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Governing the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism at higher educational institutions:

a comparison of the official policy documents of Norway and the UK through a wicked problem lens

RAGMAS – Master thesis in Risk Analysis and Governance

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Abstract

The increasing attention accorded to radicalization and violent extremism (RVE) has resulted in higher educational institutions finding themselves at the forefront of counterterrorism strategies. In recent years, both Norway and the UK have implemented official policies targeting the prevention of RVE in this sector. However, implementing policies on the prevention of RVE is not problem-free. It is often viewed as a tantamount to a wicked policy problem as there exist high degrees of knowledge gaps, conflicting values and interests, and various stakeholders with differing priorities and tasks. This challenge is also reflected in the two policies. Despite similar aims, their reception varied substantially as the UK policy has been subject to considerable criticism on its potential to endanger educational functions and societal freedoms. This thesis compares and examines the two policies to extract knowledge on their functioning and to explore why they were met with such differing receptions.

The policies´ are examined and compared regarding their risk governance strategy and through a theoretical framework building on wicked problems and governance theory. As the effectiveness of prevention concerning its possibilities to reduce RVE is inevitably unknown, the processes and management aspects of the policies illuminate knowledge on their functioning and implications on P/CVE in higher educational institutions. Three key principles for governing wicked problems are thus identified to frame a comparative document analysis.

The findings in this research point to similarities and vital differences regarding the risk governance strategies identified within the two countries´ official policy documents. These differences also result in them aligning with insights on governing wicked problems to various degrees. The Norwegian strategy is found to align with research to a high degree, while, the UK policy seems to only reflect research to some degree. Findings also showed that this results in the Norwegian policy offering better pre-requisites for approaching P/CVE at higher educational institutions. The findings also point to the identified differences in the strategies representing a plausible, partial explanation for the criticism targeted towards the UK policy. Consequently, the findings suggest an ought awareness on risk governance strategies as they are not insignificant for how the P/CVE at higher educational institutions unfolds. Simultaneously, more situational research is called for to acquire a broader and a more holistic picture of the policies and their belonging practices.

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Abbreviations

P/CVE – Prevention of radicalization and violent extremism

RVE – Radicalization and violent extremism

1. Introduction

During the last decade, increased attention has been accorded to radicalization and violent extremism (RVE), both regarding the volume and involved actors (Lid & Heierstad, 2019, p. 15). The occurrences of several terrorist attacks such as 9/11 and other small organizations and lone actor attacks in countries such as the UK, Norway, and France have all worked to emphasize the growing prominence of this threat (Parker et al., 2019, p. 264). European countries have followingly placed a significant focus on prevention efforts to respond to these conditions; a prevention where the broader society is involved and where the educational sector is increasingly found to be at the forefront of counterterrorism strategies (Sjøen & Mattssson, 2020, p. 218).

In this regard, both Norway and the UK have in recent years developed policies on the prevention of RVE (P/CVE) within the university and college sector. The strategy of the UK in this was to implement the Prevent Duty in 2015, which targets several areas in the society, including higher educational institutions. The policy lays down a list of requirements on universities and colleges to ensure fulfillment of the educational sector's responsibility for upholding "due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and to report those deemed vulnerable" (Danvers, 2021, p. 1; Whiting et al., 2021, pp. 514-515). The Norwegian approach, in comparison, was not finalized until 2018 and constitutes the "Suggested actions for prevention of radicalization and violent extremism in the university and college sector." This policy also involves a list of goals and measures to strengthen the prevention work, and they both have a common overall aim of preventing individuals from being drawn into terrorism by establishing cooperation and knowledge-sharing between governments, universities, and other relevant stakeholders (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018; Home Office, 2015a).

Despite these similarities, the implementation of the policies received significantly different responses in their respective countries. While the Norwegian document was introduced without significant controversies, massive discussions involving public, political, and academic environments have taken place in the UK (Danvers, 2021, p. 2; Whiting et al., 2021, p. 514). Concerns have been raised on its potential to transform universities and colleges into a surveillance function where academic freedom and freedom of speech are endangered. Questions then arise on why these two documents were met with such different responses; albeit their similar aim, what are the differences provoking these diverging views?

This thesis takes as its point of departure research that claims that P/CVE amounts to a wicked public policy problem that must, amongst others, be tackled in networks of different actors and stakeholders. Not only has the social and political challenges of RVE itself resulted in it being labeled a wicked problem but the prevention is also viewed to characterize knowledge gaps, conflicting interests and values, in addition to severe institutional complexity (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Haugstvedt, 2020, p. 6; Noordegraaf et al., 2019, p. 285). Little is, in other words, known about the causes and solutions to RVE, and the multitude of perceptions and interests by various relevant actors ultimately aggregate prevention into a wicked public policy problem. In fact, terrorism and P/CVE have been said to represent the ultimate wicked problem for public management due to the adaptive nature of principle actors, the conditions for information-gathering and communication, and the capability of development and learning from previous strategies (Fischbacher-Smith, 2016, p. 400).

Based on this, the thesis extracts some key insights and categories from extant research on how to govern wicked problems. It is highlighted that wicked problems surpass one agency's scope and thus require a broad systematic response where cross-boundary work and engagement of citizens and stakeholders are needed in a co-production of policies (Ferlie et al., 2011, p.308). In this view, a traditional top-down hierarchy and bureaucracy ought to be altered, and networks become crucial in developing policies on P/CVE. The categories utilized in this thesis build on two key assumptions: uncertainty is an inherent characteristic of wicked problems and the society, and there is a mutual dependency between actors (Koopenjan & Klijn, 2004, p. 9). Thus, literature on governing wicked problems not only highlights the need for acknowledging the uncertainties on the nature of wicked problems themselves but also regarding strategies of various actors and the following various institutional backgrounds. Consequently, the formulated categories concern the recommendations to address these uncertainties by embracing joint image building and cross-frame reflection, enhancing cooperation and participation, and acknowledging institutional characteristics within the development and formulation of a policy on P/CVE in higher educational institutions.

The above-mentioned categories are applied as structuring devices in a comparative analysis of the central policy documents addressing higher education in the UK and Norway, respectively. The thesis asks 1) what are the differences and similarities of their governance approaches? 2) To what extent do the governance approaches reflected in the policy documents align with

insights from wicked problems and governance theory? 3) what are the implications, and do the potential differences help explain the differing receptions of the two policies?

1.1   Problem Statement

The purpose of the thesis is to produce knowledge on how the policies of Norway and the UK approach P/CVE at the university and college levels. The problem statements were reached after seeing the policies' different receptions and through an extensive examination of research in the field. Followingly, the thesis not only aims to explore possible explanations for why such divergent responses met the two policies but also to enhance the understanding of their governance strategies. Substantial literature and research have already evolved on how governance of wicked problems ought to be carried out to make the process fruitful and the problem manageable. The policies' reflection of this will illuminate essential information that is beneficial for the respective country and also for governing P/CVE in higher educational institutions at a more general level. Especially, as significant knowledge gaps exist on the effectiveness, examining their governance strategy is vital to understand their functioning and appropriateness. In other words, the thesis aims to investigate and extract knowledge on how the interplay between actors is structured in the development and content of the policies and, followingly, which implications this has. The thesis is accordingly structured into three problem statements directed toward the official policy documents:

1. *What are the differences and similarities of their governance approaches?*
2. *To what extent do the governance approaches reflected in the policy documents align with insights from wicked problems and governance theory?*
3. *What are the implications, and do the potential differences help explain the differing receptions of the two policies?*

The problem statements are based on an aim to grasp a broad view of the policies' approaches to governing P/CVE at higher educational institutions. By building on a network approach to managing wicked problems, similarities and differences become visible while also illuminating their reflectance of research and further implications of the respective strategies. As P/CVE in higher education is a relatively new practice with significant challenges, the thesis aims to offer insights into a field characterized by substantial knowledge gaps.

1.1.1 Delimitations

The research design creates a demarcation as it is a document analysis. It is based on the official policy documents of the UK and Norway, in addition to some closely related documents. This means that no communication has been made to parties involved in the daily practice of the written policies or other sources that could have enlightened the field of study. The justification for this delimitation is that the documents themselves are the areas of interest, as they create the opportunities and boundaries of the respective countries' work on P/CVE in the university and college sectors. The aim is to compare and analyze Norway's and the UK's official basis, how the wording and content shape the collaboration and responsibilities given to actors, and thus also how they relate to generated research on governing wicked problems and further implications.

Many actors are involved in the development of a policy on P/CVE in higher educational institutions, but the thesis will mainly focus on the government and higher educational institutions. This means that several contributing actors, such as the police and social workers, will be given little attention. The choice is justified based on the government and higher educational institutions being the prime actors, and the official policy documents accord most information on these relations in their content. As will be seen later in the thesis, the interplay between the governments and higher educational institutions is also of particular interest in the research literature.

The different categories or ideological backgrounds of RVE will also be covered altogether, meaning that an elaboration of them in separation will not be carried out. Therefore, there will not be a divide between the various forms of extremism, such as right-wing extremism and Islamist extremism. These groups inhabit significant differences, but it will be outside the scope of this research to address them separately.

1.2 Structure

To answer the problem statements, the thesis is structured through seven chapters, where the first chapter captures the scope, focus, and aim of the thesis. Here, the context and problem statements are provided. Further in chapter 2, the literary background for the thesis is elaborated to offer a description and deeper understanding of the field of P/CVE within higher educational institutions. The chapter also points to consensuses, disputes, and knowledge gaps in the research environment, and the goal is to establish the literary basis on which the thesis is built.

Followingly, chapter 3 addresses the theoretical framework under which the official policy documents of the UK and Norway will be analyzed against. Simultaneously, it works to further the understanding of the context and challenges of the area. Here, discourse theory, the notion of wicked problems, and key principles in risk governance and managing uncertainties in networks will be described.

The methodological approach and analytical strategies are provided in chapter 4. As the current thesis is a comparative document analysis, this chapter clarifies the course of procedure and justifies the choices. It addresses the quality of the research while also looking into limitations and challenges. Further, in chapter 5, the comparative document analysis of the UK Prevent Duty and Norway's suggested actions for prevention of RVE in the university and college sector will be carried out. This is where problem statement 1 will be answered, and the findings are accordingly grouped into categories to emphasize their governance strategies. The chapter aims to examine and highlight how they relate to crucial aspects of risk governance and to clearly illuminate their similarities and differences.

Deeply connected to the previous chapter, the findings in the analysis is discussed in chapter 6. This is where problem statements 2 and 3 will be approached. The first part discusses the findings in the analysis against the theoretical framework, elaborating on how these fit the current insights on the governance of wicked problems. The second and last part of the discussion will move further to investigate the possible implications and the significance of the present risk governance strategies. The focus will be accorded to implications both regarding prevention and to see if the findings can help explain the differing responses. Finally, chapter 6 concludes the thesis, answering the problem statements by highlighting the key findings and identifying inquiries for further research.

2. Literary background

This chapter provides the literary background for the thesis and offers a thorough understanding of P/CVE at higher educational institutions. Before looking into the theoretical framework and the official policy documents to answer the problem statements, it is vital to understand what P/CVE at higher educational institutions amounts to. The chapter will thus present the fundamental ideas of what it constitutes and involves. The chapter commences by looking into the phenomena which the policies aim to prevent, namely the concepts of radicalization and violent extremism. Furthermore, as the official policy documents target the university and college sector, the P/CVE in higher education will also be portrayed, including the strategies of Norway and the UK. In the chapter's closing, a literature review will be presented to highlight knowledge gaps, agreements, and disputes in the field and research environment. The purpose is to offer an understanding of the topic, ultimately constituting the backbone of the thesis.

2.1 Radicalization and violent extremism

To understand what the policies of Norway and the UK aim to prevent, an elaboration of RVE is needed. The present-day understanding of radicalization in relation to terrorism originated from the political climate following the 9/11 attacks (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 480). Not only did the emergence of the concept enable much-needed discussions on "root causes" of terrorism, but it is also considered to reflect the growing acknowledgment of local, home-grown terrorism. Radicalization is, in other words, not a new phenomenon, and a standard definition holds that radicalization is a process where an individual adopts extremist views (Lid & Heierstad, 2019, p. 17; Nehlsen et al., 2020, p. 3). A famous description was also made by Neumann (2008, p. 4), who depicted it as "what goes on before the bomb goes off."

Defining radicalization, however, is not free from problems. Numerous definitions can be found, but a universal, agreed-upon definition does not exist (Neumann, 2013, p. 874). In fact, the definitional issues are stated to be the primary cause of controversies and misunderstandings regarding the concept. There is a consensus in the research community that radicalization is a multifactorial process occurring over a period of time, but not on aspects such as the length of the process, if it includes the involvement of violence, what extremist views entail, nor who constitutes the radicalized (Lid & Heirstad, 2019, pp. 17-18; Richards, 2015, p. 372). As Neumann (2013, p. 876) highlighted, radicalism is also context-dependent, meaning that what may be radical in one place or setting will potentially not be radical in another. The concept is,

in this sense, vague and ambiguous, making any definition problematic, and what one attempts to prevent is thus not tangible.

In this, however, many governments and academics draw a distinction between radicalization and violent extremism (Neumann, 2013, p. 874). Extremism can broadly be understood to constitute "political ideologies that oppose a society's core values and principles" (Borum, 2012, p. 10). Here, the definitions are also disputed, but it is often characterized by the involvement of anti-democratic thoughts (Sjøen, 2019, p. 71). Violent extremism can thus be understood as the justification of the use of violence in pursuing these thoughts and goals. There are some consensuses on which acts constitute violent extremism but no unanimity (Martin, 2014, p. 4).

To see the relationship more clearly between radicalization and violent extremism, Sjøen's (2020, p. 21) radicalization process is provided in figure 1. Radicalization is here understood to be more connected to attitudes and feelings, while violent extremism relates more closely to behavioral aspects. Consequently, prevention efforts towards RVE involve counteracting both physical and psychological aspects. The figure also highlights a thought often found in literature, namely that RVE are precursors to terrorism (Crone, 2016, p. 588; Martin, 2014, p. 3). It is, however, important to emphasize that this is not necessarily the case. There are many pathways into terrorism, and RVE and terrorism are not dependent on each other (Borum, 2012, p. 8). Still, the figure visualizes the concern of RVE potentially evolving into terrorism.


Figure 1: *The Radicalization process (Source: Sjøen, 2010, p. 21)*

2.2   Prevention of RVE (P/CVE)

Sjøen (2020, p. 21) found that a key assumption in the radicalization discourse holds that counterterrorism efforts should mitigate radicalization processes. This is in accordance with Western countries' contemporary approach, which aims to be preventive and include policies addressing individuals in their everyday life, such as universities (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 480; Veenkamp & Zeiger, 2015, pp. 151-152). Prevention of RVE is, in this regard, an "umbrella term for strategies and approaches that aim to prevent and mitigate radicalization and/or extremism" (Nehlsen et al., 2020, p. 3). As radicalization is a process, interventions can be made at several points in time. Prevention measures can therefore range from primary and secondary to tertiary prevention (Nehlsen et al., 2020, p. 4). In other words, from addressing large populations at an early stage to targeting specific individuals at risk, and all the way to addressing already radicalized individuals. Therefore, the prevention of RVE constitutes various safeguarding measures to protect both individuals and societies.

A distinction is often made in the literature between Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE), despite a reoccurring tendency to apply them interchangeably (Davies, 2018, p. 4). In this distinction, CVE represents the "tougher" side by identifying, deterring, and denying opportunities for those at risk or those who are already radicalized. PVE, on the other hand, aims to prevent recruitment into RVE by offering positive alternatives and challenging the push and pull factors potentially leading to RVE. In this thesis, prevention of RVE will be regarded to include both CVE and PVE and are abbreviated to P/CVE. Despite the observation that the "non-coercive" side of P/CVE is more often reflected in efforts directed towards education (Davies, 2018, p. 4), the more "coercive" side is a vital aspect of both the practice and the documents to be analyzed. Thus, P/CVE is in this thesis understood to involve strategies to prevent, counter, and mitigate RVE.

2.3   Prevention of RVE in the educational sector

In Western countries, the involvement of actors and sectors across society has become crucial in P/CVE (Veenkamp & Zeiger, 2015, pp. 151-152). This is visible in the educational sector, which is now viewed as an important arena for preventive work (Sjøen, 2019, p. 69-70). This can be seen in relation to the fact that young people have both carried out and been affected by violent episodes in newer times. Youths are also often perceived as a vulnerable group to radicalization, and it seems that individuals becoming radicalized are younger than before

(Campelo et al., 2018, p. 2; Veenkamp & Zeiger, 2015, p. 152). As lack of education also is one of the leading explanations for why individuals join violent groups (Sjøen, 2019, p. 69), the involvement of the educational sector in P/CVE becomes reasonable. At the present, numerous countries such as Denmark, Norway, the UK, and France have all implemented official strategies directly targeting schools and education (Davies, 2018, pp. 7-10). In addition to these government-implemented strategies, local, public-driven initiatives also exist in many countries.

Within P/CVE, education is commonly portrayed to be a primary preventer (Sjøen & Mattsson, 2020, p. 221). This means that the main objective of educational institutions is to prevent radicalization before it arises and, through this, address all attending students. Most education interventions have therefore been found to focus on aiding students in developing mindsets and attitudes that promote human rights and tolerance (Aly et al., 2014, p. 370). The methods for carrying out this consists to a large degree of citizenship education, the teaching of civic values, and socialization. This approach to prevention is compatible with the underlying thoughts of education, as education ought to have a socialization function on which stability or continuation of beneficial norms and values are pursued (Biesta, 2009, p. 40). Therefore, a large share of this prevention is a natural part of the educational environment. In connection to P/CVE, however, these efforts are carried out with the goal of building resilience against extremist views to make students capable of both identifying and rejecting these thoughts and behaviors (Sjøen & Jore, 2019, p. 274).

The role of education in P/CVE, however, is not confined to large populations before RVE occurs. In fact, the educational staff feel an increased responsibility to identify and safeguard students at risk of RVE (Sjøen & Jore, 2019, p. 276). More targeted measures are thus also evident at the educational level, specifically aimed at these individuals presumed to be at risk and those who are already radicalized. Therefore, efforts in education go further to also focus on mitigating risk factors regarding antisocial behavior and unfavorable situations. Numerous examples of such efforts can be found worldwide, such as mapping at-risk students, workshops, and support plans involving mentoring and anger management (Davies, 2018, pp. 7,16,18). In addition, efforts aimed at already radicalized individuals specifically target methods of re-education, reintegration, and aid to disengage from RVE (Sjøen & Jore, 2019, pp. 277-278). Despite limited knowledge of the educational sector's potential to fulfill this, moral

development and humanistic/relational pedagogics are seemingly the most promising strategies.

The entire execution of these deradicalization programs is, however, usually not solely situated in the educational setting alone (Davies, 2018, p. 40). Therefore, the educational sector is not alone in carrying out P/CVE at schools but cooperates with various sectors and stakeholders. Communication of concerns and coordinated efforts between these are followingly a vital aspect of the prevention. However, legislation on confidentiality in many countries makes it difficult to communicate information with the police and security services (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Haugstvedt, 2020, p. 8). Even though the duty to prevent serious crime is of a high order in many countries, an evaluation by higher educational staff on whether such crime is likely to happen can pose an issue if it is not possible to discuss and elaborate with other actors and services.

As seen, P/CVE in the educational sector can take several various forms, and educational staff can meet requirements and tasks which are both within and outside their presupposed assignments of being educators. This can be seen in relation to indications showing different ways of handling prevention among educational staff, most likely due to varying confidence and experience (Sjøen & Jore, 2019, p. 277). As P/CVE is included in education, the task of educators broadens, and new tasks develop. International findings have already shed light on a present uncertainty among professionals on how to carry out these new tasks (Haugstvedt, 2022, p. 167). With the implementation of P/CVE in the educational sector, educational institutions not only have to relate to the values of education but also to the values of security (Mattsson & Säljö, 2018, pp. 110-111). Thus, even though P/CVE is desirable within higher educational institutions, implementing policies and measures is still prone to dilemmas and challenges.

2.3.1 The UK´s preventive efforts

The UK has already witnessed several terrorist attacks, such as the London bombings in 2005 and the terrorist attacks on Manchester and London in 2017 (HM Government, 2018, p. 3; Thomas, 2016, p. 172). As a result of the first attack, the UK was one of the frontrunners in implementing policies addressing P/CVE. In recent years, hundreds of British citizens have also been identified traveling to aid the Syrian conflict, and the former Prime minister, Theresa May, expressed in 2018 the need to counter the new and emerging RVE and terrorism threats to the UK (HM Government, 2018, p. 3; Ragazzi, 2017, p. 164). RVE are thus familiar

phenomena to the UK, which continuously pose a threat to the society. P/CVE has followingly evolved to be an area high on their political agenda (Home Office, 2015a, p. 3).

Within this, the Prevent Duty addresses the official P/CVE at the higher educational level in the UK. The Prevent Duty is part of a broader governmental counterterrorism strategy named CONTEST, where it constitutes one of the four "P's", along with Pursue, Protect, and Prepare (HM Government, 2018, pp. 7-8). CONTEST originates all the way back to 2003; however, it was not until July 2015 that the higher education sector was not only specifically addressed but also received a statutory duty (Busher & Jerome, 2020, p. 2; Elwick & Jerome, 2019, p. 339). This statutory duty is located in the Counter-Terrorist and Security Act of 2015 (s. 26), which requires the specified authority to "have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism." Therefore, educators are one among several sectors that are required by law to fulfill this duty in their line of work. As highlighted in the Prevent Duty Guidance, this implementation was built on existing policy and practice, and it was assumed that most educational institutions already understood their responsibilities (Home Office, 2015b, s. 4). Still, research has shown that the implementation provided a momentous change in how the country tackled the threat of terrorism (Busher & Jerome, 2020, p. 2)

The aim of Prevent addressing higher education is to reduce the terrorism threat to the UK by safeguarding and supporting students vulnerable to radicalization, thereby preventing them from supporting and identifying with terrorism (Danvers, 2021, p. 1; Home Office, 2015b). Compliance with the duty followingly involves several requirements of higher educational institutions. This involves, amongst others, risk assessments of their institution in which they evaluate where and how students may be at risk of being drawn into terrorism; training of staff; assessment and mitigation of risks regarding external speakers; and engage and enlighten students on policies (Home Office, 2015b). It is also highlighted in the guidance that educational personnel may be able to identify radicalized students by observing changes in behaviors and viewpoints. Subsequently, most of the Prevent Duty's content addresses the "tougher" side of prevention, but from the description of its aim, a vital factor is also measures to support students. The P/CVE in the educational sector in the UK is therefore connected to both identification, prevention, mitigation, and countering RVE. It involves responsibilities situated both within and outside of the presupposed educational tasks.

This strategy applied by the UK is seemingly the approach that has gained the most attention worldwide. Those supportive have highlighted that the policy drives educational institutions to engage and develop a much-needed response (Elwick & Jerome, 2019, p. 350). Several have also argued that the Prevent Duty is a necessary reaction to a prominent social problem, and as it is based on previous practices, it will only interfere with educational values on a small scale (Busher & Jerome, 2020, p. 3). The views of the policy are, however, divided. Concerns are also raised on its potential to securitize educational spaces, and it is questioned if it is possible to both detect students at risk of RVE and, at the same time, protect and encourage freedom of speech and academic freedom (Busher & Jerome, 2020, p. 3; Whiting et al., 2021, p. 514). Numerous debates are thus taking place regarding the Prevent Duty. Simultaneously, it continues to constitute the foundation for P/CVE in the higher education sector in the UK.

2.3.2 Norway´s preventive efforts

In comparison to the UK, Norway's efforts at P/CVE were developed more recently. The overall P/CVE in Norway stems from 2008, but after several occurrences of terrorist attacks in close proximity to Norway, an intensification evolved where practitioners at the front became increasingly involved (Sjøen & Mattsson, 2020, p. 219). Especially the terrorist attacks carried out in Norway on the 22nd of July 2011 and the Mosque attack in Bærum exemplified the trend of increased support for right-wing extremism by local citizens (Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2021, p. 5). The heightened priority given to P/CVE has thus eventually resulted in the "Suggested Actions for Prevention of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in the University- and College Sector" being introduced in 2018.

The general fundamental idea of P/CVE in the educational sector in Norway involves that the core prevention should be built on ideas of building norms, citizenship, and democratic ideals (Sjøen, 2019, p. 73). In other words, methods striving for democratic mindsets and where efforts coincide with educational principles. In the official document addressing higher education, it follows that there are three main categories of goals and measures, particularly given due consideration. These are resolution of controversy, confidence building and raising ethical awareness; student welfare and learning environment; and security-oriented measures (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018, pp. 4-7). The role of higher educational institutions in P/CVE, therefore, addresses these needs for educational values such as socializing, encouraging discussions and providing support. At the same time, measures connected to security also prevail as it is highlighted as crucial for educational staff to be involved in the

security processes to strengthen the prevention work (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018, p. 6). This involves relevant actors carrying out risk and vulnerability analyses in order to map suitable measures, handle concerns regarding potential radicalization and extremist activities, and assess threats towards political and religious associations. In this, it is also recognized that the risk of RVE can never be eliminated. Rather, the goal is to acknowledge the challenge and prevent the risk from growing (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018, p. 7).

In contrast to the approach applied by the UK, the Norwegian policy is less controversial and has received a lot of support. However, by introducing vulnerability analyses and prevention through factors of vulnerability, concerns have been raised as it is questioned if RVE is by this inevitably transformed into individual pathology (Sjøen, 2019, p. 72). The involved analyses also represent a problem-oriented approach, which is argued to be concerning as education should focus on students' capabilities rather than deviant behavior.

2.4   Literature review – consensus, disputes, and research gaps

P/CVE in higher educational institutions has thus become an integral part of both the UK and Norwegian society. This last section of the chapter will review knowledge obtained in the field and, followingly, present contemporary knowledge on these policies addressing P/CVE in higher educational institutions.

2.4.1 The fundamental thought of P/CVE in education

As reflected in section 2.3, there is a broad agreement that the educational sector should be involved in P/CVE. Accordingly, scientific literature on how this should be carried out and the implications of policies and measures have flourished. The literature seems consistent in arguing that "good education" should constitute the fundamental backbone of prevention at educational institutions (Sjøen & Jore, 2019, pp. 270, 274; Stephens et al., 2021, p. 349-351). It is an important aspect in achieving the desirable resilience of students. "Good education" involves that measures should ensure to, amongst others, involve fundamental educational ideas such as student-centered pedagogics, promote inclusive environments, subjectification, and socialization of democratic values. Believing that the solution to the problem constitutes passive education is naïve, especially as those who identify with extremist thoughts are usually unsatisfied with school (Sjøen & Jore, 2019, p. 279). Engagement, inclusiveness, and socialization are thus crucial. An example to illustrate the importance of "good education" can

be seen in the UK Prevent Duty, where Thomas (2016, p. 184) found that the policy especially directed itself towards Muslim youths instead of the entire student population, and where security and surveillance surpassed these educational processes. The danger of this being that the policy may be counterproductive. The precise importance of "good education" is, however, debated. There are currently disputes on what actually constitutes "good education" and whether it is equivalent to efficient prevention (Sjøen, 2020, pp. 27-28). Uncertainties are thus present regarding the exact relationship between P/CVE and "good education", but a common ideal remains that it should be a key pillar and substantiate policies on P/CVE in higher education.

Related to this, it is argued that P/CVE in education introduces a securitization of social policy (Ragazzi, 2017, p.170). In other words, that education, which originally is a pedagogical and social arena in the society, becomes an arena for security (Mattsson & Säljö, 2018, pp. 110-111). As monitoring and reporting through official policies becomes an integral part of the educational life, measures and methods historically used by the military and the police to keep the society safe are integrated into the educational world. Concerns have been raised as these new tasks potentially can threaten the relationship and trust between students and educators but can also pose a threat to equality and freedom of speech, and ultimately endanger the fundamental ideas, knowledge, and criticality of education (Busher & Jerome, 2020, p. 5; Elwick & Jerome, 2019, p. 350; Mattsson & Säljö, 2018, p. 111; Sjøen & Jore, 2019, pp. 277, 279; Thomas, 2016, p. 172). Education ought to be a safe haven where all individuals should feel safe and comfortable expressing their thoughts constructively. Adebayo (2021, p. 15) has consequently argued that we need to obtain a broader view on security, such that it also involves human security. Education has real consequences, and he stresses the need to thoroughly reflect on "security for what type of educational means?". The implemented P/CVE ought to have a preventive effect, but there is still a need to look at the efforts' suitability in the educational world; to reflect on the unintended and undesirable consequences potentially arising from them. A prominent challenge of introducing policies on P/CVE in the educational sector is thus to find a way to simultaneously sustain the values of education and security.

2.4.2 Does it work?

Notwithstanding the broad consensus on the underlying thoughts in the literature, vast knowledge is obtained on the actual effectiveness of P/CVE in education. Extensive research on RVE exists, but the majority focuses on the phenomena themselves, leaving less attention

to the preventive aspects (Bjørgo & Gjelsvik, 2015, p. 231). The difficulties are, nevertheless, more profound. In cases where evaluation research has been carried out, few results have been identified (Bjørgo & Gjesvik, 2015, pp. 236-237). Part of the reason is that the nature of RVE makes it almost unfeasible to carry out controlled experiments. Lindekilde (2012, p. 340) highlights that if prevention is successful, the outcome will result in nothing happening and, subsequently, no radicalization occurs. Not only is it impossible to determine if the policies and related measures cause this, but it is also impossible to tell how many students (if any) have repelled from RVE.

Following this line of thought, Davies (2018, pp. 17-42) identified 20 categories of worldwide initiatives targeted at P/CVE in the educational sector and found that numerous of these reported positive outcomes. However, despite her intent to not judge their impacts, he highlights that even the most prevalent initiatives do not have any strong evidence to prove their efficiency. He further states that many initiatives in education are based on a combination of theories on causes of radicalization (e.g., vulnerability, misunderstandings, isolation), leading to the development of responses (Davies, 2018, p. 12). Even though there is a consensus in research about the causes of radicalization being multifaceted with dimensions and processes involving individual, social, political, and religious aspects, findings are still inconclusive in regard to identifying the actual factors leading to radicalization (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Haugstvedt, 2020, p. 6). If implemented policies and related measures target the real causes of RVE are thus uncertain, and it is believed that many strategies on P/CVE are guided by "common-sense" assumptions which are not testable (Davies, 2018, p. 12).

An evaluation of which measures and strategies to pursue in policies are by these conditions difficult. To add to this complexity, research also points to the context-dependent character of countermeasures. Which countermeasure that will work in a given situation will be dependent on the social context and environmental factors (Bjørgo & Gjelsvik, 2015, p. 237). What seems to be a promising approach in one situation or university will therefore not automatically be the optimal prevention in another, meaning that one ultimate solution does not exist. This has led Gielen (2019, p. 1163) to conclude that rather than asking "What works?", one should instead ask "What works, for whom, in what circumstances, and how?". In this, he calls attention to the need to be realistic.

2.4.3 Research on official policies on the P/CVE in higher education

It is thus uncertain what effect preventive measures in connection to educational institutions have in practice and which measures to pursue. Still, the increasing implementation of official policies in various countries on the P/CVE in the higher education sector illustrates their perceived potential. As the outcomes are uncertain, however, the processes and management aspects become just as vital.

A prevalent finding in the literature is the realization that policies are often based on assumptions and ideologies instead of research and professional experience (Aly et al., 2014, p. 382; Sjøen & Jore, 2019, p. 270). These policies drive and spark new initiatives in practice, which can be disadvantageous if they do not reflect contemporary insights. Fischbacher-Smith's (2016, pp. 404-405) findings are an especially interesting example in this context. Using a "wicked problem lens", he investigated the general strategy of Prevent Duty and found that policies inhabit severe limitations if they do not have the required holistic perspective on the nature of the problem. The policies will be problematic in these cases, and RVE will potentially be a continuous issue. Not only does this exemplify the importance of integrating research into policies, but it also points to the wicked problem lens as a fruitful framework to examine policies on their processes and management. In fact, the concept has been found useful in both portraying and emphasizing the complexities of RVE, while it is also seen as a promising concept to aid policymakers and involved actors in handling the involved challenges (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Haugstvedt, 2020, p. 9). Utilizing this theory on the present policies can therefore offer beneficial insights into their functioning and status.

As implied above, several have already investigated the Prevent Duty addressing education in the UK. The majority of the literature is based on the experiences of educators, utilizing theories of agency, critical thinking, and functions of education (Busher et al., 2020; Danvers, 2021; Elwick & Jerome, 2019; Miller et al., 2011; Thomas, 2016). The findings point toward the concerns of "securitization of education" as the heightened focus on "tough" measures challenges educators and numerous educational ideals. In contrast, the literature addressing Norway's official policy document on P/CVE in higher education is rather meager. Instead, more research exists on the general practices and strategies in Norway, where studies have also focused on the views of educational staff from theories on the functions of education and critical discourse theory (Sjøen, 2019; Sjøen & Mattsson, 2020). The conclusions reflect the above thoughts on the foundation of P/CVE in the education sector, where they acknowledge the

importance of "good education" but feel an inevitable challenge of balancing security and education.

A considerable amount of the studies on the policies of Norway and the UK thus seem to imply a tension between the focus on security and the educational perspectives of educators. The question then arises on how educators' views have been involved in the development of these policies. In other words, how the interplay between the government that drives the production of official policies and educational staff have occurred, and which perspectives and viewpoints on P/CVE in universities and colleges have been involved in the policies' development and content? This is not to imply that the government and educators represent two distinct, opposing groups. There are differing perspectives both within the governmental body itself and the agency of educators account for the understanding of policies (Elwick & Jerome, 2019, p. 350; Thomas, 2016, p. 173). However, it is highlighted that the differing logics and discourses employed by national and local, social actors impact the understanding and evaluation of the situation (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Haugstvedt, 2020, pp. 7-8). The point is that the government and educators are two prominent actors in the policies who come from two different sectors and perspectives in the society, and the above tension points to a need for knowledge on how their participation, roles, and interplay are shaped and reflected through the policies. In other words, through the official policy documents' development and content.

Based on this literature review, the present thesis aims to increase knowledge on these aspects by building on the notion of "wicked problems" in line with Fischer-Bacher's study. Here, however, the purpose is to move further by extracting insights into the foundation behind the daily functioning of P/CVE in higher education in Norway and the UK by examining and comparing the policies' risk governance strategies. In other words, examine the boundaries and opportunities of the interplay between relevant actors and the complex processes involved in the formation and content of the policies (Renn, 2017, p. 8). As shown above, experiences from actors are documented in the literature, but what seems to be missing is knowledge of how the official documents shape the interaction between the governments and educational staff; how the policies shape, weigh and take into consideration their roles and values. Koppenjan and Klijn (2004, pp. 10, 257) have argued that cooperation is needed in this to acquire satisfactory outcomes for all actors. Especially as the two policy documents in focus have received differing responses, and the produced criticism targets these processes, knowledge is here beneficial to increase the understanding of them.

3. Theoretical Framework

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework on which the analysis and discussion of the official policy documents of Norway and the UK are founded. The literary background mentioned that a wicked problem lens had been identified as a promising theory to capture the challenges of RVE, in addition to aiding policymakers in improving the management of such issues. As the effectiveness of P/CVE in higher educational institutions also are unknown, and there are conflicting values in play, this implies that the processes and governance strategies of the policies are vital. Accordingly, the framework applied in the thesis addresses these Insights. The chapter will first introduce wicked problems by viewing P/CVE as a tantamount to a wicked policy problem. Followingly, as the thesis aims to examine the governance strategies of the policies, the wicked problem typology introduces appropriate strategies of risk governance. Here, management of uncertainties in networks will be presented, and building on this, the key principles of governing wicked problems will be elaborated. It is these principles that constitute the heart of the framework. As it is an analysis of documents, the focus will be on principles that are identifiable in these. Accordingly, the last section will also elaborate on discourse theory to shed light on the meaning and importance of examining the policies and their connected language.

3.1 P/CVE – a tantamount to a wicked problem

Wicked Problems is a term initially coined by Rittel and Webber (1973, p. 160) as they identified that some societal issues are inherently different from others. They first used the term to describe the field of planning, but the concept has later been found to describe both RVE and P/CVE well as it is able to capture their characteristics and challenges (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Haugstvedt, 2020, p. 6).

The uniqueness of wicked problems lies in several distinct characteristics which work to highlight the problem´s complexity. Principally, the problem itself is difficult to define, and an effective solution does not exist (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 161-163). The understanding of them is, in other words, multifactorial and dynamic and, as such, is also the perception of the appropriate solutions. The chosen solutions additionally tend to produce unintended consequences and new problems that may be of a greater volume (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Haugstvedt, 2020, p. 4). The actions taken towards a wicked problem will, therefore, almost without exceptions have a broad impact as they are tightly coupled to other problems, which

inevitably adds challenges to the management. All this emphasizes a significant uncertainty present in wicked problems, which contributes to the challenge of handling them as there are often high degrees of unknowingness (Gharehgozli et al., 2017, p. 68). Especially is this the case as it often exists involvement of multiple stakeholders with different interpretations and collecting more information will rarely limit the faced uncertainty. Wicked problems are consequently issues filled with uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity, ultimately putting a high demand on the management of them.

Many of these mentioned characteristics can also be found in P/CVE. The practice aims to prevent RVE, but in accordance with wicked problems, there is no consensus on a definition of what this amount to nor on its causes (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Haugstvedt, 2020, p. 6). What one is trying to prevent is thus subject to uncertainty and ambiguity. As also seen in the literary background, there does not exist an ultimate solution or knowledge on what works, and prevention is viewed to potentially cause negative consequences regarding educational values and freedoms. Research highlights that there is a dichotomy of "freedom vs. security", meaning that increasing security by prevention can go at the expense of other liberties in the society (Jore, 2019, p. 242). Despite rejecting a deterministic relationship between these phenomena, the dichotomy still reflects the wicked problems´ characteristics of dilemmas and possible unintentional consequences stemming from P/CVE.

As also highlighted by Dalgaard-Nielsen and Haugstvedt (2020, pp. 6-8), within the field of P/CVE, conflicting values and interests are operating as inevitable knowledge gaps allow stakeholders to hold different priorities and preferred interventions. As these stakeholders also come from different sectors, they have diverging logics and discourses driving their thoughts and behaviors. This, again, can cause challenges as it might result in different perceptions, evaluations, and responses to the same situation between, e.g., the government and higher education staff. Thus, P/CVE, in accordance with wicked problems, also represents a field filled with complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty. These similarities between wicked problems and P/CVE have eventually resulted in an increasing number of researchers acknowledging it as a wicked policy problem (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Haugstvedt, 2020, p. 6; Davies, 2016, pp. 32-33; Fischbacher-Smith, 2016, p. 402). To see the similarities more clearly, Table 1 provides an overview of how P/CVE reflects central characteristics of the notion of wicked problems.

Table 1: *P/CVE as a Wicked Problem. Based on Rittel and Webber (1973, pp. 161-167)*

Characteristics of wicked problems	Description	Characteristics of P/CVE
No objective, universal definition	Not possible to obtain all information needed to understand and solve the problem. Understanding a problem depends on an idea of how to solve it, meaning that one needs an exhaustive list of all solutions ahead of time. This is not possible with wicked problems.	No objective, universal definition of RVE exists, meaning that what one aims to prevent is not clear (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Haugstvedt, 2020, p. 6; Neumann, 2013, p. 874). Information is lacking on its causes, and the general knowledge gaps on the phenomena and the multitude of perceptions hinder the creation of an exhaustive list of how to solve it.
No stopping rule	No criteria to tell when the solution has been found or when the problem is solved. There is always a possibility of improving and finding better solutions.	RVE is gradually evolving and is argued not to disappear (Nacos, 2019, p. 377; Neumann, 2013, p. 893). As also highlighted in the literary background, the effectiveness of P/CVE is not known, meaning there will be no way to know if prevention is successful or beneficial. The challenge is also in the broad nature of RVE. Local prevention efforts are only fragmented solutions to the problem and will not be able to eliminate RVE worldwide (Nordeegraaf et al., 2019, p. 295).
No true or false solutions	Wicked problems concern a judgment on answers, not an objective fact. Everyone is entitled to a judgment on the problem, but no one has the authority to determine the correctness. Rather than true or false solutions, judgments on good and bad solutions can be made.	As P/CVE is a field involving conflicting values and interests, and there is a lack of vital information, no objective, "correct" prevention method is possible to formulate (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Haugstvedt, 2020, p. 7). Actors can obtain their preferred solution, and it is currently debated whether to designate attention to punitive or supportive approaches.
Difficult to evaluate solutions	There is no ultimate test to evaluate solutions as all consequences of a solution are unreachable. To grasp all consequences, the evaluation must be carried out after all consequences and repercussions have occurred. Not only is it difficult to know when these end, but there is also no way of detecting all of them through all the affected lives ahead of time or within a limited period of time.	Many attempts have been made to obtain knowledge on the effectiveness of prevention, but the nature of RVE makes it almost impossible to generate such knowledge. There is a lack of evaluation research on prevention efforts, but this is linked to the difficulty of examining the intended and unintended consequences stemming from them (Ellefsen, 2021, pp. 16-17; Lum et al., 2008, pp. 35-36).
Every solution has consequences	Solutions cannot be tested without consequences, as it is not possible to make simulations. Every effort will have impacts on lives that cannot be reversed. This means that every attempt counts.	P/CVE is targeted toward humans and will consequently always impact lives as simulations are not applicable. Additionally, the way it is carried out will produce differing consequences. To illustrate, an over-reporting of concerns in education has been identified to undermine the student-teacher relationship and cause stigmatization, while an under-reporting fails to recognize and respond to situations of genuine concerns (Parker et al., 2021, p. 635). Additionally, (not) reporting will impact future behavior.

No exhaustive list of potential solutions	An infinite number of potential solutions. Cannot guarantee that all solutions have been identified and considered. Rather, a judgment is made on whether more solutions should be obtained or designed.	As knowledge is lacking on the nature of RVE and evaluation is difficult, there is no way to assure that all potential solutions have been thought of. To illustrate, Davies (2018, pp. 11, 15-16) examined 20 initiatives implemented within higher education alone, a selection only including those perceived to be sustainable. A myriad of potential solutions does, in other words, exist, and new initiatives constantly evolve.
Essential unique problems	Every wicked problem will always have a unique distinguishing property that is of crucial importance. Cannot separate them into classes of wicked problems, as one can never be sure that distinctive properties override the similarities.	A helpful comparison to illustrate the uniqueness of P/CVE is to see it in relation to terrorism. These are often seen in combination, but literature highlights that conflating these two concepts can hinder effective prevention of them (Neumann, 2013, p. 879). RVE is context-dependent, will not necessarily result in terrorism, and they have two essentially distinct natures. They need to be managed according to their unique characteristics and should thus not be grouped.
A symptom of another problem	Removing a cause of a problem will lead to another problem where the original problem was a symptom. Wicked problems are interlinked and often related to other problems on the higher, lower, or same levels.	P/CVE is often viewed to be closely linked to other problems. For example, the Danish counter-radicalization strategy views RVE as a symptom of inadequate social integration (Angus, 2016, p. 15). As also seen, some argue that RVE is closely connected to and a potential precursor to terrorism.
Numerous explanations/causes to the problem	No rule or process to determine the "right" explanation(s). Potential causes can be infinite, and there is no way to find the true cause.	Even though there are empirical findings on causes connected to RVE, no conclusive results are found on the factors predicting or leading to RVE (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Haugstvedt, 2020, p. 6). There is a consensus that it involves multifactorial processes and dimensions (individual, social, political, and religious aspects), but the inconclusiveness questions if prevention addresses the actual causes. The explanations can be numerous.
The decision-makers have no right to be wrong	The aim is not to find the truth but to improve the conditions. Planners are responsible for the consequences stemming from the actions they implement.	Failure of prevention can cause extensive harm, in addition to the potential for public outrage connected to the failure of prevention (Fischbacher-Smith, 2016, p.402). There is also the danger of false positives and the deprivation of human rights such as freedom of speech (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Haugstvedt, 2020, p. 7; Withing et al., 2020, p. 514).

No literature has been found disputing P/CVE as a wicked policy problem. However, the concept of wicked problems itself has been subject to critical research, questioning the overall usage of the concept. Turnbull and Hoppe (2019, pp. 317-319) argue that the notion of wicked problems has been misinterpreted in the sense that its contemporary understanding deviates

from what Rittel and Webber meant when they introduced the concept. They argue that the term was originally appointed to the distinction between social and natural sciences, but that this distinction is also misleading as problems of natural sciences also can be wicked. The conclusion thus being that the conception and interpretation of wicked problems are flawed. It is also questioned if labeling problems as wicked creates a paradox. The reason is that this framing can hinder the management as it symbolizes that the problem is of such magnitude and difficulty that it discourages attempts to handle it, in contrast to more "tame" problems (Termeer et al., 2019, p. 176). In this regard, it is interesting to note that Alford and Head (2017, p. 405-410) have proposed a contingency framework involving degrees of wickedness to accommodate this paradox. They distinguish and identify problems according to their difficulty and complexity, thus illuminating how wicked problems differ in the extent of challenges. By identifying varying types of complexities and diversities, it will thus be easier to choose beneficial management strategies to fit the specific situation.

The criticism has also been accorded to the concept's usefulness regarding its accompanied governance strategies. Researchers have questioned if the recommended governance strategies stemming from the theory of the wicked problem actually have contributed additional knowledge and impacts in relation to other classic theories of policy research (Termeer et al., 2019, p. 174). Policy research is a constantly evolving field, and not only have similar governance strategies been identified in other branches, but it also seems that the theory of wicked problems has limited impact. To add to this, Noordegraf and colleagues (2019, p. 282) also take a critical approach to problematize its macro-level focus on managing issues, such that it is located too far away from the experiences and practices of humans dealing with them daily. In this, they also look at the wicked problems theory´s focus on trust and learning and highlight that this can represent a romanization as it is not easily obtained in practice, and question what managerial and professional implications these governance recommendations have (Noordegraf et al., 2019, pp. 282-284). The journey from how it ought to be to how this should be situational arranged is unclear.

Wicked problems have thus been subject to much criticism, but those who have carried out this critical research also emphasize the importance of the concept. In fact, it is argued that the wickedness involved in many contemporary societal problems cannot be ignored as it represents some of the most prominent challenges of our time (Noordegraf et al., 2019, p. 292). This is also reflected in P/CVE as the literary background stated that it has evolved to be a top

priority on political agendas. As Termeer and colleagues (2019, p. 173) also point out, the revival of the concept across research disciplines implies a current deficiency in addressing the challenges that wicked problems stress. These studies thus argue for upholding and a continuation of utilizing the concept and instead encourage a revising and enrichment of the theory. The majority of researchers thus see the potential in utilizing the theory, and it can thus also be perceived to be appropriate in addressing P/CVE in higher education institutions. In fact, the concept has been found to offer an antidote against oversimplification and unrealistic assumptions about decision-making and policies (Termeer et al., 2019, p. 177-178). In the same thoughts, it is also argued to be of crucial importance to compare how certain types of wicked problems are governed (un)effectively and whether there are similarities or differences between policy systems to understand various types of problems and simultaneously increase knowledge on how they can be "solved" through governance interventions. P/CVE constituting a tantamount to a wicked public policy problem can thus be upheld, and the next section will introduce insights on how these wicked problems ought to be governed.

3.2   Governance of wicked policy problems

Undoubtedly, the characteristics and the significant uncertainties involved in wicked policy problems, such as P/CVE, challenge the management. In fact, the concept of wicked problems was introduced as a criticism of the then dominant, rational choice approaches to public policy, and recent findings reveal that several contemporary policy responses to wicked problems have instead worked to escalate them (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Haugstvedt, 2020, p. 4; Fischbacher-Smith, 2016, p. 399). It is thus argued that a more dynamic approach is required to address these problems in a meaningful manner. Within this, a fundamental thought of wicked problems is that they cannot be solved; instead, they can be "tamed" (Camillus, 2008, p. 98). Therefore, the aim should not be to reach a final solution or a perfect answer. Instead, the nature of wicked problems set forth that the component for efficient management lies in attaining proper risk governance.

Risk governance is a concept directing itself towards the complexity of processes and actors involved in the management of a decision or issue (van Asselt & Renn, 2011, p. 431). Regarding risk governance, Renn highlights:

"Governing choices in modern societies is seen as an interplay between governmental institutions, economic forces and civic society actors (…) At the global level, governance embodies a horizontally organized structure of functional self-regulating encompassing state and non-state actors bringing about collectively binding decisions without superior authority" (Renn, 2017, p. 8).

As a result of the increasing complexity and challenges of issues, such as wicked problems, the government is no longer regarded as the primary actor in a top-down management of the society (van Asselt & Renn, 2011, p. 434). Instead, in policy and political settings, risk governance holds that collective binding decisions are developed and introduced in multi-actor network processes. Non-governmental actors have become increasingly vital as they have the advantages of holding information and resources beneficial in addressing various issues (Renn, 2017, p. 8). The thought is thus to enhance the management of wicked problems and thus also P/CVE in higher educational institutions by utilizing network management in which relevant actors work together across boundaries. Followingly, risk governance not only entails descriptions of how decisions and choices are made regarding risk, but also sets out principles to improve these decision-making structures and processes (van Asselt & Renn, 2011, p. 443).

3.3   Key principles of governing wicked problems

Before introducing the key principles of governing wicked problems, an elaboration on what effective risk governance amount to is needed see what the principles ought to result in. In this relation, Renn and Klinke (2015, p. 34) states:

"The effectiveness and legitimacy of the risk governance process depends on the capability of management agencies to resolve complexity, characterize uncertainty and handle ambiguity by means of communication and deliberation."

Efficient risk governance is thus tightly coupled up with the individual actors´ need to inhabit capabilities, both in regard to addressing the issue itself but also in interacting with other actors. A crucial part of this is thus also the manner in which cooperation and interactions between involved actors are carried out as they must be able to resolve these challenges of complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity in a good way. Especially is this important in the view of wicked problems as these characteristics are exactly what makes them wicked. The aim of effective governance of wicked problems is accordingly to achieve mutually satisfactory processes and outcomes, where a cross-frame learning occurs to continuously improve the understandings and

strategies involved in tackling wicked problems (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p. 10). As highlighted above, the aim is still not to "solve" the wicked problem but to continuously improve the approaches.

Following these lines, the three key principles to be elaborated here are organized on the basis of Koppenjan and Klijn´s (2004) network approach to problem solving and decision-making in uncertainty. Here, the starting point is that one must acknowledge that uncertainty is an inherent characteristic of wicked problems and modern society itself, and that there is a mutual dependency between actors (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p. 9). Accordingly, uncertainty does not only stem from the nature of the problem itself (subjective uncertainty), but also from the interactions between actors (strategic uncertainty) and differing institutional arrangements (institutional uncertainty) (Koopenjan & Klijn, 2004, pp. 6-7). The principles thus reflect and focus on the prominent challenge of problem-solving; namely the interaction in coordinating these matters. Koppenjan & Klijn (2004, p. 14) argues in this that if involved parties do not deal with these uncertainties in a satisfactory manner, then the governance of wicked problems will not be effective. Followingly, the three key principles that will be described here are thus: joint image building and cross-frame reflection in definitions and goals; enhancement of participation and cooperation; and acknowledge institutional characteristics. The categories are accordingly aimed to address all these three uncertainties respectively.

3.3.1 Joint image building and cross-frame reflection in definitions and goals

This first principle directs itself to the difficulty of determining the nature of wicked problems. It is not only the inevitable lack of knowledge and information that causes this but also the following variations of interpretations and sense-making on the nature of the problem (Head & Alford, 2015, p. 723; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, pp. 19, 29-37). Different actors encompass various frames of reference or value perspectives both regarding the problem itself and in the production of knowledge. The principle thus addresses the need to deal with various possible perspectives on a wicked problem.

In this regard, it is highlighted that governance should aim for joint image building and cross-frame reflection. In essence, this means that despite the differences in perceptions, preferences, and objectives, the aim is to create a "common ground" that allows for mutual adjustments of strategies and joint action (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p. 162). It involves acknowledging that one´s own perspective is only one among numerous others and be aware of how this plays out

in the ongoing interactions (Termeer et al., 2015, p. 687). In this, it is argued that definitive solutions or definitions should not be set by authoritative determination or by actors alone, nor should there be an early fixation on solutions, problem statements, or objectives (Head & Alford, 2015, p. 723; Koopenjan & Klijn, 2004, p. 162). The reason is that it is not suitable for the nature of wicked problems themselves, but also as an interlinked relationship exists between the framing and examined solutions. The danger lies in these approaches´ potential to lead to the exclusion of numerous perceptions, objectives, and solutions further in the process, in addition, to excluding other actors´ perspectives. The risk of this is thus a tunnel vision, which may contribute to furthering the problem, enable politicization and controversy, and reduce enrichment and learning (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p. 162; Termeer et al., 2015, p. 684).

Termeer and colleagues (2015, p. 684) have, in this regard, pointed to the capability of reflexivity as being crucial in reaching this joint image building and cross-frame reflection. In other words, the capability of dealing with the multiple frames in a policy domain. It aids practitioners in acknowledging the variety of perspectives, revising superior problem frames, and transforming definitions of action perspectives. Policies ought, in this view, to reflect and be open to the variations of perspectives. It is, however, crucial to be aware that simple aggregation phenomena are not desirable either. If such a simplified, fragmented mix of perspectives is obtained, then there are dangers of limited success, and it can potentially cause more problems than they solve (Head, 2019, p. 186). The aim is thus neither for all parties to agree on all aspects of the problem nor to include everything in all perspectives. As Koppenjan and Klijn (2004, p. 163) pinpoints:

> "The goal is to develop and select solutions that can satisfy the different demands that parties have – given their different perceptions and interests – and to do justice to these differences in such a manner that a situation is created which is an improvement for all parts involved, compared to the existing or expected situation".

To achieve this, the various perspectives must be acknowledged.

3.3.2 Enhance cooperation and participation

This second principle is based on the strategic uncertainty present in wicked problems, which stems from the presence of various parties and their behavior in the management. As pointed out above, various involved actors often hold differing interests, perceptions, and strategies regarding wicked problems such as P/CVE, which can cause uncertainties and conflicts among

actors in the network management process (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, pp. 50-51). As these actors´ are dependent on each other, however, participation and cooperation are key in approaching the specific wicked problem.

Regarding participation, the notion of inclusive governance has been identified as promising. It can benefit actors´ trust in each other and strengthen confidence in the governance process and their competence if the belonging requirements have been addressed (Renn & Schweizer, 2009, p. 175). This involves, amongst others, involving representatives of all relevant actors, empowering all actors to participate actively, and establishing interaction between participatory and implementing actors. The thought is that all actors in the decision-making process that can contribute with their respective knowledge should be included to ensure effective, fair, and morally acceptable decisions (Renn & Schweizer, 2009, p. 174). Fischer (1993) acknowledges this approach by arguing that broadening the number of participants in formulating a policy is not a curse but rather the cure. However, the optimal size of actors is not established, as the larger the number of actors, the more resilient the governance will be. At the same time, the more prominent will also the complexity of interactions become (Newig et al., 2010, p. 10).

The literature consistently argues that cooperative approaches and coordinated strategies are essential and work to enhance the understanding and addressing of wicked problems (Head & Alford, 2015, pp. 724-724; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p. 247). As highlighted by Koppenjan and Klijn (2004, pp. 65, 247-248), cooperation needs to be initiated and supported; give room to the various actors´ perceptions and preferences; establish links and new interactions between actors; establish a "negotiated environment" characterized by sharing of knowledge, and resulting in unified actions and solutions. In other words, cooperation that not only unites actors and knowledge but also encourages engagement, commitment, and accountability. This type of cooperation in the governance is vital as trust gradually evolves from these interactions (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, pp. 230-231). Trust is viewed as a key factor for achieving success in governance, especially as it is argued to reduce the uncertainty between actors.

However, how the collaboration should be carried out is not clear from the literature. Alford and Head (2017, pp. 400-401) investigated authoritative, competitive, collaborative, and expert-based approaches. They found that all of them had pros and cons in handling wicked problems, despite collaborative approaches being the most promising. They concluded that none of these are likely to be an optimal approach alone as there is not any solution that will fit all. Rather, contingent strategies where the strategy depends on the concrete situation seem

necessary. However, some concrete insights can be identified. A transformational leadership where the government frames the vision and gets others to pursue it is not considered adequate to manage wicked problems (Head & Alford, 2015, p. 729). In comparison, adaptive leadership, where the leader does not express a strategy, but it instead evolves in a process with the other actors, works to address complexity and diversity. Voluntarism or formal contractual partnering is also in this found to increase the potentiality for successful collaboration in wicked problems.

3.3.3 Acknowledge institutional characteristics

The third principle is built on institutional uncertainty, namely uncertainties stemming from the involvement of actors situated within different institutional backgrounds (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p. 7). This means that governing a wicked problem is also influenced by variations in how actors´ institutional organization is structured, but also that behaviors and strategies are guided by tasks, opinions, and languages of their own institution. The principle is thus closely related to the previous principle, but the interplay is here seen from the perspective of a governance that acknowledges and allows for varying institutional characteristics.

Head and Alford (2015, pp. 723-724) argue in this that one must obtain a holistic and interactive approach and, by this, defeat the mechanistic and linear "command and control" strategies in addressing wicked problems. Carrying out tasks "by the book" or using heavy rules will not endure in the long run. It does not address the insights that institutional adjustments are often required to adapt to changing social and institutional environments (Head & Alford, 2015, p. 774; Teermer et al., 2015, p. 690). Too strict rules may therefore hinder adequate management of situations and thus neglect the institutional characteristics of organizations. As Koppenjan & Klijn (2004, p. 247) argues, we need institutional designs that enhance the compatibility of processes in different networks. Consequently, one that is adaptable and satisfactory among all involved parties according to the problem at hand and other fundamental values and structures. Accordingly, literature argues that governance needs to build on adaptive and innovative approaches as this not only enables a more flexible mindset throughout all actors regarding risk and innovation, but it also offers the higher flexibility to suit different institutions (Head, 2019, pp. 191-192; Head & Alford, 2015, p. 724). Termeer and colleagues (2015, p. 689) also point to this as they stress the capability of resilience; one must be able to adapt flexibly to uncertainties and changing conditions. A common thought reflected in literature is thus that the optimal approach is to have boundaries in combination with an openness to new ideas (Teermer et al., 2015, p. 690-691; Weber & Khademian, 2008, p. 342). In other words, flexible legislation

allows for carrying out local, tailor-made solutions to fit institutions and situations and thus allows for self-governance. It needs to be able to optimize to each actor´s institutional characteristics.

3.3.4 Overview of the key principles of governing wicked problems

As seen from the above, the key principles are closely interlinked and, at times, overlap. They are, however, structured to emphasize different aspects of the governance. They accordingly, in turn, address the areas of how problem formulations and solutions are elaborated, how cooperation and participation are shaped, and lastly, how this cooperation considers institutional variations. Table 2 offers an overview and key description of them, and it is these principles that constitute the heart of this theoretical framework. The principles will be used to guide the analysis in chapter 5 in order to address the problem statements. As they are interlinked, however, the discussion will assemble them to gain a throughout understanding.

Table 2*: Overview of key principles of governing wicked problems*

Principles of governing wicked problems	Focus	Description
Joint Image building and cross-frame reflection	The nature of the problem	Acknowledge and be open to various views and perspectives in definitions and solutions. Early fixations and authoritative definitions are not desirable.
Enhance cooperation and participation	Interactions between involved actors and their varying perceptions	Cooperation and participation in a manner that unites actors, knowledge, and strategies. The governance should foster engagement, mutual commitment, and accountability.
Acknowledge institutional characteristics	Institutional characteristics and differences	Governance must allow for flexibility and institutional characteristics. The optimal organization is flexible regulation where legislation is provided but still gives the actors room to maneuver flexibly.

3.4 Discourse – the importance of language and documents

"The important thing about the nature of a text is that, although when we write it down it looks as though it is made of words and sentences, it is really made of meanings" (Halliday & Hasan, 1985, p. 10).

As the thesis is an analysis of official policy documents, the importance of examining policies and language also needs to be elaborated before proceeding. Discourse theory addresses this, as it is the study of language. It involves the examination of both the meanings behind language and the actions taken when language is used in a specific context (Gee & Handford, 2012, pp. 1, 5). It conveys that it extends beyond its literal meaning, and utterance through language is thus not an arbitrary practice. Language does, nevertheless, not only represent meanings, but they have effects. It is through language that we achieve actions, goals, and purposes (Chilton, 2004, p. 3; Gee & Handford, 212, p. 1). For example, it is with language that one declares the content of radicalization and suspicion, thus resulting in actions and adaptations. In this sense, language is powerful, as it influences behavior, attitudes, and conditions in a society. Followingly, examining utterances, such as the policies on P/CVE in higher education, is essential to increase the understanding of the implications and meanings behind the expressed.

A vital aspect of discourse theory is to view language within contexts, such as social, cultural, historical, institutional, and identity aspects (Blommaert, 2005, pp. 40-41; Gee & Handford, 2012, p. 5). The reason is that the utilized language is not only formed for a particular context, but the context also works to make sense of what is conveyed. It is through context that language acquires its meaning. An important aim of discourse analysis is thus to understand discourses, which simplified directs itself to this relationship between context and language. Foucault, stated by Neumann (2001, p. 13), identified discourses to be a set of practices that enable the production or maintenance of a statement. Neumann himself, defined discourse to mean:

> "A system for producing a set of statements and practices which, by being inscribed in institutions and appearing to be more or less normal, are constitutive of reality for their citizens and have a certain degree of regularity in a set of social relations." (Neumann, 2001, p. 18). (Translation from Norwegian)

Discourse theory and practitioners are thus highly focused on grasping the language representations in specific social domains. As reflected in the literature review, the domains of particular interest in this thesis are security, education, and politics, as these merge in the

formation of the policies. Fairclough (2000, pp. 143-145) highlights these formations as he acknowledges that social practices are networked with multiple domains. This is crucial to be aware of as the formation and understanding of language within a social practice can differ between these domains. For example, in her article, Davies (2016) found that the term "safeguard" often had differing meanings within education and security domains. Through education, it surrounded the welfare of students, while from a security perspective, it, to a larger degree, addressed the society´s needs for protection from threats of radicalization. The point of this is, as the thesis aims to examine the interplay of governments and educational staff through the content of their policy document, discourse theory emphasizes the cruciality of being aware of the context and the various domains in play and how they position themselves against each other. As Sjøen (2020, p. 48) highlights, implementing a discourse of P/CVE within education can potentially represent a "colonization of security doctrine in education" as it can lead to new discourse arrangements and changes in educational practices. Discourses and language have effects and are thus crucial to understanding the maintenance and development of a social practice.

The act of utterance through language is, followingly, not the only area of interest in discourse theory. In this, Fairclough (1992) distinguished between a textual level, a discursive level, and a social practice level. This is to grasp the various dimensions of language, from the verbal and non-verbal linguistic characteristics to the discursive practices and further to the social practices where the relationship between utterance and discourses becomes visible. It is emphasized that these levels cannot be separated from each other but are rather deeply connected (Fairclough, 2003). Consequently, especially the branch of critical discourse theory combines textual analysis with social analysis to acknowledge that social structures mold social practices (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 66). In line with this, the thesis mainly focuses on the textual level to view the policies in a context, while aspects of the discursive and social practice will occasionally complement the textual analysis by building on findings in earlier literature. Taking in the above, discourse theory emphasizes that the understanding of a social practice, which in this case is the P/CVE in higher educational institutions, is fueled by examining both language and their context. A lack of attention to language, contexts, and discourses can, in contrast, dissimulate vital knowledge of the social world.

4. Method and Research Design

This chapter describes the methodological approach utilized in the thesis. A method is a systematic approach to examining the reality and does not only provide guidance on how to find relevant information on a social reality but also encompasses how this information is to be analyzed and which insights it provides on the societal circumstances and processes (Halvorsen, 2016, p. 20; Johannessen et al., 2021, p. 21). In this thesis, as with all research, decisions have been made that impact all aspects of the thesis, from the design, collection of data, and literature to how these data are understood and concluded. The aim of this chapter is thus to illuminate these steps to make the present research transparent while also pointing to its strengths and weaknesses.

4.1   Research design

To address the problem statements, the method applied is an empirical study in the form of a comparative document analysis. Empirical data has been collected from existing documents on the policies, and theoretical perspectives and previous literature are applied to contribute to the understanding and discussions of the empirical materials. In more concrete terms, the thesis consists of a combination between content and thematic analysis of the policies, which involves that the documents are analyzed and grouped into categories that together answer and/or are central to the problem statement (Bowen, 2009, p. 32; Johannessen et al., 2021, p. 21). As the problem statements and the general aim of the thesis is to examine the risk governance strategies in the Norwegian and the UK´s official policy documents on P/CVE in higher education institutions, this is considered an optimal method as it enables information on how the official documents form the opportunities and boundaries given to relevant actors in both its formation and daily exercise of P/CVE. In other words, it is here that the concrete or official frames of the prevention are found and on which the practice is built.

The approach of the thesis is mainly qualitative as it offers descriptive data on a social reality (Olsson & Sörensen, 2013, p. 68). The comparison is not only carried out to review the overarching differences in the policies but additionally to go deeper in offering detailed descriptions and understandings of the underlying frames for their respective social practice. In this, the policies are tools to realize the prevention within higher educational institutions, and the analysis is based on them having a function. The official documents are therefore to be analyzed as tools. Asdal and Reinertsen (2020, p. 57) point out that this involves examining

their functions and what these documents do with the practices and places they are applied. The comparative document analysis will, therefore, not only be carried out to illuminate their similarities and differences and how they reflect insights from research on governing wicked problems but also to generate knowledge on practical implications stemming from these findings. As Asdal and Reinertsen (2020, p. 14) stress, documents are never completely neutral and are an integral part of the cases and controversies that play out in society. A comparative document analysis is thus, from this, an approach not only beneficial in gaining better insights into their functioning but can also aid in uncovering why the policies were met with such different responses.

The nature of the thesis constitutes a combination of inductive and deductive reasoning. A deductive logic has been pursued to create the analytical framework of wicked problems and the key principles of governing wicked problems. The work of this creation aimed to strive for generalization, and an established framework was deduced into variables, and further, the empirical findings were assessed to see if the framework was supported or reflected (McGregor, 2018, pp. 256-257). Nevertheless, the heart of the thesis - the analysis - is inductive. Knowledge is generated from the "bottom-up", in that the official policy documents and relating discourses are analyzed to generate insights on how they structure and impact the actual P/CVE practice in the higher education sector. In this sense, the knowledge creation in the thesis is mainly inductive, producing new insights into how the world works by drawing conclusions from a specific situation to a more general level (Johannessen et al., 2021, p. 31).

The aim and strategy of the thesis described here have, however, been under continuous revision and evolvement to fit the increasing awareness and knowledge production, and thus also to fit the natural development of the thesis. Appendix A is provided to show how the research has transpired and how realizations throughout the process have formed the current work.

4.2   Data collection

Several data collections have been made to carry out the comparative document analysis. The collection consists of the official documents on the Norwegian and UK policies regarding P/CVE at higher educational institutions, in addition to the collection of literature and earlier research. The collection of data has, in accordance with Billups (2021, p. 26), been purposeful in that they are chosen to provide insights into the study. In other words, they are included by

being rich in relevant information and passing set criteria. Below, the processes of obtaining these data will be elaborated.

4.2.1 Collection of empirical data

Johannessen, Tufte, and Christoffersen (2021, p. 26) state that empirical data are expressions of reality that have their foundation in experience rather than speculations. It is, in other words, a registration of the reality of how it is perceived, and they present the conditions of the society. The empirical data used in this thesis is the official documents on P/CVE in higher educational institutions in Norway and the UK. These give the official responsibilities and are a crucial part of the reality in the field. Asdal and Reinertsen (2020, p. 181) highlight that documents cannot just be collected and analyzed without an intention, but they need to be obtained based on their potentiality to address the problem statement. The documents are chosen as they directly hold what the problem statement aims to examine. They are the written evidence of how the practice of P/CVE at higher educational institutions is intended to be carried out in the respective countries and are thus chosen as these represent the responsibilities that both the government and higher educational institutions are obliged to comply with. As the chosen empirical data are the official documents on the policies, they represent primary sources, meaning they are the original and the oldest sources on the phenomenon (Johannessen et al., 2021, p. 237). In addition, they are also case-specific, meaning that they are produced to address a specific case, namely the regulation of P/CVE in higher educational institutions (Tjora, 2018, p. 183).

One of the benefits of carrying out a comparative document analysis is that documents are easily obtainable (Asdal & Reinertsen, 2020, p. 162). This is reflected in the present collection as all the documents are obtained from open, accessible web pages. The Norwegian policy was collected from the webpage of the University of Stavanger on the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism. The document constitutes the "Suggested actions for prevention of radicalization and violent extremism in the university and college sector". This became a natural choice as this is the only official document directly targeting higher educational institutions. The collection of the UK policy was, in contrast, carried out in various steps. Originally, the only documents included were the "Revised Prevent Duty Guidance: for England and Wales" and the "Prevent Duty Guidance: for higher education". These were both obtained from the UK Government´s official webpage. However, document analysis is an iterative process (Bowen, 2009, p. 32), and during the work on the analysis, it became apparent that there were gaps in what the documents of Norway and the UK displayed. As the official

guiding document of the UK left out some vital aspects in addressing the governance, some paragraphs of the Counter-Terrorism and Security act of 2015 and CONTEST of 2018 were included to complement the already collected documents of the UK. The added law holds the policy´s statutory duty while CONTEST is the overall counter-terrorism strategy by the UK and was thus justified as they are closely related and contain information on the present UK policy.

As the previous paragraph implies, an assessment of the quality of the documents was carried out to assure their credibility and applicability. In accordance with Johannessen, Tufte, and Christoffersen (2021, p. 241) especially, authenticity, trustworthiness, and representativeness were vital in this. Here they were evaluated on who produced it, what they addressed, and why. In addition, its relevance to the thesis and its potential weaknesses were also examined. All the policies included are from official sources, and all directly address the regulation of P/CVE at higher educational institutions. Followingly, the empirical data chosen were assessed by the author to constitute the optimal documents to address the problem statements, while they also served to meet the criteria for upholding the credibility. An overview of the empirical material used in the comparative document analysis is listed in table 3. educational institutions. Followingly, the empirical data chosen were assessed by the author to constitute the optimal documents to address the problem statements, while they also served to meet criteria for upholding the credibility. An overview of the empirical material used in the comparative document analysis are listed in table 3.

Table 3: *The empirical material included in the comparative document analysis.*

Country	Material: Official documents on P/CVE in higher educational institutions
Norway	• Suggested Actions for prevention of radicalization and violent extremism in the university and college sector (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018).
The UK	• Revised Prevent Duty Guidance: for England and Wales (Home Office, 2015a). • Prevent Duty Guidance: for higher education institutions in England and Wales (Home Office, 2015b). • Counter-Terrorism and Security act 2015 – C. 6, Part 5, chapter 1 • CONTEST (HM Government, 2018)

4.2.2 Collection of research literature

Literature and research were also collected to complement and organize the understanding of the empirical material. Empirical research needs to be anchored in theoretical perspectives to avoid isolated descriptions that cannot offer new insights into societal phenomena (Johannessen et al., 2016, p. 47). The theoretical framework and literary background are, in this sense, closely connected to the empirical data. As the theoretical framework and literary background concern differing focus points within the P/CVE in higher educational institutions, their collection has mainly been made through distinct searches and various criteria. However, both literature categories are carried out per a literary study. All existing literature collection has accordingly been carried out through the search engines oria and google scholar. This has assured to leave out articles and other documents which are not denoted scientific articles and books. In addition to searches in these engines, the snowball method has also been applied. This means that literature also has been identified by being referenced or connected to already collected literature (Billups, 2021, p. 26). The collection process illustrates the iterative process of research, as obtaining and eliminating have occurred throughout the work on the thesis.

Also in the process of collecting literature, it is important to make a critical assessment to assure the quality. The literature collected for the literary background was assembled with the aim to obtain knowledge on the general field of RVE and prevention, but also to specifically address P/CVE at higher educational institutions. It was these insights, together with the empirical data, that shaped the problem statements. To assure their relevance and quality, the processes and requirements of authenticity, trustworthiness, and representativeness emphasized by Johannessen with colleagues (2021, p. 241) were also followed here. The search words and concepts have been formulated as clear as possible, involving searches such as "radicalization", "violent extremism", "prevention of radicalization and violent extremism", "Prevention of radicalization and violent extremism in education", and "Prevention of radicalization and violent extremism in higher education". Further into the process of collecting literature, the search words became more specific to fit the evolving direction of study. As the literature on prevention in higher educational institutions is relatively meager, much of the literature is views on prevention at schools in general. In addition, as the policies to be analyzed are from Norway and the UK, the chosen research literature is also mainly literature on these countries or stems from these countries. The justification for this is that prevention efforts depend on traditions, geographical location, and history (Jore, 2020, p. 1), and the aim is to reflect the insights from the analyzed countries´ traditions to the extent possible.

The collection of the theoretical framework was carried out in quite a similar manner, but the search words were here directed towards discourse theory, wicked problems, risk governance, and governance of wicked problems. The choice of the theoretical framework was made on the basis of understanding the empirical data in a new way, thus allowing for new relations between concepts (Olsson & Sörensen, 2013, p. 37). The literature review illustrated the challenge of obtaining knowledge on the effectiveness of prevention and addressed the challenging nature of RVE. As the critics of the UK policy also concerned the processes involved in P/CVE, the choice of applying a wicked problem framework and belonging risk governance strategies became logical. This would allow for an understanding of the processes and interactions behind the practice of P/CVE at higher educational institutions in Norway and the UK. To assure the quality of the obtained theory, requirements were also set here. Included theory needed to be scientific literature, and to assure the representativeness of the problem statements, the literature on principles of governing wicked problems needed to address wicked problems specifically. However, a few deviations were made when it could be assured that insights in general risk governance complemented the insights of wicked problems. As Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) had created an organized approach to managing uncertainties in networks, this followed as the natural structuring of the key principles of governing wicked problems. Other articles were also included in the principles to build a broader picture of the governance of wicked problems, thus assuring validity. In other words, it assured preciseness and compliance of thought throughout the research environment (Olsson & Sörensen, 2013, pp. 78-79). Appendix A contains the final list of literature on which the key principles of governing wicked problems were built.

4.3   Data analysis

As mentioned, the method used is a comparative document analysis, and the obtained data needs to be examined and interpreted to elicit meaning, achieve understanding, and develop empirical insights (Bowen, 2009, p. 27). The analysis intends to compare the two policies´ risk governance strategies and further how they respectively reflect insights generated from research on governing wicked problems and possible implications. The analysis was accordingly carried out with the problem statement in mind throughout.

The analysis was carried out in accordance with Bowen´s (2009, p. 32) document analysis, which involves processing the empirical data through preparing, coding and categorizing, and reporting. Nevertheless, as it is a comparative document analysis, some adjustments were made

such that comparisons were a vital part of all the steps. The comparison was involved in guiding and helping organize the analysis; however, an explicit and decisive comparison was not made until after the categorizations. In the preparation phase, the policies were read to gain an overview of the material, which helped form the problem statements and identify vital aspects. The coding and categorization of the material were further based on the theoretical frames, but the analysis categories used in chapter 5 are not identical to the principles. As the principles are closely intertwined, several areas of the polices were identified in all three principles. Thus, to avoid unnecessary repetition and structural chaos, the choice was made to rather arrange the analysis into categories closely related to the principles in the sense that they together worked to expose characteristics of the policies´ risk governance strategies and addressed the theoretical principles. It was through the open coding that the altered categories in chapter 5 were invented. The coding was accordingly going through the processes of open coding in pulling out the general information, and followingly aggregated into categories, and then connecting them in tighter clusters (McGregor, 2018, p. 250). For example, one overarching category retrieved was open vs. authoritative definitions. First, the data were organized into this category, but to gain a deeper understanding and analysis, the coding was eventually more detailed in who´s definitions, remarks on definitions etc. Appendix C is provided to illustrate examples of how the coding into categories was made. After these processes of analysis, these findings were further divided to illuminate even more specific trends and characteristics, such as the use of language and style.

The data analysis is often viewed as a continuous spiral (McGregor, 2018, p. 249), which also reflects this analysis. The steps have been carried out several times in order to fit the progression of the thesis but also to ensure that all crucial information was obtained. Accordingly, the spiral was ended when it was clear that new examinations would not give more relevant information, thus ensuring that regularities had been identified. Finally, the comparative analysis and results were reported in chapter 5.

4.4   Remarks on the quality of the research

This last section of the chapter will comment on the quality of the research and thus also point to some of the vital limitations of the chosen methodological approach. As it is a comparative document analysis, little attention will be accorded to ethical considerations on the collection and usage of data, as these are not viewed as problematic (Asdal & Reinertsen, 2020, p. 212).

The documents are open accessed, and there are no concerns about the storing and collecting of the material. Nevertheless, this last section of the chapter will instead elaborate on other aspects of the quality of the research. In a qualitative approach, it is common to look at the work´s trustworthiness to establish its quality and rigor (Billups, 2021, p. 27). It is the aspects involved in this trustworthiness that will be elaborated below.

4.4.1 Credibility and reliability

The credibility concerns whether the findings are believable, truthful, and capture a holistic representation of the specific phenomenon (Billups, 2021, p. 29). A consideration here must be accorded to the method itself, as it represents a limitation in this regard. In a document analysis, a triangulation of data is often applied to increase the evidence of credibility by assuring that the findings are not biased by or determined by one method, one source, or one investigator (Bowen, 2009, p. 28). The present research is prone to this limitation, as the data material solely consists of policies in the form of documents. Especially does this direct itself to one of the prominent limitations of data analysis, namely that the documents are not produced for research (Bowen, 2009, p. 31). Documents can be subject to a lack of details and desirable information. This limitation was attempted reduced by implementing more documents on the UK policy. Interviews were also considered to be included to complement the documents as it would most likely result in an increased understanding of the thoughts behind the texts in the policy. However, due to practical reasons such as the difficulty and timeliness of obtaining interviews from actors both in Norway and the UK, in addition to the challenge of obtaining interviews with people involved in the formation of the policies, this was not carried out. The documents being the only data material, must be considered when viewing the results. However, to restrict this limitation further, the literary background and previous research on experiences of the policies have been attempted discussed against the findings where it is applicable. The final pile of documents also turned out to contain an acceptable amount of relevant information to answer the problem statements. Despite this methodological limitation, attempts have thus been made to uphold the credibility of the thesis.

The reliability or dependability in qualitative research is often ensured when credibility is in place (McGregor, 2018, p. 220). This involves that enough information is provided such that other researchers can repeat the design in their own context. Obtaining the same results are not necessary, but it works to assure that others can depend on the study, also with time. In this regard, considerations to this have already been emphasized above and below as descriptions

have been offered on the process of creating the thesis. The thesis thus seeks to obtain this reliability.

4.4.2 Objectivity

While qualitative research ought to produce peculiar and comprehensive knowledge, it is still important that results are not marked by the researcher (Billups, 2021, p. 25). It is several aspects of the research that may have been influenced by this, and it has been taken into consideration throughout the research to minimize the impact of my influence.

Firstly, the collection of research literature is not neutral, and many aspects may have had an impact on which articles and books that have been included (Asdal & Reinersten, 2020, p. 207). Internet uses algorithms which means that previous searches, location when the search has been carried out, how many views the page has, and paid visibility are all factors that may have contributed to the chosen literature making the cut. To complement for these circumstances, the quality and relevance of the articles have been examined. In addition, in the list of results from searches online, I have intentionally explored results that are far down on the list in an attempt to find the most relevant and reliable literature. Equally important, it is highlighted that the data utilized are not independent of preconceptions (Johannessen et al., 2021). My background, experiences, and perceptions may have had an impact on the decisions of literature, and it is attempted to avoid a significant impact. The objectivity in the collection has thus been sought maintained, but it is still crucial to be aware of potential biases.

The same applies to the analysis of the documents. A benefit of document analysis is that the data is already there, meaning that they are not impacted by the research (Bowen, 2009, p. 31). In other words, the documents are objective realities that have not been influenced by the circumstances of carrying out the research. However, these documents also need to be analyzed, and it is possible that this process has involved biases regarding my views and perceptions. To reduce this possible impact, the analysis has been carried out with this in mind by being critical of own judgments. To illustrate, several times during the analyzing process, I asked myself: "Does the conclusion follow logically from the evidence or are the conclusion/finding influenced by myself or other sources?".

4.4.3 Transferability

A challenge of qualitative research is to ensure transferability or external validity. This involves that the findings can be applied to other contexts and settings (McGregor, 2018, p. 247). The descriptions of the context are attempted to be as accurate, detailed, and complete as possible to apply the findings in other contexts. However, the findings concern the UK and Norwegian policies on P/CVE in higher educational institutions, and the sample is thus both context-dependent and small. This evidently hampers the chances of being transferable. However, this research on P/CVE in higher education may still prove to produce beneficial insights considering that there is no redundancy in similar studies. Especially the insights obtained on the reflectance of the key principles of governing wicked problems will likely be beneficial for other contexts as well. Transferability is thus available in some aspects of the study while not in others.

5. Empirical findings/Analysis

The present chapter contains the comparative analysis of Norway´s and the UK´s risk governance strategies in their official policy documents on P/CVE within higher educational institutions. The Norwegian policy to be analyzed is the "Suggested Actions for Prevention of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in the University and College Sector". In the UK, it is the Prevent Duty that represents the policy on P/CVE for higher education, and the documents to be analyzed from the UK is thus the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015, which holds the statutory duty, "Revised Prevent Duty Guidance: for England av Wales" and "Prevent Duty Guidance: for Higher Education Institutions in England and Wales" which holds the statutory guidance, and parts of "CONTEST" which is the overall counter-terrorism strategy and which also Prevent is a part of. (For an overview of the structure and general information on the Norwegian and UK policy, see sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.)

The empirical findings are intended to aid in answering the first problem statement and will accordingly seek to answer:

1) *What are the differences and similarities of their governance approaches?*

The findings are organized on the basis of approaching the key principles of governing wicked problems presented in chapter 3. However, as the principles are highly interrelated, the structure will not be identical to avoid unnecessary repetition and confusion. The categories utilized in the analysis emerged from the open coding of the documents as these appeared to be crucial features in the policies and additionally targeted various parts of the insights within the identified principles. The purpose of the categories in this chapter is thus to highlight or make visible vital aspects relating to these governance principles. How they directly relate to the three principles in chapter 3 (problem statement 2) will thus be discussed in the next chapter. The empirical findings here are structured in the following categories: 1) authoritative vs. open definitions, 2) external vs. conceived by higher educational institutions, 3) Regulatory vs. collaborative policy, and 4) mandatory vs. voluntary policy. At the end of the chapter, an overview of the findings will be presented to clearly show the differences and similarities between the policies.

5.1   Authoritative vs. open definitions

The Norwegian and the UK policy both utilizes and states definitions of vital concepts. Regarding how the definitions concerning the nature of RVE are portrayed and described, the policies have adopted approaches inhabiting both similarities and differences, which is illuminated by their content and the manner the definitions are conveyed.

The Norwegian policy has an own section for key concepts and definitions. Amongst others, is it possible to see that radicalization is defined as "a process whereby a person or group increasingly condones the use of violence as a means to reach political, ideological or religious goals, and whereby violent extremism may be a result" (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018, p. 2). Followingly, violent extremism is defined as "in this context is understood to mean the actions of people and groups willing to use violence to reach their political, ideological, or religious goals". In addition to these, definitions of "undesirable events related to radicalization", "preventive", and "outsideness" are also formulated. The policy does, in other words, provide definitions that work guiding in the understanding and handling of the field of P/CVE.

There are, however, crucial divides in the utilized definitions in the Norwegian policy. While terms such as "preventive" and "outsideness" denote a given certainty, definitions of "radicalization" and "(violent) extremism" is portrayed less authoritatively. The former definitions are regarded to be common concepts and are introduced with "…can easily be defined as…" and "a term used in everyday speech" (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018 p. 4). It implies that these are terms employed with the notion that they are well-understood and are described accordingly without further elaboration. When it comes to the definitions of "radicalization" and "(violent) extremism", these are rather stated to be:

> "…Difficult to define precisely, and experts disagree on their actual meaning. Originally being radical was as a virtue, especially in academic circles…"

These definitions are thus expressed with more caution. The content explicitly points out that what one is trying to prevent can be interpreted differently. In this sense, the policy implies an awareness of such consideration and is open to diverging formulations among relevant actors. This is further emphasized as it also makes remarks to other actors in the document than the ones mentioned in the excerpt. Especially "(violent) extremism" is in this sense interesting, as the policy points out that the written definition(s) do not come off as an objective "correct"

quality as it emphasized that the chosen definition applies in the face of the present policy. It is pointed out that these are relational concepts, and the policy consequently implies that they are not static set definitions. The definitions on RVE thus work guiding, but how they are portrayed symbolizes that caution must be carried out when utilizing them.

In concordance with the Norwegian strategy, the UK policy also includes definitions of vital terms within the main policy guidance content and as a glossary list at the end. This involves radicalization being defined as "the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups" and extremism as:

> "Vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas." (Home Guidance, 2015a).

The UK policy thus defines several of the same definitions as the Norwegian, while their content is not precisely the same. The UK policy also stands out as it includes more definitions of how processes and aspects are to be understood. For example, "interventions" are included and defined as "projects intended to divert people who are being drawn into terrorist activity. Interventions can include mentoring, counselling, theological support, encouraging civic engagement, developing support networks" (Home Office, 2015a). The document also includes descriptions of what "vulnerability", "safeguarding", and having "due regard" comprise, and this policy can thus be said to offer more of a guidance in how higher education staff ought to maneuver the field of radicalization and violent extremism. More definitions are listed in the UK guidance, and these concepts are described more in detail than in the Norwegian.

The prominent difference from the Norwegian document, however, is that there are no remarks extending beyond the meaning of these definitions. References are made such that the understanding of extremism is based on the Government´s Prevent strategy and terrorism based on the Terrorism Act of 2000, but reference to other relevant actors and their understanding is not remarked. The document of the UK is mainly produced by the government, and the definitions are often introduced with "in the Act this has simply been expressed as…" and "we also include in our definition…" (Home Office, 2015a). The Government is seemingly the ones who set the definitions, but this information cannot exclude that other actors, such as higher education staff, have taken part in their development. Furthermore, although not explicitly stated, the above examples imply that the definitions used are not considered the "objective

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truths" as it highlights that these are the ones chosen for this policy. In other words, it coincides with the Norwegian policy of not directly excluding other potential definitions from existing. However, in the UK policy, the applied definitions´ authority becomes visible as the guidance document states that frontline staff "need to be aware of what we mean by the term 'extremism' and the relationship between extremism and terrorism" (Home Office, 2015a, s. 18). It can thus seem that higher educational institutions are expected to comply with the definitions listed in the policy. Hence, while the UK makes use of more decisive or binding definitions, the definitions of Norway can, in contrast, be said to be considerably less authoritative.

5.2   External vs. Conceived by higher education institutions

Policies are produced and implemented by specific actors in the society. When it comes to the Norwegian and the UK policies, distinctive differences are visible in this context as they differ in who has had a leading role in issuing their content.

It emerges from the Norwegian document that the policy was produced by the Preparedness Council, which was established by the Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research to reinforce the civil protection and preparedness work in the knowledge sector. As stated in the policy, the Council:

> "… consist of 14 members from higher public and private educational institutions, folk university colleges, vocational schools, student organizations and student unions and the Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training (UDIR)." (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018, p. 1).

The document itself thus reflects that the policy is produced by the actors it intends to address, namely higher educational institutions. Furthermore, not only are educational institutions the primary actors in this, but it is also evident that the Council represents a broad diversity regarding types of institutions and groups within the educational world. Participants included in the development of this policy is thus a joint effort between various educational staff, students, and organizations closely related to the Government.

What really emphasizes that educational institutions throughout conceive the Norwegian policy is the finding that the official document is based on the principles of academic freedom and the basic values of higher education:

> "Academic freedom means that researchers and students can freely investigate any field of study and express their professional views. Thus, academic freedom implies that researchers can disseminate ideas or facts, including any that may be unpleasant for governments or political/religious groups." (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018 p.1)

The members of the Council have, in other words, been entirely free to express their views and knowledge, and this works to assure that the content of the document is genuine views that are not limited by other actors' authority or interests. Another finding in the policy that substantiates this prominent role of higher educational institutions is that the document's content is heavily based on educational research and participation. Scholars at Risk, Centre for Research on Extremism, The Norwegian Police University College, and Universities Norway´s working groups are all examples of listed educational institutions and groups that have contributed with content and perspectives on the policy. The role of the higher education sector in developing the policy is thus prominent.

The Prevent Duty of the UK, on the other hand, differs substantially when it comes to the actors who have conceived the policy. The Prevent Duty is issued under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015, which the Government provides. As also can be seen in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015 (s. 29): "The Secretary of State may issue guidance to specified authorities about the exercise of their duty", and it is thus members of the Government who have had the primary tasks in both producing the statutory duty and the official guiding documents. This prominent role of the Government is further highlighted by the guidance expressing that "Counter terrorism is the responsibility of the UK Government" (Home Office, 2015a, s. 3). Thus, all this points to the finding that the Government posits the leading role.

These findings, however, cannot be interpreted to mean that the higher education sector in the UK did not have any saying in its formation. The guiding documents themselves do not address educational institutions' role in forming the policy. However, as it is a part of CONTEST, it implies that the higher education sector still has contributed with inputs. The reason is that it is stated in CONTEST that the Office for Security and Counterterrorism:

> "…has led work to produce this strategy, with contributions from other Government Departments, Devolved Administrations, the police and the security and intelligence agencies, the private sector, academics and community leaders." (HM Government, 2018, p. 14).

Thus, even though the policy primarily has been conceived by the Government, this implies that educational institutions still have contributed with insights. The guidance document on the policy also states that Universities UK has provided guidance documents on how to manage IT policies and external speakers and events, which points to that the higher education sector is involved in some processes or aspects related to the policy. The size of their total role, however, is not known, and one can only conclude that the Government has had the leading role. It is also important to highlight that, in contrast to Norway, the UK policy is not solely aimed at higher educational institutions but is instead a strategy simultaneously addressing other sectors such as local authorities, the health sector, prisons, and the police. Followingly, one can conclude that the higher education sector in the UK has had a considerably less prominent role in the production of the policy in comparison to the Norwegian.

These trends also seem to be reflected in both the language usage and the policies' design. The Norwegian policy is structured similarly to an academic text in that it is divided into sections where an introduction and thorough presentation of knowledge and background information is provided before the suggested goals and measures are presented. It also provides a list of references at the end of the document. This structure works to highlight the contribution from higher educational sources, strengthening the visibility of their participation. The UK policy also reflects this to some degree in the guidance documents by introducing background information before describing the included measures. However, no remarks are given to research, and equally crucial is the finding that the guidance document is structured similarly to an official law. The statutory Duty is an official law in itself and accordingly structured in such a manner, but also the content of the guidance documents is similarly organized into small, precise, and numbered paragraphs. In this sense, the design of both the statutory duty and the guidances express a formality or format belonging to official bodies.

The same is found in the use of language. The UK Prevent Duty guidance in their content often expresses the measures and recommendations through formulations such as: "We would expect RHEBs (Relevant Higher Educational Bodies) to…" and "The RHEB clearly needs to…" (Home Office, 2015b, s. 8, 12). This way of expressing, combined with the finding that the government is the leading actor in its development, implies a symbolic distinction from the higher educational institutions as it signals that it stems from one actor to another. In comparison, the Norwegian document differs in this aspect as the expressed language does not

contain direct references to who is expressing the needs and is refraining from this distinction. To illustrate, in their measure regarding risk and vulnerability analysis, it is expressed:

> "The organization shall routinely develop and update risk and vulnerability analyses (ROS) as a basis for mapping the measures that are suitable for preventing radicalization and violent extremism." (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018, p. 6)

This excerpt exemplifies that the suggested measures are targeted toward higher educational institutions in a formal manner, but there is no direct expression from whom the statement stems from. In fact, the only place the document´s own content directly targets a personal pronoun on the producers of the policy is in stating: "We must live with the fact that an open and free society can also be a vulnerable society" (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018, p. 4). The statement illustrates that a delimitation is not made here on the role of neither the government nor the higher educational institutions as it implies that "we" are meant to represent the society as a whole.

The policies´ content, therefore, both points and signals that the two policies vary in being conceived externally or by higher educational institutions themselves. These considerations additionally seem to be reflected by the respective policies´ focus on educational functions and values in their content. The UK policy formulates that the statutory duty must be viewed in relation to the daily functions of the educational world. This addresses the consideration of educational functions, which is also highlighted in some other parts of the documents. For example, the guidance directly addresses higher educational values by stating:

> "The RHEB clearly needs to balance its legal duties in terms of both ensuring freedom of speech and academic freedom, and also protecting student and staff welfare." (Home Office, 2015b, s. 8)

> "We would expect the risk assessment to look at institutional policies regarding the campus and student welfare, including equality and diversity and the safety and welfare of students and staff." (Home Office, 2015b, s. 20).

The content thus reflects educational and societal ideals. However, the manner in which the experts express this also illustrates a preciseness and a consideration of these values from a security perspective. It is the legal duties and the risk assessments that are the base of its mentioning. Additionally, throughout the two guidance documents, considerations of educational values are only mentioned four times, and among the 9 expressed prevention

aspects, it is only one (welfare and pastoral care) that directly targets the educational environment, while the rest is more connected to increasing the security. These considerations thus visualize that educational functions and ideals are involved, which works to imply participation by higher educational institutions. However, these expressed interests are formulated in a manner where they are mainly seen in relation to the need for security measures. In other words, the documents imply that security measures are the base of the documents' content, while educational ideals and functions are not equally represented. This again reflects the above findings that the role of higher educational institutions in its formation is limited as their primary tasks and interests are not given the main weight.

In comparison, the Norwegian document expresses consideration of educational ideals and functions more fully throughout its content. It contains an own section for academic foundation and basic values, and each page contains some references to their functions. To illustrate:

> "Academia shall demonstrate high tolerance towards extreme positions and radical opinions, be an inclusive arena that accommodates a large number of students having diverse cultural, ideological and religious background and views." (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018, p. 2)

> "The UC sector´s primary mission is to promote knowledge and inculcate academic and democratic values." (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018, p. 4).

These excerpts again suggest that the functions of the higher educational institutions are not only given priority but are also elaborated to a greater extent than in the UK policy. The last expert also visualizes that these values are also incorporated without reference to security aspects. In this sense, the document highlights that educational values are also represented as a base in the policy. This is further emphasized by the two of the three main categories of goals and measures targeting the educational environment instead of security aspects. For example, one of the goals commences:

> "One goal is to strengthen inclusive work that cultivates and maintains a good learning environment and proper student welfare." (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018, p. 5)

In this sense, the goals and measures are in the Norwegian policy more addressed in a manner of how security aspects can complement the educational environment, instead of seeing how the educational environment ought to complement the security perspectives. The point of this

is that the content and manner in which these aspects are conveyed implies that the Norwegian document builds its prevention on the perceived functions of higher educational institutions, while the UK documents rather work to imply that the prevention is more based and built on how to ensure security. Consequently, this works to complement the above findings of the high involvement of higher educational institutions in the Norwegian policy and the government's leading role in the UK policy.

5.3   Regulatory vs. collaborative policy

Policies can also differ regarding who inhabits the authoritative role in carrying them out in practice. In consideration of how these policies are designed, it is visible that the Norwegian and UK policy also differs regarding their degree of being regulatory or collaborative approaches.

In the Norwegian policy, it is stated: "The responsibility of preventing radicalization and violent extremism is currently a joint social responsibility", and "work of prevention is a complex task requiring cooperation between institutions, the authorities, organizations and other actors throughout all of society" (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018, pp. 2, 3). It is thus evident that the approach taken is founded on collective and collaborative values. As the above section also established that the policy was conceived in cooperation between higher educational institutions and actors connected to the government, the collaborative approach is both reflected in the formation and the practice of the policy. This collaborative strategy is not only directly expressed but is also visible by being a common theme throughout the document. In the general information on the policy, it is highlighted that RVE represents challenges that cannot be handled by educational institutions alone, e.g., that the police are responsible for the "sharp or pointed" measures. The document further acknowledges that educational institutions may resort to various forms of prevention, but their "primary mission is to promote knowledge and inculcate academic and democratic values" (Emergency Preparednes Council, 2018, p.4). These findings illustrate that the responsibility and roles are divided between various actors and sectors in the society and that there is no expectation that the higher education sector alone is to carry this out.

The Norwegian policy does, however, not only emphasize that responsibilities are shared among actors but also encourages close cooperation between relevant actors. For example,

under the goal of resolution of controversy, confidence building and raising ethical awareness, a suggested measure holds:

> "Collaboration and exchange of experience: Make provisions for the UC sector to learn and collaborate with other public and private community actors who have experience with similar prevention efforts, such as primary schools, police or different religious groups. If collaboration is to be successful, it is important to share research-based knowledge and practical experience, including experience from abroad." (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018, p. 5)

Support and knowledge sharing are thus vital ingredients in the policy, emphasizing that P/CVE is a joint effort. This is also visible within the security-oriented measures, as it in the context of handling concerns is stated: "it should be possible to consult with experts in the field, employees, elected officials or other individuals whom one has confidence" (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018, p.6). In this section, it is also further emphasized that contact points should be established with actors such as the police, PST, or Sikresiden.no (PST, and scientific and academic resources). Thus, the collaborative approach applied by the Norwegian policy strongly emphasizes that the society must join forces to carry out the policy in practice, both regarding its implementation, knowledge-sharing, and concordance of efforts. In other words, no actors stand out as having the regulatory authority.

Similar to the Norwegian document, the UK policy also emphasizes the importance of collaboration. Several areas of the policy highlight this:

> "Prevent work depends on effective partnership. To demonstrate effective compliance with the duty, specified authorities must demonstrate evidence of productive co-operation, in particular with Prevent co-ordinators, the police and local authorities, and co-ordination through existing multi-agency forums." (Home Office, 2015a. s. 17).

> "We would expect active engagement from senior management of the university with other partners including police and BIS regional higher and further education Prevent co-ordinators. We would expect institutions to seek to engage and consult students on their plans for implementing the duty (…) We would expect institutions to have regular contact with ther relevant Prevent co-ordinator These co-ordinators will help RHEBs comply with the duty and can provide advice and guidance on risk and on the appropriate response." (Home Office, 2015b, s. 16-18).

These excerpts illustrate that collaboration is vital in order to comply with the policy and thus express that P/CVE at higher educational institutions depends on cooperation between various actors. In this sense, the policy of the UK can be said to inhabit a form of collaborative approach. Especially for higher educational institutions, support and sharing of knowledge with other actors can be found in e.g. carrying out risk assessments, developing internal policies and action plans, and training of staff. A big part of the policy´s aims and measures are thus reflecting the need for collaboration, which is in concordance with the Norwegian strategy.

Nevertheless, the UK policy differs from the Norwegian as findings also point to that regulative aspects are highly pervasive, which ultimately works to surpass these collaborative efforts. For example, the excerpts on collaboration from the previous paragraph are formulated strictly, where it becomes a responsibility that needs to be complied with. The collaboration can, in this sense, be referred to as being "forced" and is followingly regulated by the government. As an earlier finding pointed out, counter-terrorism is seen as the government's responsibility, and this mindset is being reflected here. The responsibility is not shared in the same manner as the Norwegian, which is especially emphasized in section 23 of the guidance:

> "All specified authorities must comply with this duty and will be expected to maintain appropriate records to show compliance with their responsibilities and provide reports when requested." (Home Office, 2015a, s. 23)

This means that the government holds the authority, and instead of being responsible to each other, higher educational institutions inevitably become responsible to the government. Section 31 further mentions, "The Secretary of State will appoint an appropriate body to assess the bodies´ compliance with the Prevent Duty." (Home Office, 2015b, s. 31). Higher educational institutions and other relevant actors are thus not having the same position as the government in the policy, which delimits its potential to be a genuinely collaborative policy. The requirements are in big parts designed and regulated by the government. In this sense, the Norwegian policy encompasses a more collaborative approach, while the UK is directing itself to be more regulative.

5.4 Mandatory vs. Voluntary

A trait of both policies is that higher educational institutions´ compliance with the policy to certain degrees concerns mandatory aspects. A common feature in this is that they are both

anchored in law and/or official documents, which builds the foundation for these mandatory requirements.

The Norwegian policy is built on several formally stipulated responsibilities of higher educational institutions. Firstly, the policy refers to the Guide to the Regulation on Municipal Preparedness Duty by the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection which holds that higher educational institutions "are responsible for safety and emergency preparedness for their employees and pupils/students" (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018, p. 3). Further, the Instruction for the Ministries´ work on Civil Protections is incorporated to account for the responsibility of higher education sectors to "implement necessary compensatory measures to reduce the likelihood of – and the consequence of - adverse incidents in its own sector" (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018, p. 3). Finally, the policy also refers to the Norwegian Penal Code to explicitly emphasize that some acts are directly criminal if they are not acted in accordance with. The policy especially stresses paragraph 139, which holds that every person has a duty to avert certain criminal offenses in cases where one deems it certain that they will or most likely will be committed. This also means that it is illegal for educational staff to be instrumental in breaching the duty to avert the offense. Thus, these regulations and laws present requirements that the higher educational institutions are obliged to fulfill to comply with the policy and are, in this sense, mandatory. However, it is here also important to remark that in the same section as these above-mentioned responsibilities are listed, it is emphasized that they cannot be seen in isolation. An obligation of educational institutions is also to ensure the safety and security of the population, and the policy remarks that students and staff´s freedom of speech and right to protection must be safeguarded (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018, p.3). Hence, as the policy addresses these mandatory responsibilities of preventing RVE, they need to be seen in relation and be in accordance with these considerations. In certain situations, exceptions from the formally stipulated prevention responsibilities can be accepted.

The above requirements address the already existing obligations of educational institutions in Norway. However, the policy also addresses new requirements stipulated as the intent of the policy itself. Within this, the measures listed to achieve the various goals within the policy differs in regard to being mandatory or voluntary. For example, within the goal concerning resolution of controversy, confidence building and raising of ethical awareness, students and staff are "encouraged" to participate more fully in the public debate, while it is "important" that higher educational institutions are clear about which events and activities that should be

permitted on campus (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018, pp.4-5). These wording variations send differing signals about how strict they must be obliged. While some measures are mandatory, others can be said to be strongly encouraged to follow. Similar considerations can also be found within the goals relating to security-oriented measures, where it is stated that the organization "shall" routinely develop and update risk and vulnerability analyses, while the handling of concerns "should" be possible to consult with experts in the field. These examples also illustrate that the mandatory aspect of the policy is more connected to overarching practices that need to be in place. More room for maneuver or vaguer strictness is given to how these are to be carried out. The mandatory aspects can thus be said to assure that the formally stipulated responsibility in the previous paragraph is achieved, while the exact way of carrying them out is open for flexibility. In this context, it is also interesting to note that the document expresses that the listed actions or measures will need reassessment and be revised according to changes in threat situations and society in general (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018, p. 7). This means that what is required can change with time and is designed for the current environment, which is a consideration not approached in the UK policy.

Similar to the above considerations, the UK strategy is also based on a law establishing its mandatory character. It is, in fact, this statutory duty that constitutes the policy. The Prevent Duty and the relating documents are founded on the Counter-terrorism and security act of 2015 (s. 26), which requires educational institutions to "…in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism". Due regard is followingly stated in the guidance to mean "place an appropriate amount of weight on the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism when they consider all the other factors relevant to how they carry out their usual functions" (Home Office, 2015a, s.4). Educational staff is thus obliged by law to comply with this duty or strategy, and a breach will be unlawful. In a similar vein to the Norwegian policy, also the UK policy highlights that these legal duties need to be balanced against ensuring responsibilities regarding the delivery of education and safeguarding, freedom of speech, protecting student and staff welfare, responsibilities concerning gender segregation, and equality. Thus, the policy is mandatory, but deviations can be accepted if it is found to be in an unequal position to these other official responsibilities.

As stated in the UK guidance: "This guidance identifies the best practice for each of the main sectors and describes ways in which they can comply with the duty" (Home Office, 2015a, s. 12). Subsequently, it is the guidance document that sets out what is mandatory and strongly

encouraged for higher educational institutions in order to comply with the policy. In this, several mandatory requirements can be found. For example, the guidance states that it "requires that properly thought through procedures and policies are followed and are in place" (Home Office, 2015b, s.5). This applies to the management of events on campus, information sharing about vulnerable individuals, staff training, IT, risk assessments, and student welfare. Additionally, the document also stresses that people suspected of being involved in illegal terrorist-related activity "must" be reported to the police and that encouragement of terrorism and inviting speakers supporting a proscribed terrorist organization are both criminal offenses. Some parts of the policy are thus directly mandatory, and in accordance with the Norwegian policy, they address the overarching practices that need to be in place in order to tackle RVE.

A flexibility is also visible within the UK policy as it is written in the guidance:

> "We expect all specified authorities to participate fully in work to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. How they do this, and the extent to which they do this, will depend on many factors." (Home Office, 2015a, s. 12).

This again works to signal that it is mandatory to participate and have in order the overarching practices, but there is also a flexibility in how this is carried out on a lower level. For example, under the section of welfare and pastoral care/chaplaincy support, it is stated:

> "We would expect the institutions to have clear and widely available policies for the use of prayer rooms and other faith-related facilities. These policies should outline arrangements for managing prayer and faith facilities (for example an oversight committee) and for dealing with any issues arising from the use of the facilities." (Home Office, 2015b, s. 26).

While the duty thus requires a policy on the use of prayer rooms, the content itself is open for more flexibility as these are aspects strongly encouraged or guiding. However, the various areas addressed in the policy offer different degrees of flexibility. For example, in the section on carrying out risk assessments, all sentences regarding what the risk assessment involves start with "will be expected". In this sense, the UK policy can be portrayed as stricter than the Norwegian, but this is also strongly related to the UK policy´s aim of ensuring higher educational institutions inhabiting a comprehensive understanding of risks.

The flexibilities can increasingly be said to be increasingly restricted in the UK policy. As mentioned in section 5.3, higher educational institutions are required to report their compliance

with to the policy, and in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015 (s. 30), it is also stated:

> "Where the Secretary of State is satisfied that a specified authority has failed to discharge the duty imposed on it by section 26(1), the Secretary of State may give directions to the authority for the purpose of enforcing the performance of that duty."

This means that if representatives of the government do not perceive higher educational institutions to comply with the duty, they can be legally bound to enforce their practice. Thus, the mandatory character of the policy becomes strengthened as sanctions and decrees can result if higher educational institutions do not comply. Followingly, both the Norwegian and UK policy can be regarded as involving mandatory and highly encouraging requirements, but from the findings, the UK policy inhabits a more assertive mandatory approach.

5.5   Similarities and differences between Norway and the UK

As the above shows, both similarities and differences in the governance strategies of Norway and the UK in their respective policies on P/CVE in higher educational institutions are visible. Figure 3, located on the next pages, presents an organized comparison of the two policies by structuring the main findings in the analysis abreast of each other. In the next chapter, these findings will be used to answer problem statements 2 and 3 to see if these strategies reflect the key principles of governing wicked problems and examine the potential implications arising from their governance strategy and reflectance of research.

Table 4: *Similarities and differences between the Norwegian and the UK policies´s risk goveranace strategy*

Characteristics	NORWAY	THE UK
Authoritative vs. open definitions	• Contains an own section with key definition • Defines: Radicalization, undesirable events related to radicalization, violent extremism, preventive, and outsideness • Definitions of preventive and outsideness are given with certainty, well-understood. Definitions of radicalization and (violent) extremism applied with precautions, refer to various actors inhabiting different definitions, not represented as the objective, correct definition. • Definitions work guiding, but the definitions of RVE imply that caution must be carried out when utilizing them.	• Contains definitions within the main policy content and as a glossary list at the end • Defines: Having due regard, extremism, interventions, non-violent extremism, prevention, radicalization, safeguarding, terrorism, terrorist-related offences, and vulnerability. • All definitions are given with certainty. While not explicitly stated, the definitions of RVE and terrorism do not exclude other potential definitions from existing, the definitions do not come off as the objective, correct definitions. • Definitions work guiding, and the definitions of RVE imply an authority where relevant actors are expected to comply with their content.
Externally vs. conceived by higher educational institutions	• Conceived in a joint effort between higher educational institutions, students, and the government. • Developed for higher educational institutions. • Participation: A broad diversity is represented from higher educational institutions, based on academic freedom and values (represent genuine views, not restricted), document based on educational research and educational groups. • Design and language: Structured similarly to an academic text, includes references. This points to contributions from both higher education institutions and official bodies. • A high focus on educational values and interests in its content. Reflect internally conceived: the content and manner this is expressed implies the prevention being built on the functions and environments of higher educational institutions and how security measures can complement this.	• Primarily conceived by the government. • Developed for higher educational institutions but simultaneously addresses other sectors. • Participation: Imply that higher educational institutions have contributed with insights, but the size and exact role are unknown. Additional guidance on IT policies and external speakers and events by Universities UK is linked. • Design and language: Both the statutory duty and the guidances are structured similarly to a law. Also parts of the guidance that is similar to the content of an academic text, do not include references, formal language throughout. Imply contributions from both higher education institutions and official bodies but leaning towards official bodies. • A higher focus on security and prevention. It focuses on educational ideals but is not reflected throughout the whole policy's content. Reflect more externally conceived: The content and manner this is expressed implies that prevention and security perspectives are leading, while the educational functions and environments are complemented by these considerations.

Regulatory vs. Collaborative policy	• Collaborative policy: RVE is a joint social responsibility, both the formation and the practicing of the policy	• A more regulative approach: RVE is the responsibility of the government, a monitoring function exists to review higher educational institutions´ records to ensure compliance.
	• Collaboration is visible by being a common theme throughout the policy: both general information in the policy and in the listed measures.	• Collaboration and partnership are given their own section but also visible in the various listed measures.
	• Divided responsibilities between actors according to their position in the society and encourage close cooperation in implementation, knowledge sharing and concordance of efforts.	• Collaboration between actors is regarding knowledge sharing and support in carrying out various measures.
Mandatory vs. voluntary policy	• Anchored in law and official stipulated prevention responsibilities that build the foundation for its mandatory aspects.	• The duty itself is a paragraph in a law that builds the mandatory aspects.
	• Emphasizes that preventive responsibilities must be viewed in relation to responsibilities for freedom and rights. Hence, situational mandatory policy.	• Emphasizes that the legal duties must be balanced against the delivery of education and safeguarding, freedom of speech, equality, etc. Hence, situational mandatory policy.
	• Listed measures vary between being mandatory or voluntary: overarching preventive measures are mandatory, while the exact execution is given more room for maneuver.	• Listed measures vary between being mandatory or voluntary: overarching preventive measures are mandatory, while the exact execution is given more room for maneuver in some areas, while others are mandatory.
	• No reference to sanctions or measures if the policy is not complied with.	• Higher educational institutions can be legally bound to enforce their practice if they are not perceived to comply.

6. Discussion

The comparative document analysis of the UK and Norwegian policy on P/CVE in the higher education sector revealed similarities but also vital differences in how the documents were structured according to their respective risk governance strategies. In this chapter, these findings will be further compared and discussed towards the theoretical framework and literary background to gather all the loose threads and throughout answer the following two problem statements:

2) *To what extent do the governance approaches reflected in the policy documents align with wicked problems and governance theory?*
3) *What are the implications, and do the potential differences help explain the differing receptions of the two policies?*

As the research addresses the governing of wicked problems, the chapter will commence with a discussion on how the analysis reflects P/CVE as a wicked policy problem. Followingly, the comparison between the identified principles of governing wicked problems and the empirical findings in chapter 5 will be discussed to uncover how the policies reflect insights from research. In the end, a discussion will be carried out to address the implications of these findings and, additionally, if these can explain the differing receptions of the two policies.

6.1   The policies´ reflectance of the nature of P/CVE and wicked problems

An emphasis must be placed on how the comparative analysis sheds light on the nature of P/CVE and how it resonates with the notion of a wicked policy problem. From the findings in the analysis, how radicalization and (violent) extremism were formulated differently in the two policies works to acknowledge Neumann´s (2013, p. 874) statement that a commonly agreed-upon definition of RVE does not exist. Both definitions of radicalization reflect the one aspect that there is an agreement on; namely, that radicalization constitutes a process. However, they also address topics there are disputes on in the literature, such as the involvement of violence. While the UK definition of radicalization relates more to supporting ideologies, the Norwegian addresses the condonement of violence relating to ideologies. The Norwegian definition does not in this require the usage of violence, but it highlights that this definition is more focused on violent aspects. This works to emphasize the various possible approaches to defining RVE.

Furthermore, also the UK policy´s definition of extremism involving the attribute of opposition to fundamental British values further reflects the context-dependent nature of RVE (Neumann, 2013, p. 876). The exact same definition would not be used in any other country or area, despite the addressment of fundamental values being a common denoting of the concept. Therefore, the comparison of the policies already here sheds light on the complex and ambiguous nature of RVE, and the initial challenge of formulating an all-embracing definition. It thus reflects that P/CVE can be linked to wicked problems as the lack of a clear, universal definition is one of the key characteristics that Rittel and Webber (1973, pp. 161-162) identified when they first introduced the concept.

The comparative analysis addressed another characteristic of wicked problems: every solution has consequences. Both policies contain references to the need to see the provided obligations and duties against various rights such as freedom of speech, right to protection, gender segregation, and equality. These expressed precautions imply that there is an awareness that the prevention provided by the policies is not insignificant for the lives of the affected individuals. As mentioned in the literary background, this nexus between security and educational values is one of the biggest concerns relating to the implementation of P/CVE in the educational sector. Thus, these considerations identified work to emphasize that, in accordance with wicked policy problems, measures and efforts aimed at P/CVE will have consequences (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 163). If a measure is carried out, it can have profound impacts on lives that are difficult or impossible to reverse. In this sense, it also addresses the wicked problems´ feature that individuals responsible for the prevention are no right to be wrong as these are deeply cherished values in the society.

The Norwegian document particularly connects P/CVE to Rittel and Webbers´s (1973, pp. 162-164) characteristics of wicked problems in that there is not exhaustive list of potential solutions and that there are no correct ones by stating that the list of measures is open to changes and is formulated for the present-time environment. The statement implies that a multitude of potential solutions can, in theory, be formulated by time and that the ones formulated are known to be covering for neither the future nor the present. Changes in perceptions and societal factors can therefore transform the perceived optimal solutions, and there is no way to assure that all potential solutions and measures have been taken into consideration. In fact, the policies together also point to this as they were found to have distinct differences in their listed measures. Furthermore, the absence of "correctness" of solutions is also highlighted by the UK

policy in that despite formulating duties, it also incorporates how and to what degree higher educational institutions actually carry out the prevention of averting individuals from being drawn into terrorism will be dependent on many factors. This illustrates that there is no overarching correct way to prevent RVE, but it is rather dependent on the specific situation that is taking place. It is thus in accordance with the literature in reflecting that a judgment of what a good solution constitutes is possible, but not on what is correct or false.

The analysis and comparison of the two policies thus work to highlight both earlier research on the nature of P/CVE, in addition to confirming a relation between P/CVE and wicked problems. It visualizes the present uncertainties, complexities, and ambiguities involved in the practice. In this sense, these findings in the analysis seem to be in accordance with researchers who identify and connect P/CVE to a wicked policy problem.

6.2 The policies´ reflectance of the key principles of governing wicked problems

As the findings from the comparative document analysis were found to connect P/CVE to a wicked policy problem, this section will discuss how the policies align with research on key principles of governing of these wicked problems.

6.2.1 Do the policies reflect joint image building and cross frame reflection in definitions and solutions?

The first identified principle directed itself towards the uncertainties stemming from the challenge of determining the nature of RVE. The principle involved that the formulations of definitions and solutions should be based on and be open to the various views of relevant actors, thus reflecting joint image building and cross-frame reflection. From the findings in the analysis, the Norwegian and the UK policy can be said to reflect this principle to varyingly degree.

Both the Norwegian and UK policy approaches were found to not directly exclude other potential definitions of radicalization and violent extremism from existing, emphasizing that various actors can hold differing perspectives on these concepts. This can be said to be a prerequisite for potentially reaching a cross-frame reflection, as Teermer and colleagues (2015, p 687) pointed out the importance of being aware that multiple perspectives are in play within the governance. Both policies thus relate to this first aspect within the principle. However, the

analysis showed that the government primarily conceives the UK's Prevent Duty and that there is a lack of directly expressing the acknowledgment to other perspectives in their definitions. Additionally, it stated that higher educational institutions are expected to understand what is meant by extremism in the guidance document, which implies a form of authority in the definitions. This, in contrast, works to limit their potentiality to reflect the principle, and despite preliminary addressing the prerequisite, this is not followed through to achieve the principle's desirable joint image building and cross-frame reflection. In fact, it directly targets what the literature warns, namely that definitions should not be formulated by authoritative determination or actors alone (Head & Alford, 2015, p. 723). The definitions seem to be the result of some actors' perspectives and thus limit the contributions from other relevant actors. This is accordingly reflected in the UK policy not only in the definitions but also in the solutions, as the policy and P/CVE are conceived by and understood to be the government's responsibility. The opportunities for reaching joint image building and cross-frame reflection are thus limited in the UK policy, and these findings seem to comply with Fischbacher-Smith's (2016, pp- 404-405) findings in that the policy lacks the desirable holistic perspective on the nature of P/CVE and wicked policy problems.

In contrast, the Norwegian policy reflects the principle more throughout its content and separates from the UK policy in directly expressing an acknowledgment of the different perspectives. As the analysis visualized, the definitions of RVE inhabit the considerations of lack of agreement and a clear formulation both within the research environment and the society as a whole. The policy can, in this sense, be said to have been formulated by and be open to a higher involvement of reflexivity. It is, to a higher degree, able to deal with the multiple frames within the policy domain (Termeer et al., 2015, p. 684). This is also further emphasized by the analysis showing that the policy was developed in a cooperation between higher educational institutions and groups closely related to the government. The definitions of RVE were, in other words, not only expressed in a precautious manner, but it also implies that they were formulated in liaison. This does, accordingly, also apply to the solutions produced as it signals that they are a result of an intertwinement of interests and needs. In this sense, the policy is not only open to varying views within various sectors of society but also to differing perspectives within educational institutions themselves. The Norwegian policy is thus to a high degree meeting the aims of creating a "common ground" on P/CVE to allow for adjustments of strategies and joint actions that can satisfy the demands of various parties (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, pp. 162-163).

Subsequently, the two policies differ regarding how they correspond to the principle of joint image building and cross-frame reflection in definitions and solutions. While the UK policy does not exclude various perspectives on the definitions of RVE, the way the content is expressed illustrates its limitation in acknowledging the uncertain and ambiguous nature of RVE, and thus reflects joint image building and cross-frame reflection to a small degree. In contrast, the Norwegian policy is better able to incorporate the nature of RVE and the involvement of various actors within their definitions and solutions and thus reflects the principle to a high degree.

6.2.2 Do the policies reflect enhancement of cooperation and participation?

This second principle more closely addresses the importance of establishing good interactions and cooperation between actors in the governance. The analysis showed that both the policies emphasized the importance of collaboration in their content. However, how this is expressed and how the policies were conceived illustrate that there is also a difference in how they relate to this principle.

In the Norwegian document, the statement that P/CVE is a shared responsibility already addresses the actors' dependence on each other in the management, which is one of the two starting points that Koppenhan and Klijn (2004, p. 9) expressed is needed to manage these problems in a meaningful manner. The statement also symbolizes the policy's engagement of a collaborative strategy throughout the policy and clearly expresses the aim of a unified approach to the P/CVE. This is reflected through the analysis showing that the policy is conceived in a joint effort between actors in the society, where participation is extensive, and no actor is given a clear authority. These findings thus correlate with the research on this principle, as it encourages actors to participate actively and create relations between the implementing and participatory actors, which is in line with inclusive governance (Renn & Schweizer, 2009, p. 175). This is visible both in the formation and practice of the policy. As highlighted by earlier research, several possible forms of collaboration can assure to reflect the principle of enhancing cooperation and participation. The Norwegian policy especially seems to relate to an adaptive leadership where the chosen strategy develops during interactions with relevant actors. As Head and Alford (2015, p. 729) identified, this approach is promising as it targets the complexity and diversity of wicked policy problems, and thus also P/CVE. Therefore, the Norwegian official policy document can be said to reflect current insights on enhancing cooperation and participation in a good manner.

The UK policy's approach differs in this regard. The analysis showed that the policy highlighted the importance of collaboration between various actors in the policy's practice, reflecting the literature's emphasis on the importance of initiating and supporting collaboration and interactions between actors (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, pp. 65, 247-248). The policy is thus positive to inhabiting a collaborative approach and sees its importance in P/CVE in higher education. However, there are aspects within the policy that works to reduce its actual possibility of enhancing the principle to the same degree as the Norwegian policy. As P/CVE is in the UK policy portrayed as a responsibility belonging to the government and is followingly primarily conceived by them, this reduces its ability to be purely collaborative. As highlighted in research, a leadership where the government frames the vision and urges other actors to pursue it is not adequate in tackling wicked problems (Head & Alford, 2015, p. 729). This can also be seen in relation to the previous principle, in that it is a leadership that fails to fully embrace the nature of RVE. Especially the finding that the government holds an authority both in the formation of the policy and by having a monitoring role, in addition to how the collaboration is accordingly "forced" upon actors, explicitly challenges the encouraged "negotiated environment" emphasized by Koppenjan & Klijn (2004, p. 98). The analysis showed that it is the government that primarily sets the standards for how the cooperation is to be carried out. This seems to miss a vital part of the active, engaging participation and voluntary accountability of other relevant actors such as higher educational institutions. In this sense, as the analysis visualized, the policy of the UK constitutes a more regulative approach rather than being a strategy that fully enhances cooperation and participation.

Thus, the Norwegian policy can, in sum, be said to reflect the insights of enhancing cooperation and participation as it throughout demonstrates a genuine collaborative approach, all the way from the production of the policy to the content of practicing the policy. The UK, on the other hand, seems to reflect this principle to a lesser extent as cooperation is acknowledged as vital, but it is not reflected in how the policy is produced and its further content.

6.2.3 Do the policies reflect acknowledgement of institutional characteristics?

Finally, the last principle addressed the need to acknowledge and consider the institutional characteristics of the involved actors. The implementation of P/CVE in higher educational institutions involves actors from various sectors in society, and the various tasks and interests of the respective actors must, in the view of research on risk governance of wicked problems, be reflected in order to achieve efficient prevention.

The findings in the analysis point to the fact that both policies reflect the common thought within the principle in that the optimal approach in governance is to have set boundaries while there is still an openness to freely determine some aspects (Teermer et al., 2015, pp. 690-691; Weber &. Khademian, 2008, p. 342). The Norwegian policy is founded on some stipulated laws and official responsibilities, which are reflected in some overarching mandatory measures, while the actual implementation of them is open to determination by the responsible actors. Correspondingly, the UK policy constitutes a paragraph in a law itself. However, the relating guiding document also visualizes that overarching measures are mandatory while a flexibility is given in some areas in the practicing of them. This structure of the policies is thus acknowledging institutional characteristics, as it allows higher education institutions to adjust the prevention in accordance with their institution. The policies are, in this sense, adaptable and offer a desirable flexibility in the management. Furthermore, it also shows resilience, as it will be easier to adapt to the unfolding of a specific situation.

Especially the UK policy can be seen to put a high priority on this through the formulation of the duty. The statutory duty did state that higher educational institutions must "in the exercise of its function, have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism", where due regard involves placing an appropriate amount of weight on this responsibility (Home Office, 2015a, s. 4; Home Office, 2015b, s. 1). What an appropriate amount of weight means is a question of interpretation. However, these formulations insinuate that the prevention needs to be balanced against the functions of a higher educational institution and other considerations. Thus, the formulation of the duty itself expresses a flexibility that reflects Koppenjan & Klijn´s (2004, p. 247) thoughts on the need for a design that enhances the compatibility of processes in various involved networks. However, also in this principle is the actual reflectance influenced by the policy´s organization and further content. As Head and Alford (2015, pp. 723-724) highlighted, the governance must in this have a holistic and interactive approach and, by this, retrain from a mechanistic and linear "command and control" strategy. In the UK policy, it was visible that the government was the lead actor, inhabiting a monitoring- and control function as reports must be given to these by higher educational institutions, and if the reporting is not perceived to be in accordance with the duty, then sanctions and injunction can be inflicted. It is clear from these findings that despite aiming for a flexible and actor-adjusted strategy, the approach taken can work to hinder this from becoming a reality. Especially is this the case as the analysis also addressed that only some areas, such as welfare and pastoral care, allow for the desired flexibility. It can thus be

questioned if the regulative strategy of the UK may end up jeopardizing its ideal of fully acknowledging the institutional differences.

The Norwegian strategy will, in contrast, be able to avoid much of these considerations as it offers a more genuine, cooperative strategy, and the analysis additionally illustrated that all the three listed goals inhabited voluntary aspects. There is neither a monitor- and control function, which thus rejects the above-mentioned "command and control" strategy. As it was also explicitly stated in the policy that measures and actions are subject to revising by changing societal conditions, this works to demonstrate both the desirable resilience and flexibility in not only the understanding and adapting to the risk but also the possibility to adapt to the current and changing institutional arrangements. The policy does, in other words, not only seem to reflect insights on obtaining a flexibility regarding institutional characteristics but also one that allows for self-governance.

Both policies thus reflect the principle of enhancing institutional characteristics. The Norwegian policy does this in a manner that opens for substantial flexibility and resilience. The flexibility of the UK policy can be said to be more limited, but it is still a matter that the policy points out as vital.

6.2.4 The Norwegian and UK policies´ reflection of research generated on governing wicked problems

The discussions in sections 6.3.1-6.3.3 are summarized in table 4. As can be seen, the policy of Norway on P/CVE in higher educational institutions reflects all three principles to a high degree. The result of the UK policy differs as it reflects joint image building and cross-frame reflection on definitions to a small degree, while it reflects both enhancement of cooperation and participation, and acknowledgment of institutional characteristics to some degree. The Norwegian policy can thus be said to align with insights on governing wicked problems overall high, while the UK policy can be said to align with it to some extent. In other words, the Norwegian policy reflects insights on governing wicked problems considerably higher than the UK policy. These results, therefore, comment on earlier findings in the literature review, which addressed that policies are often found to not build on research, as the present, analyzed policies are found to varyingly degree reflect research within wicked problems and governance theory.

The results also convey the interchangeable connection between the three principles. Koppenjan & Klijn (2004, pp. 120-121) highlight the close relationship between the various

Table 5: Overview of how the Norwegian and the UK policies on P/CVE reflect insights obtained through research on governing wicked problems

KEY PRINCIPLES	Insights from research	Norway	The UK
Joint Image Building and Cross-frame reflection on definitions	Acknowledge and be open to various views and perspectives in definitions and solutions. Early fixations and authoritative definitions are not desirable.	Reflect principle to a high degree: The policy does directly emphasize various views on definitions. The definitions are additionally developed in cooperation among actors. The definitions are implemented with caution.	Reflect principle to a small degree: The policy does indirectly not exclude other views on definitions. However, the definitions of RVE are primarily developed by the government, and they hold an authority or decisiveness.
Enhance cooperation and participation	Cooperation and participation in a manner that unites actors, knowledge, and strategies. The governance should foster engagement, mutual commitment, and accountability.	Reflect principle to a high degree: The policy is conceived in cooperation between relevant actors; RVE is a shared responsibility. An adaptive leadership.	Reflect principle to some degree: The policy is conceived primarily by the government; RVE is their responsibility. It initiates and supports collaboration, but some limitations as the mutual dependency is not reflected between the government and higher educational institutions.
Acknowledge institutional characteristics	Governance must allow for flexibility and various institutional characteristics. Optimal is flexible regulation where legislation is provided but still gives the actors room to maneuver flexibly	Reflect principle to a high degree: The policy balances overarching mandatory measures in combination with flexible steering. Additional resilience as it is open for a reassessment of measures if changes occur in the society.	Reflect principle to some degree: The policy balances overarching mandatory measures in combination with flexible steering. There are fewer flexibilities than the Norwegian, and the monitoring and control function of the Government works to reduce some of this flexibility to higher educational institutions.

processes and factors in a governance, which often reflects a multi-causality as the complex processes result from numerous factors taking place simultaneously at various levels. This is visible in the findings as the various aspects identified in the analysis could fit into several or all the reflectance was between low and to some degree. Thus, this suggests that if joint image building and cross-frame reflection are found in definitions and solutions, this implies that

varying perspectives are considered. This again implies that a certain degree of cooperation and participation is present, which again influences that various institutional characteristics are acknowledged. This relationship exists between all the three principles, no matter which principle constitutes the starting point and in which order they are viewed. This is because all these three principles, reflecting various uncertainties within the governance, are fundamentally a matter of mutual adjustment and cooperation (Koppenjan. & Klijn, 2014, p. 114). Accordingly, if a high or low reflection is visible in one of the principles, this may indicate that the other principles are accordingly reflected in a similar manner. However, some precautions must be taken in these findings as not everything is related (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2014, p. 120). Some relations will, in other words, be more direct than others. It can offer an indication of the reflectance of the other principles but not determine them.

Some more precautions must also be taken in viewing these results. Especially the results of the UK policy need to be handled with care as the analysis also showed that the exact participation of higher education institutions within the production of the policy could not be established as it is not visible from its content and relating documents. The exact reflection of these principles can thus be subject to some changes if these become transparent. This can accordingly result in a finding of higher reflection of the principles. However, a high reflection of them would unlikely be the case, as the parts visible shows that some of the approaches utilized in the policy directly address what earlier research points to is not suitable in governing wicked problems. Thus, some positive adjustments to the result may be a reality if the information on this aspect is made visible.

Closely related to this, it is essential to emphasize that this thesis represents findings from the documents. As highlighted in discourse theory, the textual level cannot be separated from the discursive and social practice level (Fairclough, 1992;2003). This means that these results do not offer the whole reality of the policies but rather reflect the foundation of the practice. These results can thus not be interpreted to represent the whole practice of P/CVE at higher educational institutions in the UK and Norway, and they must be viewed in relation to research and findings on the social practices and experiences of involved actors to obtain the whole picture on the governance. One needs to be aware of this both in the present results and in further discussion of the implications.

6.3   Implications of the policies´ governance strategies

The question then arises on what these findings on the policies´ respective governance strategies and their reflectance of research on wicked problems can tell us. Koppenjan and Klijn (2004, p.14) argued in their network approach to problem-solving and decision-making in uncertainty that if the subjective, strategic, and institutional uncertainties are not dealt with, then the governance will not be effective. As the key governance principles identified in this thesis accordingly addressed these three uncertainties, the findings imply that the Norwegian policy, by reflecting these principles to a higher degree, will in this view likely be able to reach more effective prevention than the UK. However, an elaboration on what this entails is needed.

In this context, it is just as vital to emphasize what these findings cannot be interpreted to implicate. A critical aspect that the findings cannot offer any knowledge on is whether the Norwegian policy is more likely to accomplish a more efficient P/CVE within the higher education sector in the sense that it will be able to prevent more people from identifying with RVE. As seen in the literary background, this is information we do not know due to the challenging nature of P/CVE, and this claim would therefore have no evidence to back it up. For instance, as the UK policy was found to have a higher priority on security aspects and stricter mandatory duties, which amongst others, require all suspicions of individuals involved with RVE to be communicated to the police, it could be argued that the UK will potentially be able to detect more cases and thus reduce RVE. However, such claims would only be speculative, as successful prevention is currently not detectable nor testable (Lindekilde, 2012, p. 340). Thus, the policies´ governance strategies and their reflectance of the identified principles will not be able to give any knowledge of how effective the prevention is regarding their impact on reducing RVE. The content of the policies can provide some indications but not any information that can be theoretically or empirically proven. Therefore, the findings in the thesis will not be able to resolve the question of which governance strategy or policy will achieve the most significant reductions in RVE. Instead, the policies´ governance strategies and reflectance of these principles can offer knowledge on their perceived legitimacy across the society and point to strengths and limitations of their pre-requisites for facilitating P/CVE at higher educational institutions.

Renn and Klinke (2015, p. 34) argued that the effectiveness and legitimacy depend on the capability of resolving complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity through communication and deliberation. As the Norwegian policy reflect the present research on governance of wicked

problems to a high degree, it implies that its fundamental frames of P/CVE address these aspects needed to ensure the effectiveness and legitimacy. The reflectance work to assure that the policy is open to both acknowledging the challenging nature of RVE and to enhance cooperation between involved actors, which gives room and consideration to the views and tasks of both the government and higher educational institutions. This is further strengthened by the content of the policy expressing priority to both security and educational values, and it even reflects the literary background´s emphasis on the primary tasks of education in prevention. This is especially vital due to the prominent concerns regarding the securitization of social policy and the involved dilemmas between security and educational interests (Ragazzi, 2017, p. 170). Thus, the findings of the Norwegian policy imply that its governance strategy will likely allow for more mutually satisfactory processes and outcomes, in addition to cross-frame learning, as it opens for accommodating these varying perspectives and the environment in which the prevention is taking place (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p. 10). In other words, by the official policy document being open to broad participation and varying views and interests on the issue of resolving the challenge of P/CVE, a broader understanding and a more nuanced perspective is likely to evolve. Consequently, the general result of the analysis of the Norwegian document is that the policy illustrates a governance strategy to approach P/CVE in a meaningful manner as the potential for reducing RVE is not known. In this sense, the effectiveness obtained from reflecting these principles consists of increasing the possibility of enhancing both the understandings and strategies toward P/CVE in higher educational institutions by opening the possibility for satisfying the various demands.

The UK policy seemingly aligned with the principles to a smaller extent, where the government was found to have a distinct leading role both in its development, formulations, and the general practice, which was also reflected in its high focus on security. Thus, this suggests that there is a danger that its governance strategy does not fully facilitate the possibility of acknowledging the various views and discourses in the fundamental frames of P/CVE and subsequently does not pursue the potentiality of approaching the challenges of P/CVE more optimally to fit the current environment of P/CVE within higher educational institutions. The danger of this is that the developed solutions may not satisfy all demands of involved actors, and it risks not reaching its full potential to achieve the comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon needed to enhance suitable strategies (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, pp. 10, 163). Especially is this an important finding, as earlier literature on the experiences of educational staff in the UK also expressed concerns about the securitization of education and its demands on educational ideals

and freedoms (Busher et al., 2020; Danvers, 2021; Elwick & Jerome, 2019; Miller et al., 2011; Thomas, 2016). If all the concerns are not sufficiently addressed and accounted for in the formation and further strategy of the policy within a prevention that lacks knowledge on its impact on reducing RVE, then this can have negative effects. However, it is crucial to highlight that the findings in the analysis and the above discussion cannot be interpreted to express how the various perspectives and interests in reality have been and are considered, as these are only findings on the textual reality. Rather, the governance strategy of the UK policy documents reflects that the same assurance of the existence of these deliberations and interactions being carried out cannot be guaranteed to the same extent as the more cooperative approach of Norway. The findings can thus only imply that the deliberation of the varying perspectives and the broad understanding of P/CVE cannot be guaranteed to the same extent in the UK policy.

A crucial factor in this is also the findings' relation to trust as the reflectance of the principles has an impact on the chances of developing trust between actors, such as between the government and higher educational institutions. Trust is often viewed as a key factor for achieving success in governance, and this trust does namely gradually evolve in interactions between parties (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p. 230-231). The varying approaches to participation and interaction between the Norwegian and the UK policy documents thus seem to imply that it can pose a potential for reaching various degrees of trust between actors in the respective country. The UK policy seemingly not reflecting the principles of enhancement of cooperation and cross-frame reflection to the same extent as the Norwegian policy, can therefore challenge the effectiveness, as trust is especially important within problems such as P/CVE. The presence of trust can work to reduce some of the uncertainties between actors in an already uncertain and complex field and is thus highly beneficial. For instance, it can reduce some of the uncertainties educators expressed on the execution of the new, security-related tasks. In accordance with Renn and Klinke (2015, p. 34), the danger of the UK policy not fully reflecting these principles is thus, that not only can the effectiveness can be hampered, but the legitimacy can also be reduced if there exist skepticism and suspicion between actors. In contrast, the Norwegian policy will, in this context, inhabit a better pre-requisite for enabling trust between involved actors as close cooperation is pursued, which is crucial as it is beneficial for the prevention in the longer term.

These implications must, however, be seen in relation to the findings being unable to determine the policies´ effectiveness in reducing RVE. These findings can, in other words, not be

interpreted to express that one policy or strategy is "better" at P/CVE than the other. Even though the UK policy was found to reflect the key governance principles to a lesser extent, it is important to highlight that it still does reflect insights within the principles. Additionally, criticism has also already been appointed to these recommended governance strategies of wicked problems as they can represent a romanticization, and it is remarked that the principles are located too far away from the daily experiences of practitioners to have an impact (Noordegraf et al., 2019, pp. 282-284). What implications and to which degree these recommended governance strategies influence the daily practice and outcomes of P/CVE in higher educational institutions are subject to discussion. Other aspects are therefore also vital in viewing the implications of the policies. However, the above discussion suggests that these considerations are vital for involved actors to be aware of, both in the phase of developing a policy and in the continuing work on its sustainability and improvement, as it is not insignificant for the P/CVE.

Related to this, the findings also solely reflect the foundation or pre-requisites for practicing P/CVE at higher educational institutions in the respective countries. The findings are based on the textual reality in the field, and the entire social reality will not be identified without knowledge of the daily experiences and practices (Fairclough, 2003). This means that the precise implications of these findings regarding their prevention in practice are uncertain as knowledge is also needed on the daily functioning and related experiences to obtain this information. Accordingly, the policies´ reflectance of the principles addresses the foundation that their practice of P/CVE in higher educational institutions is built on, and the findings can only point to implications regarding how they facilitate the practice of P/CVE. The findings suggest that a reflection of these principles will create beneficial pre-requisites for improving the understanding and strategies of P/CVE by enabling the potential for reaching mutually satisfactory processes and outcomes where cross-frame learning occurs. In other words, improving the chances of accommodating the present conditions involved in RVE and P/CVE at higher educational institutions. Thus, high reflectance of the principles implies a robust foundation for being able to obtain a more appropriate and satisfactory prevention for all actors. If the pre-requisites stemming from these official policy documents are realized or followed through in the daily exercise of P/CVE, however, must be examined by situational research that digs deeper into the actual practice and experiences of practitioners. This is also additionally desirable, as there is currently a lack of literature within P/CVE on these aspects of the prevention on a more local level (Bjørgo & Gjelsvik, 2015, pp. 253-254).

6.4   Can the findings explain the different reception of the policies?

The starting point for the thesis was the differing responses the policies of Norway and the UK on P/CVE in higher educational institutions received after their implementation. The UK policy was subject to a considerable amount of criticism regarding the policy´s potential to transform universities into a surveillance function and followingly endanger vital freedoms (Danvers, 2021, p. 2; Whiting et al., 2020, p. 514). In contrast, the Norwegian policy has avoided these criticisms and has been perceived as much less controversial. This last section of the chapter will discuss if the findings in this thesis can help explain these different receptions.

The concerns expressed of the UK policy target dilemmas between values involved in P/CVE, which is an aspect that is closely related to governance strategies with their focus on the organization of participants with varying interests and perceptions. As the two policies´ reflectance of the principles of governing wicked problems differed, already this implies that there are vital differences in their governance approaches which can point to the criticisms.

The above discussions highlighted that the lower reflection of the principles by the UK policy results in it being more prone to a weakness of not assuring that neither the frames nor the daily practice of P/CVE fully incorporate and sufficiently weigh all the relevant views and knowledge needed on aspects of the prevention. Literature further highlights that the danger of not acknowledging this broad nature of RVE and the various interests and views is that it may lead to politicization and controversy (Termeer et al., 2015, p. 684). These findings can thus seem to offer a plausible suggestion to help explain some aspects of why the UK policy has been subject to this criticism. The more regulative approach by the UK cannot, through these findings, guarantee a mutual agreement across actors, and this also seems to be the case as the criticism targets this perceived uneven balance between security and educational values and liberties. It was pointed to in the above-mentioned challenges experienced by UK educational staff that they felt that the policy put a demand on their work as educators. The findings in the analysis on the policy´s control-and-monitoring systems and high priority on both security and mandatory aspects reflect this as the higher educational institutions´ maneuvers in the prevention will be reduced with such an approach. In fact, these findings additionally seem to be supported by earlier research as the policy´s legal obligation on educational staff to communicate information with the police and security services has already been highlighted to undercut their professional norms and confidentiality (Ellefsen, 2021, p. 19). Thus, the findings on the UK´s risk governance strategy in the official policy documents can offer a possible

explanation for its controversy in the sense that the nature of P/CVE, and the various views and institutional characteristics consequently have not been guaranteed by the policy documents to be fully reflected. These aspects are especially vital in this context, as the effectiveness regarding a reduction of RVE is not known, meaning that it cannot in itself offer a forceful, evidently weighted argument for the perceived appropriateness of the measures.

The Norwegian policy, in contrast, was found to be developed and monitored in liaison between both the government and higher educational institutions, thus reflecting the principles argued to increase the possibility of both more mutual satisfactory outcomes and legitimacy (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p. 10; Renn & Klinke, 2015, p. 34). In other words, the risk governance strategy of this policy offered a higher degree of ensuring a process with less controversy as the nature of RVE is reflected, where cooperation and participation are more thoroughly acknowledged in both its formation and further practice, in addition to opening for more flexible mobility of actors. Here, the analysis also showed that the educational functions and values were given a more central role throughout its content. Thus, it is plausible that the Norwegian policy´s ability to avoid the same criticisms may, to some degree, be influenced by its risk governance strategy.

However, the findings in the analysis can also point to another possible explanation for the differing receptions, which concerns the governance strategies in combination with their design and language. The findings on the Norwegian policy document revealed more deliberations on knowledge and definitions, consequently making visible the various dilemmas and considerations on the topic. The higher educational institutions were also here profoundly involved in its formation. In contrast, both the literary background on the UK strategy and the comparative analysis illustrated a big focus on security aspects in the UK policy´s content. Additionally, the government was also found to be the leading actor using a more formal and precise language where a minor role seemed to be accorded to higher educational institutions. The point is that these characteristics of the UK policy can conceal vital information between actors. Discourse theory emphasizes the importance of language representations in various domains (Neumann, 2001, p. 13), and as the UK policy is formulated within a political discourse, this suggests that it may be perceived differently from an educational perspective. It is thus not necessarily the case that educational values are not sufficiently considered nor intentionally given lesser attention. The government has a dual role where they need to protect both national security and individuals´ well-being and vulnerability (Hemmingsen, 2017, p.

15). Consideration of educational values vs. security has most likely been incorporated in the process of developing the UK policy, which is implied by its statements on the need to see the prevention in light of other values and freedoms. However, the choice of language with its preciseness and attention to security combined with a smaller participating role of higher educational institutions may work to conceal these considerations from other actors. Consequently, it can possibly come off as more ignorant of other values than the Norwegian document because of its combination of the chosen content, governance strategy, and language use. In other words, this combination can make the official policy document conceal the uncertainties, ambiguities, and complexities involved in P/CVE at higher educational institutions.

6.4.1 Alternative possible explanations

It is from the above plausible that the governance strategies identified in the Norwegian and UK policy documents in higher educational institutions can aid in explaining why the two policies were met with such different reactions. However, it is impossible to conclude that these offer the ultimate explanations behind the receptions as several potential explanations that do not directly relate to the present findings can be discussed. In the last section on the findings' implications, trust was viewed as an important factor for the legitimacy and effectiveness of a governance strategy. In this sense, it is interesting to note that the citizens' confidence in the government varies substantially between Norway and the UK. Indications show that the confidence rate is 82.92% in Norway, while it in the UK is 34.70% (OECD, 2022). In other words, these numbers illustrate that the citizens in the UK, in general, inhabit more suspicion towards the Governments proceedings, which can contribute to explaining the extensive skepticism and criticism of the policy's functioning. This can also be seen in relation to the fact that the Norwegian policy has been subject to far less research than the UK policy. As Whiting with colleagues (2021, p. 514) also points out, the Prevent strategy was already seen as a controversial and heavily criticized strategy before it extended to target P/CVE in higher educational institutions. This points to skepticism already existing before its implementation.

The differing reception and their varying focus on security in the two policies can also be linked to the differing political climates in the respective countries. In other words, it is plausible that the heightened priority given to security aspects in the UK policy may result from the threat landscape. According to their national security service, the international terrorism threat to the UK during the active years of the Prevent Duty has been assessed to range between highly

likely and highly likely in the near future (MI5, 2022). Only one year has this threat been assessed at a lower level, and Theresa May was also found to emphasize the increasing threat of RVE to the UK society. Thus, this illustrates a need for a focus on prevention. Similarily, a sense of urgency also appeared in Norway after the attacks of 22nd of July 2011, which led to a maximum threat level in 2014, but it is emphasized that after these years, a normalization appeared to considerably reduce the perceived threat (Ellefsen, 2021, pp. 10-12). The present policy document also expresses that Norway has been spared from being a crucible for RVE in contrast to other countries (Emergency Preparedness Council, 2018, p. 4). These considerations can thus imply that the political climate of the UK may be prone to a higher sense of urgency with regards to the need for prevention than the Norwegian environment, consequently explaining a need to prioritize security. It is therefore plausible that the higher assessment of the threat of terrorism in the UK, and thus also RVE, can have impacted that security measures have gained a higher priority, which eventually can heighten the concerns on its possible implications on freedoms and educational ideals.

It is thus apparent that several various conditions can influence the differing reception of the policies. Therefore, the findings in this analysis will not likely offer an ultimate explanation for explaining the differing reception of the policies. However, the above suggests that it is plausible to conclude that the findings may constitute a partial explanation or can aid with an understanding of the different receptions, as the identified findings are closely related to the addressed criticism.

7. Conclusion

Through a comparative document analysis, this thesis has aimed to examine and compare the risk governance strategies reflected in the official policy documents of Norway and the UK on P/CVE in higher educational institutions. The study has accordingly sought to answer the following research questions:

1. *What are the differences and similarities of their governance approaches?*
2. *To what extent do the governance approaches reflected in the policy documents align with insights from wicked problems and governance theory?*
3. *What are the implications, and do the potential differences help explain the differing receptions of the two policies?*

The policies have been examined through a wicked problem lens to accommodate the uncertain, complex, and ambiguous nature of P/CVE. This conclusion extracts the study´s main findings on these research questions.

The comparative document analysis of the Norwegian and UK policy visualized both similarities and differences in their governance strategies. The Norwegian document was found to be conceived in a joint effort between the government and higher educational institutions, which also reflected its collaborative approach through the seeking of active cooperation and participation. In contrast, the content of the UK policy rather reflected that it was the government who had a clear, leading role in issuing the policy, where the government also was seen as the responsible actor in the prevention. Higher educational institutions were given a minor participatory role, and the more regulative approach of the UK became visible as the government both inhabited a monitoring and controlling role. Similarities in their governance strategies also appeared as both policies had mandatory, overall requirements, which simultaneously allowed for flexibility in their execution. However, differences could also be revealed within this aspect as the flexibility was more limited in the UK policy. The same pattern was found in their definitions of RVE. Both were not directly excluding the potentiality of several possible definitions existing, but the way these definitions were defined illuminated that the Norwegian definitions were more open to varying interpretations, while the definitions in the UK were more authoritative and decisive.

The comparative analysis of the two policies in combination shed light on P/CVE as a tantamount to a wicked policy problem. Accordingly, the nature of P/CVE called for a

governance strategy that could account for its uncertainties on the nature of RVE, the various strategies and interests of relevant actors, and the various institutional characteristics of the represented sectors. Followingly, a governance aiming for joint image building and cross-frame reflection in definitions and goals; enhance cooperation and participation; and acknowledge institutional characteristics. The findings in the comparative document analysis visualized the Norwegian policy aligning with all three principles to a high degree, while the UK policy aligned to a small degree to the first principle and to some degree on the two others. The Norwegian policy was, in other words, found to reflect insights on governing wicked problems to a considerably higher degree than the UK policy. However, some precautions must be taken as higher educational institutions' exact participation in the UK policy's development was not visible, and a higher alignment is possible.

Consequently, the varying risk governance strategies reflected in their policy documents not only implied that there were vital differences in their strategies but also pointed to a differing impact on the prevention. The findings highlighted that the Norwegian policy would, in this context, potentially be able to reach more effective and legitimate prevention as it will, to a higher degree, acknowledge the various present circumstances of P/CVE. However, this does not mean that the policy will be able to prevent more people from identifying with RVE as this information is concealed by inevitable, significant knowledge gaps on RVE. Rather, the effectiveness and legitimacy consist of the Norwegian policy inhabiting a more beneficial pre-requisite for being able to improve the understanding and strategies of P/CVE by enabling the potential for reaching mutually satisfactory processes and outcomes where cross-frame learning occurs. The characteristics of the risk governance strategy in the UK policy documents could not reach the same assurance.

In light of these insights, the identified risk governance strategies reflected in the respective policy documents could also point to some of the criticism that has been accorded the UK policy, which concerned a fear that the policy transformed universities into a surveillance function that could endanger the educational and societal liberties. This criticism targets aspects closely related to characteristics of risk governance, and by the UK policy not being able to guarantee that all the various views, the nature of P/CVE, nor the institutional characteristics were fully reflected, it could pose as an explanation for its criticism. The governance strategy could additionally work to conceal vital deliberations behind the processes of developing the policy. However, explanations not targeting the risk governance strategies could also be

identified, and it could only be concluded that the differing risk governance strategies offer insights on partial or possible reasons behind the differing reception.

The findings in the thesis have thus illuminated that risk governance strategies in official policy documents are not insignificant for the P/CVE in higher educational institutions. The policies´ governance strategies and reflectance of the identified principles can offer knowledge on their perceived legitimacy across the society and point to strengths and limitations of their pre-requisites for facilitating P/CVE at higher educational institutions. This further suggests that these considerations are crucial for involved actors to be aware of, both in the phase of developing a policy and in the continuing work on its sustainability and improvement. The importance of this research in this context is not that it can offer a solution on how to improve a policy to ensure successful prevention, nor cover all aspects of the prevention. Rather, it emphasizes the cruciality of an awareness and consideration of the choice and approached governance strategy as it can have beneficial effects on assuring that the challenging nature of P/CVE is better understood. Subsequently, increasing the potential to achieve a more meaningful prevention in the face of RVE in higher educational institutions.

7.1 Further Research

As emphasized through the thesis, the research has been carried out on the official policy documents and only addresses the textual reality in the field. A limitation of the research is thus that the whole reality of the policies on P/CVE at higher educational institutions in the UK and Norway are subject to uncertainty as the policy documents cannot embrace the whole existence of the practice. Therefore, this research implies the need for more research on how the present policies and risk governance strategies are reflected in practice. Not only is there a lack of such research in the field, but a criticism of wicked problems and governance theory expresses the need for more situational examination. In other words, knowledge should be sought on the practices and experiences of the practitioners at a lower level. Not only can it complement the findings here, but it is only through such research that the broader picture of the policies and the practice of P/CVE in higher education institutions can be revealed.

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Appendix A

The progression of the thesis

Period	Output
January 2022	The aim was set to examine similarities and differences in the Norwegian and UK policy on P/CVE in higher education. The original plan was to carry out an experimental document analysis. However, a thorough literature review on the policies and the field was carried out to grasp the research environment. This illuminated that much experimental research had already been carried out on the UK policy relating to this aspect. The research also implied that wicked problems theory was a promising approach and pointed to knowledge gaps in this area. The choice was therefore made to instead focus on a comparative document analysis targeted towards their addressing of wicked problems and risk governance.
February 2022	A thorough literature review was further carried out to find a concrete problem statement and a theoretical framework constituting the base for the analysis of the documents. The problem statement was also changed to fit the findings in the literature reviews, now more targeted towards their risk governance strategies. A draft was also made on the introduction and theoretical framework.
March 2022	In drafting the theoretical framework, it became apparent that these insights alone could not offer an understanding of the field of P/CVE in higher educational institutions. The choice was made to add a literary background to assure that the thesis could illuminate the existing knowledge on this topic and complement the theoretical framework and the official policy documents, as these were the only empirical material utilized.
April 2022	Throughout this month, the comparative analysis of the documents was carried out, and the results from the coding and analysis were written into the chapter of empirical findings/analysis. Simultaneously, the previous drafted chapters were revised to leave out unnecessary information, adding more knowledge and thus being able to focus on the relevant information.

May 2022	The discussion chapter was written, and continuous changes were made to previous chapters to ensure a "red thread" throughout the thesis. When the comparative document analysis chapter and the discussion started to take form, this illuminated that the findings could point to implications and offer some insights on the differing reception. The problem statements were accordingly revised to fit the evolvement of the thesis.
June 2022	The conclusion was written, in addition to the acknowledgments and the abstract sections. Final adjustments were made on all parts of the thesis, and the work was eventually finalized by correcting grammatical revisions, ensuring formal setup, and correct referencing of sources.

Appendix B

List of articles and books included in the key principles on governing wicked problems

Authors	Title	Year
Alford, J. & Head, B. W.	Wicked Problems: Implications for Public Policy and Management	2017
Fisher, F.	Citizen Participation and the Democratization of policy Expertise: From theoretical inquiry to practical cases	1993
Head, B. W.	Forty years of Wicked Problems Literature: Forging Closer Links to Policy Studies	2019
Head, B. W. & Alford, J.	Wicked Problems: Implications for Public Policy and Management	2015
Koppenjan, J. & Klijn, E.	Managing Uncertainties in Networks	2004
Newig, J., Günther, D. & Pahl-Wostl, C.	Synapses in Network: Learning in Goovernance Networks in the Context of Environmental Management	2010
Renn, O. & Shweizer, P.	Inclusive Risk Governance: Concepts and Application to Environmetal Policy Making	2009
Termeer, C. J. A. M., Dewulf, A., Breeman, G. & Stiller, S. J.	Governance Capabilities for Dealing Wisely with Wicked Problems	2015
Weber, E. P. & Khademian, A. M.	Wicked Problems, Knowledge Challenges, and Collaborative Capacity Builders in Network Settings	2008

Appendix C

Examples to illustrate the process of coding and analysis

Categories	Descriptions/codes	Examples from the Norwegian policy	Examples from the UK policy
Authoritative vs. definitive definitions (example: radicalization)	Definition	"A process whereby a person or group increasingly condones the use of violence as a means to reach political, ideological or religious goals, and whereby violent extremism may be a result"	"Refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies"
	By whom	""The preparedness Council is established … consists of 14 members from higher public and private educational institutions, folk university colleges, vocational schools, student organizations and student unions and the Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training (UDIR)" "The Norwegian government describes radicalization as…" "The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) and several other actors in Norway apply a similar definition of radicalization. In this document, we shall use the Government´s definition of radicalization"	"The Government has defined.." Counter Terrorism is the responsibility of the UK Government".
	Characteristics of definitions: language, elaborations…	"Difficult to define precisely, and experts disagree on their actual meaning" "The term does not originally carry a connotation relating to terror or violence" "In this document, we shall use.." "Radicalization was a virtue, especially in academic circles. (…) Etymologically speaking, being radical can denote going to the root of a problem to be able to make a change"	"In complying with the duty all specified authorities, as a starting point, should demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalization in their area, institutions or body" "Frontline staff who engage with the public should understand wat radicalization means and why people may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism as a consequence of it."

Collaborative vs. Regulative approach	Responsibility of whom	"The responsibility for preventing radicalization and violent extremism is currently a joint social responsibility" "The responsibility for prevention includes the knowledge sector as well." "Radicalization and extremism are not challenges that universities and colleges can solve on their own" "Again, the work of prevention is a complex task requiring cooperation between institutions, the authorities, organizations and other actors throughout all of society"	"Counter terrorism is the responsibility of the UK government.
	Roles of actors	"We are not talking about many "sharp or pointed" measures to be taken on our part – the police are responsible for those" "Upper secondary schools, colleges and universities etc. are responsible for safety and emergency preparedness for their employees and pupils/students" "The authorities such as the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) are tasked with providing official threat assessments, and these also apply to the UC sector" "The UC sector´s primary mission is to promote knowledge and inculcate academic and democratic values"	"The authorities should place an appropriate amount of weight on the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism when they consider all the other factors relevant to how they carry out their usual functions." ""Imposes a duty on Specified authorities", when exercising their functions, to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism" "Requires that porpoerly thought through procedures and policies are in place" "Universities UK produced guidance in 2013 to support institutions to make decisions about hosting events and have the proper safeguards in place" "The Secretary of State will appoint an appropriate body to assess the bodies´ compliance with the Prevent duty."

| | Characteristics of approach: style of language, control/monitoring. | "Nor do I think it is desirable to develop a control-and-surveillance culture at universities and colleges"

 "Make provisions for the UC sector to learn and collaborate with other public and private community actors who have experience with similar prevention efforts, such as primary schools, police or different religious communities

 "Establish a separate button or tab to sikresiden.no, where advice and guidelines are provided on how to deal with a concern or uncertainty". | "…We would expect active engagement from senior management of the university (…) with other partners including police and BIS regional higher and further education Prevent co-ordinators."

 "The Secretary of State will appoint an appropriate body to assess the bodies´ compliance with the Prevent Duty" |