

## INSURGENT ATTACKS, GOVERNMENT PROTECTION, AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

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*Keywords:* International intervention, terrorism, fighting, protection, incumbent, challenger, conflict.

*Journal of Economic Literature classification numbers:* C72, D72, D74

*Acknowledgement:* We acknowledge the research assistance from Kate Ryan and Habiba Ben Barka.

### **Abstract**

A government failing to protect against insurgents may or may not be rescued by the international community. Classifying events during 1961-2012, we find that among the successful interventions, war occurs more often than tension which occurs more often than that the government remains in power. Unsuccessful interventions are less common than successful interventions. When the government protects successfully, tension occurs more often than that the government remains in power, which occurs more often than war. Empirical tests show that the type of intervener matters. U.S. interventions tend to cause more successful outcomes.

## **1. Introduction**

### ***1.1 Background and contribution***

The development of international institutions makes situations more common where the international community defined as foreign governments intervenes militarily to rescue governments unsuccessfully repelling insurgents (rebels, opponents, adversaries, terrorists, etc) seeking to take control over a country or region. Examples of motives for such interventions are ideology, humanitarianism, stability, and access to natural and other

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resources. One example is the Mali January 16, 2012 attack by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad for the Tuareg people. The attack was aided by warriors returning from Libya and funding from drug trade converted to military power. President Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted March 22, 2012 in a coup d'état over his handling of the crisis. The Mali government asked for foreign military help to re-take the north. On January 11, 2013, the French military initiated operations against the Islamists, followed by forces from the African Union states. By February 8, 2013, the Islamist-held territory had been re-taken.

For example, in Mali the insurgent faced a situation where the Tuareg people felt excluded, earning according to their view an insufficient share of the natural extractive resources within their territory, and insufficient public goods and power. That motivated the attack. The government enjoyed privileges when in power, and wanted the privileges back when losing power. The international community preferred the initial status quo of stability and e.g. the flow of natural resources which is costly to extract elsewhere. After the attack the international community faced a more precarious situation. The international community weighs the economic and humanitarian benefits of intervention against the costs.

Another example is the Syrian civil war launched March 15, 2011, which involves some insurgents, threatening the government that is in power. The major insurgent is ISIL which annexed territory, and carved out a caliphate or separate state. The US, Russia, and others have intervened militarily to fight ISIL, keeping the government in power.

This article fills a gap in approach, in the literature, by focusing on a new angle to the issues. For example, Kydd and Straus (2013) assess whether the threat of third-party intervention deters or encourages (through strengthening weak minority groups) perpetrators and atrocities. They show that the negative impact of intervention can be decreased by proper institutional design including that the third party is neutral and decision makers are imposed alternative costs. Whereas the common approach in the literature is to assume that intervention occurs, with subsequent analysis of its success versus failure, we assume that intervention may or may not occur.

The research questions are to test for the significance of drivers of a successful intervention. The eight possible drivers are pre-or post-cold war period, former colonizer, power of target country, intra or interstate conflict, intervener identity, power of intervener, type of conflict, and alignment with East or West.

## ***1.2 Literature***

The issue of external intervention into a national or region crisis has been analyzed in the literature.

Carment and Rowlands (1998) analyze the success and failures of interventions based on how intense the mission is, the belligerent's capabilities and expected gains from continued fighting, and how salient the conflict is to the intervener. In related research Rowlands and Carment (2006) assess that how the intervener transfers resources between the combatants and influences the combatants militarily, and how the combatants divide

their resources between production and fighting, determine the intervention's success. They illustrate with NATO's intervention in Kosovo. Carment and Rowlands (1998, 2004) assess whether third parties can bring peace without separation. Regan (2002) shows that third-party interventions tend to prolong civil conflicts. Cunningham (2016) finds that the potential international intervention can deter conflict.

Illustrating with the Yugoslavia conflicts, Grigoryan (2010) shows that intervention may not increase violence against minorities, contrary to common beliefs. He depicts third-party interventions as incomplete information bargaining. Escalation may then depend on the distributions of private information about the level of brutality of the target state, and the third party's resolve and motives.

Cetinyan (2002) considers ethnic bargaining in the shadow of third-party intervention. He finds that external intervention does not increase when a country mistreats a group more. Applying a rationalist approach, he shows that weak and strong ethnic groups rebel equally much against their governments. Thyne (2009) evaluate how international relations impact civil conflict, applying bargaining theory, signaling theory and rational expectations.

For further research on interventions see Blum (2003), Ege and Makhijani (1982), Grimmert (2002), Grossman (1995), Sklar (1990), U.S. Congress (1970), and Zinn, Emery, and Reeves (2003). See Schedler (2007) regarding standoffs. As in Bovenkirk and Abou Chakra (2004), Hausken (2017), Hoffman (1998), among others, one focus is to procure a public good, in the form of freedom with an altruistic intent. See Tullock (1971, 1974), and Skocpol (1979) regarding collective action linked to revolutions, Lichbach (1995) for the rebel's dilemma, and Goodwin (2001) for revolutionary movements. Schmid (2005) and Schmid and Jongman (1988) highlight that often terrorists combine violence, politics and propaganda. Gupta (2008) identifies actors within terrorist organizations, distinguished by their primary motivations for joining the group, thus combining individual utility with group utility. Berman (2003), Berman and Laitin (2008) and Gupta (2008) argue that a terrorist organization derives benefit from the support it receives from its community, through providing public goods and with violent attacks on their adversaries.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) evaluate the economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) assess partisan politics, divided government, and the economy, and Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2008) consider challenger entry and incumbency advantage. Further, Allen and Yuen (2014) find that powerful states constrain international bureaucracies, though further constrained by the interests of the Permanent Five members in the UN Security Council, and heterogeneous powerful state preferences impact bureaucratic flexibility in peacekeeping.

Kydd and Straus (2013) assess whether third-party interveners deter or encourage perpetrators and atrocities. They show that proper institutional design and neutrality decrease the negative impact of intervention. Finally, Benson, Meirowitz, and Ramsay (2014) support earlier findings that alliance commitments may cause moral hazard due to not internalizing costs of actions that can cause war, and show that moral hazard can improve security, deter potential aggressors and minimize conflict risk.

**1.3 Article organization**

Section 2 formalizes. Section 3 classifies events and describes the data. Section 4 tests the data empirically. Section 5 concludes.

**2. Formalization**

Table 1 formalizes a common situation with an insurgent, a government, and the international community. The insurgent may or may not attack. The government may protect successfully or unsuccessfully. The international community may intervene successfully or unsuccessfully. Intervention may involve the military, financial aid, or any application of resources applied against the insurgency. Successful intervention by the international community has the same impact as successful protection by the government, which means that the insurgent’s attack does not succeed.

**Table 1:** Insurgent attack versus no attack, government protection, and international community intervention, causing 15 different outcomes. The prevalence is determined by the 138 events during 1961-2012 shown in Table 2. The coding is used in section 4.

<b>Insurgent</b>	<b>Government</b>	<b>International community</b>	<b>Power, tension, war</b>	<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Prevalence</b>	<b>Coding</b>
Attack	Unsuccessful protection	Successful intervention	Government in power P	AUISP	6	1
Attack	Unsuccessful protection	Successful intervention	Tension T	AUIST	14	2
Attack	Unsuccessful protection	Successful intervention	War W	AUISW	30	3
Attack	Unsuccessful protection	Unsuccessful intervention	Government in power P	AUIUP	5	4
Attack	Unsuccessful protection	Unsuccessful intervention	Tension T	AUIUT	6	5
Attack	Unsuccessful protection	Unsuccessful intervention	War W	AUIUW	3	6
Attack	Unsuccessful protection	No intervention	Government in power P	AUNP	0	7
Attack	Unsuccessful protection	No intervention	Tension T	AUNT	4	8
Attack	Unsuccessful protection	No intervention	War W	AUNW	0	9
Attack	Successful protection	No action	Government in power P	ASP	14	10
Attack	Successful protection	No action	Tension T	AST	48	11
Attack	Successful protection	No action	War W	ASW	8	12
No attack	No action	No action	Government in power P	NP	0	13
No attack	No action	No action	Tension T	NT	0	14
No attack	No action	No action	War W	NW	0	15

The government may remain in power (P), continued tension may ensue (T), or the country may descend to war (W), assumed to be exhaustive and mutually exclusive. War is defined as armed hostile conflict (Metz & Cuccia, 2011). Tension is an intermediate state of affairs where the government cannot be judged to be in power, and the country has also not descended to war. Tension may arise for example when large parts of the population and many collective actors within a country are unsure who are in power, without armed hostile conflict.

### 3. Classification, data and description statistics of outcomes through history

This section classifies 138 events during 1961-2012 shown in Table 2. The data was collected from various sources, including the International Military Intervention Data, 1946-2005.<sup>1</sup>

**Table 2:** History and classification of 138 events during 1961-2012.

	Date (begin/end)	Country	Power of Target Country	Armed Conflict / Violence / Terrorist	Conflict / Violence Characteristic	Intervener	Intervener Power	Intervener Characteristics	Outcome
1	1961	Cuba	Middle	"Bay of Pigs" invasion by US-trained and -supported force of Cuban exiles	Interstate violence -	U.S.	Super	CIA-backed Bay of Pigs invasion	ASP: Cuban armed forces defeated
2	1963	Ecuador	Smallest	Military coup	Intrastate violence between political groups	U.S.	Super	CIA-backed military coup	AUISW: Overthrow of President Jose Maria Valesco Ibarra
3	1964	Panama	Smallest	Canal Zone clashes	Interstate violence	U.S.	Super	Clashes between US forces and local citizens	AUIUT: Complex
4	1964	Zambia	Smallest	Civil violence	Intrastate violence between political groups	Domestic	Small		AST: Fighting between Lumpa Church and UNLP government. Lumpa leaders surrender but democratic institutions weakened
5	1965	Burundi	Smallest	Ethnic violence (failed coup; Hutu/Tutsi)	Intrastate violence - ethnic tensions between Tutsis and Hutus	Domestic	Small		AST: Attempted coup by Hutu units against Tutsi-dominated government results in massacres of Tutsi in countryside
6	1965	Congo (DRC)	Small	Military coup	Intrastate violence between political groups	U.S.	Super	CIA-backed military coup overthrows President Joseph Kasavubu	AUIST: Joseph Mobutu takes power

1. International Military Data, 1946-2005, is compiled by the Department of Political Science, University of Kansas, USA. Also see Pickering and Kisangani (2009).

	Date (begin/end)	Country	Power of Target Country	Armed Conflict / Violence / Terrorist	Conflict / Violence Characteristics	Intervener	Intervener Power	Intervener Characteristics	Outcome
7	1965	Dominican Republic	Smallest	Civil violence	Intrastate violence between political groups	U.S.	Super	23,000 troops	AUISW: Military overthrows newly elected democratic government, establishes junta, and restricts leftwing parties. Insurrection by supporters of the deposed president results in U.S. intervention in support of Wessin regime
8	1965	Indonesia	Middle	Military coup	Intrastate violence between political groups	U.S.	Super	CIA-backed army coup overthrows President Sukarno	AUISW: Gen. Suharto takes power
9	1966	Ghana	Smallest	Military coup	Intrastate violence between political groups	U.S.	Super	CIA-backed military coup	AUIST: Overthrow of President Kwame Nkrumah. <i>Complex</i>
10	1966	Uganda	Smallest	Ethnic violence (Buganda)	Intrastate violence between ethnic groups	Domestic	Smallest		AST: Rebellion by followers of the Kabaka of Buganda breaks out in May 1966 over loss of regional autonomy and tribal prerogatives and is quickly suppressed by loyalist forces
11	1968	Czechoslovakia	Small	"Prague Spring" civil violence	Intrastate violence between political groups	USSR/Russia	Super	Military troops	AUISW: Communist reformers lead popular movement for political and economic liberalization known as "Prague Spring." Hardliners, supported by Soviet troops, crush reform movement and reinstall hard-line government. <i>Complex</i>
12	1971	Sri Lanka	Smallest	Attempted coup	Intrastate violence between political groups	Domestic	Smallest		ASP
13	1973	Egypt/Israel/Syria	Middle	"Yom Kippur War"	Interstate war	Domestic	Middle		AUISW <i>Complex</i>
14	1974	Cyprus	Smallest	Civil violence	Intrastate violence between political groups	Turkey	Small		AUISW: Coup by ethnic-Greek nationalists triggers communal fighting and intervention by armed forces from Turkey. Democracy restored in southern half of island while Turkish Cypriots establish de facto government in north. <i>Complex</i>

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15	1978	Congo (DRC)	Smallest	FNLC	Intrastate violence between political groups	Belgium	Middle		AUIUW: Indepen- dence movement of Lunda/Yeke (FNLC). Episodic rebellions and agitation are countered by killings of political opponents, dissident tribesmen, and prisoners. <i>Complex</i>
16	1983	Grenada	Smallest	International war violence	Interstate war violence	U.S.	Super	Military forces invade Grenada	AUISW: Complex
17	1986	Bolivia	Smallest	Counter-insurgency	Intrastate war violence between political groups	U.S.	Super	Special forces engage in counter- insurgency	AUISW: Complex
18	1986	Libya	Smallest	Foreign Attack	Interstate war violence	U.S.	Super	US aircraft bomb cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. Direct strikes at residence of president Qadaffi	AUISP: Complex
19	1989	Mauritania/ Senegal	Smallest	ethnic violence; forced repatriation	Interstate violence	Domestic	Smallest		AST
20	1989	Romania	Smallest	Civil violence	Intrastate violence between political groups	Domestic	Smallest		AUNT: Complex: Broad anti-Ceausescu coalition (National Salvation Front) over- throws Stalinist regime
21	1991	Haiti	Smallest	Military coup	Intrastate violence between political groups	U.S.	Super	CIA-backed military coup overthrows President Jean-Bertrand Aristide	AUIST: Overthrow of populist President Jean Bertrand Aristide. Establishment of Jean-Bertrand military-supported puppet government. <i>Complex</i>
22	1994	Yemen	Smallest	South Yemenis	Intrastate war violence be- tween ethnic groups	Domestic	Smallest		AST: Transition toward unified Yemen undermined by factional fighting, finally erupt- ing with southern declaration of secession in May 1994. Rebellion quickly collapses when northern forces capture Aden in July 1994. <i>Complex</i>

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23	1995	Ecuador	Smallest	Border Dispute	Interstate violence	Domestic	Smallest		AST: President Velasco suspends Constitution, dissolves legislature, and assumes dictatorial powers to cope with financial emergency. Military deposes Velasco's authoritarian-democratic regime. <i>Complex</i>
24	1996	Niger	Smallest	Military coup	Intrastate war violence between political groups	Domestic	Smallest		AST: Military coup overthrows democratically elected government and suspends 1992 Constitution. Coup leader Col. Ibrahim Mainassara Barre is elected president in seriously flawed elections. <i>ASP: Complex</i>
25	2001	United States	Super	Al Qaeda (Sept 11 attacks)	Interstate violence	US, Attacked Afghanistan and Iraq	Super		
26	2004	Haiti	Smallest	civil violence	Intrastate violence between political groups	U.S.; U.N.	Super	CIA-backed forces overthrow President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. UN Peacekeeping forces	AUIST: Following two years of stalemate between the executive and the opposition-led legislature. President Preval dissolves the legislature and rules by decree. The President uses unchecked executive power to ensure electoral victory for his party, Fanmi Lavalas, in 2000 legislative and presidential elections. <i>Complex</i>
27	2011	Cote d'Ivoire	Smallest	civil war - rejection of 2010 presidential election results	Intrastate war violence between political groups	France	Large	Ground operations; air strikes	AUISW: Arrest of president Gbagbo. <i>Complex</i>
28	2011	Egypt	Small	Popular protests against Mubarak Regime	Intrastate violence between political groups	Domestic	Small		AST: Overthrow of Mubarak regime; new Constitution and regime
29	2011	Libya	Smallest	Anti-Gaddhafi protests	Intrastate war violence between political groups	NATO; France	Super	air strikes	AST: Complex: Overthrow and death of Gaddhafi



	Date (begin/ end)	Country	Power of Target Country	Armed Conflict / Violence / Terrorist	Conflict / Violence Character- istic	Intervener	Interven- er Power	Intervener Character- istics	Outcome
30	2012	Guinea-Bissau	Smallest	Military coup	Intrastate violence between political groups	Domestic	Smallest		AST: military leaders seized control of the government to prevent the apparent election of former-Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior. The military rulers set up a sham civilian administration as a cover for increasing drug-trafficking
31	1959-66	Rwanda	Smallest	PARMEHUTU overthrow of Tutsi monarchy; repression of Tutsis	Intrastate war violence between Tutsi rebels and Hutus regime	Domestic	Smallest		AST: Cross-border incursions by Tutsi rebels. Hutus Official perpetrate vengeance/ massacres. Flight of 200,000 Tutsi refugees
32	1960-65	Congo (DRC)	Smallest	Katanga Civil war	Intrastate war violence between political groups	U.S.	Super	CIA-backed overthrow and assass- ination of Prime Min- istre Patrice Lumumba	AUIST: Gen. Mobutu takes power. Katanga, South Kasai, Orientale and Kivu regions secede from newly independent Congo
33	1960-79	Laos	Smallest	Civil war	Intrastate war violence between political groups	U.S.	Super	CIA-backed military coup	AUIUT: unsuccessful military coup by rebels to overthrow rightist Somsanith regime. Communist Pathet Lao takeover during 1975- 79 with resistance by rightist forces
34	1961-65	Brazil	Middle	Military coup	Intrastate violence between political groups	U.S.	Super	CIA-backed military coup overthrows government of Joao Goulart	AUIST: Gen. Castello Branco takes power
35	1961-75	Angola	Small	Independence	Indepen- dence from foreign domination	Portugal	Middle		AUIUP: Angola gained independence from Portugal in Nov. 1975
36	1961-93	Iraq	Small	Kurdish rebellions	Intrastate war violence be- tween ethnic groups	Domestic	Small		ASP: Rebellions for independent Kurdistan crushed by loyalist forces. Kurds reject government autonomy plan. Large-scale mas- sacres by military
37	1962-63	Algeria	Small	Civil violence (Rebel factions)	Interstate violence - Algerian mil- itants attack Europeans and Muslim civilians who collaborated with French colonial authorities	France	Large	Severe reprisals and repression to terrorist at- tacks in both Algeria and France	AUIUP: War ended with Algeria gaining complete independence from France.

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38	1962-70	Yemen	Smallest	Civil war (following coup)	Intrastate war violence - army officers attempted coup resulting in civil war	Saudi Arabia, U.K., Jordan and Egypt	Small	Hamidaddin royalists supported by Saudi Arabia, UK and Jordan. Republicans opposed supported by Egypt	AUIUW: Republicans take power and form the Yemen Arab Republic. <i>Complex</i>
39	1962-74	Guinea-Bissau	Smallest	Independence	Independence from foreign domination	Portugal	Middle		AUIUP: Guinea-Bissau gained independence from Portugal on 24 Sept. 1973
40	1962-93	Ethiopia	Smallest	Eritrian separatists	Intrastate violence - Eritrean secessionists, Afars and Oromos fight civil wars for independence	Domestic	Smallest		ASW: Imperial regime deposed by left-wing military government. One-party socialist state established. Eritrean separatists fight civil wars for independence. Eritrean-Tigrean coalition movement defeats military-backed Derg government in May 1991; transitional government accepts Eritrean independence in May 1993.
41	1963-68	Cyprus	Smallest	Makarios Crisis	Intrastate violence between political groups	U.N.	Super	Intervention by U.S. Peacekeepers	AUIUT: Disaccord over Constitutional amendment led to intense communal fighting, resulting in separation of ethnic Turks in the north. <i>Complex</i>
42	1963-93	Indonesia	Middle	Paquan-West Irian warfare	Intrastate war violence between ethnic groups	Domestic	Middle		ASW: Attempted communist coup led to Muslim vigilantes and military forces massacre. Indonesian armed forces use indiscriminate force to subdue the Free Papua Movement (OPM) in the former Dutch-administered territory of West Irian. Indonesia invades East Timor and Fretilin rebels fight to regain autonomy, leading to large numbers of suspected Fretilin supporters killed in massacres. <i>Complex</i>
43	1964-66	Kenya	Smallest	Shifita/Somali separatism	Intrastate violence between ethnic groups	Domestic	Smallest		ASP: Ethnic-Somali separatism movement in north. Kenya President bans the opposition party (KPU), dissolves National Assembly and institutes one-party rule

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44	1965-75	Vietnam	Smallest	Civil war	Interstate war	U.S.	Super	Military forces (air, naval, ground units - +500,000 troops)	AUIST: South Vietnamese communists rebel against regime. South Vietnamese government falls and Vietnam is reunified in 1975. Government military and paramilitary forces engage in killings, reprisals, and bombardments against villagers supporting Viet Cong
45	1965-83	Thailand	Smallest	Communist Insurgency	Intrastate war	Domestic	Smallest		AST: Persistent guerrilla insurgency and open warfare between leftist students and rightist paramilitary groups; military establishes hard-line civilian government that restricts political liberties and civil rights
46	1965-94	Chad	Smallest	Civil war	Intrastate war	France	Large	Military forces	AUISW: Recurring civil war among communal groups led to collapse of governance and intensified conflict
47	1965- pres	Israel/ Palestine	Middle	Ethnic war	Interstate war	Israel	Middle		AUISW: Ongoing interstate conflict. <i>Complex</i>
48	1966-70	Nigeria	Middle	Ethnic warfare (Biafra separatism)	Intrastate war	Domestic	Middle		AUNT: Ethnic violence sparked by democratic elections triggers military coup and abandonment of state's federal structure. Counter-coup by mostly Muslim officers from north results in reestablishment of federal system. Counter-coup and retaliatory massacres of Ibos in north precipitate secessionist civil war by Biafra, based on Ibos of eastern region. In response to the Biafra separatist rebellion, the Federal government imposes a blockage on May 30, 1967, that prevents food, medical supplies, and other forms of relief assistance from reaching affected populations

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49	1966-75	China	Large	Cultural revolution'	Intrastate war violence between political groups	Domestic	Large		AUNT: Red Army wars Red Guards in attempt to control Cultural Revolution, leading to arrest, harassment, reeducation, torture and execution
50	1966-96	Guatemala	Smallest	Repression of indigenous peoples	Intrastate war violence between ethnic groups	U.S.	Super	Extensive counter-insurgency operation	AUIUP: Communist insurgents battle military-dominated government forces in protracted revolutionary conflict. Military-dominated governments use severe repression including indiscriminate use of death squads against leftists and indigenous people. Conflict ended by negotiated settlement in 1996
51	1967-70	Egypt/Israel/ Jordan/Syria	Middle	"Six-Day War" and war of attrition	Interstate war violence	Israel	Middle		AUIUP
52	1968-82	India	Large	Repression of Naxalites	Intrastate violence between political groups	Domestic	Large		ASP: The Naxalites rebellion (Kharkhand separatist movement) is contained by brutal repression and is finally overwhelmed by events surrounding neighboring Bangladesh's independence war in 1971
53	1969-75	Cambodia	Smallest	Military coup; civil war	Intrastate violence between political groups	U.S.	Super	CIA-backed military coup overthrows Prince Sihanouk. Intensive bombing along border with Vietnam	AUISW: Lon Nol takes power
54	1969-79	Equatorial Guinea	Smallest	Repression of dissidents	Intrastate violence between political groups	Domestic	Smallest		AST: Failed coup against newly independent elected President Macias in March 1969. He used the crisis to consolidate his power and eliminate opposition leaders, ethnic-Bubi separatists, and potential rivals. Macias' reign of terror ended with a successful coup in August 1979 led by his nephew Obiang, who became chief executive

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55	1969-94	UK/ Ireland	Large	Ethnic violence	Intrastate violence between ethnic groups	UK	Large		AUNT
56	1970-71	Jordan	Smallest	Civil violence (Palestinians)	Intrastate violence between political groups	Domestic	Smallest		ASP: Government crackdown in February 1970 on Palestinian guerrilla groups operating in Jordan triggers intense fighting that ends with Jordanian military victory
57	1970-76	Oman	Smallest	Civil violence (Dhofar rebellion)	Interstate violence	U.S., Iran	Super	Counter-insurgency operation, incl coordination with Iranian marine invasion	AUISP: Dhofar tribal insurrection escalates to ideological struggle between rebels and autocratic regime; rebels defeated by 1976
58	1971-73	Laos	Smallest	Invasion	Interstate war violence	U.S.; Vietnam	Super	Invasion by US and South Vietnamese forces	AUISP
59	1971-78	Uganda	Smallest	Idi Amin Regime	Intrastate war violence between ethnic groups	Domestic	Smallest		AST: Gen. Idi Amin seizes power in 1971 and systematically exterminates political opponents and personal enemies
60	1972-73	Burundi	Smallest	Repression of Hutus	Intrastate war violence between ethnic groups	Domestic	Smallest		AST
61	1972-79	Zimbabwe	Smallest	ZANU/ZAPU vs. Whites	Intrastate violence between ethnic groups	Domestic	Smallest		ASW: White-dominated government fights black nationalists of ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) and ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), leading to negotiated settlement and black majority government
62	1972-97	Philippines	Small	New Peoples Army	Intrastate war violence between political groups	Domestic	Small		AST: President Marcos, confronted by growing class and ethnic conflict, declares martial law and assumes dictatorial powers. Leftist NPA (New People's Army) fights protracted guerrilla war aimed at overthrowing Manila regimes of Marcos and his elected successors. Muslim Moros mount guerrilla war for independence; autonomy agreement largely ends fighting. Militant factions continue to wage low-level insurgency

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63	1973-	Philippines	Small	Moros	Intrastate war violence	Domestic	Small		AST: Moro resistance to Christian settlement and support for separatist guerrillas results in military and paramilitary terror tactics in which many Moros die in massacres and napalm bombings
64	1973-76	Chile	Smallest	Military coup	Intrastate violence between political groups	U.S.	Super	CIA-backed military coup overthrows President Salvador Allende	AUISW: Gen. Augusto Pinochet takes power
65	1973-77	Pakistan	Middle	Baluch Separatism	Intrastate war violence between ethnic groups	Domestic	Middle		ASP: Baluchi rebellion against central authority is suppressed by military using indiscriminate violence against civilians
66	1974-85	Turkey	Small	Civil violence	Intrastate violence between political groups	Domestic	Small		AST: Widespread social unrest leading to resignation of leftwing civilian government and initiated period of "guided democracy". <i>Complex</i>
67	1975-02	Angola	Small	UNITA	Intrastate war violence between political groups	U.S./USSR/ Cuba/South Africa	Super	Military and CIA operations	AUISW: Destructive campaigns and atrocities by UNITA rebels and government forces against civilians leading to civil war. <i>Complex</i>
68	1975-	Colombia	Small	Civil violence, land reform and drug trafficking	Intrastate violence between political groups	Domestic	Smallest		AST: Left-wing groups and right-wing militias. Widespread and lucrative drug trafficking. Government increases military pressure on leftist rebels
69	1975-89	Western Sahara	Small	Polisario Front	Interstate war violence between political groups	France	Large	Air force	AUIST <i>Complex</i>
70	1975-91	Cambodia	Smallest	Khmer Rouge	Intrastate war violence between political groups	U.S.; Viet-	Super	Marines land engage in combat with government forces	AUISW: Vietnamese forces invade Cambodia in December 1978, drive out the Khmer Rouge, and install a new government. Khmer Rouge continues armed resistance until a cease-fire is brokered in May 1991, followed by a peace settlement in October 1991. <i>Complex</i>

	Date (begin/ end)	Country	Power of Target Country	Armed Conflict / Violence / Terrorist	Conflict / Violence Character- istic	Intervener	Interven- er Power	Intervener Character- istics	Outcome
71	1975-92	Bangladesh	Small	Chittagong Hills	Intrastate war violence be- tween ethnic groups	Domestic	Small		ASW: Separatist war waged by Shanti Bahini resists encroachments by Bengali settlers in the Chittagong Hills; fighting ends with au- tonomy agreement, fol- lowed by formal peace accord in November 1992. <i>Complex</i>
72	1975-92	Lebanon	Small	Ethnic war	Intrastate war violence be- tween ethnic groups	Syria	Middle		AUIST: Christian- dominated government collapses in civil war among Druze, Shi'i, Maronite, and Sunni militias. New power- sharing constitution is eventually established and elections are held under Syrian supervi- sion
73	1976-05	Indonesia	Middle	Aceh; East Timor; GAM militants	Intrastate violence be- tween ethnic groups	Domestic	Middle		AST
74	1976-80	Argentina	Middle	"The Dirty War"	Intrastate war violence between political groups	Domestic	Middle		AST: Domestic instabil- ity forces military re- gime to hold elections. Peronist victory ushers in period of political and social anarchy and military intervenes again. Military declares state of siege and death squads target suspected leftists in campaign of kidnappings, torture, murder, and "disappear- ances". <i>Complex</i>
75	1978-02	Afghanistan	Smallest	Civil war	Intrastate war violence between political groups	U.S.; USSR	Super		AUIUT: Daoud regime is overthrown in left- wing military coup, followed by political purges of ruling circles and Soviet invasion. Widespread insurgency by Mujahedeen factions provokes Soviet and Af- ghan Government tac- tics of systematic terror, destruction of villages, and execution of prison- ers. Establishment of Taliban-controlled central government. <i>Complex</i>

	Date (begin/end)	Country	Power of Target Country	Armed Conflict / Violence / Terrorist	Conflict / Violence Characteristic	Intervener	Intervener Power	Intervener Characteristics	Outcome
76	1978-79	Nicaragua	Smallest	Sandinistas	Intrastate war violence between political groups	Domestic	Smallest		ASW: Leftist Sandinistas (FSLN--Sandinista National Liberation Front) lead popularly supported revolution that ends 42-year rule of Somoza family. Anti-Sandinista forces (Contras) fight protracted civil war. Indigenous Miskitos of Atlantic coast region also rebel against Sandinista government. <i>Complex</i>
77	1978-93	Iran	Middle	Islamic state	Intrastate war violence between political groups	U.S.	Super	Special operations units land in Iranian desert. Naval forces blockade. Missile cruiser	AUIUT
78	1979-82	Syria	Small	Muslim Brotherhood	Intrastate war violence between political groups	Domestic	Small		ASP: Militants of the Muslim Brotherhood initiate a terror and assassination campaign against the Alawite-dominated, Baathist regime. Following a coup attempt in January 1982, government forces move to crush the militants' stronghold in Hama in February 1982
79	1979-92	El Salvador	Smallest	FMLN	Intrastate war violence between political groups	U.S.	Super	CIA & special forces involved in counterinsurgency campaign	AUISW: Amid widespread labor unrest, unprecedented levels of military intimidation and voter fraud characterize presidential elections. In face of widespread insurgency, military, security units, and death squads harass, imprison, and kill leftists among clergy, peasants, urban workers, and intellectuals. <i>Complex</i>
80	1980-	Turkey	Middle	Kurds/Armenians	Intrastate violence between ethnic groups	Domestic	Middle		AST: Parliamentary instability and widespread social unrest triggers military coup. Kurds of militant PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) engage in protracted conflict with Turkish authorities in quest for independence, provoking deadly counterinsurgency campaigns



	Date (begin/ end)	Country	Power of Target Country	Armed Conflict / Violence / Terrorist	Conflict / Violence Character- istic	Intervener	Interven- er Power	Intervener Character- istics	Outcome
81	1980-85	Nigeria	Small	Islamic groups	Intrastate violence be- tween ethnic groups	Domestic	Small		AST: Militant Islamic cult, the Maitatsine, battle government forces in north (REV 12/80-4/85). Ethnic competition, widespread corruption and electoral malpractice weaken democratic institution of Second Republic. Successful military coup bring Second Republic to an end and establishes military rule
82	1980-98	China	Large	Uihurs, Kazakhs	Intrastate violence be- tween ethnic groups	Domestic	Large		AST: Episodic violent protests by Uighurs in Xinjiang Province against Han Chinese control escalate by 1996 into terror campaign; government repression ends open opposition. In 1989, government violently suppresses Tiananmen Square protestors demanding democratic reforms. <i>Complex</i>
83	1981-86	Honduras/Nica- ragua	Smallest	Contra armed forces	Interstate violence	U.S.	Super	CIA directs exile "Con- tra" opera- tions. US air units drop sea mines in har- bors. Military assistance to Honduras	AUIST: <i>Complex</i>
84	1981-86	Uganda	Smallest	Repression of dis- sidents	Intrastate war violence between political groups	Tanzania	Smallest		AST: Overthrow of Idi Amin with help of Tanzania intervention, followed by his tribal supporters campaign of banditry and rebellion. Obote takes power again.
85	1981-87	Zimbabwe	Smallest	Ndebele	Intrastate violence be- tween ethnic groups	Zimbabwe	Smallest		AST: Ndebele people initiate rioting and local rebellions against Sho- na-dominated ZANU governing coalition. Ethnic tensions and crackdown on political opposition weaken Zimbabwe's fragile democratic institu- tions. Merger of ZAPU with ruling ZANU effectively establishes one-party system

	Date (begin/end)	Country	Power of Target Country	Armed Conflict / Violence / Terrorist	Conflict / Violence Characteristic	Intervener	Intervener Power	Intervener Characteristics	Outcome
86	1981-92	Mozambique	Smallest	RENAMO	Intrastate war violence between political groups	Zimbabwe; South Africa	Middle		AUISW: Anti-Communist RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance) rebels, supported by Rhodesia and South Africa, challenge Marxist regime, war ends with 1992 peace agreement. <i>Complex</i>
87	1982-90	Isreal/Lebanon	Middle	International war	Interstate war violence	U.S.	Super	US marines land and naval forces fire on local Lebanese combatants	AUISW: <i>Complex</i>
88	1982-97	Peru	Small	Sendero Luminoso	Intrastate violence between political groups	Domestic	Small		ASP: Maoist guerrillas of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) attack government troops, terrorize rural and urban sup porters of government. Facing internal warfare and recession, President Fujimori, backed by military, dissolves Congress and suspends Constitution
89	1983-09	Sri Lanka	Smallest	Tamils/ JVP-Shinhalese extremists	Intrastate war violence between ethnic groups	UN Peace-keeping forces	Super		AUISW: Ethnic-Tamil grievances against pro-Sinhalese governmental policies erupt into secessionist civil war in the northeast
90	1983-	Pakistan	Middle	Sindhis/Muhajirs/ Sectarian violence (Sunnis, Shi'ites, Ahmadis)	Intrastate violence between ethnic groups	U.S.	Super	Military strategic support	AUIST: Violent campaign by Sindhis seeking autonomy; violent attacks on Muhajirs in Karachi. Ethnic-Pash-tuns in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the border with Afghanistan provide safe harbor for co-ethnic Taliban fighters and allied al Qaeda fighters. Government offensives against militants in March 2004 are met with local resistance, mainly in South and North Waziristan
91	1983-	Sudan	Smallest	Islamic vs. African/ Darfur separatists	Intrastate war violence between ethnic groups	Domestic	Smallest		AUISW

	Date (begin/ end)	Country	Power of Target Country	Armed Conflict / Violence / Terrorist	Conflict / Violence Character- istic	Intervener	Interven- er Power	Intervener Character- istics	Outcome
92	1983-93	India	Large	Sikhs/Kashmiris/ Ayodhya Movement	Intrastate war violence be- tween ethnic groups	Domestic	Large		AST: "War of indepen- dence" for Khalistan (Punjab and Haryana) in April 1983. Mass protests against Indian rule in Kashmir erupt in violence in January 1990. Maoist People's War Group (PWG) rekindles an insurgency among "dalits"
93	1983-94	South Africa	Middle	Ethnic/Civil warfare	Intrastate war violence be- tween ethnic groups	Domestic	Middle		AST: Violent protests in black townships over poor economic conditions and lack of political rights lead to dismantling of apartheid policies and democratic elections won by ANC (African National Con- gress). <i>Complex</i>
94	1985-03	Liberia	Smallest	Failed Coup; Gueril- las; and Civil War	Intrastate war violence between political groups	U.S.	Super	Military troops	AUISW: Failed coup. Widespread civil war. Government collapses. National Patriotic For- ces of Liberia (NPFL) and militias of rival tribally based political groups compete for control of devastated society. <i>Complex</i>
95	1986-06	Uganda	Smallest	Lord's Resistance Army; Langi and Acholi	Intrastate war violence be- tween ethnic groups	Domestic	Smallest		AST: Langi and Acholi peoples continue rebel- lion with support from Sudan; December 1999 agreement between Sudan and Uganda (Nairobi Accords) ends support and rebel activ- ity lessens for a time but reignites when Ugandan troops enter Sudan in April 2002 to attack Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebel bases. Peace talks resume and an effective cease-fire is implemented in May 2006 while talks continue. <i>Complex</i>

	Date (begin/end)	Country	Power of Target Country	Armed Conflict / Violence / Terrorist	Conflict / Violence Characteristic	Intervener	Intervener Power	Intervener Characteristics	Outcome
96	1986-89	Suriname	Smallest	Black-Maroons	Intrastate war violence between ethnic groups	Domestic	Smallest		AST: Deep-rooted ethnic divisions, patronage, poor economic performance, high unemployment, interference by émigré groups, and serious political disagreements over policies and governance lead military to overthrow elected government. Sharp divisions in the military contributed to the eventual emergence of a personalistic, military dictatorship under Col. Bouterse, who imposed a martial regime on 17 March 1982. <i>Complex</i>
97	1988-05	Burundi	Smallest	Tutsi vs. Hutus	Intrastate violence between ethnic groups	Burundi	Smallest		AST
98	1988-	Somalia	Smallest	Civil war	Intrastate war violence between political groups	U.S., AU, Ethiopia and Kenya	Super	Military troops	AUISW: Rebellions of Somali National Movement. Rise of Islamist militias prolonged the fighting and, in 2006, the Islamic Courts Union briefly seized control of the capital and attempted to establish an Islamic regime. Combined military interventions by AU, Ethiopian, and Kenyan forces succeeded in dislodging the remaining al Shabab Islamist militants from major cities, allowing the formation of a new central government in September 2012. <i>Complex</i>
99	1988-97	Azerbaijan	Smallest	Nagorno-Karabakh	Intrastate war violence between ethnic groups	Domestic	Smallest		AST: Armenian rebellion to secure independence of Nagorno-Karabakh leading to instability, rebellion, and fraudulent presidential and legislative elections. <i>Complex</i>

	Date (begin/ end)	Country	Power of Target Country	Armed Conflict / Violence / Terrorist	Conflict / Violence Character- istic	Intervener	Interven- er Power	Intervener Character- istics	Outcome
100	1988-97	Papua New Guinea	Smallest	Bougainville	Intrastate war violence be- tween ethnic groups	Domestic	Smallest		AST: Bougainvillean Revolutionary Army fights PNG forces to end large-scale mining and gain independen- ce for the island of Bougainville. New gov- ernment takes a more conciliatory stance that leads to a cessation of fighting in May 1997 and a permanent cease- fire agreement in Janu- ary 1998. <i>Complex</i>
101	1990-01	Rwanda	Smallest	Tutsi vs. Hutus	Intrastate war violence be- tween ethnic groups	Domestic	Smallest		ASW
102	1990-91	Iraq/Kuwait	Middle	Gulf War	Interstate war violence	U.S.	Super	Naval blockade, air strikes, troops attacks in occupied Kuwait	AUISW: <i>Complex</i>
103	1990-95	Mali	Smallest	Tuareg Rebellion	Intrastate violence be- tween ethnic groups	Domestic	Smallest		ASP
104	1991-02	Sierra Leone	Smallest	RUF/Mende	Intrastate war violence between political groups	ECOWAS	Middle		AUISP: Revolutionary United Front (RUF) mobilizes rural peoples, mainly Temne, in armed rebellion that devastates much of country. Vari- ous peace agreements and strong international pressure eventually lead to an end of fighting and disarmament of the RUF rebels
105	1991-04	Algeria	Small	Islamic militants	Intrastate war violence between political groups	Domestic	Small		AST: Tensions between Islamic militants and military-government
106	1991-93	Bhutan	Smallest	Lhotshampas rebellion	Intrastate violence be- tween ethnic groups	Domestic	Smallest		AUISP: Forced repa- triation of Lhotshampas (ethnic-Nepalese). <i>Complex</i>
107	1991-93	Georgia	Small	Abkhazians-Ossetians	Intrastate war violence be- tween ethnic groups	Russia	Super	Military and political support to Abkhaz and South Os- setian.	AUISW: Abkhaz and South Ossetian regional governments fight for independence. While ethnic wars are underway, ousted Pres. Gamsakhurdia fights an unsuccessful civil war. <i>Complex</i>

Date (begin/end)	Country	Power of Target Country	Armed Conflict / Violence / Terrorist	Conflict / Violence Characteristic	Intervener	Intervener Power	Intervener Characteristics	Outcome
108 1991-93	Kenya	Small	Kalenjin, Masai, Kikuyu, Luo	Intrastate violence between ethnic groups	Domestic	Small		AST: Kalenjin and Masai supporters of the government are encouraged in attacks aimed at driving Kikuyu, Luo, and other rival groups from their villages in highlands
109 1991-94	Djibouti	Small	FRUD Rebellion	Intrastate war violence between political groups	France	Large	Military troops	AUISW: A rebellion led by the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), comprised mainly of ethnic-Afars, breaks out in November 1991. Government offensive in July 1993, supported by French forces, recaptures much of the territory controlled by rebels. A formal peace agreement is concluded in December 1994. FRUD registered as a political party. <i>Complex</i>
110 1991-95	Croatia	Smallest	Serbs ethnic war	Intrastate war violence between ethnic groups	UN Peacekeeping forces	Super		AUISW: Serbs in eastern Croatia and Krajina fight newly independent Croat government for autonomy. <i>Complex</i>
111 1991-97	Moldova	Smallest	Trans-Dniester Russians	Intrastate violence between ethnic groups	None	None		ASP: President Snegur attempts to forcibly disarm Gagauz and Russian (Trans-Dniestr) ethnic militias. A more conciliatory strategy is adopted in December and violence subsides in political stalemate
112 1992-+12	Congo (DRC)	Smallest	Ethnic/Civil warfare	Intrastate violence between ethnic groups	U.S., Rwanda, Uganda, UN Peacekeeping Forces	Super	Marines involved in operations in Eastern region	AUIUT: Communal and ethnic violence. Dissatisfaction with policies of nascent Kabila regime leading to the polarization of ethnic-militias, failure of central authority, and the widening of the conflict to include armed forces from regional states. Power-sharing agreement reestablishes central authority in July 2003. <i>Complex</i>

Date (begin/end)	Country	Power of Target Country	Armed Conflict / Violence / Terrorist	Conflict / Violence Characteristic	Intervener	Intervener Power	Intervener Characteristics	Outcome
113 1992-95	Bosnia/ Herzegovina	Smallest	Serbs, Croats, Muslims	Intrastate war violence between ethnic groups	U.S.	Super	Active military involvement (air and ground forces)	AUISW: The breakup of the Yugoslav Federation leads to ethnonational conflict among Serb, Croat, and Muslim inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina and failure of central authority. Muslim residents of Bosnia are subject to "ethnic cleansing" mainly by Serb and some Croat forces. Dayton peace accord ends fighting; central government established under international supervision. <i>Complex</i>
114 1992-98	Tajikistan	Smallest	Civil warfare	Intrastate war violence between political groups	Domestic	Smallest		AST: Post-Soviet government transition halted as civil war plagues ethnically and regionally diverse country. Most of the fighting decreases with 1997 peace accord and largely ends by December 1998. <i>Complex</i>
115 1992-99	Egypt	Middle	Islamic militants	Intrastate violence between political groups	Domestic	Middle		AST: Terror campaign by militant Islamic groups against secular government
116 1992-99	Senegal	Smallest	Casamance	Intrastate violence between ethnic groups	Domestic	Smallest		ASP: Violence increases in Casamance region as Casamancais (MFDC) rebels intensify separatist campaign. Government talks with Movement of Casamance Democratic Forces (MFDC) produce December 1999 ceasefire
117 1994-96	Haiti	Smallest	Military coup	Intrastate violence between political groups	U.S.	Super	Troops depose military rulers and restore President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to office	AUIST: Military rulers deposed and President Aristide back in office.

Date (begin/end)	Country	Power of Target Country	Armed Conflict / Violence / Terrorist	Conflict / Violence Characteristic	Intervener	Intervener Power	Intervener Characteristics	Outcome
118 1994-96	Russia	Super	Chechnya Secession	Intrastate war violence between ethnic groups	Domestic	Super		AST: Provisional Council of Chechnya attempts a coup to oust nationalist leader of Chechnya, President Dudayev. Civil war ensues and Russian troops are called in to restore order. Intense fighting results in military stalemate; truce agreement is reached in August 1996
119 1996-06	Nepal	Smallest	UPF "People's War"	Intrastate war violence between political groups	Domestic	Smallest		AST: Armed insurrection. Assassinations of Nepalese royal family. State of emergency declared in 2001. Civilian government reinstated in 2006
120 1996-97	Albania	Smallest	Pyramid Schemes	Intrastate violence between political groups	Domestic	Smallest		AST: Third post-Communist parliamentary elections are marked by bloody police repression and electoral fraud. Collapse of pyramid investment schemes. Tension is defused somewhat when Barisha is forced to resign and new elections are called. <i>Complex</i>
121 1998-03	Iraq	Middle	International violence	Interstate violence	U.S.; UK	Super		AUIST
122 1998-2003	Guinea-Bissau	Smallest	Attempted coup	Intrastate war violence between political groups	Domestic	Smallest		AST: Civil war breaks out when President Vieira dismisses General Mane and rebel soldiers. On May 7, 1999 President Vieira and his government are ousted by rebel factions. A transitional government is established and Yalla is elected president in January 2000. Instability persists as Gen. Mane is killed following a coup attempt in late 2000 and President Yalla is ousted in September 2003 coup led by Gen. Seabre
123 1998-99	Yugoslavia	Middle	Kosovar Albanians	Intrastate war violence between ethnic groups	NATO	Super	NATO air strikes and blockade	AUISW: Slovenes and Croats fight wars of independence against Yugoslav federal troops. <i>Complex</i>



	Date (begin/end)	Country	Power of Target Country	Armed Conflict / Violence / Terrorist	Conflict / Violence Characteristic	Intervener	Intervener Power	Intervener Characteristics	Outcome
124	1999-06	Russia	Super	Chechnya Secession II	Intrastate war violence between ethnic groups	Domestic	Super		AST: Attempts by Chechen fighters to extend control to neighboring Dagestan in August 1999 trigger new war in Chechnya as Russian forces attempt to impose central authority over the autonomous province
125	2000-05	Cote d'Ivoire	Smallest	civil war	Intrastate war violence between political groups	Domestic	Smallest		AST
126	2001-03	CAR	Smallest	Bozize loyalists; coup	Intrastate violence between political groups	Domestic	Smallest		AST
127	2001-	Afghanistan	Small	Taliban, Al Qaeda	Interstate war violence	U.S., UK, France	Super	Air attacks and ground operations	AUIST: Ouster of Taliban regime and hunt for Al Qaeda. New regime. <i>Complex</i>
128	2003-10	Iraq	Middle	Foreign Attack	Interstate war violence	U.S.	Super	Ground, air and naval forces	AUISW: Oust Saddam Hussein / Ba'athist regime; sectarian strife (Sunnis, Shias, Kurds, Al Qaeda). <i>Complex</i>
129	2004-	Yemen	Smallest	Al-Huthi in Sadaa; Anti-Saleh demonstrations; southern separatists; army mutiny; clan rivalry; and al Qaeda militants	Intrastate violence between political groups	U.S.	Super		AUISW: Followers of dissident cleric Husain Badr al-Din al-Huthi create a stronghold in Saada; government forces attack In June 2004. Widespread discontent with the regime of President Ali Abdullah Saleh sparks major demonstrations beginning in late January 2011. Militants associated with al Qaeda of the Arabia Peninsula (AQAP) complicate local dynamics and trigger a US military response. <i>Complex</i>
130	2005-10	Chad	Smallest	Anti-Deby regime	Intrastate war violence between political groups	Domestic	Smallest		ASW
131	2005-	CAR	Smallest	APRD, UFDR, and Seleka rebels	Intrastate war violence between ethnic groups	CEMAC members	Smallest		AST

Date (begin/end)	Country	Power of Target Country	Armed Conflict / Violence / Terrorist	Conflict / Violence Characteristic	Intervener	Intervener Power	Intervener Characteristics	Outcome
132 2006-	Mexico	Middle	Federal Army/Police offensive against drug cartels and corrupt police/officials	Intrastate violence between political groups	Domestic	Middle		ASP: President Calderon deployed federal law enforcement personnel and federal troops in an attempt to control increasingly violent competition among drug traffickers enabled by corrupt local authorities, particularly in areas bordering the United States
133 2006-	Nigeria	Small	Boko Haram Rebellion in North region	Intrastate violence between political groups	Domestic	Small		AST: Systematic attacks on oil infrastructure, especially in Delta region. Emergence of "Boko Haram" Islamic militancy in the northeast triggers a government crackdown in July 2009; militants reorganize and continue attacks
134 2007-	Ethiopia/Somalia	Smallest	Somalis (ONLF) and Oromo (OLF) militants	Intrastate violence between ethnic groups	Domestic	Smallest		ASW: Ethiopia's invasion of southern Somalia in support of the transitional national government triggers a backlash in the ethnic-Somali Ogaden region. Government forces launch offensive against rebels in June 2007
135 2008-	Russia	Super	Islamist militants in Eastern Transcaucasus region	Intrastate violence between ethnic groups	Domestic	Super		AST: Islamist militants in the eastern Trans-Caucasus region of Russia bordering on Georgia (Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia) regrouped and have been conducting systematic and sustained attacks in the region since May 2008
136 2009-	South Sudan	Smallest	Rebel militias; Lou Nuer and Murle	Intrastate violence between ethnic groups	Domestic	Smallest		AST
137 2011-	Syria	Middle	Popular protests, regime crackdown, and ethnic warfare	Interstate war/US/Russia/Turkey violence between ethnic groups		Super		AUIUW
138 2012-2013	Mali	Smallest	MNLA, Ansa Dine, Azawad separatists	Intrastate violence between political groups	France; Chad; UN Peacekeeping Forces	Super	Air strikes, ground operations	AUISP

**Source:** African Development Bank, International Military Interventions (University of Kansas, USA), and various sources.

For each event we specify year, country, conflict, characteristics, intervener, intervener characteristics, and outcome. The rightmost outcome column classifies each event into one of the 15 outcomes in Table 1 where the insurgent attacks. We have not chosen events giving the three outcomes where the insurgent does not attack.

The prevalence of the 15 outcomes is shown in column 2 from the right in Table 1. Remarkably, among the successful interventions, war (AUISW, 30) occurs more often than tension (AUIST, 15) which occurs more often than that the government remains in power (AUISP, 6, e.g. the 2012 Mali insurgency described in the introduction). This suggests that the intervener should be especially concerned about laying the groundwork for a proper aftermath of a successful intervention. Unsuccessful interventions are less common ( $5 + 6 + 3 = 14$ ) than successful interventions ( $6 + 14 + 30 = 50$ ). We have identified only four events, AUNT causing tension, where the government protects unsuccessfully followed by no intervention. Several such events may exist, but without intervention they get less international recognition. For the events where the government protects successfully, tension (AST, 48) occurs more often than that the government remains in power (ASP, 14), which occurs more often than war (ASW, 8).

The power of intervener is calibrated, with countries such as the US and USSR or Russia falling into the super power category (code 5), and others falling into the large power (code 4), middle power (code 3), small power (code 2), and smallest power (code 1). This calibration is based on the Cox-Jacobson Power Scale adapted in Table 3 from Cox and Jacobson (1973, pp. 437-443) and Butterworth (1976, p. 486). Table 4 provides more details on the frequency of various variables.

**Table 3:** Cox-Jacobson Power Scale

Country	1945-55	1956-61	1961-
U.S.	super	super	super
U.S.S.R.	super	super	super
China (Peking)	large	large	large
France	large	large	large
West Germany	middle	large	large
U.K.	large	large	large
Japan	middle	middle	large
India	middle	large	large
Italy	middle	middle	large
Canada	middle	middle	large
Sweden	middle	middle	middle
Switzerland	middle	middle	middle
Argentina	small	middle	middle
Australia	middle	middle	middle
Brazil	middle	middle	middle
South Africa	small	middle	middle
Belgium	middle	middle	middle

Country	1945-55	1956-61	1961-
Denmark	small	small	middle
Indonesia	middle	middle	middle
Netherlands	small	middle	middle
Poland	small	small	middle
Spain	middle	middle	middle
Austria	small	small	middle
Cuba	small	small	middle
East Germany	small	small	middle
Israel	small	small	middle
Mexico	small	middle	middle
Norway	small	small	middle
Pakistan	small	small	middle
U.A.R.	small	small	middle
Yugoslavia	small	small	middle
Czechoslovakia	small	small	small
Finland	small	small	small
New Zealand	small	small	small
Philippines	small	small	small
Turkey	small	small	small
Venezuela	small	small	small
Nigeria	small	small	small
Luxembourg	small	small	small
All Others	smallest	smallest	smallest

**Source:** Cox and Jacobson (1973, pp. 437-443) and Butterworth (1976, p. 486).

**Table 4:** Descriptive statistics(frequency): Interventions Data

Variable and Frequency											Total
	AUI SP	AUI ST	AUI SW	AUI UP	AUI UT	AUI UW	AUNT	ASP	AST	ASW	
Outcome	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	10	11	12	
Frequency	6	14	30	5	6	3	4	14	48	8	138
Pre/Post Cold War	0	1	9								
Frequency	77	50	11								138
Coloniser or Not	0	1	9								
Frequency	128	7	3								138
Target Country Power	1	2	3	4	5						

Variable and Frequency										Total	
	AUISP	AUIST	AUISW	AUIUP	AUIUT	AUIUW	AUNT	ASP	AST		ASW
Frequency	87	23	21	3	4						138
Intra/intercountry conflict	1	2									
Frequency	118	20									138
Intervener Identity	1	2	3								
Frequency	69	29	40								138
Intervener Power	1	2	3	4	5	9					
Frequency	43	15	18	7	52	3					138
Type of Conflict	1	2	3								
Frequency	84	49	5								138
Alignment of Target government	1	2	9								
Frequency	30	33	75								138

LEGEND: Outcome: AUISP(1), AUISIT(2), AUISW(3), AUIUP(4), AUIUT(5), AUIUW(6), AUNP(7), AUNT(8), AUNW(9), ASP(10), AST(11), ASW(12), NP(13), NT(14), NW(15)

Pre/Post Cold War: Pre-Cold War(1), Post-World war(2), Both Pre- and Post Cold War(9);

Colonizer of Not: Colonizer(1), Not Colonizer(0), Not known(9);

Target Country Power: Super(5), Large(4), Middle(3), Small(2), Smallest(1);

Intervener Country Power: Super(5), Large(4), Middle(3), Small(2), Smallest(1); Not classified(9)

Type of Conflict: Intra-country(1), Inter-country(2);

Intervener Identity: US(3); Other international country or Multilateral institution(2), Domestic(1)

Target Country Government Alignment: West(1), East/Russia/China(2), Not Known(9)

From Table 4, among the 138 events, most of the interventions occurred pre-cold war (77) compared to 50 during the post-cold war period, and only 11 events straddle both periods. Most of the interventions, i.e. 69, were conducted by the US, while 29 were conducted by other countries and international bodies. Forty of the interventions were conducted by the domestic government on a domestic conflict situation. Clearly, most interventions, i.e., 120, were not conducted by the former colonizer, and only 7 were conducted by the former colonizer. Looking at the power of the intervener, most of the interventions were from a small country onto another small country or smallest country (52). Super power countries intervened in 43 of the events out of 138. Most interventions targeted the smallest countries in terms of power (87 out of 138). The majority of events involved intra-country conflict (114 out of 138). On the type of conflict, most events involved military conflict, war and civil conflict (84). Violent insurrections were 49 in total. As to whether the governments in the target country were aligned to the West or East or indeterminate, it turns out that most

events were indeterminate (75 out of 138). Those that were explicitly either aligned to the East or West were almost even, at 30 and 33 out of 138, respectively.

#### 4. Empirical testing

In this section we test for significance of drivers of a successful intervention such as type of conflict, conflict characteristics, and the intervener. We also test if the time period is important in terms of Cold War vs Post Cost era, with 1989 as the watershed date for the end of the cold War era. This tests the hypothesis that a Western power in the intervention decision may have been driven by ideological reasons hinged on the Cold War. We also test if the government of the country intervened against is aligned to the West (US, Nato and Allies) or East (Soviet Union, Russia, China) or other. Such alignment could be a determinant of the nature of the intervention. We also test if the intervener is a former colonialist of the target country. This could be a decision driver for example because former colonialists may prefer to protect historical and legacy interests in the target country. In Table 2, the former colonialist is coded as 1, or as 9 if not. Each of these were codified. From Table 2, the type of conflict is a military coup and coded as 1, civil war and violence is coded as 2, and international war is coded as 3. The conflict characteristics are intrastate conflict coded as 1 and interstate conflict coded as 2. The intervener is coded as 3 for the U.S., 2 for other international or multinational intervener, and 1 for domestic government intervention.

The 15 intervention outcomes in Table 1 were also coded as follows, also shown in the rightmost column in Table 1: AUISP = 1, AUIST = 2, AUISW = 3, AUIUP = 4, AUIUT = 5, AUIUW = 6, AUNP = 7, AUNT = 8, AUNW = 9, ASP = 10, AST = 11, ASW = 12, NP = 13, NT = 14, NW = 15. Using these codes, a regression was estimated with the intervention outcome as the dependent variable and the drivers as type of conflict, conflict characteristics and the type of intervener. The results are in Table 5.

**Table 5:** Drivers of intervention outcomes (regression results)

Variable	Coefficient	t-value	Significance
Constant	12.833	13.060***	0.000
Pre-or Post-Cold War Period	-0.167	-1.839*	0.068
Former Colonizer	0.119	0.811	0.419
Power of Target Country	0.513	2.544***	0.012
Intra or Interstate Conflict	-1.040	-1.827*	0.070
Intervener Identity	-3.020	-9.279***	0.000
Power of Intervener	-0.269	-1.967**	0.051
Type of Conflict	0.743	2.136**	0.035
Alignment with East or West	0.013	0.221	0.826

R-Squared is 0.719; Adjusted R-Squared is 0.701; (\*) Significant at 10%, (\*\*) Significant at 5%; (\*\*\*) Significant at 1%.

From Table 5 and the direction of coding, the most important variable driving a successful intervention is the identity of intervener, with a coefficient significant at the 1% level.

The type of conflict and conflict characteristics are not significant for the outcome. If the intervener is the U.S., the outcome more likely becomes successful. Intervention by the domestic government and the multinational efforts is less successful than U.S. intervention. It is not immediately obvious why a U.S. led intervention yields more success. We hypothesize that the success is due to the intervention strategy and resources behind it. To our knowledge empirics about the resource amount used in interventions do not exist.

The power of the target country is also significant at the 1% level. If the target country is small or smallest then the intervention is likely to be successful. The implication is that a small target country is most likely to subdued by the intervener who then determines the outcome of the conflict.

The power of the intervener is significant at the 5% level as shown in Table 5. If it is a superpower like the US or Russia or NATO, or indeed a large power such as France or India, then the outcome is most likely to be successful. Power here would capture the resource endowment of the intervener.

The type of conflict has an impact on the outcome, and is significant at the 5% level. It matters whether the conflict is military/civil war one, or mere violence or international war.

The period of the intervention matters at the 10% level, as to whether it was before or after the cold war period (pre or post 1989). The negative coefficient points to interventions in the pre cold war period being more likely. This reflects the ideological divide that existed during this period between West and East, and may therefore have driven intervention decisions.

The nature of conflict, in terms of being intrastate or interstate, is an important driver of outcomes, and significant at the 10% level. Most of the conflicts are intrastate and the interventions resulted in successful outcomes most of the time.

As to whether the intervener is the former colonizer or not is not significant. Furthermore, as to whether the government of the target country was aligned to the West or East is not significant. However, the alignment of many governments in the target countries was not obviously known.

## 5. Conclusion

The article analyzes an insurgent attack or no attack against a government. If attacked, the government may protect successfully or unsuccessfully. If the government protection is unsuccessful, the international community may not intervene, or may intervene successfully or unsuccessfully. Each of these five possibilities may cause the government to remain in power, or may cause tension or war, i.e., 15 outcomes. The article classifies 138 events during 1961–2012 into these 15 outcomes.

Among the successful interventions, war occurs more often than tension which occurs more often than that the government remains in power. This suggests that the intervener should pay particular attention to the aftermath of a successful intervention. Unsuccessful interventions are less common than successful interventions. For the events where the government protects successfully, tension occurs more often than that the government remains in power, which occurs more often than war.

The results were tested using an econometric model which implied that the type of intervener matters. Intervention by the U.S. leads to more successful interventions than other interventions. This may be due to U.S. strategies and resources applied. The power of the target country is significant in determining the outcome. If the target country is small, then the intervention is likely to be successful.

The power of the intervener is a significant determinant. If a superpower intervenes, then the outcome is most likely to be successful. Power is expressed by the resource endowment of the intervener. The type of conflict impacts the outcome. It matters whether the conflict is military/civil war, merely involves violence, or is international war. The type of conflict in terms of being intrastate or interstate is an important driver of outcomes.

The period of the intervention is influential, especially whether it was before or after the cold war period (pre or post 1989). This reflects the ideological divide between the West and East which may have driven the pattern of various interventions. As to whether the intervener is the former colonizer or not is not significant. Future research should analyze the instances where the international community intervenes to support the insurgent.

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