



Universitetet  
i Stavanger

## The Windmills of Your Mind

Defining and locating identity in the Norwegian wind power-debate

Master thesis in Energy, environment and society

University of Stavanger, spring 2021

Espen A. Eik

Candidate number 4825

<b>CANDIDATE NUMBER:</b>	4825
<b>SEMESTER:</b>	Spring 2021
<b>AUTHOR:</b>	Espen Andreas Eik
<b>SUPERVISOR:</b>	Reidar Staupe-Delgado
<b>MASTER THESIS TITLE:</b>	The Windmills of Your Mind: Defining and locating identity in the Norwegian wind power-debate
<b>SUBJECT WORDS / KEY WORDS:</b>	wind power, discourse, renewable energy, policy, identity, story-lines
<b>PAGES:</b>	83

**STAVANGER**    June 15th 2021

.....  
**DATE/YEAR**

## Acknowledgements

Writing this thesis while working full time has only been possible thanks to the combined support and understanding from pretty much everyone around me. A big thank you to friends and family who have shown understanding when I was busy working, and been there when I had a chance to see them. My employer Dalane Tidende has been incredible. Without the backing and flexibility from my bosses and colleagues I could not have finished a single course, let alone a full master's degree. Thank you!

My supervisor Reidar Staupe-Delgado has been knowledgeable, constructive, supportive and always to the point in our meetings and correspondence. This has been greatly appreciated. Staupe-Delgado's input was crucial in taking this thesis from an incoherent jumble of ideas and false starts, to the finished product (and if readers still find it to be incoherent and full of false starts, the blame is mine alone).

Getting to know fellow students in the master's program has been a great joy. The corona virus meant that lunches, study groups and the shared experience of lectures and long days at the library unfortunately came to an end long before the master's program did. But hey - who had a more productive pandemic than us?

No thanks to my stupid dog, which frankly has shown neither understanding nor patience. Settle down. There will be more and longer walks from now on, I promise.

## Abstract

After several years of increasing investments in, and development of, on-shore wind power in Norway, things have come to a standstill. Important industry-leaders all anticipate a prolonged lull, they only differ on whether it will last for “several years” (Malkenes Hovland 2020) or a full decade (Andersen 2020). Things started stalling “in the wake of a failed proposal about which 13 areas in Norway are most suited for wind power” (Pedersen 2021). Debate about the proposal quickly became entrenched. This thesis maps some of those trenches by taking a closer look at the reactions to the proposal.

This is done by using discourse theory to find and describe identity-building story-lines that appear in the hearing answers to the proposal. The thesis shows that earlier research often viewed opposition to such developments as a result of incomplete factual knowledge about wind power. But the identity-building story-lines are not weighing pros and cons to reach a solution. Instead they conjure an “us” that is in conflict with, and usually threatened by, a “them”. Wind turbines and wind power development in general become laden with powerful symbolic meanings. These meanings create a sense of belonging or otherness that can crowd out facts in the discussion.

Four such identity-building story-lines are described. In the “Urban vs. rural” story-line, rural people and landscapes are the victims of an urban elite that reap all the benefits and incur none of the costs of wind power projects. In the “Humiliated Norway” story-line this perspective is moved from rural Norway to the whole country as such, as foreign investors and other nations are seen to be exploiting a naive country. The “Natural Norway” story-line operates more on a strictly symbolic level - here the norwegian landscape is itself laden with meaning and value, and each new wind turbine is a stab at the very heart of a perceived eternal and inherent Norwegian identity. In the “Responsible Norway” story-line there is a twist, as the in-group is the active part. Here, wind turbines are symbols both of a cosmopolitan responsibility, and a penance for carbon-based sins.

Mapping out these identity-building story-lines gives a new perspective on a debate that seems to have completely ground to a halt. This can again give a better understanding of what is at stake for the different actors.

# Contents

<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Abstract</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Contents</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>1: Introduction</b>	<b>7</b>
1.1: Delimitation	10
1.2: Structure of this thesis	13
<b>2: Literature review</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>2.1: Finding “identity” in the hearing answers</b>	<b>24</b>
2.1.1: Operationalizing the concept “identity” in this thesis	24
2.1.2: Variants of identity-markers to look for	24
Humiliated Norway: Energy and national identity	24
Natural Norway: Nature and norwegian identity	25
Responsible Norway: Norway as an international climate pioneer	26
Urban vs. rural: The elite and the irate	27
2.1.3: Not either/or	28
2.2: Analytical approach	28
<b>3: Research design</b>	<b>30</b>
3.1: The ontological fundament of the abductive theory	30
3.2: Methodological approach	31
3.3: Methods	33
3.3.1: Method for data collection	33
3.3.2: Method for data analysis	36
3.4: The qualitative case study	37
3.5: Reliability	38
3.6: Data reduction and analysis	40

<b>4: Analysis of hearing answers from the wind power debate</b>	<b>42</b>
4.1: Urban vs. rural	42
4.2: Humiliated Norway	47
4.3: Natural Norway	50
4.4: Responsible Norway	54
<b>5: Discussion</b>	<b>59</b>
5.1: Summing up the identities	59
5.2: What this thesis did not find	61
5.3: Against categorisation	61
5.4: Could the hearing answers have been different?	63
5.5: Contribution of this thesis	65
<b>6: Conclusion</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>References</b>	<b>74</b>

## 1: Introduction

Throughout much of 2019, Norway was in the grip of a fierce debate on wind power. Some wind power projects were compared to a nazi occupation (Johansen 2019). Saboteurs smeared feces on machinery used to construct wind farms, rendering it unusable (Toftaker and Kleven 2019). Protesters gathered on mountain tops across the country, lighting fires in a nod to the old way of signalling an approaching danger (Jenssen Stenberg et al. 2019). In other words, if this was indeed a debate, it seemed only to widen the distance between those who might be open to further developments, and those opposed.

It was in this context the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) presented a proposal for a national framework for wind power development. In his preface, the head of NVE wrote that “(k)nowledge and analyses contribute to better decisions, and can lower the level of conflict” (Jacobsen et al. 2019:iii). The first nazi-comparison surfaced just weeks later. It would seem that NVE’s faith in facts was misplaced.

But the head of NVE is not the only one to promote this view. In fact, by writing the introduction, he joined many other proponents of wind power in the belief that facts eventually will lead to acceptance of new wind power projects. This idea has been more or less explicitly stated in research and reports for close to 40 years (For an example, see Carlman (1982). This point will also be laid out in more detail in chapter 2.1, the literature review).

Norway has a tradition for dealing with conflict between energy-development and preservation of nature. In the first half of the 20th century, many rivers and streams were dammed and developed for hydropower. As the combined effect of many separate projects gradually became apparent, more people argued for the need for a larger framework. Committees worked on this issue all through the 1960s, and the first national preservation plan was presented by parliament in 1973 (Berntsen 1994; NVE 2021).

The 2019-proposal from NVE about wind power did not, however, lower the level of conflict. Instead the opposite happened. In the debate in and after the hearing for the proposal, the conflict became more pronounced than ever. A national survey found that the support for more onshore wind farms dropped from 64,5 percent in 2018 to 51 percent in 2019 (Aasen et al. 2019). An opinion poll the following year found that even though the moderate parts of the

debate still made up the biggest share of respondents (where people were “quite negative”, “quite positive” or “neither/nor” to the question of further wind power developments in Norway), this middle ground was shrinking - and the “very negative” share was increasing the most (Pedersen 2020). This is an indication of the increased tension and strained dialogue about the issue at hand.

After reviewing the many answers sent in from institutions, organizations and the public during the hearing, the government quickly decided to not pursue the proposed framework any further. Still, as mentioned - the polarization over the wind power-topic continued through the following year.

Opposition to wind farms is not new, and there have been several studies done on the topic. In addition to the idea that knowledge and facts can clear things up, another common framing is that people essentially want the same thing, but disagree on how to get there. This kind of conflict, often called “green on green”, is when environmentalists oppose wind power development, while those that prioritize the need for reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are in favour (see Warren et al. (2005) for an example. Again, more details follow in the literature review).

Another related and much studied approach is to see the resistance to wind power developments as a result of NIMBYism, the “not in my backyard”-attitude that can produce a seemingly dissonant set of opinions. A person can be in favour of wind power in general, but oppose a specific project near his or her home. Other studies have looked at the political and/or economic resistance to wind farm development (see section 2.1, the literature review, for examples).

However, despite these excellent approaches, there has not been a lot of consideration of wind power development as a lightning rod for wider identity-conflicts. As the debate on this topic becomes more tense and confrontational, it is of urgent interest to understand the underlying forces at work. Regardless of perspective on wind power developments as such - if the goal is to have a debate with mutual understanding and functioning dialogue, it seems clear that the current approaches are not working.



The debate surrounding on-shore wind power developments in Norway appears as if this writing to have reached an impasse. Meanwhile, debate on *off-shore* developments is just beginning. A better understanding of the different positions and elements in the debate can be important to avoid a similar deadlocked stand-off there. In order to fill this gap, this thesis tries to take a step back.

“It is as if nothing else matters anymore. Everything is about wind power”, the norwegian author Anders Totland writes (2021:19), describing his experience monitoring the debate through its peak. If everything is indeed about wind power, then the reverse is also true: Wind power is about everything. So instead of focusing directly on the “for or against”-fronts, this thesis seeks to identify a broader spectrum of opinions and ideas that come into play in the debate.

This is done by close reading of hearing answers related to the proposed national framework (more on the delimitation of the thesis below). Underlying this approach is the thought that opposition to, or a preference for, wind farms might not be about (a lack of) knowledge about the specific technology, climate change or renewable energy. It might not be about the specifics of placement and scale of each proposed wind farm. It might not even be about wind power projects as such. It could sometimes be about a bigger set of values and priorities that make up an identity.

Identity is in this context defined as a perceived self, and something that is constructed through discourse. The underlying assumption is that this perceived self and the accompanying perceived other, or, in other words, the in-group and out-group, for some participants set aside the role of facts as such, both in the broader debate on wind power developments in general, and in the specific hearing that is at the center of this thesis. Being for or against wind power development as such, is, in this perspective, not a question of considering the different arguments and facts. It is rather a part of who you are as a person.

Using discourse theory, this approach leads to the following research questions:

*1) What were the main identity-building story-lines used by the discourse coalitions in the debate surrounding the proposed framework?*

*2) What were the main parts of these story-lines - how were these identities constructed?*

### 3) *What may be considered blindspots in the different identities?*

Answering the first research question will give an overview over the part of the debate that used and created identity-building story-lines. The presumption is not that all the answers deployed these story-lines, but rather that a subset of the answers did. This initial categorization is done by finding story-lines that create ingroups and outgroups by positing an “us” that is threatened by a “them”. This structure is the basis of identity-building.

However, for it to be useful for further analysis, we also have to go into more detail about each identity. This is the purpose of research questions two and three.

Research question two will allow us to get a more granular understanding of each of the identity-building story-lines. What are the ideas, assumptions and values used in the construction of these story-lines, and how are they deployed in the question of wind power development? Getting more specific about each “us” versus “them”-construction, allows us to see how they function.

The third research question looks for something that isn’t there, so to speak. An important feature of story-lines, is that they simplify in order to allow wide coalitions of different actors and interests to unite behind them. This also means that there are blind spots in their presentation, facts and context that have to be left out for the story-line to have this unifying function. Identifying these ‘blindspots’ is important to get a better understanding of how these story-lines can build an “us”, and also to understand how these story-lines play out in the debate.

#### 1.1: Delimitation

There are many ways to answer these research questions. For purposes of delimitation, it can be useful to say first what this thesis is *not*. It is not a quantitative study of the hearing. I have for instance not made a statistical analysis of how many of the different answers can be said to be expressing one of the identities defined here, how many of them express two or more of them in the same answer, or whether a given combination of identities is more common within this

dataset. Nor have I set out to find what percentage of the more than 1.000 answers fall *outside* any of these categories by not employing what can be classified as identity-building rhetoric.

This is instead a qualitative case study, studying a contemporary event as defined by Yin: “Case studies are preferred when the relevant behaviours still cannot be manipulated and when the desire is to study some contemporary event or set of events (“contemporary” meaning a fluid rendition of the recent past and the present, not just the present)” (Yin 2018:46). The thesis relies mostly on an archival study of the answers sent in during the hearing period from April 1st 2019 to October 1st the same year. It uses concepts from discourse theory to summarize the data by the construction of an ad-hoc classificatory system (Blaikie 2000:143–45), where the classes are arbitrary and with no connections between them other than the basic claim that they all employ story-lines that construct an “us” vs. “them”-identity.

The dataset consists of the answers given in response to a specific policy proposal. This makes the thesis a single case study. Case studies have not always been held in the highest regard. Flyvbjerg (2006) identifies five common critiques (or, as he labels them, “misunderstandings”):

1. The general, theoretical (and context-independent) knowledge is more valuable than knowledge about the specific and context-dependent.
2. It is impossible to generalize on the basis of an individual case, meaning that a case study won’t contribute to scientific development.
3. A case study is most useful for generating hypotheses. If you want to actually test hypotheses and build a theory, other methods are preferable.
4. There is an inherent verification-bias in the case study-design.
5. It is difficult to summarize and develop any general propositions based on specific case studies.

These misunderstandings add up a criticism of the case study’s theory, reliability and validity - “in other words, the very status of the case study as a scientific method” (Flyvbjerg 2006:221).

Flyvbjerg counters these arguments by pointing out that in human affairs, there is no such thing as context-independent knowledge. Nor are there, or can there possibly be, any examples of context-independent, predictive theories in the social sciences. “Concrete, context-dependent

knowledge is, therefore, more valuable than the vain search for predictive theories and universals” (Flyvbjerg 2006:224).

The research-questions are all “what”-questions, meaning they require what in a quantitative study would have been called descriptive answers. However, the findings in this thesis do not fit the mold of a typical descriptive answer. Instead this is more akin to what has been called an explorative study. This kind of study has been suggested as a possible first step in a mixed-methods investigation, where possible research instruments are tried out and the researcher learns more about different aspects of the phenomenon one is studying (Danermark et al. 2005:153). Those who hold this view, will see the qualitative study as merely preparation before the “proper”, quantitative study.

The data set analysed in this thesis can be said to have a clear delimitation, as it consists solely of written documents, more specifically hearing answers given in response to a specific policy proposal (Olje- og energidepartementet 2019). However, the ministry of petroleum and energy received more than 1.000 replies in the hearing, so a further delimitation is also necessary. I chose to do this in the following way:

Reading through the answers, it quickly becomes apparent that many of them are identical. This is likely the result of coordinated campaigns, either locally, or in a Facebook-group or similar. It could be argued that these answers are especially important, as they appear to have formulated positions and sentiments that resonated with many different actors. However, I have chosen not to focus on these “cut and paste”-answers in the analysis. This is because I suspect that they reveal less about each sender’s individual’s motivation for, and thoughts about, participation in the hearing, than the individually crafted answers do.

I have also tried to focus mostly on hearing answers from Rogaland. When I say “tried” and “mostly”, this is because this filter for two reasons has not been strictly enforced: On the one hand, most of the answers say nothing about place of origin. Looking only at those that can be confirmed to be from Rogaland, would therefore severely limit the research material. On the other hand, I have not observed any significant regional differences in how the hearing answers are structured or what they focus on. While the names of specific mountains and regions used to argue for a position vary, the inherent structures of the arguments are similar.

## 1.2: Structure of this thesis

Starting with the stated research questions, and adhering to the delimitation described above, the thesis is structured in the following way:

The next section, section 2, shows why and how this thesis fills a gap in the research on conflicts surrounding wind power projects. First, a literature review (section 2.1) looks at previous research on the public opinion on wind power development. It finds that much of the earlier research has been done with the implicit understanding that resistance to wind projects is a problem to be solved, and that it is something that can be solved with facts.

Resistance is often seen as the result of a lack of knowledge about, and appreciation for, wind power as such. This sentiment is found also in the policy proposal that is at the center of this thesis. The literature review shows that this way of thinking has deep roots.

It also shows that resistance to wind projects often has been viewed as the product of what is known as a green on green-conflict, where people express support for environmental causes, but are hesitant to support the development of specific wind projects. A version of this, is the “not in my back yard”-attitude (NIMBY), that views opponents of wind projects as emotional and narrowly focused on their own interests. NIMBYs are believed to not understand the greater good these developments could contribute to. Again, these are reasons for opposition that possibly could be countered with the right facts.

The literature review goes on to show where there is a gap in the research on the debate surrounding wind power projects. The review posits that one should take a step back and look at these projects in other terms than the purely technical, or try to contrast the local emotions with a large-scale-environmental perspective. Instead there is room for an approach that looks at the possible role these projects can have in people’s *identities*. The review shows how one can build an understanding of such identities, starting with the idea of imposition, and of groups demanding respect. This can be done on a local, a national and an international level, creating different types of identities.

Identity is in this thesis seen as something that is developed, maintained and expressed through language. This process can be analysed and understood through discourse theory, using the

concepts of story-lines and discourse coalitions. Section 2.2, titled “Defining and locating identity in the Norwegian wind power-debate”, presents how this is done in practice by delimitation of the four main identities described in this thesis.

As described in section 2.2, one of the foundational theories of this thesis is that identity is not something that happens to you, but something that is actively acquired, and something the individual uses both to generate meaning and a sense of belonging and otherness (Versluys 2007). With this in mind, the identity-concept in this thesis is operationalized by looking for story-lines and discourse coalitions that construct an “us vs. them”-identity in their discussion of wind power projects. More specifically, there are four main story-lines outlined in the analytical approach-chapter.

In the analytical approach in section 2, I argue that three of these can be said to employ what Fukuyama (2019) calls the politics of resentment. These story-lines operate on different geographical, cultural and political scales. The “urban vs. rural”-identity constructs an “us” that consists of the rural “people”, broadly defined. They are suppressed by a more urban elite, seen as out of touch with the consequences of their greed and thoughtlessness. In the “natural Norway”-identity, the suppressed are a more culturally defined “us” that reside within the ideas and constructs used to give Norway an identity as the country was establishing itself as a newly independent country in the 19th and 20th centuries. They are under attack by a “them” that have no respect for ideals and vistas that are seen as inherently valuable and eternally valid. The “humiliated Norway”-identity is geographically defined by the norwegian borders. They are being threatened by foreign powers who by exporting value and leaving the costs behind, treat Norway like a colony.

The fourth identity, “responsible Norway”, is characterized by “us” being the active part, seeking a way to make up for previous climate-sins, and to contribute to the global solution to climate problems. A separate section makes clear that these four categories are neither very strictly defined, nor mutually exclusive. They will therefore seldomly, if ever, be observed in a “pure” form.

In section 3, on research design, the framework and research strategy for this analysis is laid out in detail, including a section on the ontological foundation. A social identity is in this section presented as a combination of two ideas. On the one hand it fulfills a near universal human

need to belong to a group. On the other hand it is also an individual's tool for agency and the creation of meaning. The research design explains how the categories outlined by different identities are not definite, instead something that can be seen as operating on a continuum between ingroupness and outgroupness.

This thesis builds on the ontological assumption that social reality is socially constructed. From this perspective, reality is found in everyday language, and can be studied by immersion in this language. In this case, the research is done on the language in public hearing answers given mostly by private citizens. An assumption in this thesis is also that there is political power residing in this social reality. The research design-section explains how this power can be analysed and understood through the concepts of discourse coalitions and story-lines.

Discourse coalitions are made up of atypical political coalitions that again can consist of a wide array of actors and organizations. These coalitions gather political power when they unite behind specific story-lines, understood as “narratives on social reality” that provide a common way of understanding an event, a debate or a phenomenon in society (Hajer, 2000). There is a necessity for these story-lines to find the right balance between specificity and general applicability to create a defined point of view and direction, while at the same time allowing a wide variety of actors and interests to partake. The research design explains how this is achieved by reducing complexity in each story-line.

In the research design there is also room for a discussion of the limitations and possibilities that lie within this type of design. As shown above, the case study as such has been met with criticism for, among other things, being context-specific and unsuited for generalization. At the same time, there are good arguments for why these aspects of the case study should be seen as positive qualities and not drawbacks per se.

## 2: Literature review

The proposed framework for wind power in Norway is a story about a failed attempt at finding a solution to a conflict in the Norwegian society. In short, it was an attempt at policy-making, as defined by Maarten Hajer: "Policy-making is not just a matter of finding acceptable solutions for preconceived problems. It is also the dominant way in which modern societies regulate latent social conflicts" (2000:2). I will in the following literature review show how previous studies of these types of conflict have approached the issue.

Discourse "influences the cultural legitimacy of industries" and "shapes the feasibility of policy reform" (Turnheim and Geels 2012:46). This explains why it is important to have a good understanding of the discourse in contested areas. Hajer's book has been the basis of several discourse-studies in the environmental field. Rosenbloom et al. (2016) used Hajer's work in combination with the multi level perspective (Geels 2002) to study the discourse-aspect of socio-technical transitions. Others have looked more specifically at the debate over windmills, often as a "green on green"-conflict (Köppel et al. 2014; de Vries, de Groot, and Boers 2012; Warren et al. 2005) . Several theses have been written in the Energy, Environment and Society master-programme about the Norwegian debate on wind power the last few years (Omholt 2020; Pfefferkorn Ruus 2019). These have been good entry points for my work.

The core argument in the green on green-conflict is summed up by Szarka (2004) as one where "(p)ro-wind advocates claim they are 'saving the planet'. Anti-wind campaigners argue they are 'saving the environment'". Some discourse studies see this as a central question for future debates as well: "This 'green on green' dimension of the wind energy controversy is perhaps a foretaste of environmental debates to come: society has gone green (at least in its rhetoric), but what kind of greenness do we want?" (Warren et al. 2005:854).

Echoes of this conflict are easily found in many different areas, ranging from emotional opinion pieces where nature is said to be the "sacrificial lamb" that will save the climate (Fjeldavli 2020), to more clinical surveys such as the norwegian "Klimaundersøkelsen" (Aasen et al. 2019). The latest of these surveys found that while there has been an increase in respondents who agree that they "feel a responsibility to support policy that reduces GHG-emissions" (from 42 percent to 45,1 percent), there has at the same time been a significant decrease in the support for more onshore wind farms (from 64,5 percent support in 2018 to 51 percent support in 2019).



Although seemingly remarkable, these kinds of gaps are not uncommon. Bell et. al, in a study on British attitudes to wind power, distinguish between two kinds of “gap”, specifically the “social gap” one finds “between the high public support for wind energy expressed in opinion surveys and the low success rate achieved in planning applications for wind power developments”, and a more specific “individual gap”, which is a sort of internal green on green-situation where “an individual person has a positive attitude to wind power in general but actively opposes a particular wind power development” (Bell, Gray, and Haggett 2005:460). Other studies find that there is a “moderate to strong support for the implementation of wind power” all over Europe, but still “the planning of wind power development appears to be a complicated matter” (Wolsink 2007a).

In Norway, scientists at Cicero sum up the same idea by saying that “national interest in the population for wind power, does not necessarily mean local interest for wind power, and attitudes to the idea of wind power is something else than attitudes to specific wind farms” (Dotterud Leiren and Linnerud 2019). However, as this thesis will show in section 4, in story-lines that engage in identity-building, this gap appears less prominent. Attitudes to local wind power projects merge with attitudes to wind power on a more general basis, both for those who are opposed and those who are positive.

The “individual gap” between local projects and developments in general is sometimes referred to as NIMBYism, where proximity to wind power projects seemingly is the main reason for opposition. The term itself became part of the common vernacular in the 1970s, when there was some worry that citizens’ opposition to facilities like waste disposal would be mostly successful. The concern was that what could have been a benefit for society as a whole, would be tossed aside because no one would accept the local costs. In the first examples of usage, “NIMBY” characterized citizens as: (a) overly emotional, uninformed, and unscientific in their opposition to these facilities; (b) motivated by narrow, selfish interests; and (c) obstructing policies that would provide for the collective good (McAvoy 1998:275). In other words, NIMBYism is seen as a knowledge gap.

It is not hard to find examples in the literature of formulations that seem to imply that the sentiments from NIMBY apply, and that those who oppose wind farms are assumed to not really know what they’re talking about. Going all the way back to 1982, it was said that people in Sweden who were sceptical to the idea of a possible wind farm nearby either took a too dark

view of the impact, or didn't fully realize how much power wind turbines could produce: "The attitudes towards wind power were generally positive, although many people overestimated certain negative effects and underestimated the output from the prototypes" (Carlman 1982).

Other early research into perceptions of wind power also stressed that "knowledge about the characteristics of wind turbines was small in all groups, as was knowledge about the amount of energy wind turbines yield." Without this information, "the influence of personal psychological factors on the attribution of results will be considerable" (Wolsink 1988:327). The latter interpretation leaves little room for other information, or for different perspectives. It seems that either you know how much energy the proposed wind farm will produce, or your answer is determined by "personal psychological factors".

However, the actual debates around wind farms are more nuanced than just "green on green"-conflicts, or an uninformed "not in my neighbourhood"-reflex from those closest to the areas that might be developed. Society as such has not "gone green", and there are other issues than environment, climate, wind turbine efficiency and people's backyards that also come into play here. The narrow focus might be a consequence of what Ellis et al. (2007) argue, namely that research on public perception of wind power to a large extent has been done from a specific point of view.

(...) there has been much academic and policy-orientated research on public attitudes to wind farms, with a particular emphasis on understanding the 'problem' of objection, to the neglect of exploring the basis of support. The ideological (i.e. unreflectively pro-wind) and epistemological (i.e. unreflectively positivist) bias has led to poor explanatory findings, which in turn has resulted in ineffective policy. (Ellis et al. 2007:536)

The authors argue that opposition to wind farms has been marginalized and denigrated, "failing to acknowledge that each individual's position is informed by personal and collective values that are deeply held, aspirational and often well intentioned" (Ellis et al. 2007:536).

Outside of academia there have been several examples of trying to turn NIMBY into a description of positive values, including in the current Norwegian debate - "What's wrong with

NIMBY? We all have a backyard, an area close to home that means something to us” (Lund 2020). The overall connotation of the expression, however, is still to “imply an absence of social conscience” (Kinder 2020), or to describe situations where “local opinion reacts negatively to an initiative that is seen as a positive thing on the national level (...)” (Hofstad 2015).

On top of that, findings indicate that the NIMBY-reflex is becoming less of a factor in people’s attitudes to wind farms (Devine-Wright 2009; Perlaviciute et al. 2018; Wolsink 2007b). This, Warren et. al argue, suggests that “its prevalence in early surveys is dwindling as society becomes familiar with the reality (as opposed to the uncertain prospect) of wind farms”, and that “other key influences on public attitudes” can be “local perceptions of economic impacts, the national political environment surrounding wind power, and institutional factors” (Warren et al. 2005:858).

The introduction of a national framework for wind power in Norway was presented as an invitation to a constructive debate about the amount and placement of wind farms in Norway. “Knowledge and analyses contribute to better decisions and can lower the level of conflict”, the head of NVE wrote in his introduction (Jacobsen et al. 2019). But the very status and possible function of facts has been questioned in other research. The following paragraph is from 2007, but could have been written to describe the debate in Norway in 2019:

(P)olicy makers and proponents of wind power usually also assume that improving knowledge among the public will enhance positive attitudes. Although there is nothing wrong with the idea of improving public knowledge about renewables, this is not likely to change attitudes. Many ‘facts’ about wind power, ranging from its environmental soundness to the dangers posed to a reliable power supply, are contested and used by both supporters and sceptics. (Wolsink 2007a:2696)

Thygesen and Agarwal also point out that “wind energy deployment is not only about ‘facts’ but also clashes of values and debates over what sort of sustainable future we want” (2014:1021).

The Wolsink-article above deals with the landscape’s importance for how debates on wind power play out - in other words, it is a version of the green on green-conflict. As this thesis is looking to broaden that perspective a bit, we must look for a way to deploy the values and

facts-perspective on a wider platform. I will in the following show how a concept from Pasqualetti's article "Opposing wind energy landscapes" (2011) makes this possible.

It would be unfair to call Pasqualetti's article denigrating, but the starting point is clearly that opposition to windmills is in itself a problem: "mounting public opposition to the landscape changes it produces" is threatening the expansion of "local, sustainable, affordable, and carbon free" power production (Pasqualetti 2011:907). The article goes on to identify five core issues that can be found in wind farm-debates in different places. Four of these might have some issues with discriminant validity: Immobility of wind farms, immutability of the changes wind farms bring to a landscape, solidarity between land and life, and the threat to place identity seem at times like interchangeable issues. But there is also a fifth category. Pasqualetti calls it "imposition".

It stems from the belief that such wind projects are someone else's idea, for someone else's benefit, and for someone else's profit. To one degree or another, local residences from desert to coastline, from Scotland to Mexico, were asked to bear costs for the production of something that would not flow to them directly and would not be in their best interest to support. (Pasqualetti 2011:915–16)

This idea of "imposition" opens for a wider perspective than many previous studies on the debate over wind power. Foreign ownership of energy systems "has often been highly controversial", because it can be perceived as a link to a foreign government's agenda (Högselius 2019:143–44). Imposition implies that resistance does not stem primarily from a demand for untouched mountaintops or a less noisy backyard. Nor does it have much to do with knowing how much power a wind turbine can produce, or how much a specific wind project will reduce global GHG emissions. Instead it has to do with more fundamental things like respect, and a feeling of group identity - why should my group have to bear the cost of something that benefits another group?

If the processes surrounding energy projects, such as the decision-making and public consultations are believed to be "exclusive, secretive or inequitable", this may "threaten place-related self-efficacy" (Devine-Wright 2009:435). These threats "may be especially prevalent when a place is symbolic of "home", and when energy technologies are believed to be

“imposed” upon places by companies or state organizations without genuine public engagement” (ibid). This mechanism can explain conflicts on two levels, both within a nation, and internationally. Within a country’s borders the conflict can be between people who see themselves as being on the margins, overrun by companies or state organizations that are perceived as closer to a more central power. This idea is further developed in the “Urban vs. rural”-identity outlined in this thesis. I will explain in the following why the mechanism also works if “home” is more broadly defined as “home country”.

The concept of a “national identity” is worth examining in relation to environmental issues such as renewable energy, as these issues to a very large degree are international in nature. This makes it possible to formulate hypotheses like “if the ecological state is increasingly an international creation that is dependent on international cooperation, then it must be prepared, at least in some sense, to serve purposes beyond itself” (Eckersley 2016:182).

Just a few years back researchers could state that the official Norwegian discourse “accepts without question the responsibility of developed countries to lead in mitigation, adaptation, climate finance, and the provision of other forms of assistance to developing countries”, and that the same discourse implies that Norway should “assume this responsibility without waiting for other developed countries to act” (Eckersley 2016:191). However, that does not seem like a fitting description of the recent and current debate surrounding wind power.

One of the underlying assumptions in this thesis is that perceptions of identity can be involved when there is a discrepancy between a situation that is “accepted without question” and one that leads to conflict. Devine-Wright has shown how the concept of “place identity” can be defined as “the ways in which physical and symbolic attributes of certain locations contribute to an individual’s sense of self or identity” (Devine-Wright 2009:428). Changes can make explicit bonds between person and location that earlier were left unexpressed. This can in turn result in “emotional responses” and “a sense of displacement that can lead to psychiatric trauma” (ibid). When researching attitudes to a Norwegian hydropower development, Vorkinn and Riese found that “(a)lthough place attachment may be an important factor in explaining opposition to environmental degradation among the inhabitants in the community where the degradation will take place, place attachment may be unimportant for opposition on a national level (unless the area has some national symbolic value)” (2001:250). This thesis is not focused on individual reactions to place-specific landscape changes. I will therefore in the following show how Norway

can be said to have a specific discursive context for issues of “place identity” (and/or “place attachment”) that allows us to expand the use of this concept from the individual to the national level.

In Norway, there is a strong relationship between the areas most suited for on-shore wind power and what can be seen as the core of norwegian identity. In the first part of the 1800s, as Norway was separating from Denmark, the mountains served as a distinguishing feature, making a striking contrast to the flat, danish landscape. What was previously thought of as terrifying and hideous parts of the country, were in the span of just a few decades turned into an essential part of a Norwegian’s idea of herself (Slagstad 2018). This was done through discourse. Artists taught people where to look, but also *how* to look. For example, the painter I. C. Dahls romantic tableaus of dramatic and majestic features of the norwegian mountains “contained both something that had been, and an expectation of something to come. Dahl’s landscape was nationalized nature. The character of the nature gave the nation a character” (Slagstad 2018:15). In other words, the mountains themselves, as they have been represented and imbued with meaning, define an identity.

Fukuyama writes about identity as something that grows out of a desire for respect and recognition. These impulses can lead down different paths. While the political left focuses on the interests of various marginal groups and their political, economic and cultural standing in greater society, the right emerges as “patriots who seek to protect traditional national identity” (Fukuyama 2019:7). One of the ways this manifests is in what Fukuyama calls “politics of resentment”. This is when a group gathers political momentum based on the idea that “the group’s dignity had been affronted, disparaged, or otherwise disregarded”. When these feelings emerge, they bring with them demands for dignity. The combination is powerful: “A humiliated group seeking restitution of its dignity carries far more emotional weight than people simply pursuing their economic advantage” (Fukuyama 2019:7).

At the same time, “Norwegian discourse frames Norway’s role as a climate pioneer, example-setter, front runner, and leader” and evokes “a cosmopolitan narrative of connections to, and ‘enlarged responsibility’ towards, others in a global community”. Even though Norway is not fulfilling its stated climate ambitions, “the identity that is summoned in the discourse nonetheless provides a legitimating rationale for fulfilling the international obligations and norms” (Eckersley 2016:192 and 195).

Analysing the debate about the proposed framework with these different identities in mind, can allow for a different perspective than those described and criticized by Ellis et al. (2007). The following section will show how different identities can be defined and situated in the data set used in this thesis.

## 2.1: Finding “identity” in the hearing answers

### 2.1.1: Operationalizing the concept “identity” in this thesis

Identity will in this context be defined as a perceived self, something that is actively constructed through discourse. This is not necessarily straight-forward. Versluys (2007) highlights some of the paradoxes in the way discourse analysis uses and defines the identity-construct with "vague assertions and disturbing inconsistencies" (p. 92) While I acknowledge these complications, I still consider it useful for the purposes of this thesis to use Versluys' own basic formulation as a starting point. Identity is, she writes, “in many cases interpreted as 'people's sense of what, who or where they belong to’” (2007:90). Identity is not something that happens to you. It is actively acquired as “the product of an act of self-definition”. This in turn “leads to the generation of a notion of 'otherness’” (Versluys 2007:90).

With this in mind, the markers I will look for in the research material for this thesis can be summed up like this: **Story-lines and discourse coalitions that use the act of identity-construction to create a sense of belonging (or otherness) as arguments for or against the proposed framework for wind power development in Norway.**

### 2.1.2: Variants of identity-markers to look for

#### *Humiliated Norway: Energy and national identity*

According to Fukuyama, identity is something that grows out of a desire for respect and recognition (Fukuyama 2019). While this leads the political left to concentrate on the rights and interests of marginal groups, the political right will work towards protecting a national identity. Presenting as a group who has been stripped of dignity, can provide an emotional heft that trumps many other arguments. This is what Fukuyama calls the politics of resentment. This model can also be applied in questions of energy production: Energy production is national, but technology, know-how and the energy itself will be both sourced and used across borders. And while environmental issues are international in nature, they will often require national and/or regional solutions. Therefore, the concept of a “national identity” is worth examining.

As described in the literature review, Norway's largely unquestioned identity as a responsible leader in environmental issues, has been under strain lately. Using the idea of “politics of resentment” as a starting point for what we can call the “humiliated Norway”-identity, I locate and



describe story-lines that are most closely associated with this position. It has previously been noted that when energy projects are presented as “occasions when local places must be ‘sacrificed’ in order to deal with climate change”, it can “stimulate a sense of threat in those strongly attached to the locality” (Devine-Wright 2009:434). In this story-line, as we will see, the wind turbines are symbols of oppression coming from outside Norway’s borders.

### *Natural Norway: Nature and norwegian identity*

All energy projects come with costs to the natural environment. In order to produce energy, specific places will be altered, often permanently. When studying how place attachment influenced opinions on a Norwegian hydropower development, researchers found that “(a)lthough place attachment may be an important factor in explaining opposition to environmental degradation among the inhabitants in the community where the degradation will take place, place attachment may be unimportant for opposition on a national level (unless the area has some national symbolic value)” (Vorkinn and Riese 2001:250). I will in the following argue that for wind power, many of the areas used have a “national symbolic value”. This is because there is a relationship between the areas most suited for on-shore wind power and what can be seen as the core of norwegian identity.

In the first part of the 1800s, Norway was separating from a union with Denmark. Mountains, previously thought of as a dangerous wasteland, were turned into a symbol of timeless beauty and steadfastness. (Slagstad 2018). The norwegian philosopher Gunnar Skirbekk has written about this. While acknowledging the inherent flair and irony in his writing style, it can be useful to look at the framework he describes. Skirbekk posits that the French primarily will see nature either as the provider of the necessary means for survival, or as an object for aesthetic experience, while the Germans tend to be overly romantic and feel that nature has been crushed by technology and human hubris. Norwegians, however, develop closer ties to the physical environment where they grow up, and with that, an understanding that we also belong in nature - as a small and vulnerable part of it (Skirbekk 1981).

Skirbekk also describes how the Norwegian state in its early days after the union, lacking a nobility and imposing architecture to build credibility on the international stage, instead turned to nature as a replacement.

This was a perspective on nature that can not be described as just providing raw materials, or as an object for passive, aesthetic experience. This is nature as the foundation for self-respect and self-understanding. *United and loyal until the mountains of Dovre crumble*. The new Norway was built on actual bedrock. You swore on nature, for national unity. In a very distinct way, nature became the foundation for the national identity. (Skirbekk 1981:123–24)

This was done through discourse. Artists taught people where to look, but also *how* to look, as described by Slagstad (2018). In short, this process defined an “us” that is the basis of a story-line still in use, and still flexible enough to be applied to different causes and debates. I will therefore use the idea of “nationalized nature” as a starting point for what we can call the “natural Norway”-identity, and locate and describe the identity-building story-line that is most closely associated with this position in the debate on further development of wind power.

#### *Responsible Norway: Norway as an international climate pioneer*

Norwegian identity is not always about looking inwards and upwards, to the nearest mountain top or windswept birch tree grove. As mentioned above, there is also a part of identity-building discourse that is outward-facing, and eager to place Norway in relation to other countries in the environmental field. More specifically, this story-line aims to define Norway as a climate pioneer and leader.

To do this, Eckersley (2016) writes, the discourse evokes “a cosmopolitan narrative of connections to, and ‘enlarged responsibility’ towards, others in a global community”. This identity is largely framed as an outreach, a “broader overseas development philosophy that seeks to reduce inequalities of wealth, income, and opportunity in the world and close the development gap.” Norwegian success, both economically and morally, means that the country should assist others. The “various responsibilities arise by virtue of Norway’s status as one of the richest countries in the world, from its self-understanding as a good state and a good people, and from its role as a major exporter of oil and gas” (Eckersley 2016:192).

This last part “confers a particular responsibility to provide a more climate friendly option for using fossil fuels, including coal, during the transition to a low carbon energy system” (Eckersley

2016:192). Even though Norway is not fulfilling its stated climate ambitions, “the identity that is summoned in the discourse nonetheless provides a legitimating rationale for fulfilling the international obligations and norms”. Norway’s global role is seen as “to be good and benevolent towards others who are less fortunate because Norway is blessed with good fortune and wishes to extend this to others” ([Eckersley, 2016, s. 195](#)). While outward-facing, these obligations could also be used as arguments for building wind farms in Norway. By showing that Norwegians are willing to use their own nature for this purpose, the country gains a stronger moral position and more leverage when promoting wind farms elsewhere. I will therefore use the idea of “international obligations” as a starting point for what we can call the “responsible Norway”-identity, and locate and describe story-lines that are most closely associated with this position.

#### *Urban vs. rural: The elite and the irate*

Fukuyama’s “politics of resentment”-model can also be applied within Norwegian borders. In this case, the group whose dignity has been affronted is not “Norwegians”, but instead defined parts of the population. The most clear cut example of this in the Norwegian wind power-debate, is the indigenous Sami-people. From their perspective, wind power-developments can be seen as threats to a traditional way of life by negatively affecting how reindeer move and thrive across the northern plains. This is an obvious example of identity politics. It is also a conflict where the different parties to a very large degree are defined by history, lifestyle, language and existing political structures, rather than by discourse as such. I have therefore chosen not to delve further into this specific conflict in the thesis.

There is, however, a group that is more loosely defined, where the split between an “us” and a “them” is not to the same extent defined by different histories or societal structures. The split between the urban elite and the rural everyman is, in an egalitarian society like Norway, to a larger degree defined in the discourse.

As explained above, “politics of resentment” arises when a group gathers political momentum based on the idea that “the group’s dignity had been affronted, disparaged, or otherwise disregarded” (Fukuyama, 2019, s. 7). As I will show in section 4.1, one of the main story-lines in the debate surrounding the proposed national framework for wind power developments presented the rural “common people” as victims of an urban elite that did not have to bear the

consequences of their decisions. Using the idea of “the elite” versus “the people” as a starting point for what we can call the “urban vs. rural”-identity, this thesis locates and describes the story-line that is most closely associated with this position.

### 2.1.3: Not either/or

The identities described here will rarely, if ever, be observed in “pure” form. It is therefore important to describe the mechanisms and structures that produce a more varied result.

In the social sciences, a social identity combines two ideas. It is based on the universal human need to belong to or be a member of a group, while it at the same time “makes clear that identity is very often an instrument of agency and a source of meaning for the actors themselves.” Identity is in this regard used in the research to describe “a certain sense of belonging, reflecting people's need to define themselves and others” (Versluys 2007:90). Constructing and managing social identities is “done through discourse and by means of various linguistic mechanisms and strategies”, writes Duszak (2002, s. 1). This doesn't mean that there is a definite grouping. Identity is not fixed in a limited set of categories. Instead each person can have different positions on a continuum between “ingroupness” and “outgroupness” (Duszak 2002).

In a similar vein, Versluys also warns against “an obsessive wish to fix and to clarify, a human reaction to the rather awkward reality of multiplicity”. She reminds researchers about the responsibility “to remain conscious of this human need to simplify, closely taking care we don't let it slip into our research” (2007:92). The same applies in questions of wind power. In this area, as in others, “identity” is a concept that operates on a continuum.

For the above stated reasons, the observable manifestations of these identities will be nuanced, and they will at times appear self-contradictory.

## 2.2: Analytical approach

I will in the following briefly summarize how the literature review is used in the analytical approach in this thesis. The review above shows where there is a gap in the research on the public reception of wind power developments. A simplified way of describing this gap could be to say that while much of the earlier research has started with the wind turbines as a technical

device capable of producing a given amount of power, and/or a predetermined good that people should/would learn to appreciate. These approaches start with the turbine and look out towards the reception. This thesis, on the other hand, starts from the outside and looks towards the wind turbines. The idea is that by describing wind power projects from different, specific angles, one can also describe the framework that makes the development of wind power look this way from these specific viewpoints. I leave aside technical aspects of the turbines and projects, and instead, look for symbolic meanings and how the turbines fit into existing value systems. I look for instances of identity-building, meaning statements and story-lines that imply an in-group and out-group, or, in other words, an “us” versus “them”.

As will be explained in more detail in section 3.2 on the methodological approach, this is achieved with discourse theory, which allows us to break down a debate into separate strands called story-lines. Close-reading of different story-lines lets us analyze how the different values and models presented in the literature review function as a filter through which the different participants view the wind turbines. Is the wind turbine seen as a threat to the fundamental principles of a sovereign nation, or is it providing leverage on an international stage? Does the wind turbine cause mental harm to people nearby? Does it manifest a thoughtless abuse by an urban elite? Based on the literature review above, these kinds of questions mark the start of the analytical approach in this thesis.

### 3: Research design

The source material for this thesis are the answers submitted in the hearing for the proposed national framework for wind power (Olje- og energidepartementet 2019) (see introduction for further delimitation of the data). To find answers in this material, I have used an abductive approach. There has been little research on how larger identity-issues affect the debate over wind power development, which means that the thesis also will use elements of grounded theory.

With the abductive strategy, theory is used with observation to produce interpretation. This is in contrast to the inductive strategy, where the goal is to infer generalization. It also differs from a deductive strategy, where the result follows logically from the premises. Abduction is more about getting to a *plausible interpretation* (Dey 2004:91). Through abduction ideas about a given phenomenon are placed within a new frame, allowing us to move from one conception of something on to another “possibly more developed or deeper conception” of the same thing. In short, the abductive strategy is about how science is not just description, but also re-description (Danermark et al. 2005:91–93).

Researchers using grounded theory (GT) argue that theory generation is the “result of a research process, which provides the best results if one follows certain procedures in a rigorous and systematic way” (Danermark et al. 2005:131). GT requires what Dey refers to as “an innovative approach to data selection” that involves “a process of ‘theoretical sampling’ of successive sites and sources, selected to test or refine new ideas as these emerge from the data” (Dey 2004:80). In practice, for this thesis, it meant reading and re-reading the answers sent in to the proposed national framework for wind power development, and developing ideas about identity from the data (more on this in section 3.3 on Methods).

#### 3.1: The ontological fundament of the abductive theory

Blaikie highlights the constructivist view of social reality inherent in the abductive strategy. The ontological assumption in the abductive strategy is that “social reality is socially constructed and is seen to reside in lay language. Knowledge of this reality is produced by ‘immersion’ in it” (Blaikie 2000:120).

This can be defined as an anti-essentialist ontology, meaning that from this perspective, there isn't one reality adhering to the laws of nature. Instead, there are multiple realities, all socially constructed, that exist in parallel. In interpretative environmental policy research, "it is not an environmental phenomenon in itself that is important, but the way in which society makes sense of this phenomenon" (Hajer and Versteeg 2005:176). This makes analysis essential.

Analysing multiple realities, all of them socially constructed - it can sound like tennis without a net. However, a realist approach to socially constructed views of reality acknowledges that there are several limiting factors on how the discourse plays out. By pointing out institutional limits, physical limitations and the limits made by imperatives, certain boundaries are imposed on how to make sense of any given phenomenon. It also takes into account functions that «governments of most contemporary nation states must fulfill», such as maintaining domestic order and sustaining economic growth (Ockwell and Scrase 2009:40). The task of the researcher remains the same: In order to gain insight from the analytic approach, he or she must interpret the sources, thereby "understanding the social world people have produced and which they reproduce through their continuing activities" (Blaikie 2000:115).

Danermark et. al. sums it up concisely:

Abduction is to move from a conception of something to a different, possibly more developed or deeper conception of it. This happens through our placing and interpreting the original ideas about the phenomenon in the frame of a new set of ideas. (Danermark et al. 2005:91)

### 3.2: Methodological approach

Discourse theory provides us with concepts that can be used to locate the empirical regularities needed to get started with an abductive strategy. For this thesis, the concepts of discourse coalitions and story-lines are the most important.

Discourse coalitions are defined as “various unconventional political coalitions, each made up of such actors as scientists, politicians, activists, or organizations representing such actors”, that also can have links to “specific television channels, journals and newspapers, or even celebrities” (Hajer, 2000, pp. 12–13). Political power in coalitions arises when they “group around specific story-lines that they employ whilst engaging in environmental politics” (Hajer, 2000, p. 13). Story-lines are «narratives on social reality» that provide actors with symbolic references that, when viewed together, suggest a common way of understanding. A story-line can reduce the complexity that comes with having many people and multiple organisations approaching the same subject, each with their own ideas, values and opinions. The result of this loss of meaning is that actors can seem to reach a common understanding, and «create possibilities for problem closure» (Hajer 2000; Ockwell and Scrase 2009).

Hajer's stance is that story-lines are important because "much communication is in fact based on interpretive readings, on mulling over and measuring statements in terms of whether they "sound right" (Hajer 2004:302). If it doesn't “sound right”, the result can be a divide between groups, between an “us” and a “them”. In short, it can define the boundaries of identities. “The construction and the management of social identities are done through discourse and by means of various linguistic mechanisms and strategies”, writes Duszak (2002:1). This doesn't mean that there is a definite grouping, that identity is fixed in a limited set of categories. Instead each person can have different positions on a continuum between “ingroupness” and “outgroupness” (Duszak 2002).

The same applies to questions of wind power. Also in this area, “identity” should be seen as a socially constructed idea that operates on a continuum. There is no law of nature that says Norwegians have to go forth as leading examples in mitigating the effects of climate change, nor is there any such law that says that Norwegian identity is something that follows from having a horizon filled with quiet, untouched mountaintops.

In the social sciences, a social identity combines two ideas. It is based on the universal human need to belong to or be a member of a group, while it at the same time “makes clear that identity is very often an instrument of agency and a source of meaning for the actors themselves.” Identity is in this regard used in the research to describe “a certain sense of belonging, reflecting people's need to define themselves and others” (Versluys 2007:90). This aligns with the usage in this thesis.



In Hajer's view, debates over environmental problems have no epistemological unity and no definite pro and con that actors debate. It is instead "to be seen as a complex and continuous struggle over the definition and the meaning of the environmental problem itself" (Hajer, 2000, p. 15). In this instance we can say that wind turbines are not just wind turbines. Expanding on this, and going back to Fukuyama's "politics of resentment", we could say that the debate on wind power is not even "an environmental problem" at all for some of the most vocal participants. Rather, it might be that wind turbines fit into an already existing storyline that goes beyond environmental considerations. What can be presented as for instance green on green-rhetoric, can come across as something that sounds just as much like a demarcation of an identity. For instance, is the following an environmentalist's argument for the preservation of nature, or has that specific storyline shown itself flexible enough to also be of use for a sentiment that originates somewhere else entirely?

Norway doesn't need wind power. (...) It is Høyre's longing for even more globalization that underlies their hospitality towards those who want to destroy Norwegian nature. Foreigners are given a free pass along the Norwegian coast - so that they don't have to ruin their own nature. This is globalization in practice. (Larsen 2020)

### 3.3: Methods

This thesis is a descriptive, single case archival study of the hearing answers to the proposed framework from NVE. The difference between this and a broader case study, is that the case study deals with what is referred to as "a full variety of evidence" (Yin 2018:46). As this thesis was conceived of and written during the Covid-19 pandemic, I have not conducted interviews nor done field observations for this study. I will in the following describe the method for collecting data, and then move on to the method used to analyse this data.

#### 3.3.1: Method for data collection

The data is sourced from various documents. More specifically, there are a few news articles chosen to illustrate points along the way, the proposed framework itself, as well as related government white papers. The newspaper articles were found via online searches for news

articles related to specific wind projects I knew were especially contested, both from just following the day to day news, and through reading the book “Vindmøllekampen” (Totland 2021).

The data that is being analysed and discussed, however, consists of the many answers sent in during the hearing for the proposed framework. As explained in section 1.1 on delimitation, I chose to disregard identical answers that appeared to be the result of coordinated campaigns, and further narrowed the scope by looking especially for answers from Rogaland.

I chose to focus on the hearing answers for several reasons:

- **Relevance:** I see the hearing as a focal point for much of the broader debate happening at the same time. The hearing got the attention of a broad group of citizens and organisations across the country, and many used it as an outlet for their opinions and viewpoints.
- **Topical:** The hearing answers are a window into an essential part of the transition to, and further development of, renewable power, in that it reflects public reaction and thoughts about the manifestations of this development.
- **Practical:** The debate on wind power permeated much of norwegian society at this time, and data could have been collected from many different sources over a long time period. As described by Yin (2018), collecting data for case studies can in general be quite different from data collection when using other methods. Approaching sources in a real life-setting complicates the data collection in myriad ways, and demands agility and flexibility from the researcher. This would have been a fun and challenging way to work with the thesis. However, as this thesis was developed and written during the Covid-19 pandemic, which severely restricted the ability to do field work like interviews and field observations, I settled for a more pragmatic solution. The hearing answers do several things at once. They give a broad overview over reactions from a wide set of individuals and interests, while they at the same time make up a finite amount of data from a defined time period. They are all text documents addressed to the same recipient in response to the same proposal, and all were delivered within a set time frame. This provides a pre-defined delimitation of the data. And, not least, they are available on the

government's own website (Olje- og energidepartementet 2019), accessible at all hours, pandemic or no pandemic.

Every researcher working with human subjects must make sure that he or she has thought about the ethical aspects of the methods used to collect data. In this case, using data from individuals who are (mostly) named, it is important to consider questions of privacy, confidentiality and consent. People have submitted an opinion on a specific policy proposal - does that make it ok for a researcher to use those answers, and name the individuals who have submitted them, in a study that will be publicly available? I will in the following show why that must be considered ethically non-problematic.

The National Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities (NESH) reminds us that researchers “must respect the participants' autonomy, integrity, freedom and right of co-determination” (The National Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities 2021). This means taking privacy matters into consideration, and asking whether the subjects used can be directly or indirectly identified as participants or parts of communities. This also applies when the subjects being studied have actively contributed in acquiring the data for research. This gives the researcher a “duty to inform” the subjects about the origins and intended use of the research.

However, this study is not a case where there is such a duty. This is because the hearing answers were always intended to be publicly available. Participants in the hearing were given a choice of whether to submit the answer under their own name, just a first name, or anonymously (in fact several of the sources used in this study are attributed to “Person som ikke har oppgitt navn”, meaning “person who has not given his or her name”, identifiable only by the number given to the answer by the government). The hearing answers must by their very nature be regarded as part of the public sphere. There has been no additional collection of data about the individuals that submitted hearing answers. The norwegian guidelines for research ethics states that research “conducted by means of observation in public arenas, on streets and in public squares” gives an exception from the duty to inform (The National Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities 2021). This thesis is also a study of a governmental process. NESH states that people have a legitimate interest in how social institutions function, which means that “researchers must have the greatest possible access to public administration and bodies. It should be possible to research public archives” (ibid.). For

the above stated reasons, the data used as the foundation of this study should be considered freely available, and doing research on this data does not come with a duty to inform the individual contributors to the hearing.

### 3.3.2: Method for data analysis

I began work on the analysis-part by reading several hundred of the hearing answers, using NVivo to sort and categorise different parts of the texts where I found examples of identity-building story-lines. When I had a sufficient amount of processed text to get started on the actual analysis, I started going back and forth between writing about the findings while thinking about possible categories and connections, and further close-reading, re-reading and categorising the hearing answers. This was the start of the hermeneutic process that has been described by Danermark as an interpretation “dependent on the researcher’s earlier experiences, her theories, frames of reference, and the concepts she uses in the interpretation of the studied object” (2005:159).

Central to the Grounded Theory-approach is the idea that data do not speak for themselves. Rather, you need certain strategies to be able to sketch out concepts and strategies. One central strategy is comparison, where the researcher systematically compares different data to find similarities and dissimilarities. In this way, “concepts and categories are developed providing new insight into a phenomenon and at the same time being well grounded in data” (Danermark et al., 2005, p. 133). This process was crucial when working on the thesis.

The possible identities I had in mind before starting the actual close readings, were based on my understanding of the general public debate on the proposed framework. I had not read any of the hearing answers, but assumed that political power and money would be central themes. I was also well aware of the “green on green”-dilemma. From this starting point, I re-evaluated the possible identities along the way as I got a better understanding of the material. I looked for story-lines that not only addressed the issue of political power and the flow of capital in the renewable energy-sector, but that did so by constructing in-groups and out-groups that define identities. I developed a nationalized version of the “green on green”-conflict, where Norwegian nature as such is at the center. I also saw the need to add one more category, “Responsible Norway”, in order to get a more granular understanding of the identities at play in the hearing answers.

While the government quickly shelved the proposed framework as soon as the hearing period ended, it did not take very long before an alternative was presented. I look briefly at how the various story-lines that emerged through the hearing answers were met by the authorities in the revamped overhaul of wind power regulations in 2020 (Olje- og energidepartementet 2020b).

### 3.4: The qualitative case study

The qualitative case study is concerned with “producing discursive descriptions and exploring social actors’ meanings and interpretations” (Blaikie 2000:232). It seeks to learn “how a small collection of cases, units, or activities, can illuminate key features of an area of social life” (Neuman 2014:96). In qualitative studies, the data can be collected in either the technical, academic language of the researcher, or in a more common, everyday language (Blaikie 2000:232). This thesis seeks to do what amounts to a translation from the latter to the former.

As explained by Yin (2018), a case study is an in depth-investigation of a contemporary phenomenon that allows for a broad variety of evidence, ranging from documents to observations, interviews and even artifacts. The case study is used when looking at phenomena that can not be studied in an experiment, i.e. it is studied within the real life context. It requires that the researcher keeps an open mind to other possible explanations of the findings, and a well developed case description. It can be used to study more concrete units like individuals or organizations, and also more abstract things like projects.

Hajer (2000) suggests that a discourse analysis follows certain steps, several of which have been relevant for this thesis:

- A *desk research* was done to give a “first chronology and first reading of events”.
- To identify the main story lines and metaphors, thorough *document analysis* was necessary.
- This all leads up to *the interpretation* (in this thesis called analysis, see section 4), which presents how the discourse is structured and how it is practiced.

### 3.5: Reliability

A key question when talking about the reliability of a given research result, is whether or not the findings can be reproduced by other scientists. Qualitative studies can in general be more difficult to evaluate in this aspect, as they “are sometimes attacked for lacking the widely-accepted standards of rigor associated with some quantitative disciplines and methods” (Sovacool, Axsen, and Sorrell 2018:29). Such studies can be built on data from a wide range of sources and situations, such as interviews, newsmedia and documents.

This thesis, however, is based on a clearly defined data set, namely the hearing answers sent in response to the proposed national framework. The data set is therefore uniform, in the sense that it is all made up of written documents. It also has clearly defined borders both in terms of volume, temporal and spatial variation. Or, in more plain terms: They are all hearing answers to this specific proposed framework, there are only so many of them, they were all sent in during the defined hearing period, and they are all from Norway. These characteristics will not change if anyone wants to reproduce this study to look for the identities at play in the dataset. At the same time, these very same qualities can be seen as limitations on the reliability of this thesis, as explained in the following.

In a table summarizing the strengths and limitations of different case studies, Sovacool et al (2018:31) list the following types of cases:

- Typical (commonalities or representative occurrences)
- Diverse (maximum variance or a range of differences )
- Extreme, illustrative or deviant (unusual or unique events, outliers or surprises)
- Influential (challenging popular or well-established cases)
- Most-similar (comparative, isolating the role of one variable (variation in only one variable))
- Most-different (comparative, identifying range of potential scenarios, or “boundaries” of extremes (variation in all but one variable))

This thesis is a study of an “extreme, illustrative or deviant” case. It is, however, not quite as radical as that description might make it sound. The case is not extreme, nor is it deviant per se. Government hearings as such are commonplace. If it can be seen as deviant or extreme as a

*hearing*, it is because of the large amount of answers, and the high degree of participation by private citizens.

If approached not as a hearing per se, but as part of the broader debate and discourse on wind power in Norway in the same period of time, things look different. The volume and breadth of participation that makes this stand out as a hearing, is in a wider context par for the course. Broad, popular engagement in the debate, especially for those opposed to wind projects, was the norm. From this perspective, then, the hearing can be seen as an illustrative case.

This was at the time the only hearing on a white paper outlining the development of wind power in general in Norway. The data provided in the documents is not centered around specific projects or processes in local politics, but is instead made up of a collection of texts written from across the country. This allows a broader perspective.

This thesis is a single case study, concentrated on just this one hearing. As such, it has limitations - the five different “misunderstandings” described by Flyvbjerg (2006) are not completely without merit. There is a lack of external validity, and one can argue that the insights provided are limited. A comparative case study, for instance one looking both at this hearing and the hearing to the follow up white paper the following year, or at the debate in social media or opinion pieces published in newspapers, could have provided strong evidence through triangulation, meaning using different sources of evidence. This does not necessarily make for an inferior study, as any comparative study by necessity has to be built on the basis of single-case studies (Sovacool et al. 2018:31–32). Flyvbjerg (2006) has also argued well for the value of case studies in social science in general, by pointing out that there is no context-independent knowledge in areas that have to do with human affairs.

The same temporal and spatial coherence in the research material that makes it accessible for those wanting to reproduce this study, also inflicts some limitations on the findings. According to Sovacool et al, less spatial variation “ can enhance generalizability but may force artificial ‘fits’”, and a lack of temporal variation “may require one to artificially bracket or confine research” (2018:31). In this specific study, with the chosen dataset, I saw no need for an artificial bracketing of the data. I also suspect that while the lack of spatial variation can enhance generalizability within Norway, it might well do the opposite outside this specific cultural and

sociological setting. The identities outlined here all appear tied to values and perceptions that will vary across the globe.

Another possible variation that can influence reproducibility, is the language itself. The hearing answers (and, for that matter, other official documents used in this thesis) are originally all written in Norwegian, but presented here in English, translated by me. I have chosen not to try to emulate any typos or grammatical errors in the original documents, instead aiming for translations that convey the same meaning and tone as the originals. No translation, however competent the translator, can ever be completely identical to the original in terms of meaning and context. This creates room for misunderstandings and outright errors, not least in a thesis where meaning and context is the very essence of what is being studied and analysed. Other researchers could choose to translate some words and phrases differently. In order to make my own translation as transparent as possible, I've included the original quotes in footnotes. There they are presented with the exact spelling and orthography found in the original hearing answers.

### 3.6: Data reduction and analysis

In order to go through with the process described above, some form of manipulation of the data was required. This is what is referred to as data reduction techniques (Blaikie 2000:235). I will in the following describe the technique applied in this thesis.

Coding was essential. This means that different concepts and categories are used as labels in specific parts of the gathered material. Dey emphasizes the creative aspect here. The first part of the process, known as open coding, is about “stimulating ideas rather than documenting evidence”, and it “involves generating as many categories as possible” (Dey 2004:85).

The material from the hearing was then broken down into separate parts according to these labels, later to be reassembled in a new way according to relationships between the different categories in the Analysis-chapter. This is known as axial coding. A “coding paradigm” is used to find the possible structures and contexts that make the new connections possible.

Open and axial coding both involve interpretation, making it similar to the testing and refining of ideas in grounded theory (Danermark et al. 2005). The dual interpretation also shows why the



different processes of collecting, reducing and analysing data can overlap to a high degree when using qualitative methods and the abductive strategy (Blaikie 2000). As for the practicalities of this process: I attended a University-led course in the use of NVivo. This program proved to be a good tool for keeping an overview while at the same time de- and reconstructing the available text material from the hearing.

When working with a document of this size and complexity, and not least when using this many different documents from a data set that in effect has the same source, it was crucial to also use a reference management tool in order to keep the list of references updated and correct. For this purpose I used Zotero. After some initial blundering, I found a good workflow that allowed me to keep track of the different hearing answers in both NVivo and Zotero, and keep my list of references constantly up to date. These tools allowed me to use more time and energy on the actual analysis, and less on the logistics of collecting and organizing data.

## 4: Analysis of hearing answers from the wind power debate

Identity will in the following be seen as an actively acquired quality, or as “the product of an act of self-definition”. This in turn “leads to the generation of a notion of 'otherness'” (Versluys 2007:90). By actively defining one group, there is implicitly also a distancing from other groups. This indicates that a disagreement about the subject at hand is not only about a different evaluation of the facts and context, but also about being a different kind of person.

With this in mind, the markers I will look for in this analysis can be summed up like this: **Story-lines and discourse coalitions that use the act of identity-construction to create a sense of belonging (or otherness) as arguments for or against the proposed framework for wind power development in Norway.**

### 4.1: Urban vs. rural

In their study on a hydropower-development in Skjåk, Norway, Vorkinn and Riese (2001) found that place attachment was the strongest predictor of attitudes towards the development. Likewise, conflicts surrounding wind power developments are often grounded in geography. The different identity-based arguments that in this thesis emerge from the research material can all be traced back to the actual, physical placement of the wind turbines in some way.

The author Anders Totland, after having closely monitored the debate through much of 2019 and 2020, describes a development from geographically specific resistance towards a more all-encompassing opposition.

(...) through the fight against wind power, and not least through contact with others engaged in a similar struggle, the resistance has changed character. It is a kind of radicalization, or at least a development in the engagement. They are no longer fighting against wind turbines in their neighbourhood, but against the whole of the wind power industry. (...) For these opponents, it is no longer just the case that the negatives outweigh the positives. There is simply nothing good about it. (...) It is a completely uncompromising way of approaching the debate that seems to be spreading. (Totland 2021:204–5)

Through the eyes of discourse theory, the development Totland describes can be seen as the effect of a story-line taking hold, uniting different people and organisations with one big story. It develops into what we, for the purposes of this thesis, can call *opinion as identity*.

Different wind power projects will have different stories, contexts and settings. Some are welcomed by both local politicians and the community, some are not. Some have changed significantly from planning to finished product, some have not. Some are primarily financed with foreign capital, some are not. Regardless: In the urban vs. rural-story-line, they are all examples of the urban elite steamrolling rural communities where “the people” live. In a quotation from one hearing answer, we find that the essence of this story-line is that “the local population and the host communities are left with just the negative effects and very little gained” (Bergseth 2019).<sup>1</sup>

Other, more confrontational versions can be found in exclamations such as “This is pure vandalism, with the blessing of the state” (Prytz 2019)<sup>2</sup> or “How dare you take democracy and self-governance away from our own areas?” (Fjeseth 2019)<sup>3</sup>. The story-line can also contain pleading, as in “Dear people who govern our small country, please stop the building of monster wind turbines. And remove those who already have been built. There is no shame in realising you made a mistake. We try and we fail, it’s only human. Then you try something else” (Thronsen 2019)<sup>4</sup>.

The identity being outlined here, is of the “silent majority”, meaning the common people who are looked down upon, or, even worse, not even seen, by the urban, ruling class. “I think our politicians are in some sort of bubble. Outside of that bubble is the Norwegian population,

---

<sup>1</sup> “(...) lokalbefolkninga og vertskommunane sit att med berre ulempene og svært liten gevinst.”

<sup>2</sup> “Dette er ren vandalisme, med statens velsignelse.”

<sup>3</sup> “Hvordan våger dere å ta fra oss demokrati og selvbestemmelse over egne landområder!”

<sup>4</sup> “Kjære vene dere som sitter og forvalter vårt lille land, vær så snill å stopp utbyggingen av monster vind turbiner. Og fjern de som allerede er satt opp. Det er ingen skam å snu når man ser konsekvensene. Vi prøver og av og til feiler, det er menneskelig. Da prøver man noe annet.”

neither seen nor heard. I pray that the bubble bursts, so that it will be easier to look outside” (Anonym 2019)<sup>5</sup>, one contributor to the hearing writes.

A story-line’s function is to simplify a complex reality, in order to allow a wide array of people and positions to join forces. This specific story-line downplays the fact that wind power developments in Norway, with a few and very notable exceptions, have been approved by local, regional and national democratic institutions. In one of the very few hearing answers that argue *for* wind power developments, a point is made of this, arguing that to *not* allow these developments to go forth, would be undemocratic. This hearing answer is also constructing a division between an implicit “us” and “them”, but it’s from the other side of the debate: “Build everything that has been given a license. These hysterical wind power-opponents should not overturn a decision that already has been made! I’ve read on several Facebook pages that people there are willing to join in civil disobedience! This says quite a lot about many of the people who oppose wind power!” (Anonym 2 2019)<sup>6</sup>. The argument made from this perspective, then, is that the people now protesting either weren’t paying attention when these projects were moving through the local and national systems of politics and bureaucracy, or they just couldn’t understand what these projects actually meant and would look like.

To the participants in the urban vs. rural story-line, however, this is clearly not the right perspective. It is a presentation of reality that doesn’t “sound right” (Hajer 2004:302). In the urban vs. rural story-line, people have instead been kept in the dark about this process until it was too late. “It is completely mad that you allowed these terrible encroachments on Norwegian nature, and that you didn’t show your hand. It is so enormously bad that I have trouble comprehending that this is actually happening. In Norway” (Tvetene 2019)<sup>7</sup>.

Some opponents of wind power developments appear quite moderate, merely pointing out that the laws used should be changed, like in this hearing answer: “(...) the approval-process today

---

<sup>5</sup> “Jeg tror våre politikere sitter i en slags bobble. Utenfor den boblen er norges befolkning som ikke blir sett eller hørt. Jeg ber om at den boblen sprekker slik at det er lettere å se utenfor.”

<sup>6</sup> “Bygg ut alt som det er gitt konsesjon for. Disse hysteriske vindkraft motstanderene må ikke få styre en avgjørelse som allerede er bestemt! Har lest på flere Facebook sider at det er personer der som kan være med på sivil ulydighet! Dette sier en del om mange av de personene som er vindkraft motstandere!”

<sup>7</sup> “Der er HELT fullstendig galskap at dere tillater disse forferdelige inngrepene i i norsk natur, og at dere har holdt kortene så vanvittig tett til brystet. Det er så til de grader kritikkverdig, at jeg har vanskeligheter med å forstå at dette faktisk skjer. I Norge.”

happens in accordance with the energy law. Normally development projects are guided by the zoning-laws, which ensures a completely different level of local involvement, obviously with more insight and knowledge about the different aspects that must be taken into consideration” (Gjerstad 2019)<sup>8</sup>.

Others do not shy away from following the idea of a non-lawful process to a harsh conclusion. “The future will condemn the current government if you don’t respect the will of the people” (Frøystad Kjærvåg 2019)<sup>9</sup>. Or, even more dramatically: “The government should resign immediately. You have gone against the constitution on so many counts now that it is time for a war in the country of our fathers” (Svanem 2019)<sup>10</sup>.

This shows how a simplified “rural vs. urban”-story-line can allow for an apparent joint effort by people who otherwise would have little in common. By making wind turbines into symbols of urban repression of the rural, people openly advocating for a civil war and others merely calling for an adjustment of the zoning laws, can both tell the same story.

In this story, the capital Oslo becomes shorthand for elites. The fact that wind conditions in and around Oslo are not suited for wind power developments, is often pointed out, and seen as undermining the credibility of the elite’s pro-wind stance. The Oslo-shorthand can be used ironically: “What has been the contribution from Oslo? (...) You say you don’t have enough wind. How strange. The ski jump in Holmenkollen is often cancelled because of wind. If you don’t have enough wind, increase the height of the turbines, like you do here in our area. It must be a very positive thing for the citizens of Oslo to get locally produced power. Not to mention all the amazing walking-routes you would get” (Hovden 2019)<sup>11</sup>.

---

<sup>8</sup> “(...) prosessen med godkjenning skjer i henhold til Energiloven. Normalt behandles utbyggingssaker i henhold til Plan- og bygningsloven og dette sikrer et helt annet lokalt engasjement og åpenbart med mer inngående kjennskap til de ulike hensyn som må veies mot hverandre.”

<sup>9</sup> “Ettertiden vil felle en knallhard dom over sittende regjering om dere ikke respekterer folkets vilje”.

<sup>10</sup> “Regjeringen må øyeblikkelig ta sin hatt og gå ... Dere har brutt den norske grunnlov på så mange punkter at nå er det på tide med krig i Fedrelandet vårt”

<sup>11</sup> “Hva har dere i Oslo bidratt med? (...) Dere sier at det ikke er nok vind. Det er da pussig. Holmenkollrennet blir jo stadig hen avlyst pga vind. Og om det er manko på vind så øk høyden på vindturbinene. Slik som dere gjør her i våre områder. Det må jo være svært positivt for Oslos borgere å få nærstrøm. For ikke å snakke om de fantastiske turveiene dere får.”

References to Oslo can also be used directly and with pathos: “I understand that you can sit in Oslo and decide to build wind farms in other parts of the country. Because you will never see them, hear them and feel on your bodies how destructive they are” (Rusdal 2019)<sup>12</sup>.

The “feel on your bodies”-part of this last hearing-answer touches on something that is not seen often, but shows up every now and then: An identity as a victim not just of a bureaucratic and aesthetic violation, but also of real bodily and mental harm. “The people must be heard. Politicians do what they think is correct. Regarding wind farms in Norwegian nature, they have made a mistake. (...) I will for my own part say that the sight of these wind farms has negative health consequences. It is indescribably painful to watch Norwegian nature being destroyed” (Hunsbedt 2019)<sup>13</sup>. This appears to be a clear example of what Devine-Wright has described as “a sense of displacement that can lead to psychiatric trauma” (2009:428).

Violence is sometimes seen as directly inflicted by the state: “Witnessing violence is an infliction of mental violence. A bird is not “just a bird”. Foretold bird killing, and the destruction of landscapes we love, is also mental violence. (...) I never thought I would experience that the state again inflicts mental violence on its own people” (Hauge 2019)<sup>14</sup>.

Being opposed to specific wind power developments, then, is in this story-line about being one of the many, not one of the few in power. By extension, it implies that the majority is opposed to these kinds of developments. The majority, however, is being run over: “Incredibly, terribly sad that NVE with the government and parliament are steamrolling the Norwegian population by building wind turbines in our beautiful nature, and killing and destroying our fauna and animal/birdlife. Sad, sad, should be ashamed” (Årnes 2019)<sup>15</sup>.

---

<sup>12</sup> “Jeg kan forstå at dere kan sitte i Oslo og bestemme bygging av vindparker rundt omkring i landet. Dere vil jo ikke kunne se dem, høre dem og merke på kroppen hvor ødeleggende de er.”

<sup>13</sup> “Det er forliket som må bli hørt. Politikere gjør det de tror er politisk korrekt. Angående vindparker i uberørt norsk natur har de tatt feil. (...) jeg vil si for egen del at synet av disse vindparkene har helsemessige negative konsekvenser. Det er ubeskrivelig vondt å se norsk natur øydelegges.”

<sup>14</sup> “Å være vitne til vold er også påføring av psykisk vold. En fugl er ikke “bare en fugl”. Varslede fugledrap, og knusing av landskap som vi elsker er også psykisk vold. (...) At det skulle være staten som igjen bedriver psykisk vold mot sitt eget folk hadde jeg ikke trodd at jeg skulle oppleve.”

<sup>15</sup> “Utrolig fryktelig trist at NVE med regjering og Storting overkjører den norske befolkning ved å bygge vindturbiner i vår vakre natur, og drepe og ødelegge vår fauna og dyre/fugleliv . Trist trist , bør skamme seg .”

## 4.2: Humiliated Norway

The “humiliated Norway”-identity is similar to the urban vs. rural story-line, however, it broadens the perspective. In this story-line, the affronted group is similar to the one above, but the guilty party does not reside in Oslo. The threat this time is coming from outside the country’s borders. This is in fact the main point. In its briefest form, the viewpoint can be presented like this, from one of the hearing answers: “It is not right to destroy valuable Norwegian nature to supply the rest of Europe with energy” (Standal 2019)<sup>16</sup>.

In this perspective, a cross-border transgression is causing a loss of control. As noted by Devine-Wright (2009), when energy projects are interpreted as an occasion to sacrifice a specific place in order to deal with the global problem of climate change, this can be perceived as a threat by people strongly attached to the place in question. We see this in answers such as “The wind farms are sold abroad faster than anyone can imagine and Norway is losing control over its own nature” (Nilsen 2019)<sup>17</sup>.

This story-line outlines the group-identity of Norwegians as a people. They, and the landscape where they reside, are here the victims of powerful and cynical forces. Some might even say downright immoral: “The wind industry is based on environmental crime and greed, and the nation of Norway has to put an end to it” (Wilhelmsen 2019)<sup>18</sup>. While outsiders reap profits, Norwegians, and their landscape, are left with the cost, as in the following quote from an answer: “This is not a responsible way of governing a country and a people’s taxes” (Motvind Sørvest 2019)<sup>19</sup>.

This story-line, with “a people” being robbed by outside forces, has more than a hint of nationalism. In the same hearing answer that talks about “a people’s taxes”, there is a strange reference to things you can “hear about in this program” (Motvind Sørvest 2019). It seemed out of place. Googling whole phrases from the hearing answer from Motvind Sørvest, I found that most of the text submitted to the hearing is cut and pasted from an article on Document.no titled

---

<sup>16</sup> “Det er ikke riktig å ødelegge verdifull norsk natur for å forsyne resten av Europa med energi.”

<sup>17</sup> “Anleggene selges dessuten raskere enn noen kan tenke til utlndet og Norge mister kontroll på egen natur”

<sup>18</sup> “Vindkraftindustrien er basert på miljøkriminalitet og grådighet, nasjonen Norge må sette en stopper for dette.”

<sup>19</sup> “Dette er ikke noen ansvarlig måte å forvalte et land og folks skattepenger på.”

“People are catching on to the wind power fraud” (Andersen 2019). The site is a self-described “believer in the national state as the best framework for a good and safe life” (Document.no 2016).

It appears then, that this specific hearing answer is not just a case of a story-line appearing in various forms and shapes adapted to different contexts, uniting people and opinions under one umbrella. It is literally the same text.

Others, who join this story-line with their own words, also end up fairly close to an aggressive form of nationalism. The infamous comparison between wind power developments and the nazi-occupation of Norway during World War 2 (Johansen 2019) is at times barely concealed in this story-line: “Our forefathers fought for our freedom during World War 2. That was a high price to pay, with many brave people sacrificing their lives for Norway to be an independent country and be able to make its own decisions. Destroying our untouched nature and selling it abroad is a huge betrayal of us and the Norwegian people” (Hovden 2019)<sup>20</sup>.

Pasqualetti (2011) talks about “imposition” as a core issue of the wind power debate. Fukuyama's (2019) “politics of resentment” is grounded in an affronted dignity, where identity as a group grows out of a desire for respect and recognition. The “humiliated Norway” story-line can be powerful fuel for this kind of identity-formation, as it has room for several shades of humiliation, as I will show in the following.

Not only is it humiliating that outside forces reap profits on Norwegians' behalf. Another layer can be added if you believe that it's all a bluff. “It's often foreign actors who establish wind farms, so it can appear to be prestige projects built to show that they care about renewable energy. But they have to look to Norway because it's easier here to do those projects when many countries in Europe choose to dismantle wind turbines because of the directly negative effect on the environment” (Bergva Isaksen 2019)<sup>21</sup>.

---

<sup>20</sup> “Våre forfedre har kjempet for at vi skulle ha vår frihet under den 2 verdenskrig. Det var en veldig dyr pris med mange tapre mennesker som har måtte gi sitt liv for at Norge skal være et selvstendig land og selv ta sine avgjørelser. Det å ødelegge våre uberørte naturområder og selge dem til utlandet er et stort svik mot oss og det norske folk.”

<sup>21</sup> “Det er ofte er snakk om utenlandske aktører som etablerer vindkraft, det kan derfor se ut som prestisjeprosjekter de setter i gang for å vise at de bryr seg om fornybar strøm, men de må se til Norge fordi det er enklere å få til et slikt prosjekt her fordi mange land i Europa velger å ta ned og fjerne vindkraft på grunn av den direkte negative påvirkningen av miljøet.”



Or, if it is not a bluff, it is most likely useless, anyway. At least in a world where it's every nation for itself: "Norway as a sovereign state and independent nation does not need wind power. We can produce the power we need by upgrading our already existing hydropower." (Haarstad 2019)<sup>22</sup>. Exporting power is in itself a negative thing, and, also, useless: "We have no need for wind power here, it is strictly for selling abroad. We can't save the world by industrializing our own nature" (Motvind Dalane 2019)<sup>23</sup>.

It is of course debatable how much of a difference the norwegian wind power projects make on a global scale, but to imply that the answer would be "nothing", is a simplification. The biggest simplification in this specific story-line, however, has to do with reducing Norway's agency in questions of investment in renewable energy. In the humiliated Norway story-line, the country is reduced to a helpless and naive victim. "(C)olonial powers take our mountains for glass beads, with the state's blessing" (Waage 2019)<sup>24</sup>.

Hajer (2000) argues that political power arises from this kind of collective story-telling. The stories are always simplified to make room for more participants, and, not least, to "create possibilities for problem closure" (Hajer 2000; Ockwell and Scrase 2009). If the problem is that foreign investors reap the profits, well, then one should reduce the influence and positions of foreign investors to make room for Norwegian interests. This could be solved politically through legislation.

But the simplification can turn into a contradiction. In this particular story-line, there is no mention of the fact that these kinds of investments also go the other way. At around the same time as this hearing, the Norwegian Bank Investment Fund updated its policy, in order to "outline principles and requirements related to investing and managing unlisted investments in infrastructure for renewable energy" (Norges Bank Investment Management 2019a). The fund's allocation to "environment-related investments" was doubled from 60 to 120 billion NOK. In the strategy plan for 2020-2022, released a week after the deadline for the hearing on the national

---

<sup>22</sup> "Norge som suveren enkeltstående og selvstendig nasjon trenger ikke vindkraft. Vi kan produsere den kraften vi trenger fremover med en oppgradering av allerede eksisterende vannkraft."

<sup>23</sup> "Vi har ikke behov for vindkraften her, det er kun for salg ut av landet. Vi kan ikke redde verden med å industrialisere vår egen natur."

<sup>24</sup> "Kan store selskap, utanlandske selskap, spekulantar o.s.b. drive på som kolonimakter og ta frå oss fjella våre for "perler og glansbilete" med Staten si velsigning?"

framework for wind power development, the fund's plan could not be more straightforward: "Our primary investment focus is wind and solar power generation assets"(Norges Bank Investment Management 2019b). As for the state owned energy company Statkraft, they are currently involved in wind projects on several continents. Their ambition for 2025 is to "become a major wind and solar developer, and expand today's portfolio substantially" (Statkraft 2020). This shows clearly where the blind spots are in a story-line where Norway is presented as a passive and mistreated victim of the changes that come with renewable energy.

### 4.3: Natural Norway

While the "humiliated Norway" story-line uses the country's borders as a way of defining "us" and "them", the "natural Norway" zooms in closer on the actual, physical geography of the country.

The identity formed here is built on the very same mountaintops that now, in this story's version of events, have been violently attacked by unsightly roads, concrete clearings and noisy, in-your-face turbines. Wind power developments are seen as an affront to the very nature that served as "the foundation for self-respect and self-understanding" (Skirbekk 1981:123) in the early formation of a Norwegian identity.

When the then poor and overwhelmingly rural Norway entered the world stage after centuries as an appendix to Sweden and Denmark, the lack of continental sophistication and urban culture was turned into a defining virtue. This is a clear example of a "social world people have produced and which they reproduce through their continuing activities" (Blaikie 2000:115). Norwegians continue to tell themselves the story of how their closeness to nature is superior to a more urban, continental lifestyle, as in this hearing answer: "Nature has magic and beauty that satisfies us in a completely different way than what a trip to the city can do. We can never escape that fact" (Hovden 2019)<sup>25</sup>.

The fact that the early Norwegian identity was created through art such as landscape paintings, is now in itself a reason not to interfere with this landscape. Even to suggest that these areas could be suitable for developments, seems close to heresy: "You may have heard about the artist Lars Hertervig, who lived on Borgøy in Tysvær. He painted nature and light in an incredible

---

<sup>25</sup> "Naturen har en magi og en skjønnhet som tilfredsstill oss på en helt annen måte enn det en bytur kan gjøre. Det kan vi aldri komme bort ifra."

way. And now you've made the genius move of suggesting that almost all of this area is suitable for wind power" (Lund 2019)<sup>26</sup>.

Gunnar Skirbekk (1981) has suggested that Norwegians have a closer bond to nature than most. This sentiment is an essential part of the in-group in the "natural Norway"-identity. In the following quote from a hearing answer, we understand that there is something special about "us", that those in favour of wind power development can't fully comprehend: "The Norwegian people have grown up with nature and live in nature. Nature is used for therapy and for maintaining physical and mental health. When large parts of this nature is turned into industrial areas, it has huge consequences in many different ways" (Helene 2019)<sup>27</sup>.

This is not to say that the "natural Norway"-identity is incomprehensible for all those who aren't part of the "us" in this story-line. On the contrary, it is presented as having great value to many foreigners, and therefore also to "us" through tourism. "In Norway we want to attract more tourists. What do they want to experience? Untouched, 'wild' nature. Our nature is unique and sought after" (Furunes 2019)<sup>28</sup>. Losing these areas to wind power developments would be detrimental not just to people nearby, but globally: "If the suggested plans are realized, it will mean the destruction of a unique part of nature, not just in a Norwegian context, but also from a European and global perspective. If this area is vandalized, the world will be the poorer for it" (Vardenær 2019)<sup>29</sup>.

Seen from this perspective, wind power developments would be an own goal. "Foreigners come to Norway because we advertise untouched nature, Instagram-friendly tourist attractions, fresh

---

<sup>26</sup> "De har kanskje høyrte om kunstnaren Lars Hertervig, som budde på Borgøy i Tysvær kommune. Han mala naturen og lyset på ein fantastisk måte. Og nå har dokke greid den genistreken, det er, å foreslå at nærmast heile området han mala, er eigna til vindkraft."

<sup>27</sup> "Det norske folk er vokst opp med naturen og lever i naturen. Naturen brukes til terapi og til å opprettholde fysisk og psykisk helse. Når store naturområdet blir omgjort til industriområder får dette store konsekvenser på mange måter."

<sup>28</sup> "I Norge er vi opptatt av å tiltrekke oss flere turister. Hva vil turistene oppleve? Jo, urørt «vill» natur. Vår natur er unik og ettertraktet."

<sup>29</sup> "Blir de foreslåtte planer iverksatt, vil dette innebære en rasering av et enestående naturområde, ikke bare i norsk sammenheng, men også i europeisk og globalt perspektiv. Ødelegges dette området, blir verden kort og godt et fattigere sted."

air and quiet. Wind turbines are bad advertisements, and can lead to tourists choosing to go elsewhere” (Nei til vindkraft i Sirdal og Lund 2019)<sup>30</sup>.

The idea of a Norwegian identity tied to nature was used to give the country and its inhabitants a sense of historical heft - yes, we’re a new country, but our history as a people is as old as the woods and the mountains. We see this continued in the “natural Norway”-identity in the wind power debate. This demarcation of an “us” and a “them” is tied to history in a way that the other identities outlined in this paper are not, as presented in the following hearing answer: “We must at once be left in peace to live our lives in the same way that has been green enough since the stone ages in this island region. Our identity IS nature as it is” (Hauge 2019)<sup>31</sup>.

While this identity is tied very closely to the landscape itself, it is also coupled with a monumental sense of time, where each person and, not least, each wind turbine, only has a small role. The sense of belonging in this identity is to eternity, no less. “(T)his shows that the developments have not been thought through and have no respect for the eternal: Nature itself. (...) I hope you will listen to this appeal, I love our nature and want it preserved like we’ve had it for millions of years, without brutal wounds” (Nilsen 2019)<sup>32</sup>.

Other hearing answers don’t have to go back quite that far in order to make an even more direct point about identity: “These hills and mountains where our forefathers lived and fought are a part of us and our identity. See for instance the TV-show “Alt for Norge”, and how incredibly happy the norwegian-americans are when they can come to Norway and get to know their heritage. They are all incredibly moved and usually tears stream down their faces when they can see and feel their roots” (Hovden 2019)<sup>33</sup>.

---

<sup>30</sup> “Utlendinger kommer til Norge fordi vi reklamerer med uberørt natur, instagram-vennlige turistattraksjoner, frisk luft og ro. Vindturbiner er dårlig reklame, og kan medføre at turistene finner andre steder å dra.”

<sup>31</sup> “Vi må snarest få fred til å leve livene våre på den måten som har vært grønn nok siden steinalderen i øyregionen. Identiteten vår ER naturen som den er.”

<sup>32</sup> “Da raseres naturen hemningsløst, dette viser at utbyggingen er ugjennomtenkt og uten respekt for det evigvarende: Naturen selv. (...) Håper dette innspillet blir lyttet til, jeg elsker vår natur og ønsker den bevart slik vi i millioner av år har hatt den, uten brutale sår.”

<sup>33</sup> “Disse heiene og fjellene som våre forfedre har levd og kjempet er en del av oss og vår identitet. Legg eksempelvis merke til serien «Alt for Norge», og hvor uendelig glade de norskamerikanerne er når de får komme til Norge og får kjenne til sin slekt. De er alle utrolig beveget og som regel så renner tårene fritt når de får se og kjenne sine røtter.”

The participants in this story-line also look forward in time, often mentioning coming generations, to make a point of the fact that the difference between “us” and “them” will continue. “It is completely unheard of that you can just sit and watch, and approve of this robbery, this rape of our, of your children’s, grandchildren’s and grandchildren’s children’s inheritance. END THIS NOW!!” (Linda 2019)<sup>34</sup>. The implicit message is that even if you don’t identify with the wind power-opponents’ point of view now, chances are your descendants will - and they will hold your views against you.

Baked into the “natural Norway”-identity is the idea of an “us” who loves the outdoors. “As people who love getting outdoors, it is depressing to see how our nature is destroyed by NVE and other european interests!” (Wærenskjold 2019)<sup>35</sup>. Some answers make it clear that nature in itself has a special kind of value: “I protest the destruction of Norway, of Norwegian nature and Norwegian values that the wind power developments entail” (Anonym 7 2019)<sup>36</sup>.

The biggest representative of this idea is the Norwegian Trekking Association (DNT). Their hearing answer does not aim for the same “us” versus “them” identity-building as the many other answers referred to in this thesis, but “nature” is given a high value. “DNT thinks that much used and valuable areas for outdoors-activities must be saved from wind power developments. No wind projects should be built in valuable areas like city-near forests or mountains, or in the central network of paths between cabins. These areas have a great value for everyone who loves to be in nature, and the experience of nature will be severely negatively affected by such developments” (Den Norske Turistforening 2019)<sup>37</sup>.

I would not count this specific hearing answer as part of an identity-building story-line, but it illustrates how one can use the basic idea (in this case, the inherent value of access to areas in

---

<sup>34</sup> “Helt uhørt at dere kan sitte å se på, og godkjenne dette ranet, denne voldtekten av våres, deres barn barnebarn, oldebarns arv. FÅ EN SLUTT PÅ DETTE NÅ!!”

<sup>35</sup> “Som et friluftslivselkende folkeslag, er det deprimerende å se hvordan naturen vår blir rasert av NVE og andre europeiske interessenter!”

<sup>36</sup> “Jeg protesterer mot raseringen av Norge, norsk natur og norske verdier som vindkraftutbygging medfører.”

<sup>37</sup> “DNT mener at mye brukte og verdifulle friluftslivsområder må vernes mot vindkraftutbygging. Det bør ikke bygges vindkraft i verdifulle friluftslivsområder som bymarker og byfjell, eller i det sentrale hytte- og rutenettet for friluftslivet. Disse områdene har stor verdi for alle som er glade i å bruke naturen, og naturoplevelsen i områdene vil forringes kraftig ved utbygging av vindkraftanlegg.”

nature that are free from visible wind power developments), without making it into a question of “us” and “them”. One can argue why some areas are less suited to such projects than others, without talking about “our nature”, “our forefathers” or some possible descendant. The imposition for those that do - those that try to use the politics of resentment-approach - is to view the wind power developments as an attack on time itself, and on the actual and metaphorical bedrock of Norway and the Norwegian.

DNT’s answer is also interesting because it dances around the simplification inherent in this story-line. In the more extreme end of the identity-building arguments, wind projects are “rape” of something that has been untouched for “millions of years”. DNT, on the other hand, talks about “much used and valuable areas for outdoors-activities” which will be “severely negatively affected by such developments”. The simplification that resides somewhere between these two perspectives has to do with the idea of untouched nature. For DNT this would be a difficult position to base their hearing answer on, as their core idea is to build cabins, often in remote areas, develop paths between them, and to encourage as many people as possible to use them.

Cabins in general make up a blind spot for the “natural Norway”-identity. For instance, the “Nei til vindkraft i Sirdal og Lund”-group that was quoted above arguing that “(f)oreigners come to Norway because we advertise untouched nature, instagram-friendly tourist attractions, fresh air and quiet”, is a coalition made up of people who own cabins in Sirdal. They do not specify which part of “untouched nature, instagram-friendly tourist attractions, fresh air and quiet” their cabins contribute to.

#### 4.4: Responsible Norway

The three identities so far outlined in this thesis are examples of the politics of resentment, where the “us” is someone or something under attack by an outside force. In contrast, the last category is defined by “us” being the active part.

The “responsible Norway”-identity is eager to place Norway in relation to other countries in the environmental field, as a pioneer and a leader. In this story-line, the wind power developments are part of a larger narrative about climate change and cosmopolitan responsibilities. The “various responsibilities arise by virtue of Norway’s status as one of the richest countries in the

world, from its self-understanding as a good state and a good people, and from its role as a major exporter of oil and gas” (Eckersley 2016:192).

While outward-facing, these obligations could also be used as arguments for building wind farms in Norway. The logic is that if Norwegians are willing to use their own nature for this purpose, they have a stronger moral position and therefore more leverage when promoting such projects elsewhere.

In the context of this hearing, though, the main thrust of this story-line is that renewable wind power produced in Norway will lead to a reduction in the consumption of fossil fuels. “Developing wind power helps the environment from a national and a global perspective at a time when this is a massive global issue. The wind power can replace power produced with coal, oil and gas, which contributes to large CO<sub>2</sub>-emissions” (Liestøl 2019)<sup>38</sup>.

Norway’s role as an exporter of oil and gas, something that goes largely unmentioned in the other story-lines, is here used explicitly as a reason to say yes to wind turbines. “Oil from the Norwegian continental shelf must stay in the ground. This is an unavoidable fact if we are to avoid destroying the world for future generations. I am 100 percent pro wind turbines. All the turbines in England and Denmark look just great. Please build more in my backyard if the NIMBYs don’t want them” (Anonym 4 2019)<sup>39</sup>.

The slightly derogatory reference to NIMBY (not in my backyard) shows a seeming willingness to look beyond one’s own surroundings. It is, as I will explain in the following, reminiscent of the distinction between “Somewheres” and “Anywheres” outlined in “The road to somewhere: The populist revolt and the future of politics” (Goodhart 2017).

The differences between Somewheres and Anywheres are about education and mobility, “and, in fact, the combination of the two” (2017:20). The categories are defined by distinct value clusters: Somewheres are said to be “more rooted and usually have “ascribed” identities (...)

---

<sup>38</sup> “Ei satsing på vindkraft er med å skåne miljøet i eit nasjonalt og globalt perspektiv i ei tid då ein globalt har stor fokus på dette. Denne vil kunne erstatte kraft produsert på kull, olje og gass som alle bidreg til store CO<sub>2</sub> utslepp.”

<sup>39</sup> “Olje på norsk sokkel må ligge i bakken. Det er en unngåelig fakta om vi skal ikke ødelegge verden for framtiden. Jeg er 100% positiv til vindkraft. Alle de vindmøller i England og i Danmark ser bare vakkert ut. Vær så snill å bygge flere i bakgården min om andre NIMBYs vill ikke ha dem.”

based on group belonging and particular places, which is why they often find rapid change unsettling” Anywheres, on the other hand, “have “achieved” identities, based on educational and career success which makes them generally comfortable and confident with new places and people” (Goodhart 2017:3). In direct contrast with Somewheres, Anywheres clearly value autonomy and mobility over group identity and tradition.

Goodhart’s model is used to understand British society, most directly as a way to analyse the Brexit-vote. It is therefore neither easy nor wise to directly transfer this model to a different debate in a different country. However, there are shades of the division this model outlines through all the identities defined in this thesis. However, it is most pronounced in the “Responsible Norway”-identity.

From the two sides of this divide, things literally look different. Somewheres, Goodhart writes, “are often said to be myopic, unable to see that accepting change brings long-term advantage” (2017:7). The obtrusive visual character of the turbines is in the other story-lines considered one of the very worst aspects of wind power. It is so bad that it convinces even those who purport to be positive, to say no: “We are blessed with a great nature. We must never destroy it, neither physically nor mentally. We can’t let huge windmills destroy the appearance of our incredible nature. I’m completely against developing wind power in our nature, even though I understand the great power-potential offered by the wind” (Blindheim 2019)<sup>40</sup>.

From the “responsible Norway”-perspective, wind turbines instead become a reminder not of a specific “somewhere” that has been irreparably damaged, but instead a contribution to the big “anywhere”. As one contributor to the hearing puts it: “Wind power developments should be placed where they are visible, as a reminder that the wealth of a modern society doesn’t come without costs. Still, off-shore wind might be preferable to large intrusions on land” (Øien 2019)<sup>41</sup>.

A major caveat to this interpretation, is that several of the texts with traces of this identity are from energy companies or people who make clear that they are landowners cooperating with

---

<sup>40</sup> “Vår flotte natur er vi velsignet med. Vi må aldri finne på å ødelegge den, verken fysisk eller psykisk. Vi må ikke la store vindmøller ødelegge synet av vår fantastiske natur. Jeg er totalt i mot å sette opp vindkraft i vår natur, selv om jeg forstår det store potensiale av kraften vinden har å by oss.”

<sup>41</sup> “Utbygging av vindkraft bør gjerne gjøres slik at den er synlig, en påminnelse om at verdiene med et moderne samfunn ikke kommer uten inngrep. Likevel er kanskje havvind å foretrekke framfor store inngrep på land.”



developers about specific wind projects. In that regard, the “Responsible Norway”-answers can be seen as firmly rooted in a very specific (and lucrative) “somewhere”.

A facet of the Anywheres-identity, is, as mentioned, that it places less of a premium on group identity as such. This makes it a paradoxical category to use as an identity. While the hearing answers in this category sometimes can contain big statements, like “It’s hard to imagine how Norway could do more to reduce the global emissions of CO<sub>2</sub>” (Nordisk Vindkraft AS 2019)<sup>42</sup>, the overall temperature among the contributors to this story-line is lower than in the other three identities outlined here. There is little of the explicit “us” and “them”-divide, and, as in the answer from Øien above, there is more room for nuance. Yes, wind turbines are good - but preferably off-shore.

In a hearing, it is not surprising that those opposed are more vocal about their opinions than those in favour. In the context of this thesis, which presents how someone’s view on the development of wind power becomes not a result of weighing arguments for and against the issue, but rather a question of how one identifies an in-group and an out-group, it also no surprise that those opposed argue in a different tenor than those open to the idea of more wind projects.

This difference is apparent also when looking at how opponents of wind power approach the “responsible Norway”-identity. From the opponent’s side, the idea of contributing to a global solution for a global problem, rings hollow. “I also see the building of wind turbines as letters of indulgence, so that one can say that something is done to save the planet - but it’s completely wrong” (Hunsbedt 2019)<sup>43</sup>, one hearing answer reads. So, not something that actually helps, but merely a symbolic act. And not just wrong, but “completely wrong”. Those promoting this side of the debate, then, can’t really be trusted to believe in it themselves. “This is not about the climate”, one contributor writes, and continues “You might as well just stop pretending immediately. This is vandalism of Norwegian nature, done by climate profiteers and politicians” (Anonym 6 2019)<sup>44</sup>.

---

<sup>42</sup> “Det er vanskelig å forestille seg hvordan Norge kan gjøre mer for å redusere de globale utslippene av CO<sub>2</sub>.”

<sup>43</sup> “Å bygge vindmøller kaller jeg også for avlat for å kunne si at noe blir utført for å redde vår klode - men helt feil. “Avlatsbrev” til andre utenlandske bedrifter burde være uhørt.”

<sup>44</sup> “Dette handler ikke om klima. Det kan dere like godt slutte å late som umiddelbart. Dette er vandalisme av norsk natur skapt av klimaprofitører og politikere.”

The norwegian debate on wind power has been described as using a “George Bush-jargon”, where you’re either with us, or you’re against us. This leaves very little room for nuance. The one not firmly saying no to wind power, is “a Judas, a nazi and a climate profiteer” (Totland 2021:248). To this list one might add “hypocrite”, if the following hearing answer is to be believed: “To save a planet that slowly, but surely is moving in the wrong direction, YOU have to destroy parts of the same planet” (Anonym 5 2019)<sup>45</sup>.

For some of the opponents, the basic premise of “responsible Norway” can be seen as correct - yes, Norway can make an important contribution to the world. It’s just that the proponents of wind power have reached the completely wrong answer about how this should be done: “The lack of wilderness in Europe is far more precarious than the lack of energy. It is therefore neither in Norway’s nor in Europe’s interest that our nature is further diminished” (Lindheim 2019)<sup>46</sup>.

---

<sup>45</sup> “På grunn av global oppvarming må norsk natur raseres. For å redde en klode som sakte men sikkert går i gal retning så er DERE nødt til å rasere deler av nettopp denne kloden.”

<sup>46</sup> “Mangelen på villmark i Europa er langt mer prekær enn mangelen på energi. Det er derfor verken i Norges eller Europas interesse at vår natur nedbygges ytterligere.”

## 5: Discussion

### 5.1: Summing up the identities

When studying and analysing these hearing answers, the basic premise of an anti-essentialist ontology as described by Hajer & Versteeg (2005) soon becomes apparent: These answers are not addressing one reality adhering to the laws of nature. The world that emerges from the hearing is one of multiple, parallel realities, all socially constructed to various degrees.

Though environmental concerns are the main driver for developing and implementing more renewable energy like the one produced by wind turbines, the turbines themselves, appear not to be understood or debated primarily as an environmental issue. It can also be said that many of the answers don't stick very close to the agenda for the hearing, that is, the actual proposition. To say it with Hajer & Versteeg (2005): Society made sense of this issue in other ways.

Using the levels of theory as presented by Blaikie (2000:143–45), we can say that the analysis in this case has produced an ad-hoc classificatory system that can be used to summarize the data. Four different identities emerge from the hearing answers. Through story-lines, we see different versions of an “us” that has to confront a “them”.

In the *urban vs. rural* story-line, the “us” are the people, and the “them” are the elite. The elites live in a sheltered bubble, mostly in big cities (and mostly Oslo), where they don't have to look at or hear the wind turbines themselves. The people, on the other hand, suffer the consequences, often described as a form of violence. By leaving out the fact that most all of the wind projects in Norway were approved and supported by politicians at both a local and a national level, the participants are able to create a story-line where people have been kept in the dark about the processes leading up to the actual building of new wind power-projects until it was too late. They are now disgruntled, and they are many. The participants in this story-line range from the very moderate to the most extreme: Some want a discussion of the laws and bureaucratic framework around wind projects. Others see a coming civil war. One thing is certain - their voices must be heard, or else trust in the Norwegian democracy as such could be at stake.

The *humiliated Norway* story-line creates the identity of someone looking to regain control over one's own nature, one's own power production and one's own tax money. The “us” resides here

more uniformly within the country's borders. The threat is a "them" coming in from abroad, acting not dissimilar to a colonial power. The participants in this story-line range from the very nationalistic to people who don't believe wind power can make a contribution towards the climate crisis. The humiliation they feel is based on these beliefs. Wind power projects are an affront to Norway as a sovereign state, and serve a merely symbolic function. The primary blind spot here is Norway's active role as investor and developer in other countries.

The *natural Norway* story-line outlines an "us" that is defined by the essence of nature, where identity somehow emanates from parts of the country seen as "untouched". This is under attack from a "them" who either can't see the importance of preserving these areas and vistas, or who just don't care. This identity builds upon the same ideas and rhetoric that was used when Norway was finding its place as a newly independent country in modern Europe. It builds credibility and heft in a very similar way: Norway is a new country, but Norwegians as a people are defined by the timelessness of the mountains. Wind turbines on the horizon are an affront to eternity itself, and will be condemned by coming generations. It devalues Norway both for Norwegians and for visitors. This story-line is also held together by what it doesn't include - more specifically, by overlooking the inherent contradiction between "untouched nature" and the active use - often tourism and cabin building - in these same areas.

The last identity outlined in this thesis is an outlier, with a less definite distinction between the ingroup and the outgroup. Some key features from the "us" vs. "them" rhetoric that defines identity-building, are not present in the *responsible Norway* story-line. The "us" here is not under pressure from a "them" that threatens to create humiliation. Instead, "us" is the active part, united by a felt obligation to play a significant role globally. The energizing factor is not resentment, but rather a call to fulfill cosmopolitan responsibilities. If there is resentment and a feeling of shame, it is directed inward - Norway's position as an oil and gas-exporter creates an imperative to also contribute to the development of renewable power sources. The participants in the responsible Norway story-line use rhetoric pointing to the big "anywhere". Their blind spot is often that they are doing this from a very specific "somewhere", either as companies working directly with the wind power industry, or as landowners that would benefit from wind power projects.

## 5.2: What this thesis did not find

A central part of the story-line construct is that it can unite different actors, organizations and interests into “various unconventional political coalitions” (Hajer 2000:12). In the section on operationalizing the concept of “identity” in this thesis, I stated that I was going to look for “story-lines and discourse coalitions that use the act of identity-construction to create a sense of belonging (or otherness) as arguments for or against the proposed framework for wind power development in Norway”. I will in the following paragraph explain why my research has fallen short of the goal of finding such coalitions.

Besides a few obvious participants like Motvind, an organisation made especially to unite opponents of wind power, and various businesses and private citizens directly involved in the development of new wind projects, most of the identity-building answers found and analysed in this thesis, are from private citizens. They may or may not be connected to communities within science, politics or the media, but it is not possible to tell just from the answers to the hearing. Understanding this also meant realizing that a different kind of data set (letters to the editor and/or news articles, for instance) would be necessary to do any meaningful work on the coalitions involved in these indeed-building story-lines. The identity-building story-lines described in this thesis could then be used as a starting point, for instance in a comparative study of how identities are expressed and used in a hearing versus in a different dataset.

## 5.3: Against categorisation

After developing the categories above, it is important to look at how they might be deconstructed. With Versluys’ warning in mind, against “an obsessive wish to fix and to clarify, a human reaction to the rather awkward reality of multiplicity” (2007:92), we should note that the identities described here are rarely, if ever, found expressed in a “pure” form.

The different identities outline in this thesis resist easy categorisation in two ways:

- Individuals will more often than not use elements from several of the identity-groups outlined here in the same hearing answer. Sometimes within the same sentence. This, for instance, is a succinct summation of both the “Natural Norway” and the “Urban vs. rural”-identities: “We have a completely unique nature that is now being destroyed, without the people being given a chance to voice their opinion / vote on it” (Hammersvik

2019)<sup>47</sup>. One hearing answer seems to point out three different identity-groups in three consecutive sentences: “We’re selling our country, and the beauty that characterises it! And we’re doing it for profits that won’t befall us who live here. In addition, my faith in the government for my own and coming generations sake, has been dealt a severe blow” (Sigrid (no last name given) 2019)<sup>48</sup>.

- At the same time, the participants are operating on what Duszak calls a continuum between “ingroupness” and “outgroupness” (2002) - some want a discussion about zoning laws, while others are calling for a civil war. This makes the categories nuanced. They can at times also be explicitly or implicitly self-contradictory, as shown in the blind spots hidden in the simplifications of several of the story-lines used to construct these identities.

This adds up to an issue with what in a quantitative study would be called discriminant validity - to what extent are measures that should be different, really different? To what extent can these story-lines be said to create and perform identities, if they are used several at the same time, and with such internal differences? One is here reminded of Versluys’ criticism of the way discourse analysis uses and defines the identity-construct with “vague assertions and disturbing inconsistencies” (2007:92). One possible answer is that the use of identity-building story-lines is more about a specific rhetoric, than about actual, lived and perceived identities. Story-lines are used to create heft and momentum behind political ideas and wishes. Their function is to create possibilities for problem closure (Hajer 2000; Ockwell and Scrase 2009), which all of the identity-building story-lines described in this thesis do.

There are also several examples of what Hajer has called “a complex and continuous struggle over the definition and the meaning of the environmental problem itself” (2000:15). In many of the hearing answers that are dominated by the urban vs. rural and humiliated Norway-identities, opinions or perspectives on environmental concerns are either added as an afterthought, or not present at all. Here, (a lack of) political power is more important than the (potential for) wind power. The same slogans used in other controversies are seen applied directly to the wind

---

<sup>47</sup> “Vi har ein heilt unik natur som no er i ferd med å bli rasert, og det utan at folket har fått høve til å få uttale seg/stemme over det.”

<sup>48</sup> “Vi sel landet vårt, og det som kjenneteiknar det vakre landet vårt! Og det for gevinstar som ikkje vil kome oss som bur her til gode. Som eit stort tillegg har trua mi på styresmakter for vår og komande generasjonar igjen fått seg ein real knekk.”

power debate: “Wind farms now under construction, or already finished, have been started behind the back of the Norwegian people. This is done deliberately. Enough is enough. Just like with the toll booths” (Risa 2019)<sup>49</sup>.

In one particularly clear example of this, a hearing answer starts out by saying that “people are pissed off and completely against new wind farms. Elected politicians should recognize this, and listen to the people they represent”, then goes on to make the same kind of argument for removing toll booths on roads: “The people were promised that when a road is paid for, the toll booth would be removed. Instead we keep getting more of them. Once again the politicians aren’t listening to the people, but rather steamrolling the voters and lying straight to our faces”. And then, towards the end of the hearing answer, a grievance about Norwegian taxation-levels: “The many shipping companies and other businesses that move abroad because they are strangled by taxes from the norwegian politicians, is a big disgrace, and greed without limits” (Skulstad 2019)<sup>50</sup>

Here we see how opposition to wind power development is added onto an already existing storyline that goes beyond - in fact barely even touches on - environmental concerns.

#### 5.4: Could the hearing answers have been different?

Following the realist approach to socially constructed views of reality, as described by Ockwell & Scrase (2009), it is fitting to acknowledge the factors that limit how the discourse on wind power developments plays out in this research material. I view this as similar to what Hajer (2000) calls the *sites of argumentation*. Defining these sites makes it possible to locate the argumentative exchanges and analyse for positioning effects. A change in the limiting factors, or in the character of the sites of argumentation, would likely also affect the possible identities that formed through discourse. This would again influence who “won” the debate.

---

<sup>49</sup> “Annlegg som er under bygging eller er ferdig er satt i gang bak ryggen på det norske folk. Dette er med viten og vilje. Nok er nok. Akkurat som med bompenger.”. Note: “Nok er nok” was the slogan used by opponents of road toll. This movement led to the formation of a new political party in Norway in 2014: Folkaksjonen nei til mer bompenger.

<sup>50</sup> Folk er fly forbannet og totalt imot nye parker. Dette synest eg at våre folkevalgte må ta innover seg, lytte til det Norske folk dere representerer. (...) Folket ble lovet da et bomprosjekt var nedbetalt, skulle det avsluttes. Dette skjer ikke, men det blir fler i stedet. Så nok engang lytter ikke folkevalgte til folket, men overkjører velgerne og lyver oss rett i trynet. (...) De mange rederier og forretnings foretak som flagger ut pga at de kveles i skatt og avgifter som resultat av politikken er en stor skam, og grådighet uten grenser.”

While the debate on wind power developments in Norway was “everywhere” at this time - in local and national news, in social media, in physical demonstrations at various sites of symbolic and/or project-specific relevance and so on - the site under investigation in this thesis is sense clearly defined: It is a hearing presented as an opportunity to voice opinions to the central government about a specific document.

Rhetoric and positions from all the other sites of argumentation have obviously also colored the hearing answers. But if we try to isolate the hearing as a specific site, we could say that it is an especially suited arena for grievances about the perceived power relation between national and regional administrations, and/or between national and international interests.

It is then also possible to imagine that other arenas or structures than this specific kind of hearing, would have affected how the debate (and therefore also identities) played out. For instance, I found no examples of hearing answers that addressed the issue of possible conflict between neighbouring local authorities (kommuner). One kommune can allow the construction of a wind power project in an area where this kommune’s inhabitants will not be as exposed to the visual and auditory effects of the turbines. But these effects might at the same time be very pronounced for inhabitants of the neighbouring kommune. If the hearing had been structured so that possible conflicts of this kind had become a more central part of the debate, it might have led to a better understanding of the need for a national framework for wind power developments.

The realist approach also takes into account functions that «governments of most contemporary nation states must fulfill», such as maintaining domestic order and sustaining economic growth (Ockwell and Scrase 2009:40). One could argue that this narrows down the possible responses from the government, leaving little room for more than what was presented in the 2020 white paper on the approval process for wind power projects: Increased local involvement and better information to the public are the measures to maintain domestic order. Keeping the door open to further developments is a pathway to sustained economic growth. (Olje- og energidepartementet 2020a).



## 5.5: Contribution of this thesis

The above is an attempt to identify and analyse the main identity-building story-lines used by the discourse coalitions in the hearing for the proposed framework for wind power development. What is the contribution made by such research? A way of approaching that question is to first say what this thesis is *not*.

This is not a quantitative study of the hearing. I have not looked at how many of the different answers can be said to be expressing one the identities defined here, or what percentage of the more than 1.000 answers fall *outside* any of these categories by not employing identity-building rhetoric. This is, instead, a descriptive social science qualitative study that uses discourse theory to identify story-lines that construct an “us” vs. “them”-identity.

Traditionally, quantitative studies have been held in higher regard than qualitative studies, for instance in what is called foundationalism. The key for the foundationalists is that scientific knowledge is produced through an explicit set of procedures that can be replicable by others at other times and locations. Will the same measurement technique or strategy produce the same result on different occasions? And will "different ways of measuring the same property produce the same findings" (Hammersley 2008:43)? These criteria are often very hard, not to say impossible, to meet for much of the research done in the social sciences, because much of this research is to a very large degree context-specific.

However, after Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific development as a series of paradigm-shifts, the foundational perspective has been met with challenges. Instead of a solid foundation of “absolute certain data”, critical relativists argue, at their most radical, that “we cannot uphold the existence of any reality at all outside language and its constant change of meaning” (Danermark et al. 2005:17). Others still argue that this is going too far in the other direction. They instead advocate an in-between position, known as fallibilism. From this approach, one makes "judgements about likely validity on the basis of evidence that is itself always fallible", but this "does not mean either that validity is the same as cultural acceptability or that different cultural modes of epistemic judgement are all equally effective" (Hammersley 2008:48).

Story-lines are performed and maintained by what Hajer (2000) calls discourse coalitions. These are defined as “various unconventional political coalitions, each made up of such actors as scientists, politicians, activists, or organizations representing such actors”, that also can have

links to “specific television channels, journals and newspapers, or even celebrities” (Hajer, 2000, pp. 12–13). As described above, the chosen data was not found suitable to do good work on the coalitions involved in producing and performing the described story-lines. The thesis has instead concentrated on describing the story-lines as they appear in the hearing answers.

As a stand-alone study, this thesis categorises how identities are constructed and put to use in a specific hearing. This is, as far as I’ve been able to ascertain, a new perspective on the debate on wind power development. As shown in the literature review, much of the previous research on public opinion towards wind power development has been based on the explicit or implicit assumption that wind such developments are inherently good, and that the right facts can convince anyone of this. But from the perspective of this thesis, wind power developments have little if any *inherent* value in the public discourse. This is not to say that facts are irrelevant and that story is everything in this debate. It is merely stating that facts about environmental concerns, the economics of renewable power, the placement of wind turbines, and the very turbines themselves, all can be used by both opponents and proponents alike. And when these elements are used to conjure an identity, the sense of belonging or otherness that comes with that can overpower the role of facts.

That overpowering is what happens in the identity-building story-lines described and analysed in this thesis. It would be inaccurate to say that these story-lines are for the most part factually wrong. As shown, facts play an important part in the different stories. At the same time the analysis and answer to research question number three, shows why they are just as notable for the facts they choose to omit. This is of course the very basics of storytelling, as no story could ever say everything. But by mapping out both what is in and what is left out from the story-lines, this thesis can contribute to a better overview of what can at times appear to be a completely deadlocked debate.

In a related, but much broader perspective, it is possible to question the value of social science as such. This has been a question under debate for decades. There are, broadly speaking, four possible positions (Alasuutari, Bickman, and Brannen 2008).

- There are those who see most social science research as concentrated on producing knowledge about human social life. Any link or relevance to policy and practical matters is not unimportant, but neither is it the direct goal of such research.

- Others can share the belief that social research must remain independent and not be subordinated to any professional practice or political ends, but at the same time see different criteria for assessment as properly political, ethical and/or aesthetic.
- A third position is to see the production of knowledge as the true purpose of science, but "for this to be worthwhile, it must have direct policy or practice implications: the task is to document what policies and practices 'work'" (Hammersley 2008:50).
- Lastly, there are those who are sceptical about the idea that social sciences can produce knowledge about the social world. From this position, the task of a social scientist is to "work in collaboration with particular groups of social actors to improve or transform the world" (Hammersley 2008:50)

It is possible to group these four positions into two groups of two. If we see the first and second position as one group, they are characterised by an openness to an idea of research as "pure" research, not a tool to reach a pre-defined goal.

To illustrate: From the first two positions, one can approach this thesis thinking that it is not written with a specific purpose in mind, other than to do research on the chosen data - which happens to be related to a policy-proposal. Those representing the first position, might see that link to policy as an interesting aspect of the thesis, but not something that affects the contribution of the thesis as *science*. Those in the second position could be interested in doing an assessment of the thesis with regards to how it might influence policy, at the same time knowing that the criteria for such an assessment would be different than the criteria for assessing the contribution to other fields and/or perspectives.

The two positions in the second group, however, are more goal-oriented from the start. Even as they first approach the thesis, they will be looking for ways to put the findings into practical use. From the third position, one is looking for "direct policy or practice implications", meaning: How can the identities outlined here be used in the shaping of new policy or new practices concerning wind power development in Norway? Or, from the fourth and final position: How can the findings in this thesis be put to use in such a way that it improves the world for a particular group or set of actors?

I'm hesitant to place this thesis firmly in one of the four positions. However, as mentioned in the introduction, this thesis is both with regards to topic and design shaped by the impression that the norwegian debate on wind power has reached a point where it resembles trench warfare more than a well-functioning public discourse. It is also grounded in the belief that a better debate is possible if there is greater understanding of the underlying forces at work in these confrontations, especially considering that the public discussion on *off-shore* developments is just beginning. Building on a better debate, it might also be possible to develop better (meaning less divisive) policy.

This thesis does not attempt to say anything about to what degree the specific story-lines and identities described here influenced the hearing as a whole, much less the broader debate in the norwegian society as such. The proposed framework was quickly shelved as soon as the hearing ended. One could argue that this was an example of a misplaced trust in the possible decisive role of facts, or what has been called "ineffective policy" based on "poor explanatory findings" (Ellis et al. 2007). But I would also add to this that the reasons for the shelving go beyond just the hearing. It was part of a broader change of opinion seen both among politicians and voters. In general, one can say that most of the participants in the hearing got what they wanted. An overwhelming majority of the hearing answers wanted to stop the proposed framework, which is exactly what happened.

A possible continuation of the work begun in this thesis, would be to look at how these identities shaped policy after the shelving. An hypothesis could be that the urban vs. rural-identity appears to have had a significant impact. In a new white paper on the approval process for on-shore wind power, presented in 2020, increased local and regional influence is clearly emphasised. This is done mainly through what is presented as a regional process of approval, which "will make possible better local- and regional anchoring" (Olje- og energidepartementet 2020b).

This thesis does not attempt to say anything about the value or non-value of developing wind power projects in Norway. It is simply a qualitative analysis of a defined dataset from a hearing. What is then ultimately the contribution? Perhaps this: Framing an issue, and constructing sites of argumentation, is a basic part of all politics and policy-making. As Thygesen and Agarwal have pointed out, "wind energy deployment is not only about 'facts' but also clashes of values

and debates over what sort of sustainable future we want” (2014:1021). Acknowledging that means that one also has to understand the values and identities at play, how they are constructed and what their different blind spots are. This can be a useful tool also in the politics and development of policy in this area. By identifying different identity-building story-lines, and the way these are constructed and used, the thesis can hopefully point towards a better understanding of what many of the participants see as being at stake in this discussion. A person who (more or less knowingly) identifies with the responsible Norway-category and argues for a cosmopolitan obligation, will have very little to say if she encounters a person who, from the natural Norway-position, sees himself as defending the eternal value of a norwegian mountain range.

## 6: Conclusion

The underlying question in this thesis is one of perception. What do we see when we look at a wind turbine? How do we make the different aspects of it - the turbine, its location, the process that brought it there, and the ownership-structure it is a part of? How can we make this fit into our world - more specifically, how can this fit into our *group*?

A similar situation is used for comic effect in one of the cornerstones of western literature.

"Look, your worship," said Sancho; "what we see there are not giants but windmills, and what seem to be their arms are the sails that turned by the wind make the millstone go."

"It is easy to see," replied Don Quixote, "that thou art not used to this business of adventures; those are giants; and if thou art afraid, away with thee out of this and betake thyself to prayer while I engage them in fierce and unequal combat." (de Cervantes 2010)

In "Don Quixote", the hapless title-character has taken on the identity of a knight - that is, a knight as he knows them through reading chivalric romances. His intense desire to make his life into a story leads him to misread every situation. This is contrasted by his assistant Sancho Panza, the straight man who in his own, calm manner sees the world as it actually is.

The situation in Norway through much of 2019 was seemingly without this friendly companionship between people who saw things differently. The differences meant both the end of a policy proposal, and the starting point for this thesis.

After a hearing that lasted six months, the government immediately decided that the proposed national framework for wind power development (Jacobsen et al. 2019) should be shelved. More than 1.000 answers were submitted in the hearing period, a majority of them from private citizens. At the same time, protests against wind power projects in Norway in general grew, and there were reports of sabotage against specific sites. In this thesis, I have combined discourse analysis with theories of identity-building to study which identities were at play in this conflict. As described in the delimitation-section, I thought the hearing answers to the proposal could be a relevant window into this debate. I also assumed that the finite and clearly defined amount of research data would be both practical and surmountable for a master thesis written during a

pandemic. As the work draws to a close, I believe that this, all in all, has been a constructive way to approach the chosen theme.

The head of NVE introduced the proposal for a new framework for wind power development in Norway with the hope that “(k)nowledge and analyses contribute to better decisions, and can lower the level of conflict” (Jacobsen et al. 2019:iii). The “hope” expressed here, is that people make decisions by weighing arguments and then reaching a conclusion. This thesis has identified a broader spectrum of opinions and ideas that come into play in the debate, more specifically the role of identities.

In the research questions, I asked: What were the main identity-building story-lines used by the discourse coalitions in the debate surrounding the proposed framework? What were the main parts of these story-lines - how were these identities constructed? And: What were the main blindspots in the different identities?

To find answers to these questions, I used the hermeneutic process that has been described by Danermark as an interpretation “dependent on the researcher’s earlier experiences, her theories, frames of reference, and the concepts she uses in the interpretation of the studied object” (2005:159). Approach from Grounded Theory is based on the idea that data do not speak for themselves. In order to gradually develop good analysis and understanding of the different categories, I systematically compared the elements from the data to find similarities and dissimilarities. In this way, “concepts and categories are developed providing new insight into a phenomenon and at the same time being well grounded in data” (Danermark et al., 2005, p. 133). This back and forth also meant that the categories themselves evolved as I got further into the data. The early ideas and outlines I had for possible identity-building story-lines were further developed and re-evaluated as I got a better understanding and overview of the data from the hearing answers. The crucial element was whether or not the story-line created an “us” and a “them”. An initial understanding of some participants positions as a “green on green”-conflict, or a version of the NIMBY-argument, was therefore developed into *natural Norway*-identity, where the ingroup and outgroup is more clearly defined, and more grounded in the Norwegian context. Along the way I also added the *responsible Norway*-identity, in order to get a more granular description of the data.

I'll leave it to the reader to decide if there is a Quixote among the identities found in this thesis. There is, however, no Sancho Panza who sees the world as it really is. The ontological assumption in the strategy used in this research, is that "social reality is socially constructed and is seen to reside in lay language. Knowledge of this reality is produced by 'immersion' in it" (Blaikie 2000:120). In other words, there isn't one reality adhering to the laws of nature, but rather multiple, parallel realities, all socially constructed. The defining trait in identity-building story-lines is that they all construct an "us" that is confronted, and most often threatened by, a "them". This creates resentment, and a call for justice.

In the *urban vs. rural* story-line, the "us" are the people who suffer the consequences of wind power developments. These consequences are often described as a form of violence. The people are threatened by the elite, who can reap the benefits of wind power while continuing their sheltered lives, mostly in big cities, and mostly in Oslo. Wind power development in Norway is seen as a threat to democracy.

Through the *humiliated Norway* story-line, an identity is created for an "us" that has to fight to get back control over one's own nature, one's own power production and one's own tax money. The threat is a "them" coming in from outside the country's borders, turning Norway into a colony of sorts.

In the *natural Norway* story-line, identity is found in pure and untouched nature. I have shown how this story-line can be tied back to the ideas and positions used to strengthen Norway as a newly independent country in the 19th and 20th century. The "us" here is in danger because of a "them" who either can't see the importance of preserving the "eternal" parts of Norway, or who just don't care.

The last identity I have located and described is the outlier. Unlike the other three, the *responsible Norway* story-line is categorized by an active "us", united by an obligation to play a global role in the fight against climate change. I found that if there is resentment and a feeling of shame in this story-line, it is not caused by a perceived mistreatment, but rather directed inward. Building renewable power sources is a penance for Norwegian oil and gas production.

A crucial feature of story-lines is that they simplify in order to become flexible enough for a wide array of people, organizations and interests. This simplification creates blind spots, which I have



described in all the identity-building story-lines described above. The urban vs. rural story-line implies that the norwegian people have been kept in the dark about wind power developments until it was too late. In the humiliated Norway story-line, there is no mention of Norway's own active role as investor and developer in other countries. The natural Norway story-line is based on a paradoxical idea of untouched nature. The responsible Norway story-line is built on the idea of global responsibility, with participants that often have a very specific connection to a property or an industry that stands to benefit from a local project.

The thesis has shown that these identity-building story-lines can be used simultaneously, with each of them operating on a continuum rather than being a definite category. This will raise questions about discriminant validity should these defined identities be further developed through quantitative research such as surveys or similar.

The hearing answers used as the foundational dataset are mostly submitted by private citizens who do not disclose affiliation to particular interest groups or political parties. As such, the data was not suitable for research on who the participants are in the different story-lines. I have suggested that the identities described here could be used to analyse another dataset, such as letters to the editor or content from social media. This could bring us closer to a granular understanding of the participants and interests that unite behind each story-line.

As described in the section on reliability, the chosen dataset has clearly defined boundaries in terms of place, format, timeframe and fixed context. Together with the easy accessibility, these are qualities that will enable other researchers to reproduce the study. As for external validity, I have suggested that this will depend on context. The identities outlined in this thesis are tied to values and perceptions that will vary across the globe.

## References

- Aasen, Marianne, Marit Klemetsen, Eilif Ursin Reed, and Arild Vatn. 2019. *Folk Og Klima: Nordmenns Holdninger Til Klimaendringer, Klimapolitikk Og Eget Ansvar*. Cicero.
- Alasuutari, Pertti, Leonard Bickman, and Julia Brannen, eds. 2008. *The SAGE Handbook of Social Research Methods*. SAGE.
- Andersen, Kent. 2019. "Vindkraft-svindelen begynner å gå opp for folk." *Document.no*. Retrieved February 14, 2021 (<https://www.document.no/2019/09/16/kent-andersen-med-grundig-gjennomgang-av-vindkraft-svindelen/>).
- Andersen, Pål. 2020. "Tror det blir ti år med stillstand for vindkraften." *NRK*. Retrieved May 22, 2021 (<https://www.nrk.no/osloogviken/tror-det-blir-ti-ar-med-stillstand-for-vindkraften-1.15172421>).
- Anonym. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Person som ikke har oppgitt navn, referansenummer 120445*. <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Anonym 2. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Person som ikke har oppgitt navn, referansenummer 170964*. <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Anonym 4. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Person som ikke har oppgitt navn, referansenummer 174316*. <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Anonym 5. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Person som ikke har oppgitt navn, referansenummer 215039*. <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Anonym 6. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Person som ikke har oppgitt navn, referansenummer 927369*. <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Anonym 7. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Person som ikke har oppgitt navn, referansenummer 936399*. <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Årnes, Tor Hilmar. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Tor Hilmar Årnes*. <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.

- Bell, D., T. Gray, and C. Haggett. 2005. "The 'social Gap' in Wind Farm Siting Decisions: Explanations and Policy Responses." *Environmental Politics* 14(4):460–77. doi: 10.1080/09644010500175833.
- Bergseth, Magne. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Magne Bergseth*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Bergva Isaksen, Mads. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Mads Bergva Isaksen*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Berntsen, Bredo. 1994. *Grønne linjer natur- og miljøvernets historie i Norge*. Oslo: Grøndahl Dreyer Norges naturvernforbund.
- Blaikie, Norman W. H. 2000. *Designing Social Research: The Logic of Anticipation*. Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Blindheim, Richard. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Richard Blindheim*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Carlman, Inga. 1982. "Wind Energy Potential in Sweden: The Importance of Non-Technical Factors." *U.S. Department of Energy Office of Scientific and Technical Information*. Retrieved April 2, 2020 (<https://www.osti.gov/etdeweb/biblio/5264723>).
- de Cervantes, Miguel. 2010. "Of the Good Fortune Which the Valiant Don Quixote Had in the Terrible and Undreamt-of Adventure of the Windmills, with Other Occurences Worthy to Be Fitly Recorded." in *Don Quixote*.
- Danermark, Berth, Mats Ekstrom, Liselotte Jakobsen, and Jan Ch Karlsson. 2005. *Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social Sciences*.
- Den Norske Turistforening. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Den Norske Turistforening*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Devine-Wright, P. 2009. "Rethinking NIMBYism: The Role of Place Attachment and Place Identity in Explaining Place-Protective Action." *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology* 19(6):426–41. doi: 10.1002/casp.1004.
- Dey, Ian. 2004. "Grounded Theory." Pp. 80–93 in *Qualitative research practice*, edited by C. Seale. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE.
- Document.no. 2016. "Om oss." *Document.no*. Retrieved February 27, 2021 (<https://www.document.no/om-oss/>).

- Dotterud Leiren, Merethe, and Kristin Linnerud. 2019. "Lokale Forhold Og Prosess Avgjør Holdninger Til Vindkraft." *Cicero*. Retrieved March 31, 2020 (<https://www.cicero.oslo.no/no/posts/klima/lokale-forhold-og-prosess-avgjor-holdninger-til-vindkraft>).
- Duszak, Anna. 2002. *Us and Others: Social Identities Across Languages, Discourses and Cultures*. John Benjamins Publishing.
- Eckersley, Robyn. 2016. "National Identities, International Roles, and the Legitimation of Climate Leadership: Germany and Norway Compared." *Environmental Politics* 25(1):180–201. doi: 10.1080/09644016.2015.1076278.
- Ellis, Geraint, John Barry, and Clive Robinson. 2007. "Many Ways to Say 'No', Different Ways to Say 'Yes': Applying Q-Methodology to Understand Public Acceptance of Wind Farm Proposals." *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management* 50(4):517–51. doi: 10.1080/09640560701402075.
- Fjeldavli, Christina. 2020. "Skal vi Unngå Dommedag i 2030, Må Naturen Legges Frem Som Offerlam." *Nationen*, January 26.
- Fjeseth, Mona. 2019. *Høringssvar Fra Mona Fjeseth*. [https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/mona-fjeseth.pdf?uid=Mona\\_Fjeseth](https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/mona-fjeseth.pdf?uid=Mona_Fjeseth).
- Flyvbjerg, Bent. 2006. "Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research." *Qualitative Inquiry* 12(2):219–45. doi: 10.1177/1077800405284363.
- Frøystad Kjærvåg, Laila. 2019. *Høringssvar Fra Laila Frøystad Kjærvåg*. [https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/laila-froystad-tjervag.pdf?uid=Laila\\_Fr%C3%B8ystad\\_Tjerv%C3%A5g](https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/laila-froystad-tjervag.pdf?uid=Laila_Fr%C3%B8ystad_Tjerv%C3%A5g).
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2019. *Identity: Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition*. Profile Books.
- Furunes, Kjell Arne. 2019. *Høringssvar Fra Kjell Arne Furunes*. [https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/kjell-arne-furunes.pdf?uid=Kjell\\_Arne\\_Furunes](https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/kjell-arne-furunes.pdf?uid=Kjell_Arne_Furunes).
- Geels, Frank W. 2002. "Technological Transitions as Evolutionary Reconfiguration Processes: A Multi-Level Perspective and a Case-Study." *Research Policy* 31(8–9):1257–74. doi: 10.1016/S0048-7333(02)00062-8.
- Gjerstad, Karl Olav. 2019. *Høringssvar Fra Karl Olav Gjerstad*. [https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/karl-olav-gjerstad.pdf?uid=Karl\\_Olav\\_Gjerstad](https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/karl-olav-gjerstad.pdf?uid=Karl_Olav_Gjerstad).

- Goodhart, David. 2017. *The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Haarstad, Rune. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Rune Haarstad*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Hajer, Maarten A. 2000. *The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process*. Reprinted. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hajer, Maarten A. 2004. "Coalitions, Practices, and Meaning in Environmental Politics: From Acid Rain to BSE." Pp. 297–315 in *Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance*, edited by D. Howarth and J. Torfing. Springer.
- Hajer, Maarten, and Wytse Versteeg. 2005. "A Decade of Discourse Analysis of Environmental Politics: Achievements, Challenges, Perspectives." *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning* 7(3):175–84. doi: 10.1080/15239080500339646.
- Hammersley, Martyn. 2008. "Assessing Validity in Social Research." Pp. 42–53 in *The SAGE Handbook of Social Research Methods*, edited by P. Alasuutari, L. Bickman, and J. Brannen. SAGE.
- Hammersvik, May Hege. 2019. *Høringssvar fra May Hege Hammersvik*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Hauge, Lise Andrine. 2019. *Høringssvar Fra Lise Andrine Hauge*.  
[https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/lise-andrine-hauge.pdf?uid=Lise\\_Andrine\\_Hauge](https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/lise-andrine-hauge.pdf?uid=Lise_Andrine_Hauge).
- Helene. 2019. *Høringssvar Fra Helene*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/helene.pdf?uid=Helene>.
- Hofstad, Knut. 2015. "NIMBY." *Store norske leksikon*.
- Högselius, Per. 2019. *Energy and Geopolitics*. London ; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Hovden, Anne Britt. 2019. *Høringssvar Fra Anne Britt Hovden*.  
[https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/anne-britt-hovden.pdf?uid=Anne\\_Britt\\_Hovden](https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/anne-britt-hovden.pdf?uid=Anne_Britt_Hovden).
- Hunsbedt, Odd Sverre. 2019. *Høringssvar Fra Odd Sverre Hunsbedt*.  
[https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/odd-sverre-hunsbedt.pdf?uid=Odd\\_Sverre\\_Hunsbedt](https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/odd-sverre-hunsbedt.pdf?uid=Odd_Sverre_Hunsbedt).

- Jacobsen, Sissel B., Sigrun K. Mindeberg, Ann M. Østenby, Even V. Dalen, Marte Lundsbakken, Erlend Bjerkestrand, Ingrid E. Haukeli, Mathilde Berg, Frode B. Johansen, David Weir, Jon Krogvold, Anne M. Aabøe, Fredrik Arnesen, Vegard Willumsen, Bushra Butt, Jørgen K. Bølling, Kjetil G. Solberg, Ane M. Ramtvedt, Hilde Aass, Lars H. Seim, and Kaja H. Engebriqtsen. 2019. *Forslag Til Nasjonal Ramme for Vindkraft*. Norges vassdrags og energidirektorat.
- Jenssen Stenberg, Marius André, Øystein Otterdal, Johannes Børstad, Geir Bjarte Hjetland, and Anne Kari Løberg. 2019. "Slik Aksjonerer Vindkraft-Motstandarar over Heile Landet – NRK Møre Og Romsdal – Lokale Nyheter, TV Og Radio." *NRK*. Retrieved April 1, 2021 (<https://www.nrk.no/mr/slik-aksjonerer-vindkraft-motstandarar-over-heile-landet-1.14734464>).
- Johansen, Øystein David. 2019. "Tysk vindkraftutbygger i Trøndelag sammenlignes med naziokkupasjonen." *VG.no*. Retrieved February 12, 2021 (<https://www.vg.no/i/zGIwEb>).
- Kinder, Peter D. 2020. "Not in My Backyard Phenomenon | Sociology." *Encyclopedia Britannica*.
- Köppel, Johann, Marie Dahmen, Jennifer Helfrich, Eva Schuster, and Lea Bulling. 2014. "Cautious but Committed: Moving Toward Adaptive Planning and Operation Strategies for Renewable Energy's Wildlife Implications." *Environmental Management* 54(4):744–55. doi: 10.1007/s00267-014-0333-8.
- Larsen, Ragnar. 2020. "Regjeringen med ny vindkraftoffensiv – overkjører lokalsamfunn." *Document*, April 6.
- Liestøl, Odd Helge. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Odd Helge Liestøl*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Linda. 2019. *Høringssvar Fra Linda*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/linda.pdf?uid=Linda>.
- Lindheim, Karl Øyvind. 2019. *Høringssvar Fra Karl Øyvind Lindheim*.  
[https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/karl-oyvind-lindheim.pdf?uid=Karl\\_%C3%98yvind\\_Lindheim](https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/karl-oyvind-lindheim.pdf?uid=Karl_%C3%98yvind_Lindheim).
- Lund, Andreas. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Andreas Lund*.  
[https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/andreas-lund.pdf?uid=Andreas\\_Lund](https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/andreas-lund.pdf?uid=Andreas_Lund).

- Lund, Svein. 2020. "Kva er galt med NIMBY?" *Harvest Magazine*. Retrieved March 3, 2020 (<https://www.harvestmagazine.no/pan/kva-er-galt-med-nimby?token=oMiaTfMtcwfU7QA6B3jHysb1RAIhSD1H>).
- Malkenes Hovland, Kjetil. 2020. "Få vindprosjekter fra 2022: Bransjen venter full stans." *e24.no*. Retrieved May 22, 2021 (<https://e24.no/i/IEAqpe>).
- McAvoy, Gregory E. 1998. "Partisan Probing and Democratic Decisionmaking Rethinking the Nimby Syndrome." *Policy Studies Journal* 26(2):274–92. doi: 10.1111/j.1541-0072.1998.tb01899.x.
- Motvind Dalane. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Motvind Dalane*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Motvind Sørvest. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Motvind Sørvest*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Nei til vindkraft i Sirdal og Lund. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Nei til vindkraft i Sirdal og Lund*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Neuman, W. Lawrence. 2014. *Understanding Research*. Harlow : Pearson Education Limited.
- Nilsen, Lise. 2019. *Høringssvar Fra Lise Nilsen*.
- Nordisk Vindkraft AS. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Nordisk Vindkraft AS*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Norges Bank Investment Management. 2019a. "Climate Change Strategy. Expectations towards Companies."
- Norges Bank Investment Management. 2019b. *Strategy 2020–2022*.
- NVE. 2021. "Generell Informasjon Om Verneplan for Vassdrag." Retrieved May 23, 2021 (<https://www.nve.no/vann-vassdrag-og-miljo/verneplan-for-vassdrag/generell-informasjon-om-verneplan-for-vassdrag/>).
- Ockwell, David, and Ivan Scrase. 2009. "Energy Issues: Framing and Policy Change." Pp. 35–53 in *Energy for the future A new agenda*, edited by G. MacKerron and I. Scrase. Basingstoke,: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Øien, Oddbjørn. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Oddbjørn Øien*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.

- Olje- og energidepartementet. 2019. *Høring – NVEs forslag til en nasjonal ramme for vindkraft på land*. regjeringen.no.
- Olje- og energidepartementet. 2020a. "Stortingsmelding om vindkraft på land." *Regjeringen.no*. Retrieved April 6, 2020 (<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/stortingsmelding-om-vindkraft-pa-land/id2693072/>).
- Olje- og energidepartementet. 2020b. *Vindkraft på land. Endringer i konsesjonsbehandlingen. Stortingsmelding*. Meld. St. 28 (2019-2020).
- Omholt, Maren Benedikte. 2020. "Public Opposition to Wind Power Projects in Norway." University of Stavanger, Stavanger.
- Pasqualetti, M. J. 2011. "Opposing Wind Energy Landscapes: A Search for Common Cause." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 101(4):907–17. doi: 10.1080/00045608.2011.568879.
- Pedersen, John Luring. 2020. "Nordmenns holdninger til vindkraft."
- Pedersen, Ole Petter. 2021. "Vindkraftdebatten i Norge har nærmest sporet av. Derfor faktasjekker vi ni påstander." *Tu.no*. Retrieved May 22, 2021 (<https://www.tu.no/artikler/vindkraftdebatten-i-norge-har-naermest-spoet-av-derfor-faktasjekker-vi-ni-pastander/510188>).
- Perlaviciute, Goda, Geertje Schuitema, Patrick Devine-Wright, and Bonnie Ram. 2018. "At the Heart of a Sustainable Energy Transition: The Public Acceptability of Energy Projects." *IEEE Power and Energy Magazine* 16(1):49–55. doi: 10.1109/MPE.2017.2759918.
- Pfefferkorn Ruus, Jakob. 2019. "A 'Green-on-Green' Paradox - Discursive Struggles of What Role Windpower Ought to Have in the Norwegian Electricity System." Master thesis, University of Stavanger, Stavanger.
- Prytz, Inger. 2019. *Høringssvar Fra Inger Prytz*. [https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/inger-prytz.pdf?uid=Inger\\_Prytz](https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/inger-prytz.pdf?uid=Inger_Prytz).
- Risa, Sigvald. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Sigvald Risa*. <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Rosenbloom, Daniel, Harris Berton, and James Meadowcroft. 2016. "Framing the Sun: A Discursive Approach to Understanding Multi-Dimensional Interactions within Socio-Technical Transitions through the Case of Solar Electricity in Ontario, Canada." *Research Policy* 45(6):1275–90. doi: 10.1016/j.respol.2016.03.012.



- Rusdal, Annbjørg. 2019. *Høringssvar Fra Annbjørg Rusdal*.  
[https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/annbjorg-rustad.pdf?uid=Annbj%C3%B8rg\\_Rustad](https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/annbjorg-rustad.pdf?uid=Annbj%C3%B8rg_Rustad).
- Sigrud (no last name given). 2019. *Høringssvar fra Sigrud*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Skirbekk, Gunnar. 1981. "Nasjon Og Natur. Eit Essay Om Den Norske Veremåten." Pp. 119–29 in *Eit Våpen mot vanen: nye norske essay*, edited by S. Bjugn, O. Hageberg, and S. Time. Oslo: Norske samlaget.
- Skulstad, Roar. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Roar Skulstad*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Slagstad, Rune. 2018. *Da fjellet ble dannet*. Oslo: Dreyers forlag.
- Sovacool, Benjamin K., Jonn Axsen, and Steve Sorrell. 2018. "Promoting Novelty, Rigor, and Style in Energy Social Science: Towards Codes of Practice for Appropriate Methods and Research Design." *Energy Research & Social Science* 45:12–42. doi: 10.1016/j.erss.2018.07.007.
- Standal, Marie. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Marie Standal*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Statkraft. 2020. "Strategy: Powering a Green Future." *Statkraft.Com*. Retrieved March 20, 2021 (<https://www.statkraft.com/about-statkraft/strategy/>).
- Svanem, Per Eirik. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Per Eirik Svanem*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Szarka, Joseph. 2004. "Wind Power, Discourse Coalitions and Climate Change: Breaking the Stalemate?" *European Environment* 14(6):317–30. doi: 10.1002/eet.367.
- The National Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities. 2021. "Guidelines for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences, Humanities, Law and Theology." *Forskningsetikk*. Retrieved May 20, 2021 (<https://www.forskningsetikk.no/en/guidelines/social-sciences-humanities-law-and-theology/guidelines-for-research-ethics-in-the-social-sciences-humanities-law-and-theology/>).

- Thronsen, Nina. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Nina Thronsen*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Thygesen, Janne, and Abhishek Agarwal. 2014. "Key Criteria for Sustainable Wind Energy Planning—Lessons from an Institutional Perspective on the Impact Assessment Literature." *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews* 39:1012–23. doi: 10.1016/j.rser.2014.07.173.
- Toftaker, Jøte, and Rita Kleven. 2019. "Gravemaskin er ubrukelig etter sabotasje på Frøya." *NRK*. Retrieved April 1, 2021  
(<https://www.nrk.no/trondelag/gravemaskin-er-ubrukelig-etter-sabotasje-pa-froya-1.14551549>).
- Totland, Anders. 2021. *Vindmøllekampen. Historia om eit folkeopprør*. Det Norske Samlaget.
- Turnheim, Bruno, and Frank W. Geels. 2012. "Regime Destabilisation as the Flipside of Energy Transitions: Lessons from the History of the British Coal Industry (1913–1997)." *Energy Policy* 50:35–49. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2012.04.060.
- Tvetene, Per Øyvind. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Per Øyvind Tvetene*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Vardenær, Åge. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Åge Vardenær*.  
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/>.
- Versluys, Eline. 2007. "The Notion of Identity in Discourse Analysis: Some 'Discourse Analytical' Remarks." *RASK: Internasjonalt Tidsskrift for Sprog Og Kommunikation* 11.
- Vorkinn, Marit, and Hanne Riese. 2001. "Environmental Concern in a Local Context: The Significance of Place Attachment." *Environment and Behavior* 33(2):249–63. doi: 10.1177/00139160121972972.
- de Vries, Sjerp, Mirjam de Groot, and Johnny Boers. 2012. "Eyesores in Sight: Quantifying the Impact of Man-Made Elements on the Scenic Beauty of Dutch Landscapes." *Landscape and Urban Planning* 105(1–2):118–27. doi: 10.1016/j.landurbplan.2011.12.005.
- Waage, Anne G. 2019. *Høringssvar Fra Anne G. Waage*.  
[https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/anne-b-waage.pdf?uid=Anne\\_B\\_Waage](https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b78b4164ead148e0a97df58fe741a2c5/anne-b-waage.pdf?uid=Anne_B_Waage).

- Wærenskjold, Marianne. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Marianne Wærenskjold*.  
[https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-fo  
r-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/](https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-for-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/).
- Warren, Charles R., Carolyn Lumsden, Simone O'Dowd, and Richard V. Birnie. 2005. "Green On Green': Public Perceptions of Wind Power in Scotland and Ireland." *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management* 48(6):853–75. doi: 10.1080/09640560500294376.
- Wilhelmsen, Trine. 2019. *Høringssvar fra Trine Wilhelmsen*.  
[https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-fo  
r-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/](https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--nves-forslag-til-en-nasjonal-ramme-fo-r-vindkraft-pa-land/id2639213/).
- Wolsink, Maarten. 1988. "The Social Impact of a Large Wind Turbine." *Environmental Impact Assessment Review* 8(4):323–34. doi: 10.1016/0195-9255(88)90024-8.
- Wolsink, Maarten. 2007a. "Planning of Renewables Schemes: Deliberative and Fair Decision-Making on Landscape Issues Instead of Reproachful Accusations of Non-Cooperation." *Energy Policy* 35(5):2692–2704. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2006.12.002.
- Wolsink, Maarten. 2007b. "Wind Power Implementation: The Nature of Public Attitudes: Equity and Fairness Instead of 'Backyard Motives.'" *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews* 11(6):1188–1207. doi: 10.1016/j.rser.2005.10.005.
- Yin, Robert K. 2018. *Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods*. Sixth edition. Los Angeles: SAGE.