The battle of the sexes when the future is important
Original version
Hausken, K. (2005) The battle of the sexes when the future is important. Economics Letters, 87(1), 89-93 10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.006Abstract
Contrary to the widespread belief that game repetition induces conciliatory behavior, in a repeated battle of the sexes where player 1 values the future and player 2 is myopic, player 1 is more inclined through conflicting behavior to risk a conflict in the present when the future is important, and/or there are many periods left in the game.
Description
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01651765. Reprinted from Economics Letters, 87/1, Kjell Hausken, The battle of the sexes when the future is important. Pages No. 89-93, Copyright (2005), with permission from Elsevier.