Production and conflict models versus rent-seeking models
Journal article, Peer reviewed
Permanent lenke
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/184359Utgivelsesdato
2005-04Metadata
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Originalversjon
Hausken, K. (2005) Production and conflict models versus rent-seeking models. Public Choice, 123(1-2), 59-93 10.1007/s11127-005-1717-3Sammendrag
Aproduction and conflict (P&C) model and a rent-seeking (RS) model are compared
for one group, two groups and K groups. Adding a newagent enlarges the pie in the P&C model,
but causes the fixed size pie to be allocated on one more rent seeker in the RS model. The total
production or rent is distributed within and between groups according to the within-group and
between-group decisiveness. Productive and fighting efficiencies and group sizes play a role.
The collective action problem is more severe for the RS model. As group size increases, the
ratio of within-group to between-group fighting increases marginally toward a constant for the
P&C model, while it increases convexly for the RS model. Adding an additional agent to each
of two groups is more detrimental to the utilities in RS groups than in P&C groups, while adding
a second group of agents when there is already one group of agents gives the reverse result. The
severe between-group fighting in the P&C model for many groups causes the P&C model to be
preferable for few groups, while the RS model is preferable for many groups. Applications are
considered to intergroup migration, inside versus outside ownership, divestitures, mergers and
acquisitions, multidivisional versus single-tier firms and U form versus M form of economic
organization.
Beskrivelse
The final publication is available at link.springer.com.