



MA ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY

MASTER THESIS

*Rhetoric and Reality: Norwegian climate leadership and sustainable development
assistance in the global South*

UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER
MASTER DEGREE IN
Energy, Environment and Society

MASTER THESIS

CANDIDATE NUMBER: 254056

SEMESTER: *Spring 2021*

AUTHOR: *Azra Syahiza Mohd Radzi*

SUPERVISOR: *Ellen Jenny Torgersen Ravndal*

MASTER THESIS TITLE: *Rhetoric and Reality: Norwegian climate leadership and sustainable development assistance in the global South*

SUBJECT WORDS/KEY WORDS: *Norway, sustainable development, climate change, Paris Agreement, climate mitigation, climate adaptation, common but differentiated responsibilities, development aid, UN sustainable development goals, North-South divide, climate leadership*

NUMBER OF PAGES: 108

STAVANGER, 15 JUNE 2021

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my family for supporting all the choices and adventures I have chosen to embark on, regardless of the perceived insensibilities or the worries they may have caused. I love you and thank you for letting me be me.

Special mention must go to my incredibly intelligent and dedicated friend, Thean See Xien a.k.a Professor Rex, for going through the trouble of peer reviewing my work not once, or even twice – but thrice. I could not have done this without you and am infinitely grateful for your friendship.

I must also thank my thesis supervisor, Ellen Jenny Ravndal, for unfailingly allocating time for our fortnightly discussions. Your guidance was invaluable and your patience with my ramblings and borderline freak-outs are deeply appreciated.

In reality, there are so very many people who have been unwaveringly supportive of my studies and my ability to write this thesis – more people than I could list out in this short acknowledgement section. Thank you to all the friends, here in Norway and those farther afield, who have cheered me on and have an apparently unshakable confidence in my abilities. Thank you for the hang-outs, random chats, videocalls and encouraging messages. I hope you all know who you are (you should, or I am a failed friend!) and how much I truly appreciate you. I shall resist from including a hashtag in this dedication (though I am sorely tempted).

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT.....	6
1 INTRODUCTION	7
2 LITERATURE REVIEW	15
2.1 Norwegian Policies - Environment, Climate and Development Aid	15
On Leadership: Nordic Exceptionalism, Wealth and Technology	16
‘National Action’ vs ‘International Cooperation’	18
The Norwegian Paradox	20
2.2 The North-South Divide.....	23
The Divide – The Status Quo	24
Let Bygones Be Bygones... But Nevertheless, It Persists	27
2.3 Sustainable Development.....	29
What is Sustainable Development?	30
What about the South?.....	33
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CDR)	35
3 RESEARCH STRATEGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN	40
3.1 Research Theory and Approach.....	40
Ontology – The nature of reality	40
Epistemology – How do you know what you know?.....	43
Research Strategy – Methodology.....	45
Theoretical Construct– Common but Differentiated Responsibilities	49
Research Objectives	56
Case Study Design.....	57
3.2 Qualitative Data Collection.....	60
3.3 Problems and Limitations.....	61
4 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS	63
4.1 The Oil for Development Programme (OFD).....	64
The Case of Angola.....	73
OFD – CDR and Sustainable Development Rulers.....	80
4.2 Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI).....	88
The Case of Brazil.....	96
NICFI - CDR and Sustainable Development Rulers.....	101
4.3 REFLECTIONS	107

5	CONCLUSION	113
6	REFERENCES	116

ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to examine to what extent Norwegian international environmental, climate and development policies reflect Norway's stated commitments to support sustainable development in the global South as part of the global fight against climate change. The allocation of responsibilities between the global North and South in relation to climate change and sustainable development has been recognised in the principle of 'Common but Differentiated Responsibilities' (CDR). As a member of the global North, based on the principle of CDR, Norway has a duty to address its historical contribution to the climate crisis, and to assist poorer nations in the global South to adapt to and mitigate climate change whilst also allowing them to continue lifting their people from poverty. The examination of this intersection between Norway, climate action and sustainable development will be conducted through thickly descriptive case studies of specific Norwegian policy tools, namely the Oil for Development Programme and Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. This study furthers the discussion of how Norway's international climate and sustainable development policies may diverge from Norwegian rhetoric and may ultimately be misdirected. At the same time, looking at Norwegian actions through the lens of CDR and the North-South dichotomy also contributes to the debate as to whether climate leadership from members of the global North may be transferring responsibility for climate action to the global South, and how this impacts the achievement of sustainable development in developing nations.

1 INTRODUCTION

The detriments of the fossil fuel age and its ill effects on the world's climate have been known to scientists and governments alike for decades. Despite the widely known and acknowledged dangers of greenhouse gas emissions-related climate change (Dervis, 2021; McGlade & Ekins, 2015), the Emissions Gap Report 2019 clearly shows the world's failure to curb emissions, calling the findings 'bleak' and highlighting "that deeper and faster cuts are now required" (EGP 2019), and emissions must be reduced *fivefold* in order to meet the ideal lower limit of 1.5°C target prescribed under the 2015 Paris Agreement (*Paris Agreement*, 2015). Despite the pledge by more and more countries around the globe to achieve 'net zero' emissions by 2050, there continues to be a net increase in emissions and the gap between reality and rhetoric continues to grow larger. As we begin what is likely to be the most crucial decade in turning the tide on a looming climate calamity, we find our options and the time available to take action narrowing, and limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C "requires nothing short of a total transformation of the energy systems that underpin our economies" (Bouckaert et al., 2021).

Presently, all international climate and development agreements recognise the different roles that must be played by developed nations as opposed to developing nations. The Paris Agreement clearly states that developed nations should take the lead in the fight against climate change not only by dramatically reducing their national greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, but by also agreeing that the provision of financial and technological support to developing nations is necessary to avert the climate crisis more effectively and efficiently. This is in recognition of the fundamental principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' (CDR) whereby the fight against climate change is a common cause, but the responsibility of every country in this fight varies depending on their history and development. Countries are still, more or less, divided according to the rough 'dichotomy' of the wealthy, developed global North, and the poorer, developing global South. This division between the global North and South still dominates discussions in relation to climate change, as well as inter-related areas such as global energy transitions, energy and climate justice, and sustainable development, despite detractors claiming that the division is irrelevant amidst claims that the 'North-South' divide no longer exists.

The reality is that huge divisions still exist between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ of the world, and that division was catalysed by economic growth based on industrialisation activities that emitted most of the GHG emissions which have so drastically altered the world’s atmosphere. Furthermore, those same rapid industrialisation activities of the global North were denied to members of the global South for centuries due to policies that expressly obstructed their development and appropriated their resources, including European colonialism. As such, many members of the global South are playing a game of catch up; however, due to the industrialisation of the global North changing our atmosphere for the worse, the same methods of industrialisation involving heavily polluting extraction activities cannot be employed sustainably. Climate change and extensive environmental destruction have made ‘sustainable development’ of the utmost importance to present-day developing nations.

Why Norway?

Norway is a wealthy, developed nation of the North that increased its wealth through the exploitation of fossil fuels, and is thus clearly culpable under the umbrella of emissions-induced climate change. Consequently, Norwegians are the beneficiaries of one of the highest standards of living in the world, with high per capita income and a financial safety net in the form of their sovereign wealth fund. Norway additionally professes to be a staunch advocate of the principles of equality, equity, and sustainable development, as well as a ‘climate pioneer’ leading the way in the fight against climate change. In this regard, Norway appears to be engaged with numerous developing countries in various parts of the world to assist in the sustainable development of said developing countries.

At the same time, there exists the Norwegian paradox – a country that extols its virtues as a ‘green battery’ which produces electricity from almost 100% renewable clean energy, but which simultaneously continues to explore, extract and profit from fossil fuel production. Additionally, considering the high-consumption lifestyle of its people which does not appear to be significantly lessening, does Norway then have the obligation to assist less developed nations, who will bear the brunt of the climate crisis, to implement plans and mitigation strategies to minimise the negative impacts of climate change they currently are and will face? Furthermore, are these policies a method by which Norway may avoid the responsibility to hold itself accountable for its contribution to the climate

crisis by placing the onus on middle- and low-income countries to meet the challenges of climate change?

This thesis aims to explore the relationship between Norway and the global South vis-vis Norway's international climate and development policies in developing countries to evaluate the extent to which those policies reflect Norway's commitment towards the values it extolls in terms of addressing climate change, protecting the environment, and supporting the sustainable development of developing countries. This thesis therefore seeks to answer the following research question:

To what extent are Norway's international environment, climate, and development policies reflective of its commitment to the responsibility of the global North to aid in the sustainable development of the global South?

By undertaking this thesis, the researcher hopes to gain a better understanding of how the 'universally recognised' principle of CDR is being acted upon at an international level by a developed country that claims to a high degree the burden of responsibility as defined by the different philosophies underpinning the principle of CDR, and how its policies capture the interconnected natures of international cooperation, climate action and sustainable development. Norway's policies provide an interesting study of the policies and performance of a developed nation where internal discrepancies attributable to 'distributive justice' are minimised due to its overall wealth and equal distribution thereof, and where support for the implementation of the CDR principle out on the international stage appears to be strong. Norway appears to be a role model wealthy, developed nation with a positive reputation for supporting human rights and development, as well as having a strong desire to assist other countries; thus, it is of interest to the researcher to determine to what extent these Norwegian values are being implemented and exported to developing countries in need.

Norway – Wealth, consumption, and responsibilities

Norway was, at the turn of the 20th century, one of the poorest nations in northern and western Europe, and certainly as compared to the USA. However, on a global scale and relative to countries that comprise the global South, even as one of the poorer countries of north-west Europe in the earlier half of the 20th century, it had been a 'wealthy' nation

for decades before the discovery and exploitation of its oil and gas reserves. From the perspective of the global South, the revenues from its petroleum industry propelled Norway from essentially a comfortable middle-income state to one of the wealthiest nations in the world, both in terms of GDP and per capita income (L. Ventura, 2021). Norway is also exemplary in terms of having a long-standing tradition of stable public and economic institutions, and as a leading example of Scandinavian social democracy. This had led to Norway having one of the highest standards of living in the world, though that standard comes at more than just the dollar cost. The Nordic model is highly respected in terms of achieving high levels of human development; however, the Nordic lifestyle is highly detrimental to the environment. Norwegians' (over)consumption is "four and a half times the sustainable level" (Hickel, 2019), placing Norway at 158th place out of 164 countries in the Sustainable Development Index (*Sustainable Development Index*, 2019).

Norway is party to multiple climate action agreements, and has re-affirmed its commitment to the Paris Agreement. In 2020, the Norwegian government announced an adjustment upwards of its national emissions reduction goal to at least 50%, with a stretch goal of 55%, from 1990 levels by 2030 (M. of C. and Environment, 2020). However, the way that Norway calculates its achievements in terms of meeting its nationally determined contribution (NDC) of emissions reduction may be misleading as the calculation of where emissions 'belong' often means that emissions in 'international territory', namely if the product or service is delivered outside of Norway or originates from elsewhere but is delivered to Norway, are unclaimed. In addition, NDC targets, which are driven by industry and public services, should be distinguished from emissions related to private consumption. The average Norwegian's consumption habits rely heavily on imported goods and services – this means that although Norway may be successfully reducing its private domestic emissions via, for example, heavy government subsidisation of electric vehicles as private transport or providing tax incentives for energy efficient building and renovations, the emissions generated by the harvesting of raw materials, manufacturing and transportation outside its borders to satisfy the high level of consumption of its citizens continue to rise.

Why focus on the global South?

Developing nations of the global South are predicted to bear the brunt of the negative impacts of a warming planet despite being the least responsible for both historical and present carbon emissions, with many of these countries seeing unpredictable and more severe variation in weather patterns (The Economist, 2018; The United Nations, 2019). These climate change-related environmental impacts have serious implications on factors that dictate the growth and prosperity of a society, such as food security, public health, and safety. The increasing frequency of events such as climate change-related droughts, floods or severe storms hamper developing nations striving to achieve sustainable development goals (SDGs) as defined by the United Nations 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development (UNSDA) (Brandlin, 2019; The United Nations, 2019). In a world of vast economic inequalities between rich and poor nations, climate change actively serves as an obstacle to closing this inequity gap, imposing an ‘economic penalty’ upon countries which are already economically lagging due to the disproportionate impacts of climate change (Borunda, 2019; Brandlin, 2019), only to be compounded with the financial and economic obligations of essential climate change mitigation and adaptation.

Ever since the publication of the *Brundtland Report: Our Common Future* (WCED, 1987), which first introduced the idea of sustainable development and proposed policymaking tools to address social equity, environmental degradation and economic development, there has been a wealth of discussion on sustainable development. Norway has expressly acknowledged the role that countries such as itself must take in assisting developing countries of the global South with climate action and sustainable development through international policy tools such as the Oil for Development Programme and Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative. These initiatives were launched in 2005 and 2007, respectively, before the existence of the Paris Agreement and the UNSDA, both of which Norway is party to; hence, it is important to consider whether these programmes remain effective and relevant according to the obligations and goals set out in prevailing international agreements.

The UNSDA as well as the Paris Agreement are the leading international agreements in place at present to address the twin issues of achieving sustainable development and mitigating climate change through emissions reductions, respectively. Both recognise that it is crucial that developed nations take the lead in the fight against climate change

through the reduction of their domestic GHG emissions and providing the financial and technological support that developing nations require for their growth and development to avert the impending climate crisis. For middle- and low-income nations, this involves a delicate balance of continued development and economic growth to improve average standards of living; however, the methods through which currently industrialised high-income nations developed are no longer a viable blueprint for development if the habitability of our planet is to be safeguarded.

How do we discuss this topic?

The concept of CDR lies at the heart of every international climate agreement in effect at present. This construct is fundamental to consensus-building within in the international climate regime. CDR encapsulates the understanding that climate change and the world's environment are a global 'commons' that we all share; however, the allocation of responsibility must be differentiated due to the unequal distribution of historical GHG emissions and the benefits accruing therefrom and the individual economic, financial and human capabilities of every country. The centrality of CDR to any discussion regarding climate change means that it is a crucial social construct to the field of sustainable development as it is recognised that sustainable development is impossible without actions aimed to combat climate change. Therefore, the CDR framework shall serve as the theoretical construct underlying the analysis of this thesis.

In the initial stage of this thesis, various possible theories and frameworks were considered upon which to anchor the research problem. The focus of this thesis is less on the process of policymaking itself and more on the potential difference between the philosophies those policies espouse, what those policies purport to aim to achieve, how much effort and commitment appears to be put forth, and how they fulfil Norway's international commitments, at the end of the day.

A constructivist approach will be used as "knowledge is constructed from human experience as opposed to discovered self-evident knowledge" (Harvey, 2012), therefore only through the exploration of human constructs, in this case through the study of the intersection of Norwegian international climate and development policies and its relationship with countries in the global South within the framework of CDR. The

literature found thus far provides a wealth of information of the individual aspects of the research problem, but we cannot definitively conclude that our inferences are ‘fact’. The research problem is exploratory in nature, hence abductive reasoning is employed to provide “inference to the best explanation” (Douven, 2017). The abductive method of inquiry is best placed in exploratory research such as that of this thesis to discover ‘new’ knowledge about a phenomenon or social event, through a combination of general empirical information, intuition and creativity. The findings of this thesis will add to the ‘cumulative stream of knowledge’ and may contribute to the building of more hypotheses and theories related to the social phenomenon being studied, which can then perhaps be built upon and applied to similar phenomena (McNabb, 2010).

In seeking to explore and understand the interaction of the different components of the research problem, this thesis will employ a case study methodology based on a personalised combination of a ‘structured, focused comparison’ (George & Bennett, 2005), ‘thick’ description, and comparative analysis of the selected cases studies. The use of thick description, whereby a rich description of the contextual setting of the social phenomena is given, is necessary as “we cannot provide the full picture unless we have collected the full picture from undertaking detailed in-depth research to answer our research questions” (Vromen, 2010, p. 257). The complexity of the subject matter at hand not only requires both a substantial amount of detail to provide generalisations and social scientific accounts from the data collected and clear ‘structured’ parameters to ensure the validity of the findings, but also the provision of context, meaning and interpretation of the intentions of the actors involved (Ponterotto, 2006). The comparative methodology then provides further context and measurement as to how the selected policy instruments perform in the real world. The research conducted herein is based primarily on the collection and interpretation of social artefacts, namely government documents, official statistics, and public documents from public and/or government linked organisations.

Structure of the thesis

This thesis is divided into the following sections: Section 2 – Literature Review, which contains the basic debates surrounding Norwegian environmental, climate and development assistance policy, the North-South divide, and sustainable development. This is followed by Section 3 – Research Design and Research Strategy, whereby the

underlying theoretical framework, research philosophies, methodology and data collection are discussed in detail. Section 4 – Discussion and Analysis is divided into two (2) sets of case studies, the first focused on the Oil For Development Programme and the second being Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative. This section also includes an in-depth discussion on the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ and sustainable development aspects of both policy instruments, as well as how they reflect obligations found in the Paris Agreement and UNSDA. Section 5 – Conclusion shall summarise the findings of this thesis and recommendations, if any.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

The following fields of interest form the foundation necessary to discuss and analysis the research problem. It is first and foremost important to discern what the Norwegian stance is with regard to climate change and development assistance for developing nations to formulate the baseline by which to evaluate how their international and foreign policies address those subjects. It is also necessary to clarify how the North-South dichotomy has and continues to affect Norway as a member of the global North in its interactions with developing countries of the global South. Naturally, in any discussion of sustainable development, one must understand what that concept means and how is it currently practiced. These areas of interest are fundamental to informing not only the context of the research problem but also the parameters and measures that can be applied to the discussion and analysis of Norwegian foreign development assistance. For ease of reference, this literature review is divided into the following categories: Norwegian environmental, climate and development assistance policies, the North-South divide, and sustainable development.

2.1 Norwegian Policies - Environment, Climate and Development Aid

On the world stage, Norway is generally seen as a staunch advocate and pioneer of climate friendly policies and practices. It is also perceived as a consistent advocate and supporter of the development and protection of human rights, and by extension, sustainable development. With regard to how Norway contributes to climate change mitigation via emissions reductions obligations, scholars generally seem to agree that there are two (2) competing philosophies in the tug-of-war on how best to address Norway's carbon emissions, namely the call for 'national action' versus that of 'international cooperation'. There appears to be a consensus that Norway is committed to climate change mitigation, but tiptoes around reducing fossil fuel production. To justify this paradox, Norway advocates itself as a technological leader, providing the world with the means for 'clean' fossil fuel production. Additionally, flexible international mechanisms to achieve carbon emissions 'reductions' have possibly become a means to protect and justify Norway's continued oil production. Following from this, the literature reviewed in this section will discuss Norwegian society's views

of itself, its principles and the primary drivers behind Norwegian climate and development policies.

On Leadership: Nordic Exceptionalism, Wealth and Technology

There existed, and arguably still exists, a sense of ‘Nordic exceptionalism’, whereby Nordic states such as Norway strive to be role-models, sharing and spreading their most treasured values and norms, including access to education, healthcare, justice and equitable development. According to former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Børge Brende: “Democracy, human rights, sustainable development and an international legal order form the basis of our foreign development policy” (Brende, 2015). Between the 1970s to 1990s, Norway (along with several other Nordic states) “stood out as generous donors, driven by solidarity, altruism, moral and humanitarian concerns, rather than material interests” (Elgstrom & Delputte, 2016, p. 30).

Norway’s sense of ‘exceptionalism’ has often been communicated in its foreign policy “by a strong presence in multilateral institutions, high development assistance spending and keen support for environmental and social concerns” (Cetkovic & Skjærseth, 2019, p. 1046). Norway, guided by its self-conception as a respectable role-model, and unlike many other developed nations, does not deny its responsibility “to lead in [the] mitigation, adaptation, climate finance and the provision of other forms of assistance to developing countries” (Eckersley, 2016, p. 191) and has in the past not waited on cooperation with other developed nations to take action. Thus, in the international context, Eckersley (2016) posits that Norway is willing and able to play the role of a climate leader, and principally operates based on the twin philosophies that it needs to assist in tackling poverty elsewhere through development and that it is a ‘technological pioneer’ capable of providing the transfer of technological know-how.

In the present day, with the creation of and increased cooperation with the EU, many other states beyond the Nordics have adopted progressive policies which used to be the hallmark of the Nordics. Cooperation with the EU may have resulted in the dilution of Nordic exceptionalism not only because progressive policies are implemented by an increasingly larger pool of countries, but EU policies have conversely influenced Nordic policymaking. Additionally, participation in this larger ‘club’ has also potentially reduced cooperation amongst the Nordic states, with each opting to act more

independently of each other in comparison to the past (Elgstrom & Delputte, 2016). Although the foundation of foreign development aid policies has not significantly changed, Norwegian policies now also consider economic drivers such as assisting the private sector to stimulate economic growth and pushing forward the ‘globalisation’ agenda in developing nations (Oden, 2011). This goes hand-in-hand with the increasing number of Nordic companies expanding their operations into emerging economies. The rise of the importance placed on trade and the increasing collaboration with the private sector in the provision of aid by Nordic states in the past two decades “has resulted in a dramatically changed environment for traditional inter-governmental foreign assistance... This development has arguably given rise to new debates and new trends in aid giving, further strengthening the overall importance of global transnational ideological influences” (Elgstrom & Delputte, 2016, p. 38).

Norway, with its sovereign wealth fund founded on the proceeds of oil and gas which is currently the largest fund of its kind in the world worth just over a trillion United States Dollars, may have the potential to influence the ethics and regulations of the markets and/or companies that it invests in. Being a sizable global investor, Reiche (2010) evaluates how and to what extent Norway may influence climate policies abroad through its sovereign wealth fund. Norwegian civil society has voiced that their fund should adhere to Norway’s ethical beliefs and norms, and ensure not just intergenerational equity for Norwegians, but that such funds are invested according to ethical regulations that reflect their shared values. Norway is unique in imposing a set of ethical regulations to guide its sovereign wealth fund’s investment strategy; however, the regulations put in place are restricted due to other facets of the management of the fund, including the size of its portfolio, whereby limits are placed on how much the fund may invest in one firm to limit its potential influence, the number of companies it may invest in at a given time, and that 40% of the funds are invested in government bonds. The large percentage of investment in government bonds is arguably the greatest limiting factor to utilising the sovereign wealth fund as an ethical ‘influencer’ as state bonds may only be excluded from the portfolio if the country is “formally accused of unethical behaviour, something that occurs only on rare occasion” (Reiche, 2010, p. 3574). Moreover, inter-governmental relations are much more delicate and difficult to negotiate as opposed to the private sector.

Ultimately, Norway, being a small state and one that is highly invested in the EU, needs to pay attention to and mitigate any potential changes brought about by changes in the dynamics of international relations and the global economy (Tunsjø, 2011). As discussed above, Norway may be a small state; however, it does have some potentially powerful tools at its disposal, such as its history as a reputable and steadfast supporter of social equality and development, technological pioneering, as well as its sizable sovereign wealth fund, to make its influence felt on the world stage.

'National Action' vs 'International Cooperation'

Scholarly discussion on Norwegian policies towards climate change mitigation and GHG emissions reduction recognise a shift in the philosophy underpinning the Norwegian government's climate (and correspondingly, aid) policies from the 1980s, when climate change first began to be extensively discussed, to the present day (Cetkovic & Skjærseth, 2019; Elgstrom & Delputte, 2016; Fisher, 2015; Hovden & Lindseth, 2004). Norwegian rhetoric has essentially orbited around two (2) 'knowledge systems' in relation to the climate policy debate. It began with a rather firm subscription, in the late-1980s to mid-1990s, to the philosophy of 'national action' to take responsibility for its contributions by addressing its GHG emissions domestically. By the mid-1990s, Norway pivoted 180-degrees to 'international cooperation' and pursuing mitigation mostly outside of Norwegian borders, fully embracing the flexible international mechanisms created by international climate agreements such as emissions trading and the financial support of emission reducing projects in developing nations (Elgstrom & Delputte, 2016; Hovden & Lindseth, 2004). The Norwegian government has found that this solution is much more appealing than the perceived higher cost of implementing emissions reduction measures domestically, i.e. curtailing the oil and gas industry, as further described below.

There is little incentive to pursue high domestic mitigation ambitions because the process of legitimising such ambitious measures is considerable due to its continued economic, and therefore political, reliance on the oil and gas industry (Eckersley, 2016). Norway's core policy instruments domestically are mostly demand-side policies such as carbon taxing and support of innovation in energy efficiency and it mostly employs "benevolent, internationalist, and sometimes cosmopolitan foreign policy" (Østerud & Selle, 2006, p. 26). The justification for adopting and adhering to the 'thinking globally' philosophy is

that climate change is a global issue and therefore should be viewed in a global context, and it is more important that Norway contribute to *global* emissions reductions in the most cost-effective way (Hovden & Lindseth, 2004). If financially supporting development and climate initiatives in developing countries results in Norway being able to continue reaping the benefits of domestic fossil fuel production, so be it, if *global* emissions reductions are achieved. Norway's present-day policy choices reflect that they have ultimately *consciously* chosen not to make the hard decision of clamping down on domestically generated emissions related to fossil fuel production whilst promoting the development and climate policy actions which suit them best.

As with sustainable development and climate mitigation, the idea of climate justice is anchored in the recognition of the CDR, whereby developed nations are to acknowledge and take ownership of their historical contribution to the climate crisis. However, as displayed by the Norwegian government in the earlier 2000s, the government of a developed nation can turn to international arrangements such as carbon trading instead of domestic emissions reductions without causing anyone to miss a beat (Fisher, 2015). Norway would like to be perceived as an exporter of values and norms, but would also like to influence the international climate debate in accordance with its wants/needs, i.e. "flexible, market-based climate policy solutions together with technologies that enable further use of fossil fuels" (Cetkovic & Skjærseth, 2019, p. 1046).

Norway's advocacy of 'thinking global' leads to the minimisation of its accountability by "obscuring global impacts of Norwegian petroleum exports" (Fisher, 2015, p. 212); essentially, using the 'global' nature of emissions and the climate crisis where it is most convenient. There is hope, however, that Norway may change its stance, taking into consideration that Norway tends to value multilateral cooperation, particularly with the EU. There are indications that external influences such as stricter international climate agreements may influence Norway to enact more significant structural domestic reforms, i.e. moving away from oil and gas production, than it has put in place so far, but this will depend greatly on such international mechanisms being far less flexible with the displacement and/or exporting of emissions (Fisher, 2015).

The Norwegian Paradox

There is widespread agreement and continuous debate regarding the ‘Norwegian Paradox’ with regard to its stance on climate action set against the backdrop of being a leading oil and gas producer and therefore a large exporter of GHG emissions in the world. Under the framework of CDR, Norway has a responsibility to address this paradox as “not only does Norway hold considerable historical responsibility for driving global climate change but it has also continuously expressed its commitment to contribute to mitigating climate change” (Cetkovic & Skjærseth, 2019, p. 1040). The fact that Norway is a small state distorts its actual impact in terms of GHG emissions, as its responsibility for direct emissions as opposed to emissions it ‘creates’ via the oil and gas that it produces and exports, are significantly different. Increasingly it is understood that any country’s climate policy mix should consist of a combination of nationally defined climate-policy goals which incorporate ‘low-carbon technology creation’ and ‘fossil-fuel destruction’ strategies (Cetkovic & Skjærseth, 2019, p. 1039), and Norway is under even more pressure now post-Paris Agreement to address ‘decarbonising the economy’.

Domestically, Norway has few options when it comes to decarbonisation as only two (2) sectors really contribute to GHG emissions – transport, and oil and gas production. Norway has ambitious plans with regard to decarbonising the transport sector, but we must bear in mind that that is ‘low hanging fruit’. The Norwegian government implemented a ‘supercharged’ electric vehicle policy beginning in the 1990s with the introduction of subsidies and other incentives leading to the rapid uptake of electric vehicles, buoyed by heavy government intervention and support throughout the process (Figenbaum, 2017; Zeniewski, 2017). With regard to oil and gas, the Norwegian government and the petroleum industry tout the positive ‘synergy’ between the industry and sustainable energy technologies such as wind power and carbon capture and storage (CCS). In a 2019/2020 White Paper submitted to the Norwegian parliament, the government proposes the launch of a fully integrated CCS project, dubbed ‘Longship’ (*Longship - Carbon Capture and Storage*, 2019). This includes the Northern Lights Project, involving Equinor, Shell and Total, which encompasses the full value chain of capturing, transporting, receiving, and storing CO₂ from industrial sites in Norway in empty reservoirs in the Norwegian Continental Shelf (*Northern Lights CCS - CO₂ Transport and Storage*, 2021). Equinor’s Hywind Tampen project is “the world’s first

renewable power for offshore oil and gas” (*Hywind Tampen - Floating Wind Power Project*, 2021), set to be operational in 2022, and which will reduce Norway’s domestic GHG emissions as the Gullfaks and Snorre oil platforms will no longer use gas-powered turbines.

These projects are seemingly a win for the sustainability transition, but they arguably fall under what Moe (2015) terms ‘environmental pretensions’ and he claims that “no Norwegian energy transition is underway and the discourse on energy is premised upon petroleum remaining the mainstay of Norwegian prosperity” (Moe, 2015, p. 187). The Norwegian government is applying these technologies to reduce emissions from domestic oil and gas production, effectively ‘co-opting’ them to legitimise the continuation of the status quo (Jensen, 2012). Rather than using renewable energy, namely from onshore and offshore wind power, directly where it is needed, they are opting instead to utilise it to remove more oil and gas from the ground ‘cleanly’, the emissions from which will continue to be exported beyond Norway and therefore not be within their self-defined scope of responsibility. On the one hand, the Norwegian state is encouraging the creation of low-carbon technologies, but on the other it blocks the implementation of ‘fossil fuel destruction’ strategies. Therein lies “the central contradiction in Norwegian hegemonic discourse: Norway promotes itself within international climate discourses, while maintaining its position among leading petroleum exporters” (Fisher, 2015, p. 211).

‘Norm-advocacy’ abroad helps to reduce pressure for change domestically, i.e. if Norway influences international climate agreements to reflect, and therefore to accept, their preferred mechanisms then they can continue to maintain oil and gas production as the status quo. We can see that this strategy is already successful as “the existing international and EU climate governance regimes offer considerable flexibility for countries such as Norway to fulfil their climate commitments without engaging in deeper emission cuts and creative destruction at home” (Cetkovic & Skjærseth, 2019, p. 1055). Existing policy regimes, both domestically in Norway and the international climate policy regime, continue to validate the Norwegian climate paradox created by the persistent separation of policymaking with regard to oil and the climate (Bang & Lahn, 2020). There is growing criticism to this continued dichotomy from Norwegian civil society which increasingly does not agree with this course of action. Concerns for the

climate aside, the ‘oil as welfare’ economic mentality is increasingly being challenged with the view that oil is now an economic risk. The oil and gas management regime has continued unchanged despite growing opposition. Oil production is increasingly being viewed as a risk, however, as a deeper understanding of the limits of the global carbon budget make it glaringly clear that demand-side policies are simply not sufficient to keep the warming of the planet below 2°C (Bang & Lahn, 2020).

Within Norway, the unease and reluctance surrounding the “policy consequences for the oil and gas sector have been decisive in making ‘global cost-efficiency’ the dominant approach in Norwegian climate policy, seeking international solutions based on a system of emissions trading and flexible commitments” (Bang & Lahn, 2020, p. 1001) (see also Asdal, 2014; Boasson & Lahn, 2017). In contradiction to the currently popular claim that international cooperation is more cost-effective in the case of Norway, Faehn et al.’s (2013) study focused on determining the cost-effectiveness of combining both supply- and demand-side emission reduction policies in Norway found that domestic supply-side, i.e., decreasing oil and gas extraction and production, should contribute up to two-thirds (2/3) of emission reductions as it is the optimal combination for meeting emissions reductions targets and cost-effectiveness. Norway has ambitious domestic emissions reduction goals; however, they are all demand-side policies such as electrification of transport and oil platforms, and innovation in energy efficiency.

In light of the fact that “the global combustion of fossil fuels extracted in Norway leads to CO₂ emissions that are about ten times higher than total emissions of CO₂ within Norway” (Fæhn et al., 2017, p. 78), the absence of supply-side policies affecting the oil and gas industry is stark and the Norwegian government’s reluctance to consider such policies has come under criticism from many fronts. This criticism extends to the Norwegian government’s faithful support of CCS technologies, a stance which contradicts arguments of selecting the most cost-effective solutions. CCS serves both a domestic and international purpose. Domestically, CCS as a policy works “to reconcile opposing parties of the energy-climate divide” (Roettereng, 2014, p. 6929) by allowing the continued extraction of fossil fuels with the provision of a ‘solution’ to address emissions reduction goals. CCS has become a driver in Norway’s foreign policy as the Norwegian government needs to demonstrate the utility of such technology on a global scale to justify the cost and utility of CCS domestically, ultimately protecting the oil and

gas industry (Roettereng, 2014). This is skilful manoeuvring as the promotion of CCS goes well with Norway's wider international climate mitigation policies focusing on the creation and preservation of carbon sinks through initiatives such as NICFI, therefore upholding its credibility as a climate leader, but is also expedient in facilitating its pre-eminent goal to protect its oil and gas industry.

The creation of 'flexible global mechanisms' to mitigate climate change, first introduced in the Kyoto Protocol and also a core principle in all international climate agreements that followed, provided Norway with the justification it needed to reconcile its dual roles as a major oil and gas producer and climate pioneer (Bang & Lahn, 2020). Ultimately, Norway agrees to carry out a wide range of solutions, i.e. ambitious demand-side policies to reduce domestic energy consumption, increase efficiency of energy systems, as well as financial and human resource aid for technology transfer to developing nations and the conservation of carbon sinks, but refuses to take concrete measures to wind down and eventually cease oil and gas production. It is all well and good for Norway to try to use its technological advances and investment power to sway climate policies internationally, but it should also reflect the same dedication to climate protection domestically. Despite the 'Norwegian paradox' and mounting criticism of its role as a fossil fuel producer, Norway is generally still considered a 'climate leader' by the rest of the world.

2.2 The North-South Divide

The divide between the global North and South presently still permeates discussions in relation to the international climate regime and sustainable development. This division continues to be observed in multilateral and international spaces, and as such the categorisation or 'definition' of a country's status within this binary affects both its responsibilities and the assistance it may receive from the international regime. Extensive discussion revolves around the definitions that underpin these divisions, namely what 'developed' means and by whose and what measure development reflects. The debate also includes whether the North-South divide continues to be a relevant factor in global development or if it has been adequately addressed and resolved. The following literature review will demonstrate that there are proponents for and against the persistence of this divide, as well as those who argue that the classification of the world into these camps is problematic altogether because the dichotomy distorts the real issues at hand and

therefore should be abandoned for the world to create an international regime that more accurately reflects present international relations.

The Divide – The Status Quo

The identification of the disparity between wealthy developed nations and poorer less- or under-developed nations and the repercussions of that gap on the potential development of the latter group of nations has been a topic of discussion for decades. The North-South divide came to prominence in David Horowitz's 1966 publication "*Hemispheres North and South: Economic Disparity Among Nations*", which described the widening gap between the 'developed and wealthy North' and the poorer un- and under-developed South. He puts forth an appeal that the wealthy North should urgently contribute financial aid to and assist the development of the South to address this growing problem. Horowitz's identification of this need is the very core and foundation of the construct of CDR. This conceptualisation is a direct result of how the North spurred ahead with development with little regard to the environment, and a 'clean' future became a priority only after achieving high levels of development.

Subsequently, the North has defined what 'developed' looks like; its infrastructure, systems, standards of living, and consumption levels are the rulers by which the global South measures economic and developmental success (Iqbal & Pierson, 2017). The global ecosystem cannot support the transition of the entire world's population to consumption habits and lifestyles as defined by the North. There needs to be further discussion incorporating non-Western (and therefore non-Northern) concepts of sustainable living and consumption (Hayward & Roy, 2019). The global community needs to move away from the North's emphasis on the individual's 'good life' and take into consideration local values and practices of each developing nation and take more substantial action than those proposed by policies of "[*incremental*] rational, ecological modernisation" (Hayward & Roy, 2019, p. 157).

Another argument put forward contradicting proclamations that the division between the North and the South grew insignificant over time is that proponents of this claim base it on the misleading equivocation of 'industrialised' with developed and wealthy (Arrighi et al., 2003). Arrighi et al.'s (2003) findings highlight that the increased industrialisation

of countries of the South has not led to a proportionate increase in average levels of income in those countries. This is essentially the result of the economic system which created the wealth of the North being locked-in due to structural and ideological mechanisms leading to the “creation of permanent zones of prosperity and depression” (Arrighi et al., 2003, p. 23) and which continues to dictate the development of the South in directions heavily influenced by the North. As such, the division between the North and the South “remains a fundamental dimension of contemporary global dynamics” (Arrighi et al., 2003, p. 4).

Regardless of the ecological unfeasibility of the global population ‘ascending’ to wealthy Northern lifestyles, or the fact that heavy industrialisation has not resulted in further development nor improvement of standards of living in many developing nations, it is unsurprising that they still aspire to achieve what the global North have. It is also unsurprising that they then question instruments and directives which essentially ‘block’ the path to development taken by the global North and which may exacerbate the social and economic inequality between developed and developing nations. The North’s pathway to development is not viable, however, the South views the demands of the North to be, at the very least, hypocritical (Iqbal & Pierson, 2017). The South observes developed nations basically ‘gaming the system’ through arrangements such as the bilateral carbon agreement between the US and China, who together produce almost half of the world’s GHG emissions, and by allowing the “shifting [*of*] its emissions overseas, the United States gets to take credit for cutting its carbon emissions” (p.20). Additionally, due to this agreement “curbing China’s carbon emissions will be impossible without reigning [*sic*] in US corporations” (p. 20), further throwing a wrench into global efforts.

As discussed earlier in this literature review, Norway too favours ‘flexible international mechanisms’ such as carbon trading in its ‘commitment’ to the reduction of carbon emissions. The viability and results of any policies and actions taken by developing nations to mitigate climate change thus become inextricably linked to the actions and efforts of developed nations. These actions can be interpreted as developed nations shirking their responsibility as stated in their pledges under international agreements such as the Paris Agreement and the UNSDA, and instead introducing and enforcing policy instruments “which place the burden of environmental protection on the already overburdened developing nations... [and] These policies keep the world’s poor countries

poor” (Iqbal & Pierson, 2017, p. 24). As shall be discussed in Section 4 – Discussion and Analysis, this accusation of hypocrisy and expediency complicates climate initiatives such as Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative.

The favoured status of flexible international mechanisms in the climate action plans of developed nations make multilateral spaces, such as within international organisations like the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation, key ‘sites’ for observing the struggle over environmental knowledge (Vadrot, 2020), which in turn informs global understanding of the issues and dictates what actions and plans are enacted. These spaces highlight the persistence of the North-South divide as the result of the “contestation over environmental knowledge [as a] discursive struggle over whose reality counts” (Fischer in Vadrot, 2020, p. 233). The imbalance in environmental knowledge that can be attributed clearly along geographical lines of the global North and South can be observed through the evaluation of the types of environmental research conducted between the two sides (Piguet et al., 2018). Piguet et al. (2018) focus specifically on research regarding ‘environmental migration’ to demonstrate this imbalance. As discussed earlier in this thesis, the most detrimental effects of climate change will be felt by low- and middle-income nations, many of which are within the global South. Human migration due to climate change has and will disproportionately affect the global South. This in turn has led to more climate refugees seeking safety in the ‘safer’ North. Even though the growing crisis of climate migration affects the whole world, research into environmental migration is mostly conducted in the global South, whereas the majority of climate science research is produced in the global North (Piguet et al, 2018).

The consequences of the disproportionality in the seeking and distribution of environmental knowledge are two-fold. Firstly, it creates gaps in global knowledge of climate change by not conducting research beyond the parameters immediately important to the North. This results in a lack of comprehensive solutions or resolutions of how to combat, for example, one of the most pressing and urgent consequences of climate change, mass migration. Additionally, the North has framed the discussion of environmental migration to be an “intrinsically Southern problem and as a security risk for the North” (Piguet et al., 2018, p. 358) thus reinforcing the existence of and the adversarial conception of the North-South divide. International climate agreements are extremely important to the achievement of global consensus and comprehensive action

to mitigate climate change; however, they also highlight enduring divisions and inequalities in the world.

The perception of the North-South divide could be an influencing factor in the realm of global (and local) climate and environmental policy, as well as sustainable development, for several reasons. Firstly, if the governments of developing nations are unconvinced that wealthy developed nations are truly motivated to ‘forgo excessive economic self-interest’ at their expense (Iqbal & Pearson, 2017), it is less likely that they will be encouraged to take a global view rather than prioritise national interests. Additionally, these countries may feel that governments of the wealthy North are unfairly requesting the curbing of their economic and development activities whilst continuing to participate in and profit from similar activities, such suspicion being exemplified by the existence of the Norwegian Paradox.

Let Bygones Be Bygones... But Nevertheless, It Persists

Two decades after Horowitz’s work highlighted the dichotomy between the global North and South, Nigel Harris declared in his book *“The End of the Third World: Newly Industrialising Countries and the Decline of an Ideology”* (1987) that the inequalities of the world as described by Horowitz were a thing of the past. Harris (1987) argued that the categorisations of the world, primarily into the ‘First World’ of rich developed countries and the ‘Third World’ of developing and/or undeveloped countries, was no longer valid as the dynamic and increasingly global nature of trade and industry led to the demise of the ‘Third World’. Subsequent supporters of Harris’ stance generally agree that the divide as identified by Horowitz may have been reflective of the era between the 1960s to 1980s, but by the end of the 20th century was no longer a significant factor nor descriptor of the state of the world (Eckl & Weber, 2007; Theri n, 1999). Theri n, echoing Harris (1987), proposes that we must look beyond the North-South divide in a landscape of rapid globalisation, rather viewing the state of world poverty through one of two lenses. The first argues that the gap between rich and poor nations is closing and that poverty is a “residual phenomenon... waning geographically” (Theri n, 1999, p. 725), or the second which contends that globalisation is exacerbating poverty worldwide.

In both these paradigms, globalisation is the determinant, not an ‘oversimplified’ geographical divide.

One of the principal criticisms of the persistence of the North-South division is that it is an oversimplification that does not reflect the reality of international relations or global economic deliberations in their entirety (Baumann, 2018; Eckl & Weber, 2007; Theri n, 1999; T. G. Weiss, 2009). Based on a similar rationale as to why the imbalance of environmental knowledge perpetuates the North-South divide, it is argued that words strongly influence our conception of what is real, which will in turn inform decision-making and judgements therefore creating the danger that with the continued usage of the terminology the divide becomes a perpetual self-fulfilling prophecy (Eckl & Weber, 2007). This underlies the constructivist interpretation of social phenomena whereby the dominant discourse influences the ‘reality’ of the situation and vice versa, creating a self-reinforcing feedback loop. Baumann’s (2018) discussion on the difficulties and failure of the United Nations (UN) to reform its development system to be able to effectively carry out the UNSDA exemplifies how the North-South divide continues to persist, despite assertions of the demarcation being “geographically awkward”, “outdated”, and irrelevant due to “global economic power shifts” (Baumann, 2018, p. 627), yet is a principle reason as to the dysfunctionality of the UN.

The failure of the UN’s structural reform is often blamed on reasons such as technical and/or distributional complications, but Baumann attributes the failure to “vested interests inside and outside the system” (Baumann, 2018, p. 628) which fall along North-South lines. Weiss (2009) goes further to contend that the most influential powers on both sides of the divide support the status quo as it “permits them to avoid democratisation of international relations” (T. G. Weiss, 2009, p. 282), thus allowing those powerful states in the North to maintain their privilege and the ones in the South to obstruct the growth of democracy and hang on to (authoritarian) power, such as is often seen in resource rich countries suffering from the ‘resource curse’. The resource curse is the widespread inability of resource rich developing countries to capitalise on their resource wealth in ways which have positive impact on their overall economic and human development. More often than not “the price of oil and the pace of freedom always move in opposite directions in oil rich petrolist states” (Friedman, 2006), although the resource curse is not limited to hydrocarbon resources. In addition to that, the assignment of a

binary concept to such a complex system creates an adversarial model, which binds each ‘side’ to the roles that they have been ascribed (Eckl & Weber, 2007), be it their choice or otherwise. Subsequently, the dichotomy impedes effective decision-making and action at the international level; however, there is no alternative global ‘world order’ readily available or acceptable to replace the now familiar North-South divide (T. G. Weiss, 2009).

Existing scholastic literature shows that there are proponents of the view, on the one hand, that the North-South divide remains an influential factor in international relations and global development, and on the other, that it has become or continues the path to irrelevance. There are also those who take a mid-way view, whereby they recognise the shortcomings of a binary and oversimplified North-South division, but also acknowledge that it continues to exist and exert influence be it due to social inertia or the non-existence of alternative conceptualisations. At the end of the day, it hardly matters if such influence is progressive or regressive as we can see from international initiatives such as the UNSDA and the Paris Agreement that the core idea of the North-South divide continues to be acknowledged. The division may not be strictly ‘North-South’ anymore, but the express communication of the roles and responsibilities of developed nations shows that the distinction between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ continues to play an important role in global international relations, economics, politics, and development.

2.3 Sustainable Development

Ever since the publication of the *Brundtland Report: Our Common Future* (WCED, 1987), which first introduced the idea of sustainable development and proposed policy making tools to address social equity, environmental degradation and economic development, there has been a wealth of discussion on sustainable development. The Brundtland Report was the culmination of the findings of the Brundtland Commission, which was chaired by three-time Norwegian prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland during her second term as prime minister. Post-Brundtland there appears to be a clear consensus on at least one aspect of sustainable development – that there is no consensus on its definition nor on the best way it is to be carried out. The conceptualisation of sustainable development as being inextricably tied to economic growth, a connection that was promoted by the Brundtland Report, is criticised as being, firstly, paradoxical, and

secondly, too narrow a construct. Subsequent scholars primarily fall into the camps of interpreting sustainable development along either economic, environmental, or social lines (De Kruijf & Van Vuuren, 1998).

The proponents of the latter two views express a lack of recognition in the Brundtland Report of several core factors. With regard to social interpretation, scholars argue that there needs to be a differentiation of needs and cultural perspectives and/or that sustainable development requires the decoupling of economic growth from development for it to be sustainable. Ecological advocates highlight that coupling economic growth with development makes environmental and ecological sustainability basically impossible. In this section we further explore these different aspects of the difficulties on reaching a consensus on the definition and social interpretations of sustainable development.

What is Sustainable Development?

Different interpretations of sustainable development have emerged since the concept was first brought to the fore by the Brundtland Report. The diversity of these interpretations has resulted in the absence of a uniform approach to tackling sustainable development, which has arguably proven to be a hindrance in the workability of sustainable development. The philosophy underpinning the nature of sustainable development in accordance with the Brundtland Report can be most succinctly summarised in the following quote: “Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 1987, p. 8). The report further expands on the impossibility of separating economic development from environmental issues, and is cognizant of the fact that “many forms of development erode the environmental resources upon which they must be based, and environmental degradation can undermine economic development” (World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 1987, p. 12).

The Brundtland Report posits that it is ‘futile’ to address environmental issues without first addressing what the report deems to be the underlying issues ultimately causing environmental destruction, namely poverty and inequality. The poor of the world are

owed sustainable development to meet “the basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to fulfil their aspirations for a better life”, which in turn “requires not only a new era of economic growth for nations in which the majority are poor, but an assurance that those poor get their fair share of the resources required to sustain that growth” (World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 1987, p. 16). Ultimately, sustainable development is a transformation where “the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are made consistent with future as well as present needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 1987, p. 17). The Brundtland Report puts forth that sustainable development essentially means tackling poverty, the underlying cause of environmental degradation, through economic growth.

Both contemporaries of the report and subsequent scholars critique that Brundtland is too vague or deceptively simple (Daly, 1990; Ekins, 1993; Holden et al., 2014; Hopwood et al., 2005; McNeill, 2004; Redclift, 1992). Reflecting upon *Our Common Future*, Holden (2014) notes that the sphere of sustainable development has become increasingly complex and convoluted, but somehow still no political and scientific agreement has been reached on the ‘what’ or ‘how’ of it. The concept of sustainable development “is open to interpretation of being anything from almost meaningless to of extreme importance to humanity” (Hopwood et al., 2005, p. 40). This has led to the real danger of the concept potentially becoming irrelevant; however, it has shown to have an enduring persistence albeit still somewhat lacking in utility.

Economics naturally dominates any discussion on the matter, as it is a long-held view that it is “the key to humanity’s well-being” (Hopwood et al., 2005, p. 39), the rationale being that with increased economic growth the number of people living in poverty would naturally decrease. In order to identify ‘sustainable development’ we must highlight the importance of the difference between ‘growth’ and ‘development’ (Daly, 1990). There needs to be a clear distinction between the two to determine the relationship more accurately between the economy and the development of a society. Growth and development do not necessarily grow proportionately – a society can have economic growth without further development and vice versa. In a ‘best case’ scenario (for human development and economics), a society can experience both, but the “growth of economy cannot be sustainable over long periods of time” (Daly, 1990, p. 1) as the social construct

that is 'economy' is "a subsystem of [a] finite global ecosystem which does not grow" (Daly, 1990, p. 1).

Building upon a similar foundation, but with the opinion that Daly's definition is too simplistic in that realistically it is difficult to firmly distinguish between quantitative and qualitative improvements, and to do so one would need to be able to differentiate between different types of growth, Ekins (1993) proposes quantifiable measures within which to define sustainable development, those being: long-term protection of ecological sustainability, meeting basic human needs, and the promotion of both inter- and intra-generational equity. Nearly 25 years later, Holden (2014) also stresses that "economic growth is not a primary dimension of sustainable development" (Holden et al., 2014, p. 131), it is merely a potential method to achieve sustainable development. That differentiation is crucial to evolving sustainable development beyond the stalemate that it appears to have been mired in since the Brundtland Report.

The reiteration that Brundtland's definition of sustainable development is oxymoronic in that the imperative for economic growth and development can somehow also be ecologically sustainable is echoed by Robinson's (2002) article discussing ideas on sustainable development. The relationship between unfettered economic growth and development is contradictory to ecological sustainability and protection. For sustainable development to be meaningful, we must create solutions that transverse all three principal concerns – economic, social, and environmental – and recognise that each will, at some point, act as a limiting factor to another. Additionally, the responsibility to carry out sustainable development cannot be left only to governments and businesses, civil society at large must take up the mantle as well for any actions to be sufficient at tackling the issues (Robinson, 2004). Brundtland's definition of sustainable development is not only problematic for realising ecological sustainability, but it is also difficult to reconcile doing what is best for the people of the present as well as for future generations. On the one hand, providing the 'best' options for the present will most likely come at a cost to the future. Conversely, it is erroneous to focus on the ethics of protecting the rights of future generations as opposed to, for example, poverty alleviation; however, the former has proven to be more effective at grabbing the focus in wealthy nations (McNeill, 2004).

There are several categorisations and clarifications as to why and how relevant actors within the sustainable development space make their decisions and take actions.

According to Hopwood et al. (2005), there are three (3) principal categories within which most actors fall into regarding the economic, political, and social changes required to implement sustainable development, namely: *status quo*, *reformation* and *transformation*. Those who support the status quo acknowledge that action needs to be taken but does not require drastic changes to society. Reformers go a little further, acknowledging that profound changes in policy, way of life and improved education of the populace of the impact of human activity on the environment are required. Transformationists are adamant that “many of the problems are ... within the very economic and power structures of society because they are not primarily concerned with human well-being or environmental sustainability” (Hopwood et al., 2005, p. 45), therefore society needs to drastically transform to avoid potential future collapse. Alternatively, sustainable development could be interpreted according to McNeill’s (2004) ‘discipline’ anchored proposition whereby actors are either academics, activists, political bureaucrats, or legal bureaucrats. Each category will interpret sustainable development according to the values or priorities distinct to their profession. Ultimately, *how* principal actors and/or society views the concept of sustainable transition will dictate the extent of the changes and the methods of implementation.

In summary, the way a country interprets sustainable development, be it economic, environmental, or social, as well as how culpable and/or capable the current system in place is perceived, will dictate the nature of relevant policies and the types of activities engaged in with regard to sustainable development. Additionally, the decision of where a country’s sustainable development policy falls along the spectrum of status quo to transformation will determine what actions are undertaken and to what extent such actions affect their respective societies.

What about the South?

There is scholarly consensus that definitions and interpretations of the concept of sustainable development are strongly influenced by worldviews. A repeated criticism is that the definition of sustainable development is narrow in the sense that it should take into deeper consideration alternative perspectives, particularly those of developing Southern states (De Kruijf & Van Vuuren, 1998; Ekins, 1993; Redclift, 1992, 2005).

Redclift (1992, 2005) is consistent in his criticism of the evolution of sustainable development since Brundtland. In 1992, Redclift opined that one of the principal difficulties with reaching a consensus is that the definition of and the possible solutions to sustainable development must be agreed between the North and the South. By his assessment, sustainable development policy coming out of the North is too narrow in scope and “fails to take adequate account of both international...and cross-cultural factors in sustainable development” (Redclift, 1992, p. 403).

The Brundtland Report fell short due to its lack of acknowledgement of different ‘needs’ of different peoples. It is safe to say that all humans have needs; however, different societies will have different needs and the Brundtland Report needs to take into consideration different cultural perspectives and practices to meet these needs (Redclift, 2005). Ekins (1993) too is critical of the vague nature of the definition of sustainable development in the Brundtland Report and echoes others that the needs of the so-called ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds are immensely different. The Brundtland Report’s definition caters to satisfying the ‘needs’ of ‘First’ world consumers above all. It is paramount that the differentiated needs of the North and South are identified and the increased participation of the affected populations in their development is encouraged so as to better define roles and responsibilities, leading to more justice in the global economy (Ekins, 1993).

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, otherwise known as the Earth Summit, in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 emphasised the “different but shared interests and responsibilities of so-called North and South in achieving sustainable development” (De Kruijf & Van Vuuren, 1998, p. 4). Key concerns raised that particularly affected the South include pressures due to population growth, widening wealth gap and change in behaviour, increasing poverty and land degradation, pollution, and security. For the world’s poorest populations, addressing climate change may not, understandably, be the immediate priority (McNeill, 2004). Looking back at the development of the field of sustainable development to evaluate its ‘coming of age’, Redclift (2005) observes that the underlying assumptions of the concept have moved from ‘needs’, as identified in the Brundtland Report, to ‘rights’, which in turn have increased emphasis on the interaction of science and environment with social consequences. However, he notes that these assumptions are still based on the thinking

that “civil societies are pursuing the same social and cultural goals” (Redclift, 2005, p. 214) and the “trade-off is apparent in developing countries...[where] gains from accelerated economic growth promise immediate rewards and environmental mitigation appears largely to benefit the rich world” (Redclift, 2005, p. 214). This perceived gap between the necessity of environmental mitigation and the benefits derived therefrom are an indication that the challenge of reconciling the views of developed and developing nations remains an obstacle to the creation of an effective international climate regime.

Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CDR)

The notion that the issue of global climate change is a common cause but not one that all the nations in the world can or should address the same way has been a topic of discussion since the 1980s. The Montreal Protocol of 1989 contained a pre-cursor of the concept, whereby developing nations participating in the agreement were provided with a 10-year grace period within which to comply with the terms of the protocol, combined with financial and technological assistance from developed nations to help them do so. This protocol was limited to the release of ozone destroying chemicals, but it showed that CDR is a workable principle. CDR came to be enshrined more definitively in international agreements addressing climate change for the first time within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Rio Declaration, both of which were introduced in 1992, although the former convention only came into force in 1994. Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration (1992) states:

“States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command.” (*Rio Declaration*, 1992, p. 2)

There are 3 core elements to CDR, according to the excerpt above: a) the world must work together to tackle climate change, b) the level of responsibility in relation to ‘global

environmental degradation' is different amongst nations, and c) developed nations acknowledge the greater role they must play in supporting global sustainable development. Principle 7 alludes to what anchors CDR, i.e., why developed nations have more responsibilities, but does little to clarify what those responsibilities are.

The UNFCCC refers to CDR in the Preamble, whereby parties to the convention acknowledge that collective action must be take “in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions” (UNFCCC, 1992, p. 2). Article 3 of the UNFCCC reiterates CDR as a guiding principle and adding “accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof” (UNFCCC, 1992, p. 9). The principle is again referred to in Article 4 of the UNFCCC, clarifying that the commitments undertaken by the parties under the convention are to be based on CDR. Once again, there is no express definition of CDR under the convention; however, Article 3 makes an addition to the core elements expressed in the Rio Declaration. It introduces the more nuanced idea that nations should act according to their ‘capabilities’ and ‘social and economic conditions’. The *Kyoto Protocol* (1997), which operationalised the UNFCCC and which was legally binding for developed countries including Norway, adopts the UNFCCC’s wording with regard to CDR in its Article 10, which re-affirms the parties’ commitments to Article 4 of the UNFCCC. We can see the evolution of CDR further in the Paris Agreement, whereby the preamble as well as Article 2 refers to the “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of national circumstances” (*Paris Agreement*, 2015, p. 3) of the parties.

By 2015, we see movement away from holding essentially only developed countries legally bound to address climate change to a reflect a more global endeavour. The CDR principle is the basis of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and long-term GHG emission reduction strategies, these elements forming the cornerstones of the Paris Agreement’s *raison d’être* and main mechanisms to arrest global temperature rise to less than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The importance of CDR has evolved beyond just GHG emissions reduction obligations and is expressly reaffirmed in Item 12 of the UNSDA, as environmental and climate concerns are inseparable from sustainable development (UNSDA, 2015). Despite its importance, as is demonstrated by its

reiteration in multiple international agreements related to climate, environment, and sustainable development, it is open to broad interpretation.

The academic literature on CDR is unanimous on its opinion on two (2) matters. Firstly, all quarters agree that the climate crisis is a collective responsibility; the atmosphere is a ‘global commons’ that no one can remove themselves from. Additionally, at present, there is little question as to its merit as a just and equitable principle upon which to operate. Unfortunately, much like sustainable development, there is no consensus on how to define ‘differentiated responsibilities’, therefore leading to a lack of agreement on what each country must do. Even CDR’s allocation of responsibility to states as the actors through which action should be taken is debated as there are other influential actors, such as international organisations and multinationals, that may play international and local roles crucial to the climate change regime (E. B. Weiss, 2002). Some, such as Caney (2005) argue that it is unjust to approach responsibility for climate change on a collective basis, and instead should be addressed individualistically so as not to punitively burden undeserving citizens of developed countries, instead focusing on the wealthiest beneficiaries of past and present economic development.

Ultimately, at the centre of the CDR debate on how to justly allocate responsibility and cost amongst relevant actors are two primary considerations: the international aspect and the inter-/intra-generational aspect. Kline et al. (2018) point out that the “idiosyncratic but crucial feature of the global climate change dilemma [is] the stylised fact that the causal responsibility for climate change is endogenous to economic development” (Kline et al., 2018, p. 653). Following such logic, wealthy developed nations therefore hold the bulk of causal responsibility as GHG emissions are held to be directly correlated to economic development. There exists a consensus that this is true; however, *how* to address past economic development and pollution with present wealth is disputed (Kline et al., 2018). A criticism stemming from this dispute is that the application of CDR is ‘backward looking’ and therefore: (a) unfairly saddles developed nations with the bulk of responsibility, and (b) does not take into sufficient consideration the future of carbon emissions vis-à-vis developing nations and emerging economies (Bortscheller, 2010).

There is the very real concern and probability that BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India and China), plus other rapidly developing countries, will exacerbate the climate crisis. Emerging economies, namely China, India, and Russia (UCS, 2020), now rank amongst

the top five (5) carbon emitters in the world. These concerns are intertwined with those concerning intergenerational issues, such as if and how much of the actions of past generations should be a burden upon the present generation (in developed nations), what obligations do beneficiaries of the wealth of developed nations have under CDR, and to what extent must CDR consider the achievement of a decent standard of living for the present and future generations (in developing nations), amongst other points of discussion (Caney, 2005; Kline et al., 2018; Page, 2008; Weijers et al., 2010).

There are three (3) main approaches as to how to allocate responsibility, namely: (a) the ‘contribution to problem’ or polluter pays approach, whereby the party that caused the harm is proportionately responsible for rectifying it (Bortscheller, 2010; Caney, 2005; Page, 2008; *The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer*, 1989; Weijers et al., 2010); (b) the beneficiary pays approach, which posits that those who have benefited (from the harm) should shoulder the burden associated with such benefits (Caney, 2005; Page, 2008; Weijers et al., 2010); and (c) the ability to pay approach that differentiates states’ responsibilities based on their financial and economic resources (Bortscheller, 2010; Page, 2008; *Paris Agreement*, 2015; Weijers et al., 2010). These approaches shall be further discussed in Section 3 – Research Strategy and Research Design.

The importance of CDR is supported by the fact that it is an essential feature of both the Paris Agreement and the UNSDA. In 2015 the world agreed to take action to prevent catastrophic climate change under the Paris Agreement. Since then, 197 countries have signed the agreement and 191 have ratified it (*Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification*, 2021). Early in the preamble of the Paris Agreement, the parties agree that they are “being guided by its principles, including the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of national circumstances” (*Paris Agreement*, 2015, p. 1), highlighting the importance of the concept as a pillar of international cooperation. This is reinforced in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement whereby parties expressly agree that it “will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in light of different national circumstances” (*Paris Agreement*, 2015, p. 3). Each country’s ‘nationally determined contribution’ to reduce emissions and their long-term low carbon

strategies as per Article 4 of the Paris Agreement are understood to be planned based on their respective responsibilities and capabilities as well (*Paris Agreement*, 2015, p. 5).

Member states of the United Nations agreed to the UNSDA and at the core of the agenda are the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In its ‘Declarations’, the UNSDA expressly reaffirms the principle of CDR as stated in principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration (*UNSDA*, 2015, p. 8). Although not expressly referred to in every commitment in the Paris Agreement and the UNSDA, CDR is understood to be an overarching guideline to the performance of the obligations found therein. Both these international agreements are built upon the international community’s consensus on CDR, and it is a crucial enabler of international cooperation. As highlighted above, without the conceptualisation of CDR to address the inequality across countries, the international community would be far from establishing workable frameworks for addressing global issues such as climate change.

Sustainable development continues to be a widely debated field and some may argue that little has progressed since it first came to prominence after the Brundtland Report due to the sustained lack of consensus as to its definition and best methods of implementation. It continues to be a highly relevant concept that is of import to the whole world as not only is most of the world’s population residing in the developing world, but also due to the interconnected nature of climate change. The recognition in international accords of CDR reflecting the burden of responsibility of developed nations does however provide a path forward, albeit one that is still highly debated. There are still a wide range of interpretations of what sustainable development can look like, but since 2015 arguably more of the world is on the same page, which may lead to more progress.

3 RESEARCH STRATEGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

At this point, the contextual arena within which the research question is placed has been clarified and how that question, along with its supporting sub-questions, is to be answered shall be laid out herein. As is common with research into social science, it will be based on qualitative analysis, with limited inclusion of quantitative data for the purpose of enriching the description of the case studies focused upon herein. This thesis is based on mostly a constructivist approach as it recognises and seeks to explain that the subjective understanding of natural events like climate change and conceptualisation of social phenomena like sustainable development by different societies are the obstacles in achieving effective results. One of the criticisms of qualitative social research, as compared to quantitative-based scientific method normally employed to natural sciences, is of course that it does not produce hard and fast explanations and/or theories that hold true for every situation related to the same matter of study. However, that is not the purpose of social science as human behaviour, society and social constructions are fluid and complex. As such, research in social science should focus on the restoration of “social and political science to its classical position as a practical, intellectual activity aimed at clarifying the problems, risks, and possibilities we face as humans and societies, and at contributing to social and political praxis” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 4).

3.1 Research Theory and Approach

Ontology – The nature of reality

Seeing as this thesis will be based primarily on qualitative research, the research problem will be approached on the ontological basis that the reality within which the research problem is situated is one that society has built, at least in part. As discussed in the literature review, the key factors creating the context within which the research problem is situated are still highly debated, resulting in the maintenance of divergent views and interpretations of the same. All these interpretations have their justifications and merits; therefore, it is fully reflective of the perspective that the reality we speak of is one that is highly influenced by human experiences including history, social interactions, and cultural differences. Complex social phenomena require us to move beyond the

physically measurable results of our senses and what ‘value free’ empiricism can tell us; therefore, the positivist approach cannot fully account for the ‘world we have built’.

Positivism, with its need for empirical measurements and justifications cannot fully account for the reasons underpinning the policies of Norway in the global South. The post-positivist lens moves beyond describing what ‘is’, but assists researchers to “interpret and explain why things are the way they are” (McNabb, 2010, p. 19). The purpose of post-positivist theory is to study the ideas, drivers, and rationales behind constructs, and not just the constructs themselves (Denscombe, 2002; McNabb, 2010). According to Denscombe (2002), post-positivism consists of the following factors: reality is always up to the construction and interpretation of people, ‘true’ behaviour can never be observed because people will react to the knowledge of being studied, it is impossible to objectively study social phenomena, and thus one will not be able to produce grand theories explaining social phenomena. The post-positivist approach can, however, be difficult to reconcile with the need to obtain ‘definitive’ answers. This is where the post-positivist ‘sub-group’ of constructivism comes in handy. Post-positivism, in its ‘purest’ form, is rather uncompromising and difficult to reconcile with quantitative approaches as it basically denies the existence of a definitively tangible world; however, constructivism can be more flexible and bridge that gap between empirical and social study.

Constructivism, too, rests on the premise that people behave the way they do “due to the presence of certain ‘social constructs’: ideas, beliefs, norms, identities, or some other interpretive filter through which people perceive the world” (Parsons, 2010, p. 80). In a societal context, constructivism argues that groups of people will give meanings to the world around them to create their identities, manage their relationships and interpret their environment (Parsons, 2010). The German sociologist Weber (1978) an early advocate of social constructivism arguing that sociocultural ideas and conventions functioned like ‘switches’ that shaped what people perceived as their interests and governed their decisions accordingly. Durkheim (1984) also argued in favour of the influence that cultural beliefs and identities have on creating and maintaining a society and influencing how such society responds to natural or material occurrences.

According to Wendt (1992), constructivism is distinctive in that ‘constitutiveness’ plays a fundamental role when interpreting human behaviour. He argues that it is not always

the case that the practice or existence of cultural norms, beliefs or identities causes a direct domino-like impact, i.e., has a causal effect, but rather that those concepts and/or interpretations define the features of the world as we understand it; that they are intrinsic. Wendt does however recognise that constructivist work can address both constitutive and causal relationships. It is the constructivist's challenge to show that the interpretations, beliefs, or sociocultural norms they are discussing have "made the difference between worlds" (Parsons, 2010, p. 87) and do in fact constitute determining factors in the research problem.

Constructivism is also the most appropriate ontological platform upon which to view the 'reality' of the research problem as it takes into consideration both contingency and human agency (Parsons, 2010). The importance of addressing uncertainty in relation to phenomena such as climate change and its possible mitigation strategies cannot be understated. Furthermore, mitigation of climate change and sustainable development are hinged on human agency – what we do or do not choose to do will influence our future. As highlighted by Parsons (2010), the labelling of ideas such as globalisation, sustainable development and even climate change as 'socially constructed' ultimately means that, through human agency and interpretation, the world can be whatever we want it to be, and it is absolutely within our power to change it. Additionally, constructivists, unlike more puritanical post-positivists, operate on the understanding that we should not and cannot separate ourselves from the natural world.

The chosen approach to the research problem also incorporates idealism, in that the post-positivist/constructivist reality is also experiential rather than something definitive. As observed in the literature review, the diversity of definitions and interpretations of concepts such as 'sustainable development', 'common but differentiated responsibilities', and the perception of the effects of climate change indicate the different versions of the 'reality' of climate change and development experienced along, for example, the North-South divide. Friedrich Nietzsche's views on perspectivism perfectly capture the inevitability of people to "always observe something from a certain perspective" and that "we cannot rise above ourselves and look at reality such as it really is; all observation is made from a certain point" (Nietzsche in Danermark et al., 2002, p. 8). The study of the world that humans have created requires the space and flexibility away from strict or 'dogmatic' views of the scientific method to allow for a holistic

examination of our social world (Kratochwil, 2008), the results of which cannot be captured in a meaningful way if examined under a strict positivist approach.

Epistemology – How do you know what you know?

Constructivists can epistemologically approach the problem in varying ways. The principle epistemological division that exists in constructivism is post-modern (also referred to as anti-foundationalist) versus modern (McNabb, 2010; Parsons, 2010). The issue at the heart of this division is to what extent researchers can remain objective. The term ‘post-modernism’ was coined to reflect the extensive cultural upheavals that have occurred (primarily in Western societies) after the Second World War, including extensive advances in technology, globalisation, and neo-liberalism, to name a few (Oakley, 2002).

Archaeologist Ian Hodder (2013) argues that the following four (4) ‘strands’ define post-modern society (and therefore social science): 1) society’s sense of disillusion, 2) widespread feelings of detachment and cynicism, 3) the impact of revolutionary changes after WWII, and 4) the manner in which special interest groups and lobbyists utilise, and many would argue manipulate, influential forces in society such as media, fashion, and the arts, which inevitably alters our conceptualisation and understanding of natural as well as social phenomena. Considering the looming possibility of a climate catastrophe combined with the development that has yet to occur for much of the global population, viewing the research problem alongside those social scientists who “dispute the viability of modern civilization” (Dwight Allman in McNabb, 2010, p. 26) appears appropriate. Accordingly, the post-modernist epistemology was attractive as it addresses two (2) important factors: the uncertainty surrounding key contextualising factors (as highlighted in the Section 2 – Literature Review) and the dire straits the world appears to currently find itself in.

Post-modernism is premised on essentially three (3) principles. Firstly, that no singular fundamental truth exists with regard to a phenomenon. Secondly, there is no definitive method through which to gain knowledge. And lastly, there is no absolute way to determine that science is rational. Based on these principles, one can argue that a phenomenon is unique with every iteration as “each event must be described individually,

taking into consideration the intentions of the actors, the experience of the investigator, and the external environment of the time of the event. There is no best way to describe or define, or to investigate, an event” (McNabb, 2010, p. 26). Post-modernists view every conceptualisation, including tenets that govern our societies such as democracy, justice, even nature, as human constructs, and as such every study of a particular phenomenon is merely the communication of one interpretation or meaning out of an infinite sea of possibilities. Ultimately, however, strict post-modernist interpretations contend that essentially nothing is real; reality itself in totality is a social construct therefore there is no way to know what is real, let alone definitively show relationships between phenomena. This strict interpretation of post-modernism is relevant in many respects to the research problem, but does not quite suit the purpose of this thesis.

The compromise between post-modernism’s somewhat anarchical interpretivist ‘*everything* is a subjective human construct and one can never really know what one knows’ and a strictly empirical (positivist) approach is modernism. As aforementioned, post-modernists believe that everything and everyone is subjective; however, modernists posit that researchers, being aware of the potential influence of their own perception of social constructs, can with care and deliberation create a research design which minimises this influence. Modernists also dispute the positivist argument that there cannot be valid and reliable analysis of phenomena whilst emphasizing the underlying meanings and interpretations actors may have subscribed with and/or to such phenomena. They argue that together with meticulous research design, peer reviewed results and open debate, they “can arrive at pragmatically acceptable claims about how the world really works” (Parsons, 2010, p. 90). So, unlike post-modernists, modernist scholars believe that one can document, in meaningful and comparable ways, the social constructs of the world and how ‘real’ they are.

The modernist epistemology serves the needs of the research question of this thesis as the core concepts of the research problem cannot be fully explained using quantitative methods – the less tangible human element is very much a factor in the situation – however, quantitative research is likely to be able to be carried out to complement this qualitative research. This thesis will employ the epistemological lens of modern constructivism. First and foremost, constructivism is required to specifically analyse the Norwegian interpretation and application of the theoretical framework and social

phenomena as it may be found within their worldview. That being said, due to the global nature of the social phenomena discussed herein and the high degree of overlapping experience between societies, there is a higher degree of possibility that the findings of this research correlate to the reality of the wider world. The modernist approach considers the possible influence of the researcher's own perceptions of the subject matter, acknowledging that this alters the 'reality' of the social phenomena as opposed to if the study was undertaken by another party; however, such acknowledgement minimises the role of said influence in the findings. As such, the researcher judges that this is the optimal epistemological approach to achieve the stated research objectives and answer the research question(s).

Research Strategy – Methodology

The use of the case study method was decided to be the most appropriate for the purposes of this thesis. The case study is a great tool in exploratory research as it allows the researcher greater a degree of flexibility as compared to other methods. This flexibility is partly because there is generally no consensus on how to define a case study and that case studies can be employed at any stage of research (Levy, 2008). Additionally, case studies are bespoke – they can be structured and designed to serve different purposes and different points of a research strategy. Yin (1984, 13) wrote: “As a research strategy, the distinguishing characteristic of the case is that it attempts to examine (a) a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when (b) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” The take-away from Yin's explanation as to the advantage of case studies is that they assist in bringing a particular subject into focus and provide understanding(s) that may otherwise be overlooked.

Most case studies invariably fall somewhere within the typologies identified by Lijphart (1971) and Eckstein (1975) (George & Bennett, 2005; Levy, 2008). Eckstein's (1975) categorised case studies as being configurative-idiographic, disciplined-configurative, heuristic, probability probes or crucial case studies. Lijphart (1971) labelled them atheoretical, interpretative, hypothesis-generating, theory-confirming, theory-informing or deviant case studies. George and Bennett (2005) highlight six (6) typologies, seemingly a mix of those identified by Lijphart and Eckstein, that a researcher should

choose from: atheoretical/configurative idiographic, disciplined configurative, heuristic, theory testing, plausibility probe, and building block. They clarify that “researchers should clearly identify which of these six types of theory-building is being undertaken in a given study; readers should not be left to answer this questions on their own” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 76). Stake (2000) provides a simpler collection of three (3) types of case studies: instrumental, intrinsic, and collective (Stake, 2000). The research to be conducted herein could be categorised mostly as an instrumental case study, in that the purpose is “to provide insight into an issue, not for any specific interest in the case(s) itself [but] it is studied because it improves understanding of something else” (McNabb, p.237), which corresponds roughly to Lijphart’s ‘interpretative’ and Eckstein’s ‘idiographic’ typologies, respectively.

A comparative method is appropriate as it will allow for the assessment of whether the cases considered and the findings from this thesis are unique to the research problem described or if they imply a broader trend and can be applied (and therefore tested) in follow-up studies (Hopkin, 2010). Hopkin (2010) reasons that there is ‘no alternative to comparison’ when it comes to generating prepositions and that comparisons are a necessity to measure the validity of researchers’ findings and interpretation(s) of a phenomenon as there may be various explanations for any given phenomenon, all of which would benefit from being tested comparatively. There are no minimum or maximum numbers of cases that can be used in a study. There can be anywhere from a single, in-depth case study to one that analyses an entire cache of cases for a particular area of interest (McNabb, 2010; Yin 1994; Stake 2006). The research conducted in this thesis will focus on a small number of cases, which will be analysed qualitatively. One of the overarching criticisms of small-N qualitative studies is that such studies are methodologically weak and therefore cannot be compared to the robustness of quantitative analysis (Flyvbjerg, 2004; Hopkin, 2010). Hopkin (2010) disagrees, stating that “there is no *a priori* reason to regard case-oriented, qualitative-comparative research as methodologically ‘soft’, and indeed this approach can provide a far more rigorous and sophisticated response to some types of research questions” (Hopkin, 2010, p.300).

The key, then, is to design a study that provides a robust structure that attempts to plug the perceived gaps in the conceptualisation, interpretation, hypothesis and/or theories. It is important to bear in mind that often the best a researcher can achieve is to limit the

gaps in their design and subsequently analysis, as opposed to removing them completely (Hopkin, 2010; George, 2005). The world is ‘messy’, complex and that “particular combinations of circumstances at particular points in time can produce particular outcomes” (Ragin, 1987; see also Hopkin, 2010).

George and Bennett (2005) provide a detailed description of how to carry out a ‘structured, focused comparison’ to answer one’s research question(s). The appeal of the structured, focused comparison is that it “integrates the advantages of qualitative methods with the systematic analysis typically associated with large-N statistical studies” (Drovdova & Gaubatz, p. 3). The purpose of providing ‘structure’ to how cases are evaluated and/or compared is to address the criticism that qualitative analyses suffer from a lack of control and therefore provide a poor foundation for comparison across studies. The researcher develops research questions relevant to answering the research problem which will be applied uniformly to all cases referred to in their research. This method “borrows the device of asking a set of standardized, general questions” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 69) from statistical research models to ensure that the information gathered from the study is conducted in a manner that would allow sound comparative studies on the same phenomenon. One must also ensure that the standardised, general questions tied in comprehensively with the stated research objectives of the study as well as the theoretical perspective being employed. The study is ‘focused’ in the sense that the researcher will select a specific aspect to examine about the research problem, that is, have clear research objectives.

The effectiveness of the controlled comparison approach will ultimately fall upon how rigorous and exacting the researcher is when designing and performing the tasks required to adhere to a ‘quantitative-like methodology’ (George, 2019; George & Bennett, 2005). This is a challenge as the assimilation of the various tasks and phases is no easy feat. However, the researcher need not be discouraged and should instead bear in mind that the research design will always be imperfect. This in turn does not automatically mean that their findings are invalid and of no value to the field of research on the chosen phenomenon. There is value to be found in the analysis of the gaps of their structured comparison, either to highlight errors that should not be repeated or to provide direction for possible new avenues of focus and study for the phenomenon in question (George & Bennett, 2005).

George's (2005) structure above provides a useful framework upon which to carry out the research required to answer the research question(s) posed by this thesis; however, it is unnecessary to follow it to the letter. In qualitative research, there is no one way to conduct an analysis; some researchers will find that the variable-based approach, which is incorporated into George's methodology above, is appropriate whilst other types of research may require a more holistic approach, particularly if one is interested in the observing the complexity of outcomes. In these cases, more information may be gained from analysing cases holistically, as opposed to being broken down into constituent elements (Della Porta & Keating, 2008). In case-oriented research, the purpose is to create "rich descriptions of a few instances of a certain phenomenon" (Della Porta, 2008, p. 198). The findings of such case studies are equally valid as compared to variable-oriented studies. This thick description of a small number of cases allows for more in-depth analysis and contrast on different dimensions and "explanations are narrative accounts with limited interest in generalisation" (Della Porta, 2008, p. 207), but rather to gain more specific social insight into the phenomenon being studied.

Flyvbjerg (2004) helpfully clarifies the biggest misconceptions about small or singular case studies, several which are relevant to the discussion herein. Firstly, he disagrees that general, theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more valuable than concrete, practical (context-dependent) knowledge. In the study of human interactions and society, *context is everything*. Hence, a 'thickly' descriptive single or small case study may unveil nuances that would otherwise be overlooked in a large-N, variable-oriented study. A thick description is more than just providing an abundance of detail regarding a particular case, but "deals not only with the meaning and interpretations of people in a culture but also with their intentions... Thick description builds up a clear picture of the individuals and groups in the context of their culture and the setting in which they live" (Holloway, 1997, p. 154). The 'essence' of thick description involves the following components: the description and interpretation of the social phenomenon and the context within which it takes place, the capture and interpretation of the intentions and thoughts of actors within the social interactions studied, and that the social phenomenon studied is "so well described that the reader experiences a sense of verisimilitude as they read the researcher's account" (Ponterotto, 2006, p. 543). A thickly descriptive case study ideally leaves the reader with a well-rounded understanding of the subject matter and allows for

the discernment of the intentions and deliberations of the actors involved, which buttress the identification of constitutive motivations as sought by constructivism.

Additionally, Flyvbjerg (2004) disputes the assumption that generalisations which contribute to scientific development cannot be made based on one (or few) case studies. He contends that this is contingent on how the case is selected and analysed; a ‘strategic’ choice of case may add to the generalisability of a case study, but even if it fails to do so, that does not automatically diminish its value as part of the process of knowledge accumulation. The misconception that specific case studies present challenges in terms of summarisation and development of general theories is also addressed. Researchers have an immense amount of narrative and detail from which to uncover ‘a rich problematic’, thus it may not even be desirable to create generalisations as the value is within rich contextualisation. Bearing these arguments in mind, George’s (2005; 2019) structured, focused comparison forms the skeleton of the case study research design, particularly to clearly define the theoretical basis, research questions and research objectives of this thesis, and this is employed in combination with a richly descriptive ‘thick’ study of the cases for in-depth analysis that would allow for details and nuances that would otherwise be lost in both larger-N studies and/or studies narrowly focused on a few variables (Della Porta, 2008; Flyvbjerg, 2004).

Theoretical Construct– Common but Differentiated Responsibilities

The principle of ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CDR)’, as discussed in herein, is the primary ‘theory’ upon which the comparison of the Norwegian initiatives is based in this thesis. Discussions around how to carry out CDR mostly revolve around the following philosophies in terms of distribution of responsibility and cost: the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP), the Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP), or the Ability to Pay Principle (APP) (Bortscheller, 2010; Caney, 2005; Page, 2008; Weijers et al., 2010; E. B. Weiss, 2002). In the past, these philosophies have often been discussed independently of each other, with certain parties favouring one interpretation over the other, and were often viewed as alternatives to each other, as opposed to different facets of the same construct.

In the earliest iteration of this construct, it was often viewed predominantly from the perspective of PPP and responsibility based on historical emissions. As highlighted earlier, this can be seen in the first forms of earlier agreements on international environmental cooperation, such as the Montreal Protocol of 1989, whereby the onus of the actions agreed to within the protocol was predominantly developed nations (*The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer*, 1989). The PPP states that the party(s) that are responsible for causing harm to others are morally responsible for rectifying it. Therefore, those who have caused the most atmospheric pollution should be allocated a proportionate amount of responsibility and cost to combat climate change. The basis of this principle is widely accepted in international circles already and can be found in international accords used by organisations including the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Caney, 2005; Weijers et al., 2010).

As an alternative to the PPP, proponents of the BPP argue that the focus of CDR should be on the *effects* of historic pollution, as opposed to the causes (as with PPP) (Page, 2008). The BPP philosophy argues that if a person or a group of people have benefited from the pursuit of economic development which caused historic pollution, then such beneficiaries are morally obliged to manage any problems caused by such pollution. (Weijers et al., 2010). The management of consequences includes the responsibility to cease the continuation of activities or policies that contributed to historic pollution and the “obligation to address the harmful effects suffered by the third parties” (Caney, 2005, p. 756). Beneficiaries of historic pollution are, in other words, morally obliged to carry out mitigation and adaptation to human induced climate change, and to minimise ‘unearned’ inequalities (Weijers et al., 2010) by using their privilege to pull up others who have been historically disadvantaged.

The third commonly cited philosophy is that of APP which focuses on a party’s ability to pay when considering the moral responsibility one has to contribute to combating the effects of climate change. The basis of responsibility is that “only those who can afford to pay for mitigating and adapting to climate change should pay and they should pay in proportion to their ability to pay” (Weijers et al., 2010, p. 146), and this is reflected in the CDR principles as found in international climate agreements which call upon wealthy

developed nations to financially and technologically take the lead, in addition to reducing their carbon emissions.

The philosophies above, if applied individually to determine the responsibility of a party towards climate change, have their drawbacks and criticisms in relation to what is truly 'just' and equitable. We must bear in mind that it is impossible to apply a one-dimensional interpretation to the multi-dimensional issue of the equitable distribution of responsibility for historical contributions of climate changing emissions, the continued degradation of the global environment and the sustainable development that remains to be achieved by poorer nations. With reference back to the 'description' of CDR found in the Rio Declaration, it is therefore not a singular philosophy which fulfils the necessary duties, but rather a hybrid or pluralist combination of two or more. The justification for this pluralist approach is elaborated in the discussion below regarding the shortcomings of the individual philosophies.

The micro interpretation of PPP looks at the principle from an individual level, i.e., an individual actor who causes pollution will be held responsible for the pollution they caused. The macro version allocates responsibility to a 'class' of people, establishing an 'indirect link' between the actions of a collective with the generation of certain amounts of pollution. The distinction attempts to address principally the appropriateness of the 'unit of analysis' usually applied to discussions surrounding the allocation of responsibility for climate change, i.e. the nation state, and the injustices incurred by doing so (Caney, 2005). In many societies, the wealthiest members have lifestyles that consume a disproportionate amount of resources and generate the most pollution. They are not representative of everyone in their society, yet when the PPP is applied to the country as a whole, the burden of responsibility is distributed equally among all, including those who have contributed far less to the problem and for whom the burden is one they may not be able to bear. This is particularly pronounced in countries of the global South with significant wealth gaps, where the upper echelons of those societies, 'the north in the south', not only contribute most of such countries' pollution, but are also the primary, if not sole, beneficiaries of any development associated with such pollution. This is not only a concern in the global South as many countries of the wealthy global North too have poor, marginalised and under-represented segments of society, 'the south in the north'.

PPP also does not take into consideration the existence of some states which have high historical and/or current levels of pollution which are still poor. This creates an obligation on poor developing countries, many of which are polluting because they are in the midst of development, to rich countries (Weijers et al., 2010). There also exist poor developing countries that are resource rich and have a large sector of extractive industry; however, the wealth does not contribute to the development of the state due to factors such as corruption, weak economic and public institutions, or civil strife, amongst others. Enforcing equal PPP obligations upon poorer developing countries is neither helpful nor just for their citizenry as they are poor and the ultimate consumers of the products of their extractive industries are likely people of the developed world. Another criticism that has been levelled at the application of a purely PPP approach to climate change responsibility is that it does not adequately address the intergenerational aspect of the problem. Detractors of PPP argue that most of the emissions contributing to climate change were caused by past generations who are no longer alive; therefore, we are not actually having the ‘polluter’ pay, but rather we are unjustly punishing their descendants (Caney, 2005).


The issues of intergenerational responsibility as well as receipt of ‘benefits’ are also highlighted as gaps in the BPP. Similar to the argument against strict PPP, the BPP assigns benefits to the current generation for the pollution associated with development in the past and therefore misrepresents who the ‘beneficiaries’ are, i.e., the beneficiaries were the people of the past, not those of the present. This argument is refuted by the counter-argument that people of the present cannot disassociate themselves from previous generations as they still enjoy the benefits bestowed upon them by past generations (Neumayer, 2000), such as inherited wealth or sound economic and social institutions and infrastructure. If that it is the case, it is not unjust to allocate responsibility unto them for the actions of their predecessors (Neumayer, 2000). An additional criticism of BPP, from the perspective of historical accountability, is that it does not allocate responsibility to rich states which have become wealthy without historical emissions (Weijers et al., 2010). In the scenario where two (2) states are equally wealthy, but one gained its wealth from high historical pollution and the other without, only the present population of the former would be allocated responsibility to deal with climate change as ‘beneficiaries’ despite the fact that the present population of the latter is equally wealthy and have benefited from the actions of past generations, and that climate change is a global commons.

Conversely, applying a strictly APP approach to the scenario above means that despite having completely different historical contributions to climate change, these countries would be equally responsible due to their equal ability to pay (Page, 2008). This may be interpreted as placing excessive responsibility on a country just because it is rich, which can be argued is unjust as these countries may object that they are being made to pay the price for other countries' pollution. APP also assumes that all wealthy countries have the ability to pay, which may not be the case for various reasons. Governments first and foremost owe the duty to provide a decent basic standard of living for their citizenry, so in the case of the 'south in the north', it is arguably unjust to demand that wealthy countries of the global North divert resources to fighting climate change before addressing the duty of care that they owe the poor within their borders. Additionally, a country may be wealthy overall but may not have 'excess capacity' to contribute to combating climate change (Page, 2008).

In this thesis, we will move forward on the assumption that all the philosophies are crucial to capture the summation of moral responsibility a party has towards combating climate change in an equitable and just manner. The unit of analysis is the nation state – the CDR construct proposed in this thesis does not accommodate the individualist interpretation of CDR. Accordingly, different countries of both the global North and South will fall within different segments of the construct. Figure 1 below demonstrates how different countries may fall within the various interpretations of CDR:

Note: The assignment of certain countries to specific parts of the diagram below is based entirely on the researcher's judgement and are merely suggested examples.

Figure 1 – Demonstration of CDR philosophies in practice




As is shown above, it is difficult to allocate responsibility to a country based purely on one of the three (3) main principles that are debated within the realm of CDR. Arguably, most developed, post-industrialised nations of the global North would fall within the central triangle; however, the allocation of responsibility would still have to be differentiated based on country specific factors. Norway, the Netherlands, and Qatar are examples of countries that have a high degree of responsibility under CDR within all the possible interpretations, but also have few to no citizenry living below a ‘basic decent standard of living’. Other wealthy developed nations such as the USA, UK, and France have more distinct wealth gaps in their societies with segments of the ‘south in the north’ where standards of living approximate those in developing countries; accordingly, the principles would not necessarily apply in the same manner.

The diagram below (Figure 2) is the proposed theoretical construct of CDR that forms the framework within which Norway’s responsibility to address climate change is

anchored and, consequently, Norwegian development and climate policies will be examined to establish the extent to which those policies support sustainable development of the global South. The allocation of responsibility to address climate change must be combined with the methods through which action must be taken, namely adaptation and mitigation, to produce meaningful results. Adaptation and mitigation strategies for every responsible party should be undertaken domestically, and if possible, internationally, to effectively combat climate change. The discussion of this construct as it applies to Norway is discussed in Section 4 – Discussion and Analysis.

Figure 2 – Theoretical Construct of CDR



Theoretical Support – The Paris Agreement and the UNSDA

In this study, the selected Norwegian policy instruments will be compared to the obligations prescribed under both the Paris Agreement and the UNSDA as a further analytical dimension of how they reflect sustainable development, in accordance with the case study methodology described in herein. Furthermore, the thick descriptions of the specific cases will assist in building a comprehensive basis upon which to compare the selected policy instruments with these international climate and development agreements.

Research Objectives

In accordance with the partial adaptation of the case study methodology set out by George (2005; 2019) and the requirements required to conduct a thick description, the general and specific research objectives for this thesis are clearly laid out below to provide structure and guidance for the research:

General objective:

To identify gaps, if any, between Norway's rhetoric and actions with regard to its support of the sustainable development of the global South.

Specific objectives:

To identify the key stated priorities of Norwegian policy in respect of sustainable development, with reference to the Paris Agreement and/or UNSDGs.

To explore the extent to which Norway's implementation of policy with respect to sustainable development via climate and environment-related projects in the global South match these stated priorities.

Table 1 – Structure of research design loosely adapted from George (2005) structured, focused comparison

<p>Phase 1: Design</p> <p>Task 1: Specification of the research problem and the research objectives of the study.</p> <p>(a) What kind of phenomenon or behaviour is the investigator singling out – what is the class of events on which the study will focus?</p> <p><i>The class of event being studied, broadly speaking, is ‘sustainable development’. The research will, however, focus even more specifically on ‘sustainable development assistance in the global South by Norwegian policy instruments’.</i></p> <p>(b) What is the <i>existing theory</i>, if any, that bears on those aspects of the phenomenon in question?</p> <p><i>With reference to Section 4.1.3, CDR forms the basis of the theoretical framework within which the research problem exists. The assumption of this ‘theory’ is that: (a) developed nations are historically responsible for the climate crisis, (b) developing nations will bear the brunt of the crisis, so (c) developed nations acknowledge and agree to this historical responsibility, which (d) means they will and/or are providing assistance to increase the pace and sustainability of development, plus improved capacity for climate change mitigation, in countries that need it (ultimately leading to (e) sustainable development and improved standards of living in developing nations).</i></p> <p>(c) Which aspects of the existing theory will be singled out for assessment and/or refinement and elaboration?</p>

Not applicable.

Task 2: Specification of the conditions and variables that will be used in a controlled comparison of the cases of the class of events in question.

- (a) What is the dependent variable (or outcome) to be explained?

Refer to Task 1 (a).

- (b) What independent and intervening variables comprise the theoretical suppositions and framework of the study?

Not applicable.

- (c) Which variables will be held constant, and which are allowed to vary across the cases to be compared?

Not applicable.

Task 3: Selection of appropriate cases for controlled comparison – The selected cases are to be appropriate in the light of the specifications made in Tasks 1 and 2.

For the case study comparison, the following cases have been identified, in accordance with the specifications of Tasks 1 and 2:

- 1) Oil for Development Programme*
- 2) Norwegian International Forest and Climate Initiative*

Task 4: Consideration of ways in which variance in the dependent variable (or outcome) and independent variables can best be described to further theory development.

Not applicable.

Task 5: Formulation of the general questions to be applied in the analysis of each case in the controlled comparison.

The research objectives in Section 4.3.2 were used to formulate the following questions which will be applied to the analysis of the controlled comparison:

1. *What key priorities of Norwegian policy are reflected in this instrument/program?*
2. *What type of assistance is being provided by Norway via this policy instrument/program, i.e., financial support, human capital development, technology transfer, etc.?*
3. *What obligations, if any, of the Paris Agreement are being addressed by this policy instrument/program?*
4. *What SDG, if any, are being addressed in this policy instrument/program?*

Phase 2: The Case Studies

To be discussed in Section 5 – Analysis/Discussion

Phase 3: Drawing the Theoretical Implications of the Case Studies

To be discussed in Section 5 – Analysis/Discussion

The ‘controlled’ comparison herein shall apply the most-different approach, whereby the outcome this research seeks to study, i.e., sustainable development, is present but to varying degrees, and the general characteristics leading to the outcome are similar in nature for the selected cases. As highlighted by George (2019) “the primary criterion for case selection should be relevance to the research objective of the study... [and] [c]ase[s] should also be selected to provide the kind of control and variation required by the research problem” (George, 2019, p. 83). The ‘method of difference’ case study is most appropriate as the research seeks to establish if there are similar causes across the selected cases which lead to the outcome we wish to study, but also looks to highlight the differences between the cases (Van Evera, 1997).

In addition, the selected case studies are *instrumental* in that they have been selected “to provide insight into an issue or obtain a better understanding of something else, perhaps to support a developing generalisation or theory” (Blaikie & Priest, 2019; Stake, 2005).

In this thesis, we seek to obtain a better understanding of the relationship between Norwegian discourse on international climate and development policies as compared to Norwegian actions on the same. To do so, two (2) Norwegian government initiatives, both of which are administered by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) and have the stated objective of supporting sustainable development, have been selected and shall be discussed along the parameters of their objectives, activities, allocation of funds, network of actors, and criteria for participation.

3.2 Qualitative Data Collection

This thesis employs a primarily qualitative document-based research technique where existing documents, namely social artefacts such as official statistics, public documents and governmental publications shall be studied, analysed, and interpreted through a constructivist lens. Through the study of these social artefacts this thesis attempts to discern what social constructs, ideas, beliefs, or norms are the underlying foundation of Norwegian international environment, climate and development policies. The constructivist approach should provide the societal context and the meanings that have been ascribed to certain constructs that Norway has relied upon to form their sense of identity, manage their relationships, and interpret the international climate regime and development cooperation.

Seeing as the focus of the comparative case studies shall be Norwegian government initiatives, most of the data will be collected from the relevant Norwegian government ministries, agencies, and associated organisations. These are ‘primary’ sources of data that have been “produced by political actors ranging from executive, parliamentary or judicial arms of governments, policy-making agencies or non-government organisations...generally considered to be documents that reflect a position of an actor and do not have analysis in them” (Vromen, 2010, p. 261) However, it must be noted that there are exceptions to this as there are “organisational research reports which contain analysis” (Vromen, 2010, p. 262), which is the case for several reports cited in the analysis and discussion herein. These do not necessarily dilute the objectivity of the source material, but rather enrich their context. There is limited use of quantitative information; this is mostly employed in the ‘thick’ description of the case studies to

provide a richer description. Secondary data in the form of peer-reviewed academic journals are also employed to create context and discuss different perspectives with regard to the subject matter.

3.3 Problems and Limitations

George and Bennett's (2005) 'structured, focused comparison' forms part of the methodology employed in this thesis; however, it was modified based on the recognition that the "satisfactory integration of the five tasks [*required*] usually cannot be accomplished on the first try. A good design does not come easily" (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 88). This is particularly true in certain qualitative social research as the parameters set by the structured, focused comparison are meant to employ 'stricter' quantitative-like methodology to the study of social sciences. It is recommended that the researcher "gain familiarity with the phenomenon in question by undertaking a preliminary examination of a variety of cases before finalising aspects of the design. Despite the researcher's best efforts, the formulation of the design is likely to remain imperfect" (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 88) so the researcher should not balk at modifying their design, if need be.

A commonly raised problem and/or limitation when using case study methodology is the danger of selection bias. This thesis employs a small-N case study, with the selection of only two (2) specific Norwegian government initiatives related to international climate and development policies. It is thus important to bear in mind that the "analysis of a small number of cases requires the careful, theory-guided selection of non-random cases" (Levy, 2008, p. 8) (see also Collier et al., 2004; Gerring, 2007; King et al., 1994). The researcher needs to be careful that the few cases selected do not either form the basis upon which a hypothesis was generated, or are chosen specifically because they fit the researcher's preconceptions (Levy, 2008). This thesis attempts to address this criticism by selecting the case studies based on their relevance to the research problem, namely that they are Norwegian government initiatives undertaken in developing countries clearly associated with Norwegian international environmental, climate and development policy, and there is sufficient information available about such initiatives.


Unfortunately, several Norwegian government initiatives that are clearly operating within the realm of the research problem, such as the Clean Energy Development Initiative, were not researchable due to a lack of available data. Accordingly, these initiatives were excluded from the case study. The shortcoming of having to discard other initiatives the Norwegian government may be invested in runs the risk of having gaps in the overall depiction of Norwegian sustainable development assistance; however, the lack of data related to other initiatives may be an indication that the selected cases provide the best reflection of the Norwegian government's efforts in this field.

The two (2) initiatives discussed in this thesis are the best documented and publicised Norwegian government projects related to the research problem available to the researcher. It should be noted, however, that there exists a discrepancy in terms of the quantity and quality of data collected between the selected initiatives as one has notably more consistent reporting, namely the OFD, than the other, namely NICFI, even though both were launched at approximately the same time. The researcher has made their best attempt to interpret and analyse the available data equally to the best of their ability.

4 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

In this section, the framework of CDR is applied specifically to Norway to demonstrate how responsibility for historical and current emissions contributing to the climate crisis is a responsibility that Norway is morally obliged to acknowledge and act upon.

Figure 3 – CDR as applied to Norway



Norway is a member of a rather small pool of post-industrial wealthy nations that are positioned under the principle of CDR (be it based on historic and current emissions contributions, benefits derived from carbon emissions or the ability to finance mitigation and adaptation) to have the moral imperative and responsibility to take the lead in reducing their impact on the environment and addressing the negative effects of climate change. Even after considering the financial resources to maintain a basic ‘decent’ standard of living for all its citizens and domestic mitigation and adaptation actions,

Norway still has additional financial resources that can be directed towards climate action. As a large proportion of this financial surplus is built upon the extraction of fossil fuels, Norway, in accordance with the principles of CDR, not only has the obligation to enact mitigation domestically, but also has the obligation to then look towards assisting poorer nations put in place adaptation and mitigation measures to address climate change. These measures are those that they otherwise could not afford and/or would place a disproportionate burden upon them and their development.

Bearing in mind that the two (2) prongs of combating climate change are adaptation and mitigation, we examine what actions Norway is taking via its international environmental, climate and development policies to discharge its ‘differentiated responsibilities’ and assist in the sustainable development of the global South.

4.1 The Oil for Development Programme (OFD)

The Beginnings: When and Why

Norway has been an oil and gas producer since the 1970s and is generally admired in the petroleum-producing world as being exemplary in terms of its resource and revenue management. With its oil and gas resources located in geographically challenging climates such as the North Sea and within the Arctic Circle, the Norwegian petroleum industry has gained much technical expertise and know-how that many other nations could benefit from. Hence, there is high demand in developing nations with petroleum resources for Norwegian assistance in the management of such resources. Norway has participated in international oil and gas sector development projects since the early 1980s, with countries such as Vietnam and Mozambique (*OfD Annual Report, 2008*), so it is hardly a stranger to international cooperation such as that encapsulated in the OFD. In fact, the launch of the OFD in 2005 is a formalisation and consolidation of ongoing efforts in the assistance of other nations in their petroleum resource development.


The annual reports of the OFD (2007-2019) do not present a clearly defined mission or vision *statement* that is carried from inception to the present; however, the stated objectives generally revolve around similar themes. The objective of the OFD, as presented in the annual reports from 2007 to 2019, is ultimately to assist in poverty reduction and economic growth in petroleum-producing countries by promoting

responsible resource management, revenue management, and environmental and safety management of petroleum resources “on the premise that responsible governance is an important prerequisite for sustainable growth and welfare for the citizens” (*OfD Annual Report, 2018; OfD Annual Report, 2019*). The Norwegian government has identified that the most important contribution that the OFD can make to partner countries is the building of local capacity and capabilities so that recipient countries can manage their resources unassisted and go on to achieve the OFD’s goal of poverty reduction and improved standards of living for the citizenry of partner countries.

In the OFD’s Annual Report 2011 and reports of subsequent years, helping resource-rich developing countries avoid the pitfalls of the ‘resource curse’ is prominently discussed as a motivation of the initiative. The underlying reasons for the persistence of the resource curse have been debated for decades. The explanations behind the resource curse include macroeconomic influences such as the undercutting of competitiveness on the international market due to over-valuation of exchange rates, as was the case for Dutch Disease; microeconomic factors including how the domination of one industry undercuts the growth of other sectors of the economy; the political economy of resource-rich countries (Stevens & Dietsche, 2008); weak public and governmental institutions, and widespread corruption, amongst other possible factors. The numerous reasons or factors that contribute to the resource curse make it a complicated situation to overcome once it has taken root.

The initiative identifies three (3) outcomes that proper management of natural resources should lead to. These outcomes, according to Norwegian experience, are crucial to avoiding the resource curse and contributing to the positive development of a country. The OFD’s ‘Theory of Change’, summarised in Figure 4 below, “suggests that by achieving results across these outcomes, one might expect that the country will increase benefits and minimise the risks of the petroleum sector, laying the basis for responsible management which in turn leads to poverty reduction” (*OfD Annual Report, 2019*).

Figure 4 – OFD Goal Hierarchy



Source: (OfD Annual Report, 2019)

The OFD “does not provide advice on how petroleum revenues should be distributed and spent” (OfD Annual Report, 2019), but ‘encourages’ participating governments to adhere to transparent and anti-corruption practices and procedures in the management and oversight of their natural resources.

The OFD’s strategy for pursuing the desired outcomes of the program were initially based on three (3) ‘thematic’ pillars: resource management, revenue management and environmental management. In 2013, this evolved to four (4) pillars with the addition of safety management. These divisions form what the Norwegian government and petroleum management agencies deem to be the backbone of a robust and well-governed

petroleum regime. They also provide the guidelines by which responsibilities under the OFD are divided amongst the numerous Norwegian public institutions that support the initiative. Resource management entails the identification, classification, and estimation of oil and gas resources, and is a practice that is essential to strategizing, planning, and carrying out activities related to the extraction of such resources. Transparent and structured revenue management is essential in transforming oil wealth into national wealth. Many countries seek Norway’s advice exactly because it has one of the most successful petroleum revenue management regimes in the world, as attested by its sovereign wealth fund.

Funding and Allocation

The OFD was launched in 2005 with a modest budget of about NOK 82 million, but this quickly increased and in subsequent years the initiative disbursed amounts averaging over NOK 200 million per year, as shown below:

Table 2 – OFD Annual Disbursements by region and year


Table 1: Annual OfD disbursements, by region and year (1000 NOK)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total 2006-19
Africa	35 678	52 429	79 655	89 901	102 109	164 100	117 392	164 492	176 009	134 848	151 272	129 316	101 296	114 695	1 498 497
Asia	18 195	30 908	37 773	52 635	32 687	24 400	15 608	7 139	6 889	11 331	9 656	13 042	13 187	23 194	273 451
Middle East	3 000	13 310	11 144	5 717	3 503	8 150	5 255	12 023	10 231	14 059	14 162	18 407	14 364	13 615	133 325
Latin America	353	2 058	4 875	9 155	14 441	20 500	20 349	9 851	4 326	4 514	3 124	2 742	3 253	6 340	99 541
Global and other	25 108	49 295	71 499	49 592	69 332	74 000	95 787	61 308	44 828	46 090	32 370	54 312	31 351	75 618	704 872
Total	82 334	148 000	204 946	207 000	222 072	291 150	254 391	254 813	242 283	210 842	210 584	217 819	163 452	233 462	2 709 686

Source: (OfD Annual Report, 2019)


The annual reports consistently show that most of the OFD’s funding and activities go towards resource management. Prior to 2011, more than half of all funds dispersed through the OFD were directed at resource management activities. This gradually decreases post-2016; however, as a singular ‘pillar’ it still commands the lion’s share of resources. The disbursement of funds according to thematic pillars is demonstrated by the charts below, as provided by the OFD annual reports, apart from years 2006, and 2012-2015.

Figure 5 – Fund Allocation by Thematic Areas (2007-2010)



Source: Information gathered and collated from (OfD Annual Report, 2007; OfD Annual Report, 2008; OfD Annual Report, 2009; OfD Annual Report, 2010)

Figure 6 – Fund Allocation by Thematic Areas (2016-2019)



Source: Information gathered and collated from (OfD Annual Report, 2016; OfD Annual Report, 2017; OfD Annual Report, 2018; OfD Annual Report, 2019)

Unfortunately, the annual reports from the years 2011 to 2015 do not provide the breakdown of funds allocated in the manner above. Regardless, a dramatic shift in the allocation of funds can be seen between the first chart and the second. Funds channelled towards resource management are halved in the 2016-2019 period, with a large percentage targeted towards supporting the work of NGOs/civil society organisations and/or research and education institutions, which do not fall under any of the four (4) thematic pillars as identified in the annual reports. The percentage of funds directed towards revenue and environmental management remain consistent.

The Actors

The network of actors involved with the OFD is extensive. The OFD has the support of numerous government ministries and agencies within Norway, as well as the involvement of a wide array of other stakeholders in the realm of multinational organisations, civil society organisations (both in Norway and abroad) as well as private corporations, namely in the oil and gas industry.

Table 3 – Network of Norwegian Actors in OFD

<p>Norwegian Government (or Government Affiliated) Stakeholders</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy - Norwegian Ministry of Finance - Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment - Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications - Other governmental agencies: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (under Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion) ○ Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (under Ministry of Petroleum and Energy)
--	--

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT) (under Ministry of the Environment) ○ Directorate for Nature Management (under Ministry of the Environment) ○ The Climate and Pollution Agency (Klif) (under Ministry of the Environment) ○ The Oil Taxation Office Norway ○ Norwegian Coastal Administration ○ Statistics Norway ○ Norwegian Environment Agency - Norwegian embassies (under Ministry of Foreign Affairs) - Research institutions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ NTNU - Consultancies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Amtzen be Besche ○ Bridge Consultant AS ○ IPAN AS (International Petroleum Associates A/S)
<p>Other Contributing Stakeholders</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Multilateral organisations: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ EITI ○ UNDP ○ African Development Bank ○ IMF ○ World Bank - Other donors - Civil society organisations: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Review Watch Institute ○ Publish What You Pay ○ Global Witness ○ WWF Norway

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Norway/Friends of the Earth Norway ○ Norwegian Peoples' Aid ○ The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) ○ Norwegian Church Aid ○ Norwegian Students' and Academics' International Assistance Fund (SAIH) ○ Natural Resource Governance Institute (2014) ○ Oxfam America (2014) ○ Thomson Reuters Foundation (2014) - Norwegian and international oil companies, oil and gas service contractors
<p>Recipient Country Stakeholders</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Government - Government agencies <p>*In some cases, local civil society organisations affiliated with Norwegian NGOs</p>

This collective of actors on the Norwegian side clearly indicates that the OFD is of importance to the Norwegian government, with half a dozen government ministries involved, along with numerous sub-agencies, embassies around the world, and government supported research institutes. The partnerships with some of the largest and most influential international organisations in the world including the IMF and World Bank are also an indicator of the high level of interest in the program. The involvement of members of the oil industry should be expected to assist in transferring knowledge, technological know-how as well as 'best practice' as subject matter experts; however, these companies are not generally known for promoting ecological sustainability.

The OFD's organisation consists of a steering committee with representatives from four (4) Norwegian government ministries, which is headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The secretariat is situated in the Norad, which is the agency responsible for the administration, coordination and implementation of the OFD. Norad is also supported by Norwegian embassies around the world through which requests for participation in the OFD are channelled. The embassies provide invaluable local and regional knowledge to the steering committee as well as to Norad of the participating or potential partners of the OFD. Each Norwegian stakeholder's participation varies from country to country; no one partner country to OFD receives assistance from all the stakeholders mentioned above.

The OFD also involves programmes beyond the direct bilateral agreements between the government of Norway and that of the recipient country. There are various other programmes associated with the OFD and which receive funding from the OFD. These programmes include:

- Coordinating Committee for Geoscience Programmes in East and Southeast Asia (CCOP)
- African Centre for Economic Transformation (ACET)
- Petroleum Governance Initiative (in partnership with the World Bank, from 2006 to 2013)
- Extractive Industries – Technical Advisory Facility (EI-TAF) (managed by the World Bank)
- IMF Topical Trust Fund – Managing Natural Resource Wealth
- International Association for Impact Assessments (IAIA)
- Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership (GGFR)
- Natural Resource Charter (in partnership with Oxford University)
- Norad's master programme for energy and petroleum (EnPe)

This further demonstrates the extensiveness of the network of the OFD and how much interest remains in extractive hydrocarbon activities.

Criteria for OFD Assistance

Due to demand for assistance outstripping supply, the Norwegian government has set criteria to be met by countries seeking assistance under the OFD. Requests can either be

for short-term or long-term assistance. First and foremost, the Norwegian government insists that any cooperation must be ‘demand driven’, meaning that the country requesting assistance must demonstrate the initiative and desire to use such assistance to improve the welfare of their people. The Norwegian government has not and will not seek out participants for the initiative. They must also demonstrate that there is demand for capacity and competence building within their public institutions. The requesting country must have ‘significant’ proven or potential hydrocarbon resources to which Norwegian experience and expertise must be applicable. Additionally, the requesting country must be eligible according to OECD/Development Assistance Committee (DAC) principles, which outline selection criteria for aid cooperation such as proactiveness, essential policies that should be championed, and willingness for close cooperation with donors, amongst others (*Development Assistance Manual: DAC Principles for Effective Aid*, 1992).

Short-term assistance consists of the provision of courses in the fields of management and administration of petroleum resources, environmental management, field visits, seminars on relevant subject matter and the exchange of delegations. There are no alternate or ‘absolute’ criteria for countries wishing to receive long-term assistance under the initiative; the criteria for short-term participation apply. Recipient countries receiving long-term assistance are identified as ‘core countries’ and throughout the initiative have been limited to approximately ten (10) per year. The determining factors, according to the OFD, is that there “must be well-documented political commitment to good governance, including transparency and anticorruption. The overall situation with respect to human rights and the rule of law must be acceptable and/or on well-documented course towards improvement” (*OfD Annual Report*, 2007; *OfD Annual Report*, 2008). The governments of long-term assistance must also be committed to building their country through the sustainable development of their hydrocarbon resources and committed to tackling the environmental challenges associated with hydrocarbon extraction.

The Case of Angola

A specific partner country has been selected to gain a better understanding of how the OFD has been carried out on the ground and to demonstrate how the Norwegian

government have put into practice the key philosophy behind the programme, i.e., avoiding the resource curse, as well as the four (4) pillars of ‘management’ to support the sustainable development of partnering countries. The case selected is that of Angola. Angola has been selected due to the following reasons:

- Angola is a ‘core country’;
- It has consistently been a partner in the program and is the recipient of a substantial portion of funds disbursed through the OFD thus far; and
- It is the second largest oil and gas producer in sub-Saharan Africa, after Nigeria, with significant fossil fuel reserves.

Angola is a long-term participating partner of the OFD, being identified as a ‘core country’ from 2006-2013, with a pause in activities from 2013-2014 whilst the Norwegian and Angolan governments came to a new cooperation agreement, and activities (other than aid via civic society organisations which carried on through 2013-2014) resumed from 2015 till the present. Prior to partnership under the OFD, Norway has been providing advice to Angola regarding the petroleum sector since 1983.

The stated objective of the project with Angola is to “promote improved management of national petroleum resources as one of the tools for sustainable economic and social development in Angola. This includes improving the capability to exercise regulatory control and to develop policies and strategies to ensure better administration of the Angolan petroleum resources” (*OfD Annual Report, 2008*). The local Angolan actor participating in the program is the Ministry of Petroleum (MINPET), and the cooperating institution in Norway was, initially, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and which was subsequently supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Petroleum Safety Authority, and in later years by civic society organisation Norwegian Church Aid (*OfD Annual Report, 2008; OfD Annual Report, 2013; OfD Annual Report, 2014; OfD Annual Report, 2014; OfD Annual Report, 2015; OfD Annual Report, 2016*). Together these parties focus on the following 5 ‘components’ of the petroleum sector: (1) regulatory framework, (2) responsibilities and organisation of MINPET, (3) data management and information systems, (4) multi-sector activities, and (5) ‘Angolanisation’ and general training (*OfD Annual Report, 2008*).

The following is a summarised overview of year-on-year activities and key achievements in Angola under the OFD:

YEAR	ACTIVITIES UNDER OFD
2009:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Performance of gap-analysis of MINPET organisation, competence, equipment and information required to carry out responsibilities according to law. ▪ ‘Fast Track’ Projects focused on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - leadership and competency training and development; - planning and strategy; - IT and administration development; - data management; and - language training. ▪ MINPET attended seminars and conferences at the regional level. ▪ Studies and technical support offered for construction of national petroleum museum. ▪ Study into establishing petroleum technology training, education programmes in local institutions for ‘improvement of scientific knowledge, local content and Angolanisation’. ▪ Seminar arranged to encourage multi-sector cooperation between Angolan actors in oil, fisheries, and environmental sectors.
2010:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Fast Track Projects continue. ▪ Studies into establishing petroleum museum, and research and academic training in Angola continue. ▪ Master’s cooperation programme between Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) and

	<p>Agostinho Neto University focused on technical assistance and scientific knowledge.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Regional seminar encouraging multi-sector cooperation arranged. ▪ Meeting between OFD, Norwegian embassy and Ministry of Environment to discuss potential future environmental management. ▪ Assistance to revise petroleum law and regulations.
2011:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Fast Track projects continue. ▪ Cooperation between higher education institutions continue. ▪ MINPET staff sent for 8-week training in Stavanger. ▪ Norwegian Church Aid activities focused on transparency and accountability of governance in financial management of oil revenues.
2012:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Report notes that 90% of income for Angola comes from oil and gas. ▪ Little transparency on how income is distributed. ▪ Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) assist efforts to build capacity in civil society in Angola to monitor state budgeting and spending.
2013:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No activities by Norwegian government. ▪ NPA continued civil society activities.
2014:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No activities. ▪ New programme being negotiated, signed on January 2015.
2015:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Common understanding between Angolan and Norwegian governments that areas of cooperation had to be re-defined. ▪ Few activities carried out.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Most funds and effort went into supporting research and education; increase research capacity, evidence-based voice for economic diversification, transparency, anti-corruption and tax reforms. ▪ Social monitoring groups carried out poverty assessment.
2016:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Activities focused mainly on general management of petroleum resources. ▪ Week-long course on drilling for MINPET (competence building). ▪ Strengthening of ICT. ▪ Research centre conducts studies on poverty and social stratification in rural and urban Angola. ▪ Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica (CEIC) recognised as leading social science-based knowledge centres in Angola. ▪ MINPET given document handling and transparent information management training. ▪ Most funds went to research and education in fields of energy and petroleum.
2017:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Focus on safety and emergency preparedness, general management of petroleum resources. ▪ Capacity building: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ training for MINPET personnel; ○ training in petroleum economics and English. ▪ Civil society and research activities continue. ▪ Most funding allocated to research and NGO support. ▪ Angola undertakes major restructuring to petroleum sector.
2018:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reorganisation of legal and regulatory framework continues - Norwegian assistance not requested.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Continued training and competency building for MINPET staff on resource management, language, IT and data management. ▪ Funds mostly allocated to NGO support and resource management.
2019:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ International best practice workshop conducted for Ministry of Mineral Resources and Petroleum (formerly MINPET) staff. ▪ Audit training. ▪ Funds mostly allocated to NGO support and resource management

Reflecting upon the four (4) pillars espoused by the OFD for the development of a successful, well organised, and prosperous petroleum sector, it is uncertain how substantial the activities carried out in Angola are. The activities directly involving Norwegian actors were related to resource management. The assistance provided consists mostly of capability training and development of MINPET staff through training courses, seminars and conferences. There is much less focus on revenue management as the summary above reflects few to no activities with MINPET around this pillar. The OFD outsources its efforts regarding the creation of transparency of distribution and use of oil revenue to civil society organisations. These organisations focus primarily on educating and increasing Angolan public awareness of their national budget and the contribution of oil sector revenue and encouraging the public to demand accountability from their government. In terms of environmental management, the OFD organised a few conferences to discuss inter-sectoral cooperation with the environmental and fisheries sectors, but this did not appear to be substantial. Activities focusing on safety management are also limited and consist of emergency and safety preparedness training. In total, the OFD has spent approximately NOK 130 million in Angola from 2006 to 2019 (*OfD Annual Report, 2019*).

At no point is it noted, in the case of Angola, that entities that are able to provide further technical expertise, e.g. oil and gas companies or service contractors, are engaged to provide assistance, nor is any program or project put in place to assist with technology transfer that would have significant impact on the sustainability of the petroleum sector, such as technology utilised by Norway for enhanced recovery, or technology improving environmental protection that reduces pollution in the extraction of petroleum resources. There is also no mention of the transfer of knowledge or technology that addresses carbon emission reductions from oil and gas production, a subject that is of utmost importance at this juncture and out of step with Norway being the ‘main driver behind global efforts to manage gas flaring’ (*OfD Annual Report, 2009; OfD Annual Report, 2010*). The lack of participation of the state-owned national oil company, Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola (Sonangol), in the programme is a significant obstacle to bringing about change in the industry as, in accordance with Angola’s legal and regulatory framework, it is either the sole concessionaire or must be a joint concessionaire in all Production Sharing Agreements (PSA). This seeming lack of cooperation, as it bears no mention in the reports, is a notable drawback to establishing sustainable development practices within Angola’s petroleum sector.

The reports note that circumstances in Angola are challenging – but how does cooperation with Angola measure against the ‘strict’ criteria employed when selecting partner countries? As highlighted in the reports, there is abundant demand for Norwegian assistance and insufficient resources to aid all countries that request such assistance, thus the Norwegian government carefully weighs which countries are included in the programme. Angola certainly fulfils the base criterion that cooperation is demand driven, as the Angolan government requested Norwegian assistance, and that it has ‘significant’ petroleum resources, being second only to Nigeria in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of oil and gas production. It was also noted that the programme works best in the early stages of establishing the petroleum sector of a country. Oil was first discovered in Angola in 1955 and production began in the 1950s (*OfD Annual Report, 2013*). It is an established oil and gas producer, and one that has not escaped the ‘resource curse’.

Another of the essential criteria for participation in the program is a country’s dedication to ‘transparency and anticorruption’. Revenue Watch Institute, a civil society organisation working with the OFD, ranked Angola 47th out of 50 countries in its

Transparency Index in 2010 (*Revenue Watch Index / Revenue Watch Institute, 2010*). In 2020, Angola remains in the lower quartiles in transparency indices, ranking 142nd out of 180 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (*Transparency International, 2020*). It is difficult to discern how Angola would have met the essential criteria of having 'dedication' to transparent and anticorruption practices as described by the OFD. The activities performed under the OFD have contributed little if anything to the support of sustainable development in Angola. Additionally, having known the history of the Angolan petroleum industry and the challenging circumstances they would face, it is uncertain if Norway invested resources in Angola under this initiative to genuinely make a difference, or if such 'assistance' is a convenient display of Norway's dispensation of financial, though not moral, obligations to the development of the global South.

OFD – CDR and Sustainable Development Rulers

Common But Differentiated Responsibilities

As discussed in Section 3, Norway is morally obliged to address its contribution to the creation of the climate crisis regardless of which principle of responsibility is applied, i.e., Polluter Pays, Beneficiary Pays or Ability to Pay. It can choose to do so either via taking action to eliminate policies and/or activities that are causing harm to others, or by implementing adaptation measures to address the harm occurring to others.

The OFD is described by the Norwegian government as a 'flagship' of Norwegian international development assistance. In terms of reflecting actions that a country needs to take to address its responsibilities under CDR, upon evaluation the OFD neither assists partner countries to adapt to climate change nor to mitigate it. The OFD is definitely not a mitigation measure – the activities involved under this programme are expressly for the continued extraction, exploitation and burning of fossil fuels. It is, in essence, contrary to what has been agreed under the Paris Agreement and subsequent re-affirmations of the developed world's commitment to the reduction of carbon emissions due to the use of fossil fuels. In 2015, a study published in the science journal *Nature* highlighted that up to 80% of the world's proven hydrocarbon reserves must stay in the ground to avoid a climate catastrophe (McGlade & Ekins, 2015). The International Energy Agency itself

has recently reinforced this reality in its 2021 roadmap for the global energy sector, stating that the world has no shortage of, let alone a need for, new fossil fuel supplies and that priority action and planning must be given to the development and establishment of a clean energy regime (Bouckaert et al., 2021). The OFD additionally does not appear to be providing partner countries with the knowledge or tools to adapt to the effects of climate change. Adaptation measures would include assistance in dealing with, for example, extreme weather or cleaning up of pollution related to oil and gas exploration and extraction activities, which both generate large amounts of GHG emissions and are often implicated in the contamination of land and water sources.

The OFD appears contradictory to Norway carrying out its obligations under the CDR framework; however, there are considerations within the framework and within the broader discussion of the North-South divide and sustainable development which justify the continuation of programmes such as this. Under the CDR framework, most parties agree that the development of the global poor should be prioritised, and to do so less- and the least advantaged countries in the world have the right to emit higher amounts of GHG and/or do not have the obligation to reduce their present GHG emissions in the pursuit of development and poverty alleviation (*Paris Agreement*, 2015). This distributive principle essentially safeguards developing nations from being locked-out of the same methods and resources that made post-industrial nations wealthy in the past. Allowing developing countries access to equal opportunity for development is crucial to addressing the North-South divide.

Interestingly, one of the criteria for partnership under the OFD is that developing countries that want to participate in the programme must submit requests to the Norwegian government, which will then be considered and only a limited number of countries will receive assistance. This requirement is in accordance with the OECD/DAC principles that provide guidelines to the OFD, but is also arguably a demonstration of the imbalanced power dynamic between countries of the global North and those of the South. The OFD is designed so as developing countries must present themselves at Norway's doorstep for Norwegian approval, whereas according to the CDR framework wealthy countries have the *moral obligation* to assist the poor. A justification for this stance may be found in their annual reports, where the OFD expresses that "assistance will not be efficient...unless truly accepted and understood in the receiving country" and that


“imposing external solutions on cooperating countries will simply not work” (*OfD Annual Report, 2007*). Essentially, the OFD was not designed to be nor is it executed in a way that imposes demands from the global North onto developing countries of the global South (*OfD Annual Report, 2007*).

The notion of respecting the sovereign rights and differences in societal/cultural perspectives is admirable; however, Norway proactively *offering* their assistance to resource-rich developing countries, as opposed to placing the onus upon them to seek assistance *and* compete against each other, is hardly the ‘imposition of demands from the global North’. Norway taking a proactive role in identifying candidates for this programme would foreseeably not be to the detriment of developing countries, but rather a lessening of their burden. Based on the principle of CDR, it is incumbent on Norway as a wealthy donor country to proactively engage with those in need instead of effectively washing its hands of its responsibilities under the guise of respecting national sovereignty and/or cultural differences.

Furthermore, the principle of CDR goes hand-in-hand with the wealthy nations of the global North then taking on the bulk of the responsibility for mitigation, namely that they must reduce their GHG emissions, at the very least, proportionately to new emissions related to necessary development in the global South. Realistically, the global North would have to impose even more drastic reductions as the world increases its likelihood of being on a trajectory that would go beyond the carbon budget to maintain global temperature rise to below 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by 2030 (Levin, 2018; Tokarska & Matthews, 2021). Within the Norwegian context, we have seen the shift in the underlying philosophy driving climate policies from ‘local action’ to ‘global cooperation’. This movement in turn reinforces the ‘Norwegian Paradox’ in Norway’s domestic policies. The continuation of sustained levels of oil production, or even more so the *increase* in the exploration and exploitation activities within Norway are contradictory to the purported goals and principles of CDR, according to the construct applied herein. In 2020, Norway increased its oil production by 20% from 2019 levels when the Johan Sverdrup field came online, and production is planned to continue to increase over the next few years (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2021).

Below is the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate’s domestic oil and gas production profile until 2025:

Figure 7 – Norwegian petroleum production profile until 2025



Source: (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2021)

This graph indicates that Norway intends to increase its domestic oil production to recreate the peak levels of overall production reached in the early 2000s, albeit with the distribution profile presently favouring natural gas over crude oil. Norway argues that this is acceptable due to its ambitious emissions reduction plans in its transport sector, as well as the integration of renewable energy into its oil and gas production operations, such as the electrification of offshore oil platforms supported by electricity from offshore wind turbines. These measures, along with strict anti-flaring regulations and Norway’s dedication to CCS, support Norway’s often repeated reminder that Norwegian crude is the ‘cleanest’ per barrel in the world. Norway’s actions to carry out its responsibilities under the CDR framework vis-à-vis the OFD is arguably undermined by its domestic oil and gas policies. The sustained high levels of oil and gas production do not enforce the notion that Norway is prepared to commit to the ‘distributive’ philosophy of CDR as that ‘space’ in the global atmospheric commons required for additional emissions from essential development activities of the global South is not being created.

In addition, based on the case of Angola, the OFD’s partner countries do not receive the necessary technical nor practical support required to set up a petroleum sector as ‘sustainable’ as Norway’s. The OFD is aware of this shortcoming, stating in its 2016 annual report that “countries that receive development assistance from Norway are becoming more interested in the transfer of competence and technology than in

traditional funding” (*OfD Annual Report*, 2016). It further states that it would look to “strengthening technical cooperation” (*OfD Annual Report*, 2016), but does not demonstrate how this differs from current practice. The creation of knowledgeable, transparent, and anti-corruption governmental and public institutions is necessary; however, acquiring or even having access to the know-how and latest state-of-the-art technology that allows Norwegian oil production to be the ‘cleanest’ is out of the reach of most of the OFD’s recipient countries.

The result is that these countries neither have the carbon budget to accommodate increased emissions from economic development nor are they able to mitigate the consequences of their petroleum production anywhere near the degree that Norway is able. The OFD, as discussed before, also offers little in terms of adaptation measures; however, the potential revenue from petroleum resource extraction could, in ideal circumstances, improve such developing country’s ability to carry out adaptation and mitigation measures in the future. Any future adaptation and/or mitigation measures that come to fruition in the future, however, cannot be directly attributed to Norwegian assistance dispensed through the OFD, but rather would be through such nation’s own accomplishments.

Sustainable Development

As discussed above, the OFD does not perform the basic actions of mitigation or adaptation to climate change as required of responsible parties under the CDR construct. Norway is, however, providing financial and advisory support to partnering countries in the interest of developing their petroleum sectors in efforts to reduce poverty. If this is the case, can this initiative still support Norway’s responsibility of assisting in the sustainable development of developing countries? This brings us back to the differences in the interpretation of ‘sustainable development’ – some would argue that no, this fails to create sustainable development because it ignores the ecological limits of the world as it lacks any real support for the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change. On the other hand, the ultimate objective of the initiative is poverty reduction through the engine of economic growth powered by the petroleum sector. This is clearly reflective of Brundtland’s interpretation of sustainable development, namely that economic growth is the main driver of poverty reduction, which in turn is the primary goal and what defines

sustainable development. As previously discussed in Section 2, there are many criticisms of the narrowness of this interpretation of sustainable development. The alternative interpretations that will be discussed in relation to this initiative are the argument that economic growth cannot (and should not) carry on indefinitely due to ecosystem limitations and the contention that economic growth does not necessarily lead to poverty alleviation or development.

According to Brundtland's interpretation of sustainable development, the OFD is effectively supporting sustainable development as Angola's oil sector is the driver behind Angola's 'impressive' economic growth. In 2019, Angola produced approximately 1.3 million barrels of oil per day, resulting in approximately USD 32 billion worth of petroleum exports and the GDP per capita was USD 2,709 (*OPEC: Angola, 2021*). However, in the same year, the number of Angolans living under the national poverty line increased from 37 to 41 percent (*Poverty & Equity Brief- Angola, 2020*), indicating that there is a large discrepancy in the distribution of wealth. As argued by Daly (1990), there is a difference between 'growth' and 'development', and they do not necessarily grow proportionately, as appears to be the case in Angola. The exploitation of natural resources, as it is widely noted, is a double-edged sword.

The Norwegian government is fully cognizant of this fact, citing the resource curse as a critical phenomenon that they would like to help resource-rich developing countries avoid. Recognising that more countries fall prey to the resource curse as opposed to not, the allocation of funds predominantly to the technicality and administration of resource management is, arguably, insufficient to assist countries to avoid the resource curse. Building the knowledge and capabilities of the local population on how to maximise the physical exploitation of their resources by properly managing the development and production of reservoirs is crucial to sustaining a petroleum sector over extended periods of time. However, revenue management is just as important, if not even more, of a predictor of whether a country will fall to the resource curse, especially when it has vast quantities of petroleum resources. The importance of revenue management is exemplified by Norway's own arguably most famous claim to fame, its ownership of the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world, which is currently valued at USD 1.275 trillion (NBIM, 2021), built upon the proceeds of the petroleum sector. Knowing this, the

OFD could have chosen to place equal emphasis on financial management *and* resource management as drivers of equitable economic growth and development.

The lack of mitigation or adaptation measures to protect the environment also brings into question the sustainability of this initiative. Proponents of the primacy of environmental concerns in the interpretation of sustainable development argue that activities that do not take into consideration long-term *ecological* sustainability are ultimately unsustainable and eventually detrimental to society. Taking into consideration that most of the world's carbon budget has already been utilised, encouraging countries to invest in a sector that contributes a large amount of GHG emissions contradicts the purpose of sustainable development. Whilst post-industrialised nations are investing in the sustainable and renewable energy of the future, initiatives such as the OFD run the risk of perpetuating the gap between the North and the South by encouraging investment into an industry that the most energy-intensive societies are moving away from, and an industry that must be reduced if the world is to avoid raising global temperatures above 2°C from pre-industrial levels. By OFD's own admission, developing the petroleum sector is a long-term endeavour fraught with many obstacles for any country. The OFD aims "to enable our cooperating countries to manage their petroleum resources without our assistance" (*OfD Annual Report, 2008*); however, they also note that it took more than 20 years of cooperation with Vietnam before they built up the capability to manage its petroleum sector independently (*OfD Annual Report, 2008*).

In addition, it is arguably irresponsible for Norway to encourage further investment into an industry which most post-industrial nations are turning away from and which the climate simply cannot sustain. Although Norway currently maintains its petroleum industry, the discussion is increasingly transitioning from 'oil as welfare' to 'oil as risk' (Bang & Lahn, 2020). As such, there are two (2) possible scenarios for the future that must be considered. The first is that there is a sharp reduction in the demand for fossil fuels in the future due to adaptation and mitigation measures employed by many countries to replace fossil fuel use with renewable energy for the sake of the planet. The second is that there is little to no reduction in fossil fuel use and therefore GHG emissions will increase, despite adaptation by the global North, as it will be replaced by emerging and developing nations through their continued economic growth. Both scenarios are problematic. If petroleum is a sunset industry, then it is misleading to encourage

hydrocarbon-rich developing countries to capitalise on their resources as they cannot rely on it to contribute stable economic growth and development. The exploitation of hydrocarbon is a viable sustainable economic strategy only if petroleum is *not* a sunset industry, which leads to the alternative problematic scenario of a continued increase in GHG emissions and a future that is unsustainable for all. The occurrence of either outcome does not support sustainable development.

The Paris Agreement and UNSDA

The goal of the agreement is the concerted effort by every participating countries to “strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty” (*Paris Agreement*, 2015, p. 3) through the implementation of mitigation and adaptation measures to contribute to the significant reduction of GHG emissions geared towards stopping global temperatures from increasing more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The OFD fulfils none of Norway’s obligations under the Paris Agreement as a developed nation that is meant to ‘take the lead’ in the fight against climate change. As highlighted in the discussion above, the OFD supports neither mitigation nor adaptation measures addressing climate change. In fact, the OFD contradicts the objectives of the Paris Agreement, such as to “[increase] the ability to adapt to adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development” and “making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development” (*Paris Agreement*, 2015, p. 3). Norway is essentially carrying out core ideas under the agreement such as international cooperation and developed nations ‘taking the lead’ by providing support, education, information sharing and capacity building to developing nations; however, these actions are geared towards encouraging further high-carbon emitting extraction of fossil fuels as opposed to supporting low carbon alternatives.

Within the context of the UNSDA, the OFD very clearly states that the objectives of the program are to assist in poverty reduction and economic growth in petroleum-producing countries. This is reflective of SDG 1, the ending of global poverty, and SDG 8 towards the promotion of “sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth” (*UNSDA*, 2015, p. 18). As previously discussed, it is debatable if encouraging developing countries to invest in and build up their petroleum sectors is sustainable, or accessible equally to all.

Although Angola since 2006 has seen economic growth powered by its petroleum sector, this has not effectively reduced the rates of poverty of its citizenry. Due to the prevalence of the resource curse, it is difficult to argue that the OFD has helped to achieve the goal of SDG 10 to ‘reduce [the] inequality within’ partnering countries, as demonstrated by Angola, nor ‘among countries’ as many of the OFD’s partnering countries still lag behind developed nations.

The OFD arguably attempts to support SDG 7, the assurance of “access to affordable, reliable, sustainable & modern energy” (UNSDA, 2015, p. 18), but petroleum production generally does not “ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns” (SDG 12) (UNSDA, 2015, p. 18). In the latter half of the OFD, it can be seen that substantial portions of the funds are allocated to civil society organisations which support SDG 16 and the promotion of “peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development...access to justice for all and...effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” (UNSDA, 2015, p. 18), but the results of these efforts are uncertain. Overall, despite its worthy intention of poverty alleviation through the encouragement of transparent and accountable government institutions in resource-rich developing countries, the OFD is a rather poor reflection of the goals pursued by the UNSDA.

4.2 Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI)

The Beginnings: When and Why

The origins of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, otherwise known as REDD, can be found in the UNFCCC. Parties to the UNFCCC recognised the importance of addressing REDD as deforestation and forest degradation are estimated to contribute up to 11% of global GHG emissions (*About REDD+*, 2016). Under Article 4(1)(d) of the UNFCCC, parties agreed to “promote sustainable management, and promote cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases...including biomass, forest and oceans...” (UNFCCC, 1992, p. 11). Parties are to further take all considerations and actions necessary to address the “needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of response measures,

especially on ... forested areas and areas liable to forest decay” (*UNFCCC*, 1992, p. 14). The term REDD+, as defined by the Bali Action Plan, refers to the extension of activities beyond the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation to include the conservation and enhancement of forest carbon stocks and the sustainable management of forests, specifically in developing countries (*UNFCCC Negotiations - REDD+*, 2021).

There are numerous reasons behind deforestation and forest degradation, but one of the primary drivers is that it is currently more profitable to cut down forest, be it for timber or to clear land for farming and agriculture, than it is to preserve it. Bearing in mind that most of the world’s remaining rainforest cover is found in countries of the global South where large swathes of the population are still poor, there is recognition that “it is necessary to establish a financial value for the carbon stored in forests, offering incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions from forested lands and to invest in low-carbon paths to sustainable development” (*NICFI Literature Review and Programme Theory*, 2016). To achieve this goal, REDD+ is “a global initiative designed to provide results-based payments to developing countries for protecting their forests and reducing emissions of greenhouse gases” (*Synthesising Report 2007-2013*, 2014), putting the onus on the international community, particularly wealthy countries, to provide equitable financial compensation for the establishment of policies and measures that protect forests (*NICFI Fact Sheet*, 2010). REDD+ is carried out by a wide array of actors from both the private and public sector, and through bilateral and multilateral agreements such as those coordinated and administered by organisations such as UN-REDD, the UNDP and UNEP.

Then Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg launched the NIFCI in 2007 to support the UN’s REDD+ efforts. Norway’s support of REDD+ is based on the Norwegian government’s belief that these efforts will make a “substantial contribution in the struggle against global warming” (*NICFI Fact Sheet*, 2010) and that carbon emission removal from the atmosphere is paramount to being able to achieve global emissions reduction targets in accordance with the Paris Agreement. NIFCI is considered by the Norwegian government to have played a significant role in ensuring that REDD+ actions were expressly enshrined in the Paris Agreement (*International Sustainable Forest Initiatives: Seminar on Evaluation and Learning*, 2017). NIFCI supports the UN-REDD+ initiative

through engaging in UNFCCC negotiations, participating in multilateral REDD+ institutions, launching its' own bilateral programmes, funding, and supporting civil society organisations, and sponsoring research (*Synthesising Report 2007-2013*, 2014).

The Norwegian aid budget funds NICFI; hence, it is another international policy instrument through which Norway hopes to achieve its development policy goals, which include sustainable development and poverty alleviation. Norway has pledged to spend up to NOK 3 billion per year on this initiative and, to date, is the largest single financial contributor to REDD+ efforts worldwide, contributing approximately 70% of global funding in the period 2008-2016 (*NICFI Lessons Learned*, 2017). By 2014, the NIFCI was Norway's largest development assistance program, making up three-quarters (¾) of Norway's environment and development assistance expenditure between 2009-2014 (*Factsheet - Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative: Evaluating for Success*, 2014). Since its inception, NICFI has disbursed NOK 20 billion and was slated to end in 2020; however, the Norwegian government has decided to extend its operation until 2030 (*International Sustainable Forest Initiatives: Seminar on Evaluation and Learning*, 2017; *Submission by Norway on Information to Be Provided by Parties in Accordance with Article 9, Paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement*, 2021).

The principal objectives of NICFI are three-fold. From its inception, Norway has worked towards ensuring that carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation are reflected and accounted for in the international climate regime. As this is a market-based policy, it is also important that action is taken prior to further destruction of forests as it is more cost-effective and reduction of emissions from such conservation is more effectively verified, thus making results-based payment workable. As forests, in particular tropical rainforests, are some of the most effective natural carbon sinks, NICFI aims to broaden their conservation to preserve the natural world's carbon absorption capacity (*NICFI Literature Review and Programme Theory*, 2016). Aside from its stated objectives, NICFI, at its launch, did not have an overall strategic framework through which to achieve these objectives nor did it have a system through which to evaluate results (*Considerable Progress for Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative*, 2015; *Synthesising Report 2007-2013*, 2014). In 2015, a 'Theory of Change' for NICFI was included in Norad's budget proposal for 2015-2016, outlining the necessary actions

and participation that needs to be carried out for NICFI to achieve its objectives, as shown below:

Figure 8 – NICFI Theory of Change




Source: (Norad 2015-2016 Budget Proposal in NICFI Lessons Learned, 2017, p. 187)

NICFI’s ‘theory of change’ above essentially involves the engagement of multiple actors at different levels of society, in both private and public forums, to take responsibility for supporting actions that are essential to the protection and conservation of forests. The main role that NICFI plays is “to support constructive forces where there is political will” (NICFI Fact Sheet, 2010) to implement REDD+ actions. To this end, NICFI engages in extensive policy advocacy activities at various levels, from international climate change negotiations to further the objective of placing REDD+ firmly in the international climate regime to establishing bilateral arrangements to increase the motivation and acceptance by forested developing countries to implement REDD+ actions. These bilateral partnerships “are an opportunity to build trust by demonstrating that genuine north-south partnerships...are possible in the climate change arena” (NICFI Fact Sheet, 2010). The 2015-2016 Budget Proposal also included a ‘Strategic Framework’ for NICFI, providing

more clarity as to the goals of the initiative and specific benchmarks by which to decide what actions should be undertaken and how to measure progress.

Figure 9 – Strategic Framework for NICFI

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR NICFI



Source: (Norad 2015-2016 Budget Proposal in (NICFI Lessons Learned, 2017)

When NICFI works with a partner country on a bilateral basis, NICFI has the responsibility to develop the framework for the partnership, in accordance with standards and regulations recognised in the international arena and in conjunction with the partnering country. NICFI is committed to fulfilling responsibilities assigned to it and as agreed to within such framework(s). The bilateral partnership is followed up through, at the very least, annual meetings between the partners as well as through reviews of the annual reports. Throughout their cooperation with any partnering country, the Norwegian government is committed to respecting such country’s sovereign rights with regard to the development and implementation of climate and sustainable development policies (NICFI Country Report: Brazil, 2011).

The Actors

On the Norwegian side, NICFI commands widespread political backing. The Ministry of Climate and Environment has overall responsibility for the initiative and NICFI secretariat is correspondingly placed within this ministry. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with its missions and embassies around the world are tasked with the duty of developing foreign policy and development policy in relation to NICFI, in addition to managing and disbursing funds under the initiative. Norad supports NICFI through the provision of technical expertise and manages funds allocated to the support of civil society organisations and research institutions.

The counterparts that NICFI works with are numerous and diverse. As mentioned before, NICFI operates in multiple arenas, working alongside multilateral organisations, directly with partner countries and/or funding and cooperation with civil society organisations, scientific/research institutions, and private sector corporations. NICFI is particularly focused on supporting national level activities and provides most of its country-level support through multilateral funds, which are able to reach a larger number of countries within the REDD+ network and establish donor platforms which are regulated by institutions such as the UN or the World Bank that minimise the potential of corruption in the handling of the very large financial transactions involved in the initiative (*NICFI Country Report: Brazil, 2011*).

NICFI's financial support to its various bilateral partnerships is reliant upon cooperation with the following multilateral bodies:

- The UN Collaborative Programme on Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN-REDD Programme), a joint entity between the UNDP, UNEP and FAO
- The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), under the World Bank
- The Forest Investment Program (FIP), under the World Bank
- The Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund (GRIF), under the World Bank
- The Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF), under the African Development Bank

- The Amazon Fund, under the Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES)

Funding and Allocation

As previously mentioned, the Norwegian government under NICFI have pledged to provide NOK 3 billion per year to global REDD+ efforts. The allocation of such funds is in accordance with agreements with NICFI partner countries. Norway's disbursement of funds up until the year 2016 can be seen below:

Table 4 – NICFI fund disbursements by funding channel(A) (2008-2016)

DISBURSEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS OF NICFI BY FUNDING CHANNEL (2008-2016)		
Funding Channel (Multilateral & BI-lateral)	Pledged funds (NOK)	Disbursed (NOK)
A. Country/Regional partnership agreements		
Brazil (Amazon Fund)**	6,000,000,000*	8,229,480,000
Indonesia	6,000,000,000*	1,294,690,398
Guyana	1,500,000,000	1,043,998,429
Colombia	1,800,000,000	210,870,000
Tanzania	500,000,000	369,118,692
Vietnam	180,000,000	170,000,000
Ethiopia	120,000,000#	272,624,308
Mexico	90,000,000	90,000,000
Peru	1,800,000,000	111,988,000
Ecuador	300,000,000	0
Liberia	1,000,000,000	247,616,000
Congo Basin (CAFI, CARPE, R-PP)	400,000,000#	947,908,000
Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF)***	500,000,000	500,000,000
TOTAL (A)	20,190,000,000	13,488,293,827

Table 5 – NICFI fund disbursements by funding channel (B) (2008-2016)

Funding Channel (Multilateral & BI-lateral)	Pledged funds (NOK)	Disbursed (NOK)
B. Global/Thematic support		
Civil Society Support	-	2,148,067,241
Bio Carbon Fund T3	-	690,000,000
Bio Carbon Fund+	-	58,350,000
UN-REDD	-	1,649,675,561
Forest Investment Programme	-	855,000,000
FCPF Readiness Fund	-	459,231,435
FCPF Carbon Fund	-	1,479,590,000
Green Economy Initiatives	-	353,390,814
Private Sector Initiatives	-	185,976,000
Indigenous Peoples	-	44,650,000
Strategic/other	-	628,729,909
TOTAL (B)	-	8,552,660,960
TOTAL (A+B)	-	22,040,954,787
Administration	-	565,676,990

Source: (NICFI Lessons Learned, 2017)

Between 2008-2016, NICFI’s pledge should have amounted to NOK 24 billion; however, the total amount disbursed to partner countries and ‘global/thematic’ support is just over NOK 22 billion. The difference between funds pledged and those paid out is to be expected as NIFCI operates on a ‘results-based’ payment scheme and the reduction and/or halting of deforestation as well as rehabilitation of degraded forests back to a level of health that enables them to act as effective carbon sinks takes time.

Criteria for Assistance

At the level of specific country partnerships under NICFI, developing countries were selected according to either one or a combination of the following criteria: (a) the level of carbon emissions from the forestry sector, (b) presence of high forest cover, but low deforestation rates which could demonstrate ‘workable, results-based approaches’, and (c) relevance of REDD+ activities in countries with drier forest types. Brazil and Indonesia were selected based on criteria (a), both developing countries being home to the largest proportion of rainforest left in the world but with rapid rates of deforestation. The purpose of REDD+ in a country with extensive forest cover but low rates of deforestation would be to financially reward such countries, for example Guyana, for the continued preservation and care of their forests. The protection and conservation of non-

tropical forests are also important, and Tanzania is an example of a partner country participating in NICFI under criteria (c).

The countries which NICFI cooperates with should have national REDD+ strategies either already in place or in development. Such strategies should take into consideration sustainable development and how such strategy contributes to the creation of economic opportunities and social development of their citizenry, including supporting and protecting the rights of indigenous peoples. They must also study what are the main drivers of deforestation and forest degradation in their countries to put forth solutions that tackle the root causes. Many forested developing countries additionally need to focus on capacity building and anti-corruption and transparency measures in their national and local institutions and authorities which are tasked to conserve forests and manage land use. The national strategy must include the establishment of systems for the monitoring and reporting of data about the volume, biomass, and emissions from the destruction of their forests. The establishment of a framework providing the legal, administrative, and economic support for the national REDD+ strategy is crucial to ensure effectiveness and compliance with the national strategy. Compliance will also likely be enhanced by clear indications of the cost effectiveness and financial rewards of the strategy (*NICFI Country Report: Brazil, 2011*).

The Case of Brazil

Brazil is home to the world's largest remaining tropical rainforest, the Amazon. The Amazon is not only home to the largest collection of flora in the world and countless fauna but is the ancestral home of numerous indigenous peoples whose way of life is inextricably linked to their rainforest. Beginning from the 1970s, the Amazon endured an unprecedented rate of deforestation due to Brazil's growing population and rapidly increasing global demand for lumber, meat, and agricultural products. A rainforest that once covered around 4.1 million square kilometres in 1970 shrank to approximately 3.3 million square kilometres by 2016 (Britannica, 2019). At the turn of the century, the Brazilian government and the international community began efforts to try to arrest the destruction of the Amazon. To help achieve this goal, as one of the first UN-REDD+ initiatives, the Amazon Fund was established in 2008 as "a REDD+ mechanism created to raise donations for non-reimbursable investments in efforts to prevent, monitor and

combat deforestation, as well as to promote the preservation and sustainable use in the Brazilian Amazon” (*Amazon Fund*, 2021). The Amazon Fund is a performance-based scheme aimed at financially incentivising relevant actors to support the protection and sustainable use of the rainforest.

The creation of the Amazon Fund, which was a Brazilian initiative, fit well with the intentions of NICFI and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed with Brazil in 2008 whereby the Norwegian government pledged to pay up to USD 1 billion for conservation efforts under the Amazon Fund until 2015 (M. of the Environment, 2018). The Brazil government had, at that point, already been recognised both domestically and by the international community for establishing a comprehensive system of governance for the regulation and monitoring of the Amazon. Brazil has laws and regulations, such as the 2006 Public Forest Management Law, which clearly demarcate and categorise different types of forested areas and what legal protections and/or stipulations are associated with such areas. The Brazilian government claims that the establishment of the bilateral partnerships with NICFI and Norway’s USD 1 billion pledge was the spark required to truly launch the Amazon Fund (*Joint Press Statement - Brazil and Norway Extends Groundbreaking Climate and Forest Partnership*, 2015).

Establishing a bilateral partnership with Brazil for REDD+ was, and is, crucial to Norway’s international policy(s) for combatting climate change. Brazil’s ownership of the world’s largest rainforest with worryingly high levels of deforestation makes it of utmost importance in international climate discussions as the development and/or destruction of the Amazon could be the tipping point in the global fight against climate change. The bilateral partnership between Brazil and Norway is conditional upon four (4) ‘pillars of cooperation’:


- (a) The establishment of regular dialogue between Brazil and Norway to discuss matters of global climate change;
- (b) Norway’s financial support of the Amazon Fund;
- (c) Bilateral cooperation for the monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in Brazil; and
- (d) Bilateral cooperation to support the development of Clean Development Mechanism projects.

Norway also considers its efforts under NICFI as furthering its international development policies in developing nations as the reduction of deforestation and the mitigation of climate change through the conservation of rainforest and reduction of emissions buttresses sustainable development efforts, particularly to peoples, both indigenous and those who have migrated to forested areas, who depend on the forest for their livelihoods. The creation of occupational and economic alternatives that are not based on the destruction of the rainforest complement Norway's support of sustainable development.

The NICFI's financial support of the Amazon Fund is directed through several multilateral bodies including: the UN Collaborative Programme on Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN-REDD Programme), a joint entity between the UNDP, UNEP and FAO, and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and Forest Investment Program (FIP) which are run by the World Bank. Disbursements to the Amazon Fund are made usually every six (6) months, sometime more frequently, based on the Amazon Fund's financial requirements and proof of emissions reduction from REDD+ activities under the purview of the Amazon Fund.

Despite the huge sums of money allocated to this initiative, NICFI takes very little to no direct action through the bilateral partnerships it establishes. The NICFI is essentially just a distant paymaster and relies entirely on the Amazon Fund for the selection, administration, and oversight of REDD+ projects in Brazil. The MOU between Norway and Brazil may have four (4) pillars; however, these are loosely defined and not binding in nature. Norway's initiative was successful in stimulating the kick-off of the Amazon Fund but it is difficult to discern any other concrete contributions to Brazil's climate or deforestation policy beyond the financial stimulus. Prior to the establishment of both the Amazon Fund and NICFI's support of such fund, Brazil had already successfully reduced deforestation rates, as show in the graph below:

Figure 10 – Brazilian Amazon Annual Deforestation Rate



Source: (Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI), 2021)

Brazilian deforestation hit an all-time high in 2004, but rapidly declined between 2005 and 2008. When the Amazon Fund was established, Brazil had several years of major success with reducing Amazonian deforestation on its own. When NICFI threw its support behind the Amazon Fund, Brazilian deforestation had been on a downward trend for years, demonstrating that international donor support is not necessarily required nor particularly impactful for some developing countries, including Brazil (Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI), 2021; NICFI Country Report: Brazil, 2011). These results challenge the narrative that a global payments-based mechanism is the best way to approach the problem of deforestation and the conservation of forests, as opposed to the strengthening of local institutions, authorities, and policies with regard to the same.

Whilst the Amazon Fund is generally regarded as “as an important example of the development of a national mechanism for disbursement of results-based payments” (NICFI Country Report: Brazil, 2011), it has not been without its drawbacks and criticisms. As noted in NICFI’s reporting, the Amazon Fund has come under criticism for bureaucratic and legal issues surrounding its application and selection processes, which have resulted in bottlenecks and many organisations not being able to apply and/or

not being selected to be supported by the fund. The Amazon Fund's lack of a long-term sustainability strategy has also come into question as, at the time of the latest NICFI report(s), it did not have a solution to address the event of deforestation rates increasing once more. With the election of Jair Bolsonaro as the president of Brazil in 2019, they are faced with exactly this predicament. Bolsonaro is a staunch advocate of the destruction and exploitation of the Amazon and 'development at any and all cost', and consequently "the rate of deforestation has soared by as much as 92%, according to satellite imaging" (Sandy, 2021) after his rise to power.

Since then, there has been a stark reduction in the Brazilian government's enforcement and protection of its forest laws. With Bolsonaro at the helm, the Brazilian government has breached its agreement with Norway by unilaterally changing how the Amazon Fund is governed. Consequently, Norway has frozen around USD 585 million in funds meant for the Amazon Fund since June 2019 (Solsvik, 2021) and such restrictions shall remain in place until the Brazilian government demonstrates that it will honour its agreement with Norway, re-establish the agreed governance structure of the Amazon Fund and continue protecting the Amazon and reducing deforestation (*Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI)*, 2021). Despite its large financial contributions to the Amazon Fund thus far, it is questionable if the withholding of this sum will exert enough pressure on Bolsonaro to re-establish protection of the Amazon as it is part of a wider global economic web, and one which is likely more effectively influenced by pressure from Brazil's largest trade partners, including the EU (Chang, 2019).

With regard to REDD+'s support of sustainable development, Brazilian environmentalist and indigenous organisations highlight the contradiction between such efforts and the "political and financial support to large-scale infrastructure and extraction projects with highly damaging social and environmental consequences" (*NICFI Country Report: Brazil*, 2011). Norway has a long history of supporting civil society organisations; however, NICFI cannot claim any direct success from any campaigns supporting REDD+ in Brazil advanced by local civil society activists. Overall, NICFI at best only has indirect influence on sustainable development as it is merely a financier of REDD+ efforts.

Common But Differentiated Responsibilities

Norad recognises that “climate change mitigation requires efforts to reduce emissions and increase removals of greenhouse gases” (*NICFI Literature Review and Programme Theory*, 2016, p. 4). In contrast to the OFD, NIFCI supports activities which contribute to both mitigation and adaptation measures, as required under the CDR construct. The halting of deforestation and degradation of remaining forests in the world is undeniably important. NICFI was launched due to the recognition that one of the root causes of rapid deforestation in developing countries is that the global market assigns more value to forests being cleared than if they are preserved. By providing a large financial incentive, namely one that is equally or more profitable than the product(s) made from or activities that can be performed on land cleared of forest, NICFI encourages local populations to stop pursuing policies of land clearance and land use which are harmful in many ways to the natural world and to people. In the global fight against climate change, this results in the reduction of part of the estimated 11% that the clearing and degradation of forests contributes to global GHG emissions (European Commission, 2016).

The funding provided by NICFI also supports adaptation measures such as reforestation, which is paramount to re-establishing the natural environment. Not only is reforestation vital to the atmosphere in terms of its ability to absorb carbon dioxide from the air, but forested areas are also immensely important to maintaining water tables and creating soil integrity, which are critical to the safety of the populations living in that area. In areas where the forests are retained but significantly degraded and have lost the capacity to perform their natural functions, rehabilitation of such areas to their ‘natural’ state also address the harms caused by excessive GHG emissions. The result of stopping deforestation, reforestation and forest rehabilitation is ultimately the restoration and expansion of healthy carbon sinks that are able not only to pull carbon dioxide out of the air, but also store it and return it to the soil as part of the natural carbon cycle. It should be noted, however, that although NICFI *finances* mitigation and adaptation measures, the initiative in and of itself is neither mitigation nor adaptation – it is a vehicle through which Norway funds activities carried out by other parties, such as the government of Brazil, to mitigate and adapt to climate change.

NICFI is arguably a reflection of Norwegian awareness of their duties under the CDR construct brought about by the PPP. As discussed in Section 2 – Literature Review, Norway has always and continues to be a staunch advocate of CCS. This is demonstrated by its perseverance in investing in the research and development of CCS technology, which many other developed countries balk at financing due to the yet unproven nature of its cost effectiveness and/or feasibility of being employed on a large enough scale worldwide. Unsurprisingly, natural carbon sinks are also of particular importance to Norway as it continues to be an oil and gas polluter. As discussed previously in Section 3.1 – The Case of Angola, Norway does not intend on reducing its oil and gas production in the foreseeable future; hence, it requires alternative methods to reduce and/or offset its emissions to achieve its stated national emissions reductions goals. Additionally, as previously discussed, NICFI is fully reflective of Norway’s present preference to interpret their responsibility with regard to climate change as a matter of ‘global cooperation’ as opposed to ‘local action’. The conceptualisation of climate change occurring in the ‘global commons’ is being interpreted as meaning that as long as a country is contributing to the mitigation of and/or adaptation to climate change *somewhere* in the world, it is carrying out its obligations.

NICFI is also a useful example of a wealthy nation employing the APP under the CDR construct which asserts if and when a country has ‘surplus’ wealth it is morally obliged to help poorer countries with their mitigation and adaptation measures. Norway had prior to the launch of NICFI been supportive of REDD+ efforts in Brazil, but NICFI formalised that existing cooperation. In the case of NICFI, specifically that of Brazil, no Norwegian government entity nor any government-linked bodies participate in directly in the REDD+ activities of the Amazon rainforest. The provision of stable and sufficient financial support to developing nations to implement mitigation and adaptation measures is crucial to supporting CDR; however, the MOU signed between Norway and Brazil states in Article 1 that the objective of cooperation is not only to reduce GHG emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, but also to develop, apply and transfer clean technology between the parties (*MOU between Brazil and Norway on Cooperation to Fight Against Global Warming*, 2008). The evaluations of NICFI to-date do not reflect the performance of this objective as there is no reference to clean technology transfer.

Further highlighting NICFI's passivity is the fact that the hard work was already being undertaken by the Brazilians prior to NICFI's partnership – the Amazon Fund was set up independently by Brazil, and all subsequent strategies and actions performed therefrom have been primarily driven by Brazil. As mentioned previously, Brazil's deforestation rate had already drastically fallen years before Norway decided to establish a bilateral partnership through NICFI. Norway's role in these activities is only that of a passive wealthy financier, and despite the large sums of financing being provided to Brazil, the real-time evaluations of the initiative in the Amazon note that many of the actions and decisions carried out by the Brazilian government and the Amazon Fund are beyond Norway's sphere of influence, particularly when faced with uncooperative leaders such as Bolsonaro and deliberate policies to weaken environmental protections.

NICFI's justification of its passivity throughout the evaluations and reports cited herein is that it is vital to recognise and respect the sovereignty of any partner country. It is stated in the country report for Brazil that representatives of the Brazilian government and the Amazon Fund had made it clear that Norwegian financial assistance was welcomed and catalysed effort because "other than transparency and reporting requirements, NICFI funding had not been introduced with a long set of rules attached" (*NICFI Country Report: Brazil*, 2011, p. 49), thus safeguarding Brazilian sovereignty, which apparently is a contentious issue for the Brazilian government. The issue of sovereignty has effectively been 'weaponised' by Bolsonaro and used as a nationalist justification for the destruction of the Amazon. Due to the nature and history of the North-South divide, Brazil's apparent desire to protect itself from the imposition of conditions from the global North which may ultimately be to its detriment may well be a case of once bitten, twice shy. On the other hand, Norway could, similarly to the case of the OFD, be taking the path of least resistance in the dispensation of its responsibilities under CDR under the convenient pretext of respecting national sovereignty.

Sustainable Development

In the MOU between the countries as well as the reporting of NICFI, the support of sustainable development for Brazil is a repeated theme. Once again, this Norwegian initiative reflects the implementation of actions based primarily on the Brundtland interpretation of sustainable development whereby economic drivers are the key to

sustainable development, even though the initiative is premised upon saving the world's forests from destruction, which implies that ecological protection is the principal consideration. The NICFI is a system of results-based payments whereby partner countries must present verified reports of the conservation of forest cover and/or reforestation and the correlated reduction of GHG emissions from such decrease in deforestation and degradation of their forests. The assumption behind the programme theory is that the increase in deforestation is due to 'market failure', namely the market's inability to assign higher value to the preservation and protection of forests than to the profits from logging, monoculture agricultural practices and cattle farming (*NICFI Literature Review and Programme Theory*, 2016). Therefore, a results-based payment scheme like NICFI sets out to rectify this market failure by financially incentivising forested countries to protect and rehabilitate their forests.

Valuing forests based on their function as carbon sinks sounds 'ecological', but in reality, it is not because forests are being viewed as having the sole function attributed to them by the market, that is, to absorb carbon emissions and increase our carbon budget to allow for sustained and/or more carbon emissions going forward. This market driven philosophy attributes no value to the protection of forests as an essential feature of the planet beyond how it serves the market. It most certainly does not consider the intrinsic value of forests to the unique biosphere they provide to flora and fauna, the homes they are to indigenous people all over the world nor the cultural and spiritual centrality of forests to many peoples. As such, the success and sustainability of a scheme based on the market assigned economic value of forests will always be vulnerable to the cold invisible hand of the market.

NICFI's results-based payment system also presents a 'chicken and egg' dilemma for many developing countries. A country must show a reduction in GHG emissions from deforestation to access funds; however, many of these same countries either cannot reduce deforestation without the injection of extra funds, or it would be highly detrimental to an already poor country's interests to prioritise schemes such as NICFI over other more immediate activities required for the development and welfare of their citizens. This was not the case for Brazil, which was already achieving substantial results with its own unassisted efforts, but would otherwise be the case for many other countries.

If most forested developing countries are facing these choices, NIFCI is hardly even accessible, let alone sustainable.

Ideally, NICFI funds stimulate existing domestic schemes and policies established by partnered developing countries to encourage them from further destruction of their forest cover and providing an avenue for financial gain through conservation. These funds can then be re-invested in other sectors of the economy and/or contribute to social development programs to alleviate poverty and improve the living standard of the local population. The protection of the environment plus the reduction of poverty are essential elements in sustainable development and are factors which NICFI could actively contribute to; however, by its own admission “NICFI has only had indirect influence on policies for sustainable development in Brazil” through its support of the Amazon Fund (*NICFI Country Report: Brazil*, 2011, p. 43). If this is the case for NICFI’s largest recipient of funds so far, it is debatable if this initiative has been designed in a way that truly supports sustainable development in developing countries.

The Paris Agreement and UNSDGs

The *raison d’être* of NICFI aligns with the purpose and commitments of developed countries under the Paris Agreement by several measures. First and foremost, it attempts to address the ways by which participants should “strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change” (*Paris Agreement*, 2015, p. 3) as envisioned in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement by financing adaptation and mitigation measures. Article 7 of the agreement acknowledges that the world’s need for adaptation measures is high, but ideally through intense mitigation measures such as the protection and creation of carbon sinks to remove emissions from the air, the need for adaptation, which is particularly intensive for developing countries which will bear the brunt of climate change, is reduced. The Paris Agreement recognises the importance of the conservation and rehabilitation of carbon sinks and reservoirs, which include but are not limited to the world’s forests.

Taking action through results-based payments and “policy approaches and positive incentives for activities related to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation” (*Paris Agreement*, 2015, p. 6) are in-line with Article 5 of the Paris

Agreement as well as Article 9, which highlights the need for developed countries to take the lead in mobilising climate financing, particularly to fund activities in developing countries. To encourage cohesive global action, Article 6 allows for the voluntary cooperation between countries for “internationally transferred mitigation outcomes to achieve nationally determined contributions” (*Paris Agreement*, 2015, p. 6), essentially allowing for the offsetting of domestic emissions with mitigation elsewhere, a mechanism that is particularly useful to an oil producer like Norway.

Unfortunately, the ‘success’ of NICFI is dampened by the fact that it is extremely difficult to calculate how much carbon has been removed from the atmosphere from REDD+ activities. Climate change has, and continues to, affect the carbon-removing abilities of forests and there is no internationally agreed verification system in place to calculate how much CO₂ has been removed and/or avoided. The Amazon Fund applies that 100 tC/ha (tonnes of carbon per hectare of biomass) is equal to 367 tCO₂/ha (tonnes of CO₂ equivalent per hectare); hence, for every 100 tC/ha of Amazonian forest conserved or reforested, that is 367 tCO₂/ha not released into the atmosphere and/or absorbed (*Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative: Contributions to National REDD+ Processes 2007-2010 - Executive Summaries from Country Reports*, 2011). This is not, however, a definitive measure. Moreover, studies show that tropical rainforests worldwide are increasingly losing their ability to absorb carbon, with the Amazonian forest in the most rapid decline (Hubau et al., 2020); hence, it may at best be folly and at worst disingenuous to rely on REDD+ activities and assume that business-as-usual can otherwise continue.

Although these approaches agree with the terms of the Paris Agreement, the criticism is that the favouring of these flexible international offset mechanisms by developed nations allows them to dodge their responsibilities whilst appearing to be committed to combating climate change and supporting developing nations in doing the same. This criticism aside, by the measure of the Paris Agreement, NICFI fulfils several significant obligations therein such as recognising that developed nations must take the lead in providing climate financing, recognising that developing countries require financing assistance for their adaptation and mitigation measures, and the investment in the protection of forests worldwide.

The real-time evaluation(s) of NICFI communicate that “sustainable development and poverty alleviation are overarching goals of Norwegian foreign and development policy... In pursuing the different goals, the climate policy and the development policy should be mutually supportive” (*Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative: Contributions to National REDD+ Processes 2007-2010 - Executive Summaries from Country Reports*, 2011, p. 25). First and foremost, SDG 1 is the ending of global poverty. NICFI provides some nominal funding to indigenous communities; however, the bulk of funds is dispersed through the Amazon Fund, which Norway has no control over. Ideally, NIFCI’s funding of the protection and reforestation of the Amazon contributed to the creation of avenues of sustainable living for communities in and around the Amazon. Furthermore, Norway has a long history of supporting civil society organisations which work towards SDG 16 and the promotion of civic inclusivity, access to justice and accountable institutions towards the goal of sustainable development (UNSDA, 2015). The data collected herein, however, cannot confirm that NICFI has contributed significantly or otherwise to poverty alleviation in its partner countries.

SDG 13, whereby parties must “take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts” (UNSDA, 2015, p. 18) is certainly reflected by the principal purpose of the initiative as the preservation and rehabilitation of carbon sinks is crucial to reducing GHG emissions. Norway and NICFI played an important role in ensuring that SDG 15 was expressly included in the UNSDA, that goal being to “protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss” (UNSDA, 2015, p. 18). However, the results of these efforts are less impressive due to the constraints of Norwegian influence given their arms-length approach of being essentially passive financial donors, particularly under the Bolsonaro regime. NICFI most certainly attempts to address certain SDGs as discussed above; however, it is difficult to gauge if meaningful strides have been made in accordance with the UNSDA.

4.3 REFLECTIONS

Based on the framework of CDR, the existence and performance of initiatives such as the OFD and NICFI imply that Norway acknowledges its need to take a leading role in

supporting the ‘special’ needs of developing nations in the fight against climate change and the achievement of sustainable development. The OFD and NICFI are, in summary, two (2) very different Norwegian foreign policies addressing development and climate, respectively, and reveal relatively divergent reflections of the principles enshrined in the Paris Agreement and UNSDA. It is noted that both the OFD and NICFI were developed on the basis that sustainable development and poverty reduction are primary goals that are meant to complement each other (*Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative: Contributions to National REDD+ Processes 2007-2010 - Executive Summaries from Country Reports*, 2011). These ‘overarching goals’ of Norwegian foreign development and climate policy mirror the understanding found in the preamble of the Paris Agreement “emphasising the intrinsic relationship that climate change actions, responses and impacts have with equitable access to sustainable development and eradication of poverty” (*Paris Agreement*, 2015, p. 2). The emphasis of Norwegian policies on the sustainable development of developing countries, at least in the data collected and analysed herein, implies that they must also reflect the SDGs encompassed in the UNSDA.

At this juncture there is sufficient information to reflect upon the research question:

To what extent are Norway’s international environmental, climate and development policies reflective of its commitment to the responsibility of the global North to aid in the sustainable development of the global South?

The degree to which the different philosophies that constitute the CDR framework are manifested and the mechanisms through which action is taken varies between the two (2) initiatives. The Norwegian government has made their stance on sustainable development and climate leadership clear – they are here to help. Be that as it may, as previously discussed, the OFD provides neither mitigation nor adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change. If anything, it will result in the increase of GHG emissions in pursuit of economic growth, which is a developing country’s right under the CDR framework; however, the benefits of such must be balanced by mitigation measures elsewhere. Additionally, the potential benefits of harnessing a developing country’s resource wealth are hampered greatly by the prevalence of the resource curse in resource rich countries such as those targeted under the OFD. In the case of the partner countries

of the OFD, most if not all have large wealth inequality gaps with the wealth of the nation concentrated in the hands of the few. Moreover, these countries consistently rank poorly in global transparency and corruption indices. It is also worth noting that despite the vast network of Norwegian actors involved in the initiative, the knowledge transfer and capacity-building provided to these countries is limited to high-level government to government cooperation and does not include technology transfers or funding that can be used to build a more ecologically sustainable petroleum sector.

NIFCI could act as the necessary countermeasure to an increase in GHG emissions encouraged by the OFD as it supports both mitigation and adaptation actions through REDD+. The world's remaining rainforests are crucial to the health and safety of all, and countries, particularly developing countries, should not have to sacrifice their forests or any other part of their environment for the sake of development. NIFCI reflects that understanding and consideration. However, Norway's involvement in REDD+ activities is limited to that of a financial donor. Whilst sufficient financial support is important to assisting developing countries mitigate and adapt to climate change, the success of any initiative is primarily due to the efforts of the people and parties who perform the work. Thus, while Norway fulfils its responsibility to support climate financing, the achievements of protecting and rehabilitating forests are squarely on the shoulders of dedicated and hardworking locals in recipient countries such as Brazil.

It may be unfair to negatively judge Norway's lack of active engagement under both initiatives as consideration must be given to the reasonable extent to which a country can and/or should go to for the dispensation of its responsibility to address climate change and support sustainable development beyond its borders. The Norwegian government cites sensitivities towards issues of national sovereignty and undue influence by a foreign nation as well as cultural differences in both the cases of Angola and Brazil under the respective initiatives. It is often the case that the engines of economic growth tend to be industries or sectors with high GHG emissions, such as oil and gas and forestry. These sectors are natural targets for GHG emissions reductions and the implementation of more environmentally sustainable practices, but they also tend to be the economic sectors that give rise to the most wariness of foreign intervention and manipulation, where such caution may or may not be to the detriment of the developing country. As such, it could

rightfully be the case that Norway's efforts can only go so far to assist these countries in those sectors.

However, at the same time, it may be argued that Norway is conveniently using the pretext of respecting the sovereignty of developing nations to take the path of least resistance whilst appearing for all intents and purposes to be championing the commitments encapsulated in the Paris Agreement and the UNSDA. This may particularly be the interpretation when juxtaposed against Norway's domestic policies related to climate change mitigation and adaptation. Norway is not engaging in 'fossil fuel destruction strategies' in any meaningful way that would separate it from continuing to generate wealth from the extraction and sale of hydrocarbons. On the contrary, the Norwegian government's deep investments and initiatives in renewable energy and other mitigation and adaptation measures employed domestically appear to be for the protection and continuation of the oil and gas regime. Similarly, the OFD and NICFI both arguably contribute to the goal of maintaining the Norwegian oil and gas regime - the OFD being the dissemination of Norwegian oil and gas expertise and the maintenance of its relevance worldwide, and NICFI as an international carbon offset mechanism for emissions from continued oil and gas production. When juxtaposed against each other, one does wonder if the results from each respective program at best cancel out each other, or at worst provide a 'greenwashed' perspective of Norwegian climate leadership at the expense of the environment and the fight against climate change.

With regard to sustainable development, it is clear from both the OFD and NICFI that the Norwegian authorities are steadfast disciples of the Brundtland Commission's 'original' interpretation of sustainable development. The nature of sustainable development in accordance with the Brundtland Report is anchored in a vision of building a 'prosperous' future in "a new era of economic growth, one that must be based on policies that sustain and expand the environmental resource base" (World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 1987, p. 11), not only to lift people out of poverty in the present, but also to safeguard the prosperity of future generations. The report additionally argues that addressing environmental harms is secondary to alleviating poverty and inequality as without tackling the latter, any endeavours to protect the environment are likely to fail. Ultimately, sustainable development is an economics-based transformation where the use of resources,

investments and technology contribute to the wealth of the present and the future, but ‘within the limits of the ecosystem’ (World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 1987). As previously discussed, the OFD clearly adheres to this vision of sustainable development whereby economic growth is achieved through the ‘sustainable’ exploitation of an environmental resource base, namely hydrocarbons. Likewise, NICFI’s results-based payment model hinges on the ‘profitable use’ of rainforests as a carbon sink as opposed to farming, timber or agricultural land.

Sustainable development continues to be a hotly debated topic today and arguably has gained even more urgency considering that carbon emissions continue to rise, and climate change is increasingly wreaking havoc on the world’s most vulnerable countries. Contemporary discussions regarding the subject increasingly highlight that economic growth is not and should not be the primary driver nor measure of sustainable development. It is a *potential* method through which to achieve sustainable development, but not the sole possibility (Holden et al., 2014; Robinson, 2004). In the years since the Brundtland Report, the ‘oxymoronic’ nature of its interpretation of sustainable development is increasingly obvious in that economic growth continues to come at the cost of ecological sustainability and protection, as demonstrated by the world’s inability to curb carbon emissions and its failure to address rising economic inequality within and between countries (Sneddon et al., 2006).

Reflecting upon the ‘quagmire’ of Brundtland’s vision of sustainable development, present interpretations stress the need for a more ‘pluralist’ approach. The impacts and implications of climate change are better documented and understood now than at the publication of the Brundtland Report and it is very clear that what constitutes sustainable development must be adjusted accordingly. Sustainable development needs to integrate long-term ecological sustainability and protection, basic standards of human well-being and quality of life, and the safeguarding of intergenerational and intragenerational equity with the express acknowledgement of the different social and environmental realities of different peoples (Holden et al., 2014; Sneddon et al., 2006).

In relation to Norway’s obligations under the Paris Agreement and the UNSDA, it has been shown that Norway’s efforts overall have been found wanting, particularly with respect to the OFD. The Paris Agreement specifically identifies that parties must work towards halting the increase of atmospheric temperature to below 2°C above pre-

industrial levels through the increase of adaptation and resilience to climate change and the financing of low emission and climate resistance development (*Paris Agreement*, 2015). The OFD purports to be working within the same context of sustainable development and poverty alleviation but encourages activities opposite to those required by the Paris Agreement. As such, the OFD also fails to achieve meaningful results in-line with the SDGs found in the UNSDA as climate action is fundamental to sustainable development. NIFCI performs better by the measure of the Paris Agreement, being a major initiative that influenced the inclusion of REDD+ provisions in such climate agreement to begin with. However, due to the hands-off approach adopted by NICFI and the resultant lack of control over where funds are directed or how they are used, despite the existing intent to support sustainable development practices, it is difficult to establish if the initiative achieved lasting and meaningful results with regard to furthering the UNSDA.

The Norwegian government continues to hold fast to Brundtland's 35-year-old interpretation of sustainable development, despite the evolution of the understanding of the concept and abundant evidence that current models of economic growth continue to come at the expense of ecological sustainability and social equity. Perhaps Norway feels an allegiance to this interpretation because it is 'Norwegian' and therefore a point of pride; reflective of a pervasive sense of Norwegian exceptionalism and a deep sense of self-satisfaction, thus reducing the need or desire for deeper scrutiny or change. Additionally, Norway's continued support of Brundtland's interpretation could be due to the fact that Norway's actions within the international climate regime are "motivated not only by the concerns for the country's international reputation as a norm-setter, but also by the desire to influence climate change agreements in line with Norwegian preferences and interests" (Cetkovic & Skjærseth, 2019, p. 1046). The OFD and NICFI indicate that the Norwegian government's view of sustainable development in developing countries has not changed for decades. Combined with Norway's practice domestically of exempting the oil and gas industry from climate and environmental policies, these actions reinforce the implication that Norway's 'preferences and interests' do not lean towards the enactment of the drastic economic and social transformations required to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement and the UNSDA.

5 CONCLUSION

In the realm of international cooperation, one must recognise the overarching influences and structure of the current ‘world order’. Regardless of its accuracy in terms of dividing the world’s countries into ‘camps’, the North-South divide remains an influential factor in international relations and global development, and the legacy of that divide continues to influence the wealth and development of every country. Members of the ‘traditional’ global North continue to profit from their membership thereof, and the disadvantages previously placed upon members of the global South continue to impede their progress. The incorporation of the construct of CDR into international climate conventions such as the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement demonstrates the reality that the core idea of the North-South divide continues to be acknowledged. The fundamental purpose of CDR, however, is not to reinforce existing inequalities but rather that such recognition of the North-South divide should serve to address the responsibilities of all countries in the fight against climate change, with sensitivity and support towards the needs of the disadvantaged members of the global South.

Norway, based on the different philosophies underpinning CDR, has the moral obligation to shoulder its portion of responsibility for the adverse effects of climate change brought about by historical GHG emissions. Norway has and continues to position itself as a champion of human rights, social justice, and sustainable development. The Norwegian government asserts that Norwegian foreign policy is fundamentally built upon these ideas, as well as democracy and cooperation through international legal norms (Brende, 2015). These intentions, however, are hampered by Norway’s adherence to the narrow and arguably outdated notion of sustainable development presented by the Brundtland Report, ultimately resulting in a discernible gap between Norwegian rhetoric and the reality of its activities in support of sustainable development in the global South.

Norway purports to support the sustainable development of the global South through the performance of initiatives such as the OFD and NICFI. The OFD provides neither climate change mitigation nor adaptation measures, and its contributions to sustainable development in partnered countries are difficult to discern. Norway’s support of global REDD+ activities through NICFI provides the financial support required by developing countries to protect and rehabilitate one of the world’s most important natural carbon

sequesters; however, Norway's passivity acts as a significant limiting factor to what or how activities are carried out by local actors. Similarly to the OFD, it is difficult to define the extent to which NICFI contributes towards its goal of promoting the sustainable development of partnered countries as all activities funded by the initiative are beyond Norway's control.

Norwegian international climate and development policies are, however, somewhat undercut by Norway's seemingly inextricable relationship with the oil and gas industry. It is contradictory that in foreign policies, climate and development policies must complement each other, whereas domestically in Norway fossil fuel production is beyond the purview of climate and environmental policies. At this juncture, Norway appears to be unwilling to address the 'Norwegian Paradox', which arguably limits its ability to provide solutions for sustainable development to the global South through the lack of meaningful recognition of the interception of economic, social and environmental limits.

The OFD and NICFI are only two (2) of many international initiatives currently being undertaken by the Norwegian government to address climate change and support sustainable development in developing countries. As with any in-depth, small-N case study, it may be the case that these initiatives are not reflective of the Norwegian government's entire repertoire of programmes. Nevertheless, considering the substantial financial resources and human resources directed towards these initiatives, there is reasonable probability that they *are* representative of a large portion of the overall activities related to international climate action and sustainable development. Further research needs to be conducted with a wider array of Norwegian initiatives directed at tackling climate change and sustainable development to corroborate the findings of this thesis and it would be illuminating to see if the underlying issues identified herein are found to be pervasive in Norwegian policymaking.

Notwithstanding the potential gaps in research and literature on the subject, these cases highlight the existence of what can be described as 'inertia' in the formulation of Norwegian foreign climate and development policies whereby the underlying philosophies and approaches to these issues have seen little change in decades. Whilst Norway lingers in its state of inertia, the paradigms surrounding the interpretation and performance of sustainable development have sparked richly diverse and revolutionary changes (exemplified by the breadth and diversity of the SDGs) representing a marked

evolution from the Brundtland era as the world strives to address the most urgent crisis of our time, climate change. As such, if this seeming gap in rhetoric and reality does not reflect the true intentions of Norwegian development assistance, perhaps it is time that Norway re-examines the foundation and drivers behind its international environment, climate and development policies to fully realise its potential as an ally of sustainable development and climate leader on the world stage.

6 REFERENCES

- Amazon Fund*. (2021). Amazon Fund. <http://www.amazonfund.gov.br/en/home/>
- Angola*. (2020). Transparency.Org. <https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/angola>
- Arrighi, G., Silver, B. J., & Brewer, B. D. (2003). Industrial convergence, globalization, and the persistence of the North-South divide. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 38(1), 3–31. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02686319>
- Asdal, K. (2014). From Climate Issue to Oil Issue: Offices of Public Administration, Versions of Economics, and the Ordinary Technologies of Politics. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, 46(9), 2110–2124. <https://doi.org/10.1068/a140048p>
- Bang, G., & Lahn, B. (2020). From oil as welfare to oil as risk? Norwegian petroleum resource governance and climate policy. *Climate Policy*, 20(8), 997–1009. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2019.1692774>
- Baumann, M.-O. (2018). Forever North-South? The political challenges of reforming the UN development system. *Third World Quarterly*, 39(4), 626–641. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1408405>
- Blaikie, N., & Priest, J. (2019). *Designing Social Research* (Third). Polity.
- Boasson, E. L., & Lahn, B. (2017). Norway: A dissonant cognitive leader? In *Still taking a lead? The European Union in international climate change politics* (pp. 189–204). Routledge.
- Bortscheller, M. J. (2010). *Equitable But Ineffective: How The Principle Of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Hobbles The Global Fight Against Climate Change*. 11.
- Borunda, A. (2019, April 22). *Inequality is decreasing between countries—But climate change is slowing progress*. National Geographic.

<https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article/climate-change-economic-inequality-growing>

Bouckaert, S., Pales, A., McGlade, C., Remme, U., & Wanner, B. (2021). *Net Zero by 2050—A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector* [Special Report]. International Energy Agency.

Brandlin, A.-S. (2019, August 28). *The global injustice of the climate crisis* | DW | 28.08.2019. DW.COM. <https://www.dw.com/en/the-global-injustice-of-the-climate-crisis-food-insecurity-carbon-emissions-nutrients-a-49966854/a-49966854>

Brende, B. (2015, March 5). *Foreign Policy Address* [Speech]. The Storting, Oslo.

Britannica, T. (2019). Amazon Rainforest. In *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Encyclopedia Britannica. <https://www-britannica-com.ezproxy.uis.no/place/Amazon-Rainforest>

Caney, S. (2005). Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change. *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 18, 747–775. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S092215650500292>

Cetkovic, S., & Skjærseth, J. B. (2019). Creative and disruptive elements in Norway's climate policy mix: The small-state perspective. *Environmental Politics*, 28(6), 1039–1060. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2019.1625145>

Chang, A. (2019, August 23). *Why Norway And Germany Have Frozen Money Going To The Amazon Fund*. <https://www.npr.org/2019/08/23/753836508/why-norway-and-germany-have-frozen-money-going-to-the-amazon-fund>

Collier, D., Mahoney, J., & Seawright, J. (2004). Claiming Too Much: Warnings about Selection Bias. In H. E. Brady & D. Collier (Eds.), *Rethinking Social: Inquiry Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (pp. 3–20). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

- Considerable progress for Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative.* (2015, November 6). Norad. <https://norad.no/en/front/evaluation/news/considerable-progress-for-norways-international-climate-and-forest-initiative-nicfi/>
- Daly, H. E. (1990). Toward Some Operational Principles of Sustainable Development. *Ecological Economics*, 2, 1–6.
- Danermark, B., Ekstrom, M., Jakobsen, L., & Karlsson, J. Ch. (2002). *Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social Sciences*. Routledge.
- De Kruijf, H. A. M., & Van Vuuren, D. P. (1998). Following Sustainable Development in Relation to the North-South Dialogue: Ecosystem Health and Sustainability Indicators. *Ecotoxicology and Environmental Safety*, 40, 4–14.
- Della Porta, D. (2008). Comparative analysis: Case-oriented versus variable-oriented research. In D. Della Porta & M. Keating (Eds.), *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective* (pp. 198–222). Cambridge University Press.
- Della Porta, D., & Keating, M. (2008). How many approaches in the social sciences? An epistemological introduction. In D. Della Porta & M. Keating (Eds.), *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Science: A Pluralist Perspective* (pp. 17–39). Cambridge University Press.
- Denscombe, M. (2002). *The Good Research Guide*. Open University.
- Dervis, K. (2021). *Devastating For The World's Poor: Climate Change Threatens The Development Gains Already Achieved*. United Nations; United Nations. <https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/devastating-worlds-poor-climate-change-threatens-development-gains-already-achieved>
- Development Assistance Manual: DAC Principles for Effective Aid.* (1992). Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Douven, I. (2017). Abduction. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2017 Edition).

<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/abduction/>

Durkheim, E. (1984). *The Division of Labor in Society* (W. Halls, Trans.). Free Press.

Each Country's Share of CO2 Emissions | Union of Concerned Scientists. (2020, August 12).

Union of Concerned Scientist. <https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/each-countrys-share-co2-emissions>

Eckersley, R. (2016). National identities, international roles, and the legitimization of climate leadership: Germany and Norway compared. *Environmental Politics*, 25(1), 180–201.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2015.1076278>

Eckl, J., & Weber, R. (2007). North: South? Pitfalls of Dividing the World by Words. *Third World Quarterly*, 28(1), 3–23. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4017790>

Ekins, P. (1993). *Making Development Sustainable*. <https://doi.org/10.1596/0-8213-3042-x>

Elgstrom, O., & Delputte, S. (2016). An end to Nordic exceptionalism? Europeanisation and Nordic development policies. *European Politics and Society*, 17(1), 28–41.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.205.1075765>

Environment, M. of C. and. (2020, February 7). *Norway steps up 2030 climate goal to at least 50 % towards 55 %* [Nyhet]. Government.No; regjeringen.no.

<https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/norge-forsterker-klimamalet-for-2030-til-minst-50-prosent-og-opp-mot-55-prosent/id2689679/>

Environment, M. of the. (2018, December 4). *Brazil* [Redaksjonellartikkel]. Government.No; regjeringen.no. <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/climate-and-environment/climate/climate-and-forest-initiative/kos-innsikt/brazil-and-the-amazon-fund/id734166/>

- European Commission. (2016, November 23). *Forests and agriculture* [Text]. Climate Action - European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/forests_en
- Fact Sheet: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. (2010). [Evaluation]. Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.
- Factsheet—Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative: Evaluating for Success. (2014). Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.
- Fæhn, T., Hagem, C., Lindholt, L., Mæland, S., & Rosendahl, K. E. (2017). Climate Policies in a Fossil Fuel Producing Country: Demand versus Supply Side Policies. *The Energy Journal*, 38(1), 75–102. <https://doi.org/10.5547/01956574.38.1.tfae>
- Figenbaum, E. (2017). Perspectives on Norway's supercharged electric vehicle policy. *Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions*, 25, 14–34. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002>
- Fisher, A. D. (2015). Legal Pluralism and Human Rights in the Idea of Climate Justice. *Oslo Law Review*, 3, 24.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2001). *Making social science matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again*. Cambridge University Press.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2004). Five Misunderstandings about case-study research. In C. Seale, G. Gobo, J. F. Gubrium, & D. Silverman (Eds.), *Qualitative Research Practice* (pp. 420–434). Sage.
- Friedman, T. L. (2006). The First Law of Petropolitics. *Foreign Policy*, 154, 28–36.
- George, A. L. (2019). Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison. In D. Caldwell (Ed.), *Alexander L. George: A Pioneer in Political and Social Sciences* (Vol. 15, pp. 191–214). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90772-7_10

- George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. MIT Press.
- Gerring, J. (2007). *Case Study Research*. Cambridge University Press.
- Harris, N. (1987). *The End of the Third World: Newly Industrializing Countries and the Decline of an Ideology*. Penguin.
- Harvey, L. (2012). *Constructivism*. Social Research Glossary.
<https://www.qualityresearchinternational.com/socialresearch/>
- Hayward, B., & Roy, J. (2019). Sustainable Living: Bridging the North-South Divide in Lifestyles and Consumption Debates. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, 44(1), 157–175. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-101718-033119>
- Hickel, J. (2019, December 6). *The dark side of the Nordic model* [News]. Al-Jazeera.
<https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/12/6/the-dark-side-of-the-nordic-model>
- Hodder, I. (2013). *The Meanings of Things: Material Culture and Symbolic Expression*. Routledge.
- Holden, E., Linnerud, K., & Banister, D. (2014). Sustainable development: Our Common Future revisited. *Global Environmental Change*, 26, 130–139.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.04.006>.
- Holloway, I. (1997). *Basic concepts of qualitative research*. Blackwell Science.
- Hopkin, J. (2010). The Comparative Method. In G. Stoker & D. Marsh (Eds.), *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (Third, pp. 285–307). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hopwood, B., Mellor, M., & O'Brien, G. (2005). Sustainable development: Mapping different approaches. *Sustainable Development*, 13(1), 38–52.
<https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.244>

- Hovden, E., & Lindseth, G. (2004). Discourses in Norwegian Climate Policy: National Action or Thinking Globally? *Political Studies*, 52(1), 63–81.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00464.x>
- Hubau, W., Lewis, S. L., Phillips, O. L., Affum-Baffoe, K., Beeckman, H., Cuní-Sanchez, A., Daniels, A. K., Ewango, C. E. N., Fauset, S., Mukinzi, J. M., Sheil, D., Sonké, B., Sullivan, M. J. P., Sunderland, T. C. H., Taedoumg, H., Thomas, S. C., White, L. J. T., Abernethy, K. A., Adu-Bredu, S., ... Zemagho, L. (2020). Asynchronous carbon sink saturation in African and Amazonian tropical forests. *Nature*, 579(7797), 80–87.
<https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-020-2035-0>
- Hywind Tampen—Floating wind power project*. (2021). Equinor.
<https://www.equinor.com/en/what-we-do/hywind-tampen.html>
- International Sustainable Forest Initiatives: Seminar on evaluation and learning* (Seminar Report No. 1/2018). (2017). Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.
- Iqbal, I., & Pierson, C. (2017). A North-South Struggle: Political and Economic Obstacles to Sustainable Development. *Sustainable Development Law & Policy*, 16(2), 19.
<http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdip/vol16/iss2/4>
- Jensen, L. C. (2012). Norwegian petroleum extraction in Arctic waters to save the environment: Introducing ‘discourse co-optation’ as a new analytical term. *Critical Discourse Studies*, 9(1), 29–38. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17405904.2011.632138>
- Joint Press Statement—Brazil and Norway Extends Groundbreaking Climate and Forest Partnership*. (2015). Governments of Brazil and Norway.
- King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994). *Designing Social Inquiry Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton University Press.

- Kline, R., Seltzer, N., Lukinova, E., & Bynum, A. (2018). Differentiated responsibilities and prosocial behaviour in climate change mitigation. *Nature Human Behaviour*, 2, 653–661. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0418-0>
- Kratochwil, F. (2008). Constructivism: What it is (not) and how it matters. In D. Della Porta & M. Keating (Eds.), *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective* (pp. 80–98). Cambridge University Press.
- Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. (1997). United Nations. <https://unfccc.int/documents/2409>
- Levin, K. (2018). *According to New IPCC Report, the World Is on Track to Exceed its “Carbon Budget” in 12 Years*. <https://www.wri.org/insights/according-new-ipcc-report-world-track-exceed-its-carbon-budget-12-years>
- Levy, J. S. (2008). Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 25(1), 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940701860318>
- Longship—Carbon Capture and Storage* (White Paper No. 33). (2019). Storting.
- McGlade, C., & Ekins, P. (2015). The geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused when limiting global warming to 2 °C. *Nature*, 517(7533), 187–190. <https://doi.org/10.1038/nature14016>
- McNabb, D. E. (2010). *Research Methods for Political Science* (Second). M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
- McNeill, D. (2004). The Concept of Sustainable Development. In *Development Studies and Political Ecology in a North South Perspective*. DIR & Institute for History, International and Social Studies, Aalborg University.
- Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil Regarding Cooperation on Issues*

Related to the Fight Against Global Warming, the Protection of Biodiversity and the Enhancement of Sustainable Development. (2008).

Moe, E. (2015). Norway: A Petro-Industrial Complex Leaving Little Room for Structural Change? In E. Moe (Ed.), *Renewable Energy Transformation or Fossil Fuel Backlash: Vested Interests in the Political Economy* (pp. 186–209). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137298799_7

NBIM. (2021, May 27). *The Fund*. Norges Bank Investment Management. <https://www.nbim.no/>

Neumayer, E. (2000). In defence of historical accountability for greenhouse gas emissions. *Ecological Economics*, 33, 185–192.

Northern Lights CCS - CO2 transport and storage. (2021). Equinor. <https://www.equinor.com/en/what-we-do/northern-lights.html>

Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative: Lessons learned and recommendations (Evaluation No. 8/2017). (2017). Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.

Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI). (2021). Norad. <https://norad.no/en/front/thematic-areas/climate-change-and-environment/norways-international-climate-and-forest-initiative-nicfi/>

Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. (2021, February 17). *Production forecasts*. Norwegian Petroleum. <https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/production-and-exports/production-forecasts/>

Oakley, A. (2002). *Experiments in Knowing*. Polity Press.

Oden, B. (2011). *The Africa Policies of Nordic Countries and the Erosion of the Nordic Aid Model. A Comparative Study*. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Oil for Development. (2007). [Annual Report]. Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.

Oil for Development. (2008). [Annual Report]. Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.

Oil for Development. (2009). [Annual Report]. Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.

Oil for Development Initiative. (2010). [Annual Report]. Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.

Oil for Development Programme. (2013). [Annual Report]. Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.

Oil for Development Programme. (2014). [Annual Report]. Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.

OPEC : Angola. (2021). Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.

https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/147.htm

Østerud, Ø., & Selle, P. (2006). Power and democracy in Norway: The transformation of Norwegian politics. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 29(1), 25–46.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2006.00140.x>

Page, E. A. (2008). Distributing the burdens of climate change. *Environmental Politics*,

17(4), 556–575. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644010802193419>

Paris Agreement. (2015). United Nations.

https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf

Paris Agreement—Status of Ratification. (2021). UNFCCC. <https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification>

Parsons, C. (2010). Constructivism and Interpretive Theory. In D. Marsh & G. Stoker (Eds.),

Theory and Methods in Political Science (Third). Palgrave Macmillan.

- Piguet, E., Kaenzig, R., & Guélat, J. (2018). The uneven geography of research on “environmental migration”. *Population and Environment*, 39(4), 357–383.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11111-018-0296-4>
- Ponterotto, J. G. (2006). Brief Note on the Origins, Evolution and Meaning of the Qualitative Research Concept ‘Thick Description’. *The Qualitative Report*, 11(3), 538–549.
- Poverty & Equity Brief- Angola*. (2020). World Bank. www.worldbank.org/poverty
- Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative: Contributions to National REDD+ Processes 2007-2010—Country Report: Brazil* (Evaluation No. 13/2010). (2011). Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.
- Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative: Contributions to National REDD+ Processes 2007-2010—Executive Summaries from Country Reports* (Evaluation No. 18/2010). (2011). Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.
- Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative—Synthesising Report 2007-2013* (Evaluation No. 3/2014). (2014). Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.
- Real-Time Evaluation of the Government of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative—Literature Review and Programme Theory* (Evaluation No. 2/2016). (2016). Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.
- Redclift, M. (1992). The Meaning of Sustainable Development. *Geoforum*, 23(3), 395–403.
- Redclift, M. (2005). Sustainable development (1987–2005): An oxymoron comes of age. *Sustainable Development*, 13(4), 212–227. <https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.281>
- Reiche, D. (2010). Sovereign wealth funds as a new instrument of climate protection policy? A case study of Norway as a pioneer of ethical guidelines for investment policy. *Energy*, 35, 3569–3577.

Revenue Watch Index / Revenue Watch Institute. (2010).

<http://www.revenuwatch.org/rwindex2010/rwindex.html>

Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. (1992). 1.

<http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163>

Robinson, J. (2004). Squaring the Circle? Some thoughts on the idea of sustainable development. *Ecological Economics*, 48, 369–384.

Roettereng, J.-K. S. (2014). The foreign policy of carbon sinks: Carbon capture and storage as foreign policy in Norway. *Energy Procedia*, 63, 6927–6944.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egypro.2014.11.727>

Sandy, M. (2021). The Tipping Point. *Time*, 2050: *The Fight for Earth*.

<https://time.com/amazon-rainforest-disappearing/>

Sneddon, C., Howarth, R. B., & Norgaard, R. B. (2006). Sustainable development in a post-Brundtland world. *Ecological Economics*, 57, 253–268.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2005.04.013>

Solsvik, T. (2021, April 14). Brazil must show Amazon protection is working, top donor Norway says. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/brazil-must-show-amazon-protection-is-working-top-donor-norway-says-2021-04-14/>

Stake, R. E. (2000). Case Studies. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (2nd ed.). Sage.

Stake, R. E. (2005). Qualitative case studies. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research* (3rd ed.). Sage.

Stevens, P., & Dietsche, E. (2008). Resource curse: An analysis of causes, experiences and possible ways forward. *Energy Policy*, 36(1), 56–65.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2007.10.003>

Submission by Norway on information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement. (2021). Norwegian Government.

Sustainable Development Index. (2019). SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT INDEX.

<https://www.sustainabledevelopmentindex.org>

The Economist. (2018, May). Climate change will affect developing countries more than rich ones. *The Economist*. <https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/05/09/climate-change-will-affect-developing-countries-more-than-rich-ones>

The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. (1989). United Nations.

The Oil for Development Programme. (2015). [Annual Report]. Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.

The Oil for Development Programme. (2016). [Annual Report]. Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.

The Oil for Development Programme. (2017). [Annual Report]. Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.

The Oil for Development Programme. (2018). [Annual Report]. Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.

The Oil for Development Programme. (2019). [Annual Report]. Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.

The United Nations. (2019, October 8). *Unprecedented Impacts of Climate Change*

Disproportionately Burdening Developing Countries, Delegate Stresses, as Second Committee Concludes General Debate | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases

[Meetings Coverage]. The United Nations.

<https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gaef3516.doc.htm>

Therién, J.-P. (1999). Beyond the North-South divide: The two tales of world poverty. *Third World Quarterly*, 20(4), 723–742. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436599913523>

- Tokarska, K., & Matthews, D. (2021, January 19). *Refining the remaining 1.5C 'carbon budget'*. Carbon Brief. <https://www.carbonbrief.org/guest-post-refining-the-remaining-1-5c-carbon-budget>
- Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. (2015). United Nations. <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org>
- Tunnsjø, Ø. (2011). Geopolitical shifts, great power relations and Norway's foreign policy. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 46(1), 60–77. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836710396784>
- UNFCCC negotiations—REDD+*. (2021). REDD+ Web Platform. <https://redd.unfccc.int/fact-sheets/unfccc-negotiations.html>
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. (1992). United Nations. https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf
- UN-REDD Programme Fact Sheet: About REDD+*. (2016). UN-REDD. www.un-redd.org
- Vadrot, A. B. M. (2020). Multilateralism as a 'site' of struggle over environmental knowledge: The North-South divide. *Critical Policy Studies*, 14(2), 233–245. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2020.1768131>
- Van Evera, S. (1997). *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Cornell University Press.
- Ventura, L. (2021, May 13). *Global Finance Magazine—Richest Countries in the World 2021*. Global Finance Magazine. <https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/richest-countries-in-the-world>
- Vromen, A. (2010). Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches. In G. Stoker & D. Marsh (Eds.), *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (Third). Palgrave Macmillan.

- Weber, M. (1978). Social Psychology of the World's Religions. In H. H. Gerth & C. W. Mills (Eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Cambridge University Press.
- Weijers, D., Eng, D., & Das, R. (2010). Sharing the responsibility of dealing with climate change: Interpreting the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. In *Public Policy: Why Ethics Matters* (pp. 141–179). The Australian National University E Press. https://epress.anu.edu.au/ethics_matters_citation.html
- Weiss, E. B. (2002). Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in Perspective. *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)*, 96, 366–368. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25659807>
- Weiss, T. G. (2009). Moving Beyond North-South Theatre. *Third World Quarterly*, 30(2), 271–284. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40388115>
- Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organisation*, 46(2), 391–425.
- World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). (1987). *Our Common Future*. Oxford University Press.
- Zeniewski, P. (2017). Electric Vehicle Policy in Norway. *Climate Exchange*, 7. https://www.climateexchange.org.uk/media/2086/eu_case_studies_norway_transport.pdf