THE UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER

SECURING NORWEGIANNESS:
IMAGINING THREATS TO A CULTURAL COMMUNITY

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University of Stavanger
Securing Norwegianness

Imagining Threats to a Cultural Community

Pål Almås Hatlem

University of Stavanger
When I tell the truth, it is not for the sake of convincing those who do not
know it, but for the sake of defending those that do.

—William Blake
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Preface

This Master’s thesis is born out of a growing unease with the general discourse on immigration and immigration policy in Norway. What at times appears as an ongoing discussion concerning the amount, and potential negative impact, of immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees that should or should not be admitted into Norway, has become an overarching container for a plethora of important discussions on the underlying issues of globalization, the Norwegian welfare state, secularism and religion, cultural identity, ethnicity, citizenship—and, central to this thesis; what it entails to be Norwegian.

Whereas a Norwegian identity may or may not exist as a unique conglomerate—that is, as particular to Norwegians—consisting of a range of cultural, ethnic and political idiosyncrasies, it is never the less present a posteriori, vocally defended when viewed as a target being threatened by external pressure. This external threat, it seems when looking into the Norwegian public debate, is primarily constituted by ‘foreign-culturals’, that is, migrants from beyond the Western cultural community—none more foreign than Muslims. Originating from a range of more or less vocal actors across the Norwegian political spectrum, cries for support in defending Norwegian values and culture is mediated through newspapers, television and radio on a daily basis, creating an environment where the baser instincts of homo Norvegicus are allowed to thrive and flourish.

Norwegianness—in the vast majority of its subscribers—is neither problematized nor properly conceptualized until it meets this foreign ‘constitutive outside’, forcing into play a renewed interest in what it means to be Norwegian. The value-oriented tenets of Norwegianness, however, are at times indistinguishable from the core ideas of the more classic conceptions of European enlightenment. The Enlightenment, both as historical epoch as well as ongoing civilizing project (in its multiple understandings and facets), is fundamental as a backdrop in the construction of a binary opposition between the rational and agency-driven (while emphatically good-hearted) ‘Us’ as opposed to the cultural-psychologically driven, abject, immigrant ‘Other’.

Research Question

Whereas this thesis is primarily concerned with two core themes—i.e. Norwegianness as well as the securitization of threats to it—several important themes are necessarily closely related: as the text intends to show, securitization and renewed discursive importance of national culture is a pan-European phenomenon. Furthermore, much of the rhetoric used across borders is in fact common, to the degree that it seems necessary to investigate the commonalities of the values propagated en masse, as the idea of a European or Western Enlightenment-specific ‘culture’ is portrayed as equally under siege. In following
a somewhat social-constructivist line of investigation, the instigators and actors—and their motives—within this dynamic of threat and response is attempted scrutinized:

- How is the security of Norwegian culture employed in creating negative images of immigration and immigrants? Who propagates this idea, and to what end?

The Structure of this Thesis

In the introduction, the thesis at hand will try to situate itself in relation to the ongoing Norwegian discourse on migration. A presentation of academic themes that are either adjacent or directly analogous to the thesis itself will be given, arguing towards a holistic approach to discourse as the meaning being produced within an interdisciplinary and inter-medial space. The field of migration research (as the core of the program in which this thesis is delivered) will be presented, as well as comments on existing literature on, and current conceptions of Norwegian majority culture, multiculturalism and ‘clashes of culture’.

The second chapter will address the methodological presumptions associated with doing research on public discourse. Critical Discourse Analysis, both applied as method as well as a more epistemological and normative point of view will be discussed, particularly in relation to the discursive formation of truth (i.e. justified fear) as understood in Foucauldian terms. Furthermore, the cognitive matrix of methodological nationalism—and lack of critical analysis of ‘the national order of things’—is suggested as the underlying foundation of the contemporary ethnic, cultural and political dynamics that create the conditions under which all political action is either legitimized or restricted.

Chapter 3 attempts to carve out an understanding of the discursive reconfiguration of threats to Norway after the ‘clean-cut’ security situation of the cold war; when old threats disappear, new ones must be created and upheld. In large swaths of Europe, the favorite new target is crystallized in Islam. Europe’s age-old history of racism and colonialism set against the backdrop of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the subsequent war on terror, constitutes fertile soil for stirring up xenophobia and suspicion to those recently arrived on ‘our shores’. Drawing on examples from the Norwegian press, I will attempt to show that the processes described by the Copenhagen school as Securitization is both passively at work as well as actively employed in the Norwegian political debate.

In chapter 4, a closer look will taken at different conceptions of Norwegianness and the ways in which these are presented in the public discourse on immigration. Whereas certain symbolic markers of national identity—particularly the bunad (Norwegian folk costumes) are given mention, the main focus is directed to more ‘ethereal’ constructions of Norwegianness, especially the normative constructions that are taken for granted as making up the moral framework of the ‘good Norwegian’ in response to matters as diverse as parenting, tolerance towards religion, sexuality and ‘foreign culture’, views on the
egalitarian society and racism. Though several idiosyncrasies surface as more or less particular to Norwegianness, it is nevertheless obvious that the majority of the values expressed as normative presumptions of thinking, meaning and doing the right thing are not at all found purely within a Norwegian cultural sphere, but are in fact common to a European, Western (or even universal) Enlightenment that, tracing its historical roots to the eighteenth century and beyond, radically informs our perception of the central tenets of social organization. What this Enlightenment entails for the discourse on immigration and global mobility today, is the central issue of chapter 5.

Finally, almost every section of this thesis could—and perhaps, should, for all analytic purposes—have ended with “... and then Anders Behring Breivik and the July 22. attacks changed everything.” Or did anything really change at all? The final chapter of this thesis will try to approach the discourse on Norwegianness and exclusion as the underlying cause of the tragedies that occurred when a self-admitted Norwegian crusader took it upon himself to put an end to the discussion on the future of Norwegian immigration policy. More than a mere postscript, this thesis submits in its conclusion that in view of the climate of rising xenophobia and escalating conflicts of ideology, coupled with the ongoing legitimization of a discourse on ‘our’ national, cultural security, the July 22. attacks were not only a collapse of a civilized discussion on policy, nor a mere atrocity carried out by a deranged individual external to the society in which he was reared. The perpetrator was a true child of contemporary Norway, and an inevitable conclusion to decades of institutionalized and internalized racism, hate speech and an ongoing construction of the ideology of national and cultural superiority—it was the empirical conclusion to a conceptual discussion in which human decency is faltering.

Acknowledgments

During the writing of this thesis I have become indebted to many people, and though my name is on the cover, I take responsibility for any errors and mistakes only. It is a pleasure to thank those who contributed in making this thesis possible.

First and foremost, heartfelt thanks go out to Professor Milan Mesić, who graciously agreed to supervise me during my writing of this thesis. His feedback has been crucial in writing, and perhaps even more importantly, finishing it.

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Likewise, I am indebted to my friend Jostein Helland, who time and again has set aside his own projects to offer me invaluable input throughout the entire process. His intellect and care continues to dazzle me.
I would also like to thank my fellow students at the Joint Master in Migration and Intercultural Relations, who have encouraged me in pursuing my studies. I have never met more dedicated students, and it has been an honor for me to work together with them.

Thanks to Rudolf and Malin for making coffee.

Finally, I lack the words to describe the unwavering support, patience, and love I have been shown by my family. I am forever grateful for their sacrifices, without which this thesis would never have been written. My wife and children are awesome.

Pål Almås Hatlem, Stavanger 2012.
Introduction

The power of the status quo puts up the façades into which our consciousness crashes. It must seek to crash through them. . . . Where the thought transcends the bonds it tied in resistance—there is its freedom. Freedom follows the subject’s urge to express itself. The need to lend a voice to suffering is a condition of all truth. For suffering is objectivity that weighs upon the subject; its most subjective experience, its expression, is objectively conveyed.

—Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*

This thesis is a fundamentally normative text. It claims that ethnic or racial discrimination is bad, that racism is bad, that nationalism, and needless fear-mongering on behalf of the nation, is bad. Any suffering, as the direct result of discrimination on grounds of racist or cultural exclusivist notions of superiority, is morally despicable, ethically indefensible, and normatively wrong. If you, the reader, do not subscribe to these moral presuppositions, you should probably not read any further. Indeed, it would be a wholly ridiculous undertaking to argue for any of the overarching propositions and conclusions that are to come later in this text, if the wish to minimize human suffering is not something you have an immediate affinity towards. Similarly, if you subscribe to any notion of necessary demarcation between races, cultures or nations, or to the infallibility of the free market in regulating global mobility of peoples and capital, you will not find this text particularly agreeable to your point of view.

In all fairness, you will probably not have any interest in this text unless you subscribe
to a long list of ethical, moral and even ideological tenets that is somewhat endemic to
the often caricatured left-leaning, liberal, politically correct intelligentsia. Then again,
no one will force you to read further if you do not.

Most likely, this thesis brings little new to the table. Surely, the number of people
who could express the ideas proposed in this text in clearer, more eloquent prose is in the
thousands. In reality, it has already been done: the preexisting mountain of literature
on the different themes that are attempted synthesized in this text, is likely superior in
all cases. What little insight this thesis may offer, consists solely by the synthesis of
the distinctive parts outlined in the foreword; namely the discursively created notion,
and subsequently challenged security, of Norwegianness as part of a European tradition
of Enlightenment thought. Constituting a tapestry of these different topics, this text is
not a systematic argument along the lines of a predetermined plan—nor is it intended
to be. If anything, it should be read as a series of conceptual and theoretical ideas and
interventions concerning the Norwegian condition, which should, ideally, shed mutual
light upon each other. As such, merely flipping to the last pages in order to grasp
an attempted conclusion, is not recommended: What conclusions are made, are few,
scattered, and merely tentative.

On Language, Reality and Subjectivity

Why study language? Who cares? Should not students of migration address more em-
pirical cases, where a more scient-ist, empirically based reasoning could help solve ‘real’
or more immediately tangible problems of integration?

Is this not the wrong question? Is not language an absolute precondition for power,
while simultaneously being power’s clearest expression? If we are not to study power,
then what are we to study? The dis-attached consequences of its exertion: suffering as
bare condition, with no causality or narrative?

It is, fundamentally, a necessary precondition for the outlook, method and composition
of this thesis to focus on human suffering. Not only subjective suffering in itself, but
suffering as consequence of abuse of power. And power, in this instance, is exerted
through, and is in itself, language.

To give a short exemplification in the case of Norway: The different denominations
characterizing irregular immigrants in Norwegian discourse, have taken on Orwellian
proportions: Where a range of formerly adopted terms, such as “undocumented asy-
lum seekers”, “paper-less” and their more belligerent counterparts “unjustified asylum
seekers” and “illegal immigrants”, had—for a time—been overtaken by the term “un-
returnables”, the latest addition to Norwegian new-speak (coined by a state secretary in
the Ministry of Justice, who repeatedly and shamelessly credits himself for doing so), is
“return-deniers”.\(^1\) Seemingly, where the sans-papiers and no person is illegal campaigns have managed to discredit some terms,\(^2\) there is no end to the imaginative ways in which blame, criminal intent, or active, malignant agency in ‘making oneself difficult’ can be ascribed to asylum seekers and immigrants.

Language matters, as it beyond mere euphemisms forms the conceptual matrix in which reality is interpreted. And while language is always fiercely contested, it is a contest in which the weaker part always loses out. Addressing this lopsidedness of discursive power to create truth is an imperative that academia should never take lightly.

This is the core of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA): to address the un-even distribution of language/power and its application in creating a political climate within which illegitimate actions are committed without neither identification nor criticism. Beyond use of discursive capital, CDA attempts to elucidate and criticize abuse of power.\(^3\)

Perhaps the most obscene result of the current political climate in Norway, is the horrendously denigrating treatment of irregular migrants, and in particular, their children. Symptomatically, it is not the children who are irregular—they are merely the children of adults who are denied asylum, children who are treated as a kind of unfortunate luggage belonging to their parents, somehow not deemed deserving of a judicial treatment of their own. Examples of emphatically inhuman treatment of these children abound; born in institutions far outside of Norwegian cities (out of sight, out of mind), children are raised under conditions of fear and insecurity in a society that enjoys applauding itself as a standard-bearer of democracy, peace and humanistic values. Years later, these same children—now speaking Norwegian, eating Norwegian, behaving Norwegian, being Norwegian—are, according to governmental jargon, “returned” to their country of origin under force (what country of origin? Basic linguistics and grammar would insist that these children are deported, not returning to a place they have never visited). As 10 year-old Palestinian refugee Neda Ibrahim said recently, having spent 9 years of her life in a Norwegian asylum reception center, fearing forced deportation her entire conscious life: “I actually like living in Norway, it’s Norway that doesn’t like me.”\(^4\)

These individual stories of ruined childhoods amount to nothing less than a systemic evil. Politics, however, dictate that the ruling Labor Party can hardly afford to back down on their “firm but fair” policy, as it would likely lead to a loss at the polls—in fact, in the latest round of pointing fingers, the normally immigration-critical Progress Party saw their chance to represent popular opinion in condemning the situation of irregular

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asylum seeker’s children, arguing for a full re-evaluation of their individual cases. The tables turn quickly when polls dictate policy.

**What this thesis is really all about**

The core of this thesis is one of deconstructing the notion of objective threats. The idea that Norway—and more specifically, that which *is* Norwegian—is under threat by an unwanted dilution of its culture by immigrants carrying with them customs, values and perspectives not commensurable with Norwegianness, is not particular to Norway: the same jargon and discourse of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is found throughout Europe, fueled and sustained by the rise of right-wing populists in countries such as France, Britain, Sweden and Denmark – as well as in Central and Eastern Europe. Following Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver from the Copenhagen School, I intend to argue that the above threat – whether or not, to some degree, it is partly ‘realistic’ or not – is wholly constructed, thus demanding the critical analysis which, unfortunately, it so far seems to be successfully eluding in the public imagination.

Two different perspectives will form the point of departure for my thesis. Firstly, that threats are not necessarily objective things. According to securitization theory, different issues are at regular intervals *securitized* and *de-securitized*; that is, framed within a “logics of survival” as threats, and, if accepted by an audience as legitimate, moved into the political realm of security policy, thus acquiring *fundamental* importance and subsequently all that follows with such a framing, be it increased funding or heightened legitimacy.

Can securitization as an analytic concept help elucidate some of the processes that cause this fear and worry on behalf of ‘that which is Norwegian’? Secondly, what is being threatened, the object of the perceived threats, is neither clearly defined, nor particularly susceptible to definition in itself. Hence, ‘that-which-is-Norwegian – *Norwegianness* – will have to be elucidated beyond mere pin-pointing of different markers of national cultural identity, i.e. folk costumes, culinary traditions and idiosyncratic mannerisms, or particular constructions of ‘our’ values.

The synthesis of the two topical perspectives above will as such be to analyze the *securitization of cultural threats to Norwegianness*, and, if possible, how this has increasingly become a framework in which legitimate accusations of racism and xenophobia are

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8. Which is not to say that none of these are of importance in expressing identity, nor that they do not carry immense weight in the general perception as ‘glue’ innate to our ‘imagined community.’
bereaved of legitimacy, as the discourse of cultural incompatibility is increasingly adopted by even moderate, social-democratic actors on the political plane.

**Destroying Norwegian Culture**

The destruction of the Norwegian ‘culture’ may come to pass. Imagining a future where not everyone eats brown goat’s cheese and goes skiing from the age of four wearing traditional folk costumes may seem difficult for some Norwegians, yet it remains a likely future. That, say, the privileged position of the Norwegian Lutheran State Church may be lost, is not an unlikely scenario. A plethora of markers of Norwegianness will surely disappear, or be reforged—many new ones will emerge. Norwegian culture will be forced to change. The question then, is; *So what?*

Claiming that the current ‘culture’ of Norway—as real as it may or may not be—should be perpetuated into eternity, comprises a failure on the conceptual level: In an increasingly globalized world, cultural hybridization and pluralism *is* the only national culture that is sustainable in the long run. A fully static, ‘pure’ culture is not only impossible, it is wholly undesirable, as the few contemporary and historical occurrences of such (e.g. Nazi Germany and North Korea) show all too clearly. As Kwame Anthony Appiah wrote in the New York Times Magazine, “cultures are made of continuities and changes, and the identity of a society can survive through these changes. Societies without change aren’t authentic; they’re just dead.”

It is important to not overly misconstrue the goal of this thesis, or give the reader false hopes that a complete reconfiguration of national culture will be undertaken within the text at hand. Whereas certain elements of the Norwegian public debate tend to look at all attempts of ‘deconstruction’ as a literal disassembling and scrapping of all-that-is-Norwegian, it is important to reiterate that Norway is a *wonderful* place to live for the absolute majority of its inhabitants. Norway is, as countries go, a splendid one; as rich in both oil and spectacular nature as it is peaceful and egalitarian. A functioning welfare society, with public health care, free education and little to no corruption or overt power abuse, Norway is a haven in an otherwise often troubled world. This is a point not lost on Norwegians, as it is clearly not lost on those who attempt to come here.

Whereas most reasoning on behalf of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers with regards to final destination of a migratory process tend to follow most economic “laws” of migration, i.e. push factors followed by chance, existing networks of family in destination society, and other goals common to human agency, many still make a rudimentary evaluation of potential destinations. When conducting interviews with ‘potential asylum seekers’ from Iraq, Eritrea and Chechnya, Jan-Paul Brekke and Monica Five Aarset found that, beyond economic and family oriented motives, Norway ‘won out’ as final destination.

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due to its reputation.\textsuperscript{10} Though such a reputation is a fickle thing, altering rapidly with changes in immigration policy, Norway’s reputation is still one of a peaceful nation with high regard of human rights and a fair chance of making a living.

As such, the solution to ending immigration into Norway is presented to us on a silver plate: All that Norwegians have to do, is to shape Norway into an unsafe and violent society, destroy the Norwegian welfare state and the rule of law and let corruption thrive unchecked—and immigrants will stop coming. When this is not immediately considered an option, we are left with a clear and unmistakable double standard: Norwegians completely understand the immigrants’ motives for coming here, but the security of an ethnic, homogeneous culture is more important than alleviating the suffering of fellow humans who are not born with a Norwegian passport.

Jürgen Habermas writes on the necessary demarcation between political culture and ‘culture’ as such, that

\begin{quote}
The democratic right of self-determination includes, of course, the right to preserve one’s own political culture, which includes the concrete context of citizen’s rights, though it does not include the self-assertion of a privileged cultural life form.\textsuperscript{11}
\end{quote}

Though this is not the place for a prolonged and spirited defense of neither constitutional patriotism nor exceptionally liberal multiculturalism in an extended interpretation towards a-culturalism, it is my submission that Norwegians are hard pressed to find nation-oriented ways out of a constricted, exclusive definition of Norwegianness, besides a complete reconfiguration of the premises for national identity, discarding ‘culture’ all together as the normative foundation for either national unity or particularism.


Preliminary Notes on Theory

Intellectual honesty is the quality that the public in free countries always has expected of historians; much more than that it does not expect, nor often get.

—Samuel E. Morison, The Faith of an Historian

Ours is a world constituted by nation states. Pesky migrants threaten to destroy us all through subverting the national order of things. The sacred culture of the primordial nation is under siege by religious fanatics threatening to lay our culture to waste, with the assistance of the liberal multiculturalist and cultural marxist elites, who have misled the people into a state where most no longer can identify the cultural betrayal—or so some will have us believe.

Nationalism, however, is not a problem associated with far right conspiracy theorists exclusively. Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick-Schiller conceives the notion of “methodological nationalism” as a term denoting the nation state as the conceptual starting point for many theoretizations of the social sciences, particularly problematic within the field of globalization theory.12

The social sciences, when dealing with the problem of the nation state, risk reproducing the very discourses they attempt to overcome: Obviously, any thesis delving into the subject matter of national culture and ‘external’ threats—from a case-oriented, national

vantage point, i.e. Norwegianness—stands in danger of succumbing to methodological nationalism; the text at hand is in this regard to be viewed as the proverbial bull in the china shop.

Whereas Wimmer and Glick-Schiller specifically targets the liberal and social sciences with their criticism (hence, the ‘methodological’ prefix), the remaining ‘nationalism’ as explained by their conceptualization, is perhaps telling towards an understanding of the fundamental role of the national in all facets of human life; in business, politics, identity formation etc. ad infinitum. In one way, Wimmer and Glick-Schiller take an implicitly defeatist stand; ‘Science—and by extension its practitioners—should stop being influenced by the same trifle misapprehensions of nationality held by the majority of the world’s inhabitants.’ Indeed, whereas the impressive production of literature critical to the primacy of ‘the national’ persist in hailing the dawn of the transnational, most people persist in their seemingly irrational faith in their homelands, and in the sanctity of their borders and boundaries.

It should be expressively noted here that I consider it to be a fundamental truth that national border controls, the international passport institution and the obsessive surveillance of borders, are wholly modern constructions. This constitutes an implicit presupposition that is hardly ever questioned or methodically challenged. While this thesis attempts to adress some of the blatant inconsistencies proposed by contemporary agents of nationalism, it will not, unfortunately, synthesize the criticisms it raises to produce a radically internationalist alternative to the nationalist fallacy: As such, I commit the same sin of omission with eyes open—this paper will remain an ad-hoc refusion of ground vis-a-vis the most common expressions of the national thinking.

**Studying Norwegianness as Norwegian**

The numerous pitfalls in studying the national understood as culture, not to mention one’s own culture, are too many to account for here. Ever since Herder, *culture* has been a term of controversy, and after the grueling consequences of European romantic nationalism it has been criticized by theorists in all walks of science: Yet (to mangle Adorno)—even after the holocaust—culture remains a central concept in social science and the humanities. Those attempting to study one’s own culture, Lila Abu-Lughod observes, are prone to slide into subjectivity, having problems gaining enough distance: However, though Abu-Lughod claims that culture as a concept contains an inordinate degree of bound- edness, homogeneity, coherence, and unwanted stability, many anthropologists and social theorists still regard culture as a fruitful concept to be reckoned with.\(^\text{13}\)

Viewing culture more or less as a Durkheimian social fact, it is the “cohesive behavior” that occurs wherever people gather in groups, be it physical proximity or virtual reality. As Arjun Appadurai observes, Culturalism is the conscious realization of self-identity through affirmation of cultural differences. Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis, MI: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 147 Though such culturalism can lead to wholly negative notions of primordialism and national supremacy, racism and hate, it also enables a hermeneutic twist of the role of the embedded observer. One can be explicitly aware of one’s self-through-difference in binary relation to the other, yet while conducting research in one’s own culture be conscious of one’s self-as-member, not only through affirmation through social practices, but in observing and conceptualizing cultural expressions through the lens of situated knowledge that is in accordance with the actors interpretations of their own actions.

**On Discourse**

What is *discourse*? According to the Oxford Dictionary, discourse, stemming from the Latin *discursus* (‘running to and fro, conversation, discourse’) is “a spoken or written treatment of a subject, in which it is handled or discussed at length; a dissertation, treatise, homily, sermon, or the like.”14 The implicit biformity of the term should not go unheeded; whereas a sermon could certainly be held without a congregation, or a dissertation never read—they are incumbent upon an audience, whether this audience partakes in the discourse or not.

As such, writing a thesis on discourse is a kind of meta-undertaking: while addressing the contemporary discourse on a subject, this thesis will at the same time become a part of the discourse it seeks to address.

The *Critical* in ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ is—in simplified terms—the addition of a normative point of view on Discourse Analysis: Where discourse analysis is taken to be understood as the analysis of power in written or spoken communication, Critical discourse analysis identifies—and inherently argues against—abuse of this power. Admittedly, this calls for some clarification on behalf of the analyzer.

First and foremost, all notions of a positivist approach to science, as a neutral undertaking resulting in the uncovering of objective truths will have to be dropped: in fact, CDA is the study of conflicting truths. This is not the same as accepting the proverbial high-school tenet of relativism, that “everyone is entitled to their own opinion!” Everyone is not entitled to their opinions, especially not so when these opinions are unfounded, irrational—or even abusive. Whether as *popular opinion* as the basis for political creation of policy, or in a deeper, Foucauldian sense, opinions—language—shape the world we all live in. Hence, a modicum of care in the forging and application of ones sentiments

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should ideally be considered a civil duty for all.

**Decency and Tolerance**

Anniken Hagelund suggests in her doctoral thesis on Norwegian political discourse that the Norwegian debate on immigration is one revolving around the concept of *decency*.\(^\text{15}\) Two particularly interesting motives are addressed: Firstly, that the Norwegian immigration debate is inherently moral: Racism and Xenophobia is normatively bad and a moral problem that needs to be combated. However, concrete examples of racism are hard to establish, that is, racism is universally designated immoral and in extension impossible to define without explicitly questioning the morality of the entire society for allowing such displays in the first place.

Pointing out that a sentiment or action is racist, is thus a road few will endeavor to travel. Not only is allegations of racism impossible to live with for anyone being labeled as such; it is considered ‘bad taste’ to even insinuate racism as explanans for any particular opinion or political act, as it is deemed the ultimate character assassination.\(^\text{16}\) Hagelund here builds on Ernesto Laclau’s notion of the *constitutive outside*, that which through its explicit expulsion from the communal consensus, from the hegemonic *totality*, constitutes the necessary difference for the ‘rest of us’ to agree wholeheartedly on our own particularity: the constitutive outside renders us all uniquely alike, equivalent in our condemnation of the outside.\(^\text{17}\)

Secondly, Hagelund argues that within Norwegian Politics this constitutive outside is embodied by the Progress Party, i.e. “the racists”.\(^\text{18}\) Not only is the Progress Party the object from which all other mainstream political parties ceaselessly attempts to distinguish themselves from—and in opposition to, it is also a position that serves the Progress Party themselves quite well: Where others have to argue for and defend unpopular decisions (cutting funding for schools vs. hospitals), the Progress Party are able to criticize any fragment of the status quo from a less pragmatic point of view. Where other parties need argue the *decent* solution to a moral or political problem, the Progress Party are, to a certain degree, able to undercut the political discourse.

In *De cive*, Thomas Hobbes contrasts human society’s *decency* with the *slovenliness* of nature: Whereas the human condition in nature is one of a beast’s, civil society enables man to ascend to a higher level, abandoning ”the dominion of passions” for a ”dominion

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of reason.”\textsuperscript{19} In his argument, Hobbes illustrates the dichotomy of a moral choice needed in civil society: 	extit{decency} is not inherent in man’s nature, but is something we have to strive to attain. At the same time, as I have already hinted at, decency entails a given negative, a problem that has a decent solution.

Decency presupposes that a given problem has a solution that— though not ideal— may resolve inherent conflicts in the best possible way, through a ‘moral compromise’ so to say. The concept of 	extit{tolerance} is closely connected: Amy Gutmann argues in the introduction to Charles Taylor’s 	extit{Multiculturalism} that whereas 	extit{respect} entails a certain understanding of a position “as reflecting a moral point of view,” that is, serious moral disagreements where both parts can take for granted that the opponent is arguing without ulterior motives, “…toleration extends to the widest range of views, so long as they stop short of threats and other direct and discernible harms to individuals.”\textsuperscript{20} However, it is hardly tolerant to accept opinions one agrees with: as with decency, tolerance need only be applied when confronted with a given negative, or as Jürgen Habermas puts it; “We need to show tolerance only towards worldviews we consider wrong and habits we do not appreciate.”\textsuperscript{21}

Tolerance, however, is not a sufficient precondition for neither societal justice for the Other nor the successful integration of immigrants. Zygmunt Bauman touches on this in 	extit{Postmodernity and Its Discontents}: Tolerance is necessary, but not 	extit{enough};

By itself, the democratic regime does not promote (let alone guarantee) the transformation of tolerance into solidarity— that is, the recognition of other people’s misery and sufferings as one’s own responsibility, and the alleviation and eventually the removal of misery as one’s own task. More often than not, given the present shape of political mechanism, democratic regimes translate tolerance as callousness and indifference.\textsuperscript{22}

As such, 	extit{tolerance} for the Other far too easily gives credence to passive multicultural ‘laissez-faire’ policies, arguing that an intervention into the material inequalities that dictate living conditions of immigrants, would be ‘unfair’, both to the indigenous population as well as to the immigrants themselves. Tolerance—as Wendy Brown puts it— regulates 	extit{aversion}, checking “an attitude or condition of disapproval, disdain, or revulsion with a particular kind of overcoming”: it is a process of patting our own backs despite our

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Zygmunt Bauman, \textit{Postmodernity and Its Discontents} (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 63.
\end{itemize}
prejudices, applauding our capability not to openly discriminate those we consider in the wrong:

Despite its pacific demeanor, tolerance is an internally unharmonious term, blending together goodness, capaciousness, and conciliation with discomfort, judgment, and aversion. Like patience, tolerance is necessitated by something one would prefer did not exist.\(^\text{23}\)

**Multiculturalism**

Certainly, the critics of Islam are right: Islam—as a religion—is reactionary, backwards and outdated. It is, when looking at its central tenets of misogynist patriarchy and glorification of violence, detrimental to the human condition and thus inherently immoral. On this, I, as very nearly all other western communists or liberals, agnostics or atheists, agree wholeheartedly.

It is my submission that multiculturalism needs be understood as an inherently pragmatic approach: it is a point of view born out of accepting the ‘facts on the ground’ (to put the situation in military terms); that geographical Europe is (and has always been) the home of more than the French, the British, the Germans, the Czechs or even the Basque: it is also the territory where millions of Roma, Jews, Sami, Arabs, Africans and Muslims live out their daily lives and dreams. Failing to comprehend the necessity to incorporate these groups into a political European community, is not merely a theoretical, academic or political travesty—it is a betrayal of humanity itself.

I can see no other mode of analysis than a careful conceptual and deliberative approach to discourse analysis as fitting in addressing the claims of moral and civilizational supremacy as shown by monocultural and fundamentalist enlightenment critics of Islam and Muslims.

The notion of Europe under siege by an external threat—be it military, civilizational, cultural or religious—is, by a range of ‘immigration skeptics’, ‘Islam critics’ and right wing extremists, coupled with the idea of the internal traitors. Every European country’s respective multiculturalists, liberalists, academic elite, and socialists are considered as knowingly creating policies and enabling a situation that in the long (or as some argue, not so long) run will lead to a cultural and ethnic disaster where European or national cultures, and even the indigenous populace of Europe itself will be marginalized, suppressed and ultimately destroyed, by the ever so rapidly multiplying immigrants. This fear-mongering is detrimental to our collective safety as a democratic political culture, and a slippery slope to a situation in which our neighbor may at any time be construed

as a personified threat to the well-being of our society. Such threats, historically, tend to
dealt with harshly.
Securitization

AWAKE! FEAR! FIRE! FOES! AWAKE!
FEAR! FIRE! FOES!
AWAKE! AWAKE!


The Rise and Fall of an Extremist Nobody

On February 2 2010, Dagbladet published an article claiming that the homepage of the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) were effectively ‘linking’ to drawn images on the internet depicting the prophet Muhammad as a pig.\textsuperscript{24} In addition, Dagbladet chose to print a photograph of a man, taken from a position behind him, looking at a computer screen with the provocative image itself—at its front page. Aggravated by this, an estimated two and a half thousand Norwegian Muslims gathered in Oslo to demonstrate their disapproval. During his speech at this demonstration, a young man named Mohyeldeen Mohammad claimed that

If this is allowed to continue, it will eventually be too late. Then we will get a September 11th and June 7th on Norwegian soil. This is not a threat, but

\textsuperscript{24} Dagbladet.no, “Hysj-politiet lenker til sider som framstiller profeten som en gris,” February 3, 2010.
This immediately led to a moral panic in the Norwegian media, quickly deciding that this was a threat, despite the explicit insurance that it was not, and immediate condemnation ensued from government officials, politicians, the moderate Islamic Counsel in Norway and other moderate Muslims. The left-wing newspaper Klassekampen managed to get an interview with Mohammad, in which he was asked a long range of relatively open questions. He answered the questions with zeal and propagated opinions which to most Norwegians would indeed seem extreme, and when asked if he supported stoning to death of homosexuals as a form of punishment, responded that “as far as I know that person was gay, and if so, that is the punishment he deserves.” Then Dagbladet ran an article where what could be mustered of the political elite and moderate Muslims voiced their unequivocal condemnation of such opinions under the heading “– It is sickening.” A week later, a demonstration was held in the hometown of Mohammad—opposing his opinions—by moderate muslims.

Mohyeldeen Mohammad—as the raving Islamic fundamentalist he most assuredly is—was portrayed as an immediate threat to the well-being of Norway and its inhabitants, and most importantly as representing a culture that is incommensurable with Norwegianness.

### Securitization: The Concept

Threats—and from them, derived fear—fosters action, or rather, reaction. Instilling fear in the public in order to capitalize on a situation where support, legitimacy or funding is needed, say in case of impending war, is an age-old operation; it is fundamental to the workings of the state. The police, representing the state’s monopoly on violence, could not exist if not for peoples fear for their livelihood, property or health. Wars would be unthinkable, if not for the fear for one’s survival in the face of a threatening external force.

Denial of asylum to persecuted people, redirecting over-crowded boats filled with refugees to ‘where they came from’, detaining ‘illegal immigrants’ without trials, and arresting naturalized members of local communities in the dark of the night in order to return them to oppressive regimes or war zones, would lead to riots and uproar—if not for the fear of ‘our’ borders being overrun, ‘our’ countries flooded, ‘our’ culture destroyed. Fear makes the world go ’round.

Threats are not objective things. Securitization, understood as the elevation of issues of lesser, immediate political importance to the level of politics of security, creates a

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Securitization

legitimacy of policy where there was not necessarily any from before. As Buzan, Waever and Wilde write in their seminal *Security: a New Framework for Analysis*, “‘Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization.”

A thoroughly constructivist approach, securitization builds upon Foucauldian discourse analysis, in turn characterized by its focus upon discursive practices as constructing power relations and knowledge, not merely mirroring the reality as perceived. This view of discourse as formative of truth is a precondition to understand the concept of securitization: Securitization is discourse, from the presentation of something as a threat—the ‘securitizing move’—to the audience’s acceptance of the threat presented as a valid concern.

In reference to a case analysis, Barry Buzan explicitly argues for discourse analysis as applied method in uncovering securitization:

> The obvious method is discourse analysis, since we are interested in when and how something is established by whom as a security threat. The defining criterion of security is textual: a specific rhetorical structure that has to be located in discourse.

Foucault presented the task of analyzing discourse as consisting of “. . . not [only] treating discourses as groups of signs, (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.” Viewing discourse as formative of reality, not only mirroring it, raises implications for the use of language in media: publicly repeating ‘untruths’ or normative presuppositions as purely descriptive of a perceived reality, may in turn—if repeated often enough—create the very reality which was argued for. As Foucault writes in one of his 1976 lectures at the Collège de France,

> There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth.

This view of discourse as formative of truth is a precondition to understand the concept of securitization. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde argues for such a dynamic in their book:

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30. Ibid., 25.
31. Ibid., 176.
Securitization can be studied directly; it does not need indicators. The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed?34

Securitization: The Technique

Most importantly, from my vantage point of attempting to examine the discourse on immigration and Norwegian identity, Jef Huysmans argues towards an understanding of the discourse of security as a premeditated practice: the securitizing move relies on the instigation of fear and subsequent accumulation and ‘cashing in’ of this fear for political gain; securitization is not merely an analytical lens through which a further understanding of un-intended shifts of discourse and power can be established, but also—and more disturbingly—“a political technique of framing policy questions in logics of survival with a capacity to mobilize politics of fear in which social relations are structured on the basis of distrust.”35 Securitization is discourse applied, located somewhere between politics and war on Clausewitz’s continuum.

The real-life application of a ‘technique’ tends to be premeditated, it is willed. In its ultimate consequence, the securitization of the forwarded or perceived threat (e.g. immigration) can enable governments to suspend normal political functions and rights in order to protect the safety of its citizens; extraordinary threats take extraordinary measures—the most telling exemplification of which is the American ‘war on terror’. As Teun van Dijk writes, it hardly needs further analysis to argue that “[. . .] terrorism serves Bush, his party, the Pentagon budget, the curtailment of civil liberties and especially the businesses involved in war and security.”36 David Harvey comments on this dynamic approach to security, in the case of the now clearly unfounded securitization of the ‘Iraq-problem’; when no longer feasibly sustained as a threat, the Iraq invasion was instead turned into a benevolent campaign for freedom; “When all other reasons for engaging in a pre-emptive war against Iraq was proven wanting, the president appealed to the idea that the freedom conferred on Iraq was in and of itself an adequate justification for the war. The Iraqis were free, and that was all that really mattered.” 37

The war on terror has, in many areas, led to what Giorgio Agamben calls the state of permanent exception: In the transitional phase from democracy towards totalitarianism, exceptional laws are passed that reorganize contemporary balances of power—all in the name of security and safety; after a while, the exceptions become universal and

36. Dijk, Discourse & Power, 204.
permanent.\textsuperscript{38} Saving lives and protecting potential civilian victims from terrorists’ harm has never been at the core of security (it would of course be a nearly impossible undertaking); security is not only an expression of power, it helps create legitimacy of power as well. When the citizens of the sovereign submit to the pat-downs and body-scans at airports, they are confessing their faith in, and submission to, the state. When directives are introduced that call for the constant surveillance of all electronic communication between law-abiding people—just in case—they are accepted in recognition of the absolute authority of the state.

As Slavoj Žižek comments on Agamben’s proposal in the face of the immigrant Other—or in Žižek’s terms, the Neighbor—the state of exception is already upon us. The incomprehensible magnitude of failure of the European morality in addressing the flow of immigration across the Mediterranean sea, is evident in a never-ending string of grotesque news reports. The Italian state of emergency that was proclaimed nation-wide in 2008 to cope with the illegal human beings crossing the sea, is but another example of the constant extensions of the limits of power.\textsuperscript{39}

As Foucault has argued, the portrayed focus on the security of the population, is but another expression of the state’s exertion of control and discipline—biopolitics, or biopower: Symptomatically of modernity’s ‘governmental rationality’, the inclusion of ever new areas of control is perhaps precisely the very reason for the state’s survival, “since it is the tactics of government that allow the continual definition of what should or should not fall within the state’s domain, what is public and what private, what is and is not within the state’s competence, and so on.”\textsuperscript{40} In the past, it was the states prerogative to protect its citizen’s genes: Now, it upholds its culture.

\section*{Securing Culture}

Where once the state stood as guarantor for the biological safety of its inhabitants, the state has transformed into the patron of its own cultural particularity. Where the biopolitics of old days with eugenics and skull-measurements is discredited beyond repossession, culture as the target of fearful paper-tigers is the new show in town. As in the case of the ‘reasonably racist’ treatment of the desperate people attempting to reach the Italian shores of Europe, it still represents “a clear passage from direct barbarism to Berlusconian barbarism with a human face.”\textsuperscript{41}

In his book \textit{The New Racism}, Martin Barker raises an interesting point on the epis-
temological short-cut of perceived fear versus its actual validity as such—the fear on behalf of one’s ‘way of life’, or ‘culture’, is self-validating, justifying the securitization of migration as a palpable threat:

What then do we say about a fear whose very existence justifies that policy steps be taken to remove what is felt as threatening? […] people’s feelings about their essential unity and individuality are so central that they are not even just seen as by-products of the way they live together. Rather, they constitute their way of life. If it were not for feelings of belonging, of sharing traditions, customs, beliefs, language – in a word, culture – there would be no society. We could not live together and cooperate. Therefore the very existence of fears about damage to the unity of the nation is proof that the unity of the nation is threatened. The fears are self-validating. For the feelings, the customs make up the nation for all its worth. The nation is its ‘way of life’.42

This new, self-validating ‘racism-as-culturism’ is a necessary precondition for political manipulation of fear on behalf of one’s cultural existence. The migrant threat is first constructed in respectable terms of cultural incommensurability, and then subsequently securitized as a threat. When derived of its connotations to imperialist notions of race and near history of concentration camps, xenophobia thrives when cultural incommensurability can be argued publicly; it has become possible to be a “respectable racist.”43

Visual markers of foreign identity are particularly susceptible to criticism of this ‘reasonable’ sort: the appearance of hijabs in the city-scapes of Norway has certainly stirred emotions and laid bare a range of formerly suppressed discourses on the threat of immigration.

Criticism of respectable racism is hard to raise. Last fall, when the leader of the Norwegian conservative party Høyre argued that certain aspects of the discourse on Islam and Muslims are quite analogous to the way Jews were regarded in Europe before the Holocaust, she was publicly chastised for belittling the Holocaust. Surely, no one wants to round up all the European Muslims, put them in concentration camps and kill them?

One of the more obnoxious strategies of legitimizing strict immigration control, is arguing for the decency of strictness. Ignoring subjective suffering, the case is made that in order to protect immigrants from persecution, discrimination, or overtly negative antipathies, immigrants need to be treated harshly for their own good. If they are treated well, the “racists” will be offended, or even worse, scoring political points if the immigrants “misbehave” (as in the case with Mohyeldeen Mohammad), and more people will direct irrational hatred towards immigrants. To limit such a development, Norway—for domestic, political purposes—needs to show a firm hand in dealing with asylum seekers.

This is exactly the same line of argument that was prevalent among the bourgeoisie in 1930’s Europe: reasonable measures are needed to quench unreasonable hatred. Slavoj Žižek asks:

> Is not this same attitude at work in the way our governments are dealing with the “immigrant threat”? After righteously rejecting populist racism as “unreasonable” and unacceptable given our democratic standards, they endorse “reasonably” racist protective measures . . . “... We don’t want to kill anyone, we don’t want to organize any pogrom. But we also think that the best way to hinder the always unpredictable actions of violent anti-immigration protests is to organize reasonable anti-immigrant protection.”44

### The Hijab as Threatening Extremism

In 2010, MP for the Progress Party Christian Tybring-Gjedde claimed that the Hijab is no better than the robes of the Ku Klux Klan:

> – When parents dress their children in the hijab, that is just as bad as if they had dressed them in the robes of Ku Klux Klan to me. Surely no-one would accept that?45

Here, Tybring-Gjedde attacks anyone who would even consider wearing a hijab, let alone ‘force it’ upon their children. Most Norwegians will loathe any sentiment considered as remotely close to organized racism such as Ku Klux Klan, owing both to a relatively complicated history during the second World War, and an image of self constructed as Norwegian adherence to equality—not only as ‘Norwegian egalitarianism’—but to an internationally directed understanding of ‘equality among cultures’ discursively created in the last century. Of course, no politician would ever consider attacking children for wearing a hijab, nor would Tybring-Gjedde. However, the acts of the parents are presented as abhorrent by implying that (1) the children are uninformed of the role of the hijab as conforming to the uniform of a particular world-view, thus also the ramifications towards signified identity of wearing it, and (2) Islam is ‘just as bad’ as the Ku Klux Klan (that is, racist and intolerant).

By ending it with the rhetoric remark “surely no-one would accept that”, Tybring-Gjedde effectively renders all opposition moot; ‘anyone disagreeing with me are disagreeing with common sense’. Not only are opponents rhetorically denied the opportunity of disagreeing (with the comparison of the hijab and the attire of one of the most notoriously violent racist groups in the world as), they are also common-sensically wrong; by necessarily agreeing that one would not accept that children are dressed in the robes

44. Žižek, *First as Tragedy, Then as Farce*, 48.
of the Klan, one has to agree with Tybring-Gjedde. Once agreeing (though only in a segment of the argument), it becomes difficult to disregard the argument in its entirety: leading the audience to the conclusion that ‘this man is obviously not a complete idiot’. Bridging the gap between two different statements in this way, is quite a common way to ‘sugar the pill’. However, I suspect Tybring-Gjedde to not have any pill to sweeten; at the time of publication the Progress Party was struggling at the polls, and was sorely needing attention.

Norwegian Populist Progress

As, among others, Anniken Hagelund argues, the Progress Party owes their rise to popularity to this modus operandi: Whenever threatened at the polls, they issue some more or less ridiculous statement bluntly attacking minority groups, firstly leading to ‘outrage’ among the political elite which the Progress Party purports to be in opposition to, thus effectively gaining popularity in the egalitarian, anti-elitist and anti-urban demographic segment of Norway; and secondly, they gain nods of agreement among those who perceive themselves as threatened, i.e. the self-identifying ‘common people’ of populist rhetoric.

It should be pointed out that Christian Tybring-Gjedde is a member of parliament, and has access to the media. His opinions, whether or not interesting in themselves, become interesting from the vantage point of the newspaper by him being a public figure with the (although remote, as the Progress Party are in opposition and not in government) possibility to at least cause, though not enact, policy changes. More importantly, he has the possibility to—via the media—form public opinion on the basis of communicating complicated matters in simple terms. Tybring-Gjedde has the ability—in a ‘worst case’ application of a Foucauldian view of discourse—to construct the political reality, and hence perceived reality, with random utterances of antagonism. Van Dijk identifies this prerogative of access and subsequent possibility of forming opinion— and thus exerting power and control—as that of the ‘elites’: “the groups in society that have special power resources,” in his Elite Discourse and Racism. This access to power is not shared by the general population, and especially not so by marginalized groups such as immigrants.

As van Dijk writes in Discourse and Power,

Differential access of majority elites and minorities to the media predictably

46. Hagelund, Importance of Being Decent.
48. For an account of the Progress Party’s position in Norwegian politics, and especially in regards to immigration policy, see Hagelund, “A Matter of Decency?” as well as a more exhaustive account in Hagelund, Importance of Being Decent, 28ff.
50. This is not to say that every opinion uttered by politicians or other elites are likely to be wholesale adopted by the general public, only that the tools to mediate this power is unequally distributed, and that the elites’ opinions are those best known.
results in differential access to the structure of news reports as well. Selection and prominence of news issues and topics are those stereotypical and negative ones preferred by the white political, corporate, social or scholarly elites and their institutions. Thus, the frequent issue of immigration will be primarily defined as an invasion and as essentially problematic, ... Crime, drugs, violence and cultural deviance are other preferred issues of ‘ethnic’ news coverage.\(^{51}\)

Furthermore, it should be pointed out that immigrants are also less quoted than ethnic majority speaker, and that if they are quoted at all, this is as either (1) ridiculous, zealot extremists, or (2) moderate spokespersons who support the majority view of ethnic Norwegians.\(^{52}\) Van Dijk also points out that minorities speaking in the media are seldom left to speak alone, and that “their accusations of the host society and its elites, when quoted at all, never go unchallenged.”\(^{53}\) Both these perspectives are evident in the case of the Norwegian media’s coverage of Mohyeldeen Mohammad. Where Tybring-Gjedde’s opinions are noteworthy due to his position, when presented with a rich offering of ideology divergent from the acceptable norms—albeit from a completely un-noteworthy source in the guise of Mohyeldeen Mohammad—the media had a field day.

Bio-politics: Full circle and Then Some

In February 2011, foreman Siv Jensen\(^{54}\) of the Progress Party raised a proposition in favor of compulsory DNA-sampling and the creation of a DNA-registry for all immigrants coming to Norway. Furthermore, she argued for an ‘increased effort’ in surveillance of second generation immigrants, as they purportedly represent nothing but ripe picking grounds for Islamic terrorists;

All those who are caught committing terrorism, or attempting to commit acts of terrorism, are essentially people with non-Western backgrounds. These are people who are recruited among second generation immigrants. ... they have grown up in a western society and still managed to be indoctrinated to hate western values. ... I do not want to argue that every second generation immigrant is a potential terrorist; I want to make that clear; that’s not the case. I point out that this is a situation we need to take seriously, because this is what is happening.\(^{55}\)

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52. Thus confirming the notion of the majority ethnicity as infallible: ‘Even some of you understand that we are right’.
54. Though the title clearly denotes the position of a man (at least so, in the Norwegian language, the Progress Party refused to change the title to ‘party leader’ when a woman took over the job, seeing as such precautions were seen as ‘politically correct’, hence elitist and unnecessary.
Framing terrorism and war within a terminology of security is hardly surprising: To the contrary, threats to life and health are obviously already well within a ‘logics of survival’. It is interesting, however, that Jensen insists that dangers are posited by Norwegian citizens who are born and raised “in a western society”. Not only is such a focus heavily relying on the fear of the dormant, invisible ‘sleeper-cell’, as well as on the ever-recurring syndrome of the static, immutable ‘eternal Jew’: Jensen implies that second generation immigrants somehow actively manage to get “indoctrinated to hate western values.” These second-generation citizens, obviously, are essentially not from other Western countries: they are Muslims and they hate not only our values—they hate us enough to commit acts of violent terror. And they are in our midst.

The former foreman of the Progress Party, Carl I. Hagen, has become identified as the primary deliverer in Norway of the international proverb “Not all Muslims are terrorists, but all terrorists . . .” Though this line, in all honesty, is quite true when applied to, say, the predominately Muslim nation of Iraq, it fails miserably in describing the situation in the Western world. Nevertheless, it is a line that Hagen is encouraged by the media to repeat as often as possible, unfortunately thereby adding to the ‘truthiness’ of such affirmations, and, ultimately, constituting such a Norwegian discourse as reality. Most importantly, in the case of Norway as well as in the rest of Europe during the last decades, “the immigrant other’ [is] increasingly crystallized as ‘the Muslim other’.”

Securitization is a powerful addition to any citizen’s conceptual toolkit: it enables its bearer to quickly identify attempts at ‘securitization moves’, and react to them in the fashion one sees fit. Whereas the study of security in the past has focused primarily on ‘hard’ security threats, cognitive notions of threats to identity and culture is increasingly viewed through a lens of social or cultural security.

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Norwegianness

Norwegian culture is the sum of what we celebrate on May 17: Common country, history, traditions, language, holidays, religious background, values, cultural heritage, laws, currency, etiquette, flag, upbringing, defense, national anthem, royal house, national team and a thousand other small and big things that make up a cultural community. That is Norwegian culture for all of you who feign ignorance. That is Norwegian culture in all its variation—like all strong, proud cultures have variations. End of discussion.

–Kent Andersen and Christian Tybring-Gjedde, Aftenposten, 2010

Burning Down the House

In 2010, a compound close to the city of Drammen, consisting of three buildings housing asylum seekers who had had their final appeals for residence in Norway turned down—burned to the ground after having been set on fire by dismayed ‘un-returnable asylum seekers’. Armed police arrested over twenty residents, suspected of setting the fire. The following morning Dagbladet reported that the residents of the compound were “– Enraged because they did not get halal meat.” Later on, Dagbladet followed up with a ‘typical menu’ from the reception center, which consisted of breakfast, hot lunch and

supper every day, containing dishes such as fried salmon, fish in curry, grilled chicken and so on.\(^{58}\)

The media coverage of this case illustrates the way in which the media constructs a seemingly ‘cultural’ conflict, where there is (I submit,) none. Primarily, as it turned out, very few—if any—residents had ever complained on the lack of halal meat. Many had, however, complained over the quality—or lack thereof—of the food. In an op-ed by Kari Helene Partapouli and Rune Berglund Steen from ‘Antirasistisk senter’ (‘Anti-racist center’), the authors claimed that the living conditions at the reception center were “indefensible”, and that the center had been “a single long story of personal tragedies, serious health issues left unattended, isolation, passivity, psychiatric difficulties, hunger strikes, anxiety, self-harming and even harassment by employees.”\(^ {59}\) UDI (Utlendingsdirektoratet; ‘Directorate for Foreigners’), as the responsible state directorate, had been warned in regards to the conditions several times, lastly only a month before the ‘riots’ broke out. Yet they had disregarded these concerns. In an email to the newspaper, UDI states that “it is politically determined that this is the offer to individuals who have received a final rejection of an asylum application, [and] who are obliged to leave Norway and are staying here illegally.”\(^ {60}\) By UDI’s own admission, it is explicitly intended for these (anti-)reception centers to remain unappealing to immigrants, in the hopes that immigrants will tire of such an existence, hence willingly return to their country of departure. Furthermore, it is a well established idea in Norwegian asylum discourse that benevolent treatment of asylum seekers will almost immediately lead to an increase in asylum immigration.

The phrase ‘un-returnable asylum seeker’—a euphemism for ‘difficult asylum seeker’—is applied to those who object to leaving Norway voluntarily. The Norwegian government does not necessarily agree that they are completely unable to return to their country of origin—for instance, due to legitimate concerns for their own safety—nor does it in any way imply that they may not be forcibly expelled from Norway by plane and police escort in the foreseeable future.

The discursive ‘staging’ of this incident by the media shows one more thing; it was overtly constructed as a clear-cut case of ‘demanding immigrants’ not content with their treatment—or even—not content with ‘the way we do things here.’ Complaining when offered three meals a day for free is naturally regarded as ungrateful behavior, and even more so—and here we arrive at a particularly telling denominator of Norwegianness—when the lunch offered was hot.

Norwegians—in general—do not eat hot lunches, and it is considered typical to bring a ‘matpakke’ (bagged lunch) to work or school. As Thomas Hylland Eriksen wrote, now

\(^{58}\) Dagbladet.no, “Her er menyen fra mottaket,” July 7, 2010.

\(^{59}\) Kari Helene Partapouli and Rune Berglund Steen, “Som om ingenting har skjedd,” [As if nothing has happened], Dagbladet.no, July 13, 2010.

\(^{60}\) Dagbladet.no, “Her er menyen.”
close to twenty years ago, on the Norwegian totem of identity, the brown cheese;

the brown cheese epitomizes central values in a widespread Norwegian self-definition: . . . its unspectacular taste signifies frugality and simplicity in style; its widespread use in the bagged lunches typical of Norwegian society further expresses a spirit of common sense and a “no-frills” attitude.\textsuperscript{61}

Immigrants are conveyed and subsequently perceived as not only discontent with ‘how we do it here’; even hot lunches (signifying foreign, continental elitist \textit{haut cuisine} and urban lavishness, as opposed to Norwegian, down-to-earth frugality) are not good enough for them(!). Thus, when the Muslim, halal-demanding Other is unsatisfied by the selection of culinary possibilities at hand, they promptly resort to violence by rioting and setting fire to state property. Or so it would seem, if we were to take such articles at face value.

\textbf{Norwegian Dads vs. Bad Dads}

VG, Norway’s largest daily tabloid, has over the course of the last years had a recurring series of editorials under the title \textit{Nye Norge} [New Norway]. The series is exclusively concerned with aspects of the contemporary debate on immigration—especially integration—and the errors of public policy on these matters. In one of these articles, published on June 5 2010, the newspaper reported on their own survey identifying that young girls in Oslo were using headscarves during school hours, under the heading “Five-year-olds wear hijab to school.”\textsuperscript{62} As a precursory note, it should be pointed out that children start school in Norway the year they turn six. That is, a certain portion of first-graders will necessarily remain at the age of five for the duration of the fall semester. The title suggests that at the time of the printing of the article, there were five-year-olds wearing hijab at school. The perceptive reader may note that this article was published the fifth of June, thus eliminating the possibility for this to be true. The title should as such have been “Five-year-olds \textit{wore} hijab to school last fall”. However, as one may guess, such a title would have had less of an immediate impact on the public.\textsuperscript{63}

One father\textsuperscript{64} voices his opinion on the use of Hijab among children by explicitly stating

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{62} \textit{VG.no}, “5-åringar bruker hijab på skolen,” June 5, 2010.
  \item \textsuperscript{63} I am not claiming that attacking headings in Norway’s largest tabloid as sensationalist—and identifying inconsistencies and sloppy use of present and past tense in the Norwegian language—is a grand application of Critical Discourse Analysis. One could spend a lifetime undertaking such endeavors with little or no application of intellectual rigor, method or brainpower. However, this fallacious appliance of the present tense helps illustrate the rather gymnastic approach to language held by some members of the press.
  \item \textsuperscript{64} It should be noted that the guidance regulating the use of quotations in Norwegian media are rather indulgent. The hyphen (–) before a quote only discerns that the journalist has ‘kept to the meaning intended’ by the respondent, not necessarily quoted him directly. When quoted directly, the double inverted commas (“”) are used.
\end{itemize}
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that he is Norwegian, thus implying such behavior is un-Norwegian:

– As a Norwegian dad, I do not think this is OK. The hijab defines a difference in treatment between the genders that puts women in an inferior position. The garment appears to me as encumbering to natural interaction and play between the children.\(^{65}\)

The quotation is probably partly spurious. It is different from a second article published the same day where he was not quoted as a ‘Norwegian dad’, but simply ‘dad’; the prefix was likely added—or vice versa, removed—by the journalist.\(^{66}\) However, this carries no other ramification for the analysis at hand than simply identifying the part ‘Norwegian dad’ as potentially a creation of the Newspaper itself.

As such, the reader is faced with a particularly interesting notion of nationality, namely Norwegianness as signified by the adherence to ‘Norwegian fatherhood’, gender equality and children’s rights. Firstly, the notion of a particular ‘Norwegian blend’ of fatherhood should be further addressed: Norway is considered to be one of the most gender equal countries in the world.\(^{67}\) Over the course of the last fifty years, the Norwegian father has moved away from the former stereotype of ‘the distant father’, no longer necessarily being the sole breadwinner and increasingly taking paternity leave designated to rearing children (though women continue to be the primary care-giver in child rearing, as well as doing the bulk of everyday work within the household).\(^{68}\) Trying to fulfill the role of the ‘Norwegian good father’ may easily be seen as from Bourdieu’s perspective; not necessarily only as a classifiable act, but more of an act of \textit{classification}, or even the actors \textit{self-classification}—which in turn can be classified itself. As such, the way the Norwegian father vocalizes his social identity of a loving parent can be seen as a way to distinguish himself from those carrying out an inferior form of parenting.\(^{69}\)

The modern Norwegian father faces a plethora of identities from which he will have to define himself. By internalizing positive characteristics and reacting in opposition to displays of performance of bad fathering, social identity is created. The increasingly interested, responsible and emotionally committed father is constantly being measured against the ‘soft’ family values that traditionally have been tightly associated with maternity. However, his classification of self as a ‘Norwegian father’ carries implicit connotations not only to soft fathering, but also to ‘Norwegian’ fathering, as way of categorizing

\(^{65}\) \textit{VG.no}, “5-åringer bruker hijab.”

\(^{66}\) Cf. \textit{VG.no}, “5-åringer bruker hijab”; con. \textit{VG.no}, “– Hijab gjør jentene mindreverdige,” June 5, 2010, see also note 64.


those who do dress their children in hijab. ‘Norwegian’ here becomes a marker of his group’s ethnicity, implicitly constructing the Other as those who do not subscribe to ‘Norwegianness’. This in turn implies that the Other represents a group who ‘thinks this is OK’, while those who are ‘Norwegian’ find it unanimously unacceptable, en masse. Though this is obviously not true, the hijab is designated as inherent to the Other and completely incompatible with Norwegianness: While ‘Norwegian dads’ want their children to be equal regardless of gender and free to play as they please (which is ‘all good’), other (‘bad’) dads want their children to be unequal and restricted in their play.

**Historic Norwegianness?**

Whereas a common Norwegian narrative centers around the idea that the roots of Norwegianness, both ethnic and cultural, are predominantly (though not exclusively) historic (as roots necessarily are) in nature, they have been challenged in novel ways by the contemporary immigration with subsequent problematizations of citizenship, ethnicity, national identity and cultural diversity as opposed to the perceived homogeneity of times gone by.\(^{70}\) The boundaries of the cultural unit are not set in stone: to the contrary, they are in fact never finished: identities of nation and cultural community are never quite completed, never fully static. Norwegianness (the ‘cultural stuff’) is, as such, not necessarily exclusive to ethnic Norwegians. The different markers taken for granted as expressions of Norwegianness that has come to pass through a common ‘invented tradition’, which does not necessitate an ethnic vantage point.\(^{71}\)

Still today, Norwegian history is a contested one. A common narrative is something as follows: The Norwegian nation was born by the unification under king Harald Hårfagre at Hafrsfjord sometime around 872 AD. The Norwegian Vikings then ruled the North-Sea basin as raiders, merchants, explorers and settlers. Norway also invented America. After a short stint under Danish rule (the 400-years’ night) where nothing of interest happened, Norway won its freedom from Sweden and have defended it heroically ever since. Needless to say, such narratives—albeit entertaining—have little in common with the actual occurrences. However, they accentuate certain points of interest when one is to critically analyze Norwegianness. Though the veracity as such is not in question, the constructions of Norwegian particularity and exceptionality is the backdrop against which nationalism and patriotism is drawn.

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Naturally, as long as such straightforward imagery of Norwegian history exists, attempts at deconstruction of such founding myths will be undertaken.

When looking at the “birth” of the Norwegian nation, it is interesting to look into the lack of propensity for the Viking myth. Though the image of the Norwegian Viking was extremely popular in the early years of the young Norwegian nation, the interest and sentiment for identification imploded after the second World War. Hylland Eriksen notes that, while the Vikings can easily be viewed as the pinnacle of Norwegian identity, references to the Viking age after the war “…became exceedingly problematic in an otherwise Viking-loving country like Norway” due to the extensive use of such symbolism and Viking-derived artwork in the Nazi imagery of the hated Quisling government.

While patriotism and nationalist sentiments are highly visible—in media as well as everyday life, especially on festive occasions such as Christmas (flags on the tree), birthdays (flags on the cake) and the National Day (flags everywhere)—it has, however, been common to regard Norwegian patriotism as an “…innocent and charming trait of a small and equality-oriented country without imperial ambitions.”

It should be pointed out that the ethnic and cultural disposition of the nation state has relied on racism as the means towards social cohesion much in the same way as ‘culture’ is used today. Whether the boundaries of Norwegianness are constituted by perceiving the Other as racially or culturally distinct and un-Norwegian does not really matter when ‘they’ can be categorized on grounds of their belonging to a particular group and this un-Norwegianness is ascribed to the group as a whole; every individual Pakistani, every Arab and every Muslim can be out-defined from Norwegianness. Teun van Dijk writes in *Elite Discourse and Racism* that “Negative properties attributed to the group as a whole are thus applied to its members, who therefore are seen as essentially alike and interchangeable.” Not being Norwegian is sufficiently a ‘negative property’ for stereotyping as ‘immigrant’ and discriminated against accordingly. It should be lost on no-one that differences in skin color tend to coincide with the delineations of ‘culture’ commonly described as incompatible to the Norwegian one.

**Imagined Sameness**

As Marianne Gullestad argues, we can actually identify a particular Norwegian version of this culturism along old racist boundaries, owing to a history of Nazi occupation and a

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73. Grete Brochmann and Knut Kjeldstadli, *A History of Immigration: The Case of Norway 900–2000* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2008), 237. It should perhaps be noted that Norway has had, and indeed still have, explicit ambitions towards a dominant position in the areas around the Arctic oceans (and even the Antarctic: Norway is the only nation in the world who lay claims to land both in the Arctic and the Antarctic, a term dubbed “ishavsimperialisme” (“arctic imperialism”, literally “ice ocean imperialism”).
strong collective appreciation of egalitarianism: the central value concept of Norwegian-ness is “[...]likhet [most easily translated as equality], meaning ‘likeness’, ‘similarity’, ‘identity’ or ‘sameness’.”\(^{75}\) As one can already sense in regard to the connotations to sameness, such equality can become quite stifling of one’s individuality – and exclusive in regards to ethnicity. Gullestad, nodding to Benedict Anderson, calls this central Norwegian identifier ‘imagined sameness’:

The egalitarian logic can be woven into both egalitarian and hierarchical models of society. It is not only tied to the term likhet, but also to a whole range of other expressions such as ‘to fit in together’ (å passe sammen) and ‘to share the same ideas’ (ha sammenfallende synspunkter). Often it implies that there is a problem when others are perceived to be ‘too different’. Then the parties often avoid each other. Open conflicts are seen as a threat to other basic values, such as ‘peace and quiet’. Avoidance can happen prior to the establishment of imagined sameness, and when it is no longer possible to maintain. In this way differences are concealed by avoiding those people who, for one reason or another, are perceived as ‘too different’, and by playing them down in social interaction with those who are regarded as compatible. The result is that the dividing-lines between people in terms of social class have become blurred. At the same time the differences between ‘Norwegians’ and ‘immigrants’ have become discursively salient.\(^{76}\)

As such, Norwegians may be said to be predisposed xenophobes: the dream of a quiet, peaceful life among ‘equals’ that takes such prevalence in the national imaginary, is prone to regard the Other not only as foreign and un-similar, but as a downright threat to the natural and necessary sameness of ‘our’ community. If Norwegianness is ‘imagined sameness’, any cultural challenge to the perceived ‘equality’ of ‘us all’ is a direct threat to Norwegianness itself.

**White Norwegianness**

In 2006, the weekly *Ny Tid* contacted the state-funded language council of Norway, asking if it could be possible to replace the term ‘ethnic Norwegian’, seeing as it excluded any attempts at ‘becoming Norwegian’ through the adaptation of cultural practices, e.g. food traditions, customs etc.\(^{77}\) The answer from the language council was negative, accentuating that “…a Pakistani that settles in Norway does not become a Norwegian, whether or not he becomes a Norwegian citizen. He is a Pakistani no matter what.”\(^{78}\)

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\(^{77}\) *Ny Tid*, “Norsk, norskere, nordmann,” October 27, 2006.

\(^{78}\) *NRK.no*, “Svar til Ny Tid,” September 11, 2006.
Similarly, the term ‘immigrant’ is as immutable and perpetual as ‘Norwegian’. As Marianne Gullestad writes in her collected *Plausible Prejudice*, “*Innvandrer* [immigrant] is today not only a word in the dictionary but also a rhetorically powerful concept. While its denotation is ‘neutral’, its connotations are negatively charged” and thus constituting a “hierarchy of dominance.”

Tonje Vold, writing in *Samtiden* in the aftermath of the debate on ‘the Norwegian’, noted that the prevalence of band aids with ‘skin color’, is a rather telling example of the hegemonic position belonging to the white person;

‘Skin-colored’ is a color in its own, it is pink-yellowish, in posher terms, apricot. Everyone who has put on a ‘skin-colored’ band-aid knows this. Especially black people. Those who have always been aware that white is a color, are those who do not share it. Thus, it was obvious for everyone suddenly excluded from Norwegianness that their common denominator was non-whiteness . . . The language council did not need the word ‘white’ in its definition of ‘Norwegian’; all the same that was what it meant.

There is no position more powerful than the one which is ‘only’ human. This position is a privilege that in contemporary Norway belongs to white Norwegians.

The Norwegian case is in fact even more specific in its connotations; Norway’s largest and oldest producer of band-aids is called “Norgesplaster” (Norway’s-band-aid), commonly packaged in boxes designed with the Norwegian flag as its most prominent visual characteristic.

Norwegianness as whiteness is a particularly problematic congruence of identity, due to its de facto ‘truthiness’—as demonstrated in the outcries of allegations of ‘political correctness’ in the Norwegian debate on the term ‘who is a Norwegian’—as well as in a more problematic way: When derived of its connotations to imperialist notions of race and near history of concentration camps, xenophobia thrives when cultural incommensurability can be argued publicly; it has become possible to be a “respectable racist.”

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Nationalism, or Inventing Bellybuttons

In order to further illustrate the Norwegian attitude towards immigrants, some short clarifications should be made; ‘Norwegianness’ has its historical roots in the rise of romantic nationalism in Norway from the latter half of the nineteenth century towards the fin de siècle. Nationalism, according to the well known argument by Ernest Gellner, is a “political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.” 82 That is to say, that a group of people of the same kind should hold political sovereignty over a given geographical territory that coincides with the groups cultural dispersion. The boundaries of the national—or cultural—are not set in stone; to the contrary, they are in fact never finished. Identities of nation and community are never quite completed.

According to Fredrik Barth’s seminal 30-page introduction to his edited anthology Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, boundaries should not be perceived only as mere delineations between existing, finished ‘cultures’ and their respective territorial borders. 83 In fact, as Zygmunt Bauman observes, “It is only when the border poles are being dug in and the guns are aimed at trespassers that the myths of the borders’ antiquity are spun and the recent cultural/political origins of identity are carefully covered up by the ‘genesis stories’.” 84

In his magnificent essay on Hannah Arendt, Ernst Gellner reminds us not to overlook the destructiveness of culture when coupled with Nature, that is, Nature legitimized through science and reason as something a priori true, primordial and unhindered by human conceptions of morals and norms; such notions were easily coupled with the romantic focus on rurality and volk-culture, and became an explosive force in nineteenth-century Europe. 85 Gellner wryly goes on to remark in regards to the consequences of this unholy union, that “Unfortunately, in the nineteenth century, Darwin had also popularized the fact that Nature had a lot of nasty habits, notably ruthlessness, willingness to eliminate the unfit, and to be very wasteful with life whilst in pursuit of excellence.” 86 The idea of society as not only culturally particular, but also biologically distinct was easily fused with romanticism into a synthesis where human beings were formed by their roots, a notion that is both cultural and biological, thus—here we arrive at the core of nationalism—leading to the language and euphemisms of nationhood: ‘mother tongue’ and ‘fatherland’. 87

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86. Ibid., 86.
The notion of Norwegianness and the status of Norway as ancient and primordial is constructed through founding myths, discursive application of language and cultural practices that aim to reinforce the boundaries against whatever exists outside of the national community. As such, it has been—and remains—important to weigh in these practices as tradition, in order to legitimize through history and ‘evolution’ the cultural uniqueness of Norwegianness. As Eric Hobsbawm points out in his introduction to The Invention of Tradition, so-called traditions are commonly of a much younger age than they appear:

‘Invented tradition’ is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.88

Clashing Garments

In the Norwegian case there is a plethora of such ‘invented traditions’ backing up the notion of Norwegianness. The bunad may be particularly interesting viewed as invented: The first ‘big debate’ on the bunad’s relationship with immigrants was over almost a decade ago: it will suffice to say that it was blatantly xenophobic, arguing back and forth whether immigrants could even wear a bunad (this, of course, should be seen in extension of the old Norwegian debate on the localization of different designs—seemingly a different one for each valley—and whether or not an ethnic Norwegian could ‘choose’ a specific local design or not. Birthplace and kinship was—and is—vocally defended as the only legitimate rationale for one’s choice, or rather, one’s ‘destiny’). It resurfaced in a fashion last year, when a young Norwegian named Minna Fahmida Haniffa conducted the ceremonies at Norway’s Constitution Day at the official gathering in Stavanger, while wearing a proper, locally rooted bunad—along with the hijab: Pandemonium ensued, with several hundred comments submitted by readers in the immediate aftermath (in a regional paper), angry letters by readers, and politicians arguing back and forth in the weeks that came.89

As an illustrative note to show just how unsettling this behavior was, The state broadcaster NRK ran an article a month before the incident in Stavanger, claiming that the national advisory board on bunads had recommended that embroidered hijabs should be incorporated as a voluntary accessory to the bunad on festive occasions, to ‘ease integration’ into Norwegian society: The article was published April 1, as a joke. To the NRK, it apparently seemed wholly unlikely—and proper good fun—that anyone would

even consider such an obvious abomination to be true.\textsuperscript{90}

Parallel to what Hugh Trevor-Roper showed in his study of the kilt and Scottish ‘national culture’,\textsuperscript{91} the bunad has a similarly convoluted history of forced traditionalism. Whereas folk costumes were indeed present in certain parts of Norway before the rise of nationalism, the recent omnipresence of such garments, their regionally codified design, and their disconnection from traditional rural life are of recent date. In reality, the bunad itself is but a construction to begin with: it was invented at the height of Norwegian romantic nationalism, adding to the arsenal of arguments propounding the primordial exclusiveness of Norwegianness. Hylland Eriksen notes that, though the primary proponents of nationalism were the urban elite—effectively backed up by the petty bourgeois—the “bunad confirms Norwegian identity as an essentially rural one, where personal integrity is connected to roots and regional origins.”\textsuperscript{92}

\textbf{Anti-Urban, Anti-Elite, Anti-Danish Norwegianness}

Taking as a vantage point Hobsbawm’s notion that nations seek to establish continuity with a desired (or for the job at hand, suitable) past, it is clear that the focus on Norwegianness as \textit{rurality} coupled with the proud culture of the historical figure og the Norwegian ‘free farmer’—a construct is born with potential to be effective in counting the elites, who by all standards tend to be predominantly urban. Seeing as, in the Norwegian case, the ‘urban elites’ one wanted to get rid of when birthing a new nation were the Danish civil servants operating from what is now Oslo, the Norwegian elites themselves (who were more than ready to fill the shoes of the Danes) fully supported such a cultural return to Norway’s rural roots.

Richard Sennett calls the feeling of disdain for the elites \textit{ressentiment}: In his \textit{Fall of Public Man}, he argues that—though such an anti-urban ressentiment was helpful during the birth of the nation—the ‘new elite’ (those who necessarily rise to power and wealth as a consequence of their wielding of rural anti-elitist discourse) at some point will have problems with distinguishing themselves from the elite they once so valiantly rose up against.\textsuperscript{93} However, Sennett suggests, this can be avoided by keeping a charismatic anti-elitist moral point of view, while effectively deflecting attention away from one’s actual doings in office:

The successful practitioner of this status anger must in fact continually turn people’s attention away from his political actions and position and instead

\textsuperscript{90} NRK.no, “Satser på bunad og hijab,” April 1, 2009.
\textsuperscript{92} Eriksen, “Traditionalism and Neoliberalism,” 276.
\textsuperscript{93} Sennett, \textit{The Fall of Public Man}, 277–82.
absorb them in his moral intentions. The existing order will continue then to sleep peacefully because his apparent anger at the Establishment is perceived wholly in terms of his impulses and motive, rather than what he does with his power.\textsuperscript{94}

In contemporary Norway, this is easy to identify—especially so in the discourse of the right-wing populist Progress Party: Skilled at talking against the ‘political elites’, the ‘cultural elites’, and immigrants alike, thus calling themselves ‘the party for most people’. Though ‘most people’ (in ‘most cases’) vote for other parties, right wing parties preying upon nationalist discourse, xenophobia and populist sentiments of ‘national culture’ have emerged across the European continent in recent times, and done so with a considerable degree of success. Though ressentiment of the elites is not entirely sufficient in explaining this return to the ideas of nationalism—thought by many within academia to be a thing of the past—it stands as a telling example of the power of binary oppositions on nation and power in European political life: rural ‘commoners’ against urban elites, rootedness against intellectual cosmopolitanism, national cultural identity against multicultural chaos.

As illustrated by the reactions towards the combination of the bunad and the hijab, the inclination towards moderating displays of ethnicity, religiosity or general group-adherence in the public sphere may very well be a badly concealed expression of Norwegianness itself. The characteristic of zealous boundary-drawing between these spheres has been ascribed to the ‘national culture’ of Norway and Norwegians by domestic anthropologists for quite some time. This boundary, as emphasized by Bhikhu Parekh, has a long history where the public realm is perceived as one of unity and universalism, represented by the state, which “has no moral status, and its sole raison d’être is to uphold and nurture its constituent cultural communities”, whereas all that ‘deeply matters’ to people; customs, values, and other facilities of identity, is purely derived from culture, belonging to the privatized sphere of the home.\textsuperscript{95} This division is contested when proponents of multiculturalist policies argue the recognition of culture as ‘universally particular’, that is, as that which constitutes our identity by way of group adherence, be it minority or majority.\textsuperscript{96}

\textbf{Dressing for the Age of Clashes}

As noted by Marianne Gullestad, the possibilities of choosing or constructing one’s identity freely from religious pressure, is only valid within the given frameworks of the national

\textsuperscript{94} Sennett, \textit{The Fall of Public Man}, 279.
norms of limited spheres. The hijab is viewed as malignant due to it being firstly, involuntary, sexist and foreign—and secondly, a threat to boundaries between the secular public sphere and the privatized, family-centric religious life, on which the Norwegian national order of things rest upon. Norwegians are prone to find this display of religious identity uncanny, that is in the Freudian capacity as something that ‘mirrors’ our own behavior or form of life, yet in a different and undefinable way—a way that renders the Other uncomfortably close yet culturally incommensurable. Within this setting of obfuscated liminality of identity, Norwegianness constitutes the “undefined normative center” of the debate on immigration and integration (understood as lock and stock assimilation on the immigrants’ behalf), unfortunately often foregoing any possibility of further refining or conceptualizing what ‘Norwegianness’ is really all about.

There is strong shadow where there is much light.

—Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Götz von Berlichingen

The contemporary European debate on immigration should be addressed as what it has become; an overarching container for many different debates that are deceptively incorporated into a discourse of a foreign and purportedly threatening ‘Islamic culture’, which in turn is increasingly securitized as a threat both to our safety, and also to our own ‘culture’. It seems that there is no longer a debate on immigration and integration in the European media; it has been incorporated into—and partly replaced by—a discourse on Islam, terrorism, forced marriages, ‘honor killings’, hijab, genital mutilation and sharia. Conversely, ‘European culture’ is constructed as an Enlightenment *Leitkultur* into which Muslim immigrants—if they (unfortunately, from a European point of view) manage to get here—should immediately assimilate, abandoning wholesale their own backwards culture as irreconcilable with Enlightenment values and ‘become European’, though, as Liz Fekete writes in the aptly titled *A Suitable Enemy*, “...it is tacitly assumed that this is something they can never really achieve.”

What is Enlightenment?

In 1784 Immanuel Kant had a short opinion piece responding to the question “What is Enlightenment?” published in the Berlinische Monatschrift. “Enlightenment”, he answers, “is man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity”, where “immaturity is the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another.”

From the dawn of historical enlightenment, Kant’s gesture is one drawing Enlightenment philosophy out of the study chambers of the celebrated ‘men of letters’ and activating their philosophy in political terms as a pedagogic program. Many years later Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, having managed to flee Nazi-Germany, addresses Kant’s conceptualization on the background of what they see as the bastard child of the age of Enlightenment: The failure to develop a system of criticism internal to the subjective reason implicit in Kant’s dictum ‘Sapere Aude’:

What appears to be the triumph of subjective rationality, the subjection of all reality to logical formalism, is paid for by the obedient subjection of reason to what is directly given. What is abandoned is the whole claim and approach of knowledge: to comprehend the given as such; not merely to determine the abstract spatio-temporal relations of the facts which allow them just to be grasped, but on the contrary to conceive them as the superficies, as mediated conceptual moments which come to fulfillment only in the development of their social, historical, and human significance.

The Enlightenment, while aiming to free science and knowledge from the hands of misconceived authorities readied the ground—in the eyes of Adorno and Horkheimer—both for the rise of authoritarian and fascist dictatorships, and for the misuse of it’s neutral bureaucracy and industry in exterminating a people. Adorno and Horkheimer argue that “the self-oblivious instrumentalization of science” has made science a tool of capitalism and industry instead of becoming the instrument of human emancipation it was supposed to: “[T]he Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant.”

The criticism by Adorno and Horkheimer of the subjection of instrumental reason has become a formational feature of the scholarly advancement of relativism, of the idea that the internal claim to truth posited by the philosophical advancement of Enlightenment philosophy must be countered by a criticism of the dogmatic—and therefore problematic—beliefs this system still relies upon. As Habermas points out in commenting on the mode of thinking developed by Adorno and Horkheimer:

103. Ibid., 3.
With their concept of “instrumental reason” Horkheimer and Adorno want to add up the cost incurred in the usurpation of reason’s place by a calculating intellect. This concept is simultaneously supposed to recall that when pur- pose rationality, overblown into a totality, abolishes the distinction between what claims validity and what is useful for self-preservation, and so tears down the barrier between validity and power, it cancels out those basic conceptual differentiations to which the modern understanding of the world believed it owed the definitive overcoming of myth. . . . this description is paradoxical, because in the moment of description it still has to make use of the critique that has been declared dead. It denounces the Enlightenment’s becoming totalitarian with its own tools.104

In other words, where Adorno and Horkheimer attempts to overcome the lack of critical power in the intellectual inheritance of the Bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth century, a lack that had—for them—manifested itself in the rise to power of European fascism, Habermas points out that their own project amounts to a self-devouring gesture in the sense that it is not able to move beyond the intellectual inheritance it attempts to distance itself from.

In the preface to A Revolution of the Mind, Jonathan Israel identifies the political achievements of historical Enlightenment and sees them under attack by the conceptual critique coming out of the position inhabited by the argument of Adorno and Horkheimer. Defining “Radical Enlightenment” as a

set of basic principles that can be summed up concisely as: democracy; racial and sexual equality; individual liberty of lifestyle; full freedom of thought, expression, and the press; eradication of religious authority from the legislative process and education; and full separation of church and state. . . . Its universalism lies in its claim that all men have the same right to pursue happiness in their own way, and think and say whatever they see fit, and no one, including those who convince others they are divinely chosen to be their masters, rulers, or spiritual guides, is justified in denying or hindering others in the enjoyment of rights that pertain to all men and women equally.105

As such, Israel re-radicalizes the Enlightenment that Adorno and Horkheimer has dismissed in developing a mode of analysis that aims to explain how otherization is a phenomenon contingent with the tradition of Enlightenment itself. The implicit argument being that Enlightenment is better represented through an appropriation of its still valid critical potential, rather than through the skepticist containment performed by Adorno and Horkheimer. This argument is unfortunately double edged and manifests itself as quite a dilemma: On the one hand, the Western world should as such argue for the universality of the Enlightenment principles, extending them to anyone who would care to

take part in the freedom it promises. On the other hand, such an extension could be seen as pulpiteering the superiority of Western thought and values—effectively legitimizing the multicultural criticism of globalization-as-westernization—arguing that “to attribute universal validity and superiority over other cultural traditions to core values forged in the Western Enlightenment smacks, whatever its pretensions to rational cogency, of Eurocentrism, elitism, and lack of basic respect for the ‘other’.”

**Culture Clashes**

In his 1993 article “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Samuel Huntington famously hypothesized that in the post Cold War era “the fundamental source of conflict . . . will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.” Huntington further embellishes his notion of culture in his subsequent book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, arguing that humanity has been thrown into an ‘identity crisis’, and claiming that

> while a country could avoid Cold War alignment, it cannot lack an identity. The question, ‘Which side are you on?’ has been replaced by the much more fundamental one, ‘Who are you?’ Every state has to have an answer. That answer, its cultural identity, defines the state’s place in world politics, its friends, and its enemies.

Huntington’s thesis became a seminal idea of American Neo-Conservatism, arguing that after an era of ideological alignment comes the time of the civilization—of culture as the core of psychological identification: “In coping with identity crisis, what counts for people are blood and belief, faith and family. People rally to those with similar ancestry, religion, language, values, and institutions and distance themselves from those with different ones.”

Huntington’s assumptions of culture as a necessary precondition of politics and power demands the primacy of psychological and cultural explanans. Replacing a critical material analysis and heed of political agency with a cultural causality has left the ground ripe for further application of Huntington’s principles by a range of different actors—none more aggressive than American Neo-conservative television pundits—effectively propagating the framing of contemporary conflicts in cultural, religious or ethnic terms, when they

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109. Ibid., 126.
are in fact political. This is not to say that the cultural framing is unimportant: Discarding the notion that political conflicts are cultural does not leave out the actors’ own interpretations and shared narratives as non-consequential—in fact, such perspectives may help us examine why politics take the form that they do, contextualize them and tell us why particular expressions of politics happen at a given time and at a particular place.¹¹⁰

**Enlightened We Stand**

The emergence of the Enlightenment as a contemporary focus of cultural self-identification is closely related to the problem of stadial history as criticized by Daniel Carey and Sven Trakulhun: “An imposed narrative of historical progression authorized the destruction of primitive cultures in favour of assimilation to a European standard of civility.”¹¹¹

While the opposite position on historiography—a complete regression of cultural relativism—is commonly ascribed to any focus of plural conceptions of cultures,¹¹² a more anthropologically sensitive critique of Herderian historiography may lead us to a clearer apprehension of the Enlightenment as applied in the contemporary setting: “World history” is consistently portrayed as a step-by-step progression in which the Enlightened West is the civilizational watermark, not problematizing its own role in the epistemological dominance and downright economic suppression of others for centuries, and it is thus a necessary precondition for discussing postcolonial history to address the legacy of injustice that plagues the former colonies and their inhabitants conceptions of the West and of themselves.¹¹³

Building on this positive identification of Enlightenment as ‘ours’ both historically and geographically, it becomes necessary to (out-)define ‘the other’, namely the immigrant. If it had not been for the post World War immigration, the other would likely have remained the orientalized inhabitants of a country far way, not so much threatening our existence as constituting a colorful backdrop of the unique position of the West. With the increased contact ‘back home’, the immigrant other has become what Mary Douglas calls “matter out of place”, effectively contravening a set of formerly established relations.¹¹⁴


Consumer-Purity

One particular aspect of postmodern, “Western” purity is the consumerist citizen, rejoicing in what Zygmunt Bauman describes as a “never ending chase after even more intense sensations and even more exhilarating experience”.

In the ‘good old days’, before immigration was properly problematized in the Norwegian population’s conceptual toolbox, Norwegian annoyance of others not partaking in either ‘our economy’ (cheating our GNP) or our way of life when taking advantage of our hospitality was directed at German tourists. Arriving every spring, as noted in an op-ed in Aftenposten a few years back, “German RV-tourists, complaining over Norwegian price levels—but well equipped with freezers and german canned beer—empty Norwegian fjords for fish, even throwing their lines into the enclosures of fish farms in order to bring fat, free salmon home.”

Immigrants and refugees are not only a clear economical underclass—they are blamed for their very poorness. The way in which ethnic Norwegians view refugees’ second hand baby strollers and less than fashionable winter clothing is a travesty: systemic discrimination in the job market withstanding, immigrants should, for lack of talking or looking like ‘us’, at least live like ‘us’, i.e. consume like us. Spending is living, more than any other marker or Western civilization.

Enlightenment as Neoliberalism

From the very cradle of Enlightenment thought, the idea of liberal economic policies has been at its heart. Especially so in its focus on capitals necessary transgression of the borders of nation states; words of warning were written by Adam Smith in his concluding remarks on The Wealth of Nations, that the merchant “is in great measure indifferent [...] from what place he carries out his trade; and a very trifling disgust will make him remove his capital, and, together with it, all the industry which it supports, from one country to another.” Economic freedom as potentially harmful for what Lisa Malkki calls “the national order of things”, was but a forerunner of the vast literature on the contemporary malignant implications of neoliberal globalization. However, whereas economic freedom as a virtue of modernity is argued openly in many fora, and has been so successfully for many decades, the neoliberal argumentation for a laissez-faire policy is increasingly expressed within the framework of Enlightenment discourse as but a

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118. Malkki, “National Geographic.”
contingency of freedom. As David Harvey conveys in the title of the first chapter of *A brief history of Neoliberalism*, “Freedom’s just another word…”: the principles of equal access to freedom summed up by Jonathan Israel, had in the discourse of the Bush-administration become only a catch-word, easily emptied of all meaning save the one given by those who wield it by force.

Needless to say, victims of recent wars waged by the West, have been left wondering if the graces of Enlightenment and freedom was worth the cost. Clearly, when reading Hirsi Ali, Huntington or just turning on the television set, there seems to be a need to reinvest effort in the notion that the current state of any so-called civilizational or cultural divide, either between nations or within nations, or as a consequence of migrations, has been formed against the background of economic globalization. As Gayatri Spivak notes: “globality is invoked in the interest of the financialization of the globe, or globalization. To think globality is to think the politics of thinking globality.”

To think in global terms without thinking about the financial structures against which the concepts participating in this thinking have been formed, comprises a failure to appreciate the interests behind their formation.

**Norwegian Enlightenment?**

In Western nations, the Enlightenment values are also commonly presented as national values. Whereas the images of one’s own nation’s exceptionality is quite common among most of the nations in the world, Norwegians have added an extra twist: As the NUPI report *Norske selvbilder og norsk utenrikspolitikk* [Norwegian images of self and Norwegian foreign policy] claims,

Norway, as quite a number of other countries, have kept themselves with an image of self as a nation that is unique and of high moral standards. However, Norway is one of relatively few countries that have included into this image of self a responsibility to altruistically spread the good word.

This national hubris of “samaritanism” is quite poignantly represented by the long history of Norwegian Lutheran missionaries practicing in the developing world. Furthermore, the stories and images brought home by missionaries from Africa, Central Asia and parts of Latin America have helped reinforce the notion of a binary world view in which not only the rich help the poor, nor the morally upright help the crooked heathens,

but also in more basic terms; light conquers darkness, delineating us from them in binary oppositions, while implicitly exempting those nations and immigrants the ‘big we’ have nothing against: those who share our Enlightenment values. The fact that these immigrants—from the EU, United States, Canada and Australia—also share our skin color is acknowledged as nothing but a coincidence. This easily identifiable opposition of religious symbolism matched the hues of skin to such a degree that it has remained in the minds of Norwegians up until our own days.\textsuperscript{122}

The idea of Norwegian adherence to all things good was eloquently put by former prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, by stating that “it is typically Norwegian to be good” (\textit{det er typisk norsk å være god}). This sentiment—most likely shared by the majority of her constituents at the time as well as now—is a fitting image of what Norwegianness is all about: Being better and kinder than anyone else anywhere. Whereas the duality of \textit{good} (both as ‘capable’ and ‘kind’) is perhaps even more explicit in an English translation, such a dualism is not lost on Norwegians themselves. Øyvind Østerud writes in his essay on Norway’s ambitions of being a humanitarian power, that Norwegian foreign policy is heavily influenced by a ‘policy of engagement’ (\textit{engasjementspolitikk}): it enables a small country such as Norway to stock up on political capital through goodwill among the larger international powers, as well as creating a non-controversial point of unity within the politics of the interior.\textsuperscript{123} While the words of former prime minister Brundtland have been recycled to the degree where it has lost all original context and meaning, the idea of Norway’s position in the international society of nations is heavily influenced by the Norwegian particularity of benevolence. Bringing peace and prosperity to the world seems to be Norway’s main \textit{raison d’etre}, while at the same time constituting powerful modes of identity creation.

The roots of the contemporary use of “Enlightenment values” are predominantly (though not exclusively) derived from a historic period of which the principles it propagated has now been decisively removed from. In this ‘un-grounding’ of the concept, the principles of freedom, equality have become to be reserved for the privileged West, whereas a binary has been constructed between the Enlightened, Western values and the values of the Other, that is, Islam. This bipolarity has been both solidified and challenged in novel ways by the contemporary immigration to Europe with subsequent problematizations of citizenship, ethnicity, national identity and cultural diversity as opposed to the perceived cultural homogeneity of times gone by. Without going into a long discussion of conceptualizations of racism and racist practices, it should be pointed out that the ethnic

\textsuperscript{122} For a spirited defense of missionaries’ portrayed images of their sheep (unfortunately bordering on apologetism), see Karina Hestad Skeie, “Beyond Black and White: Reinterpreting “the Norwegian Missionary Image of the Malagasy”,” in \textit{Encounter Images in the Meetings Between Africa and Europe}, ed. Mai Palmberg (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2001), 162–182.

and cultural disposition of the nation state has relied on racism as the means towards social cohesion much in the same way as ‘culture’ is used today. Whether the cultural boundaries of Europe are constituted by perceiving the Other as racially or culturally distinct and un-European or un-Norwegian does not really matter when ‘they’ can be categorized on grounds of their belonging to a particular group and this un-Norwegianness is ascribed to the group as a whole; every individual Pakistani, every Arab and every Muslim can be out-defined from Norwegianness or Europeanness. Teun van Dijk writes in *Elite Discourse and Racism* that “[n]egative properties attributed to the group as a whole are thus applied to its members, who therefore are seen as essentially alike and interchangeable.” Unfortunately, it seems not being European is sufficient a ‘negative property’ for stereotyping as ‘immigrant’ and discriminated against accordingly.

Ian Buruma proposes that in fact, the contemporary call for Enlightenment values is in part a ‘revolt against a revolt’/ the conservative reaction to a perceived failure of tolerance and multiculturalism:

They believe, like some former leftists, that multiculturalism was a mistake; our fundamental values must be reclaimed. Because secularism has gone too far to bring back the authority of the churches, conservatives and neo-conservatives have latched onto the Enlightenment as a badge of national or cultural identity. The Enlightenment, in other words, has become the name for a new conservative order, and its enemies are the aliens, whose values we can’t share.125

One of the most vocal subscribers—at least from media’s point of view—to Huntington’s view on clashing cultures is Ayaan Hirsi Ali. In the recently published accounts of her travels ‘through the clash of civilizations’. Hirsi Ali, herself of Muslim background, sums up her position in a way that is both telling and unsettling:

A culture that celebrates femininity and considers women to be the masters of their own lives is better than a culture that mutilates girls’ genitals and confines them behind walls and veils or flogs or stones them for falling in love. A culture that protects women’s rights by law is better than a culture in which a man can lawfully have four wives at once and women are denied alimony and half their inheritance. A culture that appoints women to its supreme court is better than a culture that declares that the testimony of a woman is worth half that of a man. It is part of Muslim culture to oppress women and part of all tribal cultures to institutionalize patronage, nepotism, and corruption. The culture of the Western Enlightenment is better.126

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Clearly, Hirsi Ali purports that it is *culture* that celebrates or mutilates, *culture* that legislates or oppresses. She insists that ‘culture’ not only expresses the founding truths about society, she has made it into an actor. Furthermore, borrowing the notion of a ‘clash’ from Huntington, Hirsi Ali seems to assume that the lack of things such as genital mutilation, veils, stoning, as well as the apparent nonexistence of institutionalized corruption makes ‘the culture of Western Enlightenment’ comparatively better than Muslim and tribal cultures. The idea she must be seen as propagating here is that as long as a political body is a cultural body, the political gains that have been made within that specific body cannot have been achieved through political struggle, but must rather have been brought about through the cultural-psychological mindset of the society at large. Worse still, rather than creating a climate in which political reforms can be sought, such a narrative stands in danger of turning the achievements of political reform that have been achieved in the Western, Enlightened world into Fukuyama’s ‘End of history’ rather than a ground for further development.

The point of this exercise of tentative reconfiguration of the ‘Enlightenment principles’ as portrayed in the discourse of ‘Western culture’ is this: the adherence to cultural-psychological modes of causality as originally expressed in Huntington’s clashing civilizations is fundamentally flawed: it necessarily de-emphasizes political agency and economic inequality as explanatory models. Furthermore, it furthers a world view in which the West is seen as the pinnacle of history—as an inherently unobtainable goal for all others—effectively cementing enormous economic and material inequalities and legitimizing them within a cultural framework.
Inevitable Conclusions

Good creatures, do you love your lives
And have you ears for sense?
Here is a knife like other knives,
That cost me eighteen pence.
I need but stick it in my heart
And down will come the sky,
And earth’s foundations will depart
And all you folk will die.

–A.E. Housman

Hanna Arendt once said that under conditions of tyranny it is far easier to act than to think. Thinking people are hard pressed to consider Norwegian society a tyranny, yet Anders Behring Breivik acted out of a conviction that his worldview was denied the public recognition it deserved, and sought to rectify the situation through what he considered a public relations stunt.\(^\text{127}\) Witnessing Rudolf Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem, Arendt was

struck by a manifest shallowness in the doer that made it impossible to trace the incontestable evil of his deeds to any deeper level of roots or motives.

The deeds were monstrous, but the doer—at least the very effective one now

\(^{127}\) All speculations concerning Behring Breivik’s motivations and opinions in the subsequent sections are drawn from his ‘manifesto’, see Anders Behring Breivik [Andrew Berwick, pseud.], “2083: A European Declaration of Independence” (London, 2011), original link is no longer available; see the bibliography for more information (accessed July 23, 2011).
on trial—was quite ordinary, commonplace, and neither demonic nor monstrous.\textsuperscript{128}

This \textit{banality of evil} becomes—in more ways than it’s most tabloid sense—quite evident in the persona of Anders Behring Breivik. The attack necessitated banalification. Clearly, a failed business entrepreneur in his thirties living with his mother, playing online computer games around the clock, made characterizations of banality an easy exercise. Furthermore, his apparent troubles with women, his family background, his deteriorating friendship—in addition to speculations about his sexual preferences—all gave the Norwegian and international media different angles to attack the perpetrator as a loser, a pathetic geek, a deviant.

Nevertheless, though his life until recently had amounted to little, Breivik had a magnanimous dream: He saw himself as the heroic knight (literally) that would save Europe, Norway, Christianity and the Enlightenment from the Muslim threat. The need to ridicule the perpetrator, though understandable, should thus be set aside for the time being: Breivik, though incontestably shallow, turned out to be exactly what Eichmann was not: A demonic and monstrous mass-murderer capable of executing children, point blank while laughing. His actions were unthinkable, or at least so to the vast majority of Norwegians that were faced with the horrific realization that it was one of ‘us’, in our midst, that had committed these atrocities: A white, upper middle class, ‘culturally christian’ boy from the west side of Oslo.

What happened? What malicious world view could support such horrible actions? Or was there, hope against hope, no reason at all?

\textbf{Nothing is Rotten in the Kingdom of Norway}

Terrorists brewed at home are madmen. Whereas Islamic terrorism is religiously justified, or explained within ‘Arab’ cultural-psychological terms, terrorists of ‘our own’ are considered criminally insane, thus exempt not only from punitive action, but also as fundamentally removed from the society they adhere to. Certainly, Breivik has to be insane? Arguments towards Breivik representing the relative novelty ‘Christian extremist/terrorist’ were dismissed quickly and, probably, correctly. How could any Norwegian in their right mind commit such atrocities? All too easily these question are answered by new ones: Were the terrorists flying the planes into twin towers of the World Trade Center crazy too? Was Adolf Hitler insane? Was Rudolf Eichman? Is fascism simply a medical affliction (and if so, what are its epidemiologic capabilities? How does it spread)?

In the days that followed the publication of a forensic psychiatrist’s reports, assessing the psyche of Breivik—and deeming him unaccountable for his actions, as he was

diagnosed a paranoid schizophreniac—Norwegian newspapers were ripe with paranoid schizophreniacs desperately trying to distance and distinguish themselves from the mass-murderer, much like the desperate attempts made by different actors on the far right field of Norwegian politics’ spectrum after it became clear that the perpetrator was a former member of the Progress Party.

Eerily, the distinction between ‘us and them’—when faced with a new threat from within the ranks of ‘our own’—has been reframed and is establishing itself as us and him. Breivik needs be removed from the community at large, not merely physically for the sake of safety, but also mentally for the collective’s peace of mind. A sane product of society committing mass murder, would not reflect well on the society that raised him. Distance must be established, and matters out of place need to be identified as exactly that; out of place, as foreign to ‘our ways’. Seemingly, mass-murderer is as un-Norwegian as one can get.

For the Progress Party, designating Anders Behring Breivik as the constitutive outside of Norwegianness—and the inside as including the Progress party—quickly became a key mission. The proximity of ideology between their own political program and the policies proposed in Breivik’s manifesto—not to mention his former party membership—rendered the Progress party uncomfortable—as rightly it should. In fact, it became quite clear that the entire right wing of Norwegian politics was vesting an interest in Breivik being considered a madman.

Cathrine Holst, the editor of Nytt norsk tidsskrift [New Norwegian journal] commented in the introduction to the first issue after the attacks; if one belongs to the political and ideological left, having argued against a public debate of racism and Islamophobia, the July 22. attacks were obviously the logical conclusion of this development: If, on the other hand, one belongs in the camp which, prior to the attacks have been criticizing Islam and Islamism, Anders Behring Breivik’s racism and conservative ideology fall a good way further to the back among the selection of plausible rationales for his actions.129

Less than a year before the July 22. attacks, the aforementioned Progress Party MP Christian Tybring-Gjedde—together with party colleague Kent Andersen—wrote an op-ed in Aftenposten, fervently attacking the Labor Party’s “multicultural experiment”, asking what the “goal of stabbing our own culture in the back” was. What is wrong with Norwegian culture? “Why was it not good enough for the Labor Party?”, the authors asked (suddenly using the past tense, implying that the Norwegian culture was already a thing of the past):

We know we will never get a meaningful answer. Norwegian culture will become ever more marginalized, and remade into symbols of an intolerant and excluding past.

But, will we help the Labor Party in exchanging Norwegian culture with “multiculture”? Never! Will we contribute to the culture-treachery? Not if anyone put up the poster “He will be shot, who . . . !” Will we ever feel “multicultural”? Not in a million years!

For we do not believe in multic和平。 We believe it is a dream from Disneyland. Systematized rootlessness. Idiocy in the long run, and we believe it may come to tear our country to shreds.130

The idea that Norwegian culture is under threat by an unwanted dilution or subversion of its culture by immigrants, carrying with them customs, values and religious practices not commensurable with national values, is not particular to Anders Behring Breivik, nor to Norway: the same jargon and discourse of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is found throughout Europe, fueled and sustained by the rise of right-wing populists in countries such as France, Britain, Sweden and Denmark; further fueled by catastrophic unemployment, outright fascist and national-socialist groups are stirring too, especially in Southern and Eastern Europe.

There should be a growing unease when confronted with political and media discourse on European or Norwegian “values”: the incessant political capitalization of fear, either on behalf of ‘our own’ culture’s perpetuation or ‘their’ culture’s threatening backwardness and the regress of those principles of the Enlightenment I submit to be of the utmost importance—e.g. equal opportunity to freedom—has had detrimental effects not only to the lives of immigrants, but—I claim—also to the ethical and normative inheritance that Europeans themselves once subscribed to. The polarization between the Western Enlightenment and the Other-as-Islam that accelerated enormously in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, left the ground ripe for new forms of otherization and exclusion. Though the drawing of boundaries between Us and the Other is not purely a new phenomenon—history itself has been wielded as a tool to suppress the legitimacy of the claims of the abject, ‘losing’ civilizations—the additional demarcation by way of ‘Enlightenment values’ has added yet another harmful dimension to the already existing mixture of prejudices and stereotypes moving towards downright xenophobia.

Securing Norwegianness

Fear of the malignant Other-as-Islam; the heartfelt, yet tragically misplaced patriot care for the nation; the binary construction of the European Enlightenment’s cultural superiority: This is the core of Anders Behring Breivik’s motivations. This complex of sentiments is the axiological trinity of the growing European populist right, and the rationale for violent xenophobe groups that are once again rearing their ugly heads in Europe.

When glanced through the eyes of the cultural form of life—of the fearful, Enlightened Norwegian—immigration is eroding the very foundations of the *lebenswelt*; threatening not only a way of life, but *life itself*. Ultimately, nothing less than the complete eradication of this threat will be enough to safeguard the nation. Whereas the seemingly unfathomable violence demonstrated in the case of Breivik is eluding common sense, the terrible logic of it all when displayed against the backdrop of existential fear, is numbing: In a triumphant act of messianic solipsism, Anders Behring Breivik sacrificed himself to stop the onslaught of the Other.

It is the cardinal submission of this thesis that the manipulation of fear on behalf of the cultural nation, the construction of perceived threats towards it, and the discourse on the inferiority of our neighbors, is dangerous and fundamentally detrimental to human flourishing: Such sentiments should be confronted, refuted and universally ridiculed wherever articulated.
Appendix

Though the need for an appendix is quite often not considered mandatory in a Master’s thesis of this scope, certain considerations need to be explicitly stated—and I could think of no fitting place to add these but here. Firstly, unless otherwise noted in the text or footnotes, all translations of inline or indented quotes are of my own doing. I have, naturally, attempted to add or alter nothing from the original text, while promoting intelligibility over direct word-for-word translation. If this has resulted in any misrepresentation of opinion or sentiment, I take full responsibility. It has been my intention to accurately present the respective authors’ and actors’ opinions, avoiding any unfair or personal bias in translation. All original articles and source material quoted from Norwegian news sources are available through the links offered in the bibliography.

The bibliographic essay roughly explains the layout of the bibliography itself. There are, however, some deliberations concerning sources that should be addressed in more detail: I have chosen to ignore most of the respective reporters and journalists as ‘authors’ of newspaper reports in the strict sense, against the explicit advice of the Chicago Manual of Style. Newspapers and similar material is merely given short mention (e.g. Dagbladet.no, June 5, 2010) in the footnotes: complete citations including full url-addresses is provided in the bibliography under the subheading “Newspapers and other Media”. The reason for this choice is an editorial one: in a thesis concerned with the use of language in media, the notes and bibliography would have been cluttered with names of reporters or interns who happened to hold a microphone, and who—while not belittling their work—has no importance to the task at hand. Opinion pieces, however, can be found under ‘Works Cites’ in the bibliography.

Furthermore, every online news source cited has been archived by the WebCite Consortium, a non-profit consortium supported by many different publishers and editors that is usable without charge. As stated at their homepage, “webpages or websites which are cited in scholarly articles are presumably important documents worth preserving for readers, yet due to the volatility of the World Wide Web they are at risk to disappear as a reference for future scholars. Adding WebCite® links to cited URLs increases the likelihood that the cited work remains accessible and ensures that readers have access to exactly the version as seen by the citing author.”

I have, finally, opted to make available the earliest traceable ‘original’ of the so-called ‘manifesto’ of the terrorist Anders Behring Breivik through both personal and

131. See Gunther Eysenbach and Centre for Global eHealth Innovation, WebCite, Online web-archiving service, Cross-platform. Creative Commons BY-NC-SA v2.5 (Non-commercial Software). Available at www.webcitation.org; For a published, ‘proper’ take on this service, see Gunther Eysenbach and Mathieu Trudel, “Going, Going, Still There: Using the WebCite Service to Permanently Archive Cited Web Pages,” Journal of Medical Internet Research 7 (5 2005).
public online sources, links to which are printed in the bibliography. This, I am sure, some people could find borderline reprehensible: the document contains, beyond potentially incriminating instructions on bomb manufacturing, inflammatory and hateful language and—for lack of a better word—ideology. Nevertheless, it is a necessary source of information if one is to look into the motivations and world view that made a Norwegian man commit such atrocious acts of violence towards the Norwegian society as a whole, and towards young, politically active social democrats in particular. Also, different versions and revisions of the ‘manifesto’ is already available for anyone with access to Google and a few minutes to spare, though not yet—luckily, perhaps—published in any traditional way.
Bibliography

The following bibliography lists all works cited within the text under the section Works Cited, excluding news reports, broadcasts and the like, which are available under the section titled “Newspapers and Other Media”. A selection of manuals on style, typography and typesetting has been listed under the section Selected Manuals and Supportive Literature. By no means a complete record of all the different sources I have consulted in my work, it attempts to give mention to a small selection of particularly helpful publications, as a help for anyone interested in undertaking a similar endeavor.

The thesis at hand has attempted to conform to the 16th edition of the Chicago Manual of Style, specifically its guidelines on “Notes and Bibliography”. Though the Chicago style tries to be lenient in way of variation and customization, striving to uphold the general principles when confronted with the variation of sources in print, and even more so when using on-line sources, has been a challenging—yet ultimately a rewarding—ordeal. Hopefully, no grave misapprehensions have tarnished this thesis. For instance, footnotes citing newspaper sources had their url-addresses removed for aesthetic purposes; these are provided in full in the bibliography. Also, in order to ameliorate difficulties in finding the corresponding bibliography entries, titles were stated in the notes for all newspaper articles.

Furthermore, the entire thesis has been written and typeset in LaTeX, a markup language that enables a large degree of typographic manipulation. Biblatex has been employed for bibliographic management. Though both are very powerful tools, they share a steep and protracted learning curve. As such, I have spent long hours browsing through manuals and online message boards, looking for answers to important and trifling formatting problems alike.

Finally, a short list of software that has been crucial in my work on this thesis appears under the heading Computer Software, both as a token of gratitude to the developers, and as a convenience to future readers of this thesis.

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**Online Resources and Other Media**


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Selected Manuals and Supportive Literature


Computer Software


