful of people without whose contributions, knowledge, support and encouragement I never would have reached the journey's destination.

A walkabout to Africa turned into a life-altering experience. I am forever grateful for the opportunity I was given by LWF to conduct my research in Kakuma Refugee Camp. My sincerest gratitude goes to Hellen Choge, who made the trip to Kakuma possible and whose interest in my research facilitated the realization of this thesis. I would also like to thank Lennart Hernander, who so kindly and openly shared his own perspectives on life when life as I once knew it no longer made any sense. I am keeping your insightful and reflective perspectives in mind whenever I think back on Kakuma.

I wish to thank all my informants for their contributions in making this study possible. Education offers hope to the hopeless. The work you do and the assistance you provide is so admirable and courageous. I am truly grateful for having met you all. A special thanks goes to Marcy, for taking such good care of me during my stay in the camp.

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Malin Toftesund Oekland
Stavanger, June 2014

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This thesis is dedicated to all the children in Kakuma Refugee Camp,

And 3000 in particular…

For the South Sudanese girls and boys from Hope Primary School in Kakuma 4

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Abbreviations

CBP	Community-based participation
COC	Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief
DRA	Department of Refugee Affairs
EiE	Education in Emergencies
FAI	Film Aid International
GoK	Government of Kenya
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
JRS	Jesuit Refugee Services
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MoE	Ministry of Education
NCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
PTA	Parent-Teacher Association
SMC	School Management Committee
TVET	Technical vocational education training
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
WFP	World Food Program
WTK	Windle Trust Kenya

1.0 Introduction

"We should imagine the desperate, hopeless situation of refugee children in an emergency situation as slowly drowning with no lifeboat in sight. Their fate, and perhaps loyalty, may be decided by which ever boat comes first to their rescue; the armed group, the rebels, the criminal gangs, the drug distributors, the extremist group – or the school. If no school boat comes and throws out a lifeline, chances are that others will provide the only, often destructive and forced alternative" – E. Midttun, 2014[1]

The imperative to provide education for children caught in the midst of crisis has been strongly articulated in a growing body of advocacy literature, with the above citation perhaps illuminating one of the most important reasons why one should do just so. In times of crisis and forced displacement, children comprise the most vulnerable group. Not only do they face profound risks to their physical safety and well-being, but every aspect of their future is also put into jeopardy. Premised on the fact that education is a fundamental right for all children – and for those whose lives have been uprooted and destroyed by conflict and displacement, an enabling right that critically meets short-term and long-term needs, the multiple values of education have gained precedence within the humanitarian system. It is increasingly becoming recognized that education accomplishes both life-sustaining and life-saving protection objectives in humanitarian operations, and has therefore rightfully earned its place as the fourth 'pillar' of humanitarian assistance (Machel 2001).

This thesis is an explorative study into the everyday practices of providing education for refugee children in the humanitarian operations in Kakuma Refugee Camp, northwestern Kenya. It seeks to explore the practical organizational measures through which education is designed and implemented in order to meet the benchmarks of 'do no harm' in humanitarian assistance.

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[1] Personal communication, January 2014.

1.1   **Background for the choice of study**

The latter part of the twentieth century signifies a change in nature of one of the most ancient phenomenon known to mankind: war. Throughout this period in time, the patterns of traditional warfare shifted – from wars between independent nation states to violent armed conflict confined within state boundaries, and new civil wars emerged with a different face, new impetus, and with underlying causes that continue to breed the cycle of poverty and conflict in many countries of the Global South[2] well into this day and age. Unlike wars of the past fought between soldiers of competing empires, contemporary conflict usually takes place "between groups that have a history of living together and share a language, religion and culture" (Anderson 1999, p. 11), carried out in civilian everyday living spaces along the faultlines of social, economic, and political grievances. The large-scale consequences modern conflict leaves behind have given rise to a new type of crisis conceptualization. The UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs defines a complex emergency as:

> "A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country program" (IASC 1994 in Kruke & Olsen 2005, p. 276).

One of the most prominent features of complex emergencies is protracted displacement of civilian populations. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that out of the 15,4 million refugees in the world today, nearly half have been in exile for more than ten years (UNHCR 2013). Meanwhile, the global average duration of refugee displacement reached 17 years already in 2004 (UNHCR 2005). The prevalence of large-scale populations spending most of their lives confined within the fences of an isolated refugee camp is particularly prevailing in Sub-Saharan Africa, where many nation states are still characterized by enduring armed conflicts – or struggling to overcome the legacies of old ones. As chronic insecurity, political instability, and the frequent occurrence of drought with resultant famine in the region persist, so too does the time spent in limbo for millions of people. This particular problem additionally worsens by the fact that in virtually all instances, children and adolescents constitute the majority of the refugee populations (Dryden-Peterson

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[2] The Global North/South terminology indicates a categorization of the world based on economic inequalities. The "Global" is added to emphasize that both North and South are, together, drawn into global processes (Rigg 2007).

2011a). As the lives of these children become uprooted and destroyed by forced displacement, access to the right to education is often lost. The true implications of hundreds of thousands of young people spending their childhood and adolescence trapped in protracted emergencies tend to be forgotten along with subsiding media coverage, but long-lasting refugee displacement situations have social, political, environmental, and economic ramifications that reach far beyond the affected community hosting the refugees. In effect, a crisis of this kind often generates whole generations left out of development processes, thus reaffirming the unjust relationship between those who have and those who do not in the world today. And so the cycle of poverty, grievances and ultimately – conflict, continues on.

The frequency, magnitude, and duration of contemporary complex emergencies have given rise to a new humanitarian paradigm in which the deontological[3] principles of traditional humanitarianism have been challenged and the dichotomy between relief and the protection of human rights revisited. This 'new humanitarianism' is goal-oriented, principled and rights-based, serving to "re-legitimise an arena of aid that has been blamed for fueling conflicts, prolonging wars and standing neutral in the face of genocide" (Fox 2001, p. 275). Many humanitarian agencies are now going beyond "the conventional view of how people are dying, to embrace…how people are living" (Martone 2002, p. 36), with humanitarian action increasingly being directed towards the targeting of the root causes of a crisis rather than just its symptoms. In rights-based approaches to humanitarian assistance, education has found legitimacy and support. Traditionally viewed as a task best left to those concerned with long-term development initiatives, it is now widely asserted that education for crisis-affected children cannot wait for a development phase that might be years away (Pigozzi 1999). Education in Emergencies (EiE) has therefore surfaced as a field of practice, policy and principle among academics, policy makers, UN communities and INGO practitioners. Nicolai and Triplehorn (2003) refer to EiE specifically as a component of the humanitarian response "carried out in situations where children lack access to their national and community education systems due to the occurrence of complex emergencies or natural disasters" (p. 2). Save the Children (2004) defines the term more precisely as followed:

> "Education in emergencies is understood to include formal and non-formal educational activities taking place for the benefit of children and young people during an emergency situation. The education provided in such a situation may target refugees,

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[3] Duty or moral obligation.

> internally displaced persons, or populations living in their original locations, but affected by the emergency" (p. 3)

For Sinclair (2001), whose pivotal work in many ways established the field, EiE should be understood as a distinctive entity not to be confused with mainstream conceptions of education through schooling in peacetime environments. Rather, education as a part of the humanitarian response serves multiple functions that directly support the changing short-term and long-term protection needs of children living in conflict or post-conflict environments (Nicolai & Triplehorn 2003, Baxter & Triplehorn 2004). To facilitate the implementation of EiE in field operations, the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) has developed a set of Global Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crisis and Early Reconstruction (Anderson et al. 2006).

Any kind of humanitarian aid however, whether rooted in traditional or "new" humanitarian values, or delivered in acute or protracted emergencies, has proven to come with its drawbacks. When outside assistance is given in the context of conflict, it becomes part of that context – and ultimately part of the conflict (Anderson 1999). The many humanitarian crises that took place in Africa in the early 1990's illustrated vividly that when aid is given without consideration for the impact it leaves behind on the dynamics of the situation, aid does more harm than good for the people it is meant for (Polman 2008). The concept of 'do no harm' has therefore gained momentum within the humanitarian system, serving as shorthand for the implementation of conflict-sensitive humanitarian assistance that actively seeks to reinforce the good intentions of aid without inadvertently bringing along the bad. While originally coined to account for the strengthening of local capacities for peace rather than those for conflict, the 'do no harm' concept has in recent years also expanded to include a variety of mindsets that recognize the importance of not undermining the dignity, capacities and resiliency of crisis-affected populations (Hilhorst 2005). Thus, in its broadest sense, the benchmarks of 'do no harm' epitomize both the objective *and* the means through which to reach the goal: a principle of cognizant delivery of aid that furthers positive outcomes rather negative ones, and a practice of humanitarian assistance that commences from the bottom-up rather than top-down.

1.2 Research objectives and research problem to be addressed

The advocacy rationales behind education in contexts of emergencies have been so repeatedly and convincingly argued that they appear more or less as givens for those concerned with education and its role in humanitarian operations (Karpinska et al. 2007). As noted by Tomlinson and Benefield (2005), EiE is nevertheless a field in its infancy, which is gradually becoming characterized by a policy-practice gap due to the lack of academic research with sound and explicit methodology. Most enquiries into EiE have commonly been initiated by INGOs and international bodies such as UNESCO, UNICEF or the UNHCR with the intention of influencing stakeholders, donors, and governments to develop more effective responses or to advocate for policy reform (Jacobsen & Landau 2003, Smith 2005). Insight into the methodological basis from which the asserted "best practices" in EiE derives is therefore often imperceptible. But if the means towards the ends are still unclear, there is ample reason to explore how and through which measures EiE is implemented in field operations. If humanitarian assistance always leaves its marks within aid-receiving communities, then there is also reason to investigate the marks left by the provision of education as a component of the humanitarian response to emergencies. Based on these assertions then, the study aims to address the following research problem:

> *How do EiE activities in Kakuma Refugee Camp meet the benchmarks of 'do no harm'?*

In order to find possible answers and formulate conclusions to the research inquiry, the study has applied a case-study approach to the explorative research design. Research was carried out using qualitative research methods during fieldwork in Nairobi and Kakuma Refugee Camp from late January to early March 2014. The principal objectives of the thesis have been to acquire an understanding of how the education response in Kakuma unfolds, to identify which factors underpin the design and implementation of education in the camp, and to determine how these factors in turn yield the principle and practice of 'do no harm'. As such, the thesis also hopes to ensure a pertinent academic contribution to the field of EiE, as well as to lay a foundation for potential further research in the future.

1.3   Limitations of the study

The limited scope and scale set for the thesis have necessitated making a few contractions to the research inquiry. The study has been confined to the theoretical framework set forth in chapter 3.0, with the presentation of empirical findings and the subsequent discussion of the empirical material taking place within these theoretical boundaries, respectively. While the thesis acknowledges the wider political implications that underpin refugee displacement situations, the UN system, and the humanitarian space in general, the principal level of analysis rests solely on the contours and nuances of *everyday practices* of EiE in field operations. Subsequently, empirical data has been collected from various INGOs with an education mandate in Kakuma Refugee Camp. To discuss EiE from an everyday perspective however, does not exclude the importance of variables related to the economic and political sphere. For the purpose of the thesis, these factors have nevertheless been dealt with in a rather nominal manner, albeit both commented and highlighted throughout the proceeding chapters when considered necessary.

1.4   Previous research

EiE may be a research field in its infancy, but it is nevertheless expanding rapidly. The INEE offers a collection of research into education in contexts of emergencies[4]. In this regard, both Wright (2010) and Dryden-Peterson (2011b) have looked specifically into the current state of access to and quality of refugee education in their research enquiries, which in both cases were argued to be relatively limited, uneven and of poor quality. Also, Bush and Saltarelli (2000) have researched education in conflict settings, describing how education in and of itself can easily exacerbate inter-group hostility under conditions of ethnic tensions. Their angle has nevertheless been more concerned with introducing peace-building practices into the contents of education than with 'do no harm' standards *per se*. To study EiE from theoretical perspectives rooted in the academic discipline of Societal Safety and Risk Management appears to be an unexplored approach so far. Applying theoretical and analytical frameworks from unrelated academic fields may, however, serve to enrich, broaden and shed new light on the subject of EiE, as well as provide a basis for further research.

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[4] http://www.ineesite.org/en/

1.5   Structure of thesis

Following this preliminary outline of the thesis' research topic and stated research problem, chapter 2.0 provides an overview of the context in which research has been carried out. In this regard, a further distinction is made between the 'outer' and 'inner' contexts. The 'outer' context gives a description of the state of protracted refugee displacement situations on the African continent, and highlights some of their common features. This synopsis has been added to shed light on the wider implications protracted refugee camps spur in terms of insecurity, conflict, and the violation of human rights. As such, it provides added relevance to the research topic from a societal safety and risk management perspective. A brief recount of Kenya's refugee situation is also given, as well as a description of Kakuma Refugee Camp. The 'inner' context then, constitutes the case study's asserted transferability to other real-life contexts. It offers a brief account of a rights-based approach to EiE, as well as an insight into the key aspects of the INEE Minimum Standards.

Chapter 3.0 presents the theoretical framework applied to the analysis and discussion of empirical data and establishes the parameters for the benchmarks of 'do no harm' adopted in the study. The section also presents the study's subsidiary research questions, thereby relating the theoretical framework directly to its relevance in EiE. Following the presentation of theory, chapter 4.0 accounts for the methodological principles and practices that have guided the research process. Chapter 5.0 presents the results from data collection in Kenya and seeks to give the reader an insight into the everyday practices of EiE provision in the camp by highlighting the key factors that both underpin and challenge 'do no harm' approaches in the education response. Accordingly, chapter 6.0 comprises the discussion of emerging themes from the empirical basis, in which findings are analyzed using the theoretical lenses accounted for in chapter 3.0. Throughout the discussion part, the thesis attempts to shed light on one of its key arguments: rights-based principles are not easily translated into practice when faced with the realities that linger in humanitarian operational contexts. Thus, the discussion revolves around how EiE activities are adapted to the contextual setting, how community-based participation in education unfolds, and how educational provision may inadvertently further negative outcomes. Chapter 7.0 provides a summary of the key findings in light of their theoretical relevance and concludes with remarks on the intersections between EiE and 'do no harm'. A complete list of references used and cited throughout the thesis is provided in chapter 8.0.

2.0 Context

This chapter outlines the key contours of the context in which the research topic has been studied. As research was carried out in a *real-life setting* using a case study approach (Yin 2014), the case being EiE, a distinction has been made between the 'outer' and 'inner' contexts: The 'outer' context in this thesis is understood as the real-world situation in which the case study unfolds (Kakuma Refugee Camp). While this setting in itself is unique, it nevertheless mirrors many of the characteristics common to protracted humanitarian emergencies in Africa. Chapter 2.1 therefore commences with a brief overview of the state of refugee situations on the continent. This short presentation has been added to shed light on the wider implications protracted refugee camps spur in terms of insecurity, conflict, and the violation of human rights, thereby illuminating the relevance of the stated research problem. The 'inner' context, then, may be defined as EiE as a component of the humanitarian response. According to Kruke (2010), 'inner' contexts comprise the organizational structures, guidelines, standards and responsibilities among humanitarian actors. These factors in turn, represent the external validity of single case study research, as they signify the possibility of transferability to other contexts (ibid). Accordingly, section 2.2 briefly accounts for the rights-based approach to education, and offers an overview of the INEE Global Minimum Standards.

2.1   The 'outer' context

2.1.1   Protracted refugee displacement situations in Africa

From a refugee policy perspective, protracted displacement situations occur in places where none out of UNHCR's articulated durable solutions of repatriation, local integration or resettlement to a third country are possible to implement. However, Smith (2004) argues that 'warehousing' of refugees in long-term segregated settlements has become a *de facto* fourth and all too commonly practiced alternative solution to the world's growing refugee population, stating it as a "practice of keeping refugees in protracted situations of restricted mobility, enforced idleness, and dependency – their lives on indefinite hold – in violations of their basic rights under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention" (p. 38). Refugee warehousing and

the wider implications it generates, are thus often argued to become a source – as well as a direct consequence of, instability and conflict (Loescher et al. 2003). This claim becomes particularly salient when stressing the most frequently shared characteristics of protracted refugee situations in Africa: their geographical location, their limited international attention, and their demographic composition.

Africa's protracted refugee camps are usually located in peripheral border areas of the refugees' country of origins, in places which are "insecure, where the climate conditions are harsh, which are not a high priority for the central government and for development actors, and which are consequently very poor" (Crisp 2002, p. 5). These locations are chosen for political rather than humanitarian purposes (Smith 2004), aimed at keeping the refugee population concentrated close to home when repatriation becomes an option, and concentrated far away from having an impact on national security interests (Montclos & Kagwanja 2000). The remoteness of such areas, however, often restricts any kind of economic activity taking place among the refugees, rendering them idle throughout their stay in the camp. As poverty levels become amplified due to encampment, the level of despair, frustration, aid dependency and eventually conflict tensions between those who accommodate the camps increases. In certain settings, such as the case of Kakuma discussed in chapter 2.1.3, the presence of a refugee camp can also trouble local balance when set up in areas that are already occupied by a community with historical, ethnic, and cultural ties to the land.

The second characteristic relates to the assistance that protracted refugee situations in Africa receive from the UN system. Hyndman and Nylund (1998) argue that the flow of humanitarian capital into Africa to support temporary solutions for refugees is impressive, particularly when compared to the fact that permanent solutions actually found for the beneficiaries of aid are so impressively few. This statement however, pertains to the situation 16 years ago. Today, the financial status of humanitarian aid in Africa's protracted refugee camps is commonly referred to as 'donor fatigue' (Loxley & Sackey 2008). Crisp (2002) points to how UNHCR, donors and the international community alike tend to focus their attention and resources on complex emergencies that are currently on the front page of the world's largest newspaper industries. As a result, protracted situations that drag on for decades not only lose their glare in the media, they also become deprived of funds for humanitarian aid despite the fact that these refugee populations continue to increase in size and decrease in standards of living.

Limited funding requires prioritization. In order to meet the *basic needs* of refugees, financial support for community services such as education becomes minimal at best. The cuts in humanitarian budgets, together with the fact that most camps in Africa are governed by host country policies that restrict refugees' freedom of movement and thereby many of their legal and human rights, have a severe impact on the wider implications of the third common feature of protracted refugee situations; their demographic composition. In virtually all instances, children and adolescents constitute the majority of refugee populations (Dryden-Peterson 2011a). A substantial proportion of these children have also been born into exile and aid dependency, never having seen "the 'homeland' to which they are eventually expected to return" (Crisp 2002, p. 7). Enduring displacement, limited access to the right to education and whole generations excluded from development processes are, as argued initially, a dangerous combination.

2.1.2 Refugees in Kenya

Kenya[5] shares its borders with five countries, of which four have an extensive history of widespread insecurity and internal conflict, and has therefore a long-standing tradition of providing safe haven for hundreds of thousands of refugees and asylum seekers from neighboring states (Hyndman & Nylund 1998). As of early 2014, UNHCR estimated its total population of concern within Kenya to be 620,148[6].

Despite decades with high influx, the Government of Kenya (GoK) has always pursued an open-door policy by allowing all refugees asylum and non-refoulement[7]. In the early 1990's however, due to civil war, famine and state collapse in Somalia, as well as internal conflict in many other neighboring countries, the GoK became unable to adequately handle the immense refugee influx on its own and thus called for international assistance from the UN. On the topic, Crisp (2000) writes the following:

> "Kenya was obliged to admit the new arrivals for a number of reasons: because of its status as a signatory to the UN…because it had no real means of physically preventing the influx…because of the need to prove its commitment to human rights and

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[5] See map of Kenya in Appendix B

[6] www.unhcr.org

[7] Allowed to remain on Kenyan soil when they cross the border, and to not be forcibly sent back their country of origin (Jamal 2000).

democracy, thereby ensuring a resumption of foreign aid from donors who had questioned the country's commitment to such values" (p. 616).

The GoK allowed the new refugees into its borders but nevertheless made it clear that their presence was not particularly welcome (Crisp 2000), which resulted in a movement towards a policy of refugee encampment and the establishment of the Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps in the areas of the Turkana and Garissa Districts, respectively. Since then, the mainstream procedure of the UNHCR for the determination of refugee status in Kenya has been on a prima facie[8] basis (Hyndman & Nylund 1998). With the opening of the segregated settlement camps, Jamal (2000) notes that refugees':

> "…right to asylum in the country is, implicitly but emphatically, premised upon their complying with certain restrictive conditions…they are not allowed to move freely outside of it (the camp), and they may not seek education or employment outside of it" (pp. 7-8).

Furthermore, he also points to how the camps – intended to ensure the right to life, "obstruct the right to liberty and security of a person" (ibid. p. 8). It is outside the scope of this thesis to give a detailed description of the GoK's policies on refugee issues; suffice it to say that they have been quite restrictive, with Jamal's (ibid.) remarks illuminating the essential components.

2.1.3 Kakuma Refugee Camp, northwestern Kenya

Kakuma Refugee Camp[9] is located in the semi-arid desert environment in Turkana District of northwestern Kenya, approximately 95 km south of the Sudanese border. The camp was established in 1992, primarily to accommodate and serve the thousands of 'lost boys' that had fled violence, child-soldier recruitment, and civil war in Sudan (Aukot 2003). Since then, it has steadily increased in population size, which has necessitated an expansion of the camp through the creation of two new sites: Kakuma 2 and Kakuma 3. In responding to the ongoing influx from South Sudan[10], Kakuma 4 was also recently established. In total, as of February 2014, the refugee camp hosted 132,702 refugees from 18 different countries, with Sudanese and Somali refugees accounting for the majority. Because of the diverse ethnicities present in

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[8] Prima facie determination is applied in situations of mass movements where individual determination is impractical, and where refugee status of a person is evident on objective grounds (Hyndman & Nylund 1998).

[9] A map of the refugee camp is provided in Appendix B

[10] Armed conflict broke out in South Sudan December 15th 2013.

the camp, its residents comprise a complex and heterogeneous society in which differences in languages, cultural practices, and religions imply that humanitarian aid programming must be highly conflict sensitive to the context (Crisp 2000).

Life in Kakuma Refugee Camp is fraught with difficulties and hardship. The climate in Turkana is extremely harsh, with the average temperature reaching well above 40 degrees Celsius. As the dry and dusty desert environment is not conducive to agricultural activities, the area is exceptionally vulnerable to famine and droughts. Due to the remoteness of the geographical area, economic activity is stagnant. The only employment available for the refugees is on a voluntary basis with the INGOs (Horn 2010). The lack of environmental prerequisites for growing crops and firewood, together with minimal chances of engaging in income generating activities, denote that the refugees are solely dependent on humanitarian agencies to provide for their needs. The presence of the humanitarian apparatus however, directly impacts on local security conditions. In Kakuma, the refugees coexist with local Turkana people – nomadic pastoralists whose lifestyle is focused primarily on livestock (Horn 2010). The impact of refugees in Turkana is not to be underestimated. As being beneficiaries of humanitarian aid by law, the free services available to the refugees have long been a source of grievances for the host community, which in economic and social terms is actually worse off than the refugees (Crisp 2000). Consequently, the camp in itself provides a locality not only for social conflict among the different ethnic groups it accommodates, but also between the refugees and the Turkana people. On the topic, Horn (2010) comments that due to the potential for conflict, the refugees are not allowed to keep animals. Yet, many still acquire livestock anyway, which has resulted in increased cattle theft and increased violence on the part of the host community (Crisp 2000).

Crisp (2000) has researched both the characteristics and sources of insecurity in Kakuma, which he respectively argues is quite prevalent, creating a volatile climate and rendering "UNHCR and other staff agency… confined to their compounds from dusk until dawn" (p. 603). His study points to violence between refugees and the local population and violence within national refugee groups – particularly the Sudanese, as the most common security-threats. Moreover, he argues that the causes of insecurity must be seen in relation to the nature of Kenya's refugee policies. Firstly, the GoK's decision to place the camp in such a remote area has led to what he labels a geographical concentration of violence: "there are simply more items to steal, more people to rob and more women to rape in and around the camps"

(ibid. p. 619). He additionally comments that the insecurity is self-perpetuating; because the refugees unremittingly feel unsafe they are also more prone to act in violent manners. Secondly, the GoK's restriction of movement policies means that with local integration and voluntary repatriation ruled out, the refugees' only hope out of the camp is through resettlement to countries such as the US, Canada, Australia or New Zealand (ibid.). Opportunities for resettlement are nevertheless relatively scarce, with most refugees finding themselves confined to a life in the camp.

In their research on socio-economic dynamics within Kenya's protracted refugee camps, Montclos and Kagwanja (2000) argue that both Dadaab and Kakuma have emerged as urban enclaves equivalent to small towns with local micro economies, albeit in the context of refugee camps naturally take place along the larger economic input of humanitarian agencies. In Kakuma, the local economy is evident the second one enters the camp. There is a large market space with small but thriving businesses and shops, as well as a few cafés and restaurants, all run by refugees themselves. Because the geographical distance between various parts of the campsite is rather extensive, some of the residents have also invested in motor vehicles and run their own taxi businesses inside the camp. Nevertheless, the majority of the refugees do not have the means to engage in any kind of economic activity. As noted by Jamal (2000), "anyone confined to a place like Kakuma is rendered automatically dependent on some form of hand-out" (p. 23).

2.2   The 'inner' context

2.2.1   Organizational structures and areas of responsibilities

While Kakuma Refugee Camp falls under the jurisdiction of the GoK, which holds the primary responsibility of provision of asylum to the refugees, the camp is nevertheless administrated by UNHCR. In turn, UNHCR is assisted in its protection mandate by a range of implementing and operational partners such as the GoK Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA), World Food Program (WFP), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Lutheran World Federation (LWF), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS), National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), Windle Trust Kenya (WTK), Film Aid International (FAI), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Swisscontact, and

Salesians of Don Bosco in Kenya. These organizations' areas of responsibilities are summarized in table 1.

Sector	Implementing partners
Community Services	JRS, LWF
Education	JRS, LWF, WTK, DB, Swisscontact/NRC
Food	WFP, NRC, WVI
Gender-Based Violence	JRS, LWF, IRC
Protection and Security	JRS, LWF, RCK
Registration	DRA, UNHCR
Water and Sanitation	LWF, NRC, IRC, NCCK
Reception Center	LWF, UNHCR
Shelter	NCCK
Information	FAI
Medical Services	IRC
Resettlement	IOM
Livelihood	LWF, NRC, IOM
Environment	NRC

Table 1: List of areas of responsibilities in KRC (LWF, 2013).

2.2.2   A rights-based approach to EiE

Children's right to education is enshrined in numerous declarations and conventions. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and the 1990 World Declaration on Education For All are but a few of the legal instruments articulating this particular right, including how it equally pertains to those children caught in man made or natural disasters. During emergencies and post-conflict reconstruction however, educational provision is often interrupted, delayed or even denied (Munoz 2010). In fact, Save the Children (2006) notes that more than half of the 75 million children who are out of school worldwide live in conflict-affected countries. During the 1990's, around the same time as the relief-development continuum came under scrutiny and criticism, many UN agencies and INGOs began prioritizing education as a vital component of the humanitarian response to complex emergencies (Mendenhall 2012). The decision to include education into the pillars of humanitarian assistance was rooted in a rights-based approach that emphasized the importance of upholding children's rights to education, even in times of crisis.

According to Burde (2005), there are three conceptual approaches to EiE, which combined comprise the justifications and objectives of providing education in emergency situations: the

rights-based, the humanitarian-based and the development-oriented approach. The rights-based approach to education for all is part and parcel of both the humanitarian and development-oriented perspectives. Within the former, EiE is often claimed to offer routine, structure, and a feeling of normalcy, thereby mitigating the psychosocial impact of emergency situations. Access to EiE lessens the likelihood of children becoming victims of economic and/or sexual exploitation, child soldier recruitment, forced marriages, HIV/Aids infection, drug abuse and other risks associated with idleness or despair. It can also provide a platform for disseminating the practical knowledge needed for living through an emergency situation (Sinclair 2001). Within the development-approach, a crisis is viewed as impeding development potential. Thus, educational provision ensures the restitution of developmental structures that cater for the developmental needs of crisis-affected societies. On the topic, Burde (2005) writes that:

> "Concretely, this approach emphasizes educational content, community participation, and collaboration with government officials immediately or as soon as possible, and it starts program activities with an eye toward sustainability and transition" (p. 10).

Many agencies have now aligned their goals and objectives of EiE programming along these approaches simultaneously (Burde 2005), with good help from the support and guidance provided through the INEE Minimum Standards.

2.2.3   The INEE Minimum Standards

The INEE came into being at the end of 2000 and is an open global network of more than 10,000 practitioners and policymakers from various INGOs, NGOs and UN agencies, as well as governmental bodies, university institutions and voluntary communities (Kirk & Cassity 2007). The network's key priority is to raise awareness of the life-sustaining and life-saving role that education plays in emergencies, and promote mainstream practical standards for field operations. After its establishment in 2000, INEE created a Working Group to facilitate the development of global education standards, which resulted in the publication of the handbook on Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction in December 2004. The work was ratified and expanded into a new edition in 2010, which in light of the research topic of this thesis is an essential point to emphasize. In the new version, conflict sensitivity, contextual-based approaches and 'do no harm' benchmarks in educational provision have been included as key standards.

The 'INEE minimum standards' is now the most widely used field-guide for the design and implementation of education in humanitarian operations (Anderson et al. 2006). In addition to being based upon, and reflective of, the right to education articulated in various international legal frameworks, the minimum standards are also rooted in good practices and lessons learned across the field of education and protection in emergencies and post-conflict situations. The standards are organized into five categories, illustrated in figure 1.

Figure 1: The INEE Minimum Standards (INEE 2010).

The policies and practices placed at the outer circle constitute the foundational standards deemed critical for an effective education response, and lay the basis for the application of all the other standards (INEE 2010). Thus, they must be applied across all domains in order to promote a holistic and quality response that "give particular attention to the need for good diagnosis at all stages of the project cycle, in order to better understand the context and apply more appropriately the standards in the domains that follow" (INEE 2010, p. 7). For the purpose of this thesis, attention is centered on the following standards: Community-based participation and analysis.

For education in emergencies to be an effective response that directly caters for the needs of aid beneficiaries, the INEE standards place emphasis on active community participation as a vital precondition. Community involvement should:

> "Empower people to take part in decision-making processes and take action on education issues. Community involvement and ownership enhance accountability, strengthen the mobilisation of local resources and support the maintenance of education services in the long term. Participation facilitates the identification of

education issues particular to the local context and ways to address them. In this way, community participation in assessment, planning, implementation, management and monitoring helps to ensure that education responses are appropriate and effective" (INEE 2010, p. 20).

Accordingly, community participation should be implemented as "full participation" through decision-making authority in planning and implementation, and not merely as "symbolic participation" through which the participants are using the services by accepting the decision-making of others (INEE 2010).

Both the local operational context and the evolving nature of the emergency must be adequately analyzed and understood in order to ensure that the education responses are meeting the needs of beneficiaries and their communities, and not inadvertently creating harmful conditions:

> "Analysis should consider economic conditions, religious and local beliefs, social practices and gender relations, political and security factors, coping mechanisms and anticipated future developments. The vulnerabilities, needs, rights and capacities of affected people and institutions, including available local resources for and gaps in education services for all learners, should be identified. An understanding of the community's knowledge of local hazards and the skills they possess or need to develop to take both preventive and response actions is also essential" (INEE 2010, p. 21).

In addition, implementing actors are expected to ensure that education interventions do not exacerbate underlying tensions, grievances or inequalities (INEE 2010). Thus, efforts to avoid harm through education should be based on an understanding of risk, context, and conflict.

3.0 Theoretical framework

This chapter accounts for the theoretical lenses through which EiE activities in Kakuma Refugee Camp have been scrutinized and analytically interpreted in order to address the following research problem: *How do EiE activities in Kakuma Refugee Camp meet the benchmarks of 'do no harm'?* The theoretical framework applied to the analysis and discussion of empirical data consists of a variety of different perspectives that do not inherently represent a complementary or interdependent link to one another. Through this chapter however, the intention is to further that such a connection not only exists, but also epitomizes an approach that can enhance the understanding of how EiE activities and the benchmarks of 'do no harm' intersect in a variety of ways. Chapter 3.1 commences with an overview of how complex emergencies are conceptualized in the study, and provides a summary of the different nuances that may impact the humanitarian response to such crises. Chapter 3.2 introduces the concept of 'do no harm' with its divergent connotations, from which a foundation to theoretically illuminate how the benchmarks of 'do no harm' unfold in EiE activities is established. Lastly, chapter 3.3 summarizes the theoretical parameters for research and introduces the subsidiary research questions that will guide the study in its proceeding parts.

3.1   Crises and complex emergencies

3.1.1   Complex emergencies as slow burning crises

For a long period of time, crises were primarily understood as hazardous misfortunes, as distinctive events isolated in time and space, and as external features of everyday life that often brought death and destruction upon communities before settling into a society's collective memory (Rosenthal et al. 2001). In today's globalized world, however, where the tendency towards global interdependency in almost all realms of human activity is accelerating, where a deepening enmeshment of the local and the global is taking place, and where technological advancements are rendering time and space more or less obsolete, such a conception of what constitutes a crisis has become far too narrow. We now know that the

crisis commences long before it actually strikes (Boin et al. 2005), and very often, while its geographical place of origin may have been the most remote local place, its implications easily become a global problem.

Rosenthal et al. (2001) argue that rather than distinctive *occurrences*, most contemporary crises are complex, interdependent, and highly politicized *processes* that unfold as multiple forces interact in unanticipated modes. Accordingly, the authors define crises as "periods of upheaval and collective stress, disturbing everyday patterns and threatening core values and structures of a social system in unexpected, often inconceivable ways" (ibid. p. 6). Like so many similar ones, this definition signifies a trend towards defining crises by their 'un-ness'; they are unpleasant, unwanted, unanticipated, unpredictable, unprecedented, and consequently, often unmanageable (Rosenthal et al. 2001, Boin et al. 2005).

Complex emergencies, albeit both unpleasant and unprecedented, are hardly unexpected. These types of crises develop from the ashes of complete or considerable breakdown of authority in countries, regions or societies that are direct or indirect parties to violent conflict, natural disasters, displacement of a large number of people, collapse of the economy, decline in basic services or a mixture of all of the above (Kagawa 2005). None of these incidents, however, accumulate over night. Rather, complex emergencies become the manifest consequence of a *combination* of disaster agents that slowly but steadily intertwine into complex, ambiguous, and dangerous conditions, mirroring what Rosenthal et al. (2001) conceptualize as *slow burning crises*. These calamities creep up over time rather than burst out, and therefore embody a mixture of prolonged spillover effects flowing from continuous crisis-prone processes. Slow burning crises are part and parcel of specific historical developments rooted within a certain geographical, social, or political context. As such, they should be easily identifiable before they become manifest, at least in theory. But to be able to foresee a complex emergency creeping up is neither symptomatic to crisis deterrence nor effective crisis management. By definition, the magnitude of a complex emergency overwhelms the state's capacity to handle the situation alone and therefore presupposes an international response where many different actors work together in a collaborative effort to provide humanitarian relief to civilian victims of stricken societies (Kruke & Olsen 2011).

3.1.2 Why are complex emergencies so difficult to terminate?

In addition to *speed of development*, many complex emergencies also resemble slow burning crises in their *speed of termination*. According to Rosenthal et al. (2001), creeping crises may take years to reach crisis status, but they take many more to lose such a label as their driving forces are remarkably resilient and continue to re-emerge. On the topic, the authors write that these calamities must be "discovered as problems and construed as crises by mean of political action. This takes time, effort, organization and political acumen. Success in politicizing these issues to the point of them widely being regarded as critical is by no means assured" (ibid. p. 33).

Without the international attention needed to truly frame their severity, slow burning crises are often labeled chronic, protracted or permanent, which from a mainstream outlook is ultimately the equivalent of very difficult to put to an end. Kruke (2010) argues that one of the main reasons why complex emergencies become slow burning or protracted in their speed of termination is due to their tendency of creating "a repeated generation of a flow of new disastrous events, of re-entries to the acute emergency phase" (p. 42). This sequence of events is summarized in figure 2.

Figure 2: The multiple stages of a crisis (Kruke 2010).

In mainstream definitions of emergency phases, the crisis process is normally illustrated as moving in a circular sequence from an incubation period to the actual emergency phase to a post-emergency stage characterized by rehabilitation and reconstruction towards a more robust level of preparedness for future calamities (Boin et al. 2005, Kruke 2012). Complex emergencies – and in particular those with large-scale refugee populations confined to segregated settlements, often become trapped in the late-emergency phase for years and even

decades due to the fact that the root causes of the crisis still linger in the external and internal environment (Kruke 2010). The circumstances that characterize this late-emergency stage "may be compared to what has been termed permanent white-water, conditions of social, economic and political environments fraught with risk and rapid change" (Comfort et al. 2001 in Kruke & Olsen 2005, p. 278), and where people – both the beneficiaries of humanitarian aid and those who deliver it, face profound threats to their physical safety and human rights (Metcalfe et al. 2011).

3.1.3   Risk management in the humanitarian system

The changing nature of the modern crisis has called for new perspectives on emergency planning and management (Boin et al. 2005). From the perceptions of pre-modern society where the driving forces of crises and disasters were located in nature and seen as acts of God over which man had little control, it is now generally asserted that the scope, scale, and severity of contemporary crises are acts of man and even acts of whole societies (Quarantelli 1995). Thus, while one may not always be able to prevent a crisis from becoming manifest, one can nevertheless mitigate its impact and minimize its consequences through practices of crisis management that stretch far beyond the immediate response to a crisis (Boin et al. 2005, Kruke 2012). According to Dynes (1993), to see crises as social constructs offers numerous benefits in terms of emergency management, as it also implies that prevention and mitigation efforts are tied to social solutions, thereby allowing proactive social action through risk management. These perspectives have also found their way into the humanitarian system. While the desire to alleviate the symptoms of a humanitarian crisis remains central, more aid agencies are increasingly concerned with addressing its root causes as well, which in turn has led to what Fox (2001) describes as "goal-oriented humanitarianism" (p. 279). This "new" humanitarianism is principled, rights-based and centered around the idea that humanitarian aid can minimize the risk of returns to acute emergency stages (cf. 3.1.2) by strengthening local coping capacity and facilitating development processes.

In this thesis, risk is understood according to the notion of "future harm, the probability of a harmful event or hazard occurring and the likely severity of the impact of that event or hazard" (Metcalfe et al. 2011, p. 2). It is nevertheless worth mentioning that risk, like beauty, is always in the eye of the beholder. Ultimately then, risk connotes a subjective judgment about the *uncertainty* of an event, its outcome or its consequences, set forth by a person on the

basis of the way he or she perceives the world and place value on the things, situations or activities at stake (Aven & Renn 2010). Risk can therefore never be separated from the attributes of the person who defines its meaning. According to Aven and Renn (2010), the epistemological nature of risk implies that risk must be considered a heterogeneous phenomenon that precludes standardized evaluation and control. This is not to suggest that risk cannot be handled, but that risk management activities must ensure the integration of social diversity and allow for a multidisciplinary approach to the risk assessment process (Aven et al. 2004, Boin et al. 2005, Aven & Renn 2010).

Writing on the state of risk management in the humanitarian system, Metcalfe et al. (2011) argue that humanitarian aid is in many ways defined by risk: "the high level of risks to civilian populations inherent in crisis contexts are the rationale for humanitarian intervention, and are also the predominant considerations for how, when and what interventions are made" (p. 2). However, most of the risks facing humanitarian action are not only highly complex, but also interconnected in a variety of ways. This in turn has further implications for the organizational approach to risk, as the more ambiguous or complex a risk problem is the more challenging the risk management process becomes (Aven & Renn 2010). To this note, the uncertainty attached to risk is a particularly complicated phenomenon, especially when it comes to predicting the occurrence of unwanted events and/or their consequences in contexts that are rapidly shifting from one state to another, thus rendering the databases for risk determination easily outdated (ibid.). In a similar fashion, Boin et al. (2005) also claim that some organization suffer from "the perversity of intelligent design" (p. 23), pointing to how certain organizations operating in high-risk environments have a tendency of normalizing risks to the point where they become so accepted that they are neglected. According to Metcalfe et al. (2011), related trends occur in humanitarian action. They argue that due to the nature of their work, the risk thresholds in most humanitarian organizations are extensive, and so these organizations often tolerate a high level of residual risk. Subsequently, risk management practices in most sectors of humanitarian programming become ad hoc, inconsistent, and fragmented, resulting in aid agencies often failing to account for the interconnectedness between contextual and programmatic risks (ibid.). Without a systematic approach to the relationship between these two variables however, humanitarian action runs the risk of matching the wrong response at the wrong time to the context at hand.

3.1.4 Matching response to context

The relationship between relief and development, – and where the former ends and the latter begins, has been conceptualized and debated in a variety of ways. According to White and Cliffe (2000) however, the somewhat exhausted debate around the relief and development dichotomy is one that suffers from confusion about what these concepts really mean. Complications arise primarily because aid agencies fail to grasp the "complexities of the context in which they are working" (ibid. p. 326). The authors therefore emphasize the need for contextual understanding. The wide spectrum of possible aid effects does not fit neatly into categories of either relief or development. Many forms of aid are located in the grey areas between the two, and a given form of intervention can further more than one outcome. The relief-development divide is not always clear-cut, nor is it linear. Accordingly, much more attention should be devoted to understanding the context of the crisis at hand in order to determine which forms of aid to pursue and in which manners (ibid). Several scholars have thus raised the importance of pursuing a context-based approach in humanitarian programming, in which the situation at hand dictates the response (Goodhand & Hulme 1999, Jackson & Walker 1999 Murshed 2003). Adaptability in turn, will ensure the pursuit of multiple aid objectives simultaneously, while also enabling a rapid change in emphasis between objectives so to match the ongoing realities on the ground.

Smilie (1998) nevertheless raises concerns about the complexity that comes with the pledge to pursuing multiple objectives simultaneously, such as relief assistance with developmental characteristics. He argues that the leap from policy to practice is a great one, particularly when faced with the challenges of timing and funding. In regards to the former, humanitarian organizations must master the act of appropriate timeliness, knowing when to engage, when to modify the intervention, and when to withdraw. Answers to these enquiries are, however, not always given in the continuously shifting dynamics that make up a complex emergency. Rushing the move from relief to development programming is therefore a common pitfall, preventing synergy between multiple objectives (ibid.). Equally typical however, is also the delaying of the move from relief to development, which ultimately renders crisis-affected communities aid dependent and thus highly vulnerable when faced with future calamities (Polman 2008).

3.2 The benchmarks of 'do no harm'

3.2.1 Do no harm as the end – and as the means

Why does aid, which is intended to do only good, end up doing harm? Anderson (1999) both begins and ends her book "*Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War*" with the answer to this question: "When international assistance is given in the context of a violent conflict, it becomes a part of that context and thus also of the conflict" (p. 1). What this signifies is that the manner in which the hungry are fed, the homeless are sheltered, and the uprooted are taken care of will always have significant repercussions for the dynamics of the crisis at hand. The relationship between aid and the context in which it is given is inextricably linked. Choices made in aid programming will thus determine whether the impact of aid has negative or positive repercussions for the people aid is meant for (ibid). Pouligny (2009) defines the 'do no harm' approach as the equivalent of being "cognizant of the unintended consequences some aid programs may have" (p. 17). In a similar fashion, Metcalfe et al. (2011) refer to 'do no harm' as a conventional practice of risk management in humanitarian action, aimed at minimizing the risks of humanitarian interventions inadvertently having a negative effect:

> "This includes physical risks to civilians arising from the presence of humanitarian actors or specific programmes; the risk of fueling a war economy or replacing state functions through substitution of service delivery; and compounding ethnic, religious or gender discrimination and creating dependence on external assistance. In addition, failing to link humanitarian objectives with longer-term development objectives may present risks to the sustainability of assistance, and the capacity and resilience of beneficiary communities" (p. 3).

An interesting aspect inherent in these conceptualizations is that if aid has the potential to do so much harm, then if only implemented correctly, it can also be a powerful force for good (Anderson 1999, Fox 2001). From this perspective, the benchmarks of 'do no harm' may be said to signal a goal in and of itself. In recent years however, the concept has also expanded to represent an approach to humanitarian assistance that recognizes the importance of not undermining the dignity, capacities and resiliency of crisis-affected populations (Hilhorst 2005). Subsequently, 'do no harm' equally pertains to the means as it does to the ends. This argument becomes salient when highlighting the "new humanitarian principles" of the *Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-*

Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief (COC), which now merges classic deontological principles with the more modern developmental doctrines of accountability, sustainability, partnerships and participation. In many ways, the new articles of the COC epitomize the standards through which 'do no harm' is operationalized. As noted by Hilhorst (2005), several of these articles for instance, directly address the relationship aid agencies ought to seek with the crisis-affected community (cf. table 2).

Article	Principle
Article 5	We shall respect culture and custom
Article 6	We shall attempt to build to build disaster response of local capacities
Article 7	Ways shall be found to involve program beneficiaries in the management of aid
Article 8	Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disasters, as well as meeting basic needs
Article 9	We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources

Table 2: Extract from the Code of Conduct (IFRC).

Based on the means-end distinction, it seems apposite to argue that the benchmarks of 'do no harm' pertain to both sides of the same coin. On the one hand, they signify an approach to humanitarian assistance that commences from the bottom-up rather than the top-down, in which the local crisis-affected community represents the nexus of the humanitarian response. On the other hand, they also further the importance of an in-depth understanding of the underlying socio-cultural context of the emergency situation and the wider implications of the crisis setting, in order to make sure that the dividends of aid do not inadvertently create unwanted events. These different 'sides' of the same coin are illuminated further in the following paragraphs.

3.2.2 Local capacities and the call for community-based participation (CBP)

Contrary to popular views on how crisis-affected communities are victims in need of rapid external assistance, several scholars have in fact refuted these assumptions in their research (Helsloot & Ruitenberg 2004, Murshed 2003, Scharffscher 2011). These academics argue that victimizing crisis-affected communities is a grave mistake, as they often represent the most crucial resources available in crisis areas. According to Anderson and Woodrow (1998), the sense of urgency that linger in humanitarian operational settings nevertheless often allures aid agencies to only highlight crisis-affected populations' vulnerabilities, thereby neglecting to

account for their capabilities. However, refugees may cross borders with nothing on their backs, but they still have identifiable capacities in the form of 'portable' skills they brought with them, social structures that continue to be integral within their community groups, and leaders they still listen to and respect (ibid.). Not surprisingly, several scholars have argued that local capacities should constitute the basic starting point in any aid interventions, including education, for a variety of reasons (Sommers 1999, Triplehorn 2001, Quinn 2002, Murshed 2003, Anderson et al. 2006). As summarized by Hilhorst (2005) for instance:

> "There are many good reasons to make local people central to humanitarian responses, including acknowledgement of respect and the dignity of people, legitimisation of aid efforts, enhancing the efficiency of aid and improving its knowledge base, sustainability and learning capacity" (p. 360).

The knowledge bestowed in crisis-affected communities is particularly important. Not only is it crucial when it comes to implementing conflict-sensitive humanitarian aid (Anderson 1999), but it also signifies the prerequisites needed for designing and implementing EiE programs that are actually responsive to the needs on the ground (Baxter & Triplehorn 2004). As noted by Sinclair (2001) for instance, when it comes to educational provision in emergencies, community members understand the causes for non-enrollment or dropout of children far better than international NGO workers. Utilizing such knowledge can therefore help overcome these types of problems as well. In addition, involving the local community is said to make up a crucial part in responding to risks and protection issues in humanitarian operations, as the aid-receiving communities themselves are ultimately the true analysts and agents of their own protection (Berry & Reddy 2010). According to a UNHCR report (2008) on the agency's approach to community-based participation:

> "…by placing people of concern at the centre of operational decision-making, and building protection strategies in partnership with them, they will be better protected, their capacities to identify, develop and sustain solutions will be strengthened, and the resources available will be used more effectively… This shift in emphasis requires that UNHCR and partner staff regard people of concern not as dependent beneficiaries who are to be "saved and assisted," but rather as equal partners who have an active role in protecting themselves and organizing for their own basic needs, even in emergencies" (pp. 5-6).

Lastly, the pledge to developmental approaches in relief assistance warrants a commitment to long-term perspectives that holistically cater for the *strengthening of capabilities* through inclusive participation. Ultimately, "no one ever "develops" anyone else. People and societies

develop themselves" (Anderson & Woodrow 1998 p. 95). One cannot ensure sustainable, self-efficient and resilient societies by ignoring the structures and agencies of local communities, and one cannot pursue long-term development strategies without engaging the peoples and societies that development is meant for (Rigg 2007).

The call for bottom-up approaches to development frequently rests on the writings of renowned social theorist, Amartya Sen (1987, 1999). His capabilities approach to development is rooted in the principal concepts of functionings and capabilities. A functioning is defined as "the various things a person may value doing or being" (Sen 1999, p. 75), representing valuable states and activities that make up a person's well being. Examples of functionings are for instance, being safe, being healthy, being educated, being nourished, having employment, having a skill, having a say in matters that concerns one's life and so on. Capability then, refers to the freedom to achieve and enjoy alternative combinations of functionings. In its broadest sense, "just like a person with a pocket full of coins can buy many different combination of things, a person with many capabilities can elect between many different functions and pursue a variety of different life paths" (Alkire & Deneulin 2009, p. 32). On the relationship between the two, Sen (1987) writes:

> "A functioning is an achievement, whereas a capability is the ability to achieve. Functionings are, in a sense, more directly related to living conditions, since they are different aspects of living conditions. Capabilities, in contrast, are notions of freedom, in the positive sense: what real opportunities you have regarding the life you may lead" (p. 36).

Thus, the key aspect in Sen's theories is that development is equivalent to capabilities expansion – enhancing people's freedom to promote or achieve what they value doing and being (Alkire & Deneulin 2009). From this perspective however, development relies primarily on human agency, which relates to the freedom to actively bring about achievements, and participate in matters that are central to us (Sen 1999, Rigg 2007). Human empowerment through voice and agency therefore underpins radical change by improving societal organization and commitment (Alkire & Deneulin 2009). Respectively, Sen (1999) notes that in any development activities, "the people have to be seen … as being actively involved – given the opportunity, in shaping their own destiny, and not just passive recipients of the fruits of cunning development programs" (p. 53).

3.2.3 What is in a word?

The call for CBP in humanitarian operations has several principal advantages in terms of increasing local coping capacity, harvesting local support, enhancing effectiveness of the aid response, laying foundations for sustainable aid programs, as well as direct ties to the notions of the *principle of subsidiarity* in crisis management: those closest to the crisis at hand are also those best equipped to handle its dynamics (Kruke 2012). Yet as commented by Anderson and Woodrow (1998), principles in humanitarian action are difficult to translate into practice.

Pouligny (2009) defines local participation as involvement of the affected population in all stages of the program cycle[11]. While Burde (2004) equally conceptualizes the concept of participation as "the act of including the voices and concerns of "beneficiaries" in the projects that are meant to help them" (p. 74), she nevertheless makes the claim that "the beauty of participation is often in the eye of the donor or facilitator, and less frequently in the eye of those who participate" (p.73), pointing to how from a neoliberal stance, participation is commonly glorified as the panacea needed to bridge war-torn social capital without any consideration for the complexity and multiple connotations that lie within the word. Hilhorst and Jansen (2005) take a similar stance and argue that in humanitarian action, participation has come to take on a multitude of practical meanings, particularly in regards to whether CBP-strategies should be seen as functional measures in order to get the job done – or as the goal with humanitarian assistance in and of itself. The participation typology ladder exemplifies the contours of this debate further (cf. table 3).

#	Type of participation	Description
1	Passive participation	People are told what will happen
2	Participation in information giving	Information is elicited from people
3	Participation by consultation	People gives their opinions
4	Participation for material incentives	Schemes like food for work
5	Functional participation	To make the project succeed
6	Interactive participation	People involved in deciding
7	Self-mobilisation	People take independent initiatives

Table 3: Pretty's (1993) participation ladder (Hilhorst & Jansen 2005).

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[11] Design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

For Pouligny (2009), local ownership and self-management (steps 6 and 7) are increasingly becoming recognized as the keys to success in humanitarian programming, but the concepts lack conventional meaning in the humanitarian apparatus and are thus used as catch phrases left unimplemented. Noted by Hilhorst and Jansen (2005), however, most of the ladder steps are more concerned with instrumentality than with the notions of ownership. They argue that many aid agencies have a restricted image of what participation can constitute in practice, and thus "the actual record of promoting participation is disappointing compared to the importance attached to it" (ibid, 2005, p. 69).

Participation and partnerships with local capacities are also undermined by what both Hilhorst (2004) and Scharffscher (2011) argue in terms of the relationship between 'outsiders' and those they seek to help, pointing how international aid agencies often enter crisis areas with Western perceptions of what is best and therefore fail to account for the fact that all societies have certain "systems" of resilience in times of crisis, be they informal or formal. To this note, Anderson (1999) highlights that if external aid agencies ignore the existing structures already in place and deprive local or national institutions of their traditional areas of responsibility, significant resources run the risk of being freed up for the pursuit of prolonged conflict. The principle of subsidiarity and the adjacent call for community involvement also fall short when faced with what several scholars refer to as a decision-making paradox in crisis management: the more complex a crisis is, the closer one needs to be in order to fully grasp its dynamics, yet the more complex a crisis is the higher in the organizational hierarchy does decision-making authority tend to be located (Dekker & Suparamanian 2005, Kruke 2012). Accordingly, most humanitarian organizations are characterized by a significant gap between the inadequate knowledge vested in those who call the shots and the important knowledge vested in those who do not (Dekker & Suparamanian 2005).

3.2.4   Unintentional side-affects of humanitarian aid

For Anderson (1999), the underlying aspect of 'do no harm' is that the attainments of humanitarian aid lay not so much in the *"whether to implement"* as they do in the *"how to implement"*. Outside assistance given without apprehension of its impact on the dynamics of the context will always 'do harm' – one way or another. Consequently, even when bottom-up approaches to humanitarian assistance are implemented on the basis of avoiding harm, they may still create conditions that are harmful if these considerations are left unconsidered. To

understand why that is, one must incorporate the interconnectedness that exist between context and programming, be it related to humanitarian objectives, organizational measures or even risks. What is needed for aid to do no harm then, is a better understanding on the part of humanitarian agencies of how the variables of aid, context and conflict interact, which in turn will enable them to design participatory aid programs that relate to, and support the local capacities for peace. On the topic, Anderson (1999) writes the following:

> "…Even in societies where civilian-based wars rips daily patterns apart, many aspects of life continue to connect people rather than divide them. Common history, culture, language, and experience; shared institutions and values; economic and political interdependence; and habits of thinking and acting exist in all societies, including those embroiled in civil war" (p. 24).

In times of crisis, education may be argued to represent a system that provides connection and continuity even when people are divided by conflict. As a social institution, education is a means to establishing social connections between children, families and communities, and may therefore directly promote the bonding and bridging of social capital, leading to "the formation of dense social networks which foster protective norms of solidarity and social reciprocity" (Baxter & Triplehorn 2004 p. 46). Paradoxically however, factors that connect people in times of crisis are also the ones that very often divide them, and thus constitute the local capacities for conflict (Anderson 1999). Noted by Bush & Saltarelli (2000), education has a long-standing tradition of exacerbating inter-group hostility under conditions of ethnic tensions, serving as a catalyst for violent conflict because it has so frequently been unevenly distributed. In a similar manner, Smith (2005) comments that EiE provision is a crucial entry point for building local capacities for peace, however, "it is clear that any educational assistance must not only 'do no harm', but should hopefully contribute towards 'making things better' and certainly 'not making things worse'" (p. 378).

To foresee aid's impact is nevertheless extremely difficult. For instance, when aid agencies recruit local staff to participate in their operations based on their foreign language skills, this type of employment is often seen as a good thing – but on the other hand, it may also be deemed as being biased because foreign language ability is related to educational access, which in turn is not a given in many remote communities and societies in the world today (Anderson 1999). Utilizing local resources can thus intensify existing grievances that lead to calamities in the first place, as unequal distribution of aid can underpin tensions in conflict-

prone groups (ibid.). According to Hilhorst (2005), the expanded version of the COC may have provided a more decent approach to humanitarian assistance, but it also raises the stakes concerning 'do no harm'. She argues that the modalities of goal-oriented humanitarian aid have become increasingly complicated. The principle of respecting local culture and custom for instance (cf. 3.2.1), must often be selectively upheld by aid agencies wanting to change the way certain cultures perceive the role of women and women's human rights. There are also practical limitations to basing humanitarian programming on the participation of local people, as these communities are rarely homogenous entities. Power relations may therefore impact on the allocation of resources (Quinn 2002). Consequently, as noted by Pouligny (2009), it is paramount for aid agencies to acknowledge that asymmetric relationships also characterize local contexts:

> "Humanitarian aid may increase them and exacerbate tensions in local patronage networks, as well as power struggles. Distribution of aid and, more broadly, the re-allocation of resources to which humanitarian aid contributes, can intensify divergences and conflict among different groups or parties" (p. 18).

3.3 Summarizing the theoretical parameters for research

3.3.1 Operational research questions

This chapter has presented a variety of theoretical perspectives with ties to the proposed assertion that the benchmarks of 'do no harm' unfold both as a principle and practice in humanitarian operations. To this note, three principal themes have been specifically outlined: contextual adaptability to crisis context, bottom-up approaches to the delivery of humanitarian aid, and cognizant attention towards aid's impact on the context in which it is implemented. Combined, these viewpoints represents the benchmarks of 'do no harm' as applied in the thesis.

Figure 3: The benchmarks of 'do no harm' in EiE activities.

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Based on the normative theoretical perspectives attached to these themes, the following subsidiary research questions have been established and sought answered in the next chapters:

1. *How do the organizations with an education mandate in the camp ensure contextual adaptability in EiE activities, and what are the key difficulties encountered when attempting to match the response to contextual realities?*

2. *What is the role of community-based participation in the education response, and which contributions do bottom-up strategies provide in EiE activities?*

3. *How can EiE implementation inadvertently create harmful conditions for the aid-receiving community in Kakuma?*

4.0 Research Design and Methodology

"Research is to see what everybody else has seen, and to think what nobody else has thought" – Albert Szent-Gyorgyi (1893 – 1986)

In its broadest sense, the concept of research refers to any professional endeavors that aim to discover new knowledge (Befring 2004). But the person who sets out to see what everybody else has seen – in order to think what nobody else has thought, will only go so far without a comprehensively thought out research design to guide the research process. This chapter thoroughly accounts for my own established course of action towards the research topic in question. It presents an overview of the different methodological[12] choices I have made throughout the process, and relates these decisions to the nature of the research problem, to the objectives of the research inquiry, and to the theoretical framework through which EiE has been scrutinized. It provides a summary of how empirical data has been collected through fieldwork in Nairobi and Kakuma Refugee Camp, and how this data in turn has been analyzed. The issues of reliability and internal/external validity are also touched upon and discussed. Because the ultimate purpose of writing this chapter is to give the reader an insight into the means taken to reach the thesis' end, I have also chosen to include my own reflections on the difficulty of balancing the relationship between heart and mind when carrying out research in a social world so tremendously different than the one I have been given the privilege of living in.

4.1   Research design

A research design denotes a course of action plan that a researcher develops in order to get from *here* to *there* – where *here* relates to the moment when the researcher forms his research questions, and *there* to when he is able to find answers and formulate conclusions (Yin 2014). Whichever methodological course taken, the critical prerequisite for success is that the

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[12] Blaikie (2010) argues that there is a difference between method and methodology. A method refers to the procedure or technique a researcher uses in order to collect and analyze data, while methodology is understood as a critical discussion regarding how the research was (or could have been) conducted.

approach to research has to match the requirements of the research questions posed (Blaikie 2010). In this thesis, such consistency has been sought through the establishment of an *explorative* research design coherent with the objectives of the research endeavor, as well as the ambiguous nature of the research problem to be addressed. According to Bryman (2010), a choice of research design ultimately reflects judgments about the priority being given to a variety of dimensions in the research process. Commonly, these decisions relate to *what* to be studied, *why* it is to be studied and *how* it will be studied (Blaikie 2010).

The focus of investigation in this thesis has been directed towards the provision of education in humanitarian operations. The issue has been studied in a real-life context, respectively Kakuma Refugee Camp. As stated in chapter 1.2, advocacy arguments concerning the valuable outcomes of education rarely go unmentioned in the EiE literature. The majority of enquiries into EiE however, are commonly initiated on the basis of influencing stakeholders, donors, and governments to develop more effective responses or to advocate for policy reform. As a result, few of the "best practices" of educational provision in contexts of emergencies have been rooted in academic research with sound and explicit methodology. The lack of insight into the methodological basis from which such arguments derives thus provided a justification for why I wanted to explore how EiE as a humanitarian response unfolds in practice, and how these EiE activities in turn meet the benchmarks of 'do no harm' in humanitarian assistance. With the decision to look into a contemporary social phenomenon in a real world setting it seemed appropriate to apply a case study approach to the research. As a research method, case studies are argued to be particularly useful when the objective of research is to explore, describe and explain contemporary social phenomena in-depth (Yin 2009), and when the social phenomenon being studied is part of a broader category of settings, groups, subjects or events (Berg & Lune 2012). The research topic of my thesis reflected both these rationales for employing a case study method to the explorative design.

4.1.1 Research strategy

Having decided that Kakuma Refugee Camp would be the real-world context in which to explore how EiE activities are designed and implemented to meet the benchmarks of 'do no harm', a set of subsidiary research questions was established to narrow down the research problem, and to generate a more in-depth understanding of the relevant variables I considered instrumental for producing conclusions:

1. *How do the organizations with an education mandate in the camp ensure contextual adaptability in EiE activities, and what are the key difficulties encountered when attempting to match the response to contextual realities?*

2. *What is the role of community-based participation in the education response, and which contributions do bottom-up strategies provide in EiE activities?*

3. *How can EiE implementation inadvertently create harmful conditions for the aid-receiving community in Kakuma?*

In order to find answers to these questions, I decided to apply an abductive research strategy after Danemark's (1997) understanding of the term. From his stance, abductive research is a logic of investigation that seeks to interpret and re-contextualize social phenomena within the frameworks of a given social structure or pattern. The established theoretical lenses through which the sociological puzzle in question is viewed enables the researcher to look at the phenomenon from a new perspective, thus facilitating the transition of one notion of something towards another to generate new or alternative meaning.

There were notably three rationales behind my choice to pursue an abductive strategy. The first concerned my own *preconditions* for carrying out the research project. According to Hellevik (1995), explorative designs are convenient when studying problems that are highly ambiguous, and when the researcher has little knowledge of the topic at hand. I recognized my own understanding of how EiE practices unfold in Kakuma to be relatively limited, and thus thought it best to apply a research strategy where emphasis is placed on constructing sense out of "social actors' language, meanings and accounts in the context of everyday activities" (Blaikie 2010, p. 89). The second motivation related to *how* I wanted to carry out research. Kruke (2012) argues that the more complex a situation or setting is, the closer one needs to be in order to fully grasp its dynamics. To get as close to the research topic as possible, I decided to conduct a fieldwork in Kenya, and to try to gain entry into the refugee camp in order to uncover "the understanding and interpretations of people's meanings of their actions within the system of meaning to which those actions belong" (Karanja 2010, p. 149). Accordingly, the third reason then, related to the *qualitative nature* of the research inquiry. Blaikie (2010) notes that a researcher must always decide what stance to take towards the relationship between the research and the researched, and whether it will be that of the *detached observer* who remains disconnected in order to produce reliable data, or that of the

mediator of languages between lay accounts and technical accounts, who studies social life like he would a text by giving it meaning through interpretation. I wanted my own stance to resemble the latter, and for this thesis to become a dialogue between the world as perceived by social actors and theory, mediated through my own language. The abductive strategy thus enabled such an in-depth qualitative orientation to the thesis.

4.1.2   Research process

Table 4 presents a broad summary of the essential segments undertaken throughout the research process. While all periods are briefly elaborated below, the fieldwork conducted in Kenya for the collection of empirical data is discussed more thoroughly in the succeeding section (cf. 4.2).

Period	Activity	Purpose	Outcome
Period 1: Autumn 2013	Literature review of EiE	'To gain knowledge on the research topic and to explore the relevance of my research angle to the EiE field	Further understanding into the research topic. Formulation of a temporary research problem to be addressed.
	Contact with NRC	Accumulate insight and information from practitioners and experts on the field	
Period 2: December 2013/ January 2014	Preparation for fieldwork in Kenya	Establish a network of informants, and gain access to Kakuma RC.	Scheduled appointments with a few informants in Nairobi. No access to field.
	Development of theoretical framework to guide the study. Creation of interview guide.	Initiate a clear direction for the research endeavor.	Preliminary establishment of theoretical approach
Period 3: January 31st – March 7th 2014	Fieldwork in Nairobi and Kakuma Refugee Camp	Produce findings for analysis and discussion according to the theoretical stance adopted in the thesis	25 Interviews Participant observation
	Analysis of collected data	Analyze data alongside collection process to gain further insight into recurrent themes.	Contraction of research problem to be addressed
Period 4: March 8th – June 30th 2014	Data reduction and analysis	Reduce complexity and size of data to gain a better overview. Analyze data in order to produce conclusions	Completion of thesis

Table 4: Summary of research process.

Period 1

In the preliminary stages of the research process, the objective was to gain as much knowledge on the EiE-field as possible and create a research proposal to guide the study. I did an extensive review of the relevant literature and from thereon decided to look specifically at education in a refugee camp setting. As a student of Societal Safety and Risk Management however, I had few connections at the faculty to whom I could turn to for insight and information on the chosen research topic. I therefore contacted NRC, a humanitarian INGO with immense knowledge and expertise on EiE, and was given the chance to speak with several relevant staff members who generously offered advice, guidance and insight into educational provision for refugee populations. One NRC contact in particular turned out to be exceptionally helpful. With her profound experience on the topic, as well as dedication to my research project, she has been a valuable discussion partner throughout the entire research process.

Period 2

The second period consisted of making the necessary preparations for the fieldwork in Kenya, including the development of the first chapters of the thesis. In order to establish a network of informants in Kenya, I approached numerous humanitarian organizations with country offices in Nairobi, albeit with varying result in replies. Seeing as how I had yet to secure access to the refugee camp, and because my contacts in NRC had advised me to remain realistic in regards to the chances of doing so, I also spent a significant amount of time preparing alternative approaches to the research topic.

Period 3

The third period comprised the data collection process through fieldwork in Nairobi and Kakuma Refugee Camp. Qualitative data was gathered using different research methods. The time I had to spare between interviews and observation activities was used to analyze the gathered empirical material, as well as working on the theoretical material I had brought with me to Kenya.

Period 4

This period consisted of data reduction and analysis, discussed more in detail in chapter 4.5.

4.2   Fieldwork: Getting access

The fieldwork took place in Kenya from the end of January to early March 2014. Research was carried out in Nairobi over a time period of five weeks, in which eight days were also spent in Kakuma Refugee Camp in the Turkana District of northwestern Kenya.

All field investigations begin with the problem of 'getting in' (Berg & Lune 2012). The decision to explore EiE practices in Kakuma derived from both a personal interest in protracted displacement crises at the Horn of Africa – particularly in Kenya, and from the presumption that access to the field would be relatively easier to obtain for Kakuma than Dadaab Refugee Camp[13], where the security situation is considered far more compromising than that of Kakuma. Nevertheless, from a scholarly conceptualization of ethnography, any refugee camp would fall under the category of closed research settings. This implies that access to the research site is only granted through 'gatekeepers', be they governmental officials, law enforcement, or organizational top management (Angrosino 2007, Silverman 2006). Gaining entry to such settings is often fraught with difficulties, and the researcher should therefore remain flexible in his tactics for getting in (Berg & Lune 2012).

My own strategies for ensuring access to Kakuma Refuge Camp are best described as perseverance, determination and a noteworthy amount of luck. As already mentioned, I commenced fieldwork preparations in the fall of 2013. The first step was to reach out to numerous humanitarian INGOs, present my research project, and establish relationships with relevant informants to whom I would be able to turn to when in Kenya. This was a far more challenging process than I had imagined it to be, especially with the geographical distance between the INGOs and myself being what is was at the time, but also because I was presenting a research project I had yet to fully develop in terms of angle, contraction and research questions. In addition, most humanitarian relief organizations operating under the auspices of the UN system are large international agencies with multiple country programs all over the Global South. Needless to say my e-mail enquiries all the way from Norway were not likely first in line, and many of them went unanswered. In the initial email correspondence with those organizations that did take an interest in the project and replied, though I expressed that Kakuma Refugee Camp would serve as the real-world context for the

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[13] Dadaab Refugee Camp is located in Garissa District near the Kenya-Somali-border. The region is considered extremely unstable and foreigners are advised not to travel or reside in the area. During 2012, several international aid workers stationed in Dadaab Refugee Camp were kidnapped. NRC informed me that clearance to conduct research in the camp would for these reasons be very difficult to obtain.

case study, I nevertheless chose to refrain from asking for assistance to conduct research in the camp. Gaining access to a refugee camp in Kenya requires approval from both the Kenyan DRA[14] and the UNHCR, obtained through an application supported by the goodwill of an INGO willing to facilitate the visit in terms of logistical and security-related support. I considered my chances of gaining this goodwill far better if such a request on my part was made in a face-to-face meeting. Consequently, and in spite of the anxiousness that came with it, I chose to travel to Kenya not knowing for certain that I would be able to conduct the research I had prepared.

When planning to do fieldwork in unstable and often dangerous places, unforeseen circumstances that can alter the research process often arise (Berg & Lune 2012). In mid-December 2013, severe conflict broke out in South Sudan that would soon lead to a massive influx of South Sudanese refugees into Kakuma Refugee Camp. Due to the ongoing emergency, I was certain that my chances of gaining access to the camp had been greatly reduced. When I met with two INGO staff members from LWF's country office during my first week in Nairobi, I nevertheless expressed my desire to conduct data collection in Kakuma. In spite of their demanding working conditions at the time, LWF still generously offered to facilitate my fieldwork in the camp. I left the following week with a World Food Program flight that was scheduled for Kakuma. Though my stay in the camp only lasted for eight days, it nonetheless gave me an insight into the everyday practices of EiE, access to a variety of valuable informants, and a new perspective on life – in all its ugliness and beauty.

4.2.1 Informants

The rationale for creating a research design is to enable the researcher to stay in control throughout his project, yet there will always be certain aspects of the research process where complete control is difficult to achieve (Blaikie 2010). In addition to the issue of entry into Kakuma Refugee Camp, this difficulty also related to my choice of, and access to, informants. The majority of informants were reached during the course of the actual fieldwork. In total, 25 informants from a variety of INGOs have been included in the study[15]. To uphold the promise of anonymity when citing informants throughout the presentation and discussion of empirical data, references have been made to their role/title (in particular formal/non formal

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[14] Department of Refugee Affairs
[15] See Appendix A for a complete list of informants

education) rather than organizational affiliation. Neither the objectives of the research enquiry, nor the stated research problem have necessitated making the informants' organizational associations explicit.

Informants in Nairobi

My leading justification for traveling to Kenya was to generate information and insight into the *everyday practices* of EiE. Subsequently, I considered my main sources of data to be UNHCR's implementing and operational partners with an education mandate in Kakuma. UNHCR would also of course be relevant in this regard, but the overriding goal was to get as close to the research problem as possible and I therefore saw it paramount that my informants predominantly consisted of social actors responsible for either designing or implementing formal and non-formal education in the camp.

When in Nairobi, the close geographical proximity to my main sources of data proved enormously beneficial and I eventually managed to gather informants from all but one[16] of the organizations with an education mandate in the camp. These include LWF, WTK, Don Bosco Planning and Development Office, NRC, Swisscontact and the UNHCR. Reaching the informants however, was often a long and tiresome process. The traffic in Nairobi is extremely chaotic. I would spend hours stuck in traffic jam on my way to the meetings and was therefore almost never able to schedule more than one interview per day. Because of the timeframe set for my stay in Kenya, this also meant that I was forced to prioritize the sources of data in Nairobi. Lacking from this study are the perspectives of governmental duty bearers in Kenya, such as the MoE or the DRA. I would also have wished to include other relevant organizations within the UN system, particularly UNICEF and PLAN International.

I met with several of my Nairobi informants prior to the fieldwork in the camp, which turned out to be a beneficial strategy in a variety of ways. Firstly, it gave me an opportunity to get a clearer picture of what was actually happening in the camp, and to identify certain variables of particular importance that I had not considered when preparing the semi-structured interview guide. Secondly, it helped facilitate the collection of empirical data from various organizations in Kakuma as well. My contact persons from country office level would inform their Kakuma sub-office that I would be staying in the LWF compound when visiting the

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[16] I was unable to get in contact with informants from Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), also acting in the education sector in Kakuma.

camp, and to generously assist me in my research when I approached them. Thirdly, it gave me a chance to compare and contrast the perceptions of social actors working in a humanitarian setting "from a distance" with those that derived from my informants at field-level. Dekker and Suparamanian (2005) argue that organizations involved in international disaster relief operations often have a significant knowledge gap between HQ and field-level, as the personnel located far away from the actual crisis area are less able to truly understand the contextual setting in which they work. While I would not necessarily call it a gap in knowledge, I did experience that my informants from the field were better able to exemplify, conceptualize and elaborate on nuances in educational provision in Kakuma and thus better able to illustrate challenges and obstacles to the *everyday practices* of EiE. After I returned to Nairobi, I met with a few more informants and would use these meetings to ask more elaborative questions directly related to some of the findings I had made throughout my stay in the camp.

Informants in Kakuma

In comparison to the practical difficulty of reaching informants in buzzing Nairobi, gathering informants in Kakuma was a relatively easy task. When I arrived in the camp, the LWF staff had already been informed about my purpose for visit and I was immediately set in contact with relevant informants from the education sector of LWF. Personnel from LWF then kindly took care of me throughout the days spent in the camp. They brought me with them to the field[17] every day so that I could both witness and experience my topic of research taking place in its real-life setting. As such, I was also given the chance to talk and interact with both teachers and learners, and to conduct participant observation. When I was not out in the camp, I would be inside the LWF compound where I was allowed to move freely around without staff escort. I used this opportunity to reach informants from the organizations responsible for non-formal education activities, as many of them have their Kakuma sub-offices located in the LWF complex as well. Because I was not allowed to leave the compound on my own, LWF provided me with the logistical support needed to reach those organizations located in other areas of the camp.

In the compound, all meals take place at fixed hours throughout the day. I would therefore also use the meal times to interact with NGO staff, and from thereon expand the list of informants to include social actors from a variety of crosscutting sectors in relation to

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[17] The field refers to areas of the camp outside the NGO compounds.

education. In addition to informants from formal and non-formal education, accounts of staff from child protection, youth protection, school-feeding programs, livelihoods sector, and emergency management have also been included in the study. As such, the sample incorporates a range of perspectives and is therefore argued to comprise a holistic approach to the findings put forward in the thesis.

4.3   Qualitative research methods for data collection

Social phenomena can be studied in regards to both scope/extent and meaning (Wadel & Wadel (2007). When the emphasis resides in the latter, qualitative research methods are particularly useful as they allow for in-depth understanding. In order to ensure validity of the collected data, as well as the confirmation of findings from a variety of sources, this study has utilized a fusion of different methods through triangulation. By combining methods, sources of data, and theories, the researcher can overcome the inherent bias that often comes from using a single-method (Ellefsen 1998).

4.3.1   Interviews and field-conversations

Semi-structured interviews have comprised the central method for data collection adopted in this thesis. In-depth interviews were carried out with informants in both Nairobi and Kakuma. Jacobsen and Landau (2009) assert that the descriptive data deriving from these exploratory conversations "reveal much about how forced migrants live, the problem they encounter, their coping or survival strategies, and their shaping of their identities" (p. 190), all factors relevant to this study. Yet when such data is collected in specific contexts, one must be careful not to make representative claims that inadvertently accounts for the totality of a refugee population's experiences (ibid.). Accordingly, the authors note that "unless very carefully selected, non-representative studies, especially those with small samples, seldom yield enough cases or the right kind of cases to allow the testing of competing hypotheses and causal relationships" (p. 190). In light of the fact that this thesis first and foremost has sought to generate an understanding of a social phenomenon in-depth through the lenses of a specific theoretical approach, data from the interviews are not argued to function as all-encompassing truths when separated from their contextual implications and theoretical relevance.

During the majority of the interviews I used a tape-recorded, which allowed me to partake in the interviews more thoroughly than if I were to write down the answers instantaneously, and which gave the participants the opportunity to review a transcript version of the interview to ensure accuracy. I did experience a few times, particularly at field level, that me asking to record the conversation made the informant uncomfortable. The perceived skepticism may have stemmed from fear of sharing inaccurate information, or sounding too critical towards UNHCR under whose mandate virtually all programming in the camp is administratively and financially managed. In those instances where the informant seemed uncomfortable I either refrained from using the tape-recorder or kept the questions general, allowing the informant to answer within his or her own comfort zone.

Creating the interview-guide to use in the data collection was a challenging process. Because some of my questions were grounded in theoretical extracts from a technical discipline, I had to formulate questions that would be conducive to the language and preconceptions of selected informants. The few times I asked questions that were directed towards the concept of risk management and adjacent practices for instance, I experienced that some informants neither understood the question nor its relevance to the topic I was investigating. As data were retrieved from different INGOs and from different organizational levels within the INGOs, I also had to adapt the interview-guide accordingly. The most challenging aspect nevertheless related to the inherent vulnerability of refugee populations and refugee displacement contexts (Jacobsen & Landau 2003). In regards to the fact that refugee children by virtue comprise a particularly sensitive research topic, I thought it best to adopt a 'do no harm' ethical code and to carefully consider how the formulations of my questions could either be perceived as discourteous enquiries into the poor conditions in the camp (over which the informants employed in this thesis holds no control) or as arrogant claims of contextual ignorance that point to some sort of perceived inadequacy in educational organization. I therefore decided to design the interview guide according to general thematic aspects in EiE programming with specific emphasis on design and implementation processes, on which the informants could elaborate freely.

Whilst in Kakuma, in addition to semi-structured interviews, I also constantly engaged in random field-dialogue. According to Aase & Fossåskaret (2007), these types of everyday conversations allow the researcher to receive answers to the questions he never thought to ask, and are thus instrumental in shaping his deeper understanding of the problem at hand.

Through casual field dialogue I could also explore nuances and gray areas more thoroughly than in the semi-structured interviews which were often conducted within a set timeframe. However, there is a delayed pitfall to the conversational tune taking place between the researcher and the subjects in this type of interviewing that did not reveal itself until I had returned to Norway. During the informal and friendly dialogues, as informants shared their thoughts, feelings, and experiences, I too would easily start sharing mine. Consequently, I unintentionally created "ties" to some informants that went beyond the formal researcher-researched relationship, and thus became emotionally invested in our conversation topics. I did not recognize any negative effects of this factor when in Kakuma, if anything it served as an enormous help in processing some of the emotionally overwhelming sentiments I had been left with after experiences made throughout the daytime when I was interacting with refugee children in the field. But later on, when I commenced the data reduction and analysis process, I experienced that not only was it hard separating data from the data source – it was even harder to disconnect my own feelings towards the empirical information. If all field investigations are characterized by the problem of 'getting in' – physically, then in my own case, fieldwork was equally characterized by the difficulty of 'getting out' – emotionally. I therefore felt it necessary to postpone the data analysis process until I could relate to the gathered information in a more objective, detached, and perhaps cynical, manner.

4.3.2 Participant observation

Gold (1958) distinguishes between the researcher's role as the *participant-as-observer* and as the *observer-as-participant*. In the former, the researcher gains access to the research site by virtue of having an active or natural part in the observed field, becoming part of the social group or setting he studies. In the latter, the researcher's involvement in the social setting is rather minimal. Throughout the course of fieldwork in Kakuma, I entered into both roles rather spontaneously depending on what the setting allowed. Participant observation activities were carried out every day in various settings related to educational provision in the camp. I visited both a youth center and different schools, including the UNICEF sponsored emergency education tents set up in Kakuma 4. I participated in a PTA[18] election meeting, which gave me a chance to see for myself what community-based participation may look like in practice, and I also attended an information meeting for refugee girls who were being

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[18] Parent-Teacher Association

considered for admission into a recently opened girls-only secondary level boarding school[19]. During the evenings, I would join the LWF team out to the reception center in Kakuma 4 where the daily influx from South Sudan was being accommodated and taken care of. Altogether, the degree to which I participated in these settings varied according to the specific situation. In some instances I remained largely detached from what was being observed, whilst in others, such as the nights when I would wear an LWF-shirt and directly help assist the new South Sudanese refugees, or at the temporary emergency school where I actively engaged with the children, I became more a part of the social setting being studied.

In light of the limited timeframe set for my stay in Kakuma, the opportunity to combine interviews and field dialogue with participant observation proved to be an effective way of gathering data. Yet perhaps more importantly, it also helped me generate a deeper understanding of what the accounts and descriptions of my informants actually entailed. The climatic conditions of Turkana were recurrent topics in almost all the interviews, stated to create a very difficult working environment in terms of educational services. I never realized the salience of such assertions until I experienced for myself just how hot, dusty and dry Kakuma is. In addition, many of the interviewees would often speak of the medium of instruction as a challenge in educational provision. During the PTA election meeting in one of the schools, I also got to experience first hand how challenging the issue of language in this type of context is. Parents from multiple nationalities had attended the meeting, which was held in English – a language hardly any of the female participants spoke. NGO representatives therefore quickly organized a few community members to act as interpreters. One of the men volunteered to sit next to the Arabic-speaking women to help with the translation there, while a female student from the school was asked to translate to the Somali-speaking ones. As some of the participants knew a little Kiswahili, parts of the information from the NGO workers and the school management were also given in this language. The predetermined rules for how all this conversion would occur, however, were rather fragmented. As a result, between all the English to Arabic to Somali to Kiswahili – simultaneously, I am fairly certain that we were all, literally, a bit 'lost in translation'. When it was time for the parents to elect their PTA representatives then, few seemed to have understood what this election process actually entailed. Those who were nominated into the PTA board would for instance vote on their own opponents (numerous times) as they did not seem to have understood that the purpose was to gather as many votes as possible for

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[19] Both meetings were held in English.

themselves. Consequently, and in regards to the topic of community-based participation in education, I therefore also witnessed just how easy it is to participate *without* really participating.

When undertaking participant observation as a research method, the researcher utilizes himself as the primary instrument for data collection and should thus be vary of the many errors and biases that are likely to occur (Befring 2004). In this thesis, empirical findings derive mainly from interviews, and my field notes from observations have functioned only as complementary data sources. These data sources in turn, have nevertheless proven to be a value to the empirical basis of the thesis. They have both confirmed and challenged some of the accounts of the informants, thus providing a good foundation from which to enter into a critical discussion of the empirical material.

4.3.3 Document studies

Another research method undertaken in this thesis is the review and analysis of relevant documents. To this note, the literature review on the EiE field in order to gain further knowledge on the research topic was particularly paramount, as it helped map out different areas of previous research on the topic of EiE. From thereon I was motivated to look further into the rather unexplored intersections between education and 'do no harm' standards in humanitarian aid. The preliminary research on Kakuma Refugee Camp outlined in chapter 2.0 also helped generate a deeper understanding of the contextual setting I was entering into. Whereas some documents were retrieved from INGOs employed in the study, others hold general value in various kinds of settings. The INEE Minimum Standards and the *Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief* are important examples in this regard. Using both these documents as a basis for the collection and analysis of the empirical material helped strengthen the transferability of my conclusions to other contexts.

4.4   Challenges in the data collection process

4.4.1 Practical challenges

In addition to the key difficulty of access, conducting research in a refugee camp presents a range of practical challenges. There are often security risks to the physical safety of the

researcher (Jacobsen & Landau 2003), which in my case meant that I had no freedom of movement outside the LWF compound and was dependent on staff escort whenever I was in the field. As a result, selecting informants became more a case of whom I would be physically able to reach given the logistical and security considerations that the situation presented. How long the time spent in the field would last was also an unpredictable matter. Lack of enough transportation vehicles meant that I would be dropped off and picked up according to the schedules of the drivers. In addition, activities in the field also had to correspond to the fixed meal times in the compound. For these reasons I tried to remain as flexible and lenient in the data collection as possible, using every opportunity there was to learn, observe, question, and understand.

A second challenge related to the time set for data collection. As previously mentioned, I only spent eight days in Kakuma, which ultimately raises the question of how much one can truly claim to understand in such a short period of time, regardless of how many questions one asks and how many activities one observes. Then again, the actual fieldwork lasted for five whole weeks. During the data collection process I therefore did manage to incorporate a variety of perspectives both from different levels within the same organization and from multiple organizations. I also used a variety of research methods for data collection and I conducted participant observation. While a case can be made for a limited empirical basis from which conclusions are made, another case can also be made for a sufficient enough insight into EiE activities to at least discuss the empirical findings thoroughly and to formulate *possible* conclusions to the research inquiry.

4.4.2   Ethical considerations

In *"Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan",* de Wall (2005) raises the question of whether it is morally justifiable to conduct research on large-scale human suffering, only to stand by with a notebook in hand while it is occurring. Through a discussion on the issue, he concludes that when the objective of research is to generate information that can be useful for relief agencies in their humanitarian operations, the research itself is also a meaningful task (ibid.). Nevertheless, enquiries into vulnerable settings or populations – like refugee camps and those who accommodate them, raise many ethical problems. Thus, one cannot discuss data collection in such a context without also discussing the ethical dimensions of the research (Angrosino 2007). In particular, it is important to reflect upon the impacts that one's research

and direct presence have on the subjects or system being studied, because as Jacobsen and Landau (2003) note, "unanticipated consequences of researchers' actions may only be revealed over quite long periods of time – after the researcher has left" (p. 194). In this regard, one must ensure that the research subjects are safeguarded from any kind of harm, with Jacobsen and Landau (2003) pointing to how the presence of Westerners is often associated with resources of some sort, and that interaction with the researcher can put refugees at risk "in the form of either benign family pressure, or by more malignant actors who may believe they have access to resources" (p. 194). In line with the 'do no harm' ethics, I therefore not only considered the ethical implications of my interview questions, but also to whom the questions were asked. Accordingly, no refugee children or youth's perspectives have been included in this study. Empirical findings are grounded solely in the social accounts of NGO workers that were familiar with my role as a researcher.

4.4.3   Dangerous fieldwork

While the issue of how to avoid personal or emotional harm to research subjects is comprehensively discussed in nearly all books on social research, the problem of personal or emotional harm to the researcher, however, is seldom covered (Berg & Lune 2012). Out of all the challenges I encountered during the data collection process in Kakuma, the greatest one related to the difficulty of balancing heart and mind when carrying out research in a social world so vastly different than the one I come from. Throughout the course of the fieldwork, I constantly experienced feelings of helplessness, guilt, anger, sadness, and shame that, combined, not only left me exhausted and fragile, but also so emotionally overwhelmed that I sometimes lost sight of my purposes for being in Kakuma. This was especially the case during the visits to the reception center in Kakuma 4. When physically standing in the midst of the direct consequences of ongoing conflict and war, life as one knows it stops making sense – and any attempt to hold on to some degree of scholarly objectivity makes even less. Hammersley and Atkinson (1996) write that when conducting fieldwork, the researcher must be careful not to lose sight of his role as an outsider, as this will also result in the loss of his critical and analytical perspectives. It should be noted however, that in certain types of fieldwork, the more of an outsider you are, the less you truly know. And consequently, it becomes easier, and perhaps this is rightfully so, to direct these critical perspectives towards oneself and towards the privileged society one is part of at home.

To lose sight of one's purpose for visiting a refugee camp when faced with the actual realities that characterize such a place, however, does not indicate that the research in itself is flawed. In the aftermath of my visit to Kakuma, I realized that no amount of preparedness would have prepared me well enough to handle the impressions I experienced during my stay in the camp objectively. Then again, when is qualitative social research ever neutral, faceless or objective? The true purpose of the research inquiry was always to explore, question, and learn, which is also what I did. None of these objectives necessitated a researcher detached from and indifferent to the social world being studied.

4.5 Data reduction and analysis

A useful technique for the reduction of data (prior to the actual data collection) is to establish coding frames/coding categories in the interview guide (Blaikie 2010). During the fieldwork in Kenya, I therefore applied an interview guide where the questions posed underpinned the theoretical framework I had established. A typological/thematic structure allowed me to stay in control of the research questions' possible answers, while at the same time also facilitating the identification of possible interconnections between the categories. Analysis of the data was also an ongoing process throughout the collection process. This helped identify relevant variables and themes to the research question.

However, seeing as I conducted the interviews using a semi-structured guide, I gathered an extensive amount of data that needed to be greatly reduced in the aftermath of the collection process. I therefore transcribed the interviews and categorized answers according to theory by identifying key concepts/themes and patterns. Blaikie (2010) argues that when it comes to the analysis of coded data, a crucial factor to keep in mind is the hermeneutic processes involved in the production of the researcher's accounts, I therefore also tried to be cognizant of the fact that my own knowledge, perception and understanding of the world influenced the way I, as the author of the thesis, interpreted and gave meaning to the collected data. Then again, this thesis has neither sought to generalize nor discover an "ontological truth". The aim was to explore a social phenomenon by using social actors' own points of view, and to understand their accounts by interpreting the data through a given theoretical framework. Any generalizations are thus merely suggestions of what might be alternative answers, which is

also why the abductive research strategy has been accounted for and made explicit in this methodology chapter.

4.6   Reflecting on reliability and validity

4.6.1   Reliability

The objective of reliability is to ensure that if a later researcher followed the same procedures as put forward in one's own research, he too would find the same findings and conclusions (Yin 2009). In other words, reliability is concerned with repeatability. In qualitative studies however, repeatability is immediately compromised by the fact that these types of enquiries are rarely engaged in unchangeable objects. Qualitative studies are frequently criticized for being less objective, structured and quality controlled than quantitative investigations (Fangen 2004). At the same time, however, one can counter-argue this stand by emphasizing the fact the qualitative research in general seeks to produce an entirely different type of data than the quantitative approach. Accordingly, a discussion about reliability in qualitative research ultimately comes down to the need for explication (Flick 1998). In order to safeguard reliability in this thesis, the reader has been given a thorough insight into the methodological basis that has guided the study throughout. The sources of data have been made explicit, and challenges related to the collection of the empirical material have also been honestly and openly outlined. In regards to the reliability of my informants and their social accounts, there is always the chance that my purposes for being in the camp may have affected the replies to the questions asked. According to Lee (1995), some organizations operating in challenging contexts may want to display an impression of organizational harmony to the researcher, and thus downplay the processes of internal discord, conflict or factionalism. However, for the most part I experienced that the informants had a genuine desire to share both successes *and* challenges in their work. During the interviews, to ensure that I had understood the accounts and opinions of my informants correctly, I would also summarize the key themes of our conversations, allowing the informant to correct or comment on any misinterpretations that might had been made on my part. As the study is theoretically guided, it is nevertheless important to stress that that the theoretical lenses I as a research wore during the analysis process have influenced the conclusions deriving from the discussion of the findings put forward in the thesis.

4.6.2 Internal validity

Internal validity may be defined as the degree to which findings presented in a study are recognizable to those from which these findings derive (Miles & Huberman 1994), and whether these findings in turn, are credible. According to Ellefsen (1998) triangulation in the data collection process strengthens validity. Thus, this thesis has combined a variety of research methods in order to ensure internal validity. During the analysis process of the collected data, I compared and contrasted these different methods to determine whether my findings were reasonable. I also contacted a few of my informants by e-mail after I had returned to Norway for follow-up questions when I identified gaps and uncertainties in the empirical material.

A basic problem with the issue of validity is how to specify the link between the research topic that is being studied and the version ultimately provided by the researcher (Flick 1998). While my informants were given an insight into the basic contours of my research endeavor, they were not familiar with the theoretical material that guided the study. Accordingly, empirical findings and the subsequent discussion of the empirical material have been presented separately to illuminate the fact that while the informants own the citations, the interpretation of the social actors' accounts belongs to the researcher. I did not enter the data collection process unbiased. I had a theoretical framework prepared in advance, which ultimately set the parameters for the questions asked. However, because I also kept the semi-structured interview guide relatively open, I received much more data than I had expected and consequently, I had to narrow down the empirical material by omitting several interesting themes and aspects related to the research topic. This "selective" procedure was extremely challenging, particularly because I had physically entered the social world I was studying and thus experienced first hand the various nuances that make up a social world as a whole. But there is no room for all the grey areas of the world in a thesis of this kind. It merely describes a fraction of the various colors that contributes to its totality. Thus, this acknowledgment in itself is also an attempt to ensure internal validity.

4.6.3 External validity

External validity refers to the transferability of conclusions to other contexts (Lincoln & Guba 1985). In other words, "whether a study's findings are generalizable beyond the immediate case study" (Yin 2009, p. 43). Typically, single case studies are claimed to offer a poor basis

for generalization, but according to Yin (2009), this need not be the case if one argues for analytical generalization. In this thesis, informants were not randomly sampled, even though some were more spontaneously contacted than others. They all had a connection to the education sector in Kakuma, fulfilling certain roles and titles within the organizations. In turn, I considered these roles and titles relevant to the stated research problem the thesis has sought to address. Many of these roles are also to be found in various other refugee camps around the world. A few of the informants even recounted to have worked in other places in Africa as well, such as South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Somalia and Ethiopia In addition, when discussing implementation of EiE activities in the camp, some informants drew lines to the INEE Minimum Standards handbook. As stated in chapter 2.0, these aspects are what make up the 'inner' context' and therefore reinforce the external validity of the thesis. A key finding put forward in this thesis for instance, is that inclusive participation of the aid-receiving community in the early stages of the EiE program cycle falls short when faced with the sense of urgency that linger in humanitarian operational contexts. In regards to analytical generalization then, a case can be made for transferability of such a conclusion, as the study has looked specifically at EiE provision in a context that shares some of its features with similar protracted refugee displacement contexts (cf. 2.1.1), and because EiE activities are implemented according to the standards put forward in the INEE handbook.

5.0 Empirical Findings

This chapter presents the empirical material collected during fieldwork in Nairobi and Kakuma Refugee Camp. It has been structured into four parts. Section 5.1 gives a brief overview of the current state of the different educational services scrutinized in the study. Section 5.2 accounts for key themes related to the operational context in which these EiE programs unfold, emphasizing factors that were frequently cited to impact on the provision of education. Section 5.3 presents an extensive summary of various findings related to the practice and principle of 'do no harm' in EiE activities in the camp. Lastly, section 5.4 recounts some of the recurrent themes related to everyday challenges in the education response.

5.1   The structured education response in Kakuma

The education sector in Kakuma Refugee Camp mirrors UNHCR's structured approach to the re-establishment of education in the context of an abnormal situation, which also correlates with the agency's descriptions of the stages of an emergency (Baxter & Triplehorn 2004). In policy terms, the *status quo* of the camp is currently located in a "care and maintenance" phase in which educational provision will have transitioned into a more formalized intervention response than in acute emergency. However, due to ongoing crisis in South Sudan, one part of the education sector is also currently correlated to the EiE procedures of 'acute emergency'.

In this thesis, EiE is understood according to the two definitions outlined in chapter 1.2. Given the fact that educational provision in Kakuma takes place in a *protracted emergency* under the *auspices of UNHCR* and includes a variety of formal and non-formal education activities intended for the *refugees*, this seems to be an appropriate expression even though informants employed in the study did not refer to the education sector in the camp in such a way. EiE is nevertheless used throughout to signify a collective term for the overall education response in the camp. As research has been limited to only a few of the education programs in the camp however, a distinction is made when bringing up aspects that are specifically relates to either of these programs. Data has been collected with emphasis on:

- Formal education. To this note, a further distinction is also made between formal education and the newly established emergency education program set up to accommodate the influx of South Sudanese refugees into Kakuma as a result of armed conflict that broke out in South Sudan, December 15th 2013.
- Non-formal education, specifically technical vocational education training (TVET).

For the purpose of the study, the term "children" is also used to cover both primary-age (6-13 years) individuals and secondary-age (14-18) adolescent individuals in the camp. Distinctions between the age groups are made when considered necessary.

5.1.1 Formal education

LWF is responsible for all formal education in the camp. The multi-mandated INGO has been operating in the camp since its establishment in 1992, and is the largest actor within community development aid. The organization's provision of education is anchored within UNHCR's protection and durable solutions mandate, and its commitment to provide education to the refugees is put forward as double fold: a means of protection and a means of development. Formal education includes ECD[20], primary (6-13 years), and secondary school (14-17 years). For the purpose of this thesis, only the latter two have been subjected to research.

There are 18 primary schools and three functional secondary schools (with a fourth one soon to be opened) in the camp. The Angelina Jolie Primary Boarding School for girls, the recently established Morneau Shepell Boarding School for girls (secondary level) and the newly set up emergency school (primary level) for South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma 4 are included in these numbers. The latter is dealt with separately in section 5.1.2. All schools are run and supported by LWF, respectively. Learners enrolled in primary and secondary school follow the national school curriculum as directed from the Kenyan Ministry of Education (MoE). Content of all formal education in the camp is therefore standardized after mainstream subjects taught in national schools, and the medium of instruction is predominately English. At the end of Primary 8, students sit for the KCPE[21] from which results are used as a basis for

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[20] Early Childhood Development
[21] Kenyan Certificate for Primary Education

deciding whether or not the learner will proceed to secondary education. While formal education in the camp is free for the refugees[22], informants reported that there are occasionally 'hidden costs' related to learning material, school uniforms, etc.

UNHCR has the overarching mandate to provide education services for its people of concern, but the Kenyan MoE nevertheless provides the regulatory policy framework for provision. Subsequently, LWF designs, implements, monitors, and evaluates its education activities in close consultation with both UNHCR and the MoE. In regards to the role and responsibility of the latter, one informant explained that the governmental stakeholder provides the curriculum, certification for primary and secondary examination, quality assurance and standards assessments, training of teachers in pedagogical skills, and coordination of examinations. UNHCR in turn, is the major donor and facilitator of formal education.

Statistics retrieved from LWF show that approximately 32,615 learners of age 6-13 years should be in primary schools. However, only 15,003 learners (46 percent) access primary education, which means that 17,612 learners (54 percent) between 6-13 years are out of primary school. While the NER[23] in primary school is 46 percent, the GER[24] is nevertheless 81 percent, indicating that most learners in primary schools are overage learners. Approximately 14,482 learners of age 14-17 years should be in secondary school. Only 290 learners (2 percent) of age 14-17 access secondary school, whereby 14,192 learners (98 percent) are out of school. The NER in secondary school is 2 percent and the GER is 8 percent, indicating that most learners at this level are also overage learners. As of February 1st 2014, total camp population was recorded to be 132,702 of which 72,229 (54,4 percent) of these are under 18 years of age. Thus, the demographic composition of the camp, as is the case in most protracted refugee situations in Africa, mirrors a rather young generation growing up in displacement.

While more than half of primary school-age children do not access education, the number of learners per class at this level is still exceptionally high. As noted by virtually all interviewees, there are numerous schools in the camp in which the teacher to student ratio is

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[22] Both primary and secondary education is free of charge in the camp. The GoK however, only provides free primary education for its citizens.
[23] Net enrollment rate
[24] Gross enrollment rate

approximately 1:120. Accordingly, informants commented that congested classrooms are considered the rule rather than the exception throughout the camp. There is also a vast imbalance in the ratio of girls to boys enrolled in school, with outstandingly low numbers of female learners at secondary level. For instance, in one of the secondary schools there are over 1200 learners of which only a little more than 200 are girls. As stated by a formal education officer however, *"this number may seem very low, but when considering that only a few years ago there was only one girl at the entire school, the current number is actually not so bad"*.

Informants described the standards of school infrastructure as severely inadequate, generally lacking from appropriate fencing around the buildings, appropriate construction of buildings, windows, cement floors, desks, chairs and so on. The boarding schools for girls were the only concessions mentioned in this regard. These are, however, privately funded. Teaching material was also commented to be deficient, with an average ratio of textbooks to student approximately 1:6, and in some cases far higher. Several of these statements were additionally confirmed through the author's participant observational activities at various camp schools. When discussing school infrastructure, another feature that was frequently brought up by the informants was the inadequate number and quality of sanitary facilities/latrines set up in the school areas.

5.1.2 Emergency education

On December 15th 2013, armed conflict broke out in South Sudan, which forced thousands of South Sudanese to seek refuge in Kakuma Refugee Camp. At the time of the author's stay in the camp, UNHCR had already registered 21,392 new arrivals since December 25th 2013. In order to deal with the rapidly increasing size of the camp population, Kakuma 4 was established as a new site to accommodate the massive influx. During the course of the author's fieldwork, refugee influx was ongoing with numbers ranging from 85 to well over 500 per day. Informants from the emergency management team pointed to two specific characteristics of the current influx, of which one was also confirmed during personal observation activities at the reception center in the new site. Firstly, the majority of the new South Sudanese refugees are children, many whom have entered Kakuma unaccompanied[25]. According to UNHCR-statistics retrieved at the time of the fieldwork, 67 per cent of the new

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[25] Children entering the camp without parents or other guardians.

arrivals are under the age of 18. Secondly, for many of those who are now fleeing their homes to seek safe haven within Kenya's borders, Kakuma is not an unfamiliar place*: "The majority of these people have spent half their lives here. They went back home when South Sudan gained independence and began rebuilding their lives. Now everything they built is gone, and they are refugees in Kakuma once more"* (education coordinator). To this note, another informant added that: *"the need for structure, support and hope for the future through education has never been greater"*.

As a direct response to these factors, a new temporary emergency school was recently established. The school consists of 11 UNICEF tents with inbuilt tarpaulins to use as blackboards. The temporary structures are set up in Kakuma 4 where the tents are pitched to the ground on an open field with no protection from the sun, which in turn was cited by informants to pose a great challenge given the high temperatures in Kakuma. Enrollment registration was still ongoing during data collection in the camp, but approximately 3000 children were attending the school at the time, respectively 1730 boys and 1270 girls. Like the rest of the formal education schools in the camp, learners at the emergency school follow the Kenyan national curriculum, albeit in a rather *ad hoc* manner. Accordingly, an emergency education manager explained that: *"We are trying to imitate what goes on in a normal school. The same kind of facilities, the same kind of subjects, and the same kind of structures"*.

The infrastructure comprising the emergency school is modest at best. There are no chairs, desks, books or other relevant materials for teaching. There are latrines and water facilities available, however, during the author's visit to the site, it was obvious that these facilities did not adequately match the number of learners at the school. When asked when more semi-permanent structures would replace the temporary tents, a security manager noted that such plans had not yet been established, and that pending on funding, procurement processes, structures etc., it might take months. It is nevertheless expected that the emergency school in Kakuma 4 will eventually transition into a more permanent formal school, as *"it does not look like the South Sudanese will be going home any time soon"* (formal education officer). In a similar manner, another informant stated that: *"there is peace agreement in South Sudan now, however, I doubt that will make anyone return even if, which is a big if, the peace agreement would hold"*. It is therefore estimated that by the end of 2014, 65,000 more people, of whom approximately 40,000 are expected to be children, will have come into Kakuma from South Sudan.

5.1.3 Non-formal education

There are several organizations responsible for implementing non-formal education, skills training or income generating activities in the camp. While the different organizational approaches to non-formal activities may vary in design, duration, skills on offer and so on, they all have in common the practice of absorbing beneficiaries predominantly on the basis of need and/or vulnerability. Normally, this implies that the beneficiaries' age range from approximately 15 to 25. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, empirical data from non-formal education has primarily been retrieved on the basis of gaining a rather broad overview of vocational training only.

Don Bosco in one of the largest TVET providers in the camp. The organization has been operating in Kakuma since 1993 and offers skills training through a three-grade system, each one-year long. Programming targets mostly youth who are out of school, in order to eliminate the high prevalence of idleness among the specific group and to help them gain skills needed to sustain a livelihood upon repatriation. The number of beneficiaries absorbed into programming varies, with one informant pointing to how continuously shifting dynamics in the context affect program availability: *"We actually closed one of our centers when all the Sudanese went back home … We used to have the capacity to help 1000 youth. But now, with the increasing influx, our capacity is not nearly enough"*. The same informant also commented that because funding into the education sector is so scarce, participants are asked to pay a small fee. This helps them stay committed to the training, as dropout levels are quite high.

Swisscontact and NRC also implement TVET in the camp. The two organizations recently entered into a partnership to implement a "Skills for Life" project. The donor had explicitly requested the implementation of a program with a more developmental element in the humanitarian context, which warranted the logical consortium between Swisscontact and NRC. Program implementation began in May 2013 and is a pilot in the Kakuma context expected to run until 2015. While Swisscontact, a leading organization in the field of private sector development in East Africa, brings the technical curricula, NRC, with its expertise of working in conflict-affected areas and with refugee populations, is responsible for literacy, numeracy, and life skills components. The program targets 500 youth, 250 from the refugee community and 250 from the host community, 50 percent male and 50 percent female.

"Skills for Life" promotes market oriented, flexible, and low cost skills development adapted to local supply/demand chains, and the overriding goal is to support the refugee youth (mostly school drop-outs or those who have never been to school before) to acquire technical and social skills that enable sustainable livelihoods when they return to their home countries, and to support host community youth to achieve higher standards of literacy and improved life skills in the highly vulnerable environments of Kakuma. The technical skills on offer cater primarily for self-employment, and were selected on the basis of a thorough market scan of the Turkana district and of the dominant refugee populations'[26] country of origins. Prior to implementation, Swisscontact also carried out a large-scale survey among more than 2000 youths in order to map their interests and to adapt areas of TVET priority accordingly. One informant from the project explained that the core idea behind the initiative is that beneficiaries should immediately be able to generate an income and put the dividends of teaching into practice from day one. As further exemplified by a technical advisor of the program:

> *"The main difference between Skills for Life and other vocational programs is that ours is more practical – through learning by doing, and therefore less theoretical. What is the point of learning on a blackboard when you cannot read and write?"*

When asked about current infrastructure available to run vocational training, interviewees commented that buildings, as well as necessary equipment for teaching trades were lacking from both quality and quantity. In regards to opportunities available to put the dividends of skills training into practice, some also stated that despite the most extensive ground work to find trades to market, opportunities are, and will continue to be, relatively scarce given the geographical and environmental features of Kakuma, the socio-economic *status quo* of its inhabitants, and the humanitarian relief setting that continues to dominate the various organizations' working environment year after year. A non-formal education officer elaborated on these statements and explained that due to procurements and standard procedures within the humanitarian system, the UNHCR and the other INGOs will often outsource many commodities that could have been purchased locally from the camp. In terms of sanitary towels for instance, the same informant explained that rather than having refugee youth who have undergone tailor training make these items, they are frequently purchased

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[26] Somalia and Sudan.

elsewhere in order to meet the prerequisite quality set. When asked why that is, another informant reported that it might have something to do with time – and that the UNHCR cannot afford to wait until the quality of 'local products' have been improved to meet the necessary standards. Nevertheless, several informants from non-formal sector did comment that buying from the local refugee community is at least far more practiced today than previously, albeit there is still "*room for improvement" (*program director).

5.2   Operational context

When discussing EiE activities with the INGO staff, lines were frequently drawn to the wider implications of the operational context. It is evident that Kakuma represents a very complex setting – and that this setting in turn impacts on programmatic objectives.

5.2.1 Crisis context

For an outsider looking in, Kakuma Refugee Camp illustrates vividly the difficulty of defining a complex emergency by its crisis stages. As remarked by one informant: *"what may be "care and maintenance" today might easily be "acute emergency" tomorrow"*. In one part of the camp, thousands of people are sitting restlessly on the ground, having just fled violence, armed conflict, death, and destruction in their home country. They are traumatized, hopeless, malnourished and dehydrated – and the humanitarian workers are doing everything they can to help them settle into their new homes; the white tents with the UNHCR label printed on the side. Yet other parts of the camp mirror the fact that Kakuma has been in existence for more than 20 years. Practices of everyday life unfold in various ways, resembling daily living in any rural, impoverished, and remote village on the African continent. People are buying, selling, and trading dusty kitchen supplies, books, clothes, food, soft drinks, mobile phones and what not. Youth clubs are organizing dance competitions, and talented adolescent boys and girls gather under the trees to rehearse their choreographed dance routines. The young children that one spots playing on one of the many football courts, or walking along desolated desert roads where white four-wheel pick-ups with a UN trademark occasionally pass them by, are smiling and looking cheerful. Most of them have been born in the camp, never having seen the homelands to which the GoK one day expects them to return.

When asked to explain the nature of this crisis context, most informants referred to Kakuma 4 as an emergency. It was also said that this emergency worsens by the minute because the area is becoming increasingly overcrowded as the elevated influx continues, and because when rain season soon commences in the region, the campsite will become prone to flooding and communicable diseases will spread more easily. The picture below was retrieved from LWF in the beginning of March 2014 and illustrates the practical unfolding of these concerns.

Figure 4: Kakuma 4 reception center, March 2014

Compared to the ongoing emergency in Kakuma 4, the majority of informants referred to the rest of the camp in a rather dissimilar manner. Some spoke of Kakuma as located in a reconstruction/development phase, albeit stagnant and without any durable solutions in sight. A few informants specifically labeled the setting as a forgotten crisis, pointing to how Kakuma has lost its place on the international community's agenda years ago. This in turn, means that funding is immensely scarce. All informants cited lack of resources as one of the greatest obstacles to effective provision of education. It was also reported repeatedly that the camp in itself resembles more a rural town than a refugee camp, where people have permanently settled. These perceptions may be argued to have influenced the contents of teaching in formal education. When asked whether formal education curriculum had any thematic subjects to help facilitate life in a refugee camp for instance, a protection officer explained that:

> *"Many of these children have never experienced war or anything like that. So we do not implement any specific curriculum in the Kakuma context. And there are no recruited teachers trained on refugee issues. They are trained in curriculum subjects. The one (curriculum) you'll find in an urban school in Nairobi is the same you'll find in a rural school and the same you will find in a refugee school. It's just easier this way".*

Despite resembling two 'different worlds', it is nevertheless evident that the ongoing emergency in Kakuma 4 negatively influences the already high-risk camp dynamics in the rest of Kakuma as well. This was particularly apparent in the way several interviewees spoke of resiliency in the overall education response. The pressures in Kakuma 4 drain both the financial and human resources of the UNHCR and its partners, which make it difficult to run education and other community services in the rest of the camp as usual. With the new influx, the campsite, which is already stretched in its capacity to begin with, is now seriously overcrowded. This in turn creates dangerous conditions for the refugees, and particularly the young ones, in terms of communicable diseases, food security, water supply and so on. It also indicates that the already concerning number of children and adolescents left out of the education system will become even more dismal.

Four more informants also stressed the implications of the ongoing influx to the dynamics of conflict potential, highlighting how many of them have brought the war with them into the camp. One informant explained that during one of her recent visits to the reception center in Kakuma 4, she met a 12-year-old girl, clearly traumatized by the violence she had experienced in South Sudan, who had directly asked the informant where she could find either Dinkas or Ugandans, as she evidently wanted to kill them all. Moreover, when setting up the current emergency school, an informant from the emergency education program also explained that: *"As all the children were outside playing, I saw some children standing in the corner and I asked them why they were not playing with the others. They told me: "they are Dinkas, not Nuers".* To this note, a few informants commented that there is not enough attention being directed towards the handling of situations like these within the policy framework, and that resources are simply too scarce to spend on preventing potential problems from becoming manifest.

5.2.2 No solutions in sight

All interviewees reported that the protracted nature of the camp setting has significant impact on camp life and camp dynamics, especially in regards to the issue of aid dependency. As one informant put it: *"The refugees depend on hand outs for everything. We see them standing in line all the time, for food, water, shelter, and help. Most of them have no income, and so they live solely on the items and services provided for them"*. Elaborating on these aspects, a non-formal education coordinator added that:

"The future therefore seems very bleak. The level of despair is quite high. But can you blame them for feeling this way? What kind of options in life do you have when living in this camp? They do not have farms, they are not allowed to have animals, and there is practically no job market. It is easy to conclude that you are not really needed, for anything. And when you carry such a feeling around with you, you are immediately at risk of becoming a danger to yourself, and eventually to the community".

Several informants also commented on the protracted nature of displacement in relation to being young. As the current formal education system is unable to absorb all school-aged children, and because post-primary educational opportunities are relatively limited, the level of idleness among children and youth was reported to be exceedingly high. This is problematic given the fact that the majority of children in Kakuma Refugee Camp have been born into its humanitarian architecture. As a result, the lack of a sense of belonging to ones country of origin has incited a sense of belonging to the camp. For many of the refugees in Kakuma, the camp is no longer a temporary safe haven. It has become their permanent home. As previously mentioned (cf. 2.1.3), some of them have even established small-scale businesses, created community-based schools, and even bought vehicles for transportation around the camp. On the subject, one informant concluded that these initiatives signify how *"human beings cannot be prisoned by the refugee label. They reinvent themselves, no matter how difficult the situation is"*. They also mirror the extent of local capacities present in the camp. Moreover, the protracted nature of the camp also means that more refugees are entering than exiting in order to access services. To this note, a technical advisor explained that they frequently see refugees coming into the camp in search of educational opportunities provided by the INGOs.

5.2.3   The climate in Turkana

The climatic conditions of the Turkana district were recurrent themes in the interviews. Not only is the dry and dusty desert environment not conducive to self-sufficiency in terms of food security and sustainable livelihoods through agricultural activities, but the climate was also argued to pose a direct challenge to teaching, as well as when teaching can take place. Schooling is dictated by weather conditions such as heavy rain, dust storms or intense heat. When it occasionally rains in Kakuma, the tin-roofs of the school buildings for instance, make hearing next to impossible – a phenomenon that directly obstructs teaching. Due to the temporary tent-structures, the emergency-school is completely unable to function when it rains. In addition, on Saturday February 22nd 2014, heavy wind and dust storm completely destroyed the tents and terminated all school activities for the time being, thereby also ending the much-needed support education was argued to provide for these war-affected children. The pictures below provide an illustration of the camp school before the incident (author's own picture) and after (retrieved from LWF 25.02.14).

Figure 5: Emergency school in Kakuma 4

The greatest challenge reported to affect educational provision was nevertheless the intense heat in Kakuma, particularly in the afternoons:

> *"From 1pm, the weather is just too harsh. They cannot learn the way they should. So classes end at 2.00pm, sometimes 1.00pm. In the remaining part of the day then, these people are idle. They have nothing else to do. Study is difficult without books. They cannot do farming, or be involved in other things. So they just stay idle"* (protection officer).

While both upper primary and secondary level have classes running until late afternoon, several informants recounted that many children are absent during the last hours of the day, mostly due to the fact that the heat, together with congestion in classrooms throughout the camp schools, makes any kind of learning difficult. Consequently, the physical protection that education is asserted to offer is greatly reduced, with one informant stating that:

> *"When educational provision runs from early in the morning to later in the morning, the remaining part of the day is wide open for them to engage in prostitution, exploitative labor, drug abuse, and other dangerous activities we normally advocate that education in these settings actually prevents".*

5.3 Identifying critical factors for 'do no harm' in EiE

This section accounts for various findings related to how EiE provision is designed and implemented in Kakuma. It provides an overview of some of the key factors that both underpin and challenge contextual adaptability, CBP, and context-sensitivity in EiE programming.

5.3.1 Designing EiE programs

Informants cited thorough program design as a key factor in the education response, pointing to the importance of identifying needs within the community. Accordingly, needs assessments were commented to be the most frequently used tool in this regard. To this note, a level of feedback from the beneficiaries and their networks was argued to be important, however, some recounted that there was not always enough time to conduct participatory assessments in their programming. Risk assessments were also commented to be important, however, primarily among country-office informants. In terms of protection through EiE, the establishment of procurements for identifying and reporting children's protection needs through teacher training on these issues was cited as being essential. A formal education officer also added that because they are dealing with communities that have a rather restricted image on gender roles, as well as correction and discipline of children, they have allocated resources for teacher training on child-friendly pedagogical skills to minimize the occurrence of corporal punishment in schools. Emphasis was also put on the importance of contextual

awareness in the design-phase. On the topic, an informant from non-formal education explained that the rationale behind this work derives from the notion that:

> *"We are dealing with reality. This (the context) is the reality ... we are not going in there to run a campaign to "free" people. We are going to try to find trades, or support them into trades, that are within their context. We want them to be within their context. We do not want to take them out and create a whole new can of worms that we cannot deal with in a project that runs from now until 2015.*

In a similar manner, an informant from formal education also cited that it is immensely important to understand the operational context from within:

> *Many of the African tribes here have a set of rules and a way of life. Our own values, views and rules often come in conflict with the cultural practices of these refugees. But we have to remember that these practices are also what represent the social identity of the child, and we have to understand the background and cultural context of the situation if we want to succeed in our programs".*

In order to ensure that the projects adequately fit the context, and to enhance the probability of reaching project objectives, the INGOs thus rely on an array of analyses that map out various risks and potential pitfalls that may impact on the provision of education. To this note, a protection officer commented that: *"We always try to be aware of how our presence and our programs affect the refugee population"*. To achieve this awareness however, networking and consultation with the community were cited as the most integral factors underpinning the design of education programs that are responsive to the realities on the ground. The contextual and local knowledge vested in the refugee community was therefore cited as principal, as the community represents sources of "insider" knowledge that these "outsiders" are dependent on in order to realize program objectives. One non-formal education informant exemplified this further by stating that:

> *"Some will enter an emergency context with a carefully pre-planned education program. They perceive it to be the best –and in retrospect, it also is. But the problem is that to make it succeed you also have to change the context it is implemented in. If you provide education from 8 o'clock in the morning to 4 o'clock in the afternoon, you*

have to make sure that children are released from their duties in the household and free to attend your program. This means supporting that household economically so that they no longer depend on the labor of their children, which you cannot do. We try to map out the realities of the context. We talk with parents; we try to find out when children need to work for their families. And then we try to adapt our programs accordingly".

All informants, regardless of organizational affiliation, brought up the topic of protection when elaborating on their organizational objectives, their rationales behind programming or experienced outcomes of educational provision. Access to education was cited as being an immensely important starting-point for protection from the various dangers that the camp either generates or exacerbates. However, the degree to which protection issues are systematically incorporated into the design varies among the organizations. In most cases, formal education was commented to provide a much-needed physical 'safe space' away from risks within the community:

"Education is used as a tool for protection ... when you consider the need for children to be drawn away from communities where they are exposed to certain risks during the day ... And the longer they remain there, the more they are exposed to child labor, sexual exploitation, and physical abuse" (protection officer).

This physical safe space is particularly important when it comes to the issue of early marriages, a cultural custom predominantly practiced among the Sudanese and South Sudanese populations through which young girls are married off as early as 12 years old. In these countries, a woman's ability to get married and bear children is what defines her. Marriage in turn, has immense social value. The dowry transferred from the husband's family to the young girl's family is also a very significant factor. Back in Sudan the dowry is often paid in cattle, which is not possible to do in Kakuma. However, as households living in the camp are rarely able to bring in any income, the girls represent the closest economic profit available. The refugee context does not generate the risk of child marriages *per se*, but the pressing economic situation of refugee households confined to aid dependency, and especially those with many family members, straightforwardly continues to produce the economic incentive for marrying off the girls at such a young age. Accordingly, one formal education informant explained that: *"The majority of these girls (...in the classroom) would already be*

married off a long time ago if it wasn't for the chance to go to school". On the topic, another informant exemplified this point further by recounting a story of how UNHCR had responded to a young girl's acute protection needs when she did not want to marry a 50-year-old man she had been sold to by her parents. The girl had therefore been removed from her family and placed in a foster-care-like household in which she was allowed to continue school. Interestingly, the same informant cited that in the long run, this probably was not such a good idea but given the protection mandate of the agency, children exposed to such dangers must be helped.

Informants from non-formal education, through which life-skills are given more priority than in the formal sector, asserted that equally important is the idea of using education to teach refugee children how to protect themselves in the given context. One interviewee commented that even with the most extensive sensitization activities within the community in terms of gender-based violence, HIV/aids infection, children's rights etc., Kakuma continues to be a highly dangerous place fraught with risk. Accordingly, he explained that:

> *"Education as we implement it, offers a lot more than physical protection. We offer them opportunities to go beyond what they are culturally predisposed to do and be. So much happens that goes unreported in the camps (Dadaab and Kakuma), because they (the refugees) do not know how to raise their voices. You might have cases of children who feel they have been exploited in order to access certain services, or subjected to for instance sexual exploitation, or been asked to pay for a service they should not pay for. Even right now, with new arriving refugees from South Sudan, there have been allegations of government officials asking for money at the border. If refugees are not empowered, this is what happens. If they are educated, they know how to report, why to report and where to report. They know how to engage the people who are here to protect them … and they are given the means to protect themselves".*

5.3.2 Implementing EiE programs

Informants from field-level often brought up the issue of how difficult it is to follow the standards set forth by the Kenyan MoE in implementing education in the camp. Subsequently, school and classrooms are filled up well over their capacities and well over the Kenyan standards in order to ensure that as many children as possible are placed within the safe-

spaces of school infrastructure. To address the problem of congestion, a double-shift arrangement in some of the schools has also been implemented, through which one group of children comes in the morning, another in the afternoon.

When it comes to girls' attainment in school, merit is often very low as household chores, wifely duties or taking care of children get in the way of homework and studying. Consequently, many girls perform so poorly that they eventually drop out. A teacher at one of the secondary school therefore cited that in order to deal with this problem, girls in this school are always allowed to progress to the proceeding form, regardless of low merit. There are also remedial classes for girls on Saturdays, which provides them the opportunity to catch up on their studies. A 'take home ratio incentive' for girls has been put in placed in order to retain them in school, through which girls are given a food basket to bring home to the household "in exchange" for the parents letting their daughters attend school. In addition, the girls-only boarding schools are concrete examples of how protection measures are implemented through education, as the girls are permanently kept away from the community and the adjacent practice of child marriages. In regards to the non-formal education activities, one informant pointed to how these opportunities are in fact more developmentally directed than formal education in the camp, as the refugee children in formal schooling must learn the curriculum of a country in which the chances of local integration are nominal, as well as in a language that many of them do not fully comprehend. Accordingly, the informant added that:

> *"The relationship between education and protection is ultimately linked to the local economy … I do not believe academic education works here…What is needed to make education protective is the same thing that is often not there when it does not work. It is the reality check..."*

5.3.3 Conflict-sensitivity in EiE programs

Opinions and perspectives on the issue of humanitarian programming in a setting that constitutes such a variety of ethnicities were rather divergent – particularly between Nairobi-informants and field-level informants. On the one hand, informants from Nairobi frequently cited that the heterogeneous society that make up Kakuma Refugee Camp actually contributes to a more safe and protective community, with one informant referring to the camp atmosphere as the *"Kakuma peace"*. She pointed to how the multi-ethnic composition makes

it difficult for the refugees to make distinctive lines between "us and them", thus directly mitigating the potential for conflict. On the other hand, the complex implications of multi-ethnic camp composition were not downplayed during interviews held with a few participants from field-level. As exemplified by a protection officer: *"When we are doing sports, teams have to be multinational or multi-ethnic, because not mixing them together will increase the risk of conflict"*. A formal-education officer commented on similar trends in schools, emphasizing the importance of making sure that no marginalized ethnic groups were excluded from educational provision. The same mindset also pertained to the recruitment of incentive teachers:

> *"When you are setting up a school and recruiting teachers, children will be coming from different communities here. So small community politics will interfere. A parent might say: "If I do not see a teacher from my own community, my children will not go to that school!" So suddenly I am seeing tensions coming up in the community, which were not really there, but have now come up as a result of us setting up that school".*

On the topic, another informant also illuminated that the recruitment of incentive teachers from the refugee community becomes a grievance for many, as there are numerous people who want to participate and contribute, but unfortunately lack the prerequisite grades and prior education to be selected. The same informant also explained that cultural differences sometimes creates problem in schools. For instance, Muslim households may not want to send their children to school when schooling runs from Mondays to Fridays, as Friday is considered their weekly holiday.

When asked how to deal with issues concerning ethnic and cultural differences such as these, several interviewees explained that while respecting local culture is important, they cannot let cultural differences dictate the way education for children unfolds. They therefore try to make a point of treating everyone the same, and equally expect the refugees to do so too. Three informants nevertheless stated that the multi-ethnic camp composition is hardly ever a grave problem. However, during participant observation activities at the PTA meeting in one of the schools, two interesting aspects related to the issue of culture and ethnicity were noted. Firstly, some of the subjects that were discussed among parents and the INGO representatives did revolve around distinct cultural and ethnic differences. When an NGO worker said that parents in the PTA should consist of multiple nationalities, South Sudanese participants

immediately asked whether this meant either Dinaks or Nuers. When the headmaster at the school explained to the parents how the school day would be organized for the girls, Somali participants immediately asked how prayer-times for their daughters would be included into teaching hours. Some of the Somali participants also commented the length of the girls' school uniform skirts and would have wanted them to be longer. Secondly, to comply with the principle of equal treatment of unequal groups is not necessarily so easy in practice. During the meeting for instance, the headmaster informed the parents that the school management had decided that for girls to attend the school they would have to cut their hair off, as they had experienced that the girls tend to sit and braid their hair during teaching hours. The Muslim parents appeared to react rather strongly to this rule, and eventually, the management representatives said that since the Muslim girls cover their hair, they did not have to cut it off after all. To this note, some of the other parents expressed that they thought the rule was unfair if it did not apply to everyone.

While emphasis on conflict sensitivity in aid programming for the refugees may have varied among informants, all interviewees highlighted the enormous importance of conflict sensitivity in regards to host-community relations. The organizations therefore also implement their programming in the local community, including UNHCR whose mandate is normally directed towards refugee populations only: *"In certain situations, we (UNHCR) have to have a policy on refugee-affected areas to make sure that they (the host community) are also supported and that they do not see refugee camps as an isolated island where people are feasting"* (community services officer). The decisions to include the host community in aid programming is first and foremost a response to the grievances-induced conflict potential on the part of the host population, but also because the INGOs have been operating in Kakuma for quite some time and have thus seen first hand how marginalized and excluded in developmental terms the local Turkana community really is: *"In many ways, they are far more disadvantaged than the refugees ... some pretend to be refugees and stand in line for food as well ... so we cannot justify our humanitarian imperative in this place without addressing their needs as well"* (formal education officer). It was nevertheless cited that with the exception of the "Skills for life" project in which places are equally distributed among the refugees and the Turkanas, all other education programs are predominately directed towards the refugees, leaving the host community with a minimal percentage in terms of access.

5.3.4 Community-based participation in EiE

In the daily management of schools, the organizations predominantly rely on the participation of refugees through employment of refugee staff and mobilization of established community leadership structures. In LWF for instance, recruitment of refugee staff and participation is both a necessary component in order to run the programs effectively, and an objective of programming itself, exemplified further by an extract from the organization's Global Strategy 2012-17[27]:

"Community Participation is an important strategy towards achieving sustainable development. The LWF/DWS Global Strategy 2012-17 requires all programs to adopt approaches which aim to empower and facilitate processes that will enable community members to make decisions and control their lives…the Community Based Approach acknowledges the capacities of the community members and recognizes that people want to, and are able to, manage their lives. In other words, community members are a rich source of knowledge about their community and key to achieve sustainable development".

Approximately 90 percent of staff in formal education therefore comes from the refugee community. LWF also facilitates the election of PTAs and SMC[28]s, which comprises parents, community leaders, and other stakeholders from the refugee community. These formal structures represent the voices of aid beneficiaries, and are intended to ensure active involvement and participation from the community in education, as well as continuous feedback and communication between the community and the organization. According to virtually all informants employed in this thesis, the desire to participate in education among parents and community members alike is widespread. Even at the emergency education school, which had only been up and running for a few weeks during data collection in the camp, South Sudanese community members had already been mobilized and were running the school. Discussing the state of community-participation at the emergency school, a recruited teacher from the South Sudanese influx explained that many of these new arrivals actually prefer to get up and do something fruitful for their community rather than to sit, do nothing, and passively receive relief aid. In a similar manner, an emergency education manager also commented that the emergency school was in many ways helpful for both children and parents:

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[27] Retrieved from LWF, February 2014.

[28] School Management Committee

"When you are new in a refugee camp … you line up for food, you line up for water. You can sleep all day. You have no books to read, no places to go. But the school gives structure. You need to look presentable because you are going to meet other children. Other parents. You need to brush your hair, your teeth, perhaps take a shower. Go somewhere and sit with others in a group. Then go back home".

The importance of embedding the activities in the local community was argued to be a key factor in ensuring that knowledge remains in the context after the organizations leave. Also, as explained by a key informant from non-formal education, it is a step towards ownership: *"if you want a community to own something, they have to understand it. So there has been a lot of discussion and liaison with the elders, with community leaders and representatives".*

The value of CBP was expressed in a variety of ways, albeit some more frequently than others. Firstly, participation was argued to offer a sense of human agency within the refugee community, which in turn was stated to generate a sense of ownership to the education programs. In effect, several informants pointed to the fact that this very feeling of ownership is what makes it possible to protect children through educational activities. With participation of refugees in school management, both the short-term and long-term values and benefits of education gain precedence among the refugee community, and more children and youth are encouraged into education or to partake in sustainable livelihoods training. Community support was therefore commented to be immensely important given the cultural preconditions of many of the ethnicities in the camp, in particular in regards to getting girls into the schools. Establishing a feeling of ownership was also said to facilitate community-based interventions in protection issues:

At the end of the day, the child belongs in the community. At the end of the day, I do not take the child home to live with me. It needs to stay in the community. Within the norms of the community … It is better that a community member comes and intervenes rather than an aid worker, because he (community member) will truly understand the challenges and background of the child and will be better equipped to find solutions that in the long run, are in the child's best interest" (protection officer).

5.4 Challenges in EiE provision

5.4.1 Access

Despite the fact that education is a fundamental human right for all children, providing access for all was reported to be a tremendously difficult challenge. While access may depend on the child's circumstances in the household, the key problem is nevertheless related to the fact that there are simply not enough physical infrastructure to accommodate everyone: *"We lack financial resources to build schools and classrooms...resources to include more teachers…but we have the space to build. There is nothing but space here"* (formal education officer). However, the problem of access was also reported to be part of a larger political dilemma. Due to the GoK's push for voluntary repatriation, there is little incentive for investing in infrastructure. In addition, one informant explained that improvements and expansions of school infrastructure make the camp setting appear more a permanent village, thereby driving more refugees in rather than out. Five informants recounted that access to education in Kakuma is therefore widely uneven, and that this is turn is a serious problem, particularly in regards to risks associated with idleness. Access also withers as one progresses up the ladder, with educational opportunities beyond primary school commented to be severely inadequate. In addition, many children perform so badly in school during primary years that they are not eligible to proceed to secondary level. The most frequently reasons for these findings are tied to the dismal quality of school infrastructure and inadequate quality of teaching. Virtually all informants mentioned the variety of multi-mandated organizations within the education sector to be a value in and of itself. Unfortunately, the INGOs that implement non-formal education are not able to account for all out-of-school children and youth. Several informants therefore also mentioned the importance of alternative recreational activities for those who are left out of the education system, in particular in the form of sports, child and youth clubs, theatre, dancing and so on. These types of services were nevertheless commented to suffer from a lack of both attention and funding in donor communities.

5.4.2 Retaining children in school

While inclusive access is clearly a challenge in the sector, findings indicate that retaining those children who actually do access educational services in school is an even greater one. All informants commented that absenteeism and drop out levels were exceedingly high, particularly among those enrolled in formal education. As mentioned, climatic conditions

pose challenges to both teaching as well when teaching can take place. Several informants thus brought up the problem of dependencies between school dropout and hot and dusty climate, congested classrooms, malnutrition/dehydration and poorly constructed classrooms not conducive to the weather conditions, explaining how these factors, combined, make children not attend school. When discussing school infrastructure, virtually all interviewees from field level also reported the inadequate number and quality of sanitary facilities/latrines to be one of the greatest challenges. As stated by an informant from formal education, the current state of sanitary facilities is a direct obstacle to retaining the children, and particularly the girls, in school: *"If they are not physically able to use the toilet during the few breaks there are, or if they are afraid to use the toilet because of its poor standards, they will simply not go to school".* Inadequate number and quality of sanitary facilities are, however, a problem throughout the campsites, particularly in regards to health issues. Three more informants stated that absenteeism among learners also occur due to frequent episodes of illness. The prevalence of communicable diseases such as cholera and diarrhea is quite widespread, in particular among young children who are more prone to infection due to lack of knowledge in hygiene promotion/awareness. During one of the author's trips to the field for instance, a group of children were spotted playing in, and with, muddy water right next to the sanitary facilities.

A third commonly cited reason relates to the fact that while education is free of charge to the refugee families, many prerequisites needed for school, such as for instance the Kenyan tradition of wearing school uniforms, are not. Accordingly, children whose parents cannot provide these items, or children from child-headed households with no income are also often absent. On the topic, an informant explained that they therefore try to provide the children with uniforms by having refugee youth who have undergone TVET make the clothes. Lastly, a few informants also brought up the paradox that lingers within the safe space assumption, pointing to the fact that the institution put in place to protect the refugee children is also one in which sexual exploitation, corporal punishment and abuse sometimes happen. One protection officer described that his unit deals with many cases of abuse in the camp schools, normally in the form of sexual relationships between the teacher and the child, or physical assault. Such incidents are dealt with as a violation of Kenyan law, and claims are officially reported and investigated before arrests are made. Nevertheless, if children – and particularly female learners, fear for their safety in school, they will not go to school.

5.4.3 Ownership

Most informants spoke of participation in the sense of ownership. It is evident however, that ownership is not necessarily equivalent to self-management in the Kakuma context. When asked whether this particular phrasing related to decision-making authority at the grassroots level for instance, some informants recounted that it pertained to consultation with community members, as well as participation in running programs. An interesting paradox inherent in the gathered empirical material is that while the valued practical unfolding of CBP warrants the valued practical unfolding of the protective elements in education, many of the cited everyday challenges to educational provision have root causes that mirror how the multiple faces of community-based participation in humanitarian operations impede the realization of these protection objectives.

Empirical data demonstrate that the dependencies between the problem of latrines and children's absenteeism from school for instance, is caused by a variety of mutually reinforcing factors most of which ultimately culminate in the dismal state of financial resources, or donor communities' lack of knowledge on the wider implication such a simple, yet fundamental issue really pose for the attainment of children in school. The local community however, knows this importance. As commented by one informant: *"parents have raised this issue (of toilets) numerous times in PTA meetings, and in feedback meeting with us"*, pointing to how parents prefer resources being spent on improving these facilities rather than books and pencils.

A few informants from Nairobi-level also commented that the state of CBP throughout the program cycle of education is unevenly dispersed: active involvement and participation in implementation, but limited participation in program design. Consequently, the local refugee community enters the participation process long after influential decisions regarding funding and resources, program contours, and program contents have been made. When asked why this occurs, one informant explained that very often, the donors have earmarked resources in advance. Consequently, one may talk and discuss with the community, but ultimately the decisions are made without them. Another interviewee also commented that: *"donors might encourage participation, but at the end of the day there are deadlines for proposals, which means that we do not have time to go to Kakuma and discuss with the refugees"*. The same informant then explained that a major problem with local participation is that the beneficiaries and their parents both get expectations, which when donors become involved, are often not

met. Thus, it is always very frustrating to go back to the PTAs or the SMCs and say: *"Unfortunately, we cannot meet your demands. But what is the second most important thing you need?"* (community development officer). A third challenge also relates to the fact that information sharing among aid workers and those they seek to help is often inadequate, with an accountability officer citing that:

> *"There is lack of sharing of information about what it means to participate, what the responsibilities are when you are part of an education committee or a PTA. But if you do not know these things, how can you participate to the fullest? If you do not understand the information given to you because of the language, then how will you know how to participate? These are questions that are rarely addressed in a relief-setting, regardless of how long it's been going on".*

6.0 Discussion

As noted in the methodology chapter (cf. 4.1.1), this study has applied an abductive research strategy after Danemark's (1997) understanding of the term. The purpose of this chapter is thus to present a dialogue between the world as perceived by social actors and the theoretical stance adopted in the thesis, mediated through the researcher's own language. The analysis of empirical findings seeks to find answers to the following research problem: *How do EiE activities in Kakuma Refugee Camp meet the benchmarks of 'do no harm'?* In order to formulate conclusions to the research inquiry, a set of operational research questions was established. The discussion of the empirical material presented in chapter 5.0 have been structured according to these questions, respectively.

6.1   On matching response to context within the relief-development dichotomy

6.1.1   Ensuring adaptability

The aspiration to implement aid that actively seeks to reinforce the good intentions of outside assistance without inadvertently bringing along the bad hinges on the concept of 'do no harm' (Anderson 1999). To this note, several scholars have raised the importance of matching the humanitarian response to the contextual realities on the ground and let these factors dictate which assistance to give and in which manners (Smilie 1998, Jackson & Walker 1999, Goodhand & Hulme 1999, Cliffe & White 2000). However, to maintain a context-based approach in aid programming is immediately compromised by the fact that even when INGOs obtain *geographical proximity* to a crisis at hand, they often still lack the *relational proximity* necessary to understand the economic, social, cultural and ethnic nuances of the context in which they work. This insider knowledge is only acquired through networking and consultation with the local crisis-affected community (Quinn 2002). Findings presented in the previous chapter (cf. 5.3) suggest that there are two factors underpinning contextual-adaptability in EiE activities in Kakuma: Different tools for contextual analyses, notably

needs assessments, and involvement of the refugee community through networking at the grassroots level. These aspects in turn, adhere to the foundational standards of the INEE handbook presented in chapter 2.2.3. Yet, when comparing the contours of programming to the contours of the operational setting, empirical data nevertheless demonstrate that the extent to which EiE activities in the camp are responsive to the shades and nuances of the context is varying, despite thorough groundwork in terms of needs assessments, contextual analyses, risk assessments, etc. (cf. 5.3.1). According to the INEE Minimum Standards, the foundational standards should be applied to all stages of the program cycle, and in all other domains of EiE provision (cf. 2.2.3). In protracted emergencies however, certain stages of the program cycle can be extensively longer than others, which ultimately indicates that the database applied in the design phase for determining risks within the operational context or the needs of aid beneficiaries, may not correlate to an implementation phase that lasts for years in a context that continuously changes in dynamics. To illuminate this point further, the following section discusses supportive findings more in detail, and suggests that one of the main reasons why some parts of the education system are less adapted to the contextual setting than others may be due to the difficulty of finding synergy between multiple objectives in humanitarian aid.

6.1.2 Kakuma: Complex emergency, rural village or something in between?

Many scholars within the field of crisis management have placed great emphasis on the dialectical relationship between how emergencies are understood and how they are handled (White & Cliffe 2000, Rosenthal et al. 2001, Dynes 1993, Boin et al. 2005). In humanitarian interventions, this relationship has often been vastly misinterpreted or neglected, resulting in humanitarian assistance either reinforcing, prolonging or exacerbating conflicts and crises. According to Goodhand and Hulme (1999), much of the criticism concerning how aid does harm owes its validity to the fact that the humanitarian apparatus has long been unable to utilize a context-based approach in the response to complex emergencies. In accordance, Murshed (2003) also writes that: "not too long ago, disasters were viewed as one-off events and responded by governments and relief agencies without taking into account the social and economic causes and implications of these events" (p. 145).

Kruke (2012) reasons that one of the prerequisites towards effective crisis management is to acquire a broader view of what an emergency really is by accounting for its various stages. A

crisis always has an incubation period, which in some instances will last for years before culminating into an unanticipated, unprecedented, unwanted, and even unmanageable event (Rosenthal et al. 2001). To be able to grasp the ambiguous dynamics of a crisis-context is therefore dependent on our ability to view the emergency's manifestation in light of both its causes *and* potential consequences (Boin et al. 2005). This in turn, is also particularly important in aid programming, as an all-encompassing contextual understanding will facilitate the realization that while certain situations require a strict concentration on life-saving activities, other situations allow for development-oriented assistance (Jackson & Walker 1999). Furthermore, whereas in some situations local participation may not be reliable, in others it might be both immoral and inefficient not to rely on the local capacities in place, and while the relative calm of a refugee camp in a post-conflict situation requires one response, working in the midst of ethnic tensions requires another (ibid).

But are there times when the same operational context may be in need of multiple approaches simultaneously? If one analyzes Kakuma Refugee Camp according to Kruke's (2010) circular sequence of crisis-stages (cf. 3.1.2), the camp setting may be argued to be trapped in a late-emergency phase, especially given its high-risk environment, rapidly shifting dynamics, insecurity levels, and social conflict-tensions (Crisp 2000, Kruke & Olsen 2005). On the other hand however, given the findings related to various local initiatives taking place in this global workshop of international agencies (cf. 2.2.1), there is also valid reason to further that the camp is located far beyond the late-emergency phase. As noted by a few informants for instance, Kakuma has culminated into a stagnant reconstruction stage due to the absence of durable solutions.

To answer the question posed in the title of section 6.1.2 is therefore not an easy task. Kakuma is certainly a complex setting. It mirrors a slow-burning crisis in both its speed of development and speed of termination, and thus also reflects a complex emergency as argued in the theoretical chapter, respectively. The protracted nature of the camp has become the manifest consequence of political action and inaction in the refugees' country of origins and the country in which they have sought refuge. It has become the manifest outcome of spillover effects flowing from continuous crisis-prone processes that linger in the external environment. And in many ways, it has also become the manifest result of the long-lasting presence of the humanitarian apparatus. As noted by a few informants for instance, more refugees are entering than exiting Kakuma because the humanitarian system in place offers

services they cannot receive in their home countries. The camp is no longer a temporary safe-haven, but has become a permanent home for the majority of its residents. As such, Kakuma does in fact resemble a rural village. The scope and scale of the humanitarian enterprise in Turkana also means that the refugees are receiving far more assistance than the host community residing in that same area, which has spurred the incentive to include this population into education and other forms of aid programming as well. These accounts in turn, illustrate how aid often ends up having a substitution effect, replacing state functions and thereby releasing governmental duty-bearers from their true responsibilities (Metcalfe et al 2011).

The established education system in the camp was said to be a particular important push-factor driving refugees into the camp. Discussing the current influx from South Sudan, an emergency education manager commented that: *"these children are very lucky to have come to Kakuma where the education system is already so structured and established".* While this may very well be an enormous benefit in terms of rapid restitution of children's education, as well as the need for structure, normalcy and routine –informants also stated that these children and their families are coming from a conflict-zone, with many bringing the war with them into the camp (cf. 5.2.1). Scholars in the field of EiE frequently further that education as a part of the humanitarian response should always be adapted and implemented to a post-conflict crisis context in which it is recognized that children and youth's protection needs are not necessarily the same as they would be in a pre-conflict environment (Sinclair 2001, Nicolai & Triplehorn 2003, Baxter & Triplehorn 2004, Burde 2005). Findings presented in this thesis suggest that the extent to which formal education, including the emergency education program in Kakuma 4, pertains to the true protection needs of children living in the camp is questionable. Much of EiE's protective potential appears to remain untapped, both in terms of the ability of children to access education, in terms of how to use education as a platform for disseminating information and survival skills for living through an emergency situation, and in terms of how to incorporate conflict-sensitivity into EiE activities. Several informants in fact stated that scarce funding into the education sector impedes a quality-response. As such, these findings also correlate with the same ones Dryden-Peterson (2011b) puts forward in her research on refugee education in various refugee camps around the world. Rather than "education in emergencies", the formal education system in Kakuma is implemented according to the education system in Kenya. In turn, this was cited to be a good thing as the Kenyan curriculum holds such high-value in Eastern Africa. At the same time

however, one might question whether a Kenyan curriculum for a refugee population that is expected to eventually return to their country of origins, is, in fact, the best context-based approach available.

Informants commented that formal education does not have added value subjects inherent in the regulatory policy framework for provision. Teachers may choose to contextualize subjects on their own initiative, but according to informants, they are not trained on refugee issues *per se*. A possible explanation for the lack of thematic crisis-context subjects may be related to the fact that such a large proportion of children in the camp have been born there. Another reason however, may also pertain to what White and Cliffe (2000) state in terms of matching response to context within the relief-development dichotomy. They argue that most humanitarian agencies fail to grasp the complexities of the context in which they work, which often leads to the wrong aid programming at the wrong time (ibid.). Given the fact that Kakuma has been in existence for so long, there is an obvious need for development processes within the refugee community. As such, standard Kenyan subjects are clearly important, especially in terms of numeracy and literacy. But when reviewing some of the stated reasons why children are not in school, and particularly those related to frequency of illness, conflict-tensions among different ethnic groups, inability to follow the medium of instruction, sexual and economic exploitation taking place in the safe spaces of schools etc., there may still be reason to argue that there is also an unremitting need for educational provision to equally cater for the crisis-context realities within the operational setting, regardless of how long it has been in existence.

Empirical material related to the features of the current operational context in Kakuma mirror the assertion that complex emergencies become protracted because of their tendency of generating new disastrous events, or exacerbate the likelihood of a return to old ones (Kruke 2010). Despite having lasted for years, Kakuma is undoubtedly prone to a return to unprecedented chaos as perpetuating conflict in the region persists, as well as the frequent occurrence of drought and famine. The current South Sudan emergency illuminates this point further. However, Rosenthal et al. (2001) define a crisis as a period of collective stress that disturbs everyday patterns. By the way informants described the ongoing emergency in Kakuma 4 in comparison to the rest of the camp, it is evident that this definition does not pertain to Kakuma Refugee Camp as a whole. Whereas Kakuma 4 was said to be an emergency, the rest of the camp was frequently cited as resembling a rural village. But

emergencies are neither isolated in time, nor space (Rosenthal et al. 2001, Boin et al. 2005). If crises originating in the most remote local place can easily become a global problem (cf. 3.1.1), then it is equally likely that the pressing situation in one part of the camp will spread to other parts as well. Consequently, it seems reasonable to say that the camp is in fact 'something in between', which in turn necessitates a call for multidimensional approaches in EiE programming.

Finding synergy between compound objectives however, is difficult without flexibility and adaptability inherent in the pre-planned response (White & Cliffe 2000). As noted by Smilie (1998), the quest for synergy is particularly hampered by the challenges of timing and funding in the humanitarian space. In regards to timing, he points to how aid agencies are either moving too fast, too slow, exiting too early or exiting way too late. In terms of funding in chronic emergencies, decline in international assistance also poses a great obstacle to finding synergy (ibid.). A few informants referred to Kakuma Refugee Camp as a forgotten crisis that has lost its place on the international community's agenda years ago. These descriptions in turn, mirror the assertion of how most slow-burning crises must be discovered as problems and constructed as crises by political action (Rosenthal et al. 2001). Scarcity in financial funding, limited attention in the media, an increasing camp population, the duration of displacement, and political pressures for repatriation are not a good combination, neither for right-based doctrines, nor for contextual adaption in EiE programming. The challenging variables of both timing and funding are, however, nevertheless underpinned by a lack of contextual understanding that captures the Kakuma-setting in its fullest form. Understanding is ultimately the key ingredient in both proper timing, as well as the wise use of scarce funding available (Smilie 1998).

6.2 On the role of community-based participation in EiE

6.2.1 The multiple faces of participation

According to Hilhorst and Jansen (2005), the role of CBP in humanitarian assistance often unfolds in two distinct ways, either as a means or as an end. From a minimalist approach to CBP, the rationales behind community involvement are commonly rooted in instrumental and pragmatic benefits related to cost-effectiveness. Bottom-up implementation built on local

knowledge caters for more appropriate responses that ultimately minimize the risks of placing money in unaccepted aid. It also enhances the effectiveness of the INGOs "that may have to deal with a sudden expansion of scale and services during humanitarian emergencies" (Hilhorst & Jansen 2005, p. 22). In comparison, the rationales behind a maximalist approach to CBP are more specifically rooted in the benchmarks of 'do no harm' and grounded upon the desire to strengthen local capacities, incite development processes, and to uphold crisis-affected populations' right to be active participants in matters that concern their own lives (Anderson & Woodrow 1998, Sen 1999, Rigg 2004, Hilhorst & Jansen 2005). Findings put forward in the previous chapter (cf. 5.3.4) illustrate that in many ways, the role of CBP in the education response in Kakuma is justified from a maximalist principle inherent in the organizational structures. As one informant explained: *"Our ultimate goal is to make them feel that they can run the programs without us. That they don't need us anymore"* (non-formal education officer). It is evident that the education mandated INGOs not only recognize the capacities that lay at the grassroots in the camp, but also genuinely believe that they should be strengthened to the point where they can manage the education services on their own. As a non-formal education officer commented, the key rationale behind involvement is to ensure that the knowledge remains in the community after the organizations leave. In a similar manner, an accountability officer emphasized the relationship between CBP and development:

> *"Ownership is truly the key word, the number one important factor to work towards. If they (the refugees) feel that the programs belong to the community: "our wells, our schools, our teachers", then you will have a different kind of sustainability. A more realistic one, a more productive one, and a more-long term one".*

The benefits associated with CBP are numerous. Without the support of the local refugee community, children will not be in school and thus not under the protective structures that schooling provides. As noted by a protection officer, this support has been particularly vital when it comes to girls' access to education. Without harvesting the knowledge vested in the community, the INGOs will not be able to design education programs that cater for the protection needs and interests of the beneficiaries, a point that was argued to be principally important in terms of TVET services for youth – who may easily drop out if they are not able to identify with the skills on offer. And without community involvement in protection issues concerning children, one might end up underestimating the impact that 'outsider'

interventions create for the child in question *in the long run* (cf. 5.3.1, 5.3.4), mirroring the validity of the principle of subsidiary in crisis management: those with closest proximity to the problem at hand are also those best equipped to handle its ambiguous dynamics (Kruke 2012). In terms of the protracted nature of Kakuma Refugee Camp, long-term perspectives are very important. Quick-fixes to protection issues, such as the removal of female learners away from their households, can be argued to do extensive harm in the long-run – as the child will eventually have to return to the community in which she is a part.

Anderson and Woodrow (1998) claim that aid agencies are often characterized by a gap between principle and practice when it comes to implementation of aid built on local capacities. Findings related to *when* in the program cycle some of the INGOs involve the refugee community may suggest that the principles of a maximalist approach are grander than the practice they actually leave behind. Some informants reported that the local refugee community tends to enter the participation process long after influential decisions regarding resources and funding, target groups, program contours and program contents have been made. Yet, many still spoke of CBP in terms of ownership in Kakuma. A plausible explanation for these findings might be related to the fact that participation has come to take on multiple meanings in the humanitarian space (Hilhorst & Jansen 2005). Words such as 'meaningful participation' and 'local ownership' are used as catch phrases for what is ultimately just participation through information giving, consultation, and functional involvement to get the job done (Hilhorst & Jansen 2005, Pouligny 2009). To this note, the participation ladder (cf. 3.2.3) provides a good basis from which to argue that participation unfolds in various ways in EiE activities in Kakuma, none of which necessarily correlate with people being able to take independent initiatives. Given the restrictions placed on the refugees' freedom of movement and ability to seek employment or education outside of the camp, ownership as *human agency* is not easy to achieve.

#	Type of participation	Description
1	Passive participation	People are told what will happen
2	Participation in information giving	Information is elicited from people
3	Participation by consultation	People gives their opinions
4	Participation for material incentives	Schemes like food for work
5	Functional participation	To make the project succeed
6	Interactive participation	People involved in deciding
7	Self-mobilisation	People take independent initiatives

Table 5: Participation ladder

As noted by the interviewee who brought up the difficult issue of information sharing within a multi-lingual camp population, even participation *through information giving* is often at times very challenging in Kakuma. Participant observation activities recounted in chapter 4.3.2 from the PTA meeting at one of the boarding schools support this statement further. In addition, these descriptions also mirror Pouligny's (2009) argument concerning how participation of aid beneficiaries is often more symbolic than it is real. Subsequently, if you do not understand the language through which participation is asked for, how will you know how to participate?

Moreover, as commented by a few interviewees from Nairobi, CBP-levels tend to be strong in implementation of education programs but rather imperceptible in the design-phase. It thus seems reasonable to question at what point a maximalist approach to CBP really turns into a minimalist approach. A key argument in this thesis is that rights-based approaches to education and humanitarian operational contexts are not an easy fit. In many ways, the same can be said in regards to the involvement of the community in EiE programming. The difference between two is, however, that whereas access to education remains limited and uneven due to the political and financial circumstances of the Kakuma-context (out of the control of implementing partners), causes of inadequacies in inclusive participation throughout the program cycle do not necessarily have anything to do with financial resources. Rather, it may be argued that it is a result of what Scharffscher (2011) describes as an "us and them" divide between international humanitarian actors and those they seek to help. Further exemplified by Hilhorst (2004), local knowledge for instance, is often undermined by the fact that "outsiders – in particular, intervening experts – label this knowledge as local, a status that, no matter how admiring, is ascribed to them by people from a superior position of universal knowledge" (p. 62).

Yet, in terms of how informants repeatedly stressed the need to include the knowledge bestowed in the community in order to achieve successes in EiE programming, it seems reasonable to conclude that a more appropriate explanation for the principle-policy gap relates to what Anderson and Woodrow (1998) argue in terms of *timing* in the humanitarian space. They claim that aid agencies are often allured by the myth of speed. The sense of urgency that underpins a humanitarian setting makes INGOs feel that they must rush to be helpful, which in turn leads to the undermining of existing local capacities already in place. More important than the rush to be helpful, however, is to be there *when needed* (Anderson & Woodrow

1998). Yes, disastrous conflict often overwhelms the local coping capacity. But sometimes, the *speed* of the international response can very well do the same.

The idea that EiE should be implemented through CBP structures is clearly outlined in the INEE Minimum Standards. The call for community involvement also derives from documented research on the fact that among crisis-affected populations, education normally has immense value (Burde 2005). In effect, the desire for education "often exceeds requests for food, water, medicine, and even shelter" (Anderson et al. 2006, p. 2). According to both Triplehorn (2001) and Sommers (1999), in emergencies, long before the humanitarian agencies have arrived, crisis-affected communities normally mobilize their resources and begin to provide some kind of educational provision for their children. Crisis-affected communities therefore always have certain capacities intact and available for INGOs' aid programming to start from, which was cited to be the case when setting up the new emergency school in Kakuma 4.

Moreover, utilizing local resources in humanitarian aid is often argued to set the scene for sustainable reconstruction and development. Both Sen (1999) and Rigg (2007) have spent much of their academic work trying to illuminate the capabilities that lie at the local level of deprived, poverty-stricken or crisis-affected societies. Sen (1999) argues that development is a means to achieve the freedom to pursue man's full potential, and thus development is also a process of expanding human capabilities – one that needs to begin with social, economic and political participation at the grassroots. However, to hold the *functioning* of being able to participate in matters that are central to us is not symptomatic to prosperous capabilities expansion processes if participation ultimately pertains to the use of services by accepting the decision-making of others. As noted by Sen (1999), development relies primarily on human agency, which in refugee-camp situations is often imperceptible – and a major cause for high levels of aid dependency (Metcalfe et al. 2011). Informants' accounts regarding how donors rush past the opinions of parents and other stakeholders in education indicate that the ability of humanitarian donors to hear the views of the refugees and others affected by programming remains limited if these views do not accord with pre-determined operational priorities. The issue of inadequate number and quality of sanitary facilities in the schools presented in chapter 5.4.2 exemplifies this further. These statements in turn, also mirror how rights-based principles are often negatively influenced by the decision-making paradox inherent in humanitarian relief operations (cf. 3.2.3). Dekker and Suparamanian (2005) elaborate on this

paradox by pointing to how most humanitarian organizations are characterized by a significant gap in knowledge between field officers at the sharp end and headquarter-staff at the managerial blunt end:

> "People in disaster relief either have the knowledge about what to do (because they are there, locally, in the field) but lack the authority to decide or act on implementation. Or people have the authority to approve implementation, but then lack the knowledge. Knowledge and authority are rarely located in the same actor" (p. 2).

Many informants raised the issue of how the lack of learning materials affects the quality of teaching. Then again, one might ask what good books and pencils and more teachers do if children are not in school because they fear using the latrines? And will more books improve the quality of education when virtually all classrooms in the camp accommodate more than one hundred children at once? If true contextual understanding resides in those closest to the crisis at hand (Kruke 2012) and if this understanding in turn, is ultimately the key ingredient in both proper timing, as well as the wise use of scarce funding available (Smilie 1998), then a call for more inclusive and real CBP in all stages of the EiE program cycles should be made.

6.3   On the everyday pitfalls of EiE implementation

6.3.1   'Do no harm' as risk management

Pouligny (2009) argues that 'do no harm' pertains to the act of being cognizant of the unintended consequences that aid might generate. From this perspective, 'do no harm' signals a type of risk management in the humanitarian system (Metcalfe et al. 2011). Effective handling of risk is nevertheless fully dependent on how risk is understood – and to be cognizant of that which we have never experienced is difficult (Aven et al. 2004, Aven & Renn 2010). To this note, risk management activities should ensure the integration of social diversity, which will underpin a multidisciplinary organizational approach to risk (Aven & Renn 2010). However, according to Boin et al. (2005), processes of risk management can also create cognitive blinders within organizations. If the risk in question is considered nominal, it becomes acceptable – and neglected, "as people tend to forget that risks – however small – can and do materialize. It is often true that much must go wrong before a crisis occurs, but sometimes it does" (ibid. p. 24). The risk of conflict-potential was reported to be an integral factor to outline in all aid programming, including education. Findings presented in the

previous chapter nevertheless illustrate divergent perceptions of conflict-potential in the Kakuma context (cf. 5.3.3). Whereas the risk of conflict escalation between the host-community and the refugee-community was cited as important to account for in EiE programming, risk of conflict episodes among the different ethnicities in the camp did not seem to be perceived as having high probability, particularly not among actors from HQ-level. Some informants from field-level did bring up the issue of frictions occurring between different nationalities, however, for the most part the majority of the informants cited Kakuma to be a rather peaceful setting. This point can be related to Dekker and Suparamanian's (2005) arguments concerning the knowledge gap that exist between HQ and field-level, as the personnel located far away from the geographical crisis area are less able to truly understand the contextual setting in which they work. It can also pertain to the arguments of Boin et al. (2005) outlined above. If risk connotes a subjective judgment about the uncertainty of "future harm, the probability of a harmful event or hazard occurring and the likely severity of the impact of that event or hazard" (Metcalfe et al. 2011, p. 2), then it is also evident that acts of being cognizant of EiE's unintentional side-affects are influenced by the perceived level of 'harm' present in the contextual setting to begin with. Even when EiE activities are designed and implemented with the aim of reinforcing the positive outcomes of aid, the variables of outside assistance, context, and pre-existing grievances may still interact in unanticipated ways, distorting these good intentions. Accordingly, the education system in Kakuma cannot be separated from the socio-cultural dynamics of the operational context. EiE is generally considered a force for good, but the contextual realities of emergencies can distort its benefits and spur additional risks (Nicolai and Triplehorn 2003). Subsequently, if these factors are not systematically accounted for, aid can inadvertently create harmful conditions (Pouligny 2009).

6.3.2 Mutual dependencies

Metcalfe et al. (2011) argue that the humanitarian system as a whole lacks a structured approach to risk management, despite the fact that both humanitarian principles and conduct are in many ways defined solely by risk. According to the authors, risk management practices in most sectors of humanitarian programming are ad hoc, inconsistent and fragmented, resulting in aid agencies often failing to account for the interconnectedness between contextual and programmatic risks. As noted by Aven and Renn (2010), the more complex and ambiguous a risk problem is, the more challenges the risk management process becomes.

To be conscious of the unintended side-affects of education's impact on contextual dynamics is hampered by the mutual dependencies that exist between programmatic pitfalls and contextual pressures. For instance, informants frequently brought up how climatic conditions impact on educational provision. As heated and congested classrooms create an environment not conducive to teaching, children are often absent from school and therefore also more exposed to dangerous risks within the community. However, these classrooms would not be congested if the education response adequately matched demand. In turn, this match would not be mismatched if financial resources were not so scarce.

Like any other aid programming, educational provision can also generate unintentional negative side affects. To understand this phenomenon however, one must incorporate Anderson's (1999) stance towards how humanitarian assistance can never be separated from the context in which it is given, and how the measures that are implemented to minimize harm are sometimes those that also have the potential to actually do harm (Hilhorst 2005). To mitigate the prevalence of aid-dependency for instance, the local refugee community in Kakuma is mobilized to participate in educational provision. In the daily management of education, the INGOs rely on the partaking of recruited refugee teachers. These teachers in turn, are also eventually given the opportunity to require certifications for undertaking teacher-training courses which becomes "portable skills" they will be able to take with them home one day. But this often becomes a grievance for those who want to participate but lack the prerequisite grades and prior education in order to be eligible for recruitment (cf. 5.3.3), thereby mirroring the assertion that aid creates uneven benefits (Anderson 1999). The decision to implement the Kenyan school curriculum was said to be important because of its high-value all over Eastern Africa and because the certification that the Kenyan MoE provides will facilitate job opportunities in the refugees' countries of origin. However, as empirical data depict, some children drop out of school because they are part of households that cannot effort the "hidden costs" that often come with school uniforms for instance, or because the Kenyan school system is not based on how Muslims relate to weekdays and weekends. To this note, a few informants also brought up how children are absent from school because they cannot follow the medium of instruction. As such, children become excluded from the 'safe space' structures that the school offers and thus become more exposed to risks within the community. To prevent differences in ethnic and religious background from becoming a problem, one interviewee commented that they always make a point of treating everyone the same, and equally expect the refugees to do so too. But as the

empirical descriptions related to the hair-cutting issue at one of boarding schools depict, this principle is not so easy to comply with in practice, thus mirroring Hilhorst's (2005) arguments concerning how 'new' humanitarian principles have made aid agencies become selective in their respect of local custom and culture.

The mutual dependencies among contextual and programmatic factors in Kakuma ultimately illuminate how even when everyday choices in aid programming are made with the best intensions, they can inadvertently generate negative repercussions (Metcalfe et al. 2011). CBP for instance, is an important strategy towards 'do no harm', but as one informant explained: *"Participation is power. Everybody wants power. The leaders as well. When you have power you are influential, you can have a say in things and you can control what is happening around you"*. Given the fact that Kakuma comprise such a heterogeneous society it is clear that equal participation between different ethnicities is very important – and in turn, very difficult to ensure. Thus, asymmetrical power relationships between aid recipients are created (Pouligny 2009), mirroring the assertion that humanitarian aid can inadvertently create ethnic, religious, or gender discrimination (Metcalfe et al. 2011), as well as exacerbate pre-existing grievances (Anderson 1999).

Berry and Reddy (2010) illuminate the benefits related to CBP and protection issues in humanitarian assistance. They argue that it is paramount to let crisis-affected communities partake in protection issues, as they themselves are ultimately the true analysts and agents of their own protection. On the other hand, however, the community can also be the main source of protection problems. The fact that so many informants raised the importance of education in terms of 'safe spaces' that keep children away from risks within the community demonstrates this point further. The fact that these 'safe spaces' are in fact not always so safe is another example. Such findings illustrate how the modalities of goal-oriented humanitarian assistance have raised the stakes of meeting the benchmarks of 'do no harm'. To tackle the risks that children face in their communities however, several informants recounted that more rather than less participation is key, as awareness creation and sensitization campaigns within the refugee community will change mindsets and contribute to the establishment of a safe camp setting where children's rights are respected. As such, the PTA's and the SMC's provide decent platforms for discussing these issues with community members.

6.3.3 From a rights-based to a resource-based approach to education

The theoretical starting point in this thesis is that the benchmarks of 'do no harm' unfold both as an objective of humanitarian aid – and as the means necessary to reach the end itself. These means in turn, are operationalized through the 'new' and goal-oriented humanitarian principles (Smilie 1998, Fox 2001, Hilhorst 2005, Hilhorst & Jansen 2005). To this note, the decision to include education into the pillars of humanitarian assistance is rooted in a rights-based approach (Burde 2005, Mendenhall 2012), which recognizes that the duration of contemporary crises severely impedes on development processes and human rights. Consequently, education for crisis-affected children cannot wait for a development phase that might be years away (Pigozzi 1999). Children's right to education should be upheld, even in times of crisis, conflict and forced displacement.

The dismal number of children accessing education compared to the totality of school-age children living in Kakuma supports a key argument put forward in this thesis: rights-based principles and humanitarian operational contexts are not an easy fit. Rather than a rights-based approach to education, UNHCR and its partners are forced into a resource-based approach. The benchmarks of 'do no harm' are thus sought through a "best possible output" strategy. Without equal access for all however, educational provision in itself ends up having a uneven distributional impact on the beneficiaries of humanitarian aid, which in turn mirrors Anderson's (1999) key assertions for why humanitarian assistance can do more harm than good.

Education is often presented as the panacea for a wide range of social ills (Bush & Saltarelli 2000). As noted by Karpinska et al. (2007), the assumptions and benefits related to EiE have been so convincingly argued that they appear as givens for those involved in the field. But "if it is true that education can have a socially constructive impact…then it is equally evident that it can have a socially destructive impact" (Bush & Saltarelli 2000, p. 9). The validity of this claim is particularly evident in the 2011-revised edition of the INEE Minimum Standards, through which the need for a conflict-sensitive perspective on the provision of education was added to the long list of standards in EiE implementation (cf. 2.2). According to Anderson (1999), in every conflict-affected society, local capacities for both peace and conflict exist simultaneously. Education may present a social system that provides connection and continuity even when people are divided by conflict, providing the means to build and bridge social capital within war-torn communities (Baxter & Triplehorn 2004). But systems and

services that connect people in times of crisis are also the ones that very often divide them and epitomize the local capacities for conflict, especially if distributed unevenly. Bush and Saltarelli (2000) illuminate this point further by writing that: "Because education has increasingly become a highly valued commodity, its unequal allocation has been a serious source of friction that has frequently led to confrontation" (p. 9).

In Kakuma, the very fact that more than 50 per cent of school-age children find themselves out of the 'safe spaces' that schools are argued to provide is particularly concerning and can be argued to 'do harm' in a variety of ways. Firstly, given the protracted nature of the camp, it is obvious that the only chance for the camp's young residents to acquire an education is now – not 15 years down the line. Secondly, without the structure, safety, and hope for a better future that education in these situations provide, idle children and youth are more likely to be manipulated into dangerous activities. And thirdly, uneven distribution of educational opportunity can generate grievances among different ethnic groups, which can lead to conflict. In regards to this latter point, some of the informants even highlighted that the decision to include Turkana children and youth as beneficiaries of educational provision is largely due to previous experiences of grievances-induced conflict episodes because the host community were in fact initially left out. The resource-based reality of a rights-based approach to education should therefore not be considered benign. As similarly expressed by one of the informants employed in this thesis:

> "The power-seeking authority who benefits from civil war and conflict in the background most likely once attended school and got an education. The young man who carries this person's gun in his hands, killing innocent men, women and children in the name of someone else's pursuit of power – probably did not".

7.0 Conclusions

This thesis has set out to address the following research problem: *How do EiE activities in Kakuma Refugee Camp meet the benchmarks of 'do no harm'?* To find possible answers and formulate conclusions, research was carried out in a real-life setting using an explorative case-study approach. Empirical data was retrieved from various INGOs with an education mandate in Kakuma Refugee Camp, including UNHCR who holds the primary responsibility for providing services to the residents of the camp. The parameters that set the focus of research has been described and outlined in the chapter 3.0. The theoretical framework put forward in this section was argued to epitomize an approach that would enhance the understanding of how educational provision and the benchmarks of 'do no harm' are connected. As empirical data has demonstrated, separating the contours and nuances of EiE activities from the wide-ranging factors that constitute a humanitarian operational context is difficult, thus reaffirming the importance of a rather broad theoretical basis for the analysis of collected data.

The theoretical point of departure for the thesis has been the concept of 'do no harm' with its divergent connotations. Building on the various theoretical angles outlined in chapter 3.0, this thesis has established its own understanding of what constitutes the benchmarks of 'do no harm' in EiE activities, with specific emphasis on adaptability to crisis-context, bottom-up approaches to the delivery of educational services, and cognizant awareness of the impact educational provision might have on the aid-receiving community. Combined, these perspectives have helped underpin an essential argument put forward in the thesis: rights-based principles in goal-oriented humanitarian assistance may be a solid idea in theory, but hard to implement in practice when faced with the realities of relief-mentality, scarce funding, the myth of speed, faded media coverage, and the geopolitical internal and external pressures that underpin refugee issues. Based on the empirical data presented in chapter 5.0 and the subsequent discussion of these findings in chapter 6.0, the following conclusions can be put forward:

The degree to which educational provision in Kakuma adequately matches the contextual realities on the ground is varying. Non-formal education actors have a more autonomous place in the education sector and are thus also better able to design adapted EiE programs. In

comparison, the policy framework of the GoK governs formal educational provision. Several scholars cited in this thesis have argued that context-based approaches are the key prerequisite for reaching 'do no harm' objectives. It therefore seems appropriate to question whether a Kenyan school curriculum for a refugee population that is expected to one day return to their country of origins, is in fact, the best context-based approach available. Moreover, the extent to which EiE programs in the camp are responsive to the protection needs of refugee children is compromised by the resource-based reality of a rights-based approach to education. Too many children find themselves out of the safe structures that EiE is argued to provide. Education in emergencies should be just that; adapted educational provision that seeks to meet the protection needs of crisis-affected children, be they caught in the midst of acute of chronic emergency (Baxter & Triplehorn 2004). Without specifically implemented as a risk reducing measure, much of EiE's protective potential will remain untapped.

The most paramount measure implemented to meet the benchmarks of 'do no harm' in EiE activities is the involvement of the local refugee community. This participation offers a range of benefits that strengthen the education response and minimize the level of aid dependency in the camp. In order to fill the vacuum between geographical proximity to the refugee camp and relational proximity to the underlying socio-cultural setting underpinning its dynamics, contextual knowledge is harvested from networking at the grassroots level. Rather than being passive recipients of educational services, aid beneficiaries are also given the opportunity to contribute to the practical implementation of EiE. As such, the local coping capacity of the refugee-community can additionally be said to be enhanced, as many acquire "portable" teaching skills they can take with them when they one day return home.

Findings related to *when* in the program cycle the refugee community becomes involved nevertheless suggest that voice and human agency to impact choices concerning target groups, which outcomes to work towards, contents of educational provision, where to put available resources and so on, remains limited. While community-based participation was often referred to in terms of ownership and autonomy among the aid-receiving community, empirical data illustrate that participation more frequently unfolds in terms of functionality, consultation, and information giving. The sense of urgency that characterizes the humanitarian space was argued to leave little room for community mobilization in the early phases of the program cycle. This in turn has further implications for contextual-adaptability in EiE activities. Consequently, the voices of those with closest relational proximity to

children's needs have a tendency of remaining unheard if they do not conform to pre-determined operational priorities. Combined, these conclusions in particular, set the scene for a variety of areas for further research. If true contextual understanding resides in those closest to the crisis at hand (Kruke 2012) and if this understanding in turn, is ultimately the key ingredient in both proper timing, as well as the wise use of scarce funding available (Smilie 1998), then more research into the underlying organizational factors impeding involvement in the early stages of the EiE program cycle is needed to turn the trend around.

To adhere to the need for cognizant delivery of EiE activities in the multi-ethnic camp composition that make up Kakuma, and to advance contextual understanding of the various cultures in place, the humanitarian organizations rely on an array of informal practical strategies that are intended to minimize unintentional 'harm' of outside assistance. However, programmatic choices and contextual factors are mutual dependent variables, which create conditions that may be harmful for the aid-receiving refugee community. As one informant for instance stated, recruitment of teachers from the local refugee community can for instance spur frictions in small community politics or in the worst cases, contribute to exacerbating underlying grievances among ethnic groups.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the current state of the education response in Kakuma Refugee Camp is far from matching the number of children entitled to the right to education. Thus, one might argue that rather than a rights-based approach to education the mandated INGOs are forced into a resource-based approach. The concerning number of children and adolescents left out of the education response should, however, not be considered benign. Given the protracted nature of the emergency, the chance of gaining an education is now – not 15 years down the line. Education is crucial for all children, but it is especially imperative for those whose childhood and adolescence take place in a refugee camp. Education offers hope to the hopeless, and its value as the fourth 'pillar' of humanitarian aid deserves far more attention among stakeholders and donor states than it has received to date.

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I. Appendix A - Interview Guide

INTERVIEW GUIDE

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

- o Name
- o Organization
- o Position

ORGANIZATION

- o What kind of educational provision does your organization offer in KRC?
    - ➢ Any programming targeted at host community as well?
- o What are the key visions and objectives of (org) in terms of educational provision for refugees?
    - ➢ Key strategies in meeting these objectives?

PROGRAM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

- o What kind of preliminary work is done when designing education programs?
    - ➢ How do you consider the context in which programs are implemented?
    - ➢ How do you map needs, risks, expected duration etc., and who participates in these analyses?
    - ➢ What kind of work is done in terms of conflict-sensitivity?
- o What, in your opinion, are the most prevalent risks facing the beneficiaries of education in the camp?
    - ➢ How would you describe the crisis-context in Kakuma?
    - ➢ How are your education programs made responsive to the risks prevalent in the context?
    - ➢ Any examples? Contents, teaching hours during the day, language, special thematic subjects?
- o How would you describe the role of education in protecting children in the camp?
    - ➢ Which circumstances impede the protection functions of education?
    - ➢ Any examples?
    - ➢ What, in your opinion, is needed to make education protective?
- o How are programs monitored throughout their duration?
    - ➢ Do you adapt educational contents when circumstances in the camp are shifting? (Current South Sudan influx)
- o What are the key challenges in educational provision?
    - ➢ Specific examples?

COMMUNITY-BASED PARTICIPATION

- o Does (org) have a CBP policy?
    - ➢ Why/why not?
- o What does (org) work with CBP entail?
    - ➢ What kind of participation is sought from the community?
    - ➢ Who participates?
    - ➢ When during the program cycle?
- o What, in your opinion, are the key contributions of CBP in education?
- o Are there any drawbacks to CBP in the education sector?
    - ➢ Examples?
- o How do you deal with CBP in such a multi-ethnic camp composition as the one in Kakuma?
    - ➢ Any challenges or advantages to the diversity of ethnicities?

CLOSING QUESTIONS

- o Anything to add?
  - ➢ Summary of key themes during interviews
  - ➢ Ask for contact details for sending the transcript version, and potential follow up questions

INFORMANTS

Organization	Description	Location
UNHCR	Community Services	Nairobi
LWF	Education coordinator	Nairobi
LWF	Country Representative	Nairobi
LWF	Accountability	Nairobi/Kakuma
LWF	Education officer	Kakuma
LWF	Education officer	Kakuma
LWF	Education officer	Kakuma
LWF	Protection officer	Kakuma
LWF	Protection officer	Kakuma
LWF	Protection officer	Kakuma
LWF	Emergency education	Kakuma
LWF	Emergency education	Kakuma
LWF	Emergency management	Kakuma
LWF	Teacher	Kakuma
LWF	Teacher	Kakuma
NRC	Regional education manager	Nairobi
NRC	EiE	Norway
NRC	Education manager	Norway
Swisscontact	Regional director	Nairobi
NRC/Swisscontact	Technical advisor	Kakuma
NRC/Swisscontact	Technical advisor	Kakuma
NRC/Swisscontact	Technical advisor	Kakuma
WTK	Program developer	Nairobi
WTK	Program coordinator	Kakuma
Don Bosco	Program coordinator	Nairobi

II. Appendix B – Kakuma Refugee Camp

Map of Kenya

Layout map of Kakuma Refugee Camp:

LAYOUT MAP -- KAKUMA REFUGEE CAMP

Layout map of Kakuma Refugee Camp