"United Nations Security Management System and Staff Safety in Humanitarian Operations"

What is the United Nations Security Management System, and how does it unfold in the humanitarian operations in Dadaab, Kenya?

Leikny Bakke Lie
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University of Stavanger
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Leikny Bakke Lie
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Summary

Over the course of the last 10 years, the humanitarian sector as a whole has increasingly become a target, as both frequency and brutality in violent attacks on humanitarian staff has increased steeply. With the terrorist attack on United Nations (UN) Headquarters in Baghdad in 2003, the threat to the United Nations became evident, and the organization saw the need to strengthen and unify their security management system in order to provide adequate security to the staff working in UN-led humanitarian operations.

The purpose of this thesis has been to take a closer look at the United Nations Security Management System developed to ensure staff safety in humanitarian operations, and to study how this security system unfolds in the humanitarian operations in Dadaab, Kenya.

The theoretical foundation for this thesis describes how latent conditions can accumulate within an organization and eventually, when combined with other preconditions such as active failures conducted by staff in the sharp end of the organization, it could result in an organizational accident. All organizations will operate with a set of cultural beliefs and an understanding of how the world is thought to work. These are either formally laid down in written rules and standards, or informally strengthened through a shared culture within the organization. However, in all organizations a gap will develop between its cultural beliefs on how the world is thought to work, and how it actually works. This gap contributes to the degree of vulnerability within the organization, with the possible outcome of a disaster represented by a cultural collapse due to a failure to adapt the culturally accepted beliefs to the actual context. Based on this theoretical framework, I look at how the UN perceive the world in relation to staff safety, as formally laid down in the UN security management system, and how the world really works, by looking at how the security management system unfolds in the humanitarian operations in Dadaab.

My research is based on fieldwork conducted in Dadaab, Kenya, through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR. Here I carried out several interviews with relevant informants, as well as observations during my stay. In order to understand the topic of staff safety and acquire an overview of how the UN security management system is thought to work according to frameworks and standards, I also conducted literature studies.

This method was useful in terms of prepare my self for the fieldwork, as well as to be able to recognize the elements of the UN security management system implemented in Dadaab.

The most important findings from my study suggests that there appear to have developed a gap between how the UN security management system perceives the context and threats in Dadaab, through its formal requirements and procedures, and how the system is unfolded in the real context. This possible divergent image is revealed through empirical findings that suggest that staff members, both with UNHCR and implementing partners, violate the requirements determined in the UN security management system, as they are perceived to be inadequate to the context of Dadaab. If discrepant events that are at odds with the organization's picture of the world are allowed to develop and accumulate unnoticed, it could open up to the possible cultural collapse resulting in an organizational accident.

Acronyms

ASC	Area Security Coordinator
ASMT	Area Security Management Team
AWSD	Aid Worker Security Database
DO	Designated Official
G4S	Group 4 Securicor
GIZ	German International Cooperation
HF radio	High Frequency radio
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IP	Implementing partner
IRC	International Rescue Committee
LWF	The Lutheran World Federation
MOSS	Minimum Operating Security Standards
MSF	Médecins sans Frontières
NCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
SMT	Security Management Team
SRA	Security Risk Assessment
SRM	Security Risk Management
UHF radio	Ultra High Frequency Radio
UN	United Nations
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
VHF radio	Very High Frequency Radio
WFP	World Food Programme

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1. Introduction

> *"The goal of the United Nations security management system is to facilitate the effective and efficient conduct of its programmes and activities while ensuring the safety, security and well-being of staff as a high priority"* (UN 2004a: 12).

Providing humanitarian assistance in environments of conflict has always been both dangerous and difficult (Egeland et al. 2011). The humanitarian organizations are operating in places that often are remote, usually difficult, and very often dangerous. These places are where the conflicts are and where natural disasters happen, and thus where the need for humanitarian assistance is most pressing (Holmes 2010a). Over the course of the last 10 years, reports show that the humanitarian sector as a whole increasingly has become a target, with an increase in frequency and brutality in violent attacks on humanitarian personnel (Stoddard et al. 2006; NRC 2009; Holmes 2010b). Since 1997, the absolute number of major acts of violence committed against humanitarian workers have nearly doubled each year, and according to the Humanitarian Policy Group (Stoddard et al. 2009), the global trend in violence against humanitarian workers show that the absolute number of attacks has risen steeply over the past three years, from 2006 to 2009, with an annual average almost three times higher than the previous nine years. The relative rates of attacks per number of humanitarian workers in the field have increased by 61 %, and the 2008 fatality rate for international humanitarian workers exceeded that of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping troops. In 2008 and 2009, two of the deadliest years yet for humanitarian staff, more than 100 humanitarian staff members were killed each year (Stoddard et al. 2009).

In the recent years the largest numbers of violent attacks on humanitarian workers has however been concentrated in a few countries representing some of the most difficult and volatile operating environments, while attacks on humanitarian staff elsewhere actually have been declining. This trend might imply that improved security awareness and management may have had positive implications in staggering an increasing trend of attacks on humanitarian workers (Stoddard et al. 2006; Egeland et al. 2011). However, looking at the countries with the highest incidence-occurrence; Sudan, Afghanistan, and Somalia, the increasing trend here highlight the lack of viable options to keep staff secure in the most volatile contexts where humanitarian aid is indeed most needed.

Some implications of the level of insecurity are that the humanitarian organizations can choose to pull out of the area entirely, or implement remote programming strategies such as remote managing. With remote management, the organizations work at an arm's length through local staff or local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) by delegating responsibilities and decision-making abilities to national staff (Rogers 2006; Stoddard et al. 2006; NRC 2009; Duffield 2010). The principle is that local actors are able to maintain a presence at a reduced level of risk than that faced by international staff, due to their assumed knowledge of local conditions and greater acceptance within the local community (Stoddard et al. 2006).

Increased violence against humanitarian workers and the subsequent degradation of access to beneficiaries are compromising the quantity and quality of assistance given to those that are in most need (Stoddard et al. 2006). Especially in high-risk areas, it becomes necessary to balance the primary goal of giving assistance with providing security for the humanitarian staff, which in turn emphasizes the importance of implementing a proper security system in the organization that can ensure that these two goals are met (Stoddard et al. 2006).

In the humanitarian operations in Dadaab, Kenya, located about 80 km from the Somali border, there is a direct effect of insecurity in Somalia for the humanitarian operations in the area (IRIN News 2010). According to the Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD)[1], there has been a series of attacks on humanitarian workers in Kenya in the last couple of years. In 2010, a Canadian aid worker from an international non-governmental organization was kidnapped and held for ransom, and in 2009 alone there were 4 incidents of attacks on humanitarian workers in Kenya (IRIN News 2010). As mentioned earlier, Somalia is one of the countries with the highest incidence-occurrence, and with the apparent spillover-effect in the humanitarian operations in Kenya, it becomes important to find viable options to keen the staff secure in Dadaab while at the same time avoid compromising the humanitarian assistance (Stoddard et al. 2006; IRIN News 2010).

The purpose of this thesis is to take a closer look at the United Nations' (UN) Security Management System developed to ensure staff safety in humanitarian operations, and to study how this security system unfolds in the humanitarian operations in Dadaab, Kenya.

[1] http://www.aidworkersecurity.org/

1.1 Research question

What is the United Nations Security Management System, and how does it unfold in the humanitarian operations in Dadaab, Kenya?

1.2 Limitations

The first part of my study gives a presentation of the UN security management system in general, and how it is thought to work through the presentation of frameworks, standards and procedures. In order to understand how the security management system unfolds in the field, it is necessary to understand how the system is thought to work. The second part of my thesis narrows the study down to the context of Dadaab refugee operations in Kenya, looking at how the security management system is implemented there.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as the leader of the humanitarian operations in Dadaab, represents the United Nations in my study. Though most humanitarian organizations have their own security management systems in place when operating in the field, this study has been limited to focusing solely on that of the UN, as they are perceived as the umbrella for security in Dadaab.

As the operations in Dadaab are that of humanitarian operations, staff safety in relation to peacekeeping operations is excluded. The study focuses on solely on staff safety, thus excluding the issue of refugee safety. In order to limit my study, 'staff safety' here is related to physical violence and threats of violence, thus excluding the threat of psychological stress.

1.3 Related studies

The last decade, in correlation to the trend of increased violent attacks on humanitarian workers, several relevant studies on the topic of humanitarian workers' safety and security in high-risk environments have been published, and in 2005 the Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD) was established. This database records major incidents of violence against aid workers, from 1997 to present, and thus provides a qualitative evidence base for analysis of the changing security environment for civilian aid operations. Statistics gathered by the AWSD was used as the basis of a major study by the Humanitarian Policy Group in collaboration with the Overseas Development Institute and the Center on International

Cooperation, published in September 2006; *Providing aid in insecure environments: trends in policy and operations* (Stoddard et al. 2006), as well as the update article in 2009; *Providing aid in insecure environments: 2009 Update. Trends in violence against aid workers and the operational response* (Stoddard et al. 2009).

Other relevant publications related to the topic of staff safety are the Humanitarian Practice Network's Good Practice Review nr. 8 published in 2000 and revised in 2010, *Operational security management in violent environments (Van Brabant 2000; Van Brabant et al. 2010)*, the report *To Stay and Deliver: Good practice for humanitarians in complex security environments* by Jan Egeland, Adele Harmer and Abby Stoddard (Egeland et al. 2011), as well as UN handbooks and reports such as United Nations *Field Security Handbook* (UN 2006), UNHCR *Handbook for Emergencies* (UNHCR 2007), *Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of the UN personnel in Iraq* (Ahtisaari et al. 2003) and the report from the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly; *Strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations* (UN 2004a).

2. Context: Dadaab, Kenya.

My fieldwork took place in the small town of Dadaab in the North Eastern Province in Kenya, located approximately 80 kilometer from the Somali border (UNHCR 2011a). The refugee complex, often referred to as Dadaab Refugee Camps, was established in Dadaab in 1991, in response to a large influx of refugees from Somalia (CARE 2011). In 1991, The overthrowing of the President in Somalia, Siad Barre, led the country into a state of lawlessness and clan warfare, as various groupings of Somali factions sought to control the national territory. Even in the years prior to the collapse of the Barre-regime, armed opposition had caused hundreds of thousands of Somalis to flee their homes, to neighboring Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya (Bariagaber 2006; Anderson 2009; U.S. Department of State 2011; BBC 2011). Today, drought combined with continuing armed conflict in Somalia continues to contribute to the influx of Somali refugees to Kenya and the Dadaab refugee camps (IRIN News 2011).



Map 1: Dadaab Refugee Camp is located near the border of Somalia. Source: UNHCR.org

2.1 Dadaab Refugee Camps

Dadaab Refugee Camp is located in and around the town of Dadaab, and with an overall population of 344,401[2] refugees it is currently the biggest refugee complex in the world (UNHCR 2011a). As mentioned, a large majority of the refugees in Dadaab are from Somalia, and as of 31st of January there were 295,806 Somali refugees, 16,392 Ethiopian refugees, 801 Sudanese refugees, and 310 were refugees from other countries (Appendix 1).

The High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) leads the refugee operations in Dadaab, as the UNHCR is mandated to lead and coordinate international action for the worldwide protection of refugees and the resolution of refugee problems (UNHCR 2009). In addition to UNHCR, 17 implementing partners (IPs), five operational partners, two governmental partners and the Kenyan police are also operating in the area. The core mandate of UNHCR, the operational partners, and the implementing partners in Dadaab is the protection and assistance of the refugees (for full list of partners and their main areas of responsibility, see appendix 2). The implementing partners are funded by UNHCR to implement programs and activities in the refugee camps.

The refugee complex consists of a main compound in Dadaab village and three refugee camps located outside of Dadaab; Ifo, Hagadera and Dagahaley (LWF 2009). Ifo and Dagahaley are located to the north of Dadaab, about 5km and 17 km respectively, and Hagadera is located about 13 km to the south of Dadaab main compound, as illustrated in map 2 on page 7 (Chilla 2011). The UNHCR, and most of the IPs, have a Sub-Office located in the UNHCR main compound in Dadaab village, and a Field Office located in each of the three camps. The Field Offices are located in safe compounds just at the outskirts of each of the camps (see Appendix 3 for a detailed map over each of the three refugee camps and the location of the Field Offices). All UNHCR staff lives in the main compound, while a large majority of the IPs also has staff located and living in Field Offices.

Each of the camps, originally dimensioned to host up to 30,000 refugees, now holds almost 100,000 refugees on a total camp area of 50 km^2 (UNHCR 2011b). All three camps continue to receive a significant number of new arrivals, on average around 2,000 per week. A total of 39,015 individuals have been registered since the start of this year (UNHCR 2011a). Due to

[2] Stand: 1 May 2011

this enormous and continuous influx of refugees, resources and infrastructure of the camps have been stretched beyond their capacity, compromising the quality and quantity of service delivery (UNHCR 2011a).



Map 2. Source: UNHCR (For a bigger version of the map see appendix 4).

The Lutheran World Federation (LWF), as one of the implementing partners operating in Dadaab, is responsible for overall camp management in Dadaab. This includes implementation of camp planning and layout, reception and assistance to new arrivals, community policing, and promotion of community self-management (LWF 2009). Since 2008, the LWF has stopped allocating new arrivals with residential plots of land, due to lack

of available space in all three camps. The majority of the refugees are then forced to settle outside the designated camp areas, on flood-prone land that belongs to the host community (UNHCR 2011a). Numbers from February 2011 show that about 16,000 refugees lived outside the designated camp areas: 7,000 refugees had settled outside Dagahaley, 5,000 refugees outside Hagadera, and 4,000 refugees outside Ifo (UNHCR 2011c).[3]

Ifo 2, an extension of Ifo, is currently under development and is designed to host up to 40,000 refugees (UNHCR 2011b). As the refugees living outside the camp designated areas are subject to heightened vulnerability, these were selected as a priority for relocation to the extension of Ifo. All necessary preparations were made for the relocation from Dagahaley to Ifo 2 for November 2nd 2010; however, the Government of Kenya stopped this envisaged relocation (UNHCR 2011c). In addition, the Government of Kenya ordered the UNHCR to suspend all construction work in Ifo 2 on the 22nd of January 2011. UNHCR is currently negotiating for possible solutions with the local, regional and national government levels (UNHCR 2011c). The reason for the stop-work order issued by Kenyan Government is that the central government's security authorities insist that the new camp should be of a strictly temporary nature to avoid attracting more refugees, while the host community leaders demand that the refugee accommodation should be properly constructed from long-lasting materials to avoid environmental degradation (UNHCR 2011a).

2.2 The security situation in Dadaab

Frequent fighting on the Somali side of the border has characterized the period of November 2010 and March 2011 (UNHCR 2011a). Fighting in south and central Somalia between government forces and the Al-Shabaab[4] militia has displaced about 33,000 people during the months of February and March of 2011 (UNHCR 2011d). The unrest has resulted in tensions in the area, increased presence of Kenyan troops and police, and clashes between the Somali extremists and Kenyan security forces. Evidence point to Somali factions using camps as rest facilities, raising the concern that under-occupied refugee youths could be recruited by armed groups (UNHCR 2011a).

Other security-related issues include banditry, low-level crime in the camps due to insufficient provision for law and order, intimidation of aid staff, civil disturbances, and the

[3] Stand: LWF, February 2011

[4] A group of violent Islamist guerrillas (Anderson:2009).

occasional kidnapping-threat from Al-Shabaab towards international staff. Non-political banditry occurs frequently in the area, but this has not directly affected humanitarian agencies for two years, mainly due to strict security measures (UNHCR 2011a). Greater efforts by the aid agencies to engage the local population in projects and a more cohesive approach in resisting intimidation may have contributed to the apparent decline in attempts by the local community to intimidate aid agency staff into misappropriation of humanitarian resources or award contracts and jobs to unqualified persons supported by the local leaders (UNHCR 2011a). Some civil disturbance has occurred in the camps, often as a result of misinformation spread by individuals intending to manipulate trouble against certain agencies (UNHCR 2011a).

Due to the context and the current security situation in Dadaab with the threat of kidnapping humanitarian staff, there is an apparent need for a functional UN security management system in order to deal with threats to the safety of staff operating in the area.

3. Theory

The following theoretical framework was selected in order to enhance my understanding of how implemented formal procedures unfolds on a field level, and as such to form the basis for the analysis of my research question. The starting point of the theoretical perspective is that organizations will develop divergent images between the world as it is thought to work and the world as it is, which will have implications for how the formal procedures and standards implemented in an organization will unfold on a field level. Thus, the following theoretical framework laid the foundation for my ability to understand how the United Nations Security Management System unfolded in the context of the humanitarian operations in Dadaab, Kenya.

3.1 Defining disaster

Over the last couple of decades, the discussion of defining disaster have moved from merely writing it off as an Act of God, to viewing it as Acts of Society (Dynes 1993; Turner & Pidgeon 1997; Pidgeon & O'Leary 2000; Quarantelli 2000; Rosenthal et al 2001). The perception of disasters have thus moved from a fatalistic view where disasters were unavoidable, to perceiving disasters as the direct and indirect result of human action, meaning that it could in fact be prevented or its negative effects reduced or mitigated (Dynes 1993; Quarantelli 2000). The focus has thus shifted towards the causes and consequences of disasters, and in order to understand disaster one must understand both the causes and the consequences of these events (Rosenthal et al. 2001).

The word 'disaster' holds a multitude of meanings and definitions. Pelanda (1981) defined disaster as a manifestation of the social vulnerability of society (Quarantelli 2000). He claimed that disasters occur when one or more of the sociocultural systems that the society depends on fail to adapt to the environmental conditions which surrounds it, or when one of these systems produces an event that threatens the population. This understanding emphasizes the relationship between human systems and the environmental conditions to which they are related as adaptive devices. Turner & Pidgeon (1997) presents a similar definition, viewing disaster as a significant disruption or collapse of the existing cultural beliefs and norms about hazards; *"[…] an event, concentrated in time and space, which threatens a society or a relatively self-sufficient subdivision of a society with major unwanted consequences as a result of the collapse of precautions which had hitherto been culturally accepted as adequate"* (Turner & Pidgeon 1997:70). Both definitions perceive disaster as the result of a

divergence between the culturally accepted understanding of the world and how it really is. A disaster can thus be perceived as a cultural collapse due to a failure to adapt the accepted norms and beliefs to the actual context (Turner & Pidgeon 1997).

3.2 The incubation of disasters

In order to talk about a collapse in accepted beliefs about the world, one must have a notionally normal starting point where such beliefs about the world and potential hazards are sufficiently accurate to enable an organization to survive successfully (Turner & Pidgeon 1997). At this 'normal' starting point, the organization develops culturally accepted beliefs about the world, and associated precautionary norms are established formally in laws and codes of practice or informally through customs or common practice (Pidgeon & O'Leary 2000). At some point during this stage, a chain of discrepant events, or several chains of discrepant events, that are at odds with the organization's picture of the world, will develop and accumulate unnoticed over a period of time referred to as the 'incubation period'. The result is the emergence of a gap between the organizations beliefs on how the world is operating and how it really operates (Turner & Pidgeon 1997).

All organizations operate with a set of cultural beliefs and norms, which may either be formally laid down in written rules and procedures or embedded within working practices in an informal manner, or a combination of both (Pidgeon & O'Leary 2000). And in all organizations, one will be able to find a gap between the values, assumptions and attitudes that is expressed, and the actual behavior (Olsen & Nævestad 2006). Theories on learning refer to this gap as theories of action (Argyris & Schön 1974). According to theories of action, humans are designers of action in order to achieve intended consequences, and monitor to learn if their actions are effective. People hold maps in their heads about how to plan, implement and review their actions, but are rarely are aware that the maps that they use in order to take actions are not the theories they explicitly espouse (Argyris & Schön 1974). This implies that there is a difference between what people say and what they do, better explained as Espoused theory and Theory-in-use. Espoused theory of action is based on the theory that people report as a basis for their action, the worldview and values that they believe that their behavior is based on. Theory-in-use is the theory of action inferred from how people actually behave, the worldview and values that are implied by their actual behavior (Argyris & Schön 1974). Because people may be unaware of the actual worldview and values their behavior is based on, discrepant events may develop unnoticed.

The larger the gap between the world as imagined and the world as it is, the more vulnerable the organization is, because the gap opens up to the accumulation of unintended and complex interactions between contributory preconditions (Pidgeon & O'Leary 2000; Dekker & Suparamaniam 2005). This can in turn result in what Reason (1997) refers to as organizational accidents.

3.2.1 Organizational accidents

Organizational accidents are accidents that happen to organizations. More specifically, such accidents are events that occur within complex modern technologies, and though they are relatively rare they are often catastrophic in terms of consequences (Reason 1997). Organizational accidents have multiple causes involving many people operating at different levels within the organization, and may have devastating effects on uninvolved populations, assets and the environment (Reason 1997).

To avoid accidents or disasters, an organization will set up defenses and safeguards, in order to separate hazards from vulnerable people or assets to avoid losses to the organization (Reason 1997). An organizational accident thus involves the breaching of such barriers. In an ideal world these defenses and safeguards will consist of intact defensive layers in depth, but in the real world the layers will have weaknesses and gaps in them, as illustrated in figure 1 (Reason 1997).



Figure 1: The ideal and the reality for defenses-in-depth (Reason 1997).

The holes in the layers are not static but in constant flux influenced by local conditions, and even though organizational accidents may be accidental in the way in which various contributing factors combine to cause adverse outcomes, there is nothing accidental about the existence of these precursors or the conditions that created them (Reason 1997). Human decisions and actions are implicated in all organizational accidents, and people contribute to the breakdown of systems in two ways: through active failures and latent conditions (Reason 1997).

Active failures

Active failures are unsafe acts such as errors and violations committed by personnel at the 'sharp end' of the system (Reason 1997). The 'sharp end' is where personnel are operating close to the possible disaster. In example, in this thesis this would be personnel stationed in the field. Active failures are the most obvious way of human contribution to organizational accidents, as they are likely to have a direct impact on the safety of the system (Reason 1997). The effects of active failures are often immediate and with short-lived effects, and have a tendency to be unique to a specific event. Active failures are perceived more as consequences than as principal causes of accidents, implying that there are more underlying causes behind such unsafe acts (Reason 1997). People can make errors or violate procedures for number of reasons that often goes beyond the scope of individual psychology. Reason (1997) explains this as the result of latent conditions.

Latent conditions

Where the active failures are made at the 'sharp end', latent conditions are created at the 'blunt end' (Reason 1997). The 'blunt end' is found higher up in the hierarchy, both at strategic and national levels of the organization. Latent conditions are local factors and conditions that are created through the normal processes of organizational management, politics and power distribution and top-level decisions made by governments, regulators, designers, organizational managers and the likes (Reason 1997). Decisions made at the blunt end can create local factors that promote errors, violations and shortcuts. Examples of such latent conditions are for instance poor design, gaps in supervision, undetected manufacturing defects or maintenance failures, unworkable procedures, clumsy automation, shortfalls in training, less than adequate tools and equipment, among other things (Reason 1997).

Latent conditions may be present in an organization for many years before they combine with local circumstances and active failures and penetrates the layers of defenses implemented in the system, resulting in an organizational accident (Reason 1997). Where active failures tend to be tied to specific events, latent conditions can contribute to a number of discrepant events that are not necessarily directly linked to the disaster that actually happens (Reason 1997; Turner & Pidgeon 1997). Latent conditions can also increase the likelihood of active failures, and could also lead to aggravated consequences of unsafe acts (Reason 1997). The impact of decisions made at the 'blunt end' spreads throughout the organization, shaping a distinctive corporate culture and creating error-producing factors within the individual workplaces (Reason 1997).

Safety culture as constructor of beliefs on danger and safety

Both culture and institutional design are positioned at the core of the safety question (Pidgeon & O'Leary 2000). A culture is here viewed *"in terms of the exploration of meaning, and the symbols and systems of meaning through which a given group understands the world"* (Pidgeon & O 'Leary 2000:18). A safety culture will then be about the set of assumptions and their associated practices that permit the construction of beliefs about danger and safety (Pidgeon & O'Leary 2000). According to Pidgeon & O'Leary (2000), a 'good' safety culture can both be reflected and promoted by particularly four facets:

1. *Senior management commitment* to safety;
2. *Shared care and concern* for hazards and a *solicitude* over their impacts upon people;
3. Realistic and flexible *norms and rules* about hazards; and
4. Continual *reflection upon practice* through monitoring, analysis and feedback systems (organizational learning) (Pidgeon & O'Leary 2000:18).

Institutional design and decisions will create error-producing factors within the workplace, latent conditions, and a shared culture within the organization may contribute to the preservation of such factors (Reason 1997). The safety culture in an organization will in itself be created and recreated through its members, as they repeatedly behave and communicate in ways natural, obvious and unquestionable to them. Through this, the safety culture will construct a particular version of risk, danger and safety, shared by its members (Reason 1997).

Active failures and latent conditions as contributors to organizational accidents

Because latent conditions are an inevitable product of strategic decisions, they cannot be eliminated altogether. In order to deal with latent conditions, one must make them visible to those who manage and operate the organization, in order for them to be corrected (Reason 1997). An organizational accident is the result of a rare conjunction of a set of holes in successive defenses, allowing hazards to come into contact with critical assets and people, resulting in losses for the organization, illustrated by figure 2:



Figure 2: An accident trajectory passing through corresponding holes in the layers of defenses, barriers and safeguards (Reason 1997).

Active failures can create holes in the defenses through sharp-end mistakes made by front-line personnel either deliberately disabling certain defenses in order to achieve their objectives, or unwittingly fail in their role as one of the most important lines of defense in the system (Reason 1997). A common failure is wrong diagnosis of an abnormal situation made by front-line personnel, resulting in an inappropriate course of subsequent actions (Reason 1997).

It is impossible to foresee all scenarios possibly leading to a disaster, thus it is inevitable that some defensive weaknesses will be present from the beginning, or will accumulate unnoticed or uncorrected (Reason 1997). Latent conditions are present in all systems, and as such an inevitable part of organizational life (Reason 1997). The build-up of latent conditions is a result of one of two categories: the discrepant events are (1) not known to anyone, or (2) known but not fully understood by all concerned (Turner & Pidgeon 1997). Accumulation of latent conditions is thus accompanied by a collective failure of organizational cognition and 'intelligence', referred to as failure of foresight (Turner & Pidgeon 1997; Pidgeon & O'Leary 2000).

3.2.2 Failures of foresight

Discrepant events are able to accumulate either unnoticed or not fully appreciated or understood because they are either unnoticed because of erroneous assumptions on the part of those who might have noticed them, due to information handling difficulties or a cultural lag in precautions, or because those concerned were reluctant to take notice of events (Turner & Pidgeon 1997; Pidgeon & O'Leary 2000).

Events are unnoticed because of erroneous assumptions

Events are allowed to accumulate because they are either unnoticed or their significance is misunderstood. Erroneous assumptions are made, possibly as a result of institutional rigidities of belief and perception, or because of decoy problems, where one problem act as a decoy attracting attention away from another more serious problem. Dismissing complaints of danger from non-experts outside that particular organization as a result of an erroneous assumption that they are uninformed and disregarded as alarmists, can also allow for dangerous misperceptions to develop (Turner & Pidgeon 1997). Unnoticed or misunderstood events can lead to a selective problem representation at the level of the organization as a whole, which in turn structures the interpretations and decisions of the organization's individual members. Such a selective representation may arise through organizational rigidity of beliefs regarding what is or what is not to be counted as a hazard (Pidgeon & O'Leary 2000). Due to rigidity of beliefs or attention to decoy phenomenon, significant warnings of an incubating failure are more likely to be interpreted inappropriately, or when coming from outside the organization, brushed aside and ignored completely (Pidgeon & O'Leary 2000).

Events are unnoticed or misunderstood because of information handling difficulties in complex situations

Discrepant events are unnoticed or misunderstood due to inherent difficulties of handling information in ill-structured and constantly changing situations. Large organizations with its many tasks will generate a large number of messages within the organization, and as such it is more likely to generate opportunities for failures of communication to develop than tasks that are handled wholly within a smaller organization. Similarly, the likelihood of communication failures is larger when a task is to be handled by several organizations rather than within a single organization (Turner & Pidgeon 1997; Pidgeon & O'Leary 2000). Handling and processing information is thus a complex situation, where a number of parties handling a

problem are unable to obtain precisely the same information about the problem, so that many differing interpretations of the situation exists, a concept coined *variable disjunction of information* by Barry Turner (Turner & Pidgeon 1997). Poor communications endemic to both internal workings of large organizations and across organizational boundaries are likely to reinforce variable disjunction of information, and ambiguous orders, vaguely drawn responsibilities, and shifting goals will further compound the information handling difficulties during the incubation period (Turner & Pidgeon 1997; Pidgeon & O'Leary 2000).

Events pass unnoticed due to cultural lag in existing precautions

When formal precautions are not fully up-to-date or inapplicable to the case in hand, due to a cultural lag where existing precautions has not yet been updated, uncertainty may arise about how to deal with formal violations of safety regulations. Where regulations are ambiguous, in conflict with other goals such as the needs of production, or thought to be outdated, violations might occur, thus allowing for discrepant events to pass unnoticed. In such cases, violations of formal rules and regulations may come to be accepted as normal (Turner & Pidgeon 1997; Pidgeon & O'Leary 2000).

Events unnoticed or misunderstood due to a reluctance to fear the worst

Events that offer warnings of approaching danger pass unnoticed, or are misunderstood due to a reluctance to fear the worst outcome. Even when clear-cut information or signals warning of impending danger appear, those involved may show a tendency to minimize or deny the danger. This delays preventative action, and thus may worsen the outcome (Turner & Pidgeon 1997; Pidgeon & O'Leary 2000).

Failures of foresight within an organization may contribute to the development of directives and instructions that Clarke (1999) refers to as *fantasy documents,* which is documents that does not reflect the actual situation and reasonable measures to be taken in case of adverse events. If documents describing procedures, standards or rules fail to reflect the reality, it could open up to violations and shortcuts in order to adjust the action to fit the actual situation.

3.2.3 Violations of requirements and standards

Within an organization, there will always develop a tension between the natural variability of human behavior and the system's need for a high degree of regularity in the activities of its

members. Most commonly through written procedures, managers of organizations seek to restrict human action to pathways that are both efficient and productive, and safe. However, procedures to enhance productive action are in many ways different from procedures to enhance safe action. Whereas procedures designed to enhance efficiency, tend to arise rather naturally from the nature of the equipment and task to be performed, procedures designed to enhance safe operations are constantly adjusted to prohibit actions that have been associated with recent accidents or incidents (Reason 1997). Adding more and more layers cause the set of rules to become increasingly restrictive, often resulting in a reduction in the range of permitted actions to far less than those necessary in order to get the job done under anything but optimal conditions, as illustrated in figure 3:



Figure 3. How necessary additional safety procedures reduce the scope of action required to perform tasks effectively (Reason 1997: 50).

The shrinkage of allowable space for action is eventually reduced to a range that is less than required to perform all the necessary tasks, and in the end the only way to do the job is to violate the procedures, either routinely or on those occasions when operational necessity demands it (Reason 1997). Violations, in turn, could both increase the probability of a later error and the likelihood that it will have a bad outcome (Reason 1997).

Violation can be defined as deliberate or erroneous deviations from safe operating procedures, standards or rules, however here the focus will be on the former, where the actions, though not the possible adverse outcomes, are intended (Reason 1997). Safety violations can be divided into three major categories:

- Routine violations
- Optimizing violations
- Necessary violations

All three types of violations are shaped by both organizational and individual factors (Reason 1997). Routine violations involve taking the path of least effort between two task-related points, and such short cuts can develop into habits if the work environment rarely sanctions violations or reward compliance. Routine-violations are also promoted by procedures that direct action toward what may be perceived as a pathway that is longer than necessary in order to get the job done. Optimizing violations is seen as conducting violations just for the thrill of it, and underlines that not all motivational goals for human actions are related to the functional aspects of the task (Reason 1997).

Necessary violations are not linked to the attainment of personal goals in a clear manner, as is the case with routine and optimizing violations. Necessary violations originate from particular work situations, and non-compliance is perceived as essential in order to get the job done (Reason 1997). This type of violations are often provoked by organizational failings with regards to the site, tools or equipment, and can also provide an easier way of working. These two factors can further lead to such violations becoming routine rather than an exception to the rule (Reason 1997). Where violations are becoming routine, one could say that there has been a practical drift, or *"a slow, steady uncoupling of local practice from written procedure"* (Snook 2000: 194). The development of practical drift could possibly lead to variable disjunction of information discussed in section 3.2.2, resulting in many differing interpretations of the situation within one organization (Turner & Pidgeon 1997). But practical drift could also make performance more reliable by contributing to the development of necessary slack within the organization, through stable processes of cognitions combined with routines that are open to variation (Weick et al. 1999). According to Weick et al (1999), by separating variation and stability within an organization, the stable cognitive processes will "detect" unexpected events, while the variable patterns of activity and routines will "adapt" or respond to such events (Weick et al. 1999). He refers to this as 'requisite variety', and the idea is that the larger the variety of actions one has available, the more variety in the environment one will be able to interpret and respond to. This way, requisite variety could prove useful in understanding a phenomenon and generate a reliable foundation for making decisions (Kruke & Olsen 2012). However, this is only applicable as long as it is based on the current situation in the emergency area (Kruke & Olsen 2012).

Through requisite variety, practical drift could possibly contribute to increasing an organization's ability to understand of a phenomenon, if this requisite variety contributes to a

more correct awareness of the situation, known as cognizance. This is an important element in the organizational engine that steers the organization towards a more resistant position within the safety space.

3.3 Navigating the safety space

The safety space is a notional space illustrating an organization's current position between resistance and vulnerability (Reason 1997), illustrated by figure 4:



Figure 4: The Safety Space. The positions of the organizations within the space are determined by their intrinsic resistance or vulnerability to their operating hazards (Reason 1997:111).

Organizations that find them selves to the far left are resistant, while organizations positioned to the far right are extremely vulnerable. Most organizations will find themselves somewhere in the middle between resistance and vulnerability, and an organization's position is determined by the extent and integrity of the defenses in place at any one point in time (Reason 1997). However, safety is not absolute, and very few organizations are set in fixed positions within the safety space. An organization can be actively driven towards the resistant end by implementing effective safety measures, or it can be allowed to drift towards the vulnerable end in a passive manner (Reason 1997). The closer an organization drift towards the unsafe or vulnerable end, the more likely it will be to suffer accidents, which may serve as an incentive to implement enhanced safety measures. Closer to the safe or resistant end, other forces will be at play and the gain from safety initiatives will diminish (Reason 1997). A false feeling of safety will eventually divert the organization's attention and resources towards production goals rather than safety. This, in turn, will allow the organization to passively drift towards the vulnerable end (Reason 1997).

In order to reach a desired position and stay there, an organization needs an internal 'engine' to drive the organization in the right direction, and 'navigational aids' to plot their progress (Reason 1997). The safety engine is based on three driving forces:

- Commitment
- Competence
- Cognizance

Commitment

Commitment is based on motivation and resources. In order to motivate, an organization should seek to be the domain model for good safety practices, on all levels of the organization. This implies that the safety culture is important in order to achieve high levels of commitment, as discussed in section 3.2.1 on safety culture (Reason 1997). Top management come and go, but a good safety culture endures beyond such changes in an organization and as such provides the driving force within the organization, regardless of its top leaders (Reason 1997).

In order to achieve an organization's safety goals, resources must also be properly allocated. This does not only imply monetary resources, but also the caliber and status of the people assigned to direct the management of system safety (Reason 1997).

Competence

Competence is closely related to the quality of an organization's safety information system. Technical competence is necessary in order to achieve the safety goals of an organization, in order to make sure that the safety information system collects and spread the right information, and that it acts upon it (Reason 1997).

Cognizance

Commitment and competence will not be sufficient unless the organization possess a correct awareness, cognizance, of the dangers that may threaten its operations (Reason 1997). Lack of a correct awareness of the dangers that threatens an organization may result in the development of failures of foresight and fantasy documents, presented in section 3.2.2. When the organization's cognizance does not reflect the reality, it may allow for discrepant events

that are at odds with the organization's understanding of the world to accumulate unnoticed, thus allowing the organization to drift towards the vulnerable end. This failure of foresight could eventually lead to a cultural collapse due to inadequacy or inaccuracy in the organization's accepted norms or beliefs, or what Turner & Pidgeon (1997) defines as a *disaster*.

3.4 Summary

According to this theoretical perspective on organizational accidents and man-made disasters, discrepant events that are at odds with the organization's image of how the world works will develop and accumulate unnoticed over a period of time. Such latent conditions are an inevitable part of all systems, and contribute to the construction, spreading and maintenance of differing versions of reality. This could lead to the development of error-producing factors within the individual workplace, which may contribute to the breakdown of a system. In order to regulate the human behavior by adding more layers will in turn make the system more restrictive and thus open for shortcuts and violations on regulations that are perceived to be inadequate or outdated in order to get the job done.

With this theoretical perspective as the point of departure, I could expect to find the following elements through my research:

- In all organizations, one will be able to find a gap between the values, assumptions and attitudes that is expressed and the actual behavior, thus I could expect to find differing versions of reality present within the UN security management system on how it is thought to work and how it actually unfolds in the field.
- Divergent images of how the UN security management system is thought to work and how it actually unfolds leave the security system vulnerable to violations and the accumulation of latent conditions within the UN security management system in Dadaab.

4. Scientific method

A scientific method describes a way of going about to gather empirical data in order to gain an understanding of how the world might look like. The scientific method serves as a tool for describing the world and gaining new knowledge, and any means that serve this purpose is a part of the arsenal of methods (Jacobsen 2005). But seeing as science and method is but an ideal, any actual quantitative or qualitative research will only be an approximation. In other words, one can never claim to know *exactly* how the world is, but one will be able to know *more* about it through the course of the research (King, Keohane & Verba 1994). This chapter presents the course of action and the selected tools used to describe the world and to achieve new knowledge on the topic of staff safety and the UN security management system.

4.1 Preconceptions

The fundamental idea in hermeneutics is that our understanding will always be based on certain conditions (Gilje & Grimen 1993). These conditions can be referred to as pre-opinions or pre-judgment, and may be perceived as prerequisites for understanding and sense making (Gadamer 1989). In other words, our understanding is tied to what we already know. Preconceptions are necessary in order to be able to isolate and understand the phenomena that are being studied (Gadamer 1989). Personal experiences influence the researcher, and based on the researcher's preconceptions, portions of the field of experience is classified and selected for closer attention. Without such preconditions the researcher would not know where to direct the attention (Weick 1988; Gadamer 1989; Gilje & Grimen 1993).

My preconceptions before entering the field were both contextual and academic. I was influenced by my academic studies, a theoretical overview of theories on organizational accidents, literature studies on the UN security management system and the context of Dadaab. My preparation for the fieldwork put me in a position where I risked coming into the field with a biased understanding where my findings could be dependent on my interest, biases and background (Patton 1990). Consequently, I also risked drawing conclusions based on my biases (Guba & Lincoln 1981). Ones own subjectivity must not be neglected, and thus some researchers argue that the researcher must seek to distance himself/herself from ones own concepts and knowledge in order to be able to see other actors' opinions and views (Hastrup & Ramløv 1988; Paulgaard 1997).

During my preparations for fieldwork, I came to develop some *a priori* understandings of the field. In example, I had made certain presumptions that the UN security management system

would be very restrictive upon operations, and that staff from both within UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) would be quite frustrated due to such restrictions. This may have created blind spots in terms of what I was looking for when I arrived in the field. However, during the fieldwork I found that my preconceptions turned out to be slightly wrong. Most of my informants seemed to recognize the necessity of having a security system in place, and parts of my preconceptions or pre-judgments had to be altered in the face of experience from the field.

4.2 Research Design

There are several different meanings to the concept of 'research design'. According to Yin, "*research design refers to the process that links research questions, empirical data and research conclusions*" (Yin 2003 in Blaikie 2009:39). As such, the research design functions like a logical plan for getting from here to there, from a set of questions to be answered to a set of conclusions to these questions (Yin 2003 in Blaikie 2009:39). A research design is normally based on answering three basic questions (Blaikie 2009):

- *What* will be studied
- *Why* will it be studied
- *How* will it be studied

In my research, the primary focus regarding *what* to study was the issue of staff safety in humanitarian operations. *Why* this theme was chosen as the subject of my study was due to personal interest, in combination with several reports on how the humanitarian organizations and their staff increasingly have become a legitimate target. *How* the UN security management system actually unfolds in the field, and how this system impacts the humanitarian operations on field level, was to be studied through a period of fieldwork in the refugee operations in Dadaab. However, *all* eventualities that can occur during the course of a research cannot be anticipated. Thus it is hard to achieve complete control of all aspects of the research (Blaikie 2009). I found this claim to be valid for my research: it was hard to obtain a full overview of the field from the outside, and as I had never previously conducted fieldwork or experienced the context of an UN-led humanitarian operation, certain aspects of *how* my research would be conducted when in the field were unclear in the beginning. Flexibility, patience and creativity are thus needed in order to handle unforeseen events, which I also got to experience first hand during the course of my fieldwork. Seeing as some of the aspects of

how to conduct my study were left unanswered, it left more room for adjusting the research in face of unforeseen events.

With the decision of conducting fieldwork in Dadaab came the subsequent decision of designing my research as a case study. A case study is a qualitative analysis of a particular case or event, understood as a case of a more general phenomenon, and it investigates the chosen case within its real-life context (Yin 1994; George & Bennett 2005). More specifically, for my research I chose an explorative, single case design of how the UN security management system unfolds in Dadaab and what the implications of this security system are. An explorative research design is valuable when the characteristics of the problem is unclear or when we have limited knowledge about the phenomenon central to the research, implying that many of the choices are made during the course of research as we gain new knowledge (Hellevik 1995). Security is a sensitive issue and I had some difficulties with acquiring important documents and knowledge about the UN security management system beforehand. Thus, a research design of explorative character was needed.

Yin (1994) divides case study into 'holistic' and 'embedded' designs, and these can be either single-case or multiple-case designs. A holistic case study investigates only one unit of analysis within the particular case or cases, while an embedded design investigates several units. In the latter, attention is also given to subunits. In my study, I have made use of the embedded approach. The refugee operations in Dadaab consist of several actors in addition to the UN. Even though the security and protection of humanitarian staff lies with the host government, the implementing partners (IP) perceive the UN as the provider of overall security in the area. Thus in order to study how the UN security management system unfolds in the field level, I found it reasonable to study how several units within the single case perceived this security system. The case then becomes the UN security management system implemented in Dadaab, and the units are UNHCR, implementing partners and the host government.

A research design based on a case study has a particular strength in its ability to deal with a full variety of data, ranging from documents, interviews and observations to artifacts (Yin 1994; Hellevik 1995). This influenced my choices regarding methods for gathering data for my research. Furthermore, qualitative methods for gathering data is also relevant when studying complex phenomena or phenomena of private character (Hellevik 1995). Staff safety

and the issue of security is a sensitive character, which can complicate the matter of gaining access to data. In order to be able to investigate the topic in-depth, the choice thus fell on using qualitative methods to collect data during my fieldwork. Table 1 below elaborates on the central steps taken during the course of the working process, based on the decisions made regarding research design.

Table 1. Activities during the working process

Period	What	Why	Outcome
Period 1: Summer 2010	Literature studies.	Gain knowledge on the chosen topic.	Enhanced knowledge and an overview of current trends in violent attacks on humanitarian workers.
	Approach humanitarian organizations for feedback	Examine the relevance of the topic.	Positive feedback and relevance of chosen topic
Period 2: Autumn 2010 and winter 2010/2011	Develop a research proposal, with research question and clear objectives	Present a description of the project to potential partners and relevant actors in the field.	A structured research proposal.
	Approach UNHCR Sub-Office in Dadaab with research proposal.	To gain access to the field	Gained access to Dadaab Refugee Camp, Kenya, through UNHCR in Dadaab.
	Develop a theoretical overview and interview guide	To establish a clear direction for my field study.	A theoretical perspective and interview guide
	Preparation for fieldwork through literature studies	To gain a better overview of the field	Enhanced knowledge about the region
Period 3 21rd of January – 23rd of February	Data collection through field work	Produce findings tied to my research question.	18 interviews Observations 2 Meetings Interviews in Nairobi (regional level), Dadaab (Sub-level), the camps Ifo, Hagadera, Dagahaley (Field level).
Period 4 23rd of February – 15th of June	Data reduction and analysis.	To reduce complexity of the data in order to gain a better overview, and analyze the data in order to draw conclusions to my research question.	Produce knowledge on the phenomena investigated in this research.

Period 1

Literature studies were the main focus during the first period, with the purpose of gaining knowledge on the topic of humanitarian organizations and staff safety in the field. To examine the relevance of my chosen topic and to narrow it down, I contacted several humanitarian organizations[5] and asked for input on possible approaches to the topic. The different organizations seemed to find my topic of high relevance to their operations, and

[5] UNICEF, Red Cross, Norwegian Refugee Council, Norwegian Church Aid, as well as with the Peace Research Institute Oslo.

based on this response, together with literature studies, I began developing a research questions and a research proposal for fieldwork through a humanitarian organization.

Period 2

During the second period, the main focus was developing a research proposal with research questions and clear objectives, as well as gaining access to the field. Contact with the Head of UNHCR Sub-Office in Dadaab was established through the Norwegian Refugee Council, who gave us approval to conduct our research in Dadaab. With the approval from UNHCR in Dadaab, I started working on an overview of relevant theoretical perspectives related to my chosen topic of research in order to point out a direction for my research in the field. An interview guide was developed, and preparation for fieldwork was done during this period. This included literature studies on the area of Dadaab and the refugee operations in place, as well as more practical issues such as vaccines, accommodation in Kenya, and contact information to potential informants.

Period 3

The third period consisted of the actual fieldwork in Kenya. During this period I gained access to a large amount of data generated through interviews and conversations with informants, participant observations, as well as official documents handed to me from several informants. The process of collecting data as well as analyzing and process newly attained data en route characterized this period.

Period 4

In this period the focus was on reducing the data to a more manageable amount. The large amount of data and its complexity had to be reduced in order to be able to extract the sets of data that was relevant for examining the chosen research question. Analysis of the data was a process that was ongoing during all four periods of the working process.

4.3 Fieldwork: Getting access

The process of getting access to the field was initiated during the autumn of 2010. Together with a fellow student, I gained access to the humanitarian operations in Dadaab, Kenya, through the UNHCR and the Head of Sub-Office in Dadaab, Mr. Richard Acland. His initial response was very positive, and in the beginning of September 2010 we received the official

confirmation from Mr. Acland, that we had been granted access to conduct fieldwork in Dadaab sometime during the months of January/February 2011.

Though the confirmation came about quite early in the process, the task of establishing practicalities such as setting the dates for our stay in Dadaab was a long and tiresome process. When working in an environment characterized by a humanitarian crisis, the staff will understandably have their mind on more pressing issues than answering emails and enquiries from for instance researchers. After almost five months of email-correspondence without getting any clear answers regarding the dates and other issues such as accommodation, we finally reached a contact person within UNHCR in Dadaab that was able to set the dates for our stay in Dadaab, help facilitate initial contact with informants and help with practical issues such as booking the accommodation in the UNHCR Dadaab main compound and the UN flight between Nairobi and Dadaab.

The dates for our stay in Dadaab was finally approved about 3 weeks before our intended stay, which gave us very little time to prepare for what was to come. This meant that much of the knowledge about the area and the operation had to be collected simultaneously with gathering data related specifically related to our own thesis. With the amount of information and impressions available in the field made it difficult to constrain our attention to the chosen topic. Although we had a short timespan to prepare for our field work in Dadaab I am however unsure if having more time to prepare for our field work would have given us a better overview, as it became evident that such a complex environment cannot fully be understood without experiencing it first-hand.

Our initial proposal to Mr. Acland regarding the duration of our fieldwork was three to five weeks, depending on their resources and convenience. We received no objections to this time span, and planned accordingly to the agreement with Mr. Acland and UNHCR. However, less than a month prior to our planned departure for Nairobi, we received notice that due to very tight capacities and a high number of missions visiting Dadaab, they were unable to host us for such a long period. Thus our stay was shortened down to the maximum of one week. On the other hand, UNHCR in Dadaab usually does not accept master- or PhD-students due to inconveniences with such an arrangement in the past, and normally encourage visitors to limit their stay to day-trips or three-day trips. As such, we were very lucky to get permission for a duration of one week.

We arrived in Nairobi, Kenya on the 21st of January and departed for Norway on the 23rd of February. This gave us almost five weeks in total in Kenya, with one week conducting fieldwork in the refugee camps in Dadaab (31st of January – 7th of February 2011), and the rest of the weeks spent in Nairobi. The most important part of my fieldwork was carried out in Dadaab, seeing as this was the selected case for my study. However, I was also able to undertake a few interviews with informants that had a fair overview of the security situation and the UN security management system unfolding in Dadaab while in Nairobi. The stay in Nairobi both prior to and after the main fieldwork in Dadaab was also very useful for preparations as well as reflections around collected data and the experiences we had shared. It was clear to us both that there was a strong advantage in being two students together in Dadaab and Nairobi, as we were able to share ideas, receive support, and reflect and discuss the data we had collected.

Our extended stay in Nairobi also gave us important slack in case of unforeseen events. And we did run into some unexpected events that required both patience and flexibility. One particular incident was regarding our flight to Dadaab, which was very crucial as to whether we were able to conduct our fieldwork or not. At some point during our stay in Nairobi, we found that we had been removed from the flight manifest on the UNHCR flight going to Dadaab without being noticed. We had received confirmation upon booking the flight two and a half weeks in advance, and had already scheduled meetings in Dadaab for the week of 31st of January to 7th of February.

The decision to remove us from the flight was connected to a permission to travel to the refugee camps. In order to visit the refugee sites in Kenya, one must get government permission. We had applied for the permission three weeks in advance, which we were told should be sufficient time. However, after several reminders to the Department of Refugee Affairs in Kenya from us and from the External Relations Officer in Dadaab, we had still not received this permission, and were thus removed from the flight. Eventually, the External Relations Officer managed to get us on the flight after all, and we made it to the field on the scheduled date. Still, had the course of events turned out different, due to the slack we gained from planning the extended stay in Nairobi, we would still have been able to conduct our fieldwork had the scheduled stay in Dadaab been delayed with one week.

The fact that we did travel to Dadaab without the necessary government permission, somewhat affected our selection of informants. The primary responsibility for the security of UN staff, their dependents and UN property rests with the host government. Thus, it would have been interesting to talk to government representatives regarding their view on the UN security system that are in place in Dadaab. It could also have been interesting to see whether the government perceive the UN security system as complimentary or a substitute to the government's own responsibility of providing security in the area. But as we had entered the refugee sites without a permit, we did not want to risk our fieldwork or the relationship with the UN and the Kenyan government by approaching government representatives. The lack of a governmental view on the UN security management system in this dissertation could be a possible weakness, as the government holds such an important position regarding staff safety in humanitarian operations. However, my focus was on the UN security management system, and not the government as providers of security.

4.4 Methods for gathering qualitative data

The methods for gathering qualitative data is chosen based on their appropriateness in terms of collecting the necessary and relevant data. Choice of methods to gather qualitative data will affect the validity and reliability of the data. Validity will be affected by whether or not the methods are suitable for the research thesis, while the reliability will be affected because all methods will be selective in terms of gathering information, which will affect the research results (Jacobsen 2005). In this study, my methods for gathering qualitative data were based on that of literature studies, semi-structured interviews, observations and participant observations.

4.4.1 Literature study

The method of literature study relies on secondary data, which is data that others have collected. Examples of such sources are public documents, reports, and letters (Jacobsen 2005). The method of literature studies were an important tool for enhancing my knowledge on the topic of humanitarian staff safety and the context of my fieldwork, and was an ongoing process throughout my research. By acquiring knowledge through literature studies, I was able to develop research questions and an interview guide that was designed to fit the topic. As such the method contributed to pointing out a direction for my research.

Literature studies were of great importance in order to find out what the UN security management system is. Through literature studies of the UN security management system's history, formal frameworks and procedures I obtained an overview of what this security system is. This overview was vital in order to be able to answer the second part of my research question: how does the UN security management unfold in the humanitarian operations in Dadaab. Through an overview of the UN security management system I was able to follow up on observations and statements from my informants in order to study how the system unfolded in Dadaab.

Because security is a sensitive subject, I did have some difficulties getting access to documents regarding the UN security management system. In example, I contacted the Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) in New York, and the UN headquarters in Nairobi, asking for some relevant documents. Neither replied to my enquiry, and the UN Nairobi actually responded with closing down their intranet, which had previously been open to the public. However, once in the field, I was able to attain several of the documents I had been searching for, through my informants who more than willingly gave them to me.

4.4.2 Interview

Conducting individual interviews is one of the most common methods for gathering qualitative data. Gathering of data is done through a conversation between informant and researcher, and the data is generated through words, sentences and stories (Jacobsen 2005).

The qualitative interview can be classified according to its degree of formality, along the line of structure, semi-structured, and unstructured interview (Guba and Lincoln 1981; Kvale 1996). In my research I used a combination of unstructured and semi-structured interviews. The unstructured interviews were conducted as a natural part of participant observations, in order to gain a wider understanding of my observations. The semi-structured interviews were based on an interview guide with some key elements that I wanted the informant to touch upon during the conversation, and it helped me understand how the UN security management system actually unfolds on field level. Some might argue that the structuring in advance constitutes a form of closing of the data gathering (Jacobsen 2005). However, had I conducted the interviews with no kind of predetermined structure in such a complex context as in Dadaab, it would have become very time- and resource consuming to analyze it. By pre-

structuring the interview I was able to put certain elements in focus in order to obtain the necessary information for my research question.

As the topic of security is quite sensitive, I found it appropriate to conduct the interviews face-to-face in order to try to create a climate of confidentiality or trust. I believed it would make it easier for my informants to talk about staff safety and the UN security system implemented in Dadaab, which turned out to be a valid assumption. When I arrived in Dadaab, I was informed that some of my informants had received notice from the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) in New York and in Geneva. The UNDSS had stated that that the security focal points involved in the operations in Dadaab should not talk to me and under no circumstance express their personal views to me. At first these informants seemed reluctant to engage in conversations with me. After having met me face-to-face in more informal settings, I seemed to gain some trust and I eventually got them to talk to me openly about the UN security management system. One informant also gave me the opportunity for a second interview, where he spoke more in depth about the security system and gave me his honest opinions on how this system works in Dadaab.

According to Jacobsen (2005), findings in some studies also underlines that it might be easier for the informant to lie when the interview is taken over the phone, and in addition to this I would miss out on opportunities to observe whether or not the informants actions is in accordance with their statements. I also found that people working in the humanitarian sector was hard to communicate with through emails, as they are preoccupied with more pressing matters than replying to enquiries from researchers per email. When I arrived in the field, I was more flexible as to meet them whenever they had a spare moment, and thus through face-to-face interviews I got access to more informants than I would have done through internet-based interviews.

Face-to-face interviews can have an effect on the informant in that he or she might act less normal due to the physical presence of the researcher (Jacobsen 2005). This effect is often referred to as the control-effect or the Hawthorne-effect, implying that the participants might alter their behavior due to the awareness of attention from the researcher (Benson 2001; Wood & Ross-Kerr 2011). In an attempt to reduce this effect I eventually chose to discard the use of voice-recorder during the interviews, as it seemed to affect the conversation by making the informant uncomfortable.

4.4.3 Observation

Because of my limited amount of time in the field, combining interviews with observation proved a useful method for me during my fieldwork. By combining these two methods, I was able to follow up on observations with interviews in order to gain a better understanding of their behavior and convictions, and I was able to conduct observations during interviews in order to see whether or not their words correlated with their actions. In terms of how the UN security system unfolds on field level, I gained a better understanding of how this security system actually works in practice by observing it than I would have through interviews alone. The combination of interviews and observation provided me with a deeper understanding of the topic (Fossåskaret, Fuglestad & Aase 1997).

During my fieldwork in Dadaab I conducted observations as well as participant observations. I was a guest of the UNHCR in Dadaab, and my identity as a researcher was made known to the staff. As my role in Dadaab was that of a researcher only, I did not partake in the daily routines and activities of camp management and project implementation. Being a visitor of the UNHCR, I was automatically included in and affected by the UN security management system implemented in the area of Dadaab. The implication of this was that I participated in the UN security management system on the same level as UN personnel, by complying with security arrangements such as the use of armed escorts or restricted movements. As such, I took on the role of a participant-as-observer, where I attempted to become a "normal" and "acceptable" person within the group despite my primary role as a researcher (Gold 1958; Denzin 2006).

While trying to blend in as a "normal" and acceptable" person among the staff, I did not hide the fact that I was observing throughout my stay, by openly taking notes during certain situations related to the issue of staff safety, such as while driving with armed escorts to the refugee camps, driving without escort into the blocs of the camps, and when informants showed me around the premises of the compounds and talked about security measures either lacking or in place. Observations made for instance through the window of a UN vehicle during convoys between the camps and within the blocks of the camps where not participant observations per se but more of a mere observational character. These observations were made from a distance, where I myself did not partake in the actions observed.

4.5 Informants and sampling

Qualitative studies are expensive and time-consuming, and the data generated from such studies are often so rich in detail and information that a selection of informants is required (Jacobsen 2005). As my time in the field was restricted, I had to limit the number of informants through a sampling of the population. My selection process were based on a set of defined stages:

1. Obtain an overview of everyone you would like to examine
2. Divide the population into subgroups
3. Determine the criterion for selecting informants (Jacobsen 2005).

1. Obtaining an overview

As a part of the preparations for my fieldwork, I gathered information about the UN security system and actors within the system, as well as an overview of the organizations operating in Dadaab. From here, I made a list of all those informants I would like to examine had I unlimited time and resources. This became my theoretical population.

2. Divide the population into subgroups

As humans rarely are found to be a homogenous group, the theoretical population will have to be divided into subgroups (Jacobsen 2005). The classification of the selection must be relevant to the research question at hand, and based on my research question, the theoretical population was divided along the variables of *position*, *employer* and *location*:

- Position: Security-related or non security-related
- Employer: the UN, implementing partners or the Government of Kenya
- Location: whether the informant was located in Nairobi (regional level), Dadaab Main Office (sub-level), or in Ifo/Hagadera/Dagahaley Field Office (field-level).

3. Criterions for selecting informants

The last step is to select criterions for selecting informants (Jacobsen 2005). As security is a sensitive subject, I found it quite hard to get an overview of the persons actually employed in the different security-related positions. For a while I was able to use UN Nairobi's intranet to gather information on possible informants, as well as contacting the agency personally. However, I received no reply and the day after my enquiry I found the intranet to be closed to outsiders. The apparent lack of openness from UN made it hard for me to establish a proper overview of possible informants in Dadaab.

Due to the lack of a proper overview of possible informants, I chose to base my selection of informants on a combination of non-random sampling and snowball sampling. Where random sampling is based on chance, in a non-random sampling the selection of informants is based on their relevance to the research topic (Neumann 2000). Through my contact person with the UNHCR, I managed to establish contact with a few potential informants. The informants were selected on the basis of the three abovementioned variables *position, employer* and *location.* From here, I had to rely on snowball sampling. This strategy is based on the process of accumulation: information gained from initial informants can help identify additional informants, and is a useful method when the members of a selected population are difficult to locate (Neumann 2000; Babbie 2010). Through the strategy of snowball sampling, I was able to get in contact with several informants that I would never been able to reach without actually going to the field. The final selection of informants is presented in table 2 below. My informants were selected on the basis of how they could contribute to a further understanding of how the UN security management system unfolds in the field.

Table 2: Overview of informants

Employer	**Position**	**Location**
CARE	Safety and security coordinator	Dadaab Main Office
CARE	Food distribution	Hagadera Field Office
DRC	Regional security adviser	Regional Office, Nairobi
DRC	Safety & security officer	Dadaab Main Office
Kenyan Police	Police officer	Dagahaley Field Office
Kenyan Police	S/SGT, Staff Sergeant	Dagahaley Field Office
LWF	Information officer	Dadaab Main Office
LWF	Field safety officer	Ifo Field Office
LWF	Field safety officer	Dagahaley Field Office
Anonymous IP[6]	Regional security adviser	Regional Office, Nairobi
Anonymous IP	Area Manager	Dadaab Main Office
Anonymous IP	Logistics	Dadaab Main Office
UNHCR	Associated Field Safety Adviser	Dadaab Main Office
UNHCR	Senior Field Safety Adviser	Regional Office, Nairobi
UNHCR	Field Associate	Dagahaley Field Office
UNHCR	Telecommunications operator	Dadaab Main Office
UNHCR	Field Associate	Hagadera Field Office
UNHCR	Field Safety Associate	Soon to be deployed in a Field Office in Dadaab
UNHCR	External Relations Officer	Dadaab Main Compound
UNHCR	Education Officer	Dadaab Main Compound
WFP	Food distribution	Regional Office, Nairobi
DTS	Assessment	Nairobi
ADEO	Education – teacher	Ifo Camp
ADEO	Education – teacher	Ifo Camp

[6] Informant has requested that names of individuals *and* organization remains anonymous.

4.6 Methodological triangulation

As illustrated in the previous sub-chapters, the different methods of literature studies, interviews, and observations can each bring about a certain type of data and enhance the researcher's understanding in their own ways. But when relying on multiple sources of data, these data also needs to be converged, as illustrated in figure 5. In order to enhance the separate understandings that each of the methods has gathered, a triangulated methodology is needed (Denzin 2006).



Figure 5: Convergence of evidence.

There are different types of methodological triangulation. For my research I have relied on that of methodological triangulation and data triangulation. Using a methodological triangulation relies on involves using multiple research methods to study the same case. In my study, I used literature studies, qualitative and semi-structured interviews, and observations and participant observation in order to obtain knowledge about how the world works. As mentioned, the combination of these research methods provided me with a deeper understanding of the topic than what would have been possible by relying on a single method. Data triangulation is the use of a variety of data sources in a study, or based on different levels, time and place. My empirical data was collected from different sources (UNHCR, implementing partners, and the Kenyan Police), and seeing as I conducted interviews both in Nairobi and Dadaab, they were also based on different geographical locations.

Relying on multiple sources of data and combining different research methods could contribute to overcome weaknesses within a single research method, and provide several perspectives on the same phenomena, and thus enhance the quality of the data and the conclusions drawn from these data (Ellefsen 1998; Jacobsen 2005).

4.7 Research quality

A researcher should be able to remain critical to the quality of the data collected during the research. Two important issues here are whether or not the research investigates what we wanted it to investigate (validity), and whether or not we can rely on the data we have collected (reliability) (Jacobsen 2005).

4.7.1 Validity

Validity can be internal or external. Internal validity involves whether or not the results are perceived as credible and if the informants and others can make sense of the findings (Miles & Huberman 1994; Jacobsen 2005). External validity is the study's ability to be transferred to other contexts (Jacobsen 2005).

Internal validity

In order to increase the internal validity of my research, I compared statements from informants to see whether my findings were reasonable. I also contacted the informants regarding follow-up questions to clarify any possible misunderstandings, and they all received a copy of the transcribed interview. This gave the informants an opportunity to correct any misinterpretations on my behalf.

Combining interviews, observations, participant observations and literature studies through the use of methodological triangulation, did contribute to a stronger validity to my research than if I had relied on only one of these methods. Because I used several different sources of information, namely United Nations, non-governmental organizations, and the Kenyan Police, I was able to obtain several perspectives on the same phenomena.

My questions to the informants were developed on the basis of relevant research and literature on the subject, which guided me in terms of being able to ask the right questions in order to receive the 'right' answers. This helped me make sure that I was investigating what I set out to investigate, which improved the internal validity of this research. This was somewhat based on my preconceptions before entering the field, and did to a certain extent influence my focus and what I was looking for during the fieldwork. However, I tried to enhance the internal validity of my research by striving to view the 'world' through the informants' eyes. Viewing

the ‘world’ through the informants’ eyes did as mentioned alter some of my preconceptions during my stay in the field.

The length of my observation period in Dadaab was limited to one week due to lack of resources on UNHCR’s behalf. The validity of ones observations increases in correlation to the length of the observation, and as such, duration of one week may have affected the validity of my observations (Jacobsen 2005). A brief stay in the field will limit the amount insight gained regarding the studied phenomenon, however it is nevertheless possible to form a picture of the situation and how the people perceive it (Johnsen 1971 in Kruke 2010). Even though my fieldwork was conducted during a brief period of time, I was still able to gain trust from the informants and collect data on the topic of study. Thus, the research should not be written off completely due to lack of time in the field.

External validity

I chose my informants based on a non-random sampling by selecting the informants based on their relevance to my research topic. The selection of informants is not necessary representative for the whole population. However, there is still a potential for transferability seeing as one will be able to find more or less the same responsibilities, statuses, structures, guidelines and standards in other, similar humanitarian operations. I discovered signs of latent conditions and shortcuts within the UN security management system in Dadaab, which I recognize from theories on organizational accidents. This could possibly imply that the potential for an organizational accident within the security system of the UN in Dadaab might be transferrable to other UN-led humanitarian operations. It might perhaps imply that latent conditions within the UN security management system could be found on field level in other, similar humanitarian operations.

4.7.2 Reliability

Whether or not we can rely on the data we have collected is closely connected to the procedures implemented in order to gather the data. A challenge connected to qualitative research is that it is difficult to repeat or reconstruct the study precisely, due to changing conditions (LeCompte & Goetz 1982). This is particularly true when conducting fieldwork, as both the context and human behavior is dynamic. In addition, my presence could have affected the context, making it difficult to reconstruct the exact same conditions.

However, being two students conducting fieldwork in the same context could contribute to enhance the reliability despite the lack of possibilities to reconstruct the same study. As we were two, we were able to discuss and reflect on the situation and our research, and compare our interpretations of the context, and as such strengthen the reliability of our data.

My selection of informants was based on non-random sampling, meaning that the informants were reliable in that they had knowledge and experience on the topic of my study. As such, findings from different informants as well as the use of several different methods that support my findings strengthened the reliability of this study.

Another potential aspect that could affect the reliability of my study was the Hawthorne-effect, or control-effect. The informants could have been affected by my presence and as such alter their answers or behavior. This would decrease the reliability. However, as the informants met me and got used to me as a part of the context, they seemed to relax more. As I gained their trust, they reluctance to talk to me diminished, and they opened up about even the more sensitive issues regarding staff safety. This mutual trust reduced the possible negative influence of my presence as a researcher, and as such increased the reliability of my findings.

4.8 Strengths and weaknesses

There was a clear strength in being two students traveling together to Dadaab. It is difficult to discuss experiences from the field with someone who has not been there, so to me it was very valuable to travel with a fellow student. We were then able to reflect on observations and experiences, discuss possible interpretations and approaches to our theses, and relieve our frustration to when things did not go according to plans.

Getting access to the field also contributed to enhance reliability. It is hard to study the topic of staff safety and how the UN security system unfolds in the field without being able to experience it first hand. I would not have been able to uncover shortcuts and possible latent conditions within the system without conducting fieldwork. At the same time, the security regime in Dadaab and the restricted movement complicated the process of data collection, and demanded both creativity and flexibility. The lack of openness from UNDSS presented some challenges in terms of data collection, but as I gained the trust of my informants through face-

to-face conversation I also got access to documents and data, which I clearly would not have been able to obtain without going to the field.

The limitation of such a short stay in a large and complex refugee operation became evident during the course of our fieldwork. Acquiring a good overview of the context takes time. More time would have enabled us to get a better overview and an improved understanding of the environment before selecting relevant informants, as well as more time to reflect and adjust our interview guide, and process the data we collected. But this does not mean that our fieldwork was futile. We still managed to gain access and trust. However, a prolonged stay in Dadaab, would have improved both our research and the quality of our data. The lack of time in Dadaab was however partly compensated by quite intensive fieldwork in Dadaab as well as our stay in Nairobi both before and after our stay in Dadaab.

5. Findings: The UN Security Management System

The purpose of this thesis is to take a closer look at the United Nations' (UN) Security Management System developed to ensure staff safety in humanitarian operations, and to study how this security system unfolds in the humanitarian operations in Dadaab, Kenya. The first part of my findings, sub-chapter 5.1, gives a presentation of the UN Security Management System and its components, based on literature studies. The second part, sub-chapter 5.2, presents my findings from the fieldwork in Dadaab, on how the UN Security Management System actually unfolds in the humanitarian operations in Dadaab.

5.1 Responsibility for security management

Civil protection is accepted as a governmental task, placing the primary responsibility for the security and protection of humanitarian staff with the host government (Quarantelli 2000; Olsen, Kruke & Hovden 2007). This responsibility is also acknowledged by several UN directives such as the UN Report A/59/365 (UN 2004a), UN Field Security Handbook 2006 (UN 2006), UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies 2007 (UNHCR 2007), and the UN Framework for Accountability 2007 (UN 2007), to name a few. Still, instances may occur where uncertainty influences the security and protection factor and the host government's ability to provide for security. In order to deal with such situations, the United Nations has put in place a security management system for planning and managing security issues and the protection of staff (UN 2006; UNHCR 2007). The mission statement of the United Nations Security Management System proclaim, *"the goal of the United Nations security management system is to enable the effective and efficient conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the security, safety and well-being of staff as a high priority"* (UN 2007:1). The UN should seek, in all cases, to facilitate the tasks of host Governments and local authorities in the fulfillment of their obligations, and consult with them as appropriate on matters affecting the security of United Nations staff. UN organizations may also lend assistance, when possible and feasible, to protect other people such as staff of cooperating NGOs (UNHCR 2007).

5.1.1 A strengthened and unified UN Security Management System

The context where humanitarian organizations such as the United Nations operates in has changed over the course of the last twenty years, with a steady increase in frequency and brutality in violent attacks on humanitarian staff (Stoddard et al. 2006; Holmes 2010b). The

terrorist attack on UN headquarters in Baghdad August 19th 2003, the threats against UN became very evident and alarmingly real (UNDSS 2011). Up until the last decades, the UN felt protected by its flag and its neutrality, and whenever UN personnel were directly targeted it was generally viewed as an isolated event (UNDSS 2011).

Demonstrated by the attack on UN in Baghdad, the United Nations and humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) found themselves in an increasingly threatening environment and with a security management system that proved inadequate (UN 2004a). In the wake of the attack, an Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel in Iraq was appointed to evaluate the safety and security of the UN personnel, identify key lessons on security arrangements and give recommendations on mitigation measures to avoid the occurrence of similar events (Reliefweb 2003). The panel was lead by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, and their report revealed a dysfunctional security management system in need of a reform (Ahtisaari et al. 2003). The Ahtisaari Panel stated that

> *"The failure of UN management and staff to comply with standard security regulations and directives left the UN open and vulnerable to the type of attack that was perpetrated on 19 August 2003. In particular, the UN security system failed adequately to analyse and utilize information made available to the system on threats against UN staff and premises"* (Ahtisaari et al. 2003:3).

The Ahtisaari-report called for a new, drastically revised security strategy for the United Nations (Ahtisaari et al. 2003; UN 2004a). An indirect result of the 'Ahtisaari-report' was the decision to strengthen and unify the United Nations Security Management system by establishing the Department of Safety and Security. The proposal to establish the Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) was presented to the 59th session of the General Assembly and adopted in December 2004 (UN 2004a; UN 2004b: 9).

The new Department was formally established on 1st of January 2005, and was to be headed by a senior UN official at the rank of Under-Secretary-General. The UN Department of Safety and Security is located in New York, and acts on behalf of the Secretary-General in order to ensure a coherent response by the UN to any security situation (UNHCR 2007; UNDSS 2011). UN Department of Safety and Security provides support to the Secretary-General and

specialized agencies in the implementation of the UN security management system, and is dedicated to perform the following functions:

- To support and enable the effective conduct of United Nations activities by ensuring a coherent, effective and timely response to all security-related threats and other emergencies;
- To ensure effective risk mitigation through the establishment of a coordinated security threat and risk assessment mechanism within the framework of a common, system-wide methodology;
- To develop high-quality, best-practice security policies, standards and operational procedures across the United Nations system, including the appropriate degree of standardization;
- To support implementation and monitor compliance with those security policies, standards and operational procedures;
- To ensure the most cost-effective provision and employment of security personnel by taking advantage of economies of scale and through centrally directed recruitment, selection, training, deployment and career development (UN 2004a).

Important outcomes of the abovementioned efforts from UNDSS to strengthen and unify the UN security management system were the Framework for Accountability for the United Nations Security Management System (UN 2007), the United Nations Security Risk Management framework (UN 2011), the Security Risk Assessment policy (UN 2009b), and the Minimum Operating Security Standard (UN 2009a). These are frameworks that are guiding in the implementation of the UN security management system on field level.

5.1.2 Framework for Accountability for the UN Security Management System

The Framework for Accountability for the United Nations Security Management System (UN 2007) is part of the United Nation's effort to develop an effective and integrated security system. The framework specifies the roles and responsibilities for all actors within the security system, ranging from the Secretary-General down to every individual UN-staff member and employee (UN 2007). Stating that all actors has a role to play in contributing to the highest standards of safety and security, regardless of their seniority, function, or duty station, the framework aim to bring all organizational units of the UN under one security

umbrella, and to give ownership of security management to those who are intended to benefit from it (UN 2007).

An overview of the key actors within the UN security management system is presented in figure 6, followed by a brief presentation of their main roles and responsibilities.



Figure 6: Key actors within the United Nations Security Management System.

The Secretary General

The Secretary-General is the chief administrative officer of the United Nations, and is accountable to the Member States for the proper running and administration of the Organization and implementation of its programs. This includes the ensuring of overall safety and security of United Nations personnel, premises and assets, at headquarters locations and in the field (UN 2007).

The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security

As Head of the Department of Safety and Security, the Under-Secretary-General is responsible for the executive direction and control of the United Nations security management system and the overall safety and security of United Nations civilian personnel and their recognized dependents and United Nations premises and assets, both at headquarters locations and in the field (UN 2007).

Chief Security Adviser/Security Adviser

The Chief Security Adviser/Security Adviser is a security professional appointed by the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security. The Chief Security Adviser/Security Adviser is to assist, advise and report to the Designated Official (DO) and the Security Management Team (SMT), and maintains a technical line of communication to the Department of Safety and Security (UN 2007).

Designated Official

The Designated Official (DO) is appointed in each country or designated area where the United Nation is present and is both responsible and accountable for ensuring that the goal of the United Nations security management system is met at the duty station (UNHCR 2007; UN 2007). The DO's responsibilities includes among other to liaise with host government officials on security matters, arrange a security plan for the area, inform the Secretary-General (through UNDSS) of all developments which may have a bearing on the safety of staff members, form a Security Management Team, and inform the senior official of each UN organization of all security measures (UN 2007).

Security Management Team

Normally, the Security Management Team (SMT) is chaired by the Designated Official (DO), and consists of the head of each United Nations organization present at the duty station and the Chief Security adviser (UNHCR 2007; UN 2007). The SMT advises the Designated Official on all security related matters, and the members of the Security Management Team have a collective responsibility to support the Designated official in the discharge of his/her mandate related to the safety and security of all personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependents (UN 2007).

Area Security Coordinators

An Area Security Coordinator (ASC) is appointed by the DO in consultation with the SMT, in cases of large countries with regions separated from country headquarters in terms of distance and exposure to emergencies. The ASC is to coordinate and control security arrangement applicable to all personnel employed by organizations of the United Nations systems and their recognized dependents in their area of responsibility.

Wardens

Wardens have responsibility for ensuring proper implementation of the security plan within a particular predetermined zone in a large city, and the warden system should include all humanitarian agencies. The Wardens are accountable to the Designated Official/Area Security Coordinator for their security-related functions (UN 2007).

Personnel employed by organizations of the United Nations system

Personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system are accountable to their respective organizations. They have the responsibility to abide by security policies, guidelines, directives, plans and procedures of the United Nations security management system and their organizations (UN 2007).

The actors within the UN Security Management System carry out their responsibilities relating to safety and security based on the guidance of the Security Risk Management framework.

5.1.3 UN Security Risk Management and Security Risk Assessment

The Security Risk Management (SRM) is the fundamental tool within the UN for managing risk through analysis of safety and security threats that may affect its personnel, assets and operations (UN 2009b; UN 2011). The SRM consists of the following three steps:

- Assessing the operational context of the UN
- Identifying the risk level of undesirable events that may affect United Nations personnel, assets and operations in that context
- Providing guidance on the implementation of cost effective solutions in the form of specific prevention and mitigation strategies and measures with the aim of lowering

the risk levels for the UN by reducing the impact and likelihood of an undesirable event (UN 2009b).

The level of risk[7] of specific threats to the UN is assessed in the Security Risk Assessment (SRA), and based on this assessment different security measures may be implemented to reduce the level of risk to acceptable levels and enable the UN to continue operations in an area (UN 2011). The SRA is based on the following steps:

- Identify those threats which could affect UN personnel, assets or operations
- Identify the UN's vulnerability to these identified threats
- Assess risks to the UN in terms of likelihood and impact
- Prioritize those risks
- Identify prevention and mitigation strategies and measures, in order to reduce the likelihood and impact of such threats by lowering the UN's vulnerability to them (UN 2009b).

Because the Security Risk Assessment is an integral part of the Security Risk Management process, all security decisions, security planning and implementation of security measures to manage security risks must be based on the SRA (UN 2009b). An SRA should be done for the specific country/area, but it should also be completed whenever circumstances in a location or a specific program vary significantly to those pertaining to the rest of the country (UN 2009b).

The Security Risk Management model is organized in two distinctive phases: the Preparation Phase and the Execution Phase, as illustrated by figure 7 on the following page. The Preparation Phase is where the Security Risk Assessment is conducted (2009b). The first step of the Preparation Phase is the Program Assessment, which defines the goals and objectives of the country programs and operations of UN organizations. The imperative to conduct UN activities in a specific environment is assessed by reviewing the justification for such program activities. This includes identifying elements within the different programs that may require

[7] The UN have defined risk as *"any factors (actions, circumstances or events) which have the potential or possibility to cause harm, loss or damage to the United Nations system, including its personnel, assets and operations"* (UN 2009:1), and threat as *"the combination of the impact and likelihood for harm, loss or damage to the United Nations system from the exposure to threats"* (UN 2009:1).

Figure 7: The Security Management Model (UN 2009b).

security support (UN 2009b; UN 2009c). The following phases of Threat and Vulnerability Assessments provides essential information required to determine threats to the UN and their levels of risk. During this process, the host government authorities must be consulted (UN 2009b). Together, these three assessments provide a description of the security situation or the operational context in the country or area (UN 2009b).

The Risk Analysis determines the impact and likelihood of an event based on the information provided from the foregoing assessments, and provides the basis for decisions and priorities regarding mitigation strategies aimed at the risk levels for each identified threat (UN 2009b; UN 2009c). The mitigation measures identified must be logical, feasible and relevant, and the results from the assessments and the risk analysis are then presented to the decision makers (UN 2009b).

The Execution Phase consists of three steps: decision, implementation and review and update. The Designated Official, together with the Security Management Team, select and approve risk management measures to reduce current risk levels associated with each of the threats to the UN, and decide upon an implementation plan (UN 2009b).
The implementation of the selected risk management measures must be budgeted and implemented according to the implementation plan (UN 2009b). The last step is to review and update the Security Risk Assessment (SRA). This step involves continuous monitoring of the security environment and subsequent updates of the SRA as new information is received and analyzed (UN 2009b). As the risk levels in an area may change on the basis of new

information, this is an important step of the Security Risk Management process, which in turn affects the risk management measures employed to that particular threat (UN 2009b).

The mitigation measures identified in the Security Risk Assessment are then used to set a security standard for UN field operations globally, referred to as the Minimum Operating Security Standards (UN 2009a).

5.1.4 Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS)

The Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) was developed in response to the threats and risks faced by United Nations staff and operations, and are a fundamental policy document for all United Nations field operations. By setting the *minimum* operating security standards for United Nations field operations globally, it establishes a standard field-based criterion for a minimum of security arrangements for managing and mitigating security risks to UN personnel, property and assets of the organizations of UN (UN 2004c).

The MOSS encompasses a range of measures designed to reduce the level of risk to an acceptable and manageable level, and is to be kept as simple as possible, with the flexibility and capacity to allow adaptation to differing scenarios and rapidly changing circumstances (UN 2009a). The mitigation measures that are selected must be logical, realistic, cost effective, and capable of being implemented within the context of the operation or country (UN 2009a). These mitigation measures are linked to security risks that are identified in the Security Risk Assessment (SRA), meaning that all security decisions, security planning and implementation of security measures to manage security risks must be based on the SRA (UN 2009b).

Regardless of type of operation or security environment, each country and/or UN duty station is required to develop and maintain a Country MOSS (UN 2009a). This country-specific MOSS shall be based on the mandatory Global MOSS provided in Appendix 5. As illustrated in section 5.1.3, responsibility for the development of a country specific MOSS rests with the Designated Official and the Security Management Team (UN 2004c). The measures based on the SRA should be presented to the Security Management Team with an explanation of their rationale (UN 2009a). The DO approves the MOSS at a formal SMT meeting, and the approved Country MOSS is then sent to UNDSS for review. If no objections are received after one month, the Country MOSS is endorsed. Once it is endorsed, it is binding for all

Inter-Agency Security Management Network members with a presence in that country, including missions and visitors, at both the headquarters and field level (UN 2009a).

In order to meet the challenges of the changing environment that the UN operates in, with increased deliberate attacks on humanitarian workers, the UN have sought to strengthen its security management system and bring all units of the UN under one security umbrella. This sub-chapter, 5.1, has presented the UN security management system as it is formally laid down in documents and frameworks; how it is thought to be working. The next sub-chapter, 5.2, presents empirical findings on how the UN security management system actually unfolds, based on fieldwork from the UN-led operations in Dadaab, Kenya.

5.2 The UN Security Management System and staff safety in Dadaab

This sub-chapter will present the findings from literature studies, interviews, observations and participant observations conducted during my fieldwork in Dadaab Refugee Camp. The refugee complex in Dadaab is a large humanitarian operation with many actors and activities, and my empirical findings will present some of the events that are related to the aspect of staff safety and security in the field of Dadaab.

As described in sub-chapter 4.5, I talked to informants from UNHCR, the implementing partners, as well as two informants from the Kenyan Police. The informants from the implementing partners seemed reluctant to give a description of the UN security management system that are in place in Dadaab as they felt that they did not have enough knowledge on the topic. Instead they referred me to the security focal points with the UNHCR. Thus, the sections 5.2.2, 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 on describing the UN security management system in place in Dadaab rely mainly on input from informants from the UNHCR.

5.2.1 Responsibility for security management

As stated in several UN policy documents and handbooks, the host government is overall responsible for staff safety. This is a view also shared by the UNHCR senior security adviser; however, he explains that even though this does look good on paper, it is impossible in many countries. In Kenya, he states, the police have many challenges, and this is especially true in remote places such as the North Eastern Province. Due to a shortage of police officers in Dadaab, UNHCR had proposed to the Kenyan government the placement of a special police

force in the district. The government however had said no, but was willing to increase the size of the police force in order to cover the camps. The senior security adviser further explained that the Kenyan government had expected the UNHCR to pay for this arrangement. According to the senior security adviser, and confirmed by a staff sergeant with the Kenyan Police stationed in Dagahaley Camp, UNHCR provide infrastructure, accommodation, offices, vehicles and fuel, repairs on the vehicles, means of communication, and as well as a monthly incentive paid to the police officers partaking in the convoys.

Dadaab refugee operations are made up by a large number of actors in addition to the UNHCR. Several of the informants, both with UNHCR and implementing partners (IPs), said that they consider the UN to be an umbrella for security in the area. Informants from some of the implementing partners expressed that even though the organizations have their own security system in place, it is either loosely based on that of the UN, or it largely complies with the UN security system in Dadaab. As such, the UN security management system implemented in Dadaab to a certain extent sets the agenda regarding safety and security in the area.

5.2.2 Framework for accountability

The UNHCR's senior security adviser, stationed in Nairobi, explained to me how the framework for accountability should work in Dadaab:

The Designated Official (DO) is usually a senior UN official, who represents the Secretary-General. The appointed Director-General of the United Nations Office at Nairobi is the senior UN person in Kenya. When he puts the security hat on he is the Designated Official. UNDSS and the Heads of the different UN agencies are advisers to the DO. The Security Management Team (SMT) on a country level consists of the Heads of the UN agencies, and the DO can ask for their input. But the DO can overrule the SMT even when the majority of the SMT members are against him, as he is ultimately the one responsible. On a lower level, for instance in Dadaab, there is an Area Security Coordinator (ASC). In Dadaab, this is Mr. Acland (Head of UNHCR Sub-Office in Dadaab). When he puts on his security hat he reports directly to the DO on security issues. Mr. Acland has an Area Security management Team that functions in the same manner as the Security Management Team, and is formed by all the UN agencies.

The information flow within the Security Management System follows a security reporting line, based on the Framework for Accountability. In example, the security team in Dadaab work for Mr. Acland. Their reporting chain is to Mr. Acland, but they also report to the senior security adviser in Nairobi, and share the information to the UNDSS in Garissa. The Senior security adviser pass the information on to the UNDSS in Nairobi, the whole security cell in Nairobi, and UNDSS in Geneva, who then shares it with UNDSS in New York.

The senior security adviser told me that this is how it *should* work, however it all falls down when it comes to gathering of information. According to him, UNHCR is weak on collecting information. The collection of information requires that UNHCR set up a framework at that level for sharing information. In the opinion of the senior security adviser in Dadaab, there should be lines with the police, with selected refugees in the camps, and with security focal points within each of the IPs.

5.2.3 UN Security Risk Management and Security Risk Assessment

The senior security adviser and the associate field safety adviser from UNHCR explained to me how the UN security risk management model was implemented in Dadaab. As a part of the UN security management system approach on how to enable programs, the UN Department of Safety and Security in Nairobi carry out a Security Risk Assessment (SRA) for Kenya. This assessment is based on feedback from security officers from various agencies on the context, the situation, and the threats in the North Eastern Province.

An important forum for providing the feedback from Dadaab to the SRA is the weekly Security Cell Meetings initiated by UNHCR. These meetings serve as a forum where the security focal points from UNHCR, different IP, and the G4S[8] come together. Here they discuss security-related issues and the situation in the country and in the region, share information and try to come up with mitigation measures and recommendations. The issues of concern that are raised in the Security Cell Meetings are then taken to the Inter-Agency Security Coordination Meetings held the following day, where it is shared with the Area Security Management Team (ASMT). These two weekly meetings enable networking between the different agencies and the government as stakeholders, as well as information

[8] G4S, Group 4 Securicor is a world leading international security solutions group. Unarmed G4S guards are hired to provide security within the different UNHCR and IP compounds in Dadaab.

sharing across organizational boundaries. The information generated during these two meetings can then serve as a foundation for decision-making.

According to the senior security adviser from UNHCR, the implementing partners are included in these meetings at the will of the Head of Sub-Office, Mr. Acland. However only UN agencies such as UNHCR, World Food Programme (WFP) and International Organization for Migration (IOM) has the right to vote on issues during the meetings. The senior security adviser further explained that the IPs might experience different threats than UNHCR, depending on what projects they are involved in. Thus it might be valuable to have them present at these meetings in order to gain a broader input to the Security Risk Assessment. Several of the informants I met with from the implementing partners found these meetings to be useful to them in order to establish networks, share information and discuss security threats in the area.

According to the senior security adviser with the UNHCR, the Security Risk Assessment in Kenya is done every six months, and once a year in low risk countries. As his colleague, the associate field safety adviser explained, *"it has to continually be updated, because the context will not be stagnant; SRAs done five years ago cannot be relied upon today."* From the Security Risk Assessment, the UN and the security focal points manage the risk.

In the opinion of the senior security adviser, the SRA is getting better and that it was more of shelf document before. However, he felt that it is still used as a shelf document, though now more in the sense of being an "estimate" to use as a point of departure when conducting exercises. As a part of the SRA, they also look at mitigation measures already put in place to meet a particular threat, and whether or not further mitigation measures are needed. The residual risks are dealt with by developing mitigation measures that could lower the threat. These mitigation measures are established in the Minimum Operational Security Standard (MOSS).

5.2.4 Minimum Operating Security Standards

The Minimum Operating Security Standard is a summary of all the mitigation measures identified in the Security Risk Assessment, and should relate directly to the threats identified in the SRA. The senior security adviser with UNHCR emphasized that for every requirement in the MOSS one should be able to look at the security risk assessment and find explanations

for why that particular mitigation measure is there: *"if you for instance have a requirement of using police escort, you should be able to go back to the SRA and find that it is linked to a specific threat"*.

The senior security adviser explained that the country-specific MOSS for Kenya is done by the UNDSS in Nairobi, for the whole country. The Security Cell officers work together to develop a MOSS, which is then presented to the Designated Official and the Security Management Team (SMT). The SMT have to sign off on it on country level, then it goes to UNDSS in New York for review. The UNDSS in New York examine whether or not anything is missing, if it is following a standard format, and if there are clear connections between the MOSS and the SRA. Then it is distributed to all UNDSS agency Headquarters, which are given 30 days to evaluate it and issue a protest. According to the senior security adviser, the MOSS is a living document: *"Mr. Acland, Head of Sub-Office UNHCR Dadaab, and the SMT can at a meeting evaluate the MOSS and point to aspects that does or does not make any sense according to the present situation in Dadaab. They can then pass the new recommendations to the UNDSS Nairobi, who can then change the MOSS through the same amendment process."*

Prior to my stay in Dadaab, I had made some futile efforts to get a hold of the country-specific MOSS for Kenya. When I met the senior security adviser in Dadaab, he was willing to give me a copy of the latest MOSS for Kenya, which was approved in November 2010. The MOSS for Kenya specifically states that the required standards and mitigation measures in the Country MOSS for Kenya are linked to security risks that were identified in the security risk assessment of 2010 (UN 2010). The MOSS for Kenya is divided into the following categories:

- Telecommunications
- Security information and structure
- Medical support
- Equipment and supplies
- Vehicles
- Offices, premises and facilities protection
- Security training and briefings
- Residential security measures (UN 2010).

In order to limit the scope of my research, I focused particularly on the two categories *telecommunications* and *vehicles*. These where the categories that represented the biggest impose on the staff's everyday life and operations in the field, and as such was more visible during my stay in Dadaab than other categories within the MOSS. In the following I will present some of the requirements from the MOSS for Kenya that is directly linked to the field in Dadaab (for the country-specific MOSS for Kenya in full see Appendix 6). The subsequent section, 5.2.5, will elaborate more on how these requirements actually unfolds in Dadaab.

Telecommunications

Radio room

The MOSS for Kenya states that radio rooms should be established in Nairobi, Mombasa, Garissa, Dadaab and Kakuma (UN 2010). During the security briefing upon arrival in Dadaab, we learned that UNHCR have established two telecommunications room in the main compound in Dadaab. According to one of the telecommunications operators, the UNHCR have provided a good radio control room for the telecommunications. They have several transmitters, backup VHF radios, public exchange switchboard to communicate to other agencies, they have email, mobile phones, handsets, so that if any one means of communication fails, they have the possibility to switch to another.

Radio communications

As a standard requirement, all vehicles shall have effective and reliable communications, and all UN vehicles are to be equipped with VHF radios (UN 2010). In addition, vehicles operating in field conditions are to have a second radio system, usually HF radio or an alternative communication system, such as a satellite phone (UN 2010). In addition, as a country-specific requirement, VHF radios are to be provided to drives of rented/non-UN vehicles when on missions outside Nairobi (UN 2010).

Radio checks

According to the MOSS standard requirements, there should be standard operating procedures for radio checks. All critical staff, drivers, wardens and personnel deemed to be essential are to be issued with handheld VHF and/or UHF radios if the latter is compatible with the VHF system, and all personnel who works regularly outside office premises are to be trained to operate all forms of telecommunications equipment provided, including VHF/HF systems in

field vehicles (UN 2010). As a country-specific procedure, there are to be conducted radio checks daily in all duty stations outside Nairobi and Mombasa (UN 2010).

Vehicles

Movement

The Minimum Operating Security Standards for Kenya imposes restrictions on movement in areas and field locations with elevated risk levels, and field vehicles are mandatory for such areas (UN 2010). According to the UNHCR Visitor Information Pack (Appendix 7), Dadaab is considered an area with elevated risk levels (UNHCR 2011b). As such, movement is restricted from 1800hrs to 0600hrs. During this time staff and visitors are required to stay in a secure UN compound (UNHCR 2011b). However, exceptions can be made by the Area Security Coordinator (ASC) or the Area Security Management Team (ASMT) (UN 2010).

In Dadaab, all UN vehicles must move by convoy with armed police escorts (UN 2010; UNHCR 2011b). According to the Visitor Information Pack for Dadaab, all UN staff or non-UN staff traveling in UNHCR vehicles in the camps is obliged to comply with the UN security arrangements. If coming with own vehicle and if that vehicle is not to be joined by UNHCR staff, one does not have to comply with UN security arrangements, although this is encouraged by the UNHCR for ones own safety (UNHCR 2011b). It is stated in the Visitor Information Pack for Dadaab that due to the security situation, it is not recommended by the UNHCR to travel to Dadaab by road. If doing so the UNHCR request to be provided by travel details in order to alert the UNHCR security and to arrange for security escorts (UNHCR 2011b). The MOSS for Kenya clearly states that police escorts of UN official missions are mandatory for designated areas within the country, such as the distance from Ukasi and east towards Garissa, including all areas in North Eastern Province (UN 2010).

Vehicle movement control

Vehicle movement control procedures are to be implemented, and official travel in non-UN vehicles that are not MOSS compliant must be approved on a case-by-case basis (UN 2010).

Armed police escorts

In Dadaab, UNHCR has implemented the requirement of using armed police escorts to apply to movement by UN vehicle between the Dadaab Main Office and the three camps Ifo, Hagadera and Dagahaley (for map see Appendix 4). In addition, the requirement has also

been made to apply to all movement by UNHCR from the Field Offices into the blocks of the camps (for maps see Appendix 3).

The convoy with armed police escorts between the main compound in Dadaab and the three camps is operating from Monday to Friday, with fixed departure times. According to the security briefing, the scheduled police escorts leaves the main office at 08.00hrs, 14.00hrs, and 15.00hrs going into the camps, and return to the main office at 09.00hrs, 12.30hrs, 14.45hrs, and 16.30 hrs. Staff and visitors are encouraged to synchronize their movements to take advantage of the escort. If there is need for an escort outside of the scheduled times, it must be notified one day in advance in order to organize and make for the arrangement. Emergencies are however excluded from this procedure. In Dadaab, these movement restrictions are applied to UNHCR, Partners, and guests (UNHCR 2011b).

5.2.5 The UN Security Management System in Dadaab

The following section gives a description on how certain aspects of the UN Security Management System unfolds in the humanitarian operations in Dadaab.

Telecommunications

Radio room

As described in section 5.2.4, the informant from the telecommunications room felt that UNHCR had provided a good control room on the perimeter. However, even though the material components are in place in the radio room, two of my informants expressed the opinion that the radio control room in UNHCR Dadaab Main Office was not good enough.

According to the senior security adviser, the security room should own the radio room. This is the case with other UN agencies, and according to him, UNHCR is the only agency were this does not apply. In Dadaab, the radio room is owned by telecommunications and the administration, which was one of the reasons why he felt that the radio room in Dadaab was not satisfactory. As he explained, because the drivers report in to the radio room, the radio room becomes a great source of information. But the problem with the radio room not being owned by the security room in Dadaab is then that those operating the radio room do not see the value of information in a security-related manner. He gave me an example: *"if a driver*

sees a riot somewhere obstructing the roads, he might call it in to the radio room to tell other drivers to avoid the area due to traffic problems. The radio room will report it to the chief of transport, and then it dies there. The security focal persons might never even get to hear about it". The senior security adviser meant that when the security room owns the radio room, the telecommunication operators would normally have received training to look for other things, and thus would be able to see the possible security implications for instance a riot. This way they can act as collectors of information that can be related to security-issues.

According to the senior security adviser, the problem is that security has always been pushed back in UNHCR. In general, he seemed to be of the opinion that security should be a component part of the agency's culture, and agency training thus should include security. However, he felt that UNHCR was not there yet. He claimed that the UNHCR is one of the worst agencies he has worked with in terms of thinking security: *"security should be part of the way of thinking, instead it becomes a more secondary task."*

The other informant that expressed dissatisfaction with the radio room in Dadaab was a telecommunications operator with the UNHCR, currently stationed in the Dadaab radio control room. According to him, the limitations with radio room in Dadaab were that it was not linked, they lacked coordination, and they did not receive enough information. He wanted it to be more alive, with more reports and information coming in, and better procedures for sharing information. In his opinion, information needs to be shared with the right persons in order to get a reaction: *"a 24/7-control room never be effective if the information is not shared, and any incident must be logged for future reference or as evidence."* He further explained that with information coming in, the radio control room and the security room should share this information with each other. One concern he had was that staff on certain occasions did not report to them when a vehicle is leaving the compound. Unless they receive this information, they cannot track the vehicles moving outside the safe compounds.

The day before I met with my informant from the radio control room, there had been a shooting incident in one of the camps, Ifo. This incident can serve as an example to illustrate the shortcomings with the Dadaab radio room pointed out by the senior security adviser and the telecommunications operator. The shooting incident had happened in Ifo on the 4th of February, and the next day there were a lot of rumors on what had actually happened. I had some informal conversations with some informants from different implementing partners to

find out more about the shooting-incident. It seemed to me that word travelled fast as everyone I talked to that morning had heard of the incident, but their explanations differed in terms of details such as the time of the shooting, the number of victims, how many that had died, and what they thought to be the underlying reasons for the incident.

I also visited the security room in the UNHCR main compound to see if I could get some confirmed information about the shootings. The security room was closed, so I went to talk to the telecommunications room to hear if they had some more information for me. The officer on duty whenever there is such an incident it should be logged in the logbook for future references. From here, the information should be passed on to the people of concern. The shooting-incident in Ifo was however not logged, and because of this he did not have any information for me regarding the incident.

When I returned to Nairobi after my week in Dadaab, I was able to meet with the senior security adviser from UNHCR for a second interview. When asking him about the Ifo-shootings, he could tell me that two persons had been shot, one had died and the other was badly wounded. He also informed me that there had been a shooting incident in Mandera, located northeast in Kenya on the border to Somalia, at about the same time as the one in Ifo. He had found that there seemed to be some linkages between the two shootings, but he had only found out about the incident in Mandera due to a cross reference done at Nairobi level. On the 15th of February, the day before I met the senior security adviser in Nairobi, there had also been a shooting in Garissa. He had missed this incident, because Garissa had not reported to him. According to the senior security adviser, the Public Information desk at UNHCR in Nairobi is responsible for reading local newspapers, and had come across the shootings in a news article based on details from Garissa. They had then shared this information with the Public Information desk stationed in Dadaab, rather than with the security officers there.

The senior security adviser felt that the Public Information Desk had failed to share the information with the security officers in Dadaab because the staff there does not think security, and thus does not see the security implications such information could pose. He further explained that information is needed in order for the security officers to more adequately understand the situation. For instance, if there is a clan war shaping up in the North Eastern Province, it is going to affect the camps in Dadaab. Thus, the security focal

points in UNHCR needs to receive this information in order to get a picture of the situation and how it possibly could affect the camps.

According to the senior security adviser, the only reason why the security focal points in UNHCR in Dadaab were able to pick up the linkages between the incidents this could pose, where due to the Head of UNHCR Sub-Office in Dadaab, Mr. Acland and his security background. He was informed by the Public Information Desk in Dadaab due to his position as Head of Sub-Office, and had recognized that this information could hold certain implications for security in the area and thus shared it with his security officers. The senior security adviser pointed out that UN staff is hired on contracts for a certain period of time, and posed the question of what would happen when Mr. Acland no longer is Head of Sub-Office in Dadaab. The focus on security is quite dependent on having the right person in the right position. He also told me how the focus on security within UNHCR in Kenya as a whole was quite dependent on the person assigned as head of the agency. This was something which he had experienced first-hand with the assigning of a new head of agency which had not had much focus on security in comparison with the previous head of agency.

Radio communications

The MOSS for Kenya states that all vehicles are to be equipped with two communication systems. Previously, according to the senior security adviser, the MOSS stated the HF radio as the only alternative for a backup system. A recent change in the MOSS had now opened for a range of options on backup systems. According to him, this change in the Kenya MOSS was one example of the system working well and that the MOSS can in fact be changed in order to adapt to the situation.

The MOSS for Kenya requires that all vehicles shall have effective and reliable communications, and VHF radios should be provided to drives of rented/non-UN vehicles when on missions outside Nairobi. During the Security Cell meeting on 31st of January (Appendix 8), it was stated that one of the participants had given the police VHF radios. However, another participant claimed that the police escorts on the escort from Garissa on the 30th of January did not have a VHF radio with them. According to the Area Security Coordinator with the UNHCR, the Police quite often forgot to bring the VHF radios on with them on the convoys.

As specified in the MOSS for Kenya, in section 5.2.4, all critical staff, drivers, wardens and personnel deemed to be essential should be issued with handheld VHF and/or UHF radios. The MOSS also states that all such essential staff should be trained to operate all forms of telecommunications equipment provided. I got to observe the use of the telecommunication system in the UN vehicles during several convoys into one of the refugee camps. When leaving with a convoy, the driver reports to the radio control room, announcing the calling signals of that particular vehicle and all passengers onboard. Based on this information the radio room can establish an overview of who is located outside the compound. Other than during this procedure I did not see or hear the VHF radios in use. I did not observe the driver of any of the vehicles I was a passenger on during my stay use the VHF radio to contact the drivers of other UN vehicles, IP vehicles or the police vehicle. Nor did I hear the VHF radio being used during the convoys. If a VHF radio is turned on and set to a shared frequency one would be able to listen to the conversations made between the vehicles during the convoy. With the exception of the report in to the security room regarding passengers and destination, the VHF radio was silent during all of my trips with the convoy.

Upon asking the senior security adviser with the UNHCR whether there was in fact any communication between the police vehicles and the other vehicles in the convoy, he replied that there was communication between them, but it was not very good. He felt that there should be a radio check done by the police vehicle at the start of the convoy, but as he explained, no one even really knows the call sign of the police vehicle.

Radio checks

The MOSS for Kenya also states that radio checks should be conducted daily in all duty stations outside Nairobi and Mombasa. In Dadaab, the radio check is held daily at 20.00hrs. Through one of the informant from the UNHCR I was able to participate in the radio check and observe how it was conducted. A telecommunications Operator recited the different calling signals and then the respective persons answered. Through this procedure the radio control room can check whether all the radios are working. Several staff members did not respond to their own calling signal, which according to my informant was quite normal. According to the informant, a good deal of the staff members did not take the radio check seriously and thus either forgot or did not bother to answer to their calling signal. According to another informant with the UNHCR, this has become a problem because it is almost normalized not to answer the radio check. She told us that the UNHCR in Dadaab had now

informed all personnel stating that those who did not participate in the radio checks would loose the additional risk pay to their salary.

Vehicles

Vehicle movement control

The country-specific MOSS for Kenya states that vehicle movement control procedures are to be implemented. As mentioned, in Dadaab the driver of the vehicle reports the call signal of the vehicle and its passengers, as well as intended destination. In addition, as a vehicle movement control measure, the G4S guards that are stationed at the entrance of the different compound, have a logbook in which the driver signs when he is leaving the compound with his vehicle. This way they can keep track of which vehicles are outside the safe compound at what time. I observed this measure being carried out every time I passed an entrance to a compound guarded by the G4S.

Armed police escorts to and from the camps

I took part in the convoy escorted by armed police vehicles between the Dadaab Main Office and the three refugee camps on several occasions. My own observations and input from my informants gave me an overview of how the requirement of using armed police escorts is implemented in Dadaab.

Before exiting the secure main compound the vehicles have to sign the logbook with the G4S guards, in accordance with the requirement of vehicle movement control. The vehicles then position themselves a couple of hundred meters outside the compound, often in open landscape or in vulnerable positions, and wait until the escort is ready to move. The driver reports to the radio room with the call signal of the vehicle and all the passengers inside, where they are departing from and what the destination is.

It seemed to me that the convoy then started moving at random, there was no clear signal as far as I could see, and no communication over the VHF radio. Some of the IP vehicles even left before the convoy was ready to depart. It appeared to me that the drivers of the IP vehicles were impatient and thus choose to leave before the armed police vehicle was ready. The convoys are moving at high speed, and with all the dust that is kicked up it is hard to keep a visual of the other vehicles in the convoy. On some of the convoys I was able to spot the armed police vehicle driving either in front of us or behind us, but on others I could travel

the whole distance without having observed the police vehicle. On many of the convoys that I participated I observed IP vehicles driving alone without the use of armed escorts, from organizations such as Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), German International Cooperation (GIZ), International Rescue Committee (IRC) among others. My overall impression of the convoys was that it was disorderly, disorganized and resembled a desert rally. One of my informants, the senior security adviser, actually referred to it as a *"Dakar rally",* an image that was shared with other informants from the implementing partners as well.

On one occasion, during a special arrangement of armed escort on a Saturday, the return from Ifo was scheduled to 12.15hrs. At 12.00hrs our vehicle took a position just outside the field office compounds in Ifo, waiting for the police escort passing from Dagahaley. At 12.15, we still had not seen any police vehicle, and after a short discussion the driver and the passengers seemed to agree on the assumption that the police vehicle probably already had left, or was on its way, and just drove off. I did not observe a police vehicle on that distance from Ifo to the main compound in Dadaab.

The recurrent violations by the implementing partners on the requirement of travelling in convoys led by armed police escorts between the main compound and the camps was a hot topic during the Security Cell Meeting on January 31st 2011. Some of the participants did not agree to whether or not the use of armed escorts was a requirement or only an offer to the IPs. Some felt that this was only an offer to IPs such as CARE and Save the Children (whom were mentioned as examples of IPs driving without armed escorts), as stated by one of the participants: *"It makes sense to complain to the Head Office that they left the convoy again, to tell them that they need to discipline their driver. But as long as the NGOs does not declare that they want to follow the rules, UN cannot do much about it. Or you can report. But there is no agreement, we cannot enforce it, we offer it."* Others were of the opinion that the implementing partners have chosen to accept the protection of the UN, and therefore they have to play by these rules.

When I asked informants from different implementing partners regarding how they felt about the requirement of armed police escorts to and from the camps, some of them explained their lack of adherence to the convoys from time to time with the inconveniences such an arrangement caused to them. As an example, they explained that if they for instance had a meeting or some work to be done in the field office that would take about 20 minutes to an

hour, they still have to wait in the field office until the escort goes back again. One informant told me that he felt that it made life more programmed, which to him was a bit boring. And because the convoy is scheduled to leave at certain times, it may cause inconvenience to wait for the departure if they are in a fix and have to get to a place in a hurry. Some of the informants from the implementing partners, and one informant from UNHCR, told me that in such cases they would take a shortcut and just go, without waiting for an escort.

However, even though a large part of the informants from the implementing partners (IP) felt that the use of armed police escorts caused certain inconveniences, they told me that they did find the escorts necessary when travelling to and from the refugee camps. Some of the informants from the implementing partners felt that it was a necessary precautionary because although the North Eastern Province has had very few incidences, one could never know what could happen in the future. They particularly found the requirement necessary due to the proximity to the Somali border and the threat of the Al-Shabaab in the region. A large part of the IP informants felt that the advantages of adhering to an armed police escort was greater than the disadvantages, and that these precautions were accepted as a part of working in such a complex environment. Even so, I witnessed several IP vehicles travelling on the stretch between the main compound and the field offices without waiting for an armed escort.

Armed escorts within the camps

In Dadaab, the UNHCR has implemented the requirement of travelling with armed police escort not only between the camps but also inside the blocks in the refugee camps. According to the police sergeant in Dagahaley, all the agencies stationed in Dagahaley (including the implementing partners) make use of the armed police escort when going into the blocks. This is however contrary to what the different IP agencies themselves admit to. While most of the IP informants expressed that the use of armed police escorts was very necessary when moving to and from the camps, they did not find the UNHCR requirement of having armed escorts when going into the blocks of the refugee camps to be equally necessary.

Most of the informants I talked to from the different implementing partners felt that there was no need for them to use armed escorts when moving into the blocks of the refugee camps. Some of the informants relied on what seemed to be a common assumption that the threat to staff safety in the area is connected to the stretch between the main compound and the refugee

camps. If they were to be attacked it would most likely be during movement on this distance. A common reason the informants from the implementing partners gave me for not using armed police escorts inside the refugee camps was that it would make things much more difficult. Their staff often has different tasks to attend to and they might be going to different areas within the camp. In order to meet these needs, several armed police vehicles would be needed. According to the head of the main police station in Dagahaley Camp, their station have one police vehicle stationed in Dagahaley, which is used for patrolling within the camps and for emergencies, and one police vehicle stationed in Dadaab, which is used for convoys between the main office and the field offices. According to the police sergeant, and confirmed by an informant with UNHCR, the staff must place a request for an escort vehicle with the police station if they need an armed escort in order to go into the camp. As the informant from UNHCR expressed, this could take some time and sometimes the police does not always have a vehicle available right then and there. To him, it made the job more inconvenient.

Another reason many of the informants from the implementing partners gave for not using armed escorts when travelling within the camps was that they found the environment there to be friendly. They explained this with their role as implementing partners, working closely with the refugees. The IP informants I talked to generally felt that they had a good relationship with the beneficiaries because the refugees know them and their agency's work in the camp. They emphasized the need to be very simple when travelling into the blocks, and bringing an armed escort complicates this. One informant from CARE did however feel that it was advisable for international staff to use armed escorts when going into the blocks or moving around inside the refugee camps or between the different field offices in the camps.

On one occasion I was able to travel into the blocks in Hagadera refugee camp, together with an informant from the UNHCR. Prior to our trip into the blocks I had had a conversation with him regarding the UN security management system and the use of armed escorts when going into the blocks. He told me that as a precaution, there is a requirement for the UNHCR staff to go with a police escort when you go in to monitor projects in the camps. In his opinion, the reason for this requirement was previous incidents of threats to UN staff, with people throwing rocks and so on. There had however not been any major incidents. He told me that the IPs did not use this kind of escort when travelling into the blocks: *"You'd be surprised*

that our partners, like for instance CARE, LWF, NCCK[9], GIZ, most of them don't use police escorts when they go in to do monitoring". I got the impression from him that he did not approve of this kind of behavior, and that the IPs too should use armed escorts.

After our formal talk, the UNHCR informant asked me if I would like to go with him into the blocks, as he had go in to monitor and assess some areas where refugees had settled in a flood prone area in the outskirts of the camp area. Together with three staff members from Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), we drove into the blocks in an NRC vehicle, without any armed escort. The driver from NRC told me that if UNHCR staff goes together with NCR they are able to get closer to the refugees. One of his colleagues explained to me the refugees had told them that they feared the police, and that bringing armed police escorts with them into the blocks could signal that the staff fears the refugees if they find it necessary to bring armed police with them.

When we arrived back to the UNHCR field office, I again asked my informant from UNHCR whether using armed escorts when travelling into the blocks was necessary. He still claimed that it was a UNHCR requirement and that it was highly necessary. But at the same time, when asked about the fact that we had just travelled into the blocks without an armed escort, he replied, *"it is more easy this way. If you want to go into the blocks, you have to make a request for an escort. This can take time, and sometimes they don't have a vehicle available. So when for instance there are reports of flooding, I just jump into an IP car, CARE, NRC, LWF, and just go. For UN vehicles it is a requirement. But it is easier to do the job without using an escort"*.

As specified in UN policies, the MOSS is a summary of all the mitigation measures recommended, and every mitigation measure in the MOSS should have direct linkages to the SRA. According to the senior security adviser with UNHCR, there is nothing in the Security Risk Assessment that can justify having a requirement of using armed escorts when travelling into the blocks. As far as he could tell, there are no linkage between the MOSS and the SRA regarding this requirement, and as a consequence the risk assessment might be in need for an update. Based on a new assessment, they might find that there is no real need for using an escort when travelling into the blocks.

[9] National Council of Churches of Kenya

The senior security adviser also told me that he had found that UNHCR staff doesn't go into the blocks very often, and that the connection to the blocks mainly is done through the implementing partners. He was curious as to why the implementing partners are violating the MOSS. Most IPs claim that they feel safe in the camps through an acceptance from the refugees, so that dragging the police along constitutes a problem for them he stated. The senior security adviser is aware that IP and UNHCR staff is talking about the use of armed escorts and its necessity, and that someone needs to put it on the table so that they can have a look at it. He suggests that a possible explanation on why no one wants to be the one to first mention it is that many do not understand that the MOSS is indeed changeable.

As illustrated in findings above and expressed by the associate field safety adviser, the requirements in the MOSS are not always met: *"We don't always adhere to the MOSS 100%, no field office can say that they do that. But we try to adhere to the MOSS as much as possible".* This chapter has given a description on how he UN security management system is thought to work, and how it actually unfolds on field level in Dadaab. These findings will be further discussed in the following chapter, in relation to the theoretical framework presented in chapter 3.

6. Discussion

Based on the theoretical perspective presented in chapter 3, one could expect to find a gap between how the organization believes the world works, and how it actually works. Within these differing versions of reality, latent conditions and discrepant events are allowed to accumulate unnoticed, and could eventually lead to an organizational accident resulting in a disaster (Turner & Pidgeon 1997; Reason 1997). In this chapter, my empirical findings from Dadaab presented in the foregoing chapter 5, will be discussed in the light of this theoretical perspective. Is there a gap between how the UN security management system is thought to work according to frameworks and policies, and how it actually unfolds on field level in Dadaab? And if so, are there findings from Dadaab that could imply that latent conditions and discrepant events are allowed to accumulate within the UN security management system that are implemented in Dadaab?

6.1 Incubation of disaster

All organizations operate with a set of cultural beliefs of how the world works. At some point during what during what Turner & Pidgeon (1997) refer to as the incubation phase, a chain of discrepant events that are at odds with this image of the world will accumulate within the organization. The result is a developing gap between the values and attitudes expressed by the organization and its actual behavior (Turner & Pidgeon 1997; Olsen & Nævestad 2006). Theories of learning refer to this gap as theories of action: a divergence between what the actors say and how they act, or espoused theory vs. theories-in-use (Argyris & Schön 1974).

The informant who chose to bring me along with him into the blocks without an armed escort despite emphasizing the necessity of such armed escorts, show signs of theories of action. It seems that he has a mental map over how he is supposed to act as an UNHCR staff when travelling into the blocks to monitor projects, and according to his own statements his values and worldview correlated to that of UNHCR. His espoused theory, what he claims to base his actions on, then is that armed escorts are necessary as a precautionary measure when going into the blocks. His actions however, revealed a theory-in-use that differed from his espoused theory. Although he stated that the use of armed police escorts was necessary, his actual behavior insinuated the opposite. Instead of following procedure and request an escort, he violated the UNHCR requirement and went into the blocks in an implementing partner's vehicle. Because he still claimed that the use of armed escorts was necessary even after having openly violated this requirement, there is plausible reason to argue that he is unaware

of the actual worldview and values his behavior is based on. His behavior thus represents a discrepant event that is at odds with the organization's picture of the world.

I got the impression that there was little awareness among informants on higher levels in the hierarchy than the field office-level about the fact that UNHCR staff stationed in the field offices uses IP cars when travelling into the camps as to avoid the strict UNHCR requirement of using armed police escorts. As mentioned earlier, the senior security adviser with UNHCR in Nairobi had found that UNHCR staff doesn't go into the blocks very often. This might indicate that such discrepant events between how the organization is thought to work and how it really works are allowed to accumulate unnoticed.

Other statements from IPs also show a certain divergence between the culturally accepted understanding of the world and how it really is. Many IP informants claim that they always travel with escorts between the main compound and the field offices, however both observations and statements show otherwise. This might imply that they are unaware of the divergence between the espoused theory, the theory that they report as a basis for their action, and the theory-in-use.

The greater this gap between how one thinks the world works and how it actually works, the more vulnerable the organization is, because this gap opens up to the accumulation of unintended and complex contributory preconditions within the UNHCR and the UN security management system (Pidgeon & O'Leary 2000). These contributory preconditions are what Reason (1997) refers to as latent conditions, and can if combined contribute to the development of an organizational accident.

6.1.1 Organizational accidents

Per definition, an organizational accident is an accident that happens to organizations. Such accidents are events that occur within complex modern technologies, have multiple causes and often result in catastrophic consequences involving devastating effects on uninvolved populations, assets and the environment (Reason 1997). One could argue that a breakdown in the UN security management system in Dadaab could be defined as an organizational accident. Seeing as the UN is perceived as an umbrella for security in the area, the consequences of a breakdown in the UN security management system could result in catastrophic consequences. It could lead to immediate effects such as the loss of the lives of

staff and damage to assets, both for UN and implementing partners. Such adverse and immediate consequences could even branch out throughout the refugee operations in Dadaab and possibly lead to withdrawal of organizations and operations in the area. As pointed out in the introduction, deliberate attacks on humanitarian staff have in many cases led to implementation of remote managing or complete withdrawal from the area. These implications of a breakdown in the UN security management system will affect the quality and quantity of the assistance given to those most in need, namely the refugees in Dadaab. As such, the safety and security of UN and IP staff is closely tied to the safety and security of the refugees in the area. A breakdown in the UN security management system as a result of combining active failures and latent conditions, with the possibility of such catastrophic consequences as mentioned above, could arguably be defined as an organizational accident.

Defenses and barriers

The Minimum Operating Security Standard (MOSS) and the mitigation measures decided upon through the Security Risk Assessment can be perceived as defenses or safeguards against the development of an organizational accident. An organization will develop requirements that are supposed to separate the potential threats from vulnerable people and assets in an attempt to avoid disasters, and an organizational accident thus involves the breaching of such barriers (Reason 1997). In Dadaab, non-compliance with the MOSS would represent a violation that could cause holes in these defenses. The empirical findings from Dadaab presented in sub-chapter 5.2 points to possible active failures and development of latent conditions in the UN security management system, creating holes in the defenses.

Active failures

Active failures are made in the 'sharp end' (Reason 1997). The 'sharp end' in the UN security management system in this study is on sub-level and field-level in Dadaab, particularly those stationed at the Field Offices in the three camps, but partly also those stationed in the Main Compound. The latent conditions are a result of decisions made at the 'blunt end', meaning the top-level in the hierarchy (Reason 1997). In this study, the 'blunt end' would be UNHCR in Nairobi, and the UNDSS headquarters in for example Garissa, Geneva and New York.

During my fieldwork in Dadaab, I observed several active failures. They did not lead to any immediate and visible effects, but in combination with other active failures or latent conditions, these active failures could contribute to aggravated consequences of future events

(Reason 1997). As mentioned in section 5.2.5, requirement in the MOSS on daily radio checks in Dadaab were not taken seriously by a significant number of UNHCR staff. This is an active failure that could indeed exacerbate the possible consequences of an incident; the radio checks are conducted to make sure that all handheld VHF radios are working in order to ensure communication in case of an adverse event. If people don't take the radio checks seriously, the status of their VHF radios will not be confirmed, and worst-case scenario in case of an event is that they will not be able to receive or transmit important information. Contact between the security room and staff members could indeed be of vital importance in case of an event in order to reduce possible consequences.

Another significant active failure I observed during my fieldwork was the UNHCR staff that took a shortcut and violated the MOSS requirement of using armed police escorts when travelling into the blocks of the refugee camp. The implication of this violation is his location is unknown to the security room or the radio control room in Dadaab Main Office. If latent conditions were to combine, resulting in an incident involving this staff member while inside the camp, the security room would not be able to come to his assistance. Similar implications can be found every time the drivers chose not to report to the radio control room when leaving a secure compound. These are active failures, made by personnel on field level. Even though it is mainly the implementing partners that do violate the requirement of moving to the camps with an armed police escort, these active failures will affect the UN security management system as a whole seeing as it is perceived as an umbrella for security in the area.

Active failures can create holes in the UN security management system's defenses (Reason 1997). These holes are created when front-line personnel either deliberately disable certain defenses in order to achieve their objectives, or unwittingly fail in their role as one of the most important lines of defense in the system (Reason 1997). By choosing to not respond to the daily radio check, the staff commits a violation on the requirement, at the same time as they fail in their role as an important line of defense in the system in place to ensure staff safety in Dadaab. And by making the decision to travel without armed escorts are examples of front-line personnel deliberately disabling the defenses implemented by the MOSS for Kenya in order to get their job done.

Latent conditions

Latent conditions are the inevitable product of top-level decisions (Reason 1997). As such, these are not as easily observable as active failures. But active failures might often be an indication of some underlying, latent conditions (Reason 1997). In Dadaab, I observed some signs that could possibly indicate that latent conditions are developing within the UN security management system in place in the area.

Unworkable procedures are the result of strategic top-level decisions. The MOSS for Kenya is established on higher levels within the UN, with the input from field-level. Any changes to the MOSS must be approved by the UNDSS following a chain of accountability upwards through levels in the framework for accountability presented in the sections 5.1.2 and 5.2.2. If the MOSS for Kenya is considered to be unworkable for that particular context, it could contribute to the accumulation of latent conditions within the system.

The Policy for UN Minimum Operating Security Standards clearly states that the MOSS system is to be kept as simple as possible, with the flexibility and capacity to allow adaptation to differing scenarios and rapidly changing circumstances. As stated by one of my informants, the MOSS is indeed changeable, and the SMT together with the Head of Sub-Office in Dadaab can suggest or recommend changes to the UNDSS in order to adapt the framework to the context of Dadaab. This flexibility may possibly counteract a development of latent conditions and subsequent active failures. However, as pointed out by the senior security adviser, it does not appear to be known to the staff that the MOSS is changeable in practice. In consequence, the debate regarding requirements that are felt to be unfit for the context is discussed privately rather than in important forums, where changes can be called for.

If the decisions are not made as an effort to adjust the MOSS to the context, the result will be continued violations of such procedures. And as one of the security officers stated, they don't adhere to the MOSS 100% as they should, but they strive to comply with the requirements as much as possible. This statement can in fact be an indicator that certain aspects of the MOSS could be outdated or inapplicable to the cases at hand, and that the MOSS for Kenya is ready for an update. But without suggestions from those that implement these requirements on a daily basis, the UNDSS will not be aware that the MOSS needs a revision.

UN policies regarding the security management system state that the mitigation measures also must be logical, realistic, cost effective, and capable of being implemented within the context of the operation or country, but given the description from informants on how the procedures of attaining an armed police escort when planning on going into the blocks work, it is clear that this solution, as it is per today, is neither. This might imply that top-level decisions fail to reflect how the organization really works.

Some of the UNHCR requirements implemented in Dadaab can't be claimed to be logical, such as the requirement of using armed escort when travelling inside the blocks. As pointed out by the senior security adviser, there is nothing in the SRA that justify this requirement. The MOSS for Kenya can be found to be realistic, in the sense that threats of kidnapping do occur, but arguments can be made that it is not realistic in the sense of being practical or feasible, as informants claim that it makes their job more inconvenient. In the opinion of the senior security adviser, the amount paid by UNHCR to the police for them to provide armed escorts, is not proportional to the service provided from the police. The general feeling stated by the senior security adviser that UNHCR is not getting their money's worth is a sign that this solution is not cost effective. As my informant put it, right now UNHCR might be spending money that they need to spend.

The procedure and number of vehicles available for providing escort-service when travelling inside the camps does place restrictions on how capable this requirement is of being implemented within the context of the operation. The staff must place a request for an escort, and if a vehicle is not available, the staff will have to wait, which will affect their ability to do their job. As such, it might seem more reasonable to both UNHCR and IP staff to violate the requirement and travel inside the blocks without an armed escort, causing the shortcut to become the norm rather than a violation. Official travel in a non-UN vehicle that are not MOSS compliant must also be approved on a case-by-case basis, a requirement that might seem cumbersome to the UNHCR staff, and to them it might seem easier to just go with an IP car without reporting it. The result is that official numbers will show that UNHCR staff is not going in to the blocks very often and that it is the implementing partners that carry out monitoring, even though this might not necessarily be the case. When UNHCR staff is travelling into the camps without consent or the security staff knowing their whereabouts, it creates latent conditions within the system. A latent condition is not necessarily a problem when standing alone, but when different latent conditions and active failures combine, such as

UNHCR staff travelling into the blocks without an armed escort without notifying the telecommunication or the security room about their whereabouts, it could reinforce the possible consequences if anything where to happen to that staff member while in the blocks.

Shortfall in training is one example of a latent condition (Reason 1997). As the senior security adviser mentioned, he felt that security should be included in agency training, and with that implied that this is lacking within UNHCR. Without proper training, the possibility of making an active failure increases. According to the senior security adviser, if the security room owned the radio room in UNHCR, they would have received the proper training in looking for security-implications in the information collected. Without this training, the telecommunications officers could fail to share important information with security officers in Dadaab, and thus conduct an active failure. The decision to place the radio room with the telecommunications and administration in Dadaab, rather than with the security room, is thus a latent condition that could contribute to a number of discrepant events. The lack of security thinking can be an outcome of the safety culture within the UNHCR.

Safety culture

Safety culture is closely intertwined with safety and security (Pidgeon & O'Leary 1997; Reason 1997). Latent conditions are made at top-level, and decisions made at this level contribute to the shaping of a distinctive culture within that organization (Reason 1997). According to the senior security adviser in UNHCR, security has always been pushed back in the agency. As mentioned in the findings in section 5.2.5 the radio room had not logged the shooting incident that happened in Ifo during our stay in Dadaab. This might have been a result of the above-mentioned lack of training in recognizing the value of information in a security-related manner. This could support the senior security adviser's point of view of security being pushed back in UNHCR. Had the telecommunications officers seen the implication of such information in relation to security, this would probably have been logged and shared with at least the other telecommunications operators.

Because safety culture is created and recreated through its members, it is crucial that staff such as the telecommunications officers, learn to focus on security and implement a shared care and concern for hazards and solicitude over the possible impact on people, as well as a continual reflection upon practice through monitoring, analysis, and feedback systems (Pidgeon & O'Leary 2000). In order to enhance a good safety culture, the officers in the radio

room needs to receive training in how to look for security implications in the information they receive. The shared views in an organization or a part of an organization is what shapes a distinctive culture, and it is then necessary to alter this shared view towards a greater focus on security.

Another example that illustrates a lack of security thinking within UNHCR is the way information regarding several shooting-incidents in the North Eastern Province was shared within the agency. According to the senior security adviser in UNHCR, because the staff at the Public Information Desk both in Nairobi and Dadaab did not seem to recognize the value of the information in a security-related manner, the information was not shared through the proper channels. This could imply that the staff does not think security, nor seem to comprehend how certain information could have security implications that the security focal points in Dadaab should know about.

As the senior security adviser explained, the important information on the different shooting incidents only reached the security officers in Dadaab because of the Head of Sub-Office, Mr. Acland, who with his security-related background was able to see the value of this information and share it with the right persons. This example could bear witness to a poor safety culture within UNHCR. As Pidgeon & O'Leary (2000) points out, a good safety culture is reflected and promoted by senior management commitment to safety. In my opinion, the findings from Dadaab could imply that the senior management, represented by the senior security adviser in Nairobi and the Head of Sub-Office in Dadaab, do show a commitment to safety. However, as Reason (1997) emphasizes, in order to navigate an organization within the safety space, good safety practices is needed on all levels of the organization. A good safety culture is dissociated from the top management, and endures beyond the replacement of top-level management (Reason 1997). It seems that the safety focus within UNHCR in Dadaab to a certain extent is tied to the commitment of the current Head of Sub-Office. As pointed out by the senior security adviser, there is plausible reason to question whether the focus on security among the staff and the head of agencies in Dadaab will be upheld when Head of Sub-Office is replaced.

The lack of adherence to the daily radio checks mentioned above could also serve as an example of how UNHCR staff lack a focus on security, or as the senior security adviser said: they do not think security. They do not seem to comprehend the relevance of conducting these

radio checks, or they simply do not care. Either way, their manner of thinking is not focused on the security issues. The Framework for Accountability, presented in section 5.1.2, clearly states that *all* actors, down to every individual UN staff member have a role to play in contributing to the highest standards of safety and security (UN 2007). The lack of security thinking among staff members in Dadaab, illustrates that the UN's effort to develop an effective and integrated security system has not yet been achieved.

One way of strengthening the safety culture could be to run a campaign to explain why measures implemented in Dadaab are indeed necessary in terms of ensuring the security of the staff. It is important that the staff understand the value of such precautions, in order to ensure that they do in fact respect and adhere to them. This is related to the points emphasized by Pidgeon & O'Leary (2000), that not only does a good safety culture need to reflect and promote a shared care and concern about hazards and their impacts, but that the norms and rules about such hazards needs to be realistic and flexible, and evaluated continually. If the staff seems to find the norms and rules to be unrealistic, it might be time to assess them and find whether or not they are still appropriate or practical. The same goes for the findings where the implementing partners choses to leave before the convoy or travel outside the scheduled times without escorts. It might reflect a poor safety culture among the implementing partners, or they might just not see the value of that particular precaution. Thus, the top management needs to communicate downwards the importance of this requirement as well as encourage the staff to come with suggestions on changes in the requirements.

6.1.2 Failures of foresight

According to Turner & Pidgeon (1997), discrepant events are allowed to accumulate unnoticed when the organization suffers from failures of foresight. Erroneous assumptions, information difficulties, cultural lags in safety measures or a reluctance to take notice of events are examples of such failures of foresight (Turner & Pidgeon 1997).

Events are unnoticed or misunderstood because of information handling difficulties in complex situations

Handling and processing information is a complex process, and in a context characterized by a constantly changing environment it could be difficult to achieve the same situational understanding. According to Turner & Pidgeon (1997), this is particularly so in situations

where tasks are handled by several organizations. A number of differing interpretations can arise, causing a variable disjunction of information (Turner & Pidgeon 1997). In Dadaab, there are over 20 partners involved in the refugee operations in Dadaab in addition to UNHCR. This includes other UN agencies, several implementing partners, departments from the Kenyan Government, as well as the Kenyan Police. With so many different actors with differing agendas involved in running the projects and tasks in Dadaab, it is likely that information handling difficulties or communication failures will arise. In example, it might be possible that UNHCR and the implementing partners will obtain different interpretations of the same situation, because they have such different roles and agendas; UNHCR, being the main funder, and the implementing partners being those who implements the projects funded by UNHCR. Poor communication both internal in organizations and across organizational boundaries are likely to reinforce variable disjunction (Turner & Pidgeon 1997).

In Dadaab, the weekly Security Cell meetings described in section 5.2.3 and 5.2.5 could be one way of counteracting the development of variable disjunction of information among the partners operating in Dadaab. Here focal points from several partners are invited by UNHCR to discuss security-related issues and come up with recommendation, and serves as a forum for the different actors to achieve a higher degree of common understanding regarding the security situation in the area. However, my empirical findings presented in chapter 5 illustrated a tendency of poor communication and variable disjunction in Dadaab. The lack of communication was apparent both within the telecommunications room and between the vehicles participating in the convoys between the camps and the main compound.

The latent condition of shortfall in training the telecommunications operators to recognize security-implications of the information collected, could contribute to the emergence of divergent images of the world and the accumulation of unnoticed events. The example given by the senior security adviser in section 5.2.5 serves as an illustration: in case of reports on riots blocking the road, a telecommunications operator will immediately relate this to a traffic jam and begin redirecting vehicles. A security officer, on the other hand, will reflect on how the riot could have implications for the security in the area. The two different staff members then show a variable disjunction of information in that they possess two different interpretations of the same situation. The same argumentation could be applied to the different situational understandings between the security focal points and the public information desk in the example discussed earlier in relation to the safety culture in Dadaab.

As mentioned in the findings from Dadaab, in section 5.2.5, the telecommunications officer had some complaints regarding the radio room. Particularly, he wanted the staff to use the telecommunication room more actively by reporting information to them, for instance by reporting when a particular vehicle is going out to perform a task. Without information, such vehicles are left to their own, contributing to a variable disjunction of information, where the drivers and the operators in the telecommunication room will end up having different understandings of the situation. As the telecommunications officer stated, a radio room can never be effective unless people share information with them. The telecommunications operator that I talked to had not been informed by the officer on duty about the serious shooting-incident in Ifo camp. Neither was it written down in the logbook. As such, the communication within the telecommunication room also seemed to be poor.

As presented in the findings in section 5.2.5, I talked to different informants regarding the shooting-incident, and all had slightly divergent information to give. Even though the explanations differed in terms of how many that had been shot, how many that had died, at what time it had happened, and the reasons for the incident, most of my informant had a fairly good overview of the incident. Only the informant at the telecommunications room did not seem to know much about it, he could not even give me an estimate of the time of the incident. The fact that the officer working at the UNHCR telecommunications room did know less than my other informants also do bear witness to the lack of communication and the poor sharing of information that apparently is characterizing the security system in Dadaab.

Even though it is stated in the MOSS that all UN vehicles are to be equipped with communications system such as VHF radio, and that all vehicles shall have effective and reliable means of communications, such requirements does not help to counteract variable disjunction of information as long as the communication means are not used properly. Even if UNHCR provide the police vehicles with VHF radios, as long as no one knows their calling signal and they keep forgetting to bring the radios on the convoys, this contributes to communication difficulties during the convoys. The security measures have to be implemented and used properly, or else the requirements will not serve its intention.

Especially during the special arrangement with the escort on the mentioned Saturday, 5th of February, the lack of communication between the vehicles partaking in the convoys became evident. As stated in section 5.2.5, our driver eventually based his actions on his and the

passengers own understanding of the situation. Since the police vehicle did not arrive at the time they thought it would, they drew the conclusion that it had either already passed or was on its way, and then acted upon this interpretation of the situation by leaving Ifo and head for the main compound in Dadaab. With better communication between the vehicles through the VHF radios or other means of communication, such misunderstandings or divergent understandings of the situation would be minimized, as one would be able to update each other on the whereabouts of their vehicles. This could in turn impede the possible accumulation of unnoticed events due to information handling difficulties.

The convoys between the main compound and the refugee camps were often compared to a desert rally, with high speed, bad driving conditions and road dust disturbing the visibility of vehicles in front or behind ones own vehicle. In such ill-structured situation, difficulties of handling information are inherent. More frequent communication between the vehicles could help the driver locate the other vehicles as well as warn or be warned about dangers or other issues along the route. With poor communication between the participating vehicles in the convoys, as was the case in Dadaab, the drivers are thus left to their own interpretation of the situation, clearly opening up for the development of a variable disjunction of information. In cases of emergencies, for instance a flat tire, ambush or a car accident, this latent condition that the poor or lack of communication creates within the UN security system could even exacerbate the possible consequences.

Events are unnoticed because of erroneous assumptions

According to the senior security adviser, as elaborated on in section 5.2.5, there is a lack of security thinking among the staff, and the telecommunications operators and the Public Information Desks does not see the security-implications certain information could hold. This gives room for different situational understandings, variable disjunction of information, between the security persons in Dadaab and the staff handling information. If staff is not able to relate information to the aspect of security, the information will not be shared with the right persons at the right time. This could allow for discrepant events to accumulate unnoticed within the organization. If the information is misunderstood or not interpreted right, it could pose serious implications for the security situation in the field.

As presented in chapter 5, the UN security management system is based on a security risk assessment and a certain framework of accountability. The security risk assessment is based

on information gathered by security focal points from different levels within the organization. As seen in Dadaab, the security focal points from different organizations gather information and discuss implications and recommendations, which is then used as a basis for decision-making for the head of agencies. If the security focal points don't receive important information from for instance the telecommunications room or the public information desks, it could result in decisions made on the basis of insufficient or inadequate information. Unnoticed or misunderstood events could lead to a selective problem representation within the organization, causing decisions to be made based on a possibly incorrect understanding of the situation (Turner & Pidgeon 1997).

Events pass unnoticed due to cultural lag in existing precautions

According to UN policy documents elaborated on in sections 5.1.4 and 5.2.4, the requirements in the MOSS are supposed to be linked to the threats identified in the security risk assessment. However, according to the senior security adviser with UNHCR, there is nothing in the SRA that can justify using armed police escorts when going into the blocks. One could argue that this requirement thus is not appropriate in this area. Why then, do UNHCR still operate with this requirement in Dadaab? One explanation could be that there possibly exists a cultural lag in the existing MOSS for Kenya, and that the precautionary measures need an update in order to fit its environment.

The informants that I talked to from the implementing partners did not find it necessary to bring armed police with them when travelling inside the camps, and I got the impression that the precautionary measure of using armed police escorts into the blocks was perceived as inapplicable to the case in hand by the implementing staff as well as one of the UNHCR staff members I talked to. They seemed to feel that it conflicted with other goals such as being able to respond to reports from the camps quickly. According to Turner & Pidgeon (1997), discrepant events may allow to accumulate unnoticed as a consequence of such outdated or inapplicable procedures and precautions. When the staff find the procedures to be unfitting for the context, it could open up to violations in order to fit action to the situation (Turner & Pidgeon 1997).

As shown in section 5.2.5, implementing partners and at least one staff member from UNHCR did chose to take shortcuts in order to move around the precautionary requirements and get the job done. Such violations could allow for discrepant events to pass unnoticed, and

repeatedly violations may cause them to become accepted as the norm (Turner & Pidgeon 1997). When violations become accepted as the norm, it creates latent conditions within the system, which in turn can increase the likelihood of active failures and aggravated consequences of unsafe acts (Turner & Pidgeon 1997). Based on my findings, it could seem that the MOSS for Kenya is ready for a new assessment in order to fit the precautions to the context, in order to reduce violations, shortcuts, and the possibility for accumulation of discrepant events.

Events unnoticed or misunderstood due to a reluctance to fear the worst

As mentioned above, as well as elaborated on in section 5.2.5, findings show that the implementing partners do not find it necessary to use armed police escorts when travelling into the blocks. So far, it has been implied in this discussion that one reason for this could be that the UN security management system have suffered from a cultural lag in existing precautions and that these need to be updated in order to fit the context. However, it is not necessarily so that the implementing partners possess a more correct understanding of the situation within the camps. Another suggestion could be that the implementing partners don't see the need to use armed escorts when travelling inside the camps simply because the organizations are reluctant to fear the worst. According to Turner & Pidgeon (1997), discrepant events could accumulate due to a tendency to minimize impending danger, and as such preventative action is delayed. This could in turn worsen the outcome of a possible adverse incident.

Fantasy documents

Failures of foresight could contribute to the development of directives and instructions that fail to reflect the actual situation, so-called fantasy documents (Clarke 1999). Findings from the field in Dadaab could imply that certain requirements implemented in Dadaab could be similar to such a fantasy document.

As discussed above, and illustrated in the findings presented in section 5.2.5, there are certain aspects of the MOSS for Kenya that seem to fail to reflect the reality in Dadaab. For instance, though the MOSS clearly states the need to equip staff and vehicles with VHF radios, it fails to reflect the lack of active usage of these radios. It seems to be insufficient to have a requirement of *having* VHF radios, and that there possibly should be some sort of procedure that encourage the *use* of the VHF radios in order to enhance communication in the area.

Findings from Dadaab show that there has been some updates to the MOSS for Kenya, for instance the expansion from only one type of backup communications systems to the inclusion of several types. Such changes contributes to the MOSS to a lesser extent evolves into a fantasy document, by adapting to changing conditions. This is crucial in order to avoid the accumulation of unnoticed events due to cultural lags or fantasy documents.
The discussion above regarding the requirement of using armed police escorts when travelling into the blocks could also imply that this precaution might fail to reflect the actual situation. As the security risk assessment is an assessment of the context and possible threats, and if there is nothing within this assessment that justifies such a requirement, it could indeed be a possible indication that the requirement does not reflect the actual context in Dadaab.

If the implementing partners don't find it threatening to travel inside the blocks without an armed escort, it could possibly be that it also could be safe for UNHCR staff to do so. According to Clarke (1999), documents concerning procedures, standards and rules that fail to reflect the reality could open up to the possibility of violations and shortcuts in order to adjust the action to the situation of concern (Clarke 1999). As illustrated in section 5.2.5, one of my informants from UNHCR did in fact violate this requirement in order to 'get the job done'. His violations, and his statement on how it was easier to take a shortcut in order to get his job done, could possibly imply that this requirement has indeed evolved into a fantasy document. It should at least be reviewed, in order to determine whether this requirement is justifiable.

6.1.3 Violations of requirements and standards

Organizations will seek to alter human behavior in order to enhance efficiency, productivity and safety (Reason 1997). Most commonly, this is done by implementing procedure and regulations in order to direct behavior in the desired direction. However, as this adds more layers to the space of allowable actions, this allowable space will shrink (Reason 1997). When this space becomes reduced to a range that is less than what is required in order to perform the tasks, violations could be perceived as the only way to get the job done (Reason 1997). My findings from Dadaab, described in section 5.2.5, show that violations and shortcuts did occur in certain situations.

In Dadaab, UN vehicles are required to move into the blocks in the refugee camps with an armed escort, while the implementing partners have no such requirement nor see the need to.

An explanation for why UNHCR in Dadaab has implemented this requirement might be the system's need for a high degree of regularity of its members' behavior, and a continuous updating of procedures (Reason 1997). According to Reason (1997), procedures designed to enhance safe operations are constantly adjusted with the aim of controlling actions that are associated with recent accidents or incidents. This could possibly explain why the use of armed escorts inside the blocks is laid down to be a requirement in the MOSS even though the SRA does not show an imminent need for this. The occasional threats from Al-Shabaab of kidnapping international staff in Dadaab may have been a contributor to the adding of additional layers such as this requirement of using escorts into the blocks. Because the adding of such layers increase restrictiveness of the workspace and reduce the range of permitted actions necessary to get the job done, the result may be such violations of the rules as stated in the example above (Reason 1997).

Reason (1997) divides violations into three categories: routine, optimizing, and necessary violations. The staff member from UNHCR that went into the blocks without an armed escort clearly violated a UNHCR requirement. The question is, did he do this for the pure thrill of it, or because it was necessary in order to get the job done? According to his own statement, he took shortcuts in order to get the job done, because it was easier this way. This is in line with the definition of a routine violation, where one takes the path of least effort in order to get the job done, when procedures requires action that follows the longer pathway (Reason 1997). I did not get the impression that he violated the requirements just for the thrill of it, which is consistent with an optimizing violation. In certain situations, his violations could even be that of a necessary violation, which are provoked by organizational shortcomings and seen as necessary in order to perform the tasks needed (Reason 1997). For instance, if an emergency required him to visit a site within the camps, and the vehicle used for armed escorts were not available, he would have to violate the requirement in order to get to the site in due time. The same explanation were used by the implementing partners when explaining why they took shortcuts and chose to violate the requirement of travelling with armed escorts both inside the camps and to the camp site. To many of the IP informants, the requirement of using armed police escorts were perceived as an inconvenience, and when they were in a fix and needed to get to a place in a hurry, they thus chose to violate the requirement.

The violations done by the implementing partners travelling without using armed police escorts, also seemed to be more of a routine violation than a necessary violation. However, as

with the informant from UNHCR, in certain situations where time was of the essence their violations was more likely that of a necessary violation. Neither of the informants I talked to seemed to take shortcuts and violate requirements just for the sake of violation in it self, but rather as a necessary step in order to perform their tasks. In contrast, the decision to not partake in UNHCR's daily radio check on the part of several UNHCR staff members seemed to me to be more of an optimizing routine, as there seemed to be no apparent reason for violating this rule in terms of performing a task or get a job done.

If violations are not sanctioned it could develop into a habit or a routine, which I got the impression seemed to be the case with the UNHCR staff member that chose to travel inside the camps without using an armed escort, as well as with the implementing partners. As discussed earlier, the shortcuts taken by the staff to travel inside the blocks without an armed escort could be the result of a cultural lag in procedures, or that the MOSS has become a fantasy document that fails to reflect the reality of the context in Dadaab. Another possible explanation is that there has been a practical drift, which is the slow, steady uncoupling of a local practice from the written procedure (Snook 2000). Practical drift is the result of violations becoming the norm or a routine rather than an exception (Snook 2000). The development of practical drift is however related to that of outdated procedures and fantasy documents. If the procedures and requirement fail to reflect the context, it could turn out to be necessary to adjust action to fit the actual situation. Thus, the local practice might end up being different than the written procedure (Clarke 1999; Snook 2000).

A practical drift could lead to the development of variable disjunction of information, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Or it could lead to a requisite variety within the organization (Snook 2000). Requisite variety means that an organization will possess a set of stable cognitive processes, while at the same time being open to adapt routines and actions to the environment at hand (Weick 1999). Based on a requisite variety, the UN security management system should keep the cognitive processes stable, with a firm focus on safety, but allow for a variety of actions at hand in order to respond to a changing environment (Weick 1999). The informant from UNHCR and those from the implementing partners seemed to be able to adapt their actions to the situation, especially in times of urgency. However, this involved the violation of a set requirement.

As mentioned, the changes in the MOSS for Kenya regarding expansion of allowable backup communications systems, could contribute to counteract the development of cultural lags in procedures and the development of fantasy documents and a practical drift. Assessing and changing standards to ensure that they continue to reflect the context could reduce the occurrence of violations. Because violations represents a breaching of an organization's barriers and defenses against threats and hazards, the reduction of possible violations could help position the organization further towards the resistant end within the safety space.

6.2 Navigating the safety space

As elaborated in sub-chapter 3.3, the safety space illustrates the position of an organization between resistance and vulnerability. As this position is not fixed, it is important that the organization continually strive to steer towards the resistant end within the safety space. This is to a large extent done through the three driving forces of commitment, competence and cognizance (Reason 1997).

Commitment

Commitment involves motivation and resources (Reason 1997). As mentioned earlier in this discussion, I felt that both the senior security adviser and the Head of Sub-Office in Dadaab did show a great extent of commitment and focus on security in the area. However, as the senior security adviser pointed out, motivation and allocation of resources could seem to be quite dependent on the top management. The current Head of Sub-Office has a security-related background, thus he has an eye for seeing the security implications of information and events. To ensure commitment to security within an organization, all levels need to be involved in the safety culture (Reason 1997). The recurrence of certain violations could imply that the safety culture within the UNHCR in Dadaab does not permeate the organization as a whole.

Competence

Competence is related to the quality of the safety information system within an organization (Reason 1997). The safety information system should collect and spread the right information, as well as act upon it (Reason 1997). The examples regarding the radio control room and the Public Information Desk within UNHCR show a lack of information sharing, which could imply that the quality of the safety information system needs improvement. The

issue of police officers forgetting to bring with them their VHF radios on the convoys, and that few know their calling signal, could further impede the safety information system in Dadaab, by hampering the sharing of information and subsequent action based on this information. However, the procedure of reporting passengers and destination to the radio control room when preparing for departure with a convoy is a procedure that could increase the quality of the safety information system. The more information collected by the safety information system, the better are the chances of both sharing this and acting upon it in case of any events. Gathering information could also contribute to improved cognizance within UNHCR.

Cognizance

As Reason (1997) points out, commitment and competence is not sufficient in steering the organization towards the resistant end of the safety space if the organization does not possess a correct awareness of the dangers that may threaten its operation. Such lack of cognizance could emerge if information is not collected and shared with the right people. For instance, if the radio room in Dadaab does not share information with the security room, and vice versa, both rooms could be in danger of develop an incorrect awareness of the possible threats. And if the Public Information Desk does not share the information they collect with the right persons, it could become hard for the organization to develop a correct awareness of the context in Dadaab. Without the information about other shooting incidents in the North Eastern Province similar to that in Ifo, the awareness of the situation and the threats in Dadaab would have been a completely different one. Then, the security focal persons could have assumed that the shootings in Ifo were but a single episode with no further security implications. But if it turns out that the episodes have certain characteristics in common, it could suggest that there are underlying causes that need to be taken into consideration when assessing the security situation in Dadaab.

Again, the reports from drivers to the radio room regarding passengers and destination contributes to the possibilities of developing a more correct awareness of the situation. With information, the radio room and the security room can generate an image of what staff member is where, and thus apply more appropriate measures in case of adverse incidents.

The possible lack of commitment, competence and cognizance within UNHCR exemplified in the discussion above, could contribute to a passive drift towards the vulnerable end of the

safety space. But there are also certain procedures that could function as an engine and steer the organization towards the resistant end. Movement control is one: by logging vehicles that leave the secure compounds, and reporting passengers and destinations. As just mentioned, this helps in increasing the cognizance, but from here it is important that the information is spread through the right channels and to the right people, in order to ensure proper reactions.

7. Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis was to take a closer look at the United Nations Security Management System implemented to provide for staff safety in humanitarian operations, and to study how this security system unfolds in the humanitarian operations in Dadaab, Kenya. With the increasingly threatening environment humanitarian organizations find themselves in, it becomes important to be able to implement an adequate security management system in order to ensure staff safety without compromising the quality of humanitarian assistance.

In order to study how the UN security management system unfolded in Dadaab, I based my theoretical starting point on the assertion that all organizations will develop formal norms and beliefs about how the organization and the world are thought to work, and that in all organizations, a gap between these formal norms and beliefs and the actual behavior unfolding in the organization will develop. According to the theoretical framework, I could expect to find that the UN security management system that unfolds in Dadaab is likely to differ from the formal framework within the UN security management system. I also expected to find that the presence of such divergent images leaves the security system vulnerable to violations and the accumulation of latent conditions within the UN security management system in Dadaab.

Through fieldwork I conducted a case study on the UN security management system in Dadaab, and based on literature studies, interviews and observations, I found that there are evidence pointing to a gap between how the UN security management system is thought to work, and how it actually unfolds in the field.

The security management system is based on a chain of command described in the Framework for Accountability, where responsibility and accountability on all levels is described. This framework states that *all* actors, down to every individual UN-staff have a role to play in contributing to the highest standards of safety and security. This includes adherence to the procedures and measures implemented in humanitarian operations such as in Dadaab. My findings point to a lack of a good safety culture illustrated by the absence of security thinking among several staff members in Dadaab, which implies that the Framework for Accountability's goal of developing an effective and integrated security system has not been achieved in the humanitarian operations in Dadaab.

There have not been any severe incidents involving humanitarian staff in Dadaab for a while, and such absence of visible consequences of the threats in the area could cause UNHCR to let their guard down and drift towards the vulnerable end of the safety space. However, it does not seem to appear so as the procedures have not been loosened despite absence of incidents, which could point to the organization being proactive and keeping a focus on security.

Still, the repeated violations on security requirements presented in my findings might imply the opposite. In many cases the violations on the UN security management system in Dadaab seems to have developed into a routine. If requirements are routinely violated through shortcuts made by the staff, the requirements' intended objective is thus compromised. Most of the explanations for why the staff members took shortcuts were that some of the requirements made their job more inconvenient, and that sometimes they just had to violate it in order to be able to do their job. This could imply that there has been a cultural lag in the procedures and that the requirements are considered inadequate to the context of Dadaab. Rather than adding new layers to decrease the allowable space for action in order to alter the behavior of staff members, a suggestion could be that UNHCR need to review their current security risk assessment and the minimum operating security standard for Kenya in order to evaluate whether or not these requirements are appropriate to the context of Dadaab.

There appear to have developed a gap between how the UN security management system, through its formal requirements and procedures, perceives the context and threats in Dadaab, and how the system is unfolded in the real context. An explanation for why there is a gap between the formal UN security management system and how it unfolds could be that the formal requirements and standards are developed on a higher level in the hierarchy, in the blunt end, and are failing to see the implications of such a system in the context of Dadaab. As such, the decisions made on higher levels within the UN are creating latent conditions enabling the staff in the sharp end in Dadaab to commit errors and violations. Such latent conditions are an inevitable part of all systems, and needs to be made visible to those who manage and operate the organization in order to be corrected. The process of unveiling the latent conditions present within the UN security management system in Dadaab seems to be impeded by the information handling difficulties and poor communication that appears to be characterizing the security management system within the UNHCR in Dadaab.

If latent conditions and discrepant events that are at odds with the UN security management system are allowed to accumulate unnoticed in Dadaab it could leave the system vulnerable to a possible disaster due to a cultural collapse in the formal beliefs about how the UN security management system is thought to work. Latent conditions within the system can eventually combine with other preconditions such as active failures conducted by the staff in the sharp end in Dadaab, and as such the violations made by staff in Dadaab could contribute to the possible end result of an organizational accident with possible consequences such as the loss of life, assets and withdrawal from the humanitarian operation in Dadaab. Thus, it is important to strive to make visible the possible latent conditions and discrepant events in the UN security management system implemented in Dadaab, in order to avoid a worst-case scenario that could compromise both staff safety and the quality of the humanitarian assistance in Dadaab.

However, due to the short duration of my fieldwork, it is hard to draw some absolute conclusions on how the UN security management system unfolds in Dadaab, and particularly what the implications of this could mean to the safety of staff working in the humanitarian operations. It could thus be interesting to conduct a case study of the UN security management system over a longer period of time in order to get deeper into the matter and investigate whether the findings from my study is representative for other humanitarian operations and to what extent the current UN security management system is adequate in order to provide for the security of its staff members operating in the field.

8. References

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Appendix

1. UNHCR map: Kenya – Registered refugees as of 31st of January 2011
2. UNHCR's Partners in Dadaab
3. UNHCR Refugee Camp Overview: Ifo, Hagadera, Dagahaley.
4. UNHCR map: Kenya – Garissa County. Overview location of refugee camps.
5. Global MOSS
6. Country-specific MOSS: Kenya
7. UNHCR Visitor Information Pack for Dadaab, Multiple Days.
8. Security Cell Minutes: Monday 24th January 2011
9. Interview guide

Appendix 1



Figures shown on the map should be considered as provisional (Source: UNHCR BO Nairobi)

Appendix 2

UNHCR's Partners in Dadaab:

Government:	
Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA)	Registration, camp coordination, management
National Bureau of Registration (NBR)	Registration and verification

Operational Partners	
World Food Programme (WFP)	Food distribution, selective & school feeding, multi-story gardening, income-generating activities, food for training, food for assets
UNICEF	Supplementary food, fund SC-UK Child Friendly Spaces in camps
International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Voluntary repatriation, resettlement
Medecins Sans Frontieres Swiss and Spain	Health care
CESVI	Sanitation facility rehabilitation

Implementing Partners	
Handicap International	People Living with Disabilities (PLWDs) - in Dadaab and Medical Referrals to Garissa.
Norwegian Refugee Council	Shelter and Latrine Construction, Youth Education Project (YEP), Lagdera host community agro-forestry (with RRDO).
CARE Kenya	Primary education Dagahaley, food distribution, water supply, sanitation, education, community and gender development and counseling.
German International Cooperation (GIZ)	Health, environment, firewood distribution.
FilmAid International	Mass Information, Awareness Raising and Capacity Building.
Lutheran World Federation	Primary Education Hagadera, Camp management/camp coordination, community policing and camp planning, transit centers and safe havens, Fafi host community agro-forestry (with FaIDA)
National Council of Churches of Kenya	Sanitation, Peace Education, Reproductive Health & HIV/AIDS.
Windle Trust Kenya	Secondary Education - DAFI Programme
Save the Children (UK)	Child protection services
International Rescue Committee (IRC)	Health care; hospital and health posts, Hagadera Camp
Kenya Red Cross Society	child tracing and family reunification
AVSI	School classroom rehabilitation, teacher training
Danish Refugee Council	Shelter, construction
African Development Emergency Organization (ADEO)	Primary Education, health services care
Oxfam (GB)	Water and sanitation in Ifo extension
Refugee Consortium of Kenya	Legal advise and consultation in Camps, protection training, border monitoring
Centre for Torture Victims Kenya	Psychosocial interventions.

Appendix 3


Kenya - Lagdera District
Ifo Refugee Camp Overview
As of March 2011
Geographic Information Systems and Mapping Unit
UNHCR Regional Support Hub in Nairobi
Tel.: +254 20 4222000 Email: kennarsh@unhcr.org
Sources:
UNHCR, LWF-Dadaab, GeoVantage
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
N
To Dagahaley
To Dadaab
Mosque
Borehole
Proposed health post
Garbage Disposal Site
Satellite Office
Hospital
Windle Trust
SGBV Centre
Madarasa
Western Pri. Sch.
Water tank
Market area
Police Post
Food Distribution Centre
NRC Ware house & SCUK
Community Sec. Sch.
Graveyard
Borehole 6
Safaricom YEP centre
Community centre
Darulhikma Integrated Academy
Borehole 2
Health Post 5
Islamic School
Abdi Aziz Pri. Sch.
Mosque & Madarasa
Safe Haven
Police Post
Hornimo Pri. Sch.
Adult Literacy Sch.
GTZ Compound
Borehole 5
Market
Family Life Centre 1
Borehole 7
Halane Pri. Sch.
Main Mosque
Horseed Pri. Sch.
Islamic School
Health Post 7
Borehole 0
Police Post
Social Hall
Health Post 4
Borehole 4
Midrimo Pri. Sch.
Transit Centre
Hospital
CARE / Food Distribution Centre
Firewood Distribution Centre
ICRC
UNHCR Field Office
Slaughter Slab
Friends School
Child friendly space
0 250 500
meters
Hospital
CARE Compound / Food Distribution Centre
Ifo Sec. School
Islamic School
Welding Shed
LWF/DWS Field Office
Firewood Distribution Centre
ICRC
Family Life Centre 2
NCCK Field Office
UNHCR Registration Centre
Borehole 1
UNHCR Field Office
0 75 150
meters

Kenya - Fafi District

Hagadera Refugee Camp Overview

As of March 2011

Geographic Information Systems and Mapping Unit
UNHCR Regional Support Hub in Nairobi
Tel.: +254 20 4222000 Email: kennarsh@unhcr.org

Sources:
UNHCR, LWF-Dadaab, GeoVantage





LEGEND

- Camp block
- Camp facility
- Greenbelt
- Main road
- Feeder road

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kenrsgis@unhcr.org

Appendix 3

Appendix 3


Kenya - Lagdera District
Dagahaley Refugee Camp Overview
As of March 2011
Geographic Information Systems and Mapping Unit
UNHCR Regional Support Hub in Nairobi
Tel.: +254 20 4222000 Email: kennarsh@unhcr.org
Sources:
UNHCR, LWF-Dadaab, GeoVantage
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
DAGAHALEY
IFO
DADAAB
HAGADERA
To Garissa
To Mdo
KEN_DAG_CampOv_A3PC-WGR
N
Borehole 8
Graveyard
Central Pri. Sch.
Health Post 4
Dump site - open
Overhead Tank
Islamic School
Old Borehole 2
Borehole 6
Community Center
Graveyard
Family Life Centre 1
Graveyard
Unity Pri. Sch.
Borehole 4
Illeys Pri. School
Borehole 1
Dump Site - open
NRC latrine slab factory
Health Post 7
Child friendly space
Police Post
Overhead Tank
Family Life Centre 2
Slaughter Slab
Juba Pri. School
Graveyard
Health Post MSF CH
Borehole
El Nino Pri. Sch.
YEP Center
Dump site
Dump site
Adult Literacy School
Firewood Distribution Centre
Graveyard
Police Post
GTZ Tree Nursery
Social Hall
UNHCR Residential Compound
Market
Safaricom Tower
Market Area
CARE
ICRC
Health Post
Disability school
Dagahaley Sec. Sch.
Hospital
CARE
Food Distribution / Stores Compound
Borehole 3
Cholera Outbreak Centre
Market area
Computer Centre
UNHCR Field office
Transit centre
LWF Borehole
Police Post
LWF
NRC
NCCK
Graveyard
Community Sec. Sch.
Borehole
To Ifo
LEGEND
Camp block
Camp facility
Greenbelt
Main road
Feeder road
0 250 500
Meters
Printed: 23 March 2011
kenrsgis@unhcr.org

Kenya - Garissa County

Overview location of refugee camps

As of March 2011

Geographic Information Systems and Mapping Unit
UNHCR Regional Support Hub in Nairobi
Tel.: +254 20 4222000 Email: kennarsh@unhcr.org

Sources:
UNHCR, LWF-Dadaab, GeoVantage

LEGEND
- Refugee camp block
- Refugee camp facility
- Greenbelt
- Flood prone area
- Dadaab township
- Main road

KEN_DOS_RefugeeCamps_Dy_A3PC-MGR

N



DAGAHALEY

Ifo Extension Site

IFO

DADAAB

HAGADERA

To Liboi

To Garissa

To Amuma

0 1.5 3
kilometers

Printed: 28 March 2011

kenrsgis@unhcr.org

UNITED NATIONS MINIMUM OPERATING SECURITY STANDARDS (UN MOSS)

Country MOSS Tables must justify, through the rigorous application of the Security Risk Assessment (SRA) process, the inclusion or exclusion of each of the items listed below.

While the intention is to maintain flexibility and management discretion, common-sense will dictate those measures (such as vehicle safety equipment and fire precautions) which should be mandatory in all locations regardless of the prevailing security situation.

1. TELECOMMUNICATIONS

1.1 Emergency Communications System

a. Where the SRA indicates a need, establish an **Emergency Communications System (ECS)** throughout the country, and its operational locations, in order to:

1. Provide communications between DO, SA, SMT, Wardens and UN medical personnel within in the Capital.
2. Provide communications between ASC and DO/SA and UN medical personnel.
3. Provide communications between the ASC and the Area SA, SMT within the Area.
4. To enable communications between the DO/SMT/SA and relevant UN Offices outside the country (including DSS).

b. **Mobile satellite telephones** should be provided to all CCCs, DOs and CSA/SAs and Agency Security Officers as well as for other key managers as decided by the SMT.

c. The ECS is to be tested and practiced at regular intervals.

d. The ECS network should be capable of operating 24 hour/7 days per week (24/7) should need arise.

1.2 Radio Communications

a. When VHF/UHF communications are employed (in accordance with need identified in the SRA), a **Security channel** for DO, SA and SMT members, and where applicable ASC, ASMT members, UN medical personnel and wardens, must be incorporated into radio networks.

b. All UN vehicles are to be equipped with **VHF/UHF radios**. In addition, "Field Vehicles" (those which travel into the countryside or move between urban areas) are to have **a second radio system, usually HF or an alternative communication system (e.g. satellite phone)**.

c. SOPs for regular radio checks at residences and while moving are to be established.

d. All international personnel, all drivers, all wardens and national personnel deemed "essential", are to be issued with hand-held VHF/UHF radios. Radio checks are to be conducted routinely.

e. All personnel who work regularly outside office premises are to be trained to operate all forms of telecommunications equipment provided for Field Vehicles.

2. SECURITY INFORMATION AND STRUCTURE

2.1. **Documentation**. Each country, and each duty station in the country, will have the following documentation:

a. Security Risk Assessment.

b. UN Field Security Handbook (FSH).

c. Security Operations Manual.

d. Country/Area-specific Security Plan.

e. Country/Area-specific MOSS.

f. Security Standard Operating Procedures.

g. Relevant country maps. h. Country PEP Protocol.

2.2. **Warden Systems**

a. Established and operational.

b. Exercised regularly.

2.3. **Crisis Management Plans and Building Emergency/Evacuation Plan**

a. Established for all UN offices and facilities.

b. Exercised every six months (or more frequently if SRA so indicates)

2.4. **SMT Meetings:** To be conducted and documented as per UN Security Policy Handbook.

2.5. **Security Clearance and Travel Notification**: System in place for approving security clearances into country, recording travel notifications, and tracking personnel movements inside the country.

2.6. **Incident Reporting:** System to ensure that all security incidents in country are reported using "SIRS".

2.7. A common-system **Crisis Coordination Centre (CCC)** is to be established in the Capital and all UN locations in country which have an ASC.

3. MEDICAL

3.1. **Response to Medical Emergencies**

a. **Casualty Evacuation Plans.** All duty stations are to have a "CASEVAC Plan" which includes rescue, immediate medical attention, identification or procurement of appropriate means of transportation, and location of appropriate primary health care facilities. **[**CASEVAC **:** the process for the rescue and movement of injured or sick personnel from the place or incident site at which injury occurs, or the person becomes ill, to a primary care medical facility inside the country].

b. **Medical Evacuation Plans.** All Duty Stations are to have a "MEDEVAC Plan" which includes the medical and administrative procedures necessary for evacuation of sick or injured personnel from the country, including the authority for authorization of evacuation and use of an air ambulance service where necessary. [MEDEVAC : the process for movement of injured or sick personnel from the primary care medical facility to a hospital, advanced care facility or place of recuperation outside the country in which the injury or illness occurred. It may also refer to the repatriation or reassignment of a staff member from a duty station which is deemed by the medical authorities to be potentially damaging to the staff member's health for reasons of climate, altitude or other environmental factors.]

c. Each country is to have a **MASS CASUALTY PLAN** appropriate to the risks in country and the response capacity of the local emergency services.

d. Register of locally available medical facilities, emergency response services, and contact numbers to be maintained up to date and made available in ECS and to all duty personnel.

e. Based on the country/duty station security situation an appropriate number of UN personnel will be trained in Basic First Aid.

f. Each country is to have a medical plan and PEP Protocol.

3.2 Medical Equipment

a. All vehicles to carry Vehicle First Aid kits (specifications as per Security Technical Standards Manual).

b. **Emergency Trauma Bags** (ETBs) distributed according to number of trained UN staff.

c. One Basic First Aid kit per building (or per floor in buildings with more than 50 personnel).

d. **PEP Kits** (which must be replaced by their due expiry dates) will be distributed through the country PEP Kit protocol (which is to be attached to the Country Security Plan as an annex, and available in all radio rooms and duty personnel folders)

4. EQUIPMENT and SUPPLIES

4.1 Emergency power supply available for charging and operation of **common-systems** communications equipment, office external security lighting and other essential equipment. Adequate reserve stocks of fuel to be maintained.

4.2. **Emergency Food, Water, Medical, Sanitary and Shelter Supplies** (in non-perishable form) to be stocked in preparation for use in concentration points, bunkers and safe rooms, storm shelters as appropriate for the country and situation.

4.3. All personnel to prepare **Individual Emergency Bags**, maximum weight 15 kg (33 lbs) containing essential documents, clothing, hygiene and medical supplies, ready for rapid evacuation or relocation.

5. **UNITED NATIONS VEHICLES**

5.1. **All UN Vehicles**

a. Must be operated by properly licensed operators.

b. All UN vehicles appropriately registered with the Host Government and properly maintained.

c. All vehicles identified, where appropriate, with UN logos/flags/decals as determined by prevailing local conditions.

5.2. Non-UN Vehicles. Where UN staff travel in non-UN vehicles which are not MOSS compliant, every effort should be made to ensure that the UN personnel are MOSS compliant (i.e. equipped with communications etc).

5.3. **UN Vehicle Equipment**

5.3.1. All vehicles (regardless of location)

a. First aid kit.
b. Fire extinguisher
c. Spare wheel, jack and appropriate tools.
d. Reflector triangles, battery-powered lantern, seat belts.

5.3.2 All Field Vehicles (according to country situation):

a. 5 metre rope, strong enough to pull another field vehicle.
b. Shovel, hand-axe or machete.
c. Fire-lighting materials.
d. High visibility sheet/flag,
e. GPS based tracking system for curfew, movement restriction and convoy monitoring.
f. Adequate drinking water, food and necessities (including blankets/sleeping bags) to support all occupants for 24 hours (according to climatic conditions).

6. **OFFICES, PREMISES AND FACILITIES PROTECTION**

6.1. **All UN Managed Buildings**

a. All buildings occupied by UN to be compliant, where feasible, with international building, safety and fire regulations or the applicable laws of the host country as appropriate (including construction for resistance to earthquakes or other natural hazards, according to local conditions).
b. Appropriate access control measures based on size and location of premises.
c. Separate entrances for personnel and visitors, where feasible and appropriate, in compliance with established standards (if/where applicable).
d. Secured parking for authorized vehicles where appropriate.
e. Alternate/emergency exits from buildings and from compounds.
f. Security and/or Guard force trained on appropriate surveillance and reconnaissance detection and reporting protocols.

6.2. **Premises with Additional Risks**. Premises that are assessed to be at high risk from terrorism are to have:

a. Stand-off distance as estimated/advised by qualified expert (taking scale of likely threat, surroundings/approaches, construction etc into account)
b. Structural reinforcement, blast walls as required/advised by qualified expert.
c. Shatter Resistant Film on windows and frame catchers.
d. Bunkers/reinforced rooms.
e. Surveillance and access control systems.

6.3 UN Personnel working in government (or other non-UN) facilities

a. To the extent practical, the DO and concerned head of organization should request MOSS-compliant conditions, to UN standards, for personnel working in non-UN premises.
b. Where this is not fully possible, the security adviser should be asked to assess the premises to see if the security measures in place provide an equivalent level of protection from the risks identified in the SRA as that provided in UN-managed premises.
c. Where a MOSS-equivalent level of protection is not achieved, the DO and head of organization concerned should consider, and negotiate with the host government authorities, alternate means of enhancing mitigation, such as:

(1). Allowing physical modifications to the workspace actually occupied by the UN personnel.
(2). Re-allocating the work space used by the UN personnel (for example, to ensure that they are as far as possible from external walls or likely terrorist approaches).

(3). Adjusting work patterns to limit the exposure of UN personnel within the government premises.

7. **SECURITY TRAINING AND BRIEFINGS** 7.1. **All new UN personnel and recognized dependents, as applicable, briefed on/provided with:**

a. Country-specific security orientation briefing
b. Summary/Extract of Country Security Plan and Evacuation Plan
c. Relevant Country/Area-specific Security Plan, SOPs and policies.
d. Compliance with all UN security policies.
e. Copy of current MOSS and MORSS applicable to the duty station.
f. Briefing and written handout on medical arrangements available in country and how to access them or call for emergency medical assistance.
g. A copy of the Country PEP Protocol, which should specify PEP custodian arrangements, location of PEP kits, and procedure for obtaining assistance in the event of possible exposure to HIV/AIDS .

7.2. **All personnel provided with:** UN "Security in the Field" booklet (latest version)

7.3. **Training:**

a. All UN personnel to complete Basic Security for UN Personnel (BSUNP) and /or Advanced Security In The Field (ASITF) online or by CD-ROM, as required for the duty station,.
b. All personnel to receive cultural sensitivity briefings appropriate to country before or on arrival.

8. RESIDENTIAL SECURITY MEASURES

a. Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards (MORSS) will continue to be approved as a separate country table, in accordance with MORSS procedures as updated from time to time.
b. MORSS must take account of the relevant conclusions of the SRA with respect to the local law and order situation.

9. ADDITIONAL MEASURES:

9.1 Depending on the security environment and the SRA, the DO and SMT may have to consider special measures. Examples of these are:

a. **Personal Protective Equipment** (helmets, body armour etc) to be stocked adequate for all personnel needs as indicated by the Security Risk Assessment, and SOPs establishing conditions for issue, carriage in vehicles and mandatory wearing.

b. Armoured Vehicles. In addition to providing a means of evacuating personnel under fire in extremis, armoured vehicles are an option where access is needed to areas which are marginally under the "acceptable risk" threshold, and where there is potential for resumption of conflict or fluidity of nearby conflict areas.

United Nations Minimum Operating Security Standards

KENYA

November 2010

(Required standards/mitigation measures are linked to security risks as identified in the SRA of 2010)

TELECOMMUNICATIONS				
o.	Item	Standard Requirement	Country Specific Requirements, Equipment & Procedures	Remarks
1	Emergency Communications System	a. Emergency Communications System to be established in Nairobi and throughout Kenya, to provide for communication links between the: 1. DO, SMT, Wardens and UN Medical Personnel 2. ASC and DO/CSA and UN Medical Personnel 3. ASC and the FSCO,ASMT 4. DO/SMT/CSA and relevant UN offices outside the country (including DSS) b. Mobile satellite telephones to be provided to Crisis Co-ordination Centers (CCC), DO, ASCs, CSA, DSA, FSCOs, Agency Security Officers as well as other key managers as selected by the DO	1. A system to be established to ensure all ECS communications are monitored 24/7 by a common system radio room 2. SMS alert system for staff information 3. The ECS is to be tested and practiced at regular intervals 4. The ECS network should be capable of operating 24 hour/7 days per week (24/7) should the need arise 5. There should be a minimum of one Mobile satellite telephone with each UN Office 6. All changes in contacts for critical staff needs to be centrally collated on a monthly basis, information to be provided to UNDSS by the respective organizations.	
2	Radio Communications	a. When VHF/HF communications are employed, a security channel for the DO, CSA, SMT members, UN Medical Personnel, ASCs, Wardens and other selected staff to be incorporated into radio networks b. All UN vehicles are to be equipped with VHF and/ (UHF radios may be used if compatible and integrated with the VHF system). In addition 'Field Vehicles' are to have a second radio system, usually HF or an alternative communication system (e.g. satellite phone) c. SOPs for regular radio checks and response plan for field locations are to be established – for Nairobi only in case of elevated risk d. All critical staff, drivers, wardens and personnel deemed to be essential are to be issued with hand-held VHF and/or UHF radios if the latter is compatible with the VHF system. e. All personnel who work regularly outside office premises are to be trained to operate all forms of telecommunications equipment provided, including VHF/HF systems in field vehicles. Agencies are responsible for training.	1. A communications management system to coordinate Nairobi and Field operations to be established (technical working group led by DSS). 2. ECS to be reinforced with a fully operational, independent radio network utilizing VHF and/or HF equipment outside Nairobi and Mombasa 3. VHF radios to be provided to drivers of rented/non-UN vehicles when on missions outside Nairobi 4. Radio rooms established in Nairobi, Mombasa, Garissa, Dadaab and Kakuma 5. HF base stations installed in all agency field offices outside Nairobi 6. VHF repeater systems established for coverage of larger areas where appropriate 7. Radio checks to be conducted daily in all duty stations outside Nairobi and Mombasa 8. In Nairobi and Mombasa , staff with radios are to conduct a monthly radio check.	

Appendix 6

2. SECURITY INFORMATION AND STRUCTURE				
No.	**Item**	**Standard Requirement**	**Country Specific Requirements, Equipment & Procedures**	**Remarks**
2.1	Documentation	The following documentation will be held in Nairobi and each duty station in the country: a. Kenya/Area/Headquarters specific Security Risk Assessment (SRA) b. Field Security Handbook c. Security Operations Manual d. Country Security Plan e. Country MOSS f. Security Standard Operating Procedures g. Country/Area maps h. PEP Protocol	1. Cellular phone coverage map 2. Updated directory of phone, e-mail, radio call signs held in SitCen and distributed monthly 3. Copies of Agency contract with ambulance, fire truck, air ambulance companies and hospitals as well as insurance companies with list of who is authorized signatories to activate such services: held in agency and SitCen (both the security and JMS one)	
2.2	Warden System	a. Warden system for national and international staff established and operational for all duty stations b. Warden system should be exercised regularly	1. In Nairobi, the warden system will be agency based 2. Warden meeting every three months 3. Warden training every six months	
2.3	Building Emergency/Evacuation Plan	a. Established for all UN offices and facilities b. Exercised every 6 months c. Reviewed annually with presentation to SMT	1. Mass Casualty exercise at UNON once a year 2. Business continuity plans in place 3. Offices outside of UNON to complete a MCI exercise once a year	
2.4	SMT and ASMT meetings	To be conducted and documented as per UN Security Policy Handbook		
2.5	Security Clearance and Travel Notification	ISECT in place for approving security clearances into and within Kenya and recording travel notifications	1. Security clearance required for all staff members traveling to Kenya. 2. Security clearance required for all official travel within Kenya that is out of staff members duty station	
2.6	Incident Reporting	All security incidents are reported using SIRS	All occupational injury reported to JMS within 24 hours.	
2.7	Crisis Coordination Centre (CCC)	Established in Nairobi	1. CCC established at UNON 2. CCC to be established in Mombasa and Dadaab consisting of , a. Identified staff b. Satphone/HF Radio/Reliable internet communications c. SOP's	

Appendix 6

MEDICAL SUPPORT				
lo.	Item	Standard Requirement	Country Specific Requirements, Equipment & Procedures	Remarks
.1	Response to Medical Emergencies	a. Casualty Evacuation Plans. All duty stations are to have a 'CASEVAC plan' which includes rescue, immediate medical attention, identification or procurement of appropriate means of transportation and location of appropriate primary health care facilities. b. Medical Evacuation Plans. All duty stations are to have a 'MEDEVAC plan' which includes the medical and administrative procedures necessary for evacuation of sick or injured personnel from the country, including the authority for authorization of evacuation and use of an air ambulance service where necessary. c. Each duty station within Kenya is to have a Mass Casualty Plan appropriate to the risks in country and the response capacity of the local emergency services. d. Register of locally available medical facilities, emergency response services and contact numbers to be maintained by radio rooms and distributed to all staff. 1. Based on the country/duty station security situation an appropriate number of UN personnel will be trained in Basic First Aid. e. A country medical plan must be in place	1. All UN facilities to have a casevac/emergency response plan for their location with a copy provided to JMS 2. All UN Agencies to have valid contracts for: air ambulance for onwards evacuation, ground ambulance for office to hospital and from home to hospital 24/7 access to nearest hospital 3. Revised contract with institutions for mass casualties as per NY Medical Service Divison (JMS responsible to organize) 4. Blood needs to be pre-positioned in major hospitals in Nairobi (JMS responsible to organize) 5. Casualty Stabilization Center required if there are more than 6 hours until CASEVAC.	
.2	Medical Equipment	a. All vehicles to carry Vehicle First Aid Kits b. PEP Kits, which must be replaced by their due expiry dates, will be distributed through the country PEP Kit protocol. The PEP protocol will be developed and maintained by JMS.	1. Where there is more than one hour for professional emergency trained response, ETB should be in place for offices at a ratio 1:20 staff members 2. One basic first aid kit per UN compound where there is no UN clinic 3. All UN compounds to have one stretcher per 50 staff members 4. PEP kit custodian to be trained in their duties and to report all usage to JMS	

Appendix 6

EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES				
o.	**Item**	**Standard Requirement**	**Country Specific Requirements, Equipment & Procedures**	**Remarks**
.1	Emergency power supply	a. Emergency power supply available for charging and operation of communication equipment, lighting and other essential equipment. b. Spare parts for emergency power supply obtained c. Adequate stocks of fuel to be maintained		
.2	Emergency Food, Water, Medical, Sanitary and Shelter Supplies	Non-perishable emergency food and medical supplies together with water, sanitary and shelter supplies to be stocked for concentration points in Nairobi and other major hubs		
.3	Individual Emergency Bags	All personnel in a duty station with elevated risk (as defined by SMS, locations can vary from time to time) to prepare Individual Emergency Bags (quick run bags), maximum weight 15 kg containing essential documents, clothing, hygiene and medical supplies, ready for rapid evacuation or relocation	All staff members that are on chronic/essential medication must maintain a minimum 3 months supply of their medication	

Appendix 6

VEHICLES				
o.	Item	Standard Requirement	Country Specific Requirements, Equipment & Procedures	Remarks
1	UN Vehicles	a. All drivers must have a relevant and current Kenyan drivers license b. Vehicles must be appropriately registered by the Host Government c. All vehicles identified, where appropriate, with UN logos/flags/decals as determined by prevailing local conditions.	1. Field vehicles mandatory for areas with elevated risk levels and field locations - SOP to be developed and maintained by DSS 2. Police escorts of UN official missions mandatory for designated areas within the country: ▪ From Kapenguria (RVP), all areas north towards Lodwar, Kakuma and to the border with Sudan ▪ From Isiolo and north ▪ From Ukasi and east towards Garissa including all areas in NEP 3. Vehicle movement control procedures implemented 4. Travel restrictions for areas with elevated risk levels and field locations - SOP to be developed and maintained by DSS a. No travel between 1800 hrs to 0600 unless decided otherwise by ASC/ASMT b. Armed police escorts 5. National staff members in Nairobi have access to staff buses organized and monitored by UNON, using approved routes 6. Official travel in non-UN vehicles that are not MOSS compliant must be approved on a case-by-case basis	
.2	UN vehicle equipment All Vehicles	a. Effective and reliable communications b. First Aid Kit c. Fire extinguisher d. Spare wheel, jack and appropriate tools e. Seat belts f. Reflector triangles g. Strong torch and batteries		All UN vehicles in Kenya
.3	UN vehicle equipment All Field Vehicles	a. 5 meter rope, strong enough to pull another field vehicle b. Shovel, hand axe or machete c. Fire lighting materials d. Adequate drinking water, food and necessities (including blankets/sleeping bags) to support all occupants for at least 24 hrs	In addition vehicles operating in field conditions to be equipped with: 1. VHF and HF radio or satellite phone (and/or HF radios or satellite phone may be used if UHF is compatible and integrated with the VHF system) 2. Satellite telephones 3. Comprehensive First Aid kit 4. Two Spare tires with jack, tow rope, wheel spanner, winch (except where vehicle is traveling in convoy), spade and other appropriate tools. 5. Water and purification tablets	

Appendix 6

. OFFICES, PREMISES AND FACILITIES PROTECTION				
lo.	Item	Standard Requirement	Country Specific Requirements, Equipment & Procedures	Remarks
.1	All UN Managed Premises	a. All buildings occupied by UN to be compliant, with Kenyan and where feasible, international building, safety and fire regulations (including construction for resistance to earthquakes or other natural hazards) b. Appropriate access control measures based on size, purpose and location of premises c. Separate entrances for staff and visitors, where feasible and appropriate d. Secured parking for authorized vehicles where appropriate e. Alternate/emergency exits from buildings and from compounds f. SSS officers or Recognized Commercial Security companies (SSS officers are trained in hostile reconnaissance and reporting protocols)	1. Shatter resistant film on windows 2. UNON compound to complete PACT II project before end December 2011 3. Provide training (including hostile surveillance reconnaissance and reporting protocols) to all security company trainers in order to filter down to guards 4. Flooding risk to be assessed at time of compound selection 5. Police employed overnight at all UN offices in areas with elevated risk (as determined by the DO)	
.2	Premises with Additional Risks	Premises that are assessed to be at high risk from terrorism are to have: a. Stand off distance as estimated/advised by a qualified expert taking scale of likely threat, surroundings/approaches, construction into account b. Structural reinforcement, blast walls as required/advised by qualified expert c. Safe havens/reinforced rooms	All UN offices with additional risk are to have additional Access Control Measures - assessment to be conducted by a professional security officer.	
.3	Government (or other non-UN) facilities with UN personnel presence	a. To the extent practical, the DO and concerned head of organization should request from the host country MOSS compliant conditions, to UN standards, for personnel working in non-UN premises b. Where this is not fully possible, the CSA will assess the premises to see if the security measures in place provide an equivalent level of protection from the risks identified in the SRA as that provided in UN managed premises c. Where a MOSS equivalent level of protection is not achieved, the DO and head of organization concerned should consider and negotiate with the host government authorities, alternate means of enhancing mitigation, such as: 1. Allowing physical modifications to the workspace actually occupied by UN personnel		

Appendix 6

		2. Relocating the work space used by UN personnel 3. Adjusting work patterns to limit the exposure of UN personnel within the government premises		

7. SECURITY TRAINING AND BRIEFINGS				
No.	**Item**	**Standard Requirement**	**Country Specific Requirements, Equipment & Procedures**	**Remarks**
7.1	All UN personnel (briefings also for recognized dependents)	a. Kenya specific security orientation briefing b. Compliance with all UN security policies in the various duty stations in Kenya c. Copy of the Current MORSS applicable to Kenya d. Briefing and written handout on medical arrangements and related contact lists (conducted by UNON JMS) e. A copy of the Kenya PEP protocol, specifying PEP custodian arrangements, location of PEP kits and procedure for obtaining assistance in the event of possible exposure to HIV/AIDS (conducted by UNON JMS)	1. The booklet, 'Security Advice and Information for Staff Members of the UN system in Kenya' 2. A guide to choosing residences	
7.2	All personnel provided with:	a. The link to the electronic version of the UN 'Security in the field' booklet	1. A copy of the booklet ' Security Advice and Information for staff Members of the United Nations System in Kenya' 2. How to register with DSS for the Security SMS system 3. Weekly security advisory	
7.3	Training	a. All UN personnel to complete Basic security for UN personnel (BSUNP) and Advanced Security in the field (ASITF) online or by CD-ROM and a copy of the relevant certificates included in personal records b. All personnel to receive appropriate cultural sensitivity briefing by their respective agency before or on arrival	1. Security briefing mandatory for newly assigned staff to a duty station and when going on their first mission to areas with elevated risk levels and field locations - SOP to be developed and maintained by DSS 2. Female personnel to be provided with awareness training in respect of rape/sexual assault 3. Agencies to provide gender focal points to guide staff in case of sexual harassment or exploitation 4. Identified staff (by Agency/ASC) must have ETB training	

8. RESIDENTIAL SECURITY MEASURES				
No.	**Item**	**Standard Requirement**	**Country Specific Requirements, Equipment & Procedures**	**Remarks**
8.1	MORSS	a. Separate Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards (MORSS) is approved for Kenya, in accordance with MORSS procedures and is regularly updated b. MORSS must be updated in accordance with the SRA 's assessment of the local crime situation		

Appendix 6

UNHCR
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés

Visitor Information Pack for Dadaab
Multiple Days

General Information

UNHCR welcomes your interest in visiting Dadaab, Kenya. There are three refugee camps (Dagahaley, Ifo and Hagadera) around Dadaab with a total population of about 295,000. The three camps were originally established to accommodate 90,000 refugees (30,000 per camp) in the early 1990s. An extension of Ifo is currently being developed and will soon host up to 40,000 refugees.

Despite the large number of missions wishing to travel to Dadaab, it should be understood that UNHCR's (and our Implementing/Operational Partners) core mandate is the protection and assistance of the refugees here. Therefore, because of shortages of other commitments, it may not always be possible to facilitate missions at particular times. Thus, in order to plan for your mission, we would kindly ask you to inform us as soon as possible (ideally four weeks in advance), so that we can alert and liaise with the respective partners, arrange for transportation with special police escorts and also book accommodation for you if required.

Government Permission:
You will need permission from the government to visit refugee sites. This applies to anyone wanting to go to Dadaab. Government clearance is sought from the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) at the *Ministry of Immigration and Registration of Persons*. Once you have received permission, you are kindly asked to send a copy via email to Bettina Schulte, External Relations (Schulte@unhcr.org) as well as to bring a printed copy with you to Dadaab. DRA requires a minimum of two weeks to process the request. Please note that journalists joining a government official will also have to go through the process of obtaining DRA permission. The contact persons at the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) are: Mr. Omar Dhadho, DRA Protection Officer, email: Dhadho67@yahoo.com; Tel: +254 20 317393/254 20 250120, Fax: +254 20 315573.

Visas:
A visa is necessary for entering Kenya. UNHCR does not assist in obtaining visas. Please make arrangements before flying to Kenya.

Security:
According to the UN Security Level System, the entire North Eastern province (Dadaab included) is classified at Security level 4 – (Substantial threat levels). Our Minimum Operating Security Standards require that movement for everyone (UNHCR, partners and guests) is restricted from 1800hrs to 0600hrs every night, during which time they are required to stay in a secure UN compound. In addition, there is no free movement in the camps; all UN vehicles move by convoy with armed police escort. Please note that you are required to fasten your seatbelt while travelling in a UNHCR vehicle. In addition, car doors should be kept locked and windows closed particularly when moving in crowded areas.

UN staff or non-UN staff travelling in UNHCR vehicles in the camps is obliged to comply with the UN security arrangements. If you are coming with your own vehicle and if you will not be joined by UNHCR staff, you do not have to comply with the UN security arrangements, even though we would nevertheless encourage you to do so for your own safety.

We highly encourage visitors (especially non-UN staff, such as journalists and researchers) to attend a security briefing upon arrival. UNHCR Associate Field Safety Officer - Michael Chilla can be contacted via: chilla@unhcr.org, Tel: +254 714639290. A briefing can be organised through External Relations.

Travel to the Camps:
UNHCR has flights twice a week (Monday and Wednesday) going to Dadaab. Seats are offered to visitors at a fee of USD 300.00 for a return trip to Dadaab (subject to change). Ticket fees are to be paid a day before travel at UNHCR Finance Office in Nairobi.

Because of shortage of accommodation and other restrictions, we encourage most visitors to come for a day trip if possible; the Monday and Wednesday flights arrive at 8.30.a.m. and depart at 4.00.p.m., giving visitors at least six hours to complete their objectives. If a longer period is required we prefer visitors to come on Monday and leave on Wednesday as many routine humanitarian coordination activities are scheduled on the other days.

Please kindly check in at Wilson Airport, ALS, from 6:00 am to 6:30 am at which time we close the passenger manifest. You will not be reimbursed if you miss this flight. There is an airport tax fee of KSH 300.00 per passenger that is to be paid to the ALS personnel on ground for which a receipt shall be issued. Please note that luggage is restricted to 15 kg per passenger. Special arrangements must be made for television crews wishing to carry more weight than specified. The contact person for booking flights is: Catherine Masha: Masha@unhcr.org

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Because of the security situation, UNHCR does not recommend travel by road to Dadaab. However, if you do wish to come by road, we would appreciate if you could kindly provide us with the travel details, so that we can alert UNHCR security and arrange for security escorts.

Accommodation:
Accommodation for visitors in Dadaab is KSH 1,200 per night in the UNHCR guesthouse rooms. Because there is often a shortage of accommodation in Dadaab, at last four weeks notice is required. Please finalise payment at the finance/admin office before departure. Please make sure that you copy UNHCR compound manager in all emails regarding accommodation:
Ricardo Vieitez: Vieitez@unhcr.org, Tel: +254 714 639 291.

Food:
Meals in the staff canteen are KSH 800 per day (breakfast: KSH200, lunch: KSH 300 and dinner KSH 300). Please ask the kitchen staff for the bill and to finalise payment. Breakfast is served from 6:00 – 8:00, Lunch is at 13:00, Dinner at 19:00. All Bills are payable in Kenyan Shillings.
Consider taking snacks with you or buying them in Nairobi before you head towards the camps. This is particularly advisable for delegations that will go straight form the airstrip to the camps. Some snacks, bottled water and soft drinks are available at the UNHCR cafeteria, at the UNHCR shop as well as at the bar called *Pumzika.*

Money:
Take as much cash (Kenyan Shillings) with you as you need for the trip as there are no banks or ATMs in the vicinity of the camps.

Weather Patterns:
In Dadaab, November-December is the short rainy season; roads are in a bad state (flooded with 1-2 feet of water and mud). The temperature is still high (around 30 degrees Celsius) and relatively humid. January-March are the hottest months, temperatures reach at the highest 45-50 degrees Celsius. There is a longer rainy season at the beginning of March. The effects of El Nino are however altering weather patterns. Because of the hot weather, sunscreen and wearing a hat is advisable.

Interpreters:
Interpreters charge about KSH 300 per day. UNHCR Dadaab will endeavour to provide you with interpreters in the camps but due to operational requirements and constraints, this will obviously not always be possible. Please kindly let us know well in advance, so that we can forward the request to our Field Officers.

Health Insurance/Medical Kit:
Please kindly bring your medical kit as well as any medication you need with you to Dadaab, since there are no medical facilities here, apart from the hospitals for refugees in the camps. In addition, please kindly assure that your health insurance covers your stay in Dadaab as well the costs of an evacuation in case of an emergency.

Internet:
Unfortunately, UNHCR is unable to provide internet facilities for visitors on the compound. Thus, if emailing is necessary, each visitor should be equipped with the necessary tools.

Clothing:
Please be reminded to wear appropriate and culturally sensitive clothing in Dadaab. Women should avoid wearing very tight and short T-shirts and/or short pants or skirts. Loose shirts and blouses that cover legs and elbows are advisable. Headscarves are not necessary.

Precautions:
Please note that there are snakes, scorpions and camel spiders around the compound and camps. Therefore, it is advisable to bring good footwear and to be alert. It is also advisable to bring a torch for walking at the compound after 19.00. Please also look into your shoes in the morning to make sure that there are no scorpions hiding.

Recreation:
The UNHCR compound has a small bar called *Pumzika*. In the evenings they have a small selection of food: salads, sandwiches, fries, fried chicken, fish or sausages as well as Ethiopian food which should be ordered in advance (Manager: Tomas 0724 291723). *Pumzika* is a cash bar. In addition, there is a small gym in the compound located beside *Pumzika*. If you have appropriate equipment (sneakers/runners etc.) you may use the facilities. There is also a Tennis and Volleyball court.

Focal Points:

UNHCR External Relations Nairobi: Rika Hakozaki External Relations Officer Tel: + 254733995 Email: hakowaki@unhcr.org	**UNHCR External Relations Dadaab:** Bettina Schulte External Relations Officer Tel: +254720095990 E-mail: schulte@unhcr.org
UNHCR Security Nairobi: John McComber Senior Security Officer for Kenya Tel: +254734333180 Email: mccomber@unhcr.org	**UNHCR Security Dadaab:** Michael Chilla Associate Field Safety Officer Dadaab Tel: +254714639290 Email: chilla@unhcr.org,
UNHCR Public Information Nairobi (for journalists): Emmanuel Nyabera Information Officer Tel: 0733995975 Email: nyabera@unhcr.org	**UNHCR Dadaab Compound Manager:** Ricardo Vieitez Compound Manager Dadaab Tel: +254 714 639 291 Email: vieitez@unhcr.org

4

Security Cell Minutes: Monday 24th January 2011

PRESENT:

Jesse Mituki	Assistant Field Safety Officer	UNHCR
Samwel Cheryiot	Safety and Security Officer	LWF
Ruben Mwangi	G4S Contract Manager	G4S
Mohamed Rage	Security Officer	CARE
Paul Kimani	Field Safety Associate	UNHCR- taking minutes

AGENDA:

- Review and follow up on minutes from last meeting
- Situation update – Nationally; North Eastern Province, Dadaab and Somalia
- Update on compound
- Update on camps
- AOB

Follow up on minutes from last meeting	Deployment of police officers to Ifo 2 still pending. G4S contract manager was requested to come up with the number of G4S officers required to man Ifo 2 Camp considering the various facilities on sight	UNHCR Security unit. GOK, G4S
Situation update national, North Eastern Province and Dadaab region	Somalia/Nationally/Regionally International: The recent referendum in Southern Sudan might have an impact on the refugees in the camps after the results are announced with some of them opting for voluntary repatriation. Nationally: - Gun related crime on the rise in Nairobi culminating to recent execution of suspects on Langata road. Police seem to be targeted in recent crimes also in the city. Observation: Staff proceeding on leave/R&R advised to be cautious and be alert always to avoid becoming victims of circumstance. - A banditry attack was reported on Saturday evening between Kulan and Dagahaley where a new arrival was shot and apparently passed away on Monday 24th January 2011. - Three incidents of assault during food	All agency staff

	distribution were reported. During one of the incidents one of the refugees produced a knife and threatened to cut any one who came on his way. In another report from Dagahaley one of the clerks at the FDP was assaulted. - There is a worrying trend of refugees accessing FDP sights with weapons and with the recent increase of such incidents, it is recommended that all refugees entering FDP to be frisked with a metal detectors - It was reported that 53 asylum seekers who were arrested after being found outside the camps illegally were released to go back to the camps. - In GTZ hospital Ifo, it is reported that a mentally sick person entered the hospital compound and threatened the nurse with a knife almost injuring him. He was however ejected by the guards. - Police presence in the Dadaab Agencies compound main gate should be enhanced. It is reported that most of the time Police just make a technical appearance and then disappear. Sometimes they do not show up at all.	UNHCR WFP CARE GOK UNHCR GOK
AOB	Sunday's Escort from Garissa was hailed to have been very well organised. It was observed that Police escort did not have a radio but they were assisted by agency staff. However we should reiterate the importance of the Police escorts to have radios. G4S contract Manager reported that the promise by G4S to Sponsor one child from the local community through secondary education is almost being finalized and very soon it will be effected With no other business the meeting ended at 1745hrs. The next meeting will be held on Monday 31st January 2011	UNHCR GOK

INTERVIEW GUIDE

UN Personnel:

Personal background:

1. Name
2. Employer
3. Position
4. Background and relevant experience with security
5. Experience and knowledge from Dadaab

UN Security management system:

6. Could you briefly describe the UN Security System?
7. What are your thoughts on this security system, in terms of strengths, weaknesses, and possible areas of improvement?

The security situation in and around Dadaab:

8. Could you briefly describe the current UN security Management System here in Dadaab?
9. Could you describe the information flow in Dadaab?
10. Do you find that the system for sharing information is satisfactory?
11. From where do you collect data related to the security situation in and around Dadab?
    a. Do you find that these sources are reliable?
12. Is the information you receive subject to evaluation, and if so what are the routines for evaluating information gathered in the field?

Concluding remarks

13. Do you have any additional comments you would like to add?
14. Would you be open for follow-up questions at a later stage?

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Non-UN personnel (Implementing partners, Kenyan Police)

Personal background:

1. Name
2. Employer
3. Position
4. Background and relevant experience with security
5. Experience and knowledge from Dadaab

Security Management System:

6. Do you have any knowledge of the UN Security Management System?
7. What are your thoughts on the UN security Management System in the Dadaab-area?
8. Have your organization implemented its own security Management System, or has it adopted the UN security Management System?

If own security system:

9. Could you give a description of your organization's security Management System?
10. What are your thoughts/perceptions on this security Management System?

The security situation in and around Dadaab:

1. Could you briefly describe the current UN security Management System here in Dadaab?
2. Could you describe the information flow in Dadaab?
3. Do you find that the system for sharing information is satisfactory?
4. From where do you collect data related to the security situation in and around Dadaab?
    a. Do you find that these sources are reliable?
5. Is the information you receive subject to evaluation, and if so what are the routines for evaluating information gathered in the field?

Concluding remarks

11. Do you have any additional comments you would like to add?
12. Would you be open for follow-up questions at a later stage?