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Governance in the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren: how increased Multi-Level Governance could help achieve the zero-growth goal in the region

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Abstract

Urban transport policy has been lifted by the Norwegian government as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the transport sector in recent years. This has happened at the same time as reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and by Norwegian academia underline the importance of good governance of climate policy. Urban Growth Agreements and similar national schemes have aimed to reduce transport emissions and to improve national transport infrastructure, but this study concludes that the structure of the current Agreements is preventing them from being successful. These Agreements have one main goal: to prevent that growth in the transport sector continues to be dominated by private cars. This is called the zero-growth goal and it aims to reduce transport emissions in Norway. The main question of this thesis is therefore:

Could increased Multi-Level Governance in the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren help achieve the zero-growth goal in the region?

It considers the Multi-Level Governance framework outlined by the IPCC and others to better understand whether the structure of the Urban Growth Agreement in Nord-Jæren has led to the current level of disagreement in this region. In Nord-Jæren, in Southwestern Norway, an agreement between four municipalities, the regional government, and the Norwegian State has faced divisions between the different parties. Local parties to the agreement have been unable to agree on the terms they want to negotiate with the State, and the State has created tensions with the local parties by setting stricter budgetary requirements and distancing itself from decisions made locally. Both groups in the agreement have also been influenced by recent social movements against road tolls at a national level. This study concludes that the current governance structure for the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren is top-down and hierarchical, and therefore a lack of vertical cooperation between national and local actors has contributed to a pause in renegotiations for this Agreement. It recommends that communications between the national and the local actors improves so that coordination between the actors in the Agreement contributes towards the zero-growth goal.

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Location of Nord-Jæren within Southern Norway



Figure 1: Location of Nord-Jæren (in red square) within Southern Norway

Source: Google 2019

1. Introduction: The Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren

Members of the United Nations committed to limiting global warming to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels in 2015 and aimed to limit warming below 1,5°C above pre-industrial levels. Since then, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published a Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1,5°C above pre-industrial levels that included policy recommendations for how to limit warming below the 1,5°C threshold. This 2018 Special Report includes a chapter on policy and implementation options that could limit global warming to below this threshold, with a focus on governance across levels (de Coninck et al., 2018). In Norway, one of the national government's responses to the Paris Agreement was the creation of a scheme called the Urban Growth Agreements, which are contracts between national and local actors that seek to reduce emissions in the transport sector. One example of such an Agreement was established in the region of Nord-Jæren, in Southwestern Norway.

The Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren entered into force in 2017 following negotiations between the Norwegian State (represented by the Norwegian Public Roads Administration and Railways Directorate), Rogaland County, and four municipalities – Stavanger, Sandnes, Sola, and Randaberg. This Agreement is a contract between these seven actors that serves to finance infrastructure projects in the Nord-Jæren region in Southwestern Norway. Within the contract, the actors agree to prevent an increase in the use of private cars and to improve accessibility (*fremkommelighet*)¹ for all other traffic groups (Rogaland Fylkeskommune, 2017c). Locally, this Agreement is framed as the Urban Environment Package (*Bymiljøpakken*) and is communicated as contributing towards several goals, such as Norway's commitments to the Paris Agreement and the nationally approved Climate Settlement – *Klimaforliket* (Bymiljøpakken, 2018b). The Climate Settlement was agreed upon by the Norwegian parliament in two versions, 2008 and 2012, and one of its goals is zero-growth in private car use. This goal seeks to reduce emissions in the transport sector and has been implemented through agreements with counties and municipalities across Norway, as is the case with Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2016).

¹ Accessibility (*fremkommelighet*): a level of accessibility for navigation – own translation.

i. Zero-growth in private car-use and the Paris Agreement

Zero-growth in private car use, referred to as the zero-growth goal (*nullvekstmålet*), is central to the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren, hereafter referred to as ‘the Agreement.’ This goal seeks to prevent an increase in the use of private cars despite growth in the Norwegian transport sector. All future growth in the private transport sector is to be transferred to modes of transport other than private cars (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2016). Making the zero-growth goal a central part of the Agreement has even required a name change to the local framing of the Agreement. Originally it was referred to as the Urbanisation Package for Nord-Jæren and it focused on infrastructure and road toll projects which were divided from other ‘mobility’ projects part of the Agreement. In May of 2017, it was decided to bring all aspects of the Agreement together and rebrand it locally as the Urban Environment Package (*Bymiljøpakken*) to better communicate the Package to the population (Bymiljøpakken, 2018a). The local population is to be convinced that the policies in the Agreement are not focused on the largest of the policy tools implemented, namely road tolls and rush-hour tariffs within those tolls. One reason given for the name change is that Norway is party to the Paris Agreement and must reduce emissions from the transport sector (Bymiljøpakken, 2018b). Road tolls have been central to Norwegian plans for urban development in the past, and so the change in name for the Agreement has aimed to connect the different aspects of the Agreement as well as its contributions to national and global goals (Rogaland Fylkeskommune, n.d.).

ii. The Urban Environment Package: actors, factors, and goals

Bymiljøpakken, as the local name for the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren, has seven main actors and several different goals. It was approved as the Urbanisation Package for Nord-Jæren (*Bypakke Nord-Jæren*) by the Norwegian parliament in 2017 in cooperation with Rogaland County Council, Randaberg Municipality, Sandnes Municipality, Sola Municipality, and Stavanger Municipality. Representatives from these five local authorities are joined by the national head of the Norwegian Public Roads Administration and a board member of the Norwegian Railways Directorate in a Board to implement the Agreement locally (Rogaland Fylkeskommune, 2017c). Officially the Agreement has two goals, one being the zero-growth goal, with a horizon of 2032 for zero-growth in private car use, and the second being improved accessibility for all traffic groups that are not private cars (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2016). Locally, the Board of the Urban Environment Package describes goals beyond this that consider the consequences of population growth, traffic problems, environmental problems, air

pollution, road safety, Norway's commitments to the Paris Agreement, and the nationally approved Climate Settlement. Additionally, there is a focus on justifying the use of road tolls as part of this package (Bymiljøpakken, 2018b).

Road tolls as part of the Urbanisation Package were approved by parliament in 2017 as a continuation of a previous arrangement called the Nord-Jæren Package (*Nord-Jærenpakken*), which was a plan for financing infrastructure projects in the region from 2001 until 2011. The Nord-Jæren Package was financed through toll roads, funds from Rogaland County and the participating municipalities. It was later extended until 2016, and once again postponed until the replacement 'Urbanisation Package for Nord-Jæren' was implemented. The Urbanisation Package eventually became a part of the Urban Growth Agreement and is currently led by a Board, in line with existing Urban Environment Agreements and Urban Development Agreements (see section 2.ii) (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2016). Previous research on the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren has concluded that there are strong opposing forces in the municipal administrations, and that the novelty of the Urban Growth Agreements means there is limited understanding of these new schemes (Haraldseid, 2018).

The Urban Growth Agreement in Nord-Jæren adds aspects of regional planning to the framework created by the Urbanisation Package for Nord-Jæren. Financing for the Urbanisation Package was approved by the Norwegian parliament in March 2017. In June 2017 the Agreement was agreed upon by the local parties and finally approved by the Norwegian government in September of the same year (Rogaland Fylkeskommune, n.d.). Rogaland County's Mayor ² Solveig Ege Tengesdal signed on behalf of Rogaland County and the four municipalities, and the Ministers of Transport and Communications and of Local Government and Modernisation signed on behalf of the Norwegian State (Bymiljøpakken, 2017). These parties thereby entered into a contract which would be managed by the Board of the Urban Environment Package. Within this board, the Norwegian Public Road Administration and Norwegian Railways Directorate are the representatives of the Norwegian State, and the Director of the Road Administration serves as the Board Leader. This Board is to guide goal-setting and achievements in line with the National Transport Plan, manage annual budgetary

² The County Mayor (Fylkesordfører) is the highest political representative in each of Norway's counties (Fylker), elected by citizens. Meanwhile, the County Governor (Fylkesmann) is the highest administrative representation in each county, selected by the government as representative of the State to the county.

grants from the government, and play a part in the region's land planning (Rogaland Fylkeskommune, 2017c, p. 5).

Whilst the Agreement is anchored in the zero-growth goal and locally the Urban Environment Package is framed as a local contribution to national climate commitments, the situation is unclear. After nearly two years, the actors that compose the Agreement appear to have some incompatible goals. There has been strong disagreement about one of the central policy tools in the Agreement – the introduction of toll rings and a rush-hour tariff to cross into these toll rings. More recently, Sandnes Municipality has threatened to withdraw from the Agreement if the rush-hour tariff is not scrapped (Fosse, 2019a). Creating a common infrastructure plan for the region that is in line with national and global goals has proven difficult due to different priorities and has even formed a part of a national debate on which measures Norwegian society wants to implement to reduce transport emissions. This debate has gone far enough that one of the parties in the national government may withdraw from the coalition (Åsnes, 2019).³

Urban Growth Agreements are a framework created by the Norwegian State to cooperate with local and regional actors towards national goals, in this case the zero-growth goal and Paris Agreement commitments. Analysing this framework through the lens of Multi-Level Governance, a framework suggested in the 2018 IPCC Special Report, may help understand the structure of Urban Growth Agreements, and whether they are in line with the governance recommendations of the Special Report.

iii. Thesis Outline

The objective of this thesis is to analyse the structure and goal-setting of the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren, in order to answer this main research question:

Could increased Multi-Level Governance in the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren help achieve the zero-growth goal in the region?

This will be done through:

- 1) An analysis of the actors and structure of the Agreement to understand the relations between actors and the kind of governance that is reflected in the Agreement

³ The Norwegian Government formed a majority coalition in January 2019. It is composed of the Conservative, Progress, Liberal, and Christian Democratic parties (*Høyre, Fremskrittspartiet, Venstre, Kristelig Folkeparti*).

- 2) An analysis of the differing priorities that are sought by the actors in the Agreement, whether these priorities prevent cooperation within the Board, and whether Multi-Level Governance could help improve the structure of the Agreement.

Further research questions to investigate aspects of the main question are:

1. Who are the current influential actors in the Urban Growth Agreement?
2. Is there more top-down or bottom-up governance in the Urban Growth Agreement?
3. Do the actors present in the Board of the Urban Growth Agreement have interests and goals that are incompatible the Zero-Growth Goal?

The first chapter of this thesis provided background information for the Urban Growth Agreement in Nord-Jæren, including how the zero-growth goal became a part of this scheme, the different factors to consider when studying it, and finally an overview of the main problems with the current Agreement that make it worth studying.

Chapter 2 provides a context for the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren and different schemes that have been implemented in the region to address traffic problems in the past, including road tolls. First, this chapter provides a summary of road toll schemes that have existed in Nord-Jæren and how they have become controversial in a local context. It then outlines how the Agreement scheme has become a form of local climate policy following several evolutions, starting from what once were only road toll schemes and evolving to the current schemes that integrate land-use and transport planning. The third section of the chapter describes why ‘Bymiljøpakken,’ the local name for the Agreement, is unique because of the number of actors participating in it.

Chapter 3 outlines Multi-Level Governance, the theoretical framework mentioned in the 2018 IPCC Special Report that can contribute to the process of climate policy formation. This chapter first differentiates between Multi-Level Governance and Polycentric Governance, two similar concepts which have a vast literature related to climate and environmental policy. It argues that the Urban Growth Agreement is best described by a Multi-Level Governance framework, and then it differentiates between Type I and Type II Multi-Level Governance. Following this, the chapter considers different variables in policy-making and the role of local actors in Multi-Level governance. It concludes by looking at recent literature on Norwegian policy-making that supports governance systems that include actors at several level and are more ‘bottom-up.’

Chapter 4 adds to the theoretical framework by providing a research strategy and methodology to answer the questions above. Here there is a breakdown of the three sub-questions and how they contribute to answer the main research question in the study. This is followed by a classification of the research as a case study and how this research method is valid for this thesis, and then an outline of the different documents that were analysed as part of this case study. Sources such as interviews and media were also considered, and this chapter concludes with a breakdown of how data from these sources is used.

Chapter 5 includes the analysis of the data gathered, and therefore the results of this thesis. All the methods mentioned in chapter 4 are considered according to each sub-question, always considering the main research question and multi-level governance. This chapter concludes by gathering the conclusions of each sub-question to help answer the main research question, tying into Chapter 6. The final chapter of this thesis concludes with recommendations for how the structure of the Urban Growth Agreement could be improved by a more bottom-up Multi-Level Governance structure.

2. Local Mobility and Climate Policy in Nord-Jæren

The Urban Environment Package is the result of the merge between the Urbanisation Package for Nord-Jæren and the parallel Mobility Package (*Mobilitetspakken*) in May of 2018 – an effort to connect the different aspects of the Urban Growth Agreement. The Urbanisation Package had a focus on infrastructure projects, whilst the Mobility Package was aimed towards mobility and behavioural-change initiatives (*Bymiljøpakken*, 2018a). From before, the Urbanisation Package was described as a toll-road initiative to finance infrastructure that would ensure sustainable travel and accessibility for cars. Meanwhile, the Mobility Package was meant to provide initiatives that make local citizens feel more freedom to move without the need for a private car (Solheim, 2018). By merging the two initiatives and providing them with a new name, local politicians hoped to make the population understand why they were implementing a new toll-road scheme. Christine Sagen Helgø, mayor of Stavanger municipality, said on the day the initiatives were officially merged that tolls and improved mobility were to be seen in parallel. She did not expect the toll roads to become more popular, but wanted people to see that the environment was a central focus in implementing all the policies in the ‘new’ Urban Environment Package (Simonsen, 2018).

Road-tolls in Nord-Jæren have been contentious in the past and have created tensions in local politics for years. Section 2.i will outline how these tensions have built up over time and contributed to the context in which the Urban Environment Package was planned. Figure 2 on the following page prefaces this section by showing the toll rings that are part of the Urban Environment Package (*Bymiljøpakken*) in Nord-Jæren. It also shows the location of neighbouring communities, such as Kleppe in Klepp Municipality, which have contributed to the formation of the Urban Growth Agreement that the Urban Environment Package is a part of.



Figure 2: Toll Rings in Nord-Jæren from Autumn 2018

Source: Rogaland County Council

i. A brief history of toll road plans in Nord-Jæren

Road tolls in Nord-Jæren have been controversial since the 1970s, when a bridge from Stavanger city centre to the ‘city islands’ opened with a toll to pay for construction costs. After five years of protests and fear of political reprisal, the tolls on the bridge were taken down and the protesters gained a verbal concession that the city bridge would never again have a toll.

Since then, there has been political doubt when discussing road tolls in the region (Nesvik & Schibevaag, 2018). Politicians in the region floated the idea of road tolls from the late 1980s, but by 1989 only Sandnes Municipality was in favour of introducing them in order to advance infrastructure projects. By 1997, Nord-Jæren was the only urban area in Norway without extraordinary road financing measures, and the then Minister of Transport Sissel Rønbeck recommended that local politicians implement a toll ring to acquire additional financing for road plans. Gunnar Eiterjord, the project manager for the Transport Plan Jæren at the time, had previously been told to not expect road tolls to be a welcome proposal, and he highlighted in an interview in 2018 that politicians in the southern municipality of Klepp convinced local politicians to finally accept Nord-Jæren Package (Jøssang & Søndeland, 2018).

Only once Klepp approved the measures in the Nord-Jæren Package in 1997 did Sola Municipality join in, soon followed by Stavanger Municipality. This first agreement covered plans from Klepp Municipality in the South to Randaberg Municipality in the North and had an initial budget of around 2.4 billion NOK – 1.4 billion to be paid by the State and 1 billion to be financed through road tolls. Existing road projects were to be financed first, then new roads, rail infrastructure, public transport, cycling infrastructure, and safety and environmental measures. These tolls were to be in place for ten years from 2001 or until all projects were paid down, but it did not take long before a protest movement was set up. Toll stations fell victim to regular vandalism in the years 2001-2005 and incomes in the period were lower than what was originally expected (Jøssang & Søndeland, 2018).

By 2007, the outlines for a new Transport Plan for Nord-Jæren pointed to a 70 percent rate of car use amongst inhabitants in what was one of the fastest-growing regions in the country. Additionally, around 94 percent of households had access to a private vehicle in comparison to 87 percent nationally. The Urban Area Analysis (Storbyanalyse) concluded that a mixture of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ measures was required to reduce this proportion of car use in the local transport sector. One such ‘negative’ measure was the implementation of a rush-hour tariff in the region’s toll rings, accompanied by ‘positive’ ones such as improved bus routes, a tram system, and improved roads (Transportplansamarbeidet, 2007).

Around the same time, the Norwegian parliament approved the first version of the Climate Settlement (Klimaforliket), and members of parliament for Rogaland County used the Settlement as an argument for changes in the existing Nord-Jæren Package. In 2008, members of parliament representing Rogaland County argued for rush-hour tariffs as a local policy

towards the Climate Settlement, but politicians in Rogaland County Council disagreed over whether new toll rings, a road tax, or the Norwegian State should cover new projects.⁴ Between then and 2010, Rogaland County Council agreed to maintain road tolls at higher rates as an extraordinary form of finance, rather than waiting for state finance. The Nord-Jæren Package was first extended until 2011 and then until 2016, giving local politicians time to agree to a replacement arrangement and to pay down projects that had been started (Jøssang & Søndeland, 2018). This disagreement resurfaced in the preparations for the National Transport Plan 2010-2019, where parliament noted that local politicians in Rogaland had been unable to agree to restrictive measures against car use despite a 70 percent rate of car-based trips. Projects begun under the earlier Transport Plan had yet to be paid down due to lower revenues than expected, which led to the extension of the tolls (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2009).

Given a lack of restrictive measures against car use and lower revenues, the mayors of Stavanger, Sandnes, and Sola municipalities agreed in 2012 to a new toll plan targeting private car use. They sought an Urbanisation Package with the State and a binding goal of zero-growth in car use. Christine Sagen Helgø, Mayor of Stavanger Municipality, recognised the political difficulties of implementing the new plan but sought a solution that could unite local politicians. Stanley Wirak, Mayor of Sandnes Municipality, and Ola Ueland, Mayor of Sola Municipality, agreed with her and joined her plan (Jøssang & Søndeland, 2018). These three mayors also applied for Reward Scheme funding (belønningsmidler), which would have given the region access to extra state financing of infrastructure given certain conditions. Zero-growth of private car use was the main of these conditions, and a rush-hour tariff appeared to be the only political solution (Ueland, 2013). One year later, in 2014, Sandnes Municipality threatened to leave the negotiating table for the new Urbanisation Package because several developments in Sandnes were excluded in the final plan (Nærland, 2014). There were several changes in the distribution of investment funds during that year, before Rogaland County Council finally approved the Urbanisation Package for Nord-Jæren in December 2014.

In June 2014, Rogaland County Council had discussed the use of 17,85 billion NOK of toll road income towards infrastructure projects, in addition to 3 billion NOK that would be used towards running public transport in Nord-Jæren. Simultaneously, State and county financing

⁴ This compares to the current situation, discussed in Chapter 5, as political parties and even members of the government debate how to achieve national goals. Roads tolls as a solution have faced strong backlash.

would contribute 2,7 billion NOK towards projects in the Urbanisation Package, and up to 3,3 billion NOK were seen as necessary to finance a Bus Expressway system in the region (Rogaland Fylkeskommune, 2014b). Before it was approved, local news had displayed a breakdown of the investments in the Urbanisation Package which implied that almost half of the 20,5 billion NOK in expected income from road tolls would go towards road financing. Meanwhile, the other half (10,5 billion NOK) was designated towards public transport, cycling infrastructure, and pedestrian infrastructure (Andersen, 2014).

When Rogaland County Council finally approved the Urbanisation Package on 11 December 2014, the financial plan distributed 70 percent of toll incomes towards public transport measures and 30 percent towards road projects. Additionally, the County Council sought for the Norwegian State to finance at least 50 percent of the value of high-worth public transport infrastructure. Summed up, the budget for the Urbanisation Package was of 22 billion NOK, plus 3 billion NOK required for the upkeep of public transport in the region (Rogaland Fylkeskommune, 2014a) This contrasts with the previous tolls, where 61 percent of earnings were to be directed towards road-building and 39 percent towards other projects, including public transport, cycling paths, walking paths, road safety, and ‘environmental initiatives’ (Transportplansamarbeidet, 2007, pp. 16–17). The Urban Growth Agreement signed with the Norwegian State in 2017 reflects this change, specifying that 30 percent of earnings are to be used on road projects and 70 percent on public transport, cycling infrastructure, and pedestrian infrastructure. The major projects in this Agreement are shown on Figure 3 below, ranging from road projects, to a cycle expressway, to over 50 kilometres of exclusive bus lanes.

Within the Urban Growth Agreement, the zero-growth goal is placed centrally, with the caveat that if there is an increase in use of private vehicles outside of urban areas, this will be compensated by decreases in urban areas (Rogaland Fylkeskommune, 2017a). Previous local tensions caused by road tolls and differences in priorities appear to have affected the development of the Urban Growth Agreement. Zero-growth is now more heavily emphasised in the agreement than in the previous Package, but road tolls and specifically rush-hour tolls continue to create disagreement between the different members of the Board (Jupskås, 2019a). In recent meetings, the Mayor of Sandnes Municipality threatened to unilaterally withdraw from the Agreement, but declarations from Transport and Communications Minister Jon Georg Dale made it clear that the Agreement is a binding contract from which parties cannot unilaterally withdraw (Fosse, 2019b).




Figure 3: Measures in the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren

Source – Rogaland County Council

ii. From Urbanisation Packages to Urban Growth Agreements

Now that the Urbanisation Package for Nord-Jæren and the Mobility Package have been merged into the Urban Environment Package, Nord-Jæren becomes one of the first regions in the country, along with Bergen, to complete a process that unifies several national initiatives within the transport sector (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2019a). These national initiatives, which resulted in the Urban Growth Agreements, started to evolve once the Norwegian parliament approved the 2012 Climate Settlement (*Klimaforliket*) and the national goal for zero-growth in use of private cars (*nullvekstmålet*). This goal, hereafter the zero-growth goal, has been included in planning processes since then, including the National Transport Plans (Tønnesen, Krogstad, Christiansen, & Westskog, 2018). The National Transport Plan 2014-2023, which was approved in 2013, had at the time laid the base for ‘Urban Environment Agreements’ (*Bymiljøavtaler*) with an increased focus on the zero-growth goal. These agreements underwent changes that concluded with the creation of the Urban Growth Agreements (Tønnesen & Christiansen, 2017).

Early Urbanisation Packages, such as the Nord-Jæren Package of 2001-2018, were the first road initiative of this kind in Norway. Initially, their focus was on toll-based financing of road infrastructure. It was not until the approval of the National Transport Plan 2006-2015 that these Urbanisation Packages were made to consider both land-planning and transport, and in the approval of the National Transport Plan 2010-2019 these plans were to be linked to funds to reward Urbanisation Packages that contributed to national climate goals (Tønnesen & Christiansen, 2017). The Reward Scheme for Better Public Transport and Less Use of Cars in Urban Areas has existed since 2004, and since 2012 has sought to stimulate better traffic flows, environment, and health in urban areas by decreasing the growth of private car use. Agreements in line with this Scheme have since 2012 been aligned with the Climate Settlement and the zero-growth goal. Reward agreements are the responsibility of the local transport authority, are usually for a period of 3 to 4 years, and are paid in line with the approval of the State Budget by the Norwegian parliament (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2019a). Additionally, the zero-growth goal does not differentiate between private vehicles with an internal combustion engine or zero-emission vehicles, as all ‘contribute to traffic, road accidents, noise, and [tyre] waste’ [own translation] (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2017, p. 147)

Since the implementation of the reward scheme Urbanisation Packages became more complex in terms of goal hierarchies, policy comparison, form of financing, and network governance.

They maintained their focus on road tolls for financing, along with state funding, but the number of actors present in these agreements grew. Additionally, the number of urban areas eligible to apply grew from four to nine.⁵ Norway’s four largest urban areas – Oslo and Akershus, Bergen, Trondheim, and Nord-Jæren – were further eligible for new Urban Environment Agreements that could fund regional public transport projects of great national interest.

By 2013, the National Transport Plan 2014-2023 placed the zero-growth goal as the basis for the Urban Environment Agreements, where the State, county and municipalities act as equal parties to a contract. Goals are to be defined and sought in common, with 26,1 billion NOK set aside for these contracts in said National Transport Plan (Tønnesen & Christiansen, 2017). Urban Environment Agreements build up on the Urbanisation Packages with greater public transport investments and the expectation that local authorities follow goal-oriented land-use policy based on their investments in public transport. As of June 2019, the State had entered Urban Environment Agreements with Trondheim Municipality and South Trøndelag County, and with Oslo Municipality and Akershus County (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2019a).




Figure 4: Development of National Transport Schemes in Urban Norway

In 2015, Urban Development Agreements were introduced to complement the Urban Environment Agreements by reinforcing the need for the State, county, and municipalities to cooperate in the field of land-use planning. Land-use and transport plans for were to be

⁵ Oslo and Akershus, Bergen, Trondheim, Nord-Jæren, ‘Buskerudbyen,’ Nedre Glomma, Grenland, Kristiansand, and Tromsø have all, in the past, had Reward Scheme Agreements.

considered and followed when planning for growth in the transport sector. These final Urban Development Agreements were merged with the Urban Environment Agreements in the National Transport Plan 2018-2029. With this merge the government created the Urban Growth Agreements, the first of which were agreed to with Bergen and Nord-Jæren in 2017 (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2019a).

Funds from Urban Growth Agreements, which in the period 2018-2029 are planned to be at 66,4 billion NOK, are to be combined with road-toll incomes to bring the road toll schemes and Agreements further together. Larger projects of state interest are secured finance, whereas others are financed through project portfolios, meaning that a fixed budget is assigned to them and any increases in cost must be made up by savings elsewhere (Tønnesen et al., 2018). Oslo and Trondheim will continue to have separate Urban Environment Agreements and Reward Scheme Agreements until these expire and they enter negotiations for Urban Growth Agreements (Tønnesen & Nyseth, 2017).

iii. Bymiljøpakken as a first cross-council Urban Growth Agreement

Over time, all nine urban areas that currently qualify for Reward Scheme Agreements will be able to sign an Urban Growth Agreement with the State. For now, Nord-Jæren is a pioneering region with the new initiative, as well as the first cross-council Agreement of this type. The other three main urban areas – Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim – have an Urban Environment or Urban Growth Agreement between a single municipality, a county, and the Norwegian State (Tønnesen & Nyseth, 2017). Meanwhile, in Nord-Jæren the Urban Growth Agreement is between four municipalities, Rogaland County, and the State. Due to the greater number of actors in Nord-Jæren's Agreement, the region faces governance challenges unlike the other three large urban areas, and the network structure here is different from these other agreements (Haraldseid, 2018).

From before, urban areas composed of more than one centre, such as in the area around Drammen in Buskerud County, have shown a more complex governance structure because of their context. Tønnesen and Nyseth (2017) compare the examples of existing agreements in Buskerud and Trondheim, where Drammen Municipality is one of ten partners in Buskerud, whilst Trondheim Municipality is the main partner with the State. Further, whereas in Buskerud the State is represented by the local leader of the Norwegian Public Roads Administration, in Trondheim it was represented by Terje Moe Gustavsen (now deceased), head of the

Administration at a national level. These two policy networks therefore work very differently and can have varying results (Tønnesen & Nyseth, 2017).

By combining the road toll and mobility aspects of the Agreement, which would have related to the previous Urbanisation Package and Reward Scheme, respectively, the Urban Environment Package in Nord-Jæren unites the different measures towards the zero-growth goal (Simonsen, 2018). Members of the Board of the Package re-branded the Urban Growth Agreement and increased the focus towards mobility in order to shift the public view that created such a focus on road tolls. This included cooperation with Kolumbus, the regional transport and mobility company, and Smart City Stavanger, an initiative in Stavanger Municipality (Åsland, 2018e). With schemes to reduce car use and schemes to promote alternative modes of mobility now merged, there is a mix of ‘stick’ and ‘carrot’ policy initiatives to entice changes in transport habits.

As part of the Reward Scheme funding now in the Urban Growth Agreement, Nord-Jæren is set to receive annual funds for public transport infrastructure, which is to be administered by Kolumbus (Solheim, 2018). This funding is threatened by the local disagreement over the rush-hour tolls, as Rogaland County Council has already begun investments on public transport and mobility based on a budget of 200 million NOK. Without agreement between the local actors on a new Urban Growth Agreement, the Reward Scheme funding is currently at 100 million NOK, meaning some projects will be underfunded if the higher funds are not approved (Jupskås, 2019b).

Despite disagreements regarding rush-hour tolls and the prioritisation of different projects, local actors have joined together to reach the existing Urban Growth Agreement with the Norwegian State. The Agreements are a form of incentive from the Norwegian State to local actors, so that the latter will contribute to national targets. A mixture of requirements and rewards from the State, such as the requirement of zero-growth in the Agreements and the Reward Scheme funding that goes with it, serve to motivate local actors to comply with the terms of the Agreements. Although the agreements are set for four-year periods, their funding is dependent on yearly reviews of progress and approved in parallel with the annual Norwegian State Budget (Haraldseid, 2018). Therefore, the Reward Scheme funding that Rogaland County is to receive every year for its transport network through Kolumbus is dependent on effective initiatives towards zero-growth in private car use. Existing arrangements have been the result of successful

compromise, but future funding will depend on further cooperation, as the case of the rush-hour tolls and threats to existing plans has shown.

Researchers at CICERO (Aamaas & Jensen, 2018), the Centre for International Climate Research in Oslo, have highlighted policy-making as important to limit a rise of the average global temperature to within 1,5°C above pre-industrial levels, in line with the more ambitious targets in the Paris Climate Agreement of 2015. They point to the relationship between different levels of governance in climate policy in light of the IPCC Special Report from 2018 that highlighted the weight that urban populations have in contributing to climate solutions, as well as the importance of urban local innovation. From before (Westskog, Selvig, Aall, Amundsen, & Jensen, 2018), researchers at CICERO have framed local politics as an important space for climate policy, as municipalities can serve both as implementers of policy from above and influencers in the creation of national climate policies.

Aamaas and Jensen's (2018) analysis of the IPCC Special Report, carried out at the request of Oslo Municipality, sees a focus on more 'bottom-up' approaches to climate policy and an approach called Multi-Level Governance; where the State, region [county], municipality, and suburbs must coordinate planning. Here, global action is seen as the sum of local actions, and transitions towards a low-carbon society must be carried out in an integrated way across sectors of society and levels of administration. Local communities can be pioneers in climate policy, as Oslo and Bergen have proven by setting climate strategies before the Norwegian State, and by involving more actors to contribute to national goals (Aamaas & Jensen, 2018).

Urban Growth Agreements could be an example of a system of Multi-Level Governance, as they will require coordination across administrative levels within the Norwegian State, as well as cooperation with private actors and the public. By providing for the establishment of road tolls with differentiated prices throughout the day, and financial incentives for local administrations to implement this type of measure, the Norwegian State (through parliament) created a legal framework for local administrations to establish more bottom-up initiatives (Westskog et al., 2018). Urban Growth Agreements are therefore a framework created by the Norwegian State to interact with local and regional actors towards national goals, in this case the zero-growth goal. This thesis will analyse the Agreements through the lens of Multi-Level Governance to understand whether they are in line with the recommendations in the 2018 IPCC Special Report.

3. Theory: Multi-Level Governance and Sustainability Policy

The 2018 IPCC Special Report (de Coninck et al., 2018, p. 317) recommends “accountable multilevel governance that includes non-state actors, such as industry, civil society and scientific institutions” in order to remain consistent with limiting global warming to 1,5°C above pre-industrial levels. According to the report, such governance must overcome financial, institutional, behavioural, and legal barriers if it is to achieve decarbonisation in urban transport. Emissions reductions in the transport sector have lagged behind reductions in the power sector, and the changes in fuel efficiency and urban design that are required must be coordinated through both adaptation and mitigation initiatives (de Coninck et al., 2018, p. 332). Engagement between various levels and types of governance is required to promote policies consistent with 1,5°C pathways, going beyond formal authority or government and strengthening both horizontal and vertical collaboration. Horizontal collaboration takes place within a level of governance, such as networks of cities, and vertical collaboration would be across levels of governance, such as local and regional. It is also pointed out that participation is important for successful implementation of policy, but with the consideration that actors have different and possibly contradictory priorities (de Coninck et al., 2018, p. 352).

Multi-level governance is a concept that has developed since the 1990s, and one definition taken from European Union studies is of a “system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers – supranational, national, regional and local.” Such a system “allows decision makers to adjust the scale of governance to reflect heterogeneity” (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 236). It forms part of an academic debate that places an emphasis on local jurisdictions when developing and implementing climate policy. Coordination and cooperation across levels of governance on climate change has been discussed from different perspectives that share common points on how local governance interacts with regional, national, and global levels in order to achieve climate targets. This debate includes political institutions, unelected actors, and covers different contexts in which governance towards climate goals takes place (Aall, 2012; Boswell & Mason, 2018; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005; Di Gregorio et al., 2019; Galera, 2017; Iwanicki, Bellette, & Smith, 2017; Ostrom, 2010; Urwin & Jordan, 2008).

i. Multi-Level Governance or Polycentric Governance

Multi-level governance (MLG) frameworks point to local governance as best suited to decide on some services, with debate on whether responsibilities should overarch or overlap. Responsibilities are either nested in a hierarchy of overlapping formal institutions or shared between competing jurisdictions (Bulkeley, 2010; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005; Daniell & Kay, 2017; Di Gregorio et al., 2019; Gustavsson, Elander, & Lundmark, 2009; Hooghe & Marks, 2003). These two ways to spread responsibility are labelled Type I and Type II MLG. Type I MLG includes nested responsibilities, exclusive membership, general-purpose jurisdictions, and stable composition. Type II MLG includes overlapping responsibilities, specialised and functionally-specific jurisdictions, and fragmented compositions (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, pp. 233–236). Exclusive membership, hierarchical cooperation and a focus on formal state institutions place Type I MLG within a realm of decentralised federalism (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005; Daniell & Kay, 2017; Di Gregorio et al., 2019). Such cooperation does not have to be limited to a single state, and can be expanded into intergovernmental cooperation across national boundaries (Galera, 2017; Gustavsson et al., 2009). Meanwhile, Type II MLG can include more informal networks and has aspects of polycentricism (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005; Daniell & Kay, 2017; Di Gregorio et al., 2019; Hooghe & Marks, 2003). This is to remain differentiated from polycentric governance, in which where there are “many centres of decision-making that are formally independent of each other.” Here, governance takes place at multiple centres and not necessarily at multiple levels (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 238).

Polycentric governance, like Multi-Level Governance, appears in analyses of climate policy with a focus on climate change as a collective action issue. Participants in a polycentric system learn from local knowledge that has resulted from trial-and-error processes (Ostrom, 2010). When faced with collective action problems, independent decision-makers can cooperate to resolve conflicts, and a polycentric approach “allows for benefits at multiple scales (i.e. individual, local, regional, state)” without action taking place at multiple scales. In the case that they do, one example is that federal programmes can initiate inter-jurisdictional cooperation by providing for the development of regional institutions. (Boswell & Mason, 2018, p. 62). When national actors initiate this process, they are termed ‘nudging’ actors that influence regional and local policy (Ostrom, 2010). Cooperation across jurisdiction levels is especially strong when federal programmes contribute to regional policy through such nudging. Polycentricism can strongly influence local governance, but this is dependent on regional and national hierarchies

that affect the amount of influence that each actor has. Funding and voluntary agreements increase the likelihood of cooperation (Boswell & Mason, 2018), but in many cases municipalities may only prioritise global environmental problems if there is some form of national coordination (Aall, 2012, p. 79).

Hierarchies and policy contexts have a strong effect on how actors engage in climate policy. Whilst some local actors will follow in the footsteps of others, some will try to lead by example (Boswell & Mason, 2018). Polycentric governance can be a “[transfer] of power and responsibility to a variety of stakeholders and scales of governance that do not fit typical government administrative boundaries” (Daniell & Kay, 2017, p. 4). These governance systems are flexible and become better linked together when monitoring takes place at various levels - carried out by local, regional, and national actors. Within such polycentric systems there is increased attention to the role of urban and regional governments (Schreurs, 2012, p. 213). Global environmental problems can be difficult to prioritise locally, but if there is local will to become a policy actor rather than a local structure for policy implementation, municipalities can become front-runners of environmental policy (Aall, 2012, p. 79).

Polycentrism can however raise questions of legitimacy, accountability, fairness, and representation for successful governance, especially when seen from a broader context where polycentrism applies to the international system of governance that lacks a centre (Stevenson & Dryzek, 2012). Analyses of polycentric governance have tried to link together international and local climate governance and raise debate around some of these questions. This includes a call to ‘Think global, Act local’ in regards to climate governance (Di Gregorio et al., 2019; Lundqvist, 2012; Ostrom, 2010). Problems and solutions are to be framed within this mindset, as any targets that are set globally or nationally must in the end be implemented regionally and locally. This top-down approach that includes nudging nonetheless requires the cooperation of actors at lower levels of governance (Ostrom, 2010). Differing interests at each level of governance can make goal-setting and achievements difficult, as competing goals are sought or not taken into account. Each level of governance may prioritise differently, further leading to doubts about competences and responsibility in regards to previously-agreed goals (Lundqvist, 2012). Nonetheless, polycentric governance is seen as an answer to the collective action problem that is climate change (Di Gregorio et al., 2019; Lundqvist, 2012; Ostrom, 2010).

Following a similar thread that focuses on local governance, other analyses of local climate policy point to a balance between top-down and bottom-up governance, or to an idea of trend-

setters that motivate other actors to enact climate policy (Schreurs, 2008; Urwin & Jordan, 2008). In the latter case, actors at different levels of governance, such as the German State and the state of California in the U.S., have been compared as leaders within a regional context. For Germany, this context is the European Union and for California it is the greater United States. In the past, cooperation between the German Federal Government and the state of California would have been unthinkable, but it is now a reality. These actors have become trendsetters for other actors in their context – EU member states and other states in the U.S., respectively – but this has varied according to their institutional setting (Schreurs, 2008).

Analyses of polycentric governance and of multi-level governance share in this focus on balancing bottom-up and top-down governance, where a policy context determines the influence of each level of governance (Di Gregorio et al., 2019; Lundqvist, 2012; Mulgan, 2017; Urwin & Jordan, 2008). Within this balance, climate adaptation decisions are concluded to work best when taken locally and not top-down, from a regional or national level imposed on the local level. The balance requires cooperation horizontally, within the same level of governance, and vertically, at different levels of governance (Urwin & Jordan, 2008). Particularly within Multi-Level Governance systems, polycentrism is a measure of the degree of dispersion of authority (both horizontally and vertically) in a system, regardless of whether it is a Type I or Type II Multi-Level Governance system (Di Gregorio et al., 2019).

ii. Type I and Type II Multi-Level Governance

Since the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren is structured within state institutions across levels of administration, it better resembles a system of Multi-Level Governance than of Polycentric Governance. However, it is of interest to this study to determine whether it most resembles a Type I or Type II MLG framework because its structure has aspects of both. Structure is the main feature that divides the two types of Multi-Level Governance (MLG), with Type I MLG focusing on a more hierarchical structure whilst Type II MLG focuses on overlapping, interconnected spheres of authority within the same (horizontal) level of governance (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005). Multi-Level Governance can make policy-making more flexible by allowing for both vertical and horizontal shifts of authority and power. Increased flexibility and negotiation between and within levels of governance can increase policy innovation, but such shifts in authority and power can result in unclear accountability (Daniell & Kay, 2017). This is not unique to MLG systems and also happens in polycentric governance systems.

Within Type I MLG, governance is about “power sharing among a limited number of governments operating at just a few levels,” which is a form of federalist governance (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 236). The unit of analysis here is the individual government, rather than the individual policy, and of interest is the relationship between the central government and non-intersecting subnational governments. Jurisdictions have bundled functions, and there is a limited number of levels of government. Their boundaries are durable, non-intersecting, and apply the Westphalian principle of exclusivity beyond the nation-state, to the domestic and international arenas (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, pp. 236–237). Systems typical of Type I MLG distribute responsibilities across levels of governance in a hierarchical manner, in a way that appears to mirror power in a decentralised manner. In Brazil, for example, influence on climate and land use policy decreases from the federal, to the state, to the municipal level. Meanwhile, in Indonesia the districts (lower level of governance) have more influence than provinces (the median level of governance) due to a power-structure in the country that grants more autonomy to the districts than the provinces (Di Gregorio et al., 2019).

Because Type I MLG has a more institutional focus, it has also been labelled ‘intergovernmentalism.’ Governments are the central governing authority, and the focus of analysis is on the tiers of authority between levels of governance (Gustavsson et al., 2009). Since climate-related policy can face free-rider issues, where some ‘lagging’ actors benefit from the actions of other ‘leading’ actors, the characteristics of Type I MLG seek to limit these free-rider issues through the structure of governance. Type I MLG limits the number of autonomous actors present in policy-making, seeking to bundle tasks across territorial scales in order to limit the amount of coordination required (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). Jurisdictions here are general-purpose, the number of levels is also limited, and the system is bound together by a single court system with ultimate authority. These systems are explicitly hierarchical, with a pyramidal top-down structure (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 239).

Type II MLG systems are more flexible than Type I systems, as the number of jurisdictions can be vast rather than limited, these jurisdictions can operate across territorial scales, and are intended to be ‘flexible rather than durable.’ Such jurisdictions are nonetheless task-specific, which means they can overlap, either competing with each other or complementing each other within intersecting territorial boundaries (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 237). “Polycentricity” in Type II MLG systems means that many independent centres of decision-making “act autonomously to solve common problems and produce different public goods.” Examples of

this include conferences of city mayors, boards of regional planners, associations of local authorities, and chambers of commerce. These jurisdictions are meant to respond to changing citizen preferences and are generally embedded in Type I governance systems (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 238).

Membership in Type II MLG communities is voluntary and their goal is to solve a common need or make a collective decision. Contrarily, Type I systems are not voluntary and are created to voice differences rather than create separate spaces. By bundling policies together, Type I MLG systems are able to bargain at scale whereas Type II MLG systems separate policies and provide choice amongst several options available for participants (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 240). Such flexibility can be aimed at tackling “specific policy issues and contexts,” but flexibility can raise further accountability issues and may not be desirable (Daniell & Kay, 2017, p. 7). Furthermore, all Multi-Level Governance can disperse and distribute power to jurisdictions that are not conventionally ‘public,’ creating hybrid governance systems with shifting interdependencies. Actors have to negotiate and exert influence over each other, and can go so far as to marginalise representative institutions of democracy (Daniell & Kay, 2017, pp. 11–13). The Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren may be an example of such a hybrid system, as it contain aspects of both Types of MLG. It is an agreement between several state actors, it is a voluntary system where parts agree to commitments, it is based on consensus, and several actors both within and outside the official structure can influence it. It could be an example of a Type I MLG system with aspects of a Type II system.

iii. Policy Implementation in Multi-Level Governance

Accountability and transparency in Multi-Level Governance systems is also a focus in the IPCC Special Report, where these characteristics are seen as essential for effective MLG (de Coninck et al., 2018, p. 354). If Multi-Level Governance relies on negotiation and cooperation between different actors and different governance levels, this means that a single level of governance cannot act alone. However, tight-knit communities able to steer decision-making, called policy communities, can be determinative actors in these systems. Success can depend on whether such communities are scattered across levels of governance or focused within one. Within Type I MLG systems, state actors will remain the decision-making authority, and in these systems the balance of power between levels of governance (central to local government) tends to be asymmetrical (Di Gregorio et al., 2019, pp. 65–66).

When Multi-Level Governance systems have a very hierarchical, top-down structure directed by a central government, questions of accountability and implementation arise (Aall, 2012; Bulkeley, 2010; Galera, 2017; Gustavsson et al., 2009; Iwanicki et al., 2017; Lundqvist, 2012). Policy proposals can arise from both a central (national) level and from a local level, meaning that they can go through either a top-down or a bottom-up process. However, since climate and environmental policy is more typically implemented locally or regionally, local levels of governance benefit from increased participation in the policy process. Consulting them when formulating policy is not enough (Galera, 2017), however, as actors at the local and regional levels require a solid base of information and knowledge in order to implement decisions, gather data after implementation, and measure progress (Aall, 2012). Therefore, unless there is coordination between the levels of governance it can be difficult to hold someone accountable for effective policy implementation.

Relations between levels of governance can be improved by more bottom-up policy processes that includes active local participation (Di Gregorio et al., 2019, p. 66). One challenge is that within a level of governance, different actors can share authority but lack responsibility. Responsibility can be spread amongst actors within a network on the same level of governance (i.e. horizontally), but responsibility is usually imposed top-down in a vertical manner in hierarchical governance systems. Local and regional actors can thus only have responsibility over a policy if they have been granted the competency over that policy area (Bulkeley, 2010). Due to this, each level of governance must be clear in their competences and be provided with the knowledge necessary to make policy decisions. Studies in the UK and Sweden have shown that despite the prevalence of climate issues on local agendas for over two decades, one of the biggest barriers to implementation of climate policy can be the knowledge held by local administrators (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005; Lundqvist, 2012). Local councils can feel that all responsibility for implementing climate policy is placed on them, but without significant funding or a solid knowledge base (Lundqvist, 2012).

Similar studies in Norway have concluded that there is a “lack of administrative capacity at the local level to make use of existing government information and guidance” within the field of local climate change adaptation. Instability of staff has also contributed to the success or failure of climate and environmental policy. Municipalities that have lost their environmental officers have simultaneously halted all climate change adaptation work, whilst those that have maintained the position of an environmental officer over a prolonged period have been most

successful (Aall, 2012, pp. 89–90). Aamaas and Jensen’s report (2018) on the IPCC Special Report, directed towards Oslo Municipality, points to bottom-up approaches as crucial to any upcoming transition. Local levels of governance in MLG systems must acquire a more central role in climate policy-making, a process which must be planned in an integrated manner across fields and levels of governance for successful implementation (Aamaas & Jensen, 2018).

Influential actors can be crucial to such implementation of policy. Individuals, policy networks, and policy communities can either hinder progress or ensure success of a policy (Daniell & Kay, 2017; Di Gregorio et al., 2019; Gustavsson et al., 2009; Iwanicki et al., 2017). Individuals or groups with their own timelines and agenda can influence an entire process, as shown by Iwanicki et al. (2017).⁶ Pre-existing relations between members of a committee and ‘buy-in’ created by mutual trust can determine eventual approval of a plan. Individuals, with their connections, can exert influence that determines the success of a process (Iwanicki et al., 2017, pp. 272–273). If a policy system is not very collaborative, such individuals with key decision-making powers or capacities can steer the policy process (Daniell & Kay, 2017, p. 24). Local conflicts of interest and vested interests must therefore be overcome to achieve policy implementation, and this requires strong leadership and agency (de Coninck et al., 2018).

iv. Multi-Level Governance in Nord-Jæren

Tønnesen and Nyseth (2017) have previously analysed the governance challenges created by different transport packages, more specifically the Urban Environment Agreements and Reward Scheme that preceded the Urban Growth Agreements. They point to the existence of policy networks within these packages and how the number of actors present in them affects goal implementation. In the case of the Urbanisation Package for Buskerud, ten public partners (municipalities, Buskerud County, national authorities), some associate partners, and participants from the public and private sector contribute to the solutions in the Package in a network of 100 associates. Meanwhile, in the case of *Miljøpakken* in Trondheim the only actors at the negotiating table are Trondheim Municipality, Trøndelag County, and the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (Tønnesen & Nyseth, 2017, pp. 62–63).

⁶ In a study of water-management projects in South Australia, Iwanicki et al. (2017) showed how individuals and pre-existing relations in the area were determinant to the success of cooperation in what they frame as a system of Multi-Level Governance. Three members of a planning group had enough influence to drive the entire project.

Both packages fall within the framework of Type I MLG systems, but the Urbanisation Package for Buskerud has more polycentricity because in addition to public actors there is a presence of business organisations in a wider web of cooperation. Nonetheless, formally both packages are agreements between the State, the county (regional) government, and one or more municipalities (Tønnesen & Nyseth, 2017, p. 63). As a project implemented by several municipalities and the county in cooperation with national rail and road authorities, the Urban Growth Agreement in Nord-Jæren also appears to fit within the framework of a Type I MLG system. Since it was initiated by the Norwegian parliament to achieve national goals at a local level, at first glance it appears to have a top-down goal structure.

Nord-Jæren has the first implemented Urban Growth Agreement, but prior to their implementation the Urban Growth Agreements were described as ‘governing from a distance’ by the Norwegian State, where the State is meant to apply indicators to measure the goals set by these Agreements and reward the urban areas that abide by them (Tønnesen & Nyseth, 2017, p. 66). Within the Urban Growth Agreements, the zero-growth goal was to be the single main goal to be sought after in a sort of indirect hierarchical governance system. Since the Agreements are contracts between the Norwegian State and the local actors, the contract can be renounced if either side does not fulfil its duties or if there is no progress towards the goals in the Agreement (Tønnesen & Nyseth, 2017, pp. 66–67).

Urban Growth Agreements will in the future replace the Urbanisation Package in Buskerud and the Urban Environment Agreement in Trondheim, so the existing arrangements in each of these contexts provide background for comparison with the Agreement in Nord-Jæren. When increased numbers of actors are present in these Agreements, such as in Buskerud, it appears that a network structure is more engrained, and this can limit expectations and ambitions because these networks usually work under a consensus model (Tønnesen & Nyseth, 2017, p. 64). In both cases the road authorities have a leading position, but whilst in the case of Trondheim the national director of the Norwegian Public Roads Administration is a member of the board of the local Agreement, in the case of Buskerud a local representative of the road authorities is present (Tønnesen & Nyseth, 2017, p. 63).

This means that both structures have a hierarchy that prioritises national actors, but the network structure in Buskerud has more polycentricity than the simpler structure present in Trondheim. By encompassing several municipalities as well as private associate actors, the Urbanisation Package in Buskerud has a horizontal aspect of governance that is lacking in Trondheim.

Trondheim's Urban Environment Package is almost straightforwardly vertical, with one local, one regional, and one national actor coordinating it (own analysis). Both packages are differing examples of how much policy networks and multi-level governance can narrow the gap between rhetoric and reality in climate policy, a gap which tends to limit success in local climate policy (Gustavsson et al., 2009, pp. 59–60).

Horizontal cooperation may also be a central part of the Urban Growth Agreement in Nord-Jæren, as the local actors must reach an agreement before entering negotiations with national actors – i.e. the Norwegian State. This is made evident by the requirement for road tolls to be unanimously agreed upon by local actors before parliament will approve them (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2016). Furthermore, the local actors in the Agreement are municipalities and a county. These are general-purpose jurisdictions, with authority that is granted to them nationally. Their membership is non-intersecting, with boundaries that clearly demarcate the municipalities and with distinction in the competences that the municipalities and the county have. None of these jurisdictions, nor the national ones, has a temporary purpose, but the Board of the Agreement does. Finally, the Agreement is limited to cooperation between three jurisdictional levels – the local, regional, and national. Together, these characteristics make the Agreement fit within a framework of Type I Multi-Level Governance (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, pp. 239–240), with some aspects of a Type II system. Like the Urbanisation Package in Buskerud, horizontal cooperation may be an obstacle for reaching local consensus, which may be the case with the rush-hour road tariff and the change of stance by Sandnes Municipality.

Given the recommendations of the IPCC and previous analyses of the Urban Growth Agreements, this Agreement will be analysed in terms of the research questions of this thesis. With the main question as a starting point, the three sub-questions will be used to understand the current structure and goals in the Agreement, and whether a structure built on Multi-Level Governance would contribute to improved progress in planning and implementation. Existing analyses of Urban Growth Agreements and similar schemes, along with analyses of the Agreement in Nord-Jæren (such as Haraldseid, 2018) will contribute towards answering the main question:

Could increased Multi-Level Governance in the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren help achieve the zero-growth goal in the region?

To answer this question, it must be broken down in order to acquire a holistic understanding of the context in which the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren exists. Firstly, this requires an understanding of the governance system connected to the Agreement, and the relationship between the actors in this system. The first two research questions are targeted towards this structure. Understanding which actors are present in this system and their relationship will help describe the situation as either a Type I or Type II MLG system, if either, and the existence of other aspects of governance such as the networks described by Haraldseid (2018) and Tønnesen and Nyseth (2017).

1. Who are the current influential actors in the Urban Growth Agreement?
2. Is there more top-down or bottom-up governance in the Urban Growth Agreement?

Then, the third research question will consider the goals and interests that each actor in the Agreement has, compared to the zero-growth goal.

3. Do the actors present in the Board of the Urban Growth Agreement have interests and goals that are incompatible with the Zero-Growth Goal?

Finally, the different variables from the above three questions will be compiled to consider the main question. Of interest is whether a more bottom-up system of Multi-Level Governance would contribute to achieving the goals of the Urban Growth Agreement.

4. Research Design and Methodology

To tackle the research questions above, this study uses the Abductive research strategy to better understand the structure and goals in the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren. Abductive research provides social scientific accounts generated from everyday accounts by intertwining theory and data. It provides descriptions and understandings based on actors' point of view rather than on the researcher's own. In this thesis this is done through an analysis of the meanings and interpretations provided by actors in the Agreement. These social accounts and existing theory are combined to create this understanding. Governance structures in the Agreement are central to the research questions.

A mixture of theory and of insight from local actors contribute to an understanding of the governance structure in the Agreement. Multi-Level Governance is the main theoretical framework used to answer these questions, along with existing analyses based on frameworks like network governance. Existing theory is used to answer the first research sub-question, which seeks an understanding of the governance structure that exists in the Agreement and the main actors within it. Here the focus is the legal framework that underpins the Agreement, the negotiations processes, and the board meetings that coordinate the implementation process. It looks into the extent of hierarchies and polycentrism in this structure, considering the political context within which it exists.

Analysis of the second research question considers literature on the Urban Growth Agreements, on Multi-Level Governance, and recent literature of climate policy within local Norwegian contexts to better understand the current structure of the Agreement. Of interest is whether the Agreement fits within a Type I MLG system, or if it has more aspects of a Type II MLG system than appear evident at first sight. Building on first question, the existence of hierarchies is more closely considered to understand if local actors are able to make decisions actively or are given a more passive role of implementing national policy.

For the third research question the focus is on the different goals that the actors present in the Agreement may have. This research question seeks an understanding of the different goals that each actor in the Agreement has, whether these goals align or create tensions, and whether they are compatible with the main goal of the Agreement, the zero-growth goal. As a broader question, it seeks to gather the different stances present within the Board.

With the main research question, the goal is to understand possible conflicts within the Agreement and ways to overcome them. It seeks to take the meanings and interpretations of the Agreement from the actors that take part in it, along with their interpretation of the structure of the Agreement. As a concluding question that builds on the three sub-questions, its goal is to recommend if a clear Multi-Level Governance system would contribute to more progress in the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren.

Since the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren, and more specifically the Urban Environment Package, are the result of an agreement between institutions within the Norwegian State, the Agreement's governance structure and governance challenges will be analysed within the framework of a Type I Multi-Level Governance system. Political structures will be the focus of the first two-sub questions and prioritisation of goals of the third one. Of interest is the extent to which there is a hierarchical structure within the Agreement, as well as a balance between top-down and bottom-up governance across the levels of governance present. This MLG framework will be used to consider the influence of actors at each level of governance, and whether local or national interests are a greater barrier towards the zero-growth goal. This will also take into account policy-formation considering the four modes of governing described by Lundqvist (2012, pp. 103–104) in his analysis of local climate governance in Sweden.

Further analysis will draw upon literature on local planning and climate governance in Sweden and Norway, which also applies either Multi-Level Governance or Polycentric Governance frameworks (Aamaas & Jensen, 2018; Gustavsson et al., 2009; Lundqvist, 2012; Tønnesen & Nyseth, 2017). These will be applied mainly to the second and third research questions to understand the policy process locally and how interests and individuals have affected local consensus. Since the zero-growth goal is the underlying base for the Urban Growth Agreement, a lack of understanding of this goal or of how to achieve it will likely hinder progress towards it. An analysis that considers the local context and policy process will dig deeper into this in order to tackle these two questions. To conclude, the final question will gather insight from the different frameworks in order to provide recommendations to the Agreement, considering the development of several agreements around the country and recommendations such as those carried out for Oslo Municipality by the research institute CICERO.

i. Analysis of Research Questions

This study will use qualitative analysis to address each research question.

1. Who are the current influential actors in the Urban Growth Agreement?

For the first research question, documents relevant to the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren were analysed taking into consideration the literature review above, as well as process tracing. A document analysis includes the legal frameworks for the Agreement – the parliamentary bill approving financing, National Transport Plan, and the Agreement signed between the parts – as well as the meeting minutes for the Board of the Agreement. It considers the actors present in the planning and implementation processes for the Agreement, their relationship, and which of them has had the most influential contributions. This document analysis will reflect back on the existing analyses of the Urban Growth Agreements and of the schemes that preceded them, such as the analysis by Tønnesen and Nyseth (2017), in addition to the literature review on Multi-Level Governance. Together these contribute to the understanding of the overall decision-making structure in the Agreement.

2. Is there more top-down or bottom-up governance in the Urban Growth Agreement?

The analysis of the second question follows from elite interviews, previous analyses of the Urban Growth Agreements, analysis of the Board meeting minutes, and analysis of a draft Agreement that has resulted from the latest rounds of negotiations for a new Urban Growth Agreement.⁷ This draft gathers the proposals of the different actors and the points of contention between them. Interviews with participants to the Board of the Agreement are also central, but due to practical and time constraints these interviews focus on the local members of the Board from Randaberg, Sandnes, Sola, and Stavanger Municipalities as well as Rogaland County. Since the Agreement in Nord-Jæren is the first Urban Growth Agreement that includes multiple municipalities, the interaction between the local actors may serve as an example of future challenges in the upcoming Urban Growth Agreements. Previous Reward Scheme Agreements and Urbanisation Packages such as Buskerudbyen can serve as a point of comparison for governance challenges in local climate governance within the transport sector in a Norwegian context. Where interviews with political members of the Board are not possible, interviews with administrative staff in the relevant bodies have been carried out. This links into the next question.

⁷ The local and national parts in the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren carried out renegotiations from May 2018 until March 2019, when they were postponed indefinitely.

3. Do the actors present in the Board of the Urban Growth Agreement have interests and goals that are incompatible the Zero-Growth Goal?

As a result, the second and third question will be analysed in tandem. The relationship between the actors and their prioritisation of goals in the Agreement may be as a result of their community or their political goals. Past toll road and infrastructure plans in Nord-Jæren have shown how financing of specific projects (or lack of) can lead to deadlock and breakdowns in negotiations. Considerations of network governance and the methods used for the second question will be relevant here, as well as of the zero-growth goal.

Could increased Multi-Level Governance in the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren help achieve the zero-growth goal in the region?

Finally, a combination of the insights from the first three questions will contribute to the analysis of the main research question. Together, the first three research questions will set the base for an analysis of what could be improved with the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren in order to better achieve its goals, and primarily the zero-growth goal.

ii. The Case of Nord-Jæren

The Urban Growth Agreement in Nord-Jæren has been chosen as a case within the existing system of Agreements between the Norwegian State and urban areas because of its novelty. It is the first of two new Urban Growth Agreements, and the other existing Urban Growth Agreement is in Bergen. That Agreement is between Bergen Municipality, Hordaland County, and the Norwegian State, whilst in Nord-Jæren there are four cooperating municipalities within a single Agreement. It is further worth considering that the Urban Growth Agreement in Nord-Jæren is being planned in cooperation with a smaller Development Package in Jæren (*Utbyggingspakke Jæren*), with two municipalities to the south of Nord-Jæren that are part of a common work market (Åsland, 2015a). Given existing research on the Agreements and the Schemes before them, it is of interest to this study if issues or successes from similar arrangements share similarities with those that exist in Nord-Jæren. As a single holistic case study, this study will focus on creating an understanding of the governance structure in the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren and how this structure has affected the implementation of the zero-growth goal in the Agreement. It seeks an in-depth description and understanding of the policy context here (Yin, 2009), and will draw on other research on Urban

Growth Agreements. The case study will also draw on process tracing to identify the causal chain of events that created the current context for the Agreement (George & Bennett, 2005).

iii. Document Analysis and Interviews

In order to constrain the analysis for this study, the documents used will be those that followed the approval of the Urbanisation Package Nord-Jæren by Rogaland County Council on 9 December 2014. This approval was used as a foundation for the negotiations for what eventually became the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren. It had followed a process of hearings in each of the affected municipalities, and therefore the document gathers the opinions of all the local actors for any future Agreement. These hearings were also considered in the parliamentary bill approving financing of the Urbanisation Package - St. Prop. 47 S (2016-2017) – which will be considered when analysing the third research question. Together these legal documents provide a basis for the local and national parts in negotiations.

Following from these documents, the analysis will focus on meeting minutes from the Board of the Urbanisation Package (now the Urban Growth Agreement) to provide a local political perspective of the Package-Agreement process.⁸ These span from the foundation meeting of the Board on 13 February 2015 to the latest meeting on 20 May 2019 for a total of 33 meetings. For the latest meeting, the minutes are a draft and are to be approved at the following meeting, but I was able to attend this final meeting and have personal notes to complement the draft minutes.⁹ Meeting minutes provide an insight of some points of disagreement or doubt during Board Meetings and of the process that led to the current situation. They also reference any parallel events or legislation that is relevant, such as the legal framework led by the Ministry of Transport and Communications through the Norwegian Parliament or any negotiation rounds between local and national actors.

Meeting minutes serve as secondary data to provide an insight of the local political process that has planned the Urban Growth Agreement. Since they are documents that note down what the

⁸ Attachments to the meetings were not considered because these are not available for the majority of the meetings. The meeting minutes were determined to provide a summary of the progress in the Board Meetings.

⁹ All Board meetings are in principle open to the public, but I was not aware of this earlier on.

minute-taker sees as ‘key’ to Board meetings, they may be incomplete or leave out any significant conflicts between the members of the Board. Members of the Board also approve the minutes, so they may influence the content of the final published versions of the minutes. To complement the Board minutes, news articles on the meetings will also be considered. Members of the local press have joined the Board meetings regularly since the 11th Board meeting on 5 January 2017, with newspaper Stavanger Aftenblad and national broadcasting company NRK being the most frequent press audience during these meetings.¹⁰ After meetings, these news media have often published articles with quotes from interviews with members of the Board. Some of these articles were used in the context section of this study and more will be used in the analysis to consider information missing from meeting minutes.

To further complement the meeting minutes, this study includes primary data collection through semi-structured elite interviews with participants in the Board of the Urban Growth Agreement. Local participants of the Board will be of special interest because there is a focus on local consensus in negotiations with the State. Representatives from Rogaland County and from Randaberg, Sola, and Stavanger Municipalities agreed to requests for interviews, whilst representatives from Sandnes Municipality were unable to participate. As for representatives of the State in the Board, the Director of the Public Roads Administration in Norway, who has led the development of the Urban Growth Agreements, has recently passed away, and the Railway Authorities did not respond to a request for an interview. All representatives who were interviewed are either political representatives for their respective institution or administrative members who have had an active role in the Board meetings. Interviews with these participants in the Board seek to acquire a more in-depth view of the planning process for the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren and provide information that may have actively been excluded from Board meeting minutes. Participants received an interview guide beforehand and a copy of the notes taken from the interviews afterwards.

For an analysis of the national process, this study considers the legislative documents from Parliament and from the Ministry of Transport and Communications that serve as a basis for the Urban Growth Agreements. This includes the National Transport Plan 2018-2029, as well as the previously mentioned 2017 Parliament Bill ‘Financing the Urbanisation Package for

¹⁰ Public broadcaster NRK was present at the 7th Board meeting on 14th March 2016, but no media were present between that meeting and the 11th Board meeting.

Nord-Jæren in Randaberg, Sandnes, Sola, and Stavanger Municipalities in Rogaland.’ These documents provide a background for the national perspectives on the Agreement and the stance that the Ministry of Transport and Communications has on the Agreement. It was not possible out of economic and time purposes for this study to include an interview with the relevant Minister, so existing data on his and his predecessor’s stances will be analysed.¹¹ Comments made to the press, particularly to the press that has been present in the Board meetings – newspaper Stavanger Aftenblad and Norwegian national broadcaster NRK – is of interest when considering the minister’s role in the planning of the Agreement. Despite not having direct contact with Minister Jon Georg Dale, he has expressed himself on the matter several times throughout the spring of 2019.

Additionally, documents from the two groups negotiating a new Urban Growth Agreement will be analysed. These two groups are together composed of the members of the Board, representatives from the Ministry of Transport and Communications, and representatives from the Ministry for Local Government. These documents therefore provide insight into the interactions between the local and national actors, and the role of the Ministries that is not evident from Board minutes or interviews with participants in Board meetings. Such documents include minutes from the meetings, and the latest draft Agreement that has been debated upon by the negotiating committee, dated 20 December 2018. In this document, there are highlights over what each group of actors would like to keep and change in the Agreement. Using a colour scheme, it differentiates where local and national actors agree and disagree. Together, these documents and the interviews with local actors will provide an idea of influence and of goal-setting within the context of negotiations. The hope is to know whether the actors have more goals in common or more differences that make achieving the common goals difficult.¹²

¹¹ Current Minister of Transport and Communications Jon Georg Dale replaced his predecessor Ketil Solvik-Olsen in August 2018. Solvik-Olsen had the role from 2013 and was therefore in charge of the development of the current Urban Growth Agreements.

¹² Iwanicki’s (2017) article on Multi-Level Governance of water policy in Australia, as well as Lundqvist’s (2012) and Gustavsson’s (2009) articles on local climate governance in Sweden, will provide examples as to how to analyse the governance structures in the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren.

iv. Data Collection

Since this study relies on a combination of data sources, the collection and handling of the data has varied. Primary data consists of document analysis and semi-structured interviews. The interviews were recorded in a voice recorder without internet connection that was never connected to a computer. Some hand-written notes taken were taken during the interviews because the interviews were not transcribed to protect the privacy of interviewees. To help with these notes and the semi-structured nature of the interviews, an interview guide with 10 common questions serves as a basis, along with some common follow-up questions. Interviews lasted around 30 minutes and were used to understand the experiences of participants in Board meetings. They were carried out after some initial document analysis that focused on the first year of the Board, and the Draft Agreement that has been discussed since December 2018. Interviewees have been chosen by contacting the institutions present in the Board, and the interviewees are all individuals who have actively participated in the Board meetings or in the planning of the meetings. Only one of the four interviewees, the Mayor of Randaberg Municipality, agreed to have her name linked to quotes. All other interviewees asked for anonymity but allowed for their comments to be linked to their place of work. Interviews were carried out in Norwegian, and any quotes are own translations. Existing literature on Multi-Level Governance and interviews with the media serve as secondary data, and previous analyses of other Urban Growth Agreements serve as supplementary data for comparison.

v. Data Reduction and Analysis

Analysis of this study mostly follows process tracing to ‘narrow the list of potential causes’ for the current governance structure and stagnation in the negotiations process. Causes for the current context include key events and decision-points (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206–207). All of these factors will be considered in addition to the actors that conform the governance structure for the Agreement. This is based on the frameworks and theories used and conforms with the abductive research strategy. Additionally, there is some coding of the data collected based on Bulkeley and Kern’s (2006) typology of modes of governance, as outlined in Lundqvist (2012). This coding is aimed at the second and third research questions, and the four modes of governance are as follows:

- “*Self-governing*: the capacity of local government to govern its own activities;

- *Governing by provision*: the shaping of practice through the delivery of particular forms of service and resources;
- *Governing by authority*: the use of traditional forms of authority such as regulation and direction;
- *Governing through enabling*: the role of local government in facilitating, coordinating and encouraging action through partnership with private and voluntary sector agencies, and to various forms of community engagement” (Lundqvist, 2012, p. 103).

Bulkeley and Kern had further described each of the modes of governance as follows: “self-governing relies on processes of organisational management; governing by provision is accomplished through practical, material and infrastructural means; governing by authority takes place through the use of sanction, and governing through enabling works through persuasion, argument and incentives” (2006, pp. 2242–2243). Self-governing measures are therefore carried out directly by authorities and are either internal or measures applying to public property; governing by provision creates facilities for the affected population; governing by authority applies where authorities can set requirements or change plans (sticks); and governing by enabling applies communications strategies and interaction with non-governmental bodies, as well as incentives (Lundqvist, 2012, pp. 103–109).

Due to the focus on bottom-up governance and local climate action in literature on Multi-Level Governance and Polycentric Governance, the focus of this coding is on the influence that local actors have in the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren. This coding helps to understand which of the four modes of governance best describes the Agreement and therefore the relationship between the local and national actors. It is used in the analysis of the Board meetings and the elite interviews to describe the influence perceived by the actors as well as what is apparent from the structure of the Board.

At the beginning of this study, I expected to understand whether the planning and implementation structure for the Urban Growth Agreement is a barrier to achieving its goals. Further, I wondered whether the climate goals claimed for the Urban Growth Agreement carry much weight. The Agreement has been used to finance large infrastructure projects in the region that have political importance for the individual Municipalities, not all of which contribute to the zero-growth goal. Given the political turmoil on the topic of road tolls in the region, I sought to explore the other aspects of the Agreement and whether it has been a successful scheme.

5. Governance in the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren

The governance structure for the Urban Growth Agreement is centred on the Board that manages the agreement locally (*styringsgruppen*) and the negotiation rounds that take place between the local and State parts. Urban Growth Agreements are further based on parliamentary bills for financing, such as St. Prop. 47 S (2016-2017) on financing the Urbanisation Package Nord-Jæren (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2016), and in the case of Nord-Jæren a motion by the regional Rogaland County Council (Rogaland Fylkeskommune, 2017b). These legal frameworks were approved in March and June 2017, respectively. They are joined by a 2014 motion in Rogaland County Council that included a round of hearings in the four municipalities (Rogaland Fylkeskommune, 2014a), which were taken into consideration when parliament approved a financing bill in 2017.

Together, these documents create the legal and structural framework for the existing Agreement. The parliamentary bill provides for the Ministry of Transport and Communications to enter into an agreement with actors in the region, whilst the 2017 motion in Rogaland County Council was the basis for an agreement between the County, the four Municipalities in Nord-Jæren, and the Norwegian State, signed by the relevant ministries and the County Mayor for Rogaland on 28 September 2017 (Samferdselsdepartementet & Kommunaldepartementet, 2017). Meanwhile, the motion from 10 December 2014 in Rogaland County Council created a basis for the local parts to negotiate from and continues to be applied today.

Financing for the projects in the Agreement is approved in accordance with a valid National Transport Plan (NTP). Since the latest NTP was approved in June 2017, after parliament had approved the financing for the current Agreement in Nord-Jæren, the current agreement is based on financing from NTP 2014-2023. Its main goal is zero-growth in private car use as aimed by the 2012 Climate Settlement and NTP 2014-2023. Although the projects in the Agreement were to be considered in the drafting of NTP 2018-2029, annual budgets for the projects in the Agreement are based on approved budgetary constraints in NTP 2014-2023 (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2016). All Urban Growth Agreements are open for renegotiation when a new NTP is proposed, and for that reason there is currently a round of renegotiations between the local and State parts (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2019a).

i. Challenges for the Urban Growth Agreement in Nord-Jæren

These renegotiations have stalled because of disagreement over financing and policy measures in the Agreement, especially over rush-hour tolls. Road tolls have come to dominate the debate around the government's several 'agreement' and 'package' mechanisms. Negotiations between the State and local parts will not continue until the local parts in the Urban Growth Agreement reach a negotiating consensus. Local consensus is one of the conditions set by the State, through the Ministry of Transport and Communications, in order to approve local transport plans that include financing through tolls. Parliament has delegated responsibility to the Ministry to approve changes in the toll road system in the region - given local consensus and given that any changes do not weaken the financial basis for the toll system (Stortinget, 2017). Despite reaching consensus on most points in the existing Agreement and in a draft Agreement that was last negotiated on 20 December 2018 (Forhandlingsutvalget, 2018g), the different local parts show differences in priorities. Further, the local and the State parts disagree on how to finance the projects in the Agreement, and the current structure for organising, negotiating, and implementing the Agreement has contributed to the disagreements.

Formally, the Urban Growth Agreement is between the Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications, the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, Rogaland County, and the Municipalities of Randaberg, Sandnes, Sola, and Stavanger. These 'parts' are defined as the 'State' (represented by the ministries) and the 'local parts' (all others) in negotiations (Rogaland Fylkeskommune, 2017a), providing a state-centric structure alike to Type I MLG. However, in the everyday governance of the Agreement, the State is represented by the Director of the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (*Statens Vegvesen*) and by the Governor of Rogaland (*Fylkesmannen i Rogaland*). Both are administrative posts and they are, respectively, delegated oversight over infrastructure (on behalf of the Ministry of Transport and Communications) and land-use planning (on behalf of the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation) related to the Agreement. When there are not negotiations, the Director of the Roads Administration is the main representative of the State and leads the Board of the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren (Rogaland Fylkeskommune, 2017a). Director Terje Moe Gustavsen had a significant role in the development of the Urban Growth Agreements in Nord-Jæren and elsewhere in the country but passed away on 4 May 2019. Whoever replaces him will be able to influence the development of these agreements, as well as take part in the negotiation process.

a. Current and New Actors

Since the Agreement was signed on 28 September 2017 its structure has changed, and the influence of different groups and actors has become evident. Previously, the structure had clear vertical and horizontal divisions, but is now more complex. Figures 5 and 6 below show the differing groups that manage the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren, and the respective level of governance in which they fall. Figure 5 shows the actors present in the Board for the Agreement, and Figure 6 shows the actors present during the negotiation process for the Agreement. Not all these actors have been present from the beginning.



Figure 5: Actors present in the Board of the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren

National-Level State Actors

- Ministry of Transport and Communications: Secretary of State^{†*}
- Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation: Secretary of State*
- Norwegian Public Roads Administration: Director of Roads*
- Norwegian Railway Directorate: Director for Railway Strategy*

Regional-Level State Actors

- Rogaland County: Rogaland County Mayor[†]
- Governor of Rogaland: Governor*

Local-Level State Actors

- Randaberg Municipality: Mayor
- Sandnes Municipality: Mayor
- Sola Municipality: Mayor
- Stavanger Municipality: Mayor

External Influence on Board Meetings (Non-Members, not exclusive)

- Political parties (at all levels)
- Stavanger Chamber of Commerce
- Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO)
- Protest groups (i.e. Nok er Nok, Folkeaskjonen Nei til Mer Bompenger)

[†] The Secretary of State leads meetings of the *Political Negotiating Committee* on behalf of the State, whilst the County Mayor acts as the leader for the ‘local parts’ during negotiations.

* Contrary to in the *Board*, the Governor of Rogaland is an active member of the negotiations. Secretaries of State are also administrative employees, directly under their respective ministers. Secretaries of State are only present at the start and end of the negotiations, or when budgetary matters require approval. In their absence, the Negotiating Committee is composed of the same members as the Board, along with the Governor. The Director of Roads also leads the ‘non-political’ negotiations.

Figure 6: Actors in the Political Negotiating Committee

Given this complex web of actors that fall both within and outside the official state structures, there have been challenges in coordinating priorities and goals in the Agreement. Dividing official state actors as either State or local has also created disagreement, especially because during recent negotiations the biggest point of contention was State funding (Forhandlingsutvalget, 2018g). Additionally, the Ministers responsible for the Agreement are not direct participants in either the Board or the negotiations process between the State and

local parts, as seen in Figures 5 and 6. Instead, a State Secretary (second-in-command to the minister) leads the start and end of the negotiation process, in what is referred to as the ‘Political Negotiating Committee’ (*politisk styringsgruppe*) for the Urban Growth Agreement. In the current negotiation process, the State Secretaries agreed to participate in future Board meetings that determine annual budgets or implementation plans that require the approval of financing. However, this only applies after a renegotiated agreement enters into force (Politisk Styringsgruppe, 2018).

Outside the Political Negotiating Committee, the majority of negotiations are carried out by the Negotiating Committee (*forhandlingsutvalget*), which is led by the Director of the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (*vegdirektør*), and where there are no representatives from the ministries. Instead, the Director and Rogaland’s Governor serve as representatives of the State in close contact with the ministries. Meanwhile, the ‘local parts’ negotiate together and are represented by the political leaders of each municipality and of Rogaland County, led by Rogaland’s County Mayor (Politisk Styringsgruppe, 2018). As a result, in both contexts for negotiation, the State is represented by administrative staff whilst the ‘local parts’ (hereafter, the Locals) are represented by the highest-ranked politician in their respective administration. For the State, the Roads Administration is in charge of a negotiating mandate, and Rogaland County Council builds a basis for negotiation on behalf of the local parts. This local negotiation considers the inputs in the motion approved by the County Council on 9 December 2014, as well as considering the Regional Land-Use Plan (*Regionalplan Jæren*) (Åsland, 2015c).

Governance in the Urban Growth Agreement has previously been referred to as contract and network-based, with a pattern where State priorities and State-led administrative processes guide planning and implementation. Individuals who have participated in the planning process have pointed out that the importance of contracts in the Urban Growth Agreements and questioned the governance structure (Haraldseid, 2018, pp. 54–55). This structure has made it challenging to achieve progress in the Urban Growth Agreement, despite the fact that the government attempted to simplify it by combining the previous Urban Environment and Urban Development agreements under the Urban Growth Agreements.

Along with this combination of two schemes, one from the Ministry of Transport and Communications and one from the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, the leadership role in the negotiating process was shifted from the County Mayor to the Director of the Public Roads Administration (Haraldseid, 2018, p. 56). Further changes to the Agreement

structure include the participation of the company in charge of road toll administration in Western Norway, *Ferde*, and of regional mobility company *Kolumbus*. The latter has had greater participation in Board meetings now that the Mobility Package has been merged into the Urban Environment Package in Nord-Jæren.¹³

Simultaneously, public participation in Board and negotiation meetings has increased since 30 August 2018, from when members of the general public have joined media under negotiation meetings. Although Board meetings have been open to the public from the Foundation Meeting in 2015, the Negotiating Committee only officially made negotiations open from 23 October 2018 to increase transparency. Therefore, all Board and negotiation meetings are to the public, except in special circumstances (Forhandlingsutvalget, 2018b; 2018c). This has allowed for an indirect, and sometimes active, presence of anti-toll groups in the negotiating process. Given that the Agreement combines the Urbanisation Package (*Bypakke Nord-Jæren*) with the Reward Scheme and aspects of the Urban Development Agreements, a central financing measure within this combined scheme is the use of road toll rings (see Figure 2 in section 2.i). Following the long toll-road debate in the region mentioned in section 2.i, frustration against tolls in Rogaland has grown to be called ‘the road toll revolt’ (*bompengeopprøret*).

This revolt has led to protests in several cities, with protests in Stavanger and Bergen receiving national attention and leading to the creation of a political movement against road tolls. The movement has members who are standing in the upcoming local and regional elections in the autumn of 2019,¹⁴ and a recent poll in Bergen gave the electoral list there the highest expected vote count (Vissgren & Myklebost, 2019). Both local and national politics have been affected by the rise of this ‘revolt,’ which has become a new factor to consider along with the Urban Growth Agreements. Further, the social movement related to the ‘revolt’ has become an influential actor in their development. An anti-toll movement in Rogaland has existed in the current form since September 2014 (Jøssang & Søndeland, 2018), and those who have attended the meetings of the Board of the Agreement in Nord-Jæren as observers since 30 August 2018

¹³ Both are publicly-owned companies. *Kolumbus* is financed entirely from the County budgets, including funds received from the Reward Scheme, and *Ferde* is state-owned, but must manage its own loans and finances.

¹⁴ As an example, Folkeaksjonen Nei til Mer Bompenger (FNB) has candidate lists in 11 municipalities around the country, including Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger, Sandnes, and Sola. It also has candidate lists for four of eleven regions in the local and regional elections of autumn 2019.

include members of this movement. Attendance then coincided with the implementation of road tolls as part of the Urban Growth Agreement on 1 October 2018, as the meeting after this was on 28 September 2018, and toll tariffs had been announced after the previous meeting (Åsland, 2018g, 2018h).

As well as the Board meetings, protesters against road tolls have disrupted political meetings related to road tolls, as happened in Stavanger 3 weeks after the toll roads part of the Agreement entered into force (Jupskås, 2018). Parallel to this movement, politicians in Rogaland and elsewhere have faced an increased number of threats. Several female politicians in Rogaland have faced harassment and threats to their families because of their position on road tolls, and these politicians have even reconsidered their future in politics as a result. This has happened to the Mayor of Stavanger, the Mayor of neighbouring municipality Klepp, and the County Mayor for Rogaland (Våga, 2019). Whilst this is not the case in all cities that have implemented or planned to implement road tolls as part of schemes like the Urban Growth Agreements, municipal councils around the country have reacted to the rise of this movement against tolls. Political authorities in at least five other Norwegian urban areas have either postponed or stopped plans to implement tolls, likely due to the social movement against them. Some of these plans included potential Urban Growth or Reward Scheme Agreements (Tjørhom, 2019).¹⁵

This social movement has become an actor in the development of the Urban Growth Agreements and similar schemes on a national scale. In Nord-Jæren it has already led to a change in the local branding of the Urban Growth Agreement – from the Urbanisation Package for Nord-Jæren (*Bypakke Nord-Jæren*) to the Urban Environment Package (*Bymiljøpakken*) as mentioned in sections 2 and 2.ii. Additionally, it has affected the development of the Development Package Jæren (*Utbyggingspakke Jæren*), a parallel toll-financed plan that was recently rejected by politicians in Klepp Municipality as a response to the social unrest regarding road tolls (Heimsvik, 2019). Meeting minutes from the Board of the Agreement show that the Development Package has been part of the plans since the foundation meeting of the Board, and this includes considerations of how to achieve zero-growth in parallel with neighbouring municipalities. Klepp and Time form part of a labour market with Nord-Jæren,

¹⁵ Municipal Councils in Bergen, Drammen, Kristiansand, Tromsø, and Arendal have made decisions as a reaction to the perceived level of social discontent against road tolls.

so these neighbouring municipalities have also been indirect actors in the planning process behind the Agreement in Nord-Jæren (Åsland, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2018i, 2019c, 2019d).

All these non-member groups have added aspects of polycentricism to the mostly state-centric structure of the Urban growth Agreement. Most of the structure of the Agreement fits within a Type I Multi-Level Governance framework, with state-based actors, spread across levels of governance, cooperating within Boards and Committees on an 'equal' footing. With more considerations and actors than in similar agreements mentioned in chapters 2 and 3, the governance Urban Growth Agreement appears more complex than a Type I MLG system. It may resemble the complex structure present in Buskerud more than the simple structure in Trondheim, as analysed by Tønnesen and Nyseth (2017). Contrary to in Buskerud, the difficulties in cooperation are not only between actors within the Agreement, like neighbouring municipalities or businesses in Nord-Jæren. Here in Nord-Jæren, they extend to municipalities south of Nord-Jæren and a national social group that has affected politics at a national level. At the latest meeting of the Urban Growth Agreement Board, on 20 May 2019, a politician from Rogaland County Council who is not a Board member went so far as to argue that the local movement against tolls will determine the development of the Agreement in Nord-Jæren.

b. New Political Context

In addition to the presence of new actors to influence the Urban Growth Agreement, the political context in which it is being planned has affected progress and development. The last meeting of the recent negotiation rounds was a meeting of the Political Negotiating Committee on 4 March 2019, but it ended without a successful agreement. Local elections in 2019 and the national debate on road tolls have become factors that affect consensus amongst the local parts in the Board. Within the Board, the Locals have previously sought consensus between themselves and with other politicians in the region through Dialogue Meetings. These have included a broad range of politicians in the region so that the Locals have a stronger and more stable mandate from which to negotiate. First proposed in May of 2016 (Åsland, 2016c), the first of these Dialogue Meetings was eventually planned for November of the same year. Two more since then have focused on communications and experiences from similar schemes in Oslo and Trondheim (Åsland, 2016c, 2017a, 2017d, 2018a, 2018b). The next one is planned for after the local elections of September 2019, in order to consider incoming politicians, as well as to further gather experiences from other Urban Growth Agreements (Åsland, 2019e). Forming networks appears crucial to the success of the Agreement in Nord-Jæren, including

local networks with politicians, networks between urban areas with similar Agreements, and possibly even networks with the social movement against tolls. This has become evident in the past year.

Uncertainty amongst members of the Board regarding a rush-hour toll has arisen since the summer of 2018, from when the final toll levels were announced before the Board, and Local members expressed a desire to re-evaluate the rush-hour system under renegotiations. Toll levels and the rush-hour tolls are to be re-evaluated after 1 year, as mandated by St. Prop. 47S (2016-2017) (Åsland, 2018f). Three days before the Urban Environment Package was to come into force on 1 October 2018, Sandnes Municipality proposed to the Board that the entire Package be postponed until renegotiations had completed but was not supported by the other members of the Board. The Minister of Transport had previously expressed that it was possible to postpone the Package, but the Director of Roads reiterated during the meeting that the Locals would have to agree to any changes by consensus. Randaberg Municipality then proposed for the rush-hour tolls to be axed and was supported by Sandnes. Following this, a united Board (State and Locals) approved a motion to reconsider the level and effect of a rush-hour toll under renegotiations (Åsland, 2018h).

In between these two Board Meetings, the Minister of Transport had called in to a meeting in Oslo with the members of the Board, pointing to zero-growth and financial stability as central aspects that the government expects of projects that include toll financing. Rush-hour tariffs were not to be seen as a requirement from the state, but simultaneously any toll-financed projects have to balance revenue and spending (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2018). The Mayor of Sandnes Municipality then received a mandate from his City Council on 22 October 2018 to withdraw from the Urban Growth Agreement if his demand to remove the rush-hour tolls was not removed (Fintland, 2018). Mayor Stanley Wirak expected to withdraw from the Agreement after renegotiations stalled in March 2019, but Minister of Transport Jon Georg Dale made it clear that it was not possible to withdraw from the Agreement and that the local parts would have to renegotiate changes. Dale's comments countered ones by previous Minister Ketil Solvik-Olsen that no party would be forced into an Agreement, and that if one party chose to withdraw, the remaining parts would have to renegotiate projects and financing (Fosse, 2019b). These comments have added to tensions amongst the local parts, and between the local and State parts. A new Minister of Transport has therefore become a new actor to consider.

Since the negotiations stalled, several local politicians have expressed themselves for or against Sandnes Municipality's position on rush-hour tolls. Fellow members of Mayor Wirak's Norwegian Labour Party (Ap) in Sola and Stavanger have publicly supported scrapping the rush-hour tolls (Fosse & Jupskås, 2019), whilst his colleague and fellow Board member in Randaberg had previously proposed scrapping it, and her Municipality has showed opposition to it since the Agreement underwent public hearings in 2014. Meanwhile, the Vice-Mayor of Rogaland County (*fylkesvaraordfører*) Marianne Chesak, a fellow Labour Party member, has expressed disagreement with the local politicians because Rogaland County has stood as the responsible negotiator for the local parts. Politicians at the County level highlight the difficulty of achieving a compromise and have expressed frustration that the rush-hour toll could become a party-political issue (Fosse, 2019c). Toll roads in general have become a party-political issue at a national level, which is one reason for the changes in political decisions on local Urban Growth and Reward Scheme Agreements mentioned above. However, at a national level the debate on tolls has been more severe.

Nationally, the Labour Party now suggests replacing road tolls with road pricing, where a GPS system calculates how much each driver travels to charge them accordingly. Within the Norwegian Government, the Conservative Party (*Høyre* – see footnote 3) has considered this alternative to tolls whilst the Progress Party (*FrP*) is both against road pricing and in favour of a significant reduction of road tolls in Norway (Rognsvåg & Kjelland-Mørdre, 2019). For the Progress Party the topic of road tolls has become critical enough for party members to consider leaving the government if the party leadership does not gain concessions prior to local and regional elections in 2019 (Juva & Tollersrud, 2019). After an extraordinary general meeting of the party leadership, the party has come with the following demands to the government if it is to remain a part of it:

1. The zero-growth goal should be replaced with a zero-emissions goal for vehicles
2. There should be no new Urban Packages or similar schemes in the country
3. Costs in existing Urban Packages and similar schemes should be cut
4. Further the government commitment to cut charges in existing toll systems
5. Road pricing is clearly undesirable
6. Place stronger requirements on local authorities who seek state financing for projects.

However, the Christian Democratic Party (*KrF*) and the Liberal Party (*Venstre*), the other two members of the coalition government, have come out against the majority of these points.

Whilst the Progress Party claims it is entering into renegotiations on the coalition agreement with its partners in government, these two parties argue that their agreement is solid and that they will hold discussions, but not negotiations (Åsnes, 2019). A national debate on road tolls has become a national debate on all the projects that they finance, including Urban Growth Agreements, and has gone so far as to destabilise the governing coalition in parliament. Political parties have therefore become additional non-member actors influencing the Agreements.

Leading up to and following the 2019 local and regional elections there will be changes in Norwegian politics that could change the Urban Growth Agreements, and possibly even a change in the national government. Changes in political actors have brought challenges in the past, as did the 2014 local elections when new actors that had not been involved in previous planning became Board members. Participants in the Board have expressed that this makes achieving consensus more difficult because it means that not everyone is part of the planning and implementation process over a longer period of time. Now that political parties have become additional actors in what once was a simpler Type I MLG scheme, the relationship between levels of governance becomes more complex and local consensus relating to progress in the Agreement even more so.

ii. Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up Governance

Urban Growth Agreements were originally voluntary agreements between different parties, but the recent comments by Transport Minister Jon Georg Dale frame them as binding contracts that cannot be revoked. In this manner, the governance structure of the Agreement becomes more hierarchical due to a decision made at the State level. Voluntary membership was one aspect of the Agreement where it resembled a more Type II MLG system, but this new political context reinforces a top-down and state-centric structure. When asked who in the Board of the Urban Growth Agreement has been central to making decisions, representatives from three of the four municipalities¹⁶ and from Rogaland County Council all mentioned the funding they receive from the State. Local representatives perceive a lack of States funding as a barrier for progress in the negotiations. There are varying descriptions of the governance within the Board and during the negotiation rounds, but in common is a mention of state funding and a lack of significant influence over it. Within the Board, one interviewee describes governance as:

¹⁶ Randaberg, Sola, and Stavanger. Sandnes did not respond to an interview request. All quotes are translations.

'Led by the Director of Roads at the same time as all parts are equal.'

The Director of Roads, as head of the Board and of the Negotiations Committee, appears to have had a strong level of influence from the start. As an administrative representative for the State, the Director's mandate is to adhere to decisions made previously by the Government and by Parliament (Interview 1, 13 May 2019; Interview 3, 15 May 2019). This has been seen as a partial barrier to negotiations because the involvement of the Director became almost personal and because, as an administrative representative, the Director of Roads cannot immediately confirm or approve any motions or changes to the Agreement. Any changes must be confirmed by the relevant ministry. This separates the local members of the board from the real decision-makers: the government and parliament (Interview 4; 21 May 2019). Two of the interviewees highlighted the difference in who participates, where the local parts have attended negotiations with actors from the highest political level whilst the State is represented by administrative personnel. This concern has been raised at Board Meetings as well, and in September 2018 Randaberg Municipality proposed that, under renegotiations, the County Mayor be made leader of the Board (Åsland, 2018h).

Members of the Board are, in theory, equal when discussing implementation or carrying out a round of negotiations. Representatives of the Board have, following an explanation of the concept, expressed that Board Meetings follow a Multi-Level Governance system because they are able to negotiate directly with the State. When asked whether they thought was more top-down or bottom-up governance in the Urban Growth Agreement, three of the participants in the Board said that their experience pointed to more top-down governance than bottom-up governance. One of the three said there are bottom-up aspects to the Agreement because Members are able to present input and their understanding of the Agreement, but that *'it is the State and Parliament that set the premise for the Urban Environment Package.'* A third interviewee described the interactions in Board meetings as Multi-Level, where all parts can contribute, and decisions are made by consensus. However, the interviewee said that *'in the actual negotiations the State is superior to the local parts.'* Another said that the division between administrative and political representation makes for a more top-down than bottom-up structure even during Board Meetings.

As mentioned in section 3.i, governance can either be hierarchical or polycentric. In the case of the Urban Growth Agreement in Nord-Jæren, the context in which it operates has aspects of both. The comments made by participants in the Board, the Minister of Transport, and in

meeting minutes suggest that the relationship between the Locals and the State has hierarchical characteristics. Since the Norwegian State, through Parliament and the Ministries of Transport and of Local Government, has set the legal and financial framework for the Agreement, it is able to change its demands for the Board. It is also able to determine which projects are prioritised and when cuts must be made through the budget limits that have been approved and the considerations made by the Norwegian Public Roads Administration. Since this decision-making is nested in the hierarchy of state institutions, the Urban Growth Agreement best fits within a Type I MLG system framework. This hierarchy is affected by the context within which it exists, but most of the final decisions lie with the Minister of Transport and Communications, to determine if Urban Growth Agreements are within their budgetary constraints and also contributing to the nationally-determined zero-growth goal.

Simultaneously, the Norwegian government, and specifically the Minister of Transport's Progress Party, have been influenced by the social movement against road tolls. This has made the hierarchical structure of the Agreement more complex than is apparent at first sight, as a pressure group grew horizontally to affect other Agreements locally and eventually rose to the national level of governance. Actors that were once constrained to a local level and mostly outside the structure of the Norwegian State became political actors with a growing influence in several urban areas with Urban Growth Agreements or similar. In Nord-Jæren, this movement includes both political and social aspects, with candidates to the local and regional elections as well as representatives who observe Board meetings. Nationally, the Progress Party and its list of demands for change in the structure of the Urban Growth Agreements has had a more immediate impact, shown by the new tone given by Transport Minister Jon Georg Dale.

One requirement from the Minister that has been reinforced in recent months is that of local consensus. It has entrenched the feeling of top-down governance amongst the interviewed representatives of the Board, and two of the four representatives mentioned that the pause in negotiations meant that the region is losing access to significant State funds. One described the situation as follows:

'The fact that we have not acquired a renegotiated Agreement means that we are losing money. We could have received increased State funding that we now are not receiving.'

This has been echoed by other participants in the Board, including transport leader Gottfried Heinzerling at Rogaland County. Heinzerling has previously warned that the region has already made transport and mobility investments that are in line with the suggestions in the renegotiated

Agreement. Namely, 200 million NOK in Reward Scheme funding were to be part of the Agreement and be targeted towards public transport and mobility measures (Jupskås, 2019b). An interviewee from Rogaland County made a similar comment, highlighting that Rogaland County has a transport and mobility budget of over 200 million NOK, but that the amount agreed to under renegotiations will not be granted until there is full local consensus. On behalf of the State, the Governor of Rogaland has meanwhile criticised that the local parts focus bringing projects forward instead of on strengthening revenue to finance them (Munkvik, 2019).

At the latest Board Meeting (20 May 2019), representatives from the Public Roads Administration made it clear that any financing has to come from the annual State Budget, and thus bringing projects forwards depends on the State Budget. On the same day, the Minister of Transport published new guidelines on the use of tolls in Urban Growth Agreements. According to the guidelines, in Agreements where costs increase or revenues are less than expected, those in charge are expected to scale down projects or remove them so that drivers do not face increased toll costs. Minister Jon Georg Dale expects for *'the dimensions of [toll-financed projects] to be adjusted to the actual revenue stream'* [own translation] (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2019b). Balanced finances have become a more central requirement from the State, and a reason why negotiations in Nord-Jæren have stalled.

Since the premise for the Urban Growth Agreements is local consensus, local members of the Board are unable to make changes to the Agreement or seek reconsideration if there is not such a consensus. Considering Aall's (2012) and Westskog et. al.'s (2018) analyses of local administrations in making climate policy mentioned in Chapter 3, one question is whether the local members of the Board are an implementing tool or a decision-making actor. If the governance of the Agreement is hierarchical and top-down, local Board members have little decision-making power and become a simple tool for implementation of national policy. However, local will can determine if actors move from being a structure for implementation to a policy actor that can define "policy goals and means independently of national environmental policies" (Aall, 2012, p. 79). Lack of administrative capacity and competence can hinder this type of bottom-up initiative, which has been the case in Nord-Jæren. As far back as 2015, the municipality members of the Board had expressed a lack of resources and capacity to dedicate to the then Urbanisation Package for Nord-Jæren (Åsland, 2015d).

Local initiatives have also been constrained by the legislative and financial boundaries of the Urban Growth Agreement in the past. From before the Urbanisation Package for Nord-Jæren was approved, all planning and negotiations depended on plans from the Public Roads Administration evaluated by the Ministry of Transport and Communications. These institutions were in charge of creating feasibility studies and quality-assurance (KS2) of any projects.¹⁷ The Public Roads Administration starts all planning preparations, including for the legislative proposal on financing, any plans are passed on to the Ministry, and finally must be approved either by the government or by parliament (Åsland, 2015a, 2015b). Most decisions made by the Board are therefore managed by the Roads Administration before being considered by national political authorities, as well as the other way around.

An example of the opposite is that Stavanger University Hospital will be relocated, a decision made at the national level. However, this decision was made after local transport plans for its future location and not considered in the planning of the Agreement. Now that the decision has been made to move the hospital, the Locals have sought to reprioritise the order in which projects will be built, but this also must follow the principle of Portfolio Management set by the State (Åsland, 2016a, 2016c). Local members of the Board have sought to finance projects ahead of time by having Rogaland County serve as a loan guarantor that applies portfolio management to its priorities, but this must also be approved by the government (Åsland, 2015e). Since all parts are in theory working towards the zero-growth goal, uncertainty in competence and authority can prevent a balance of bottom-up and top-down governance, similarly to in Lundqvist's study of local climate governance in Sweden (2012).

Local members of the Board face a dilemma of priorities because the Agreement has only earned around half of the revenue that was expected during its first 5 months. In part this is because the measures in the Agreement have been successful in reducing the amount of private traffic throughout the day, but it is also because national measures promoting electric vehicles have allowed more individuals to avoid paying tolls (Åsland, 2019e). Whereas in the parliamentary basis for the Agreement the budget estimates that 5 percent of vehicles crossing

¹⁷ The Norwegian Public Roads Administration carried out a quality-assurance survey of all the projects in the Urban Growth Agreement before it was submitted to parliament. Since then, Urban Area Reports (*Byutredninger*) have been used to assess which projects will most contribute to zero-growth. Further quality-assurance is meant to follow for the projects intended for financing under the next National Transport Plan (expected in 2022).

tolls would be electric, the real number has risen to 16 percent in Nord-Jæren (Tønset, 2019). Therefore, the members of the Board must recalculate their priorities and action plan, but they base their plans on the financing approved at a national level.

At the same time, the current Minister of Transport is setting more constraints on the level of toll financing that urban areas are allowed to use in Urban Growth Agreements, as mentioned earlier. However, the Minister places responsibility with the local parts, requiring that they control their finances and cut costs. For the Agreement in Nord-Jæren, he has criticised the high cost of the Cycle Expressway (see Figure 3 in section 2.i) and his opinion is that a more affordable solution must be found (Kalajdzic, Tollersrud, & Vignæs, 2019). Local members of the Board have sought local solutions, and local media have had access to the draft compromise that was in the end not accepted by Sandnes Municipality in March 2019. Here, the Negotiating Committee had proposed that the rush-hour tariff is reduced from 44 NOK to 33 NOK, that the afternoon rush period is reduced from 15:00-17:00 to 15:00-16:30, and the period for the Agreement is extended from 2017-2023 to 2018-2029. After negotiations, State Secretary Anders Werp was clear that Portfolio Management would remain central to the Agreement and that the State's budget for Urban Growth Agreements is shared between several urban areas (Jupskås, 2019a). Therefore, even with proposed changes to the Agreement with lower toll charges, the Board in Nord-Jæren is constrained by national legal and financial limits.

By considering the four modes of governance outlined by Bulkeley and Kern (2006), the Urban Growth Agreement in Nord-Jæren contains measures that apply to all four of the modes. Figure 7 below shows the different measures present in the Agreement, divided according to the criteria set by the proponents of these modes of governance, the examples provided in their article (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006, p. 2243), and Lundqvist's (2012) application of the same modes of governance.

<i>Self-Governing</i>	<i>Governing by Provision</i>	<i>Governing by authority</i>	<i>Governing by Enabling</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Renaming from Bypakke Nord-Jæren to Bymiljøpakken • Integration of toll-road measures and ‘mobility’ measures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Investment in public transport network • Integration of bus and train tickets • Bus Expressway • New roads (E39) • Cycle Expressway • Heavy Goods Vehicle Priority Lane • Rebates for EVs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Toll rings • Rush-hour tolls • Updates to urban and regional plans 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communication on the Urban Environment Package aimed at the general public • Campaign to reduce private car use • Cooperation with local businesses • Hjem-Jobb-Hjem

Figure 7: Measures in the Urban Growth Agreement according to mode of governance

Governing by provision is the mode of governance in the Agreement under which most measures are being carried out, with a range of infrastructure projects, financial incentives, and coordination between train and bus services. These measures fall under the category of provision for creating the facilities for a community to change, and they all depend on financing from the Agreement budget. Governing by enabling also applies to several measures, most of which are campaigns to persuade residents of Nord-Jæren to contribute to the zero-growth goal, but one measure targeted at companies is a programme where businesses can acquire subsidised public transport for their employees (*Hjem-Jobb-Hjem*). This last measure also counts as an incentive, but it requires for businesses to sign up to the programme and is thus not a measure of provision. The Board created a communications team already in 2017 (Åsland, 2017b), and at its most recent meeting its members emphasised the importance of viewing the Agreement as a whole, as well as to communicate the successes so far.

Self-governing has not been a large focus of the Agreement because its target is the entire region, and as such this mode of governance, called the ‘low-hanging fruit’ (Lundqvist, 2012, p. 106), would not be enough to achieve the goals of the Agreement. *Hjem-Jobb-Hjem* for public employees can show that even they are contributing towards the goals, but the programme is optional even for public entities. Other measures, such as integrating the Mobility and Urbanisation Packages into the Urban Environment Package, are more clearly coming from the Board and can be controlled by it. Finally, governing by authority applied to the most controversial measures in the Agreement – road tolls and planning restrictions. These can be the most difficult to implement because they can be perceived as limiting freedoms, and they

can create “a disadvantage vis-à-vis other local governments” (Lundqvist, 2012, pp. 112–113). In Lundqvist’s own study on Swedish municipalities, local governments were less likely to apply measures of governance by authority and most likely to apply measures of self-governance that they had control over (*Ibid*). In Nord-Jæren, measures of governance by authority have been promoted in the past through negotiations between the State and the local members of the Board, but now lacking financing from the measures of *authority* could jeopardise some of the measures of *provision*.

Different measures in the Agreement are dependent on approval or financing from the State and the Board, and the capacity of local members of the Board can determine if and when these measures are implemented. Some of the infrastructure projects, for example, have faced delays because of new requirements by the state that then require processing by the local authorities. Motorway project E39 Smiene-Harestad has previously faced cuts after being processed by Stavanger Municipality, and the Heavy Goods Lane in Sola Municipality has also faced cuts and additional planning requirements after Sola’s authorities had approved land-use plans (Åsland, 2017, 2018g). Interviewed participants of the Board feel that they have set high ambitions and cooperated with the requirements set by the State, but that they are not given the financing or political support that they see necessary for the success of the Agreement. This becomes clear in the draft Agreement from December 2018, in which the Locals require that each ‘road owner’ (state, county, municipality) has planning and financial responsibility for infrastructure projects under their area of competency, and also require that the budget ratios rather than the budget numbers are what determine State financial contributions to the Agreement (Forhandlingsutvalget, 2018g).

The result is that a local wish to become policy actors has been constrained by the governance structure of the Urban Growth Agreement, where the Norwegian State can determine the financing for each project, creating a top-down system. Even where local members of the Board are policy actors, their policy action is not necessarily in line with the goals of the Agreement. Each member of the Board has their own responsibilities and priorities for planning and implementation, some of which may focus on goals within the Agreement other than the zero-growth goal, and therefore are not local climate or environmental goals. These members had once referred to the Urbanisation Package as a local version of the Climate Settlement, given its focus on zero-growth (Åsland, 2016a), but not all goals appear to be in line with zero-growth of private vehicle use. Horizontal cooperation becomes a factor for the success of this goal.

iii. Vertical vs. Horizontal Goal-Setting and the Zero-Growth Goal

Before the Urban Growth Agreement was signed between the State, Rogaland County, and the four Municipalities in Nord-Jæren, the board of the then-Urbanisation Package agreed to prioritise the large infrastructure projects in the Agreement as follows:

1. Cycle Expressway from Stavanger to Sandnes, through the Forus business area
2. Bus Expressway trajectory 1: North-South (Stavanger to Sandnes through Forus)
3. Transport Corridor West (*Transportkorridor Vest - TKV*): A Heavy Goods Vehicle lane, and Bus Expressway trajectory 2 (East-West in Stavanger)
4. E-39 motorway project from Smiene in Stavanger to Harestad in Randaberg
5. E-39 motorway project from Hove in Sandnes to Ålgård to the south, and Bus Expressway trajectories outside of Sandnes city centre (Åsland, 2015d).

Prioritisation has always been a point of contention, as the local actors must reach a consensus every time one Board member does not feel that its priorities are given weight. Given this model, a single actor has a veto right and can stall negotiations, as is happening now. Disagreement over how to prioritise the projects in the Agreement has been present from early on, especially amongst the local members of the Board. On the same day that the prioritisation above was agreed to, the Vice-Mayor of Sandnes Municipality (*varaordfører*) proposed that the E-39 project from Hove-Ålgård (point 5) receive first priority and that the cycle expressway (point 1) be prioritised last. Other Board members argued that the plans for the cycle expressway were mostly in place and as such it was preferable to prioritise this project the most. The Board members compromised to leave the priorities as they were but asked the Secretariat to consider an early start for the E-39 Hove-Ålgård project (Åsland, 2015d).¹⁸

When the National Transport Plan 2018-2029 was presented in June 2017, this project did not receive funding in the first plan period (2018-2023). Sandnes Municipality expressed regrets when this was presented and pointed to the parliamentary report that accompanied NTP 2018-2029. There, the majority in the parliamentary committee outlined that projects can be brought forward in time if local administrations take out a loan (Åsland, 2017c). Coincidentally, the

¹⁸ Since neither Sandnes Municipality nor representatives of the State were available for an interview, this study relies on Board and Negotiation Committee minutes, as well as comments made to the media when analysing their priorities.

Public Roads Administration announced during the latest Board meeting (20 May 2019) that it had recommended that the Ministry of Transport bring forward plans for one of the two large infrastructure projects: either E-39 Ålgård-Hove or the TKV project (point 3). This depends on national financing and local prioritisation, neither of which the Administration is responsible for. The Administration is therefore unable to facilitate prioritisation within the Board and relies on the approval of the Ministry of Transport.

In its letter to the Ministry, the Administration pointed to comments made by businesses in the region rather than by members of the Board as reasons to bring the projects forward in time. It did not recommend either in particular, leaving the Board to make the final decision through Portfolio Management (Åsland, 2019e). These projects serve as examples of the different prioritisation made by actors within the Board in relation to the two main goals in the Agreement: zero-growth and improved accessibility for all. These goals can counteract each other, as improved accessibility for private vehicles can dampen the possibility of zero-growth in private car use. Additionally, the way in which the projects were prioritised suggests that the Public Roads Administration has a strong influence in the process. Whilst the Ministry of Transport must approve projects and these projects must be based on local approval by consensus, the Public Roads Administration is a middleman in the prioritisation process.

Balancing zero-growth and improved accessibility is a central part of goal implementation in the Agreement, as seen from the comments of interviewees. One describes Zero-growth as *'meant to contribute to better accessibility for everyone, regardless of the mode of transport that they choose.'* This interviewee suggests that the E-39 projects could generate more traffic in Nord-Jæren, but that this challenge is addressed by new infrastructure that will provide alternatives to private cars. Another interviewee explains that the region is being evaluated as a whole, and therefore more central areas must overcompensate for areas that will never achieve zero-growth. According to this second interviewee, all members of the Board see that they are clearly interdependent but at the same time want to prioritise projects in their municipality. A third interviewee gave a different point of view from where it is difficult to believe that the population in the region will grow in the next 15 years without any growth in private car use. Zero-growth in private car use for this interviewee is a requirement set by the state where *'the local parts commit to helping Norway achieve this goal in order to receive state funding.'* Municipalities may wish to build more roads, but in order to achieve the zero-growth goal only 30 percent of the Agreement's budget is aimed at building road infrastructure (see section 2.i).

Mayor Kristine Enger of Randaberg, the fourth interviewee, provided a different description:

‘The zero-growth goal is explicitly communicated as the main goal. For a long time, it was the only goal that was discussed, but in recent years accessibility has been communicated more noticeably in discussions and Board meetings. Especially on behalf of the State, accessibility becomes more noticeable whilst zero-growth almost becomes a way in which to measure accessibility’ (Interview 2, 15 May 2019).

In the eyes of the Mayor commercial traffic has gained priority and the zero-growth goal has become *‘a tool with which to measure accessibility for commercial traffic.’* All interviewees have been heavily involved in the planning around the Urban Growth Agreement, so their comments provide different internal perspectives. They gave varying importance to the zero-growth goal, which as explained by the Mayor of Randaberg is central but maybe has lost its place as the *de facto* main goal of the Agreement. As recently as in 2018, the Board agreed to limit the zero-growth goal to the current boundaries of the four municipalities in Nord-Jæren (Åsland, 2018j), given that from 1 January 2020 Stavanger and Sandnes Municipalities will be merged with less populated neighbouring municipalities to the north and to the east. Private car use in these municipalities can therefore grow despite zero-growth within Nord-Jæren, and not affect the zero-growth goal. Section 5.i describes a different arrangement to the south, where the municipalities of Klepp and Time had expected to cooperate with Nord-Jæren to contribute to the zero-growth goal (Åsland, 2018j, 2019a), but this arrangement has been affected by the national revolt against road tolls. Furthermore, it is uncertain if zero-growth will remain a central government aim after the Transport Minister’s Progress Party expressed a wish to change this goal to *‘zero emissions from private vehicles’* (see section 5.ii).

Some of the comments above describe a state-enforced goal which not all of the participants take on willingly, which reinforces a view of top-down governance because the local actors acquiesce to zero-growth and the demands that come with it in order to receive financing for their projects. Local parties to the Agreement are therefore able to suggest projects and how they would like to prioritise them but may not be able to make the final decision. The Public Roads Administration contributes horizontally in the prioritisation process in the Board and can steer the prioritisation process, but it cannot make decisions and must receive vertical consent from the Ministry. A new political context shows that even the government is not entirely in control of its goals. Nonetheless, each local Member of the Board has shown that they have at least one priority within the Agreement. These priorities are outlined below following from the

interviews taken for this study, as well as the priorities for the project as a whole that are listed earlier in this section. Horizontal prioritisation is the idea behind the agreements, where all members of the Board are ‘equal parts,’ but as in other MLG systems explained by Di Gregorio et al. (2019), the State can exert its priorities and determine the steering of these agreements.

For Randaberg Municipality, the priorities are smaller measures that tackle road safety, cycling and pedestrian infrastructure, and the possibility for its residents to choose alternatives to private cars. Randaberg is the smallest of the four municipalities, and so most of the projects it has proposed are placed under common budgets for smaller projects. Cycling and bus infrastructure are key for Randaberg because many in the region travel to the municipality during the weekends for outdoor leisure. Although Randaberg will not be linked to any of the planned Bus Expressway trajectories, which are the largest transport infrastructure in the Agreement, the municipality has settled for smaller projects. However, the E39 Smiene-Harestad and TKV projects, two of the largest in the Agreement, go through Randaberg and are controversial in the municipality. According to the mayor, they will most benefit residents in other municipalities and yet will most affect local residents. These road projects will be built over significant amounts of farmland in Randaberg and the mayor says that many in the municipality hope that the section of the TKV in Randaberg is cut as a result of cost reductions (Interview 2, 15 May 2019).

Rogaland County, as the largest of the local actors, has different goals. The County is responsible for the planning of the Bus Expressway, which it sees as central to meeting the goals in the Agreement. At one point the Bus Expressway project had cost estimates that far exceeded the original budget and making costs cuts was difficult. For their part, the State has committed to financing up to 50 percent of the total financing of the Expressway, which is budgeted at 10,5 billion NOK. Rogaland’s County Mayor leads the negotiations on behalf of the Locals, so County officials have had to defend the projects during negotiations when the State has reduced support or stepped back. The County has fought for the State to commit to a share of the project costs rather than a fixed amount, and outside the regular projects the County has argued for an increase in Reward Scheme funding as part of the Agreement (Interview 1, 13 May 2019). As mentioned earlier, the Reward Scheme funding is used to finance public transport in the County, and current spending levels far exceed the funding provided now.

Sola Municipality, for its part, expects to receive funding for large infrastructure projects that cover roads, commercial transport, and improved public transport connections to the

municipality. Transport Corridor West (*TKV*) is the main project in the Agreement that affects Sola, as within the municipality it is a road project, a commercial transport project, and a project for public transport. Two extra lanes will be added to existing road as priority lanes for Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGVs) and public transport, which is important for the municipality's businesses and residents near Stavanger Airport Sola and around Risavika Harbour. Another important project for Sola is a Bus Expressway trajectory that will go from the Forus business district (shared by Sandnes, Sola, and Stavanger municipalities) towards Sola town and the airport, but this trajectory does not have top priority in the Agreement. Sola Municipality will greatly benefit from Bus Expressway infrastructure but understands that Nord-Jæren is a region and that all of the projects in the Agreement are interrelated. For Sola Municipality,

'The order in which [projects] are built is not the most important thing, rather it is that everything falls in place. If the bus system is to work well, it has to work both in Stavanger and in Sandnes.' (Interview 4, 21 May 2019).

Lastly, for Stavanger Municipality the priorities are in Stavanger City Centre, areas surrounding train infrastructure, and what is called the 'urban belt' (*bybåndet*) between Stavanger and Sandnes city centres. Stavanger Municipality sees this urban belt as key to achieving the zero-growth goal, where Trajectory 1 for the Bus Expressway (point 2 in the list above) within this belt must be built to very high standards in order to succeed. This municipality is described as being 'more ambitious' than the others because considerations like zero-growth are included in Stavanger's Municipal Plan and its Climate and Environment Plan. Stavanger Central train station and Stavanger City Centre must be made attractive because the entire region is dependent on the success of Stavanger Municipality, according to the interviewee from this municipality. Simultaneously, the interviewee underlines that the members of the Board are aware of their interdependence even though they seek priority for their own projects (Interview 3, 15 May 2019).

Taken together, these goals show differences in prioritisation and display potential reasons for why achieving consensus has been so difficult. Comments from the last interviewee show how all local actors in the Agreement may attempt to see a bigger picture but at the same time aim for their own goals. All of the interviewees pointed to state financing as central to achieve both particular and common goals, guided by zero-growth and improved accessibility. One of the interviewees suggested that at first there may have been selfish reasons to join the Urbanisation Package when that initiative was set up, but that since the creation of the Urban Growth

Agreements there has been an increase in the motivation to take part in this new initiative. This interviewee says that acquiring state financing has always been a reason to participate, and that because Nord-Jæren has shown results it has acquired more funding. Horizontal collaboration must therefore overcome vested interests in order to achieve the goals of the Agreement.

Disagreement between local members of the Board over which projects to prioritise and what policy measures to implement in the Agreement display the aspects of network governance present in this Agreement. As in the case of the similar scheme in Buskerud (Tønnesen & Nyseth, 2017), difficulties in managing horizontal collaboration in Nord-Jæren have limited the success of the Agreement in this region. Individual members of the Board have proven that the State-led focus on consensus gives each member a strong veto power. Such a decision-making power influences the implementation process for the Agreement, so in order for the Agreement to succeed the members of the Board must overcome their conflicts of interest. Additionally, the influence of the Public Roads Administration as a State representative in the Board is evidenced by its position as a middle-man between the local members of the Board and the State. Without direct communication between the local members and the State, the Agreement faces questions of accountability which the Administration cannot answer to. The Administration can only refer to its mandate from the Ministry of Transport and to the financial framework for the Agreement approved by parliament in 2017.

When Parliament approved the financing for the then-Urbanisation Package, it took into account comments from each local actor. These had been gathered during a hearing process prior to the local approval by Rogaland County Council in December 2014, and in addition to comments from local members of the Board it included neighbouring municipalities Gjesdal, Time, Klepp, Hå, and Strand (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2016, pp. 6–14). These hearing comments in the parliamentary finance bill show that the five local members of the Board agreed on most points that were included and even on which ones were left out of the Agreement. Three of the four municipalities in Nord-Jæren, the exception being Randaberg, made it clear that zero-growth and accessibility for all road users were the main goals (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2016, pp. 6–10). Rogaland County meanwhile went further than the municipalities and set a goal of zero-growth for all vehicles, not just private cars (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2016, p. 11). Local Board members agreed that Nord-Jæren had to cooperate with its neighbouring municipalities, and all except Randaberg accepted road tolls as a way to finance infrastructure projects (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2016, pp. 6–14).

Randaberg Municipality's hearing comment to the parliamentary bill was the shortest amongst the member of the Board and lacks details, but all the other members outlined other projects that they wanted to prioritise in addition to the projects in the Agreement. Not all projects that the members of the Board initially suggested received priority in funding, but Sola, Sandnes, Stavanger and Rogaland coincided in a request that a crossing over Gandsfjord in Sandnes be considered at least in parallel to the Agreement (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2016, pp. 6–14). This latter project had previously been a part of the Agreement's budget but was later excluded, and Sandnes had threatened to not participate in the Agreement as a result (see section 2.i). Sandnes set the eventual construction of a bridge over Gandsfjord as a condition for its participation, as well as development of an area called Sandnes East (*Sandnes Øst*) (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2016, p. 8). Stavanger and Sola municipalities wanted any crossing over this fjord to be considered as part of a cross-municipality project, and Rogaland County requested plans for infrastructure in Sandnes East and around Gandsfjord according to its land-use plan (*Regionalplan Jæren*). Other comments reflected those in the interviews, such as a priority for Sola to receive a trajectory of the Bus Expressway and for Stavanger Central Station to be developed (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2016, pp. 6–14).

Gandsfjord and Sandnes East have not been mentioned in Board minutes since, but funds for planning infrastructure in Sandnes East are part of the Agreement (Rogaland Fylkeskommune, 2017a). Following the break in negotiations for a new Agreement in March 2019, these projects were brought up again by four party leaders in Sandnes City Council in an editorial on newspaper Stavanger Aftenblad.¹⁹ These leaders, including the vice-mayor (Progress Party) and members of the mayor's Labour Party, restate the argument that a bridge over Gandsfjord and the development of Sandnes East should be prioritised in the Agreement. Their focus is accessibility for cars, bikes, pedestrians, and also public transport, without naming zero-growth and with criticism of the rush-hour tariff. They argue that it was the other local members of the Board that halted the negotiations process, and that local businesses have a clear demand that the rush-hour tariff is removed (Borgli, Selvikvåg, Haaland, & Tangen, 2019). As the second most populous municipality in Nord-Jæren, Sandnes has strong influence in regional politics but it feels that it is not being prioritised enough. This is also evident during negotiations.

¹⁹ Sandnes City Council is currently led by a coalition between the Labour Party, the Progress Party, and the Centre Party. Stanley Wirak of the Labour Party is mayor, and Pål Morten Borgli of the Progress Party is vice-mayor.

Since that start of the recent negotiations process, which had its first meeting on 14 June 2018 after a meeting of the Political Board of the Urban Growth Agreement on 4 May 2018, the different local priorities have been expressed more often during Board meetings. For their respective parts, Sola Municipality has been worried about cuts to the TKV project and to the Bus Expressway trajectories that enter the municipality, whilst Rogaland County wants to avoid that budget cuts on the Bus Expressway project affect trajectory 1. Both mentioned a commitment to zero-growth and to improved accessibility when expressing their view on current cost cuts to the projects given new estimations that exceed the original budgets (Åsland, 2018d, 2018e). Sola Municipality has at a later meeting expressed that cuts to the TKV project could affect accessibility for commercial transport and public transport connections within its borders (Åsland, 2018g). These comments coincide with the comments made by the interviewees, and Sola Municipality's comments in particular give weight to the argument that some members of the Board are giving an increased priority to accessibility for commercial transport as a goal.

For their part, Sandnes and Stavanger Municipalities have had more comments on the existing toll system in the past year than comments on project prioritisation. As mentioned in section 5.1, Sandnes Municipality proposed in a Board meeting in September 2018 to postpone the enforcement of the entire Agreement until the toll system was renegotiated, a move supported by Randaberg Municipality. Meanwhile, Stavanger Municipality had requested for one of the tolls, on the city bridge where the initial anti-toll movement began in the 1970s, to charge for crossings in the opposite direction as it does now (Åsland, 2018h). This proposal to change the direction of toll charges on Stavanger City Bridge was likely a part of the negotiation process after this, because during the Board meeting on 12 April 2019, Stavanger repeated this proposal and was followed by comments from all the other Board members (Åsland, 2019d). Sandnes and Randaberg jointly proposed that this change is made if:

1. The Ministry of Transport and Communications and Parliament scrap rush-hour tolls,
2. Local members of the Board reconsider toll charges for several neighbourhoods,
3. Electric Vehicles begin to pay 50 percent of the toll fees,
4. The costs of the projects in the Agreement are re-evaluated to not exceed income,
5. The Bus Expressway is built with more affordable solutions that maintain punctuality.

Sola Municipality then proposed to manage toll positioning and charges as a separate case, and Rogaland County does not want to reconsider the tolls before one year has passed, as stated in

the Agreement (Åsland, 2019d). These proposals by Sandnes and Randaberg resemble arguments from meetings of the Political Negotiating Committee on 4 March 2019 that were made public by the media, as mentioned in section 5.ii (Jupskås, 2019a). At the Board meeting on 20 May 2019, the local members of the Board agreed on the importance of the Bus Expressway and echoed the State's concern that project budgets not exceed current income levels. Members are satisfied with the success of the tolls and the fact that they have reduced traffic by 2 percent overall, but they are worried that the number of electric vehicles during rush-hour has increased (Åsland, 2019e). They have a degree of consensus on the development of the Agreement, and rather several questions throughout the meeting considered who actually decides which projects to prioritise and how. Although representatives from the Public Roads Administration explained that the Agreement's budget is based on four-year action plans and on the text of the Agreement, the local Board members expressed a need to improve dialogue with the Ministry.

Due to the hybrid structure of the Urban Growth Agreement in Nord-Jæren, the State has a central role which means that it must delegate resources in the form of information, knowledge, and funding to the members of the Board of the Agreement for it to succeed. Local Board members appear displeased with the amount of resources delegated to this Agreement, and one of the interviewees of this study has described this situation as a '*dismissal of responsibility*' on behalf of the State. Perhaps additional funding for the Agreement would not result in consensus amongst the local Board members. Rather more meetings with representatives of the relevant ministries could reduce local tensions and provide the clarifications that would improve horizontal cooperation within the Board. Currently, a hierarchical Type I MLG structure governing the Agreement is creating a top-down policy process that limits the possibility for local Board members to feel that they have a clear negotiation process. This Type I MLG structure nonetheless receives input from actors outside of it, giving providing 'horizontal' inputs at each of the levels of governance in the Agreement. If this continues, actors outside of the Agreement such as the social movement against road tolls may gain more influence on the Agreement than the parties to the Agreement.

6. Multi-Level Governance in the Urban Growth Agreement

Multi-Level Governance systems require cooperation from actors at every level of governance involved if they are to succeed. Despite resembling a Type I MLG system, the structure of the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren is more complex and has several examples of lack of cooperation that prevent it from being successful. The main goal for the Agreement, zero-growth of the use of private cars in the region between 2017 and 2032, has been set off with a good start as the establishment of toll rings show a decrease in traffic throughout the day. These toll rings have created a large discussion between the members of the Agreement and threaten the future of the Agreement as well as possibly the future of the national government. Individual actors such as the Director of Roads and Minister of Transport and Communications have proven central to the development of the Agreement, and the particular influence of outside groups on these two individuals has provided aspects of polycentricity to the Agreement.

The social revolt against roads tolls has increased the influence of outside groups on the decisions taken by the Board and the prioritisation process in the same. Though the Agreement is engrained in a vertical state-centric system, anti-toll groups and political parties, amongst others, have been able to exert horizontal influence on the different levels of governance present in the Agreement and thus the steering of the Agreement. Minister Jon Georg Dale has distanced himself from the decisions made in Nord-Jæren and criticised the projects in the Agreement there despite having strong influence on the process in the Agreement and the financing of it. One reason for this distancing is the actual structure of the Agreement, where the minister does not take part directly and rather is represented by administrative staff in the negotiations and communications with the actors in Nord-Jæren.

Now that a new Director of Roads will take the place of Terje Moe Gustavsen (deceased), the direction taken forward in implementing the Agreement may change. A more radical change may come, however, if Jon Georg Dale's Progress Party leaves the national government and a new politician from another party takes his place as part of a new government. Either way, in future the Agreement in Nord-Jæren will greatly benefit from improved communication and therefore cooperation between the Ministry of Transport and Communications and the Board of the Agreement. In this way, any issues within both vertical and horizontal cooperation can be clarified more quickly and progress towards the zero-growth goal can be more efficient. The Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren therefore needs more bottom-up Multi-Level Governance, as recommended by the 2018 IPCC Special Report and by Norwegian academics.

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Interview 2 (2019, 15 May). Personal interview with the Mayor of Randaberg Municipality.

Interview 3 (2019, 15 May). Personal interview with employee at Stavanger Municipality.

Interview 4 (2019, 21 May). Personal interview with employee at Sola Municipality.

Figures

Figure 1: [Location of Nord-Jæren (in red square) within Southern Norway] [edited online image]. Retrieved 22 May, 2019 from <https://www.google.no/maps>.

Figure 2: [Toll Rings in Nord-Jæren from Autumn 2018]. Retrieved 22 May, 2019 from <https://bymiljopakken.no>.

Figure 3: [Measures in the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren]. Retrieved 22 May, 2019 from http://www.rogfk.no/strand/Filer-og-bilder/Internett/Bilder_RFK_Internett/Samferdsel-bruk-mappe-under-Filer/Bussvei-2020-filer/Kart-og-bomringer.

Figure 4: Actors present in the Board of the Urban Growth Agreement for Nord-Jæren. *Own Creation*.

Figure 5: Development of National Transport Schemes in Urban Norway. *Own Creation*.

Figure 6: Actors present in the Political Negotiating Committee. *Own Creation*.

Figure 7: Measures in the Urban Growth Agreement according to mode of governance. *Own Creation.*

Annex

Vil du delta i forskningsprosjektet

Masteroppgave i Energi, Miljø og Samfunn?

Dette er en invitasjon om å delta i et forskningsprosjekt hvor formålet er å analysere politisk målsettinger knyttet til Byvekstavtalen Nord-Jæren og Bymiljøpakken. Dette skrivet gir deg informasjon om målene for prosjektet og hva en deltakelse vil innebære for deg.

Formål

Prosjektet har som mål å få innsyn i tankegangen bak Bymiljøpakken med hensyn til både nasjonale og lokale mål. Aktørene bak Bymiljøpakken kan ha forskjellige forståelser og målsettinger og dette prosjektet vil både analysere og sammenligne disse. Prosjektet er en masteroppgave.

Forskningsspørsmålene knyttet til prosjektet er som følge:

1. Hvem ser ut til å ha mest innflytelse over planleggingen av Bymiljøpakken?
2. Hvordan oppfatter aktørene bak Bymiljøpakken hensikten til Byvekstavtalen?
3. Hvordan påvirker forskjellig målsetting måloppnåelse i Byvekstavtalen?
4. Hva må til for å løse utfordringene som finnes i styringen av Byvekstavtalen?

Opplysningene som tas inn i løpet av prosjektet vil ikke brukes til noe annet. Prosjektet er ikke tilknyttet andre institusjoner enn Universitetet i Stavanger og tankegangen bak prosjektet er individuell.

Hvem er ansvarlig for forskningsprosjektet?

Institutt for medie- og samfunnsfag ved Universitetet i Stavanger er ansvarlig for prosjektet.

Hvorfor får du spørsmål om å delta?

For å kunne svare på forskningsspørsmålene er meningene til de som sitter i styringsgruppen for Bymiljøpakken helt sentralt. Derfor får representanter fra alle syv aktørene som sitter i styringsgruppen spørsmål om å delta i prosjektet.

Hva innebærer det for deg å delta?

Hvis du velger å delta i prosjektet, innebærer det at du deltar i et intervju. Det vil ta deg ca. 20 minutter. Intervjuet inneholder spørsmål om forholdet mellom aktørene i styringsgruppen, om mål hver aktør forventer å kunne nå gjennom Bymiljøpakken og om hva hver aktør ser som begrensning til måloppnåelse. Jeg vil ta lydopptak og notater fra intervjuet. Lydopptak tas på lydopptaker uten nettilkobling og lydopptakene blir ikke overført til datamaskin.

Det er frivillig å delta

Det er frivillig å delta i prosjektet. Hvis du velger å delta, kan du når som helst trekke samtykke tilbake uten å oppgi noen grunn. Alle opplysninger om deg vil da bli anonymisert. Det vil ikke ha noen negative konsekvenser for deg hvis du ikke vil delta eller senere velger å trekke deg.

Ditt personvern – hvordan vi oppbevarer og bruker dine opplysninger

Vi vil bare bruke opplysningene om deg til formålene vi har fortalt om i dette skrivet. Vi behandler opplysningene konfidensielt og i samsvar med personvernregelverket.

- Prosjektansvarlig og veilederen til prosjektet er de eneste som vil ha tilgang til opplysninger.
- Notater fra intervjuet vil nevne forholdet du har til styringsgruppen, uten andre opplysninger enn stilling. Siden de fleste i styringsgruppen jobber ved enten fylkeskommunen eller en kommunaladministrasjon vil det nevnes hvilken institusjon man jobber i.

Hva skjer med opplysningene dine når vi avslutter forskningsprosjektet?

Prosjektet skal etter planen avsluttes 14.06.2019. Notater og lydopptak fra intervjuet vil så slettes eller destrueres. All nødvendig informasjon tatt fra intervjuet anonymiseres i selve oppgaven.

Dine rettigheter

Så lenge du kan identifiseres i datamaterialet, har du rett til:

- innsyn i hvilke personopplysninger som er registrert om deg,
- å få rettet personopplysninger om deg,
- få slettet personopplysninger om deg,
- få utlevert en kopi av dine personopplysninger (dataportabilitet), og
- å sende klage til personvernombudet eller Datatilsynet om behandlingen av dine personopplysninger.

Hva gir oss rett til å behandle personopplysninger om deg?

Vi behandler opplysninger om deg basert på ditt samtykke.

På oppdrag fra Universitetet i Stavanger har NSD – Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS vurdert at behandlingen av personopplysninger i dette prosjektet er i samsvar med personvernregelverket.

Hvor kan jeg finne ut mer?

Hvis du har spørsmål til studien, eller ønsker å benytte deg av dine rettigheter, ta kontakt med:

- Universitetet i Stavanger ved Oluf Langhelle - oluf.langhelle@uis.no; 51831508 - og Rafael Rosales – r.rosaleslatorraca@stud.uis.no ; 40631064
- Vårt personvernombud: Kjetil Dalseth; personvernombud@uis.no
- NSD – Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS, på epost (personverntjenester@nsd.no) eller telefon: 55 58 21 17.

Med vennlig hilsen

Oluf Langhelle
(Forsker/veileder)

Rafael Rosales
(Masterstudent)

Samtykkeerklæring

Jeg har mottatt og forstått informasjon om prosjektet Masteroppgave i Energi, Miljø og Samfunn, og har fått anledning til å stille spørsmål. Jeg samtykker til:

- å delta i intervju
- at opplysninger om meg publiseres slik at jeg kan gjenkjennes gjennom arbeidssted

Jeg samtykker til at mine opplysninger behandles frem til prosjektet er avsluttet, ca. juli 2019

(Signert av prosjektdeltaker, dato)

Intervju i forbindelse med Masteroppgave i Energi, Miljø og Samfunn

Tusen takk for at du vil delta i et intervju i forbindelse med min masteroppgave. Formålet med dette intervjuet er å forstå hvilke utfordringer som er sett som hindrer til måloppnåelse i Bymiljøpakken. Disse spørsmål vil ikke kunne knyttes til deg, men til de forskjellige institusjonene som er med i styringsgruppen til Bymiljøpakken. Intervjuet tar ca. 20 minutter og er semi-strukturert. Spørsmålene nede skal lede intervjuet, men meningen er at intervjuet skal være som en samtale og ikke en spørreundersøkelse.

Styringsgruppen i Bymiljøpakken består av representanter fra Rogaland Fylkeskommune, Stavanger Kommune, Sola Kommune, Sandnes Kommune, Randaberg Kommune, Statens Vegvesen og Jernbanedirektoratet.

1. Hva forventer du at (fylkeskommunen/kommunen/direktoratet) skal få ut av Bymiljøpakken? Mener du at slike mål er tatt inn i Byvekstavtalen?
2. Hvilke tiltak i Byvekstavtalen har krevd mest innsats fra (institusjonen)?
3. Blir (institusjonen) mer påvirket av tiltakene i Byvekstavtalen enn de andre partene?
4. Ser du for deg at (institusjonen) ikke kan sikre sine interesser gjennom Bymiljøpakken?
5. Hva betyr nullvekstmålet for deg og hvor stor betydning ser du for nullvekstmålet i planleggingen av Bymiljøpakken?
6. Synes du at det er vanskelig å få til Bymiljøpakken parallelt med andre store prosjekter i regionen?
7. Hvem har hatt sentrale roller i Styringsgruppen og når det gjelder beslutninger?
8. Forventer du at det blir en vellykket reforhandling av Byvekstavtalen i år?
9. Tror du at lokalvalg i år kunne påvirke Byvekstavtalen?
10. Hvilken fremtid ser du for Byvekstavtalen?