When counterterrorism enters the curriculum

Exploring risks and practices of the securitisation of education

by

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Preface

Coming to grips with why I would temporarily leave my habitual existence as a teacher educator to pursue a PhD in *societal safety* is something that I have regularly reflected upon these last years. Although the answer is now very obvious to me, this was certainly not the case when I applied for a research position at the University of Stavanger back in 2016. Like many others, I initially developed my interest in studying topics like *radicalisation*, *violent extremism* and *terrorism* (*terrorism-related* subjects) after the 2011 right-wing terrorist attacks in Norway. Yet, the event that would actually lead me to carry out research on these subjects was, as it happens, the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris.

In the aftermaths of the 2015 Charlie Hebdo shootings, Celine, a French-Norwegian student of mine, used this extreme event to develop a deeper understanding of the importance of liberal and inclusive education. Celine had told me that she struggled to come to terms with her "pedagogical creed" (Dewey, 1897), this because she originated from a French educational system, a system that in her words was traditional and authoritarian. In her own experience, education had mainly been a question of inserting newcomers into existing social orders. Yet, as she learned more details about the perpetrators of the Charlie Hebdo shootings, brothers Chérif and Saïd Kouachi, Celine went on to describe how these two men had probably never experienced a sense of belonging in a safe and inclusive school, and I remember her telling me that

> These boys had nothing; at some point in time they were living on the streets. Nobody really looked after them before they came under the influence of an imam who took them under his care. He even taught them Arabic so they could read the Koran. Can you imagine learning a difficult language like Arabic when you struggle to read and write in your own native tongue? Why could it not have been their teachers who had provided them with a sense of belonging like this imam had done?

These words were uttered during her final exam in her teacher training studies, as she could not help but wonder whether more caring teachers in a more inclusive school might have prevented these men's destructive paths towards extreme violence. Celine's pedagogical journey, which was prompted by such a tragic event, also had a profound effect on me. It was difficult not to be affected by her belief that a safe and inclusive school might prevent detrimental situations for young lives. Her pedagogical commitment struck me foremost on the grounds of being a practitioner at heart, and it ignited my dedication to carry out research that explored the role of education in preventing radicalisation.

Admittedly, the transition from being a practitioner to becoming a scholar, a dialectic process that continues to intrigue and confuse me, has revealed that this is a contested and emotive research topic. I have had to question all of my existing beliefs regarding terrorism-related subjects throughout this research process, and the only knowledge that I am truly confident of having is that we really know far too little about the role and consequences of preventing radicalisation and violent extremism in education. It is with that claim that I consider myself at the starting point of a scholarly journey, not at the end of one, and before I recognise those who have helped me on this path, let me start by thanking Celine for connecting the dots between education, security and radicalisation, which laid the groundwork for this doctoral study.

Acknowledgements

It may seem somewhat of a paradox to be acknowledging others in what at times can best be described as the loneliest journey one can take. After all, "life", when writing a PhD, is something that you occasionally get a glimpse of when you look out from your office window. However, a sense of privilege also comes to mind when contemplating the support and encouragement that one has received during those exhausting years. For this thesis, although it carries my name, is in all honesty a collaborate effort, and this section is an attempt to recognise some of the many people who have helped me along this scholarly journey.

A natural place to start is to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisors, Sissel H. Jore and Christer Mattsson. Their guidance has allowed me to carry out my inquiries with support and encouragement, and they serve as professional inspirations to me. Furthermore, I would like to thank all of my colleagues at the Centre for Risk Management and Societal Safety (SEROS) at the University of Stavanger, the Department of Teacher Education at Stord University (HVL), and to everyone at the Segerstedt Institute at the University of Gothenburg (GU) for hosting me as a visiting scholar. A special thanks also to Hulda M. Gunnarsdottir, who served as an opponent during my final thesis seminar.

To my dear mother, thank you for your love and support, yet, perhaps more important in this context, for showing me the value of a strong work ethic. Thank you, Kjerstin for helping me to understand that two is better than one and for including me in your family alongside Ingrid, Kristi and Torstein. Thank you, Daniel, for being my best friend and for occasionally managing to help me forget about my work, if only for a few hours. Thank you Steinar who transitioned from being my teacher to becoming my colleague and now my friend. We still have a lot of this world to discover. Thank you, Linda, from the *Good English Company* for your tireless efforts to make my texts more intelligible. Thank you to all the PhD course coordinators, administrative staff,

Summary

It is commonly assumed that the civic and moral virtues of democratic education can be a powerful and effective antidote to extremism and terrorism. The assumption here is that education can help young lives in the development of their political orientations and behaviours in support of human rights and peace. While this belief has underpinned much of Western education for millennia, we arguably do not understand enough about how education can prevent radicalisation and violent extremism, or the consequences of placing preventive responsibilities on education.

This doctoral thesis studies the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism in education. More specifically, the research objective is to *explore the risks and practices of integrating counter-radicalisation efforts in education*. It is a qualitative research, based on interviews with practitioners in Norway that have been studied through the framework of critical discourse analysis (CDA). The purpose has been to enhance our knowledge on the intersecting of security and education, particularly by studying what discursive practices are expressed by practitioners and, to analyse what are their potential consequences for social practice.

This is an article-based thesis comprising four studies. The thesis provides a literary background, theoretical framework, methodology, research design, presentation and discussion of the four studies, an outline of the implications and limitations of the study, and a concluding summary, with suggestions for future research needs and priorities.

Article I is a literature review of primary-data studies exploring the prevention of radicalisation and extremism in education. The study found that, while research remains inconclusive as to whether education can prevent extremism, there is a case for arguing that inclusive, student-centred and supportive educational relations may alleviate some of its causes. However, counter-radicalisation efforts tend to result in the use of harder preventive measures, which may impair inclusive education.

Article II is a qualitative study of how educators understand and

approach counter-radicalisation efforts in Norwegian schools. The study revealed that youth extremism is a limited problem in these schools, yet when faced with concerns, most educators draw on so-called therapeutic prevention strategies. These strategies conforms to the radicalisation discourse in global politics aimed at rehabilitating vulnerable students, and the study argued that this can be considered a form of pedagogical control that is implemented to maintain national security interests.

Article III is a qualitative study, focusing on how young Muslims are sometimes framed by practitioners as vulnerable to being radicalised towards violent extremism. The study argued that this occurs because practitioners remain unaware of how the radicalisation discourse extends from the Global War on Terror, which may cause a practice of informal criminalisation of Islam. However, there is also evidence of hegemonic struggle in these educational discourses, as practitioners often state that the stigmatising portrayal of Muslims in politics can negatively affect educational inclusion in Norway; thus, they also express resistance towards the exclusionary effects of the radicalisation discourse.

Article IV is a qualitative study that explored the integration of the radicalisation discourse in Norwegian education. The study found that counter-radicalisation policies circumvent ethical dilemmas by appealing to the educational ideal of citizenship and the safeguarding of vulnerable youth. Nevertheless, these policies have little applicational value for practitioners, and their suggested preventive measures tend to be seen as probabilistic, generic and de-contextualised, which does not correspond well to what we currently know about preventing terrorism.

To summarise, this research provides both theoretical and empirical insight into the securitisation of counter-radicalisation efforts in education generally and Norwegian schools specifically. The main argument offered throughout this thesis is that prevention efforts carried out in schools must be grounded in genuinely good education. However, the securitisation paradigm that drives these efforts may undermine emancipatory, liberal and progressive education; thus, it risks making prevention efforts a practice of educational exclusion and stigmatisation.

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List of articles

Article I

Sjøen, M. M. & Jore, S. H. (2019). Preventing extremism through education: Exploring impacts and implications of counter-radicalisation efforts. *Journal of Beliefs & Values, 40*(3), 269-283.

Article II

Sjøen, M. M. & Mattsson, C. (2019). Preventing radicalisation in Norwegian schools: How teachers respond to counter-radicalisation efforts. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*.

Article III

Sjøen, M. M. (2019). When counterterrorism enters the curriculum: How the global war on terror risks impairing good education. *Journal for Deradicalization, 20*, 156-189.

Article IV

Sjøen, M. M. & Jore, S. H. (2019). How the counter-radicalization discourse securitizes education and why this might not be an effective approach to preventing terrorism. In M. Beer & E. Zio (Eds.). *Safety & Reliability: Theory and Applications*, (3973-3980). Singapore: Research Publishing Services.

Abbreviations

CDA   Critical discourse analysis

CL   Critical linguistics

CVE   Countering violent extremism

EU   European Union

EXIT   Deradicalization and/or disengagement programmes

GU   University of Gothenburg

HVL   Western Norway University of Applied Sciences

IR   International relations

ISIS   Islamic State or Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

NSD   Norwegian Centre for Research Data

PST   Police Security Services

PVE   Preventing violent extremism

SEROS   Centre for Risk Management and Societal Safety

SFL   Systemic functional linguistics

UN   United Nations

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Part 1

Chapter 1: Introduction

> Terrorism is a peculiar category of violence, because it has a
> cockeyed ratio of fear to harm (English, 2016, p. 5).

What is terrorism, and why do some individuals ultimately decide to join terrorist groups? Is the use of extreme violence and terrorism[1] as a means to coerce an audience or government an inevitable part of humanity that has existed all through history, or is it a consequence of modernisation, fundamentalism and globalisation? Perhaps equally important from a political and societal position, do we have sound knowledge on how to prevent or deter individuals from committing to terrorism? These are foundational questions within *terrorism research*, and scholars from a wide range of disciplines have been studying them for more than half a century. While optimistic projections suggest that developments in research production might help us to address some of these long-standing issues (Schuurman, 2018), there are scholars who are more cautious as to whether we are really any closer to answering them (Sageman, 2014).

Notwithstanding any definitional, conceptual or methodological issues concerning terrorism-related subjects, some that are discussed in this thesis, and all that have been discussed at lengths among scholars (Jackson et al, 2011; Sageman, 2014; Silke, 2004; Schmid & Jongman 1988; Schuurman, 2018; Tilly, 2004), the focus on terrorism in politics, research, media and public life is nothing short of bewildering. This is especially the case since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks, when the international gaze on terrorism grew to unprecedented heights (Birkland, 2004), subsequently placing counterterrorism at the top of global security concerns in the 21st century (Jackson et al., 2011).

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[1] *Radicalisation*, *violent extremism*, *terrorism* and other related terms and concepts will be defined and discussed more thoroughly in *Chapter 2*.

Naturally, societal concerns regarding terrorism are not formed in social vacuums, they are constituted by real-life events; in modern times most notably the 9/11 attacks, the global wave of violent attacks that ensued in the mid-2000s (Lindekilde, 2012a), and the more recent surge in mass-casualty terrorist attacks that are associated with the Islamic state (ISIS) across Europe and the Middle East since 2011 (Hegghammer, 2016). These extreme, violent events caused great pressure on politicians and security communities to prevent terrorism more "efficiently", which seems to have paved the way for the *radicalisation discourse* in global politics. Here, the *radicalisation discourse[2]* is understood as a security doctrine emerging from the Global War on Terror, which assumes that terrorism is an end product of people having undergone a *radicalisation* of attitudes (Lindekilde, 2012c). This security doctrine is now a distinct and pre-emptive strand of international counterterrorism in which *radicalisation* and *extremism* are intrinsically linked with *terrorism*.

Although this specific use of the *radicalisation discourse* traces back to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, where *radicalisation* was initially used to describe a new type of violent Islamic terrorism in parts of Asia (Jackson et al., 2011), the term would eventually be appropriated by European policymakers and security communities to explain how Western citizens could also commit to terrorism. Thus, the radicalisation discourse traces back to political, bureaucratic and security institutions in Europe, which, after the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) attacks, urged governments to focus more on preventing *homegrown terrorism*, which are extreme violent events committed by citizens that live in the country in which they carry out their attacks (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009).

Homegrown terrorism is certainly no recent phenomenon, as most terrorist acts have historically been "domestic" (Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev, 2011). Yet, as the radicalisation discourse gained both political and societal notoriety, the term would quickly become the

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[2] In this thesis, *discourse* is defined as linguistic expressions that represents the social practices within different domains such as education (Fairclough, 2003).

master signifier of the modern terrorist. Evidently, neither *radical* nor *radicalisation* are new concepts in relation to terrorism, and many scholars have written about radical ideas and radical milieus, in their study of political violence (Bandura, 1990; Crenshaw, 1981; della Porta, 1995). However, the concept of *radicalisation*, as it is commonly applied today, did not exist in the same vein prior to the 9/11 attacks (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 480), and it is this reinvented understanding that sees the term linked with explaining how some individuals can potentially turn to terrorism. Imbedded in this understanding is also a belief that certain psychological and sociocultural characteristics can be interpreted as risk factors for becoming a terrorist. O'Donnell (2016a, 2016b) describes these risk factors as being related to people who show oppositional attitudes and/or behaviours, or who suffer from psychosocial problems or who simply show religious expressions (often just being Muslim).

The mainstreaming of the radicalisation discourse that carries these assumptions has resonated well in political and societal domains. As a consequence, counterterrorism has been reformulated as a multi-sectorial security task in which public sector services are given a key role in preventing individuals from being radicalised towards extremism. With the supposition that radicalisation entails processes that can lead non-violent people towards violent behaviours, it has been suggested that first-line workers are ideally situated to identifying and intervening in radicalisation processes, due to their proximity to students, patients and clients. On this basis, a number of countries have introduced counter-radicalisation policies that place education[3], health care and social services at the forefront of its national security (Gielen, 2019). Hence, security has been reconfigured into a shared governmental and public responsibility, which sees the combination of the state's use of "hard" measures, like surveillance and punitive factors, with public sectors' "softer" approaches, like cultural integration, the ideological battle to win hearts and minds, and psychosocial support (O'Donnell, 2016a).

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[3] *Education* is used as a collective term for primary, secondary and tertiary education. When called for, *school* and *university* are used to explicate certain points.

In this societal climate, education tends to be prescribed as the most important sector in the efforts to protect particularly young individuals from radicalisation and violent extremism. As argued by Durodié (2016), to integrate preventive functions in education is supported across the political spectrum. However, this "securitisation" (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998) of education remain ambiguous on several fronts. To be sure, preventing young lives from developing extremist mind-sets is arguably a long-standing educational objective (Gearon, 2013). In fact, schools have always had a moral responsibility to assist the young on the path to becoming responsible citizens and functioning members of society (Biesta, 2015). Thus, it is assumed that the core ideals and functions of education can be effective tools in helping the young to develop attitudes in support of human rights and peace. Yet, the merger of education and security is also a political project that has positioned schools in a difficult place, and emerging literature reveals that the integration of counter-radicalisation efforts can have a chilling effect on democratic educational practice (Thomas, 2016).

One of the more ostensible negative effects of this securitisation appears to be how counter-radicalisation efforts are structured on the principle of disciplining illiberal *radicals* into becoming liberal *citizens* (Sukarieh & Tannock, 2016). Such an approach can result in a practice where the young who do not conform to the ideal image of students are labelled as potential terrorists. While counter-radicalisation efforts are politically framed as being consistent with the existing safeguarding duties of first-line workers (Kyriacou et al., 2017), disciplining oppositional students is hardly compatible with the genuine safeguarding principles that practitioners are accustomed to within their practices (Panjwani et al., 2018). In fact, this may very well be resonant of colonial discourses of contagion and immunity that can lead to a silencing of students who are only seeking social change (O'Donnell, 2016b). This is problematic, and history has certainly revealed on many occasions that the political apparatus can severely exploit educational systems under the banner of "national security", often by means of indoctrinating and

suppressing both students and cultures alike (Davies, 2008, 2014b).

The relationship between education and conflict is obviously a long-standing one; in fact, humans have questioned whether and how education can reduce or prevent political violence at least since antiquity (Sargent, 1996). Norway is no exception to this, as the creation of public schools in the late 19th century was partially based on the objective of preventing young people from adhering to monistic or extremist doctrines (Solerød, 2005). However, the use of education to protect or maintain global and national security interests is also an ambiguous topic that is saturated with philosophical, ethical and pedagogical dilemmas. Clearly, this raises important questions about integrating counter-radicalisation efforts in education, and it seems appropriate to "reverse" the question of asking how education can prevent terrorism, to scrutinise also how counterterrorism may affect educational practice, which serves as the backdrop for this research.

1.1   Research objective and research questions

This doctoral study explores the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism in education generally and in Norwegian schools specifically. While the target audience of efforts to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism in education is, naturally, *students*, this study has its main empirical focuses on a specific subset within education; *practitioners*[4], those who Biesta (2015) says are responsible for the art form of *educating* students. The methodological focus on practitioners will be further delineated in *Chapter 4*; however, in this study, the focus is not limited to how practitioners describe their work within the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism through formal teaching activities; rather, it will explore prevention through formal, informal and non-formal pedagogical and social pedagogical activities (Jackson, 1968).

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[4] In this thesis, *educator* is used as a term for teachers and principals, while *social educator* includes social educators, counsellors and health care workers. *Practitioners* is used as a collective term for both *educator* and *social educator*.

Hence, the focus is not restricted to core curriculum or specific school subjects or topics, but, rather, to education in a generalised sense.

This research offers no comprehensive evaluations of efforts to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism in education; rather, it will study prevention efforts from a discourse theoretical position, based on the narratives of practitioners in Norway. This includes analysing how practitioners describe radicalisation and violent extremism as social phenomena, what social/pedagogical approaches they explain applying when preventing these issues, as well as discussing the potential social and educational consequences of prevention efforts in practice.

The importance of studying practitioners can be appropriately highlighted in John Goodlad's (1979) curriculum theory and what he calls the "five substantive domains". These domains, which are *ideological*, *formal*, *perceived*, *operational* and *experienced*, illustrate the process of producing, consuming and transferring curricula. Practitioners are at the centre of this educational process whereby they first interpret the formalised curricula before they operationalise it subjectively in school. Thus, practitioners become the mediator between ideological and political visions at the societal level, core curricula at the formalised level and, most importantly, educational practice as it is experienced by students in real life. Moving beyond curriculum theory, the supposition that *practitioners* are the most important factor governing educational practice seems justified from an empiricist position, as practitioners are what matters by representing the greatest source of variance for what makes a difference in school (Hattie, 2003).

This research on educational efforts to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism provides a theory-building framework of the impacts on and implications for education, by reviewing the state of literature. Moreover, it assesses the radicalisation discourse in Norwegian schools, by analysing interview data on how practitioners describe their understandings and approaches to preventions in social/educational practice. These interviews were studied through the framework of critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 2003), and they were based on

the objective of *exploring the risks and practices of integrating counter-radicalisation efforts in education*. Here, *risks* and *practices* refer to the central tenet in CDA research of providing *descriptive* and *normative* analysis, meaning that the study does not simply describe social realities, but also tries to evaluate and assesses them critically (Fairclough, 2013).

From this premise, the research objective is divided into three research questions, the first of which is mainly addressed in a literature review (Article I), while the remaining two are mainly addressed in three primary-data studies (Article II, Article III and Article IV).

I. How can education contribute to preventing students from becoming radicalised towards violent extremism, and what are the potential implications of integrating counter-radicalisation efforts in education?

II. How is the relation between education and radicalisation articulated in educational discourses, and what discursive orders have formed these discursive practices in Norwegian schools?

III. How may these discursive practices establish legitimacy in changing social practices, and how can this affect inclusive educational practice in Norwegian schools?

These research questions overlap and are to some degree explored throughout the entire study. Yet, as they vary in their empirical and theoretical enquiries, they are unequally represented in the research. Although CDA is elucidated in *Chapter 3*, a brief explanation might be required in the reading of these research questions. *Discursive practice* concerns the production and consumption of text (discourse types) that is used in particular ways in domains (i.e. education). Thus, it refers to how people use language that shapes and is shaped by the social practices that exist in domains (Fairclough, 2003). *Discursive orders* are the social structuring of all discourses that are in use within domains, thus, they are specific discursive practices through which text and talk are produced and consumed or interpreted (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

1.2 Research design and theoretical framework

This research applies a flexible qualitative research design that is argued to be beneficial when exploring understudied social phenomena (Maxwell, 2009). The decision to carry out qualitative research rests on many factors, firstly, which contradict some social scientific disciplinary assumptions, that empiricism as a methodology is not inherently linked with numerical or statistical logic, but that discourses, documents and praxis are important forms of data (Neal, 2013). Secondly, this research is concerned with the centrality of *meanings*, which favours interpretive analysis aimed at explaining how practitioners understand social phenomena when they participate in their professional settings (Weber, 2011). Recognising also the inherent complexity and uniqueness of these settings, qualitative methods provide ample possibilities to seek in-depth and comprehensive interpretation of social contexts, without having these contexts being reduced down to numeric variables (Hatch, 2002).

Additionally, researching politicised concepts, such as *security*, *radicalisation*, *violent extremism* and *terrorism*, which can be considered as rhetorical forces in their own rights, may benefit from discursive attention (Jackson et al., 2011). After all, terrorism is often regarded as political communicative events (Crenshaw, 1981), and focusing on how society interprets these communicative events through different writings, may allow for analysing how language is used to achieve certain effects in social life. Moreover, qualitative research is closely associated with inner states of human activity that may not be directly observable, and the inherent normative aspects of studying terrorism-related subjects require a capacity for subjective qualitative judgements (Jackson, 2008).

The primary-data in this study consist of in-depth interviews with 23 practitioners in Norway (16 educators and 7 social educators), and the research is structured on the framework of critical discourse analysis (CDA). Yet, despite the application of an established research framework, writing an article-based doctoral thesis is not as "seamless" as writing a monograph (Skrede, 2014). For instance, research focus,

theory and methodology can all change in an evolutionary study process, in which terms and concepts may also take up new meanings.

1.3   Axiological and philosophical considerations

The background for conducting this research was touched upon in the previous subchapter. However, this background is also connected to a set of axiological and philosophical considerations that must be recognised. After all, the credibility of any social enquiry depends on whether the researcher adheres to moral, ethical and philosophical considerations (Hatch, 2002). It is exemplified through the mutual trust that exists between researchers in academic communities, between researcher and research participants, and for society at large (Silverman, 2015). Yet, these considerations do not only refer to procedural standards, as they also relate to how any conclusion will inevitably be affected by the researchers subjective position in the study, or the recognition that the researcher is part of the world that is being studied (Douglas, 2015).

The point of departure for any social enquiry is to ask oneself "What is the motivation for conducting this research in the first place?" Naturally, this question is closely related to methodological concerns such as what kind of knowledge will be produced and how (Maxwell, 2009). Yet, equally important, it relates to what is the purpose of the research, including why it should be carried out and what will be its wider implications. Within *terrorism research*, as with much of the social sciences that branch to *international relations* (IR), a scholarly divide has manifested itself, with the notable consequence of dividing research into two broad subfields, *traditional* and *critical* studies (Cox, 1981).

A simplistic distinction between these two subfields would be to say that scholars operating in the former focus primarily on studying policy-relevant issues, while those working in the latter focus more critical attention on power-knowledge issues in politics and society (Jarvis, 2009). Naturally, some will consider this divide artificial, seeing that most social science scholars acknowledge the need to produce

critical, intellectual and coherent knowledge of power (ab)use, while also providing conclusions that can have implications for research, policy and practice (Fairclough, 2003). In the words of Arun Kundnani (2009)

> Scholars of political violence should want societies to make use of their work in order to reduce such violence, but true scholarship also involves a duty to question the underlying assumptions that define the discipline, particularly when those assumptions reflect priorities of governments that are themselves parties to the conflict under investigation (p. 7).

This doctoral study is placed within a critical research tradition, meaning that its purpose is not only to describe the social world but also to try to change it for the better (Jackson et al., 2011). Such a normative stance is based on an assumption that knowledge and power are intrinsically linked with each other (Foucault, 1975), and that any attempt to describe or explain the social world essentially connects with the motivation and background of the creator of that particular knowledge. As Cox writes, "theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose" (1981, p. 128), and research that operates in critical traditions must try to uncover different forms of knowledge about social life, and how our understandings may vary and impact this social life in different ways (Lindahl, 2017). More specifically, CDA is geared to a better understanding of the nature and sources of social wrongs, which is also applicable for this thesis.

This critical stance conforms to CDA research, with its objective of providing normative and explanatory critique (Fairclough, 2013). Here, *explanatory critique* derives from Bhaskar (1986) and his belief that research should start from the assumption that it must help to solve a social problem. However, what actually constitutes a social problem in this research context can on one hand be interpreted as the existence of youth extremism, but it might also be understood as the unintended and often negative consequences of intersecting the domains of security and education. After all, any social intervention in education and elsewhere will have unintended consequences, some of which might be deleterious

(Phillips, 2005). Hence, this study will discuss how education can potentially prevent radicalisation and violent extremism, while also scrutinising how prevention efforts can pervert educational practice.

Philosophically, this research is placed within a critical realist tradition, which is regarded as a type of philosophical ontology that holds secondary epistemological consequences (Phillips, 2000). Critical realist researchers seek to explain and contextualise social phenomena by reference to social mechanisms that operates below the "visible" surface. Hence, this work assumes a realist ontology and an interpretivist epistemology that entails a situated view on knowledge (Bhaskar, 1997), which is compatible with CDA research (Fairclough, 2013). The coherence in this research is illustrated in *Figure 1*.

Figure 1. Coherence in the thesis

1.4   Placing the research project

This study constitutes the first in-depth exploration of efforts to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism in Norwegian schools. The research focus on security and education in Norway is timely, as a decade has now passed since the government introduced counter-radicalisation policies

that placed practitioners at the forefront of preventing radicalisation and violent extremism. This preventive logic is certainly not confined to the educational sector in Norway (or elsewhere), but there is reason to surmise that schools are considered the most important preventive actor against violent extremism. In fact, the assumption that schools can counterweigh violent extremism has underpinned much of the political discussions since 9/11, illustrated through the growing realisation about the potential of education to serve security interests (Gearon, 2013). To enlarge upon this convergence of education and security, which is crucial for this study, what are the potential impacts and implications of securitising education for the purpose of preventing radicalisation?

This doctoral research is an interdisciplinary study placed in the field of *societal safety*, which combines concepts and theories from *educational studies*, *security studies* and *terrorism research*, without being reduced to anyone of these fields. *Societal safety* is described by Olsen, Kruke and Hovden (2007) as the study of "vulnerability and resilience in society" towards different security threats, including violent extremism and terrorism. In the process of narrowing the scope of the study, some of the aforementioned fields will be emphasised more than others are, and while this research is based on an argument that the *radicalisation discourse* is a discourse on *terrorism* (Kundnani, 2009), the focus over the next chapters will primarily be aimed at preventing radicalisation and violent extremism in the domain of education, and the social consequences of merging education and security. As a result of this concretisation, a vast body of literature on security, radicalisation, violent extremism, terrorism and counterterrorism is effectively neglected.

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) serves as a theoretical and methodological framework that binds this interdisciplinary research together. CDA entails a view that assumes how discourses figures as a form of social practice, and, by studying language, scholars can make methodical claims about how discourses *constitute* and are *constituted* by social practices. Although discursive theories are no rarity in studying *security* (Salter & Mutlu, 2013), *terrorism* (Jackson et al., 2011), or

education (Bernstein, 1990), there has been limited research that applies a CDA framework to the study of the securitisation of education (see Faure-Walker [2019] and Mattsson [2018b] for notable exceptions).

On that note, while working across different fields is rewarding, it also presents the researcher with linguistic, epistemic and institutional challenges. At times, interdisciplinary research requires the synthesising and fragmentation of a vast body of disciplinary thinking, which always runs the risk of oversimplifying theories and concepts, especially when they are transmitted into new fields. Moreover, it can be quite difficult to convince audiences in different fields. An illustrative example of this is how the word *radicalisation* in education relates historically more to questions of *emancipation* than it does to *terrorism* (Bartolome, 2004).

Despite interdisciplinary difficulties, this study is held together by a normative commitment to carry out critical research. Yet, *criticality* reflects a range of contradictory theoretical, philosophical and political propositions. The concept of *criticality* is, therefore, ambiguous, which is compounded by how this study draws critical influence from *security studies*, *terrorism research* and *educational studies*. However, while criticality is an ambiguous concept, it can be argued that it entail the promotion of emancipations and human freedoms (Lindahl, 2017).

Here, the study will trace criticality in two lines; the first is within pedagogy, based on the premise that education constitutes the social domain of the study, and this requires a focus on the emancipatory functions of education. More specifically, criticality will be derived from how Biesta (2010) utilises Rancière's *emancipatory theory* as a process of subjectification. The second line is methodological, and here the study relies on the normative framework of CDA research (Fairclough, 2013).

1.5   Disposition

This thesis comprises two sections, the first of which represents the main part that comprises seven chapters (Part 1), and the second holds the appendices and the four research articles (Part 2).

Chapter 1 introduced the overall study including outlining its research purpose, objective and design. The introductory chapter also focused attention on philosophical and axiological considerations, as well as placing the research within an interdisciplinary frame.

Chapter 2 provides a literary background in which key concepts are defined and conceptualised. The radicalisation discourse and counter-radicalisation efforts will be discussed in this section, before the focus is shifted towards the complex relationship between radicalisation, violent extremism and education. This chapter concludes with a context-specific focus on counter-radicalisation policies and research in Norway.

Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical and conceptual framework of critical discourse analysis (CDA). While this chapter will primarily draw on CDA as authored by Norman Fairclough (2003), attention will also be focused on discourse analysis in a more general sense.

Chapter 4 is dedicated to the study's philosophy, methodology and research design. The appropriateness of the CDA framework in this study will be highlighted, before various methodological and technical choices are presented and discussed.

Chapter 5 presents the findings from the four studies. Presenting the three primary-data studies (Article II, Article III and Article IV), the chapter is structured according to the logic of CDA where the main focus is placed on the textual analysis and the discursive practices analysis.

Chapter 6 discusses the findings from all four studies, and with reference to the three primary-data studies, this chapter will analyse more thoroughly the discursive practices and the discursive orders that have formed them, in order to shed light on how the radicalisation discourse can potentially lead to social change in the educational domain. The chapter is concluded by outlining research implications and limitations.

Chapter 7 summarises the doctoral study based on the overarching research objective, while outlining key research gaps and suggesting future research needs and priorities.

Chapter 2: Literary background

Is not intolerance and absolutism a remarkable quality to have in combating oppression and exploitation? (Haavelsrud, 2009, p. 114)

This chapter serves as the literary background for the thesis in which key terms and concepts are presented and discussed. First, the mainstreaming of the *radicalisation discourse* will be outlined, before terrorism-related subjects and counter-radicalisation efforts are defined and discussed more thoroughly. This leads into a discussion of the ambiguous link between education and conflict, or the *education-terrorism nexus* (Krueger & Malečková, 2003). After this, research on radicalisation and education is described, before attention is paid to the preventive potential of *good education* and *emancipatory pedagogics* (Biesta, 2015). The chapter concludes with a context-specific focus on counter-radicalisation policies and research in Norway. An overview and audit trail of reviewed literature in this thesis is found in *Appendix A*.

2.1 Mainstreaming the radicalisation discourse

The contemporary usage of *radicalisation* and *violent extremism*, as outlined in the introductory chapter, emerged with the mainstreaming of the *radicalisation discourse* and the massive attention on terrorism that has ensued after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Jackson et al., 2011). However, there is arguably little new in entertaining the idea that terrorism amasses great societal attention; in fact, terrorism was even voted the "best news story" by the American Associated Press back in 1985 (Chomsky, 2002). What we have witnessed over these last two decades is perhaps best described as processes of integrating security concerns into areas of society and culture where they previously had limited or no foothold.

This is dubbed *securitisation processes* by the Copenhagen School of *security studies*, performative speech acts where a powerful securitising actor (usually government) claims that something constitutes an existential threat (the securitisation move). If such moves are accepted by the audience (for instance, practitioners), the securitising actor may successfully implement exceptional emergency measures into new domains (education), thus representing the securitisation process (Buzan et al., 1998). Here, the Copenhagen School draws on John Austin's (1911-1960) theory of *speech acts* in which expressions are seen not only as the transferring of information between a sender and a receiver but as actions with intentions, purpose and effects. The fact that *radicalisation* can usually be written without much explanation, and with sufficient confidence that the audience will know what this word means, may demonstrate the rhetorical force of the radicalisation discourse.

For security scholars, this *widening* of securitising actors, or the inclusion of non-military sectors' concerns into security strategies, is a post-Cold War phenomenon (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). In a sociological frame, these developments have been thoroughly studied through the notion of *risk society*, where a growing focus on *security* is seen as a key characteristic of modern society (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1999). Many argue that this also exemplifies how counterterrorism is dealt with in today's world, particularly by how terrorism is commonly seen as an existential threat to democratic life and well-being (Wolfendale, 2016). Still, the notion of security remains paradoxical, as we are, for the most part, living in the safest period in human history, yet our perceptions of risk can consume and transform any area of society. Moreover, our perceptions of risk can trigger substantial feelings of psychological unease (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and humans tend to overestimate the severity of security threats (Slovic, 1987). Hence, to understand the psychological and social consequences of terrorism and its preventions is important when coming to grips with why these subjects command so much attention in contemporary society (Bandura, 1990).

It is clear that the mainstreaming of the radicalisation discourse,

or the popularisation of this security doctrine in social life (Panjwani et al., 2018), is reflected in notions of *risk society* and *securitisation processes*, where elements of social life are continuously reorganised as a response to security threats. Terrorism-related threats have a unique proclivity to cause societal fear that may result in exceptional regulatory actions. Yet, as argued by Jackson et al. (2011, p. 139), risk assessments of terrorism usually reveal that extreme violence poses a relatively minor risk to human life, especially in comparison to other dangers to our well-being. Obviously, this points to a discrepancy between social perceptions of terrorism and the occurrences of terrorist events, which Slovic (1987) calls *dread risk*, based on how terrorism is a low-probability but high-consequence event that triggers strong emotions. However, the "terror of terrorists" also relates to how terrorism are communicative events, meaning that when assessing the "effectiveness" of terrorism, societal and psychological fears should also be considered in the equation.

The mainstreaming of the radicalisation discourse, including widening the preventive duties into public sectors' services, is arguably not due to societal terror of terrorists alone but also because such securitisation can easily interact with existing societal developments. For example, the radicalisation discourse explicitly draw on vulnerability issues, that is, how perpetrators of extreme violence are commonly portrayed as vulnerable individuals (O'Donnell, 2016b). This logic coalesce with contemporary educational practice that Biesta (2009) claims is turning pedagogy into a practice of *therapeutisation*, which is more concerned with the psychological well-being of students, often at the expense of other educational functions. Another example of how the radicalisation discourse interacts with societal developments is how the inclusion of first-line workers in counter-radicalisation efforts links with wider issues of neoliberal governance, which is redistributing traditional governmental tasks (i.e. counterterrorism) onto public sector services.

Although this entanglement of education and security enhances existing logics in modern society, the securitisation of education rests on normative and political connotations that may not be compatible with the

educational values of liberty, tolerance and inclusion. After all, while the radicalisation discourse has roots in Western security concerns, it also draws on debates about the state of liberal democracy (O'Donnell, 2016a) and the integration and treatment of minorities in Europe (Lindekilde, 2012b). Thus, the ideological assumption that the young, and particularly immigrant and Muslim young people, are a threat to societal safety, is not only disrespectful towards these groups, but it may also oppose democratic education. Therefore, the question of preventing terrorism cannot be isolated to just the case of preventing extreme violence; it must also be linked to the spectrum of providing security, while maintaining fundamental democracy and human freedoms. After all, terrorism is not only a threat because of its potential to cause physical harm but also through the fear and anxiety that it generates. Considering, then, how terrorism may cause added societal unease and conflict (Bandura, 1990), education should arguably try to intervene in these tendencies and not to maintain or to reinforce them (Davies, 2009).

2.2   Towards defining terrorism-related subjects

Terrorism-related subjects are what Jackson et al. (2011, p. 100) call the centre of a "definitional quagmire". The terms *radical*, *extremist* and *terrorist* are pejorative labels that carry explicit and implicit ideological assumptions; uttering them can be effective language tools that convey strong condemnation (Ahmed, 2001). There is, however, little new in entertaining the idea that words like *radical*, *extremist* and *terrorist* are problematic concepts, and many simply use them without defining or conceptualising them properly (Jackson, 2008). On this, Laqueur (2011) argues that all definitions have their shortcomings, as reality is always richer than any explanation of reality. Hence, while it is unlikely that there will ever be definitional consensus, defining concepts is still crucial to discern similar phenomena from each other (Jackson et al., 2011).

Writing about the word *radicalisation*, Peter Neumann famously stated that it represents the standard term to explain "what goes on before

the bomb goes off" (2008, p. 4). Etymologically, the term *radical*, which *radicalisation* derives from, can be interpreted as someone who expresses significant dissent from prevailing norms or rules. In this context, being radical is simply understood as rejecting the status quo and not necessarily in any problematic way (Bartlett & Miller, 2012). Most conceptualisations of radicalisation share the idea that it involves a gradual adaptation and internalisation of oppositional and undemocratic attitudes that defy the status quo or mainstream society. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) further elaborate that opposing attitudes that are accompanied by an increased support for or willingness to commit violence are usually defined as *violent extremism*. This is what Bandura (1990, p. 162) calls the "conversion of socialised people into combatants". Following this reasoning, violent extremism and terrorism are generally viewed as behavioural products of radicalised attitudes.

Processes describing how radicalisation can potentially lead into violent extremism and eventually terrorism are commonly depicted as individual and linear paths with more or less distinguishable phases (O'Donnell, 2016b). Hence, it is implied in policymaking that there is a direct relationship between radical attitudes and extreme behaviours (Lindekilde, 2012c). Yet, any causal inference between radical thinking and extreme behaviours is certainly open to debate (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009). While extreme attitudes can precede the willingness to commit violence, this link is not inevitable, and extreme attitudes can be adopted both pre and post violent behaviours (Crenshaw, 1981). There are even extremists who have not been radicalised, indicating that radicalisation is not an accurate predictor of violent extremism or terrorism[5].

This thesis will not provide any conclusion to the age-old task of defining terrorism-related concepts. However, it will suggest that these

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[5] A significant body of literature exists, which draws on psychological theories, group mechanism theories and sociological theories on radicalisation. These different theories will not be examined in this thesis, as they fall somewhat outside the research focus, and since most theories have already been the subject of reviews (Borum, 2011a, 2011b; Christmann, 2012; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008a, 2008b, 2010; Hafez & Mullins, 2015; King & Taylor, 2011; Victoroff, 2005).

concepts are not defined in terms of any specific ideology, politics or religion. Based on Sedgwick's (2010) proposal, this thesis abandons the idea that *radical* and *radicalisation* are absolute concepts (p. 491), suggesting instead that their relative nature should be recognised. Thus, radicalisation is understood as the process of internalising oppositional attitudes that reject the prevailing societal norms or status quo. This conceptualisation does not see radicalisation as intrinsically positive or negative; rather, it is the radical attitudes in relation to using anti-democratic, suppressive or violent methods that demonstrate its problematic potential. Furthermore, the thesis adopts a broad understanding of *violent extremism* as an acceptance of, or commitment to carry out, extreme violence or threat of extreme violence, which includes all types of extreme ideological, political and religious movements and groups (Cragin, 2014).

Terrorism is interpreted as physical acts or psychological threats of indiscriminate violence to advance a cause, which is perhaps best described in Schmid's (2011) comprehensive definition of terrorism as

> A doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatant, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effect on various audience and conflict parties (p. 86).

This comprehensive definition is not without its flaws, and it risks mixing up elements that belong to different conceptualisations. Yet, it is likely that terrorism as a phenomenon will never be adequately defined, and what Schmid's definition offers are two elements that are the subject of some consensus: namely, how terrorism is 1) violent actions without legal or moral restraints, and 2) actions that target mainly civilians.

The term *radicalisation discourse* will be used in respect of the prevailing political and now societal assumption that radicalisation is a process that can lead seemingly non-radical individuals towards violence

(Sedgwick, 2010). Hence, this is a concrete use of *discourse* as argued by Fairclough (2003), based on how it gives meaning from a particular ideological stance of how people can become terrorists. Yet, as Brown and Saeed (2015) write, there is not *one* radicalisation discourse, but there are different discourses *on* radicalisation. However, most of these discourses are based on the same assumption that is illustrated through linear and individualised radicalisation processes as shown in *Figure 2*. Thus, the radicalisation discourse is guided by the idea that violent behaviours can become an almost inevitable consequence of having had unchecked radical attitudes for too long (Lindekilde, 2012a).

Figure 2. The radicalisation process

This conceptualisation tends to mark a stage in the radicalisation process (dotted line in *Figure 2*), where changes in someone's beliefs, feelings and attitudes can lead them closer towards extreme violence and terrorism, and at which preventions should be aimed to mitigate these trajectories. Thus, the radicalisation discourse actually entails two key assumptions: 1) that a radicalisation of attitudes may become a pathway to terrorism, and 2) that counterterrorism should mitigate radicalisation processes. These two ideas underpin most *radicalisation discourses*, which is also how this concept is understood and applied in this thesis.

The irony is not lost on the many challenges associated with using concepts that are permeated with political assumptions, particularly in a study that aims to scrutinise the underlying ideological underpinnings of

the radicalisation discourse. However, to refrain from using any policy-driven terms may create a distance between how the researcher and research participants talk about these concepts, which is problematic, as a key purpose of this research is to analyse how practitioners understand and apply them, and how this may affect their educational practice.

2.3   Counter-radicalisation efforts

Efforts to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism are linked to many terms in policies, research and practice, including *preventing violent extremism* (PVE), *countering violent extremism* (CVE), *de-radicalisation programmes*, *counter-radicalisation efforts* and *EXIT-programmes* (Davies, 2018). Yet, how these terms literally differ from each other, or what their boundaries are from the broader concept of *counterterrorism*, is difficult to discern, as Gielen (2019) writes

> Like counterterrorism and counter-radicalisation, there are no clear definitions of CVE. Rather, it has become a catchphrase for a policy spectrum varying from early prevention and safeguarding measures for society, groups, and communities to very targeted measures for violent extremists (pp. 1152-1153).

This study refers to all forms of prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism as *counter-radicalisation efforts* and to the policies referring to these efforts as *counter-radicalisation policies*. *Prevention* or *prevention efforts* will also be used to maintain a varied language. When called for, terms that are more precise are used to highlight key issues.

Most of what is written on counter-radicalisation efforts is centred on the notion of building *resilience*, which is here defined as a someone's ability to identify and reject extremist ideas or to recover from disadvantaged situations that may increase the risk of radicalisation. Creating resilience can be directed at either the attitudinal or behavioural aspect, or sometimes a combination of both, depending on the context and the scale of the radicalisation "intensity", or how far the person has

ventured into the radicalisation process (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle & Zammit, 2016), meaning that, in some cases, resilience is also conceptualised as helping extremist individuals to disengage from violent behaviours through interventions that are more targeted.

Resilience against extremist attitudes and behaviours tends to be portrayed as an individual capacity, thus, counter-radicalisation efforts often overlook contextual structures and institutional logic in their preventive strategies (Stephens, Sieckelinck & Boutellier, 2019). This is not surprising; in fact, it is rather symptomatic, as the underlying assumptions of the radicalisation discourse tend to direct focus on the individual, where contextual structures become understated factors (Mattsson, Hammarén, & Odenbring, 2016). Yet, when assessing the current state of literature on counter-radicalisation efforts, it would appear that acknowledging social structures and contexts is crucial for the preventive outcomes. For instance, the review by Stephens et al. (2019) argued that building resilience require that people are supported in the development of their capabilities for critical thinking and moral reasoning and their prosocial values towards citizenship and diversity. However, communities must also be supported for prevention efforts to have their desired effects, a claim that Gielen (2019) seem to support.

2.4   The education-terrorism nexus

The relationship between education and conflict attracted attention long before the advent of the radicalisation discourse in global politics. Questions concerning if and how education can prevent or reduce extreme violence and terrorism, often dubbed the *education-terrorism nexus*, seem to have intrigued and astonished scholars at least since antiquity (Sargent, 1996). These questions are warranted, given that education at its most basic level pertains to "what the living generation wants the future generations to know and to do". Extending from this, one of the key functions of education has always been to promote social order and political stability (Dewey, 1966). Naturally, as schools and

universities constitute a common denominator for most young people in today's world, helping students to develop political orientations and behaviours in support of human rights and peace is certainly within the ideals and objectives of education. Furthermore, the demographic groups of the young and young adults are considered more susceptible to exploring or being drawn towards violent extremism (Silke, 2004). This implies that education has a safeguarding responsibility to promote resilient attitudes and behaviours that extend beyond the traditional role of just transferring skills and knowledge between generations.

Considering the assumed preventive capabilities of schools and universities, perhaps there is good reason to argue that education has a moral and pedagogical responsibility to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism. Østby and Urdal (2010) write that the preventive role of education can be related to how it may reduce social grievance by creating cultures of peace. After all, education is associated with upward mobility in society, and the civic and moral virtues of democratic education are believed to be a powerful antidote to extreme attitudes and behaviours. Yet, the application of education to promote peaceful coexistence is best described as assumptions based on good intentions and perhaps naïve beliefs. Whether or not education can prevent young lives from committing to extreme violence remains unknown, and although lack of education is often cited as a cause of terrorism, the link between education and terrorism is in reality far more complex. In fact, access to education has not been shown to be able to reduce terrorism in any convincing way, and there are indications that education is positively associated with terrorism, as many terrorists are well educated (Azam & Thelen, 2008; Barakat & Urdal, 2009; Berrebi, 2007; Brockhoff, Kreiger & Meierrieks, 2015; Danzell, Yeh & Pfannenstiel, 2018; Krueger & Malečková, 2003; Piazza, 2006; Østby & Urdal, 2010).

The realisation that many terrorists are actually well-educated middle-class citizens seems to be a driving force behind the securitisation of education, particularly since 9/11, when schools and universities have not only been seen as arenas for preventing radicalisation and extremism

but also as potential hotbeds for radicalisation where future terrorists are created (Durodié, 2016). Clearly, there are conflicting ideals adrift here, and Barakat and Urdal (2009) describe the "two faces" of education as making schools and universities quite vulnerable to political suppression. Historical analysis reveals that education has often been misused for political ends (Davies, 2008, 2014b), and the fact that school have been an active part in many protracted violent conflicts, genocides and ethnic cleansings throughout human history is a gloomy legacy.

2.5   Radicalisation and education

Although the relationship between education and terrorism is a complex one, developments in research production may provide new insight into the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism in education. However, there are several challenges related to assessing this research. Firstly, there are no evaluation studies at hand, which relate to the high impact but low prevalence of radicalisation and extremism among the young. Secondly, this is compounded by the philosophical and methodological challenges of conceptualising *radicalisation* and *violent extremism* (Borum 2011a), including providing reliable measurements of their prevention efforts. As Lindekilde (2012a) write, if preventions are successful, nothing happens, which means that one must prove a negative or how the preventions are the reason for the non-events.

The current state of research suggests that educational counter-radicalisation efforts are mainly aimed at building resilience for the entire student population through curricular activities that promote civic values, critical thinking and human rights ideals (Aly, Taylor & Karnovsky, 2014). This can be regarded as a general and non-specific form of risk reduction targeted at preventing students from becoming radicalised in the first place (Barakat & Urdal, 2009). Building resilience through citizenship education assumes that giving the young necessary cross-curricular skills, knowledge and competency, may enable them to participate as informed, responsible and well-functioning citizens, but

this is certainly dependent on society also providing the young with the genuine possibility of jobs and social status (Davies, 2016).

Another interrelated subject concerns the use of student-centred pedagogics in the promotion of resilient attitudes and behaviours against violent extremism. Obviously, student-centred pedagogics have become an educational manifesto in modern education (Davies, 2014b), yet, they commonly relate to a greater utilisation of active, reflective and problem-oriented activities to help students to learn, develop and socialise. The claim that resilience against violent extremism is closely tied with the use of student-centred pedagogics resonates well with how educators and students express their views and experiences on these issues (Aly et al., 2014; Busher et al., 2017; Davydov, 2015; Kühle & Lindekilde, 2010; Mattsson, 2018a; Mitchell, 2016; Quartermaine, 2016; Thomas, 2016).

Moreover, another commonality in the literature is how education should *safeguard* students from risk factors of becoming an extremist, which is often defined as the protection of the young's well-being and safety (Quartermaine, 2016). Here, safeguarding broadens the preventive efforts beyond formal curricular activities by also including strategies that mitigate the risk factors of antisocial behaviours. Naturally, safeguarding pertains to all students regardless of any risk of violent extremism, but there is an assumption that counter-radicalisation efforts are particularly dependent on protecting the young through psychosocial inclusion and support (Busher et al., 2017). This tie with a priori claims of emphasising student-centred pedagogics, and it seems clear that a basis for building resilience against extremism can be approached through good education (Aly et al., 2014; Thomas, 2016).

2.6 The promise of good education

There is an emerging body of literature suggesting that efforts to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism in schools should be based on the concept of *good education*. Here, the study relies on how Biesta (2009) conceptualises good education, that is, how schools must acknowledge

that they hold important *qualifying*, *socialising* and *subjectification* functions for young lives. For Biesta, the function of *subjectification* is especially important, which is how education can help students to become autonomous and independent humans. Thus, subjectification, or becoming a subject, can be understood as the opposite of the socialising and qualifying functions, as it is not about inserting newcomers into existing orders. Practitioners must be aware of these functions and how they may require different rationales, and, while it is possible to draw a synergy between them, there is also potential for conflict, and a one-sided emphasis on any function can damage the others (Biesta, 2009).

Naturally, the current state of research into the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism in schools and universities does not unequivocally state that efficient strategies require good education. For one thing, what comprise genuinely good education is the subject of much debate, and many terms are used in the literature to describe it, including *student-centred pedagogy* (Davies, 2008), *liberal pedagogy* (Panjwani et al., 2018) and *progressive pedagogy* (Sukarieh & Tannock, 2016). Yet, some are not very convinced about any progressive turn in education, and Hannah Arendt (1958) has perhaps been among the more outspoken critics, explaining that progressive education consisted of an "astounding hodgepodge of sense and nonsense" (p. 493).

Arendt's concern was rooted in the political aspirations behind progressive developments, which she feared could prohibit rather than encourage schools to prepare young lives to renew the common world. Accordingly, her criticism was arguably not a question of using child-centred versus curricula-centred education, nor was it a question of whether the educator is obsolete in modern education (for this is surely not the case). Rather, her views pertained to how the political assumptions behind the progressive turn often neglected how education should serve different functions, not unlike the political assumptions underpinning prevention efforts, and recognising that education actually holds different functions is arguably as integral for good education, as it is for preventing radicalisation and violent extremism in education.

However, given the shared complexity of radicalisation, violent extremism and their respective preventions, there is a significant risk that even the most student-centred pedagogies will not affect prevention as desired. Still, a solid argument can be made that the most promising way for educators to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism rests on preventions grounded in progressive, liberal and inclusive education. On this, O'Donnell (2016b) writes that a clear set of philosophical and ethical principles should underpin education in order to preserve its autonomy from security agendas (p. 54). This statement is not only appropriate in the context of preserving the autonomy of education; when assessing research, it is reasonable to assume that the autonomy of good education in its fullest and broadest sense must be the basis for any educational counter-radicalisation efforts. In fact, a trend in the literature is how education should contribute to preventing radicalisation and violent extremism by what it arguably should do, that is to help young lives to learn, to develop and to socialise, because this is beneficial for students and society in the first place (Biesta, 2015). Empirical findings that are presented in this thesis should be viewed as supportive of this.

2.7   The importance of emancipatory education

Related to these educational functions, both Arendt (1958) and Biesta (2015) argue for the need to respect the subjectification of students. Here, the concept of educational *emancipation* emerges as an indispensable responsibility for practitioners. Emancipation stems from Roman law, and the concept is commonly associated with human freedom (Sen, 1999); the close connection between emancipation in both education and philosophy traces back to Immanuel Kant's ideas about human enlightenment (Biesta, 2010). From this essential point, which extends from the basic "Marxist mantra" (Lindahl, 2017), emancipation is key to most critical social research, which recognises that the production of knowledge must aim to free humans from suppression (Booth, 2005).

However, emancipation is regarded as a rather "broad church"

that consist of many philosophical principles and perspectives in research (Lindahl, 2019). In this thesis, emancipation in a pedagogical sense is based on what Biesta (2010) calls a "new logic of emancipatory practice" that extends parts of Jacques Rancière's thinking. Through his emphasis on Rancière, Biesta (2017) has been able to reconstruct traditional emancipation by placing the individual at the centre of the emancipatory process. Biesta argue that this is necessary because much of the traditional view on emancipation is based upon fundamental inequality. Although he claims that most forms of emancipatory thinking are concerned with equality and freedom, it may be interpreted as instilling dependency at its very core, particularly as the premise often relates to how freedom must be introduced from the outside, that is, from a position that is uncontaminated by the workings of suppressive power. In other words, the *emancipated* is dependent on the truth of the *emancipator*, which, Biesta (2012) argues differs little from traditional pedagogics that radical theories paradoxically often aim to criticise.

Nevertheless, Biesta (2017) concedes that we cannot reject the logic of traditional views on emancipation, but that it deserves more scrutiny, especially in the educational domain. Therefore, when Biesta (2010) draw on Rancière's theory of emancipation as a subjective process, equity and freedom is not the outcome of emancipation, but its starting point. This relates to subjectification where emancipatory education is not about freeing someone from an oppressive structure, but an act of revealing an intelligence to itself (Biesta, 2017). In opposition to for instance Paulo Freire (1970), Rancière does not attempt to remove the educator in this process, since for him, emancipatory education is foremost the endeavour to remove the role of absolute and authoritarian truths, not the educator. Hence, central to this idea is that emancipatory pedagogy is the consciousness of what an intelligence can do when it considers itself equal to any other and considers any other equal to itself (Biesta, 2010, p. 55). This should not be confused with the claim that all intelligence is equal, for in this perspective, this is not the case. However, it pertains to seeing what can be done under that very supposition.

2.8   Counter-radicalisation policies in Norway

To understand the integration of counter-radicalisation efforts in Norway require an overview of counterterrorism policy development in a global context, which was largely set in motion with United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 1372, which was adopted unanimously on 26 September 2001. This resolution put in place security policies and laws that are relatively similar in shape in countries that are otherwise radically different (Scheppele, 2010). The European Union (EU) would soon follow with its creation of a policy that tracked the essential parts of the UN resolution. Historically, counterterrorism had not been considered a prioritised policy field in the EU, yet, after the 9/11 attacks, all its members were asked to strengthen their efforts against terrorism. Following the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) terrorist attacks, counter-radicalisation policies started to gain significant global currency, as country specific policies were introduced, first in the United Kingdom (2006), Netherlands (2007) and Denmark (2009), before they were quickly transferred to many other Western countries (Lindekilde, 2012a).

Shifting focus to Norway, counter-radicalisation policy work started in 2008, culminating in an action plan that was released in 2010. In a historic lens, Norway had significant experience with right-wing extremism, especially during parts of the 1980s and 1990s, which had seen the pioneering of local EXIT programmes in many municipalities (Bjørgo, 1997). However, violent extremism in Norway during this period was mainly considered a local problem and preventive responses in society were tailored accordingly (Hardy, 2019). This contrasts with contemporary responses, where radicalisation and violent extremism are seen as interlinked with global terrorism (Ministry of Justice and the Police, 2010, p. 29). Yet, while the action plan of 2010 acknowledged global concerns regarding terrorism, the policy's main emphasis was on strengthening local capacity and capability in order to protect vulnerable individuals from becoming radicalised and engaging in extremism.

The action plan of 2010 defined *radicalisation* as a "process

whereby a person to an increasing extent accepts the use of violence to achieve political goals", while *extreme* referred to "attitudes to use of violence" (Ministry of Justice and the Police, 2010, p. 7). *Processes* here might entail cognitive or attitudinal aspects, although the distinction between *radical* and *extreme* is not clear. Thus, the geopolitical influence of this document was visible, and it drew explicitly on other European counter-radicalisation policies in terms of simplistic and linear portrayal of the radicalisation process. Moreover, the policy outlined four major strands of preventing radicalisation, which were 1) to construct more knowledge on radicalisation issues, 2) to strengthen co-operation, 3) to strengthen dialogue, and 4) to support vulnerable and at-risk persons.

However, in 2011, Norway would experience one of the deadliest right-wing terrorist attacks globally, which, on top of the surge in Norwegian foreign fighters travelling to the Middle East, intensified the political attention on counter-radicalisation efforts. Consequently, the government released a revised action plan, a policy that built on its predecessor, yet a document that claimed to provide a more dynamic approach to prevention that was suitable for the fluid nature of violent extremism (Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2014, p. 7). The revised action plan was accompanied by 30 specific sectorial preventive strategies, many of which were aimed at practitioners in public sector services. With the intensified problem of foreign fighters travelling from Norway to the Middle East, a number of cities were also instructed to implement local preventive efforts (Office of the Prime Minister, 2014).

The action plan of 2014 maintained the previous definition of *radicalisation* as a "process whereby a person increasingly accepts the use of violence to achieve political, ideological or religious goals", while *violent extremism* was understood as "activities of persons and groups that are willing to use violence in order to achieve their political, ideological or religious goals" (Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2014, p. 7). Imprecise use of concepts persisted in the revised policy, especially as it applied both (Islamic) *extremism* and *violent extremism* as terms, thus, perhaps suggesting the existence of both *violent* and *non-*

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violent extremism. This certainly does not make explicit how *extremism* would differ from *radicalisation*, yet this could also be based on the underlying assumption that all Islamic extremism is essentially violent.

This action plan identified three main challenges to prevention: 1) the emergence of the Internet and social media as a virtual arena for radicalisation, 2) global circumstances that had gained considerable influence over the threat situation, and 3) the risk of increased polarisation between different groups. Thus, there seemed to be greater acknowledgement of global factors for terrorism. However, this action plan, alongside the national guidelines that were published the following year (Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2015, p. 18), described preventions grounded foremost on the principle of identifying the young who are vulnerable to radicalisation and intervening in their cases.

Turning the attention towards the preventive expectations that are now bestowed on educators and social educators in Norway, there are currently no specific measures in place in the educational system. This could be down to the prevailing assumption that, for schools and universities, the responsibility is foremost to safeguard students, while preserving and developing democracy (Sivenbring & Malmros, 2020). Thus, the most important preventive task for Norwegian education seems to be related to helping students in the development of their political orientations and behaviours in support of human rights and peace, which is conducive to Norway's core educational ideals (Solerød, 2005).

Because of the growing focus on safeguarding young people's well-being, schools in Norway are also expected to identify and intervene in risk factors for antisocial behaviours or disadvantageous situations that are associated with violent extremism (Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2014). As argued by Sivenbring and Malmros (2020), on one hand, schools are now supposed to build trust and strengthen and reinforce democracy. On the other hand, schools are also supposed to use their classrooms as observatories to detect future radicals and sometimes report a crime that has not yet been committed.

Considering the rhetorical force of the radicalisation discourse

and the geopolitical assumptions that are tied to it, an important question remains as to whether the Norwegian prevention model is characterised as globally unique, especially when taking into accounts how criticisms emerging elsewhere point to how counter-radicalisation policies can be at odds with liberal, democratic and inclusive education (Taylor & Soni, 2017; Thomas, 2016). Writing specifically about the integration of counter-radicalisation policies throughout Europe, Vidino and Brandon (2012) claim that each country's political experience has been shaped by the political, cultural and legal elements unique to each society. Burgess (2009) seems supportive of such a statement, as he writes that there is no single European *security* only European *securities* (p. 310).

On this topic, Lid and Heierstad (2019) write that the Norwegian model is based on a societal crime prevention model that is grounded in the ideals and values of a democratic welfare state, which is dependent on social and political trust that is essential for democratic and stable social life. Norway, alongside the other Nordic countries, differs from the United Kingdom, where it has been made a statutory duty, upon specific authorities for sectors like education to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism (Home Office, 2015). Moreover, Solheim (2018) claims that Norway's attitude towards counter-radicalisation efforts has been marked by strong support for tolerance, democracy and openness, even after the 2011 right-wing terrorist attacks in Oslo and on Utøya Island, which was markedly different from other responses in this post-9/11 era. Additionally, Lindahl's (2017) analysis reveals that the Norwegian counterterrorism approach is based on a commitment to protect human security and human rights. In fact, Norway's role in global peace diplomacy has on several cases diverged from the "simplistic and totalising" Global War on Terror rhetoric that has been embraced in many other places (p. 536).

Perhaps there are some distinctive features in the Norwegian counter-radicalisation model. However, it might also be the case that there are common cross-national challenges with the integration of these efforts. In fact, there seems to be a habitual practice with counter-

radicalisation policies, as they appear to be transferred across states without much concern for local needs and contexts (Mattsson, 2019). Moreover, the underlying assumptions of the radicalisation discourse seem remarkably consistent in the many countries that implement these policies (Bryan, 2017). Therefore, while there is good reason to assume that Norway's counter-radicalisation approach is characterised by its own culture, political environment and legal framework, one should tread carefully with any assumptions regarding the "unique" Norwegian model, as there is reason to believe that the unintended social and cultural effects of the radicalisation discourse that has emerged elsewhere (Heath-Kelly & Strausz, 2019) might also be happening in Norway.

This study builds on and contributes to the critical focus on the securitisation of education, which has emerged in many parts of Europe, including Denmark (Kühle & Lindekilde, 2010) and Sweden (Mattsson, 2018a), yet which has only recently started to gain notable attention in Norway generally and in Norwegian education specifically.

2.9   Researching prevention efforts in Norway

The first research on radicalisation and violent extremism in Norway dates back to the late 1980s[6]. Yet, similar to the policy developments within this field, research production has been the centre of much growth during recent years. This includes theoretical and empirical research and, with relevance for this thesis, a wide range of studies focusing on societal and sectorial prevention. For instance, research in Norway has been carried out on the preventive roles of municipalities (Lid et al., 2016; Lid & Heierstad, 2019), social work (Haugstvedt, 2019), police (Gjelsvik & Bjørgo, 2019), faith-based communities (Winsvold, Mjelde & Loga, 2019) and psychological health-care (Paalgard, 2019).

Shifting the focus towards education specifically, little research has emerged from education in Norway since the government placed

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[6] This section will focus on research on counter-radicalisation efforts after 2010, for a historic overview; see Bjørgo and Gjelsvik (2015).

counter-radicalisation efforts on its agenda. The aforementioned study by Lid et al. (2016) drew on interviews with some teachers; however, the aim of this research was arguably not to describe or explain educational efforts to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism per se. Yet, this study revealed that educators are among the most important preventive actors in municipalities, that educators are ideally positioned to identify radicalising students, and that schools refer the most cases of concerns to relevant authorities (Lid et al., 2016, pp. 78, 197, 199).

Although not directly researching prevention efforts, yet still with great relevance within an educational context, an important study on the youth of Norway's capital Oslo, revealed that Muslims who had been exposed to cultural and religious harassment, were the most prone to hold the view that there is a "war" between Islam and the West. Moreover, these Muslim young people also showed the strongest support in defending the use of political violence (Pedersen, Vestel & Bakken, 2018; Vestel & Bakken, 2016). These findings cannot be used to determine the role of education in preventing radicalisation and violent extremism, but they can be used to suggest the importance of schools in preventing young lives from being disenfranchised in society. This seems particularly vital when considering how the young with extreme ideals tend to describe an educational experience of exclusion, which research in Norway substantiate studies (Vestel, 2016; PST, 2016, 2019).

A last point to be made concerns teaching about terrorism, and particularly teaching about the 2011 right-wing terrorist attacks in Norway, as research suggests that this topic is often avoided in schools, and that discussing contested subjects tends to be silenced. However, there seem to be large variations across Norwegian schools, and there is reason to surmise that personal and academic competencies among educators are important when dealing with controversial subjects and situations in schools (Anker & von der Lippe, 2016). This would indicate that educators should consider a reflexive approach so as not to shy away from talking about terrorism-related subjects in their practice.

Chapter 3: Theoretical framework

If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences
(Thomas & Thomas, 1928, p. 572).

This chapter is dedicated to discourse theory and Norman Fairclough's (2003) *dialectical-relational* analytical framework in particular. Yet, as his framework represent both theory and methodology in social science research (Fairclough, 2013), the focus will be discerned over the next two chapters. The main emphasis in this chapter is placed on theoretical and conceptual dimensions of CDA, while the next chapter will focus more on philosophy, methodology and research design. This means that the current chapter will have a larger descriptive focus and the following chapter will put more emphasis on the application of CDA.

In what follows, the rationale behind the study's discursive approach will be outlined. This leads into a discussion of discourse analysis generally, which helps to conceptualise how *discourse* is applied in the study. Thereafter, CDA and Fairclough's dialectical-relational theory are discussed more thoroughly, before attention is placed on how the CDA framework allows for analysing the mediated effects between language and social practice, that is, how discursive practices constitute and are constituted by social practices. After this, the focus shifts to how discursive orders reflect and contribute to maintaining ideological domination, which can be an important driver of social change. The chapter concludes by outlining some key criticisms of CDA.

3.1   The linguistic turn of this research

First, it seems appropriate to explain how this research evolved into a discursive study of radicalisation in the context of education. After all, the research was initially designed as a mixed-methods study, and analysing discourse was not considered a specific part of that. However,

a gradual awareness emerged as the research unfolded, an awareness of the need to focus on language in use, language users and their social contexts. This awareness became overwhelming in the data-gathering phase, thus, marking the linguistic turn of the study. Here, the *linguistic turn* is a play on words, referring to the emergence of *linguistics* as a field, which gradually (and at times somewhat reluctantly) had an important impact on the social sciences. Linguistics developed into a scholarly field in the early 20th century, partly due to the growing philosophical interests in studying language use and language users.

In this study, the decision to focus on discourse was brought about by how language and communication proved to be the master signifier for how *radicalisation* and *violent extremism* (as objects) were described by the practitioners (as subjects). In some respects, this research was always concerned with discursive questions, at least implicitly, as attention was aimed at what *radicalisation* could mean in theory and practice. It was not always the spoken word by practitioners that seemed important; often, what was not said or how something was actually said was more crucial. At other times, the rhetoric force of the radicalisation discourse was more visible in the sampling process than in the actual interviews. Moreover, how radicalisation and extremism were explicitly and implicitly framed in politics was of great interest when coming to terms with how terrorism-related subjects are constitutive of social life.

The gradual immersion in discursive theory resulted in the study moving away from the mixed-methods design, although there are still remnants of the "original project" left in this thesis. For instance, Article I has not been the subject of any discourse analysis, although its findings are brought into the overall discussion on discourse. As it stands, the path towards analysing discourse was somewhat typical for a non-linguist, and Fairclough (1992, p. 2) writes that there has been much reluctance among social scientists to recognise the importance of language. It must also be noted that this study is primarily not interested in the study of language as an *object* but in studying language as a window into social life. Yet, the following chapters aim to demonstrate how the CDA

framework can help to explain how the radicalisation discourse on a societal macro level connects with educational discourse on a micro level, and what its potential consequences are for social life.

3.2   Discourse and discourse analysis

Before shedding light on theoretical and conceptual considerations of CDA in this research, *discourse* and *discourse analysis* will be explicated in a more general sense. According to Hitching, Nilsen and Veum (2011), discourse analysis can be viewed as a wider umbrella term for different scholarly approaches to study language in practice. Following this line, language is structured according to different discursive patterns that our utterances follow when we enact them in various domains of social life. Relevant examples of domains for this research would be *education*, *politics* and *security*. Although these domains are, in some capacity, interfaced in modern society, a premise upon which this interdisciplinary study is based, they are also governed by different institutional logics, such as how they are structured as organisations, what their functions and objectives are, what interest, knowledge and values they promote, and by what authority they promote them in society (Bourdieu, 1996). The linguistic expressions that represent the social practices of these domains are often referred to as *discourses* (Fairclough, 2003), which is also how this term is understood and applied in this thesis.

Thus, discourses are language representations of social domains, or what we interpret these domains to be, which should not be understood as representations of how the real world actually is (Bhaskar, 1997). Yet, discourses in these domains are not uniform, they are heterogeneous, conflicting and can sometimes be contradictory. In fact, discourses in any given domain are the scene of power struggles where influential groups (i.e. governments, international organisations, multinational companies, religious institutions, etc.) struggle to maintain or change the hierarchy of discourses. Although discourses are believed to be relatively stable over time, they are prone to change and can sometimes cause change. So,

the general assumption that this thesis is based upon is that one can study any domain for its discursive patterns; that is, to study linguistic features of relatively stable social activities that are shared by a number of people is what Fairclough (1992) calls *discourse analysis*.

All discursive theories have roots in French post-structural theory, and Fairclough (1992) credits the French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-1984) for having played a significant role in developing discourse analysis in the social sciences. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) expand upon this by comparing and contrasting different discursive theories, which they claim can be distinguished by their theoretical and methodological boundaries, such as whether they are only occupied with discourse, or if they also include social practice in their analysis. With its inclusion of social practice in the analysis, CDA differs from many forms of discursive theories. Fairclough (2001) explains that social practice includes a range of related elements that are discrete but not fully separated from each other, in the sense that they internalise the others without being reducible to them. Examples of these elements include "physical activities, subjects and their social relations, items and objects, time and place, consciousness, values and discourse" (p. 231).

Most discursive theories share the attitude that parts of what makes the social world can be found in discourse. Leaning further on Fairclough (2003), discourse figures broadly in three ways

> First, it figures as a part of the social activity within a practice. […] Second, discourse figures in representations. […] Third, discourse figures in ways of being, in the constitution of identities – for instance the identity of a political leader such as Tony Blair in the UK is partly a discoursally constituted way of being (p. 206).

Elaborating on this, Skrede (2017) claims that discourse can be used in an abstract manner to denote meaning-making processes, where people interpret their understanding of the world, their identities and the social activities that they are engaged in. Fairclough (2003) write that discourses are important parts of social activities in which verbal and

non-verbal expressions (referred to as *texts* in CDA) display parts of social events that are mediated by our interpretation of them. Words are not only used to describe the world, but they are also vital for us to make sense of the world and enact with the world. This is discerned into three analytical stages: 1) how people produce texts, 2) texts themselves, and 3) how texts are received, including the interplay between these stages.

As mentioned, the domains of education, politics and security have situated language use that is determined by the context in which the communication takes place. With relevance for this research, one would expect a number of features in the different communicative event from, say, when a prime minister holds a speech, to when a security analyst informs about the threat of terrorism, or when an educator conducts classroom teaching. Politicians tend to be formal in their communication, while the educator is perhaps more informal and caring, and the security analyst will be likely to be more urgent in his or hers communication. Meaning making will also differ between these domains (Fairclough, 2003), which can be illustrated by how the word *safeguarding* within education is commonly used about the well-being *of* the student, while a security domain might entail a greater focus on how to safeguard society *from* the threat posed by young individuals (Davies, 2016).

Thirdly, discourse is used as a count noun to explain parts of the world that are associated with societal or macro level structures, for instance neoliberal discourse with its commitment to bringing about more efficient, competitive and standardised services (Fairclough, 2003). This is the most concrete usage in which discourse refers to a way of speaking from a particular perspective, which in this thesis is argued to be how terrorism as a phenomenon is explained, evaluated and represented through the radicalisation discourse. The application of the radicalisation discourse in this frame is associated with an assumption of how non-radical vulnerable individuals can potentially turn to terrorism and how this should be prevented. To summarise, discourses contribute to abstract personal meaning making, the construction of social and professional identities and social relations, and systems of knowledge.

3.3 Critical discourse analysis (CDA)

CDA as a discourse analytical approach emerged from a branch of *critical linguistics* (CL) in the 1970s that a group of scholars developed at the University of East Anglia (Fairclough, 1992). These scholars, most notably Roger Fowler, Bob Hodge, Gunther Kress and Tony Trew, combined critical theory from the Frankfurt School with Michael Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics' (SFL) view of language as a social act, in their study of how values, beliefs and ideology are maintained, reproduced and legitimised in social, political and historical contexts (Fowler et al., 1979). The interplay of *social science* and *linguistics* was considered an important aspect in their scholarly approach to uncover ideological structures that are placed beneath texts.

Over the years, Norman Fairclough would contribute to this merger of *social science* and *linguistics* by both criticising this branch of CL (1992, p. 29) and by expanding the focus beyond textual analysis, to show how discursive patterns are responses to different social fields. Fairclough (2003) would pay close attention to how ideology is present in language use, and he departs from a post-structuralist position when he interprets *ideology* as a different representation of aspects of the world that can contribute to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation. Thus, ideology is understood as the service of power, and discourses can be said to be ideological, if they misrepresent society to maintain their control over society (Fairclough, 1992). This shift in focus from textual analysis to include intertextual analysis coincided with the emergence of CDA, although the term *CDA* has often been used interchangeably with the term *CL*.

Wodak and Meyer (2009) argue that CDA scholars, as opposed to many CL scholars, are not primarily interested in studying linguistics per se; rather, they aim to study linguistics as part of social phenomena. Here, CDA can be used to describe both Fairclough's *dialectical-relational* discursive theory, and the broader realm of CDA approaches, which includes van Dijk's *socio-cognitive* approach, Kress and van

Leeuwen's *social semiotic* approach and Wodak's *discursive-historic* approach (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Skrede, 2017). While there are many theories of CDA, they all seem to focus on the need to study ideology, power, dominance and social change (Fairclough, 1992).

CDA is concisely summarised by van Dijk (2001) as a linguistic-discursive study of social phenomena that examines how discursive practices enact, legitimise, reproduce or challenge power abuse in social life. The main tenets of CDA were first conceptualised by Fairclough and Wodak (1997) and later summarised by van Dijk (2001, p. 353) as how

- CDA addresses social problems
- Power relations are discursive
- Discourse constitutes society and culture
- Discourse does ideological work
- Discourse is historical
- The link between text and society is mediated
- Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory
- Discourse is a form of social action

Several of these tenets are shared by other forms of discourse analysis, for instance by focusing on power-knowledge issues and social wrongs, and how underlying power relations can be found in discourse. Most discourse theories are concerned with why and how some statements are accepted by an audience, and one way to explain this is to study how social practices, which might seem natural, are in fact determined by historical, political and cultural aspects (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

CDA research also holds attributes that differ from other theories, particularly in that it views discourse as only one of many forms of social practice (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). The reasoning for centring on social practice is that is allows for an oscillation between the perspectives of *structure* and *agency* (Fairclough, 2000), and, while many discursive theories see people as determined by their structures, CDA scholars believe that people are both the "slaves" and "masters" of their language

(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 17). Accordingly, two important features with relevance for this study are how the social world cannot be reduced to our knowledge of the world and, furthermore, that researching social life cannot be reduced down to the study of language or discourse.

3.4 Fairclough's three-dimensional framework

Inspired by Michael Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), Fairclough (1992) has conceptualised a three-dimensional framework for studying discourse. Yet, as Fairclough's framework has been revised and refined many times over his long academic career (Skrede, 2014), some aspects of his theory receive more attention in this thesis. In addition, this three-dimensional framework has been eclectically operationalised in the thesis and the appended articles, particularly by integrating the textual and discursive analysis in Article III and Article IV.

Fairclough's dialectical-relational framework comprises a *textual level*, a *discursive practice* level and a *social practice* level. Fairclough now prefers the terms *social event*, *social practice* and *social structure*, although, this thesis maintains the use of the older terms. In his framework, language has three main functions: 1) an ideational function, where humans interpret our experience of inner and outer and worlds, 2) an interpersonal function, where humans interacts in social relations and 3) a textual function that weaves these two functions together. Hence, by analysing texts, researchers can make methodical claims about their functions and impacts on social life (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999).

Situated on the first level is textual analysis, which involves studying any form of verbal and non-verbal linguistic features, including visual images. Textual analysis is done in order to gain insight into how discursive processes operate linguistically in specific texts. In this study, textual analysis was carried out with the interview data, counter-radicalisation policies, media articles and other documents. Textual analysis is different from the discursive level analysis, and it can be viewed as text in context, although it cannot be separated from neither

the discursive nor the social practices (Fairclough, 2003).

The second level of analysis involves studying the discursive practice, in which one produces and consumes texts. Analysing discourse builds on textual analysis, but the main focus is to study discursive processes (speech acts) that are situated above the semiotic analysis of words and sentences. Different texts within the same chain of events or which are located in relation to the same network of social practices, and which represent broadly the same aspects of the world, differ in the discourses upon which they draw (Fairclough, 2003, p. 127). Here, the dialectical-relational CDA framework focuses on the discursive practices within a domain, what discursive orders have formed these practices, what interests they serve, and what ideological structures are prioritised over others (Fairclough, 1992). It is partly through discursive practices that social change and reproduction take place. However, it is important to note that discursive practices are impacted by other forces that are not exclusively discursive, nor can they be reduced to discourse, such as political and economic structures (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 90).

Text production

Text

Text consumption

Discursive practice

Social practice

Figure 3. Fairclough's model of CDA

The third level involves the dialectic relationship between discursive processes and relations, and how these mediates texts and social practice. For Fairclough, text analysis alone is not sufficient for discourse

analysis, as it does not shed light on the links between texts and societal and cultural processes and structures (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Consequently, CDA research combines textual analysis with social analysis, which takes into account that social practices are shaped by social structures and power relations and that people are often not aware of these processes (p. 66). The contribution of the interpretative tradition is to provide an understanding of how people actively create a rule-bound world in everyday practices (Fairclough, 1992). For instance, classroom teaching is a social practice that articulates together a particular way of using language with the social relations with students, the structuring of the classroom as a physical space, and the relationship between these elements is dialectical. Thus, social practice holds various orientations, in all of which discourse may be implicated, without having any of them being reduced to discourse (Fairclough, 2003, p. 25).

3.5   Hegemony in the order of discourse

CDA, like many discourse theories, is oriented towards the study of social change by showing how discourse not only reflects social practice: it can also shape and reshape it. The entry point for Fairclough's (2003) critical research is to analyse how domains are prone to social change by importing discourses from other domains. Fairclough (2000) adopts Bourdieu's (1996) theorisation of fields to grasp how social practices are networked within domains, for instance education, which is relatively coherent and demarcated from other social fields. Fields in this sense are seen as more or less autonomous, a key feature in societal organisation, where actors operate with different rules and expectations, while exercising different resources and constraints to their practice (capitals).

　　　The social practices in these fields are networked in a particular way that constitutes a social order, and the discursive aspects of these social orders are what Fairclough calls discursive orders (1992). Here, Fairclough borrows Foucault's (1971) concept of *order of discourse* to conceptualise how this social structuring of different discourses can

contribute towards meaning making, and Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) expand upon this by saying that

> The order of discourse is the sum of all the genres and discourses which are in use within a specific social domain. First of all, the order of discourse is a system in the sense that it both shapes and is shaped by specific instances of language use. Thus it is both structure and practice (p. 72).

For instance, the dominant historic educational discourse (and thereby practice) regarding the educator-student role within Western culture views the educator as all-knowing and authoritarian and the student as unknowing and compliant. This discourse, which is certainly found in modern educational practice, maintains an authoritarian relationship between the educator and the student (Biesta, 2010). Yet, there is also a more democratic educational discourse, where educators are expected to play down their authoritarian role and where educational practice is based on social interaction and collaboration (Dewey, 1966). Yet, another educational discourse maintains the role of individual emancipation, that is, educators must allow students to realise their potential by helping them to become autonomous and independent subjects, even if this can comes at the expense of inserting these young newcomers into existing sociocultural orders (Biesta, 2015). Yet, another discourse, one that has gained much notoriety in recent years, relates more to a therapeutic language of contagion and immunity, where the educator-student relationship resembles that of a therapist-client, where vulnerable students are the subject to rehabilitation (Biesta, 2009).

Discourses within a field like education are not considered equal, and there is potential for conflict between them (Fairclough, 2001). In fact, the philosophy of *good education* can itself be regarded as dualistic, since it integrates individual, group and societal ideals and values, which are functions that at their "extreme" ends are in conflict with each other (Biesta, 2009). However, this is also a central tenet of CDA, as it rests on a premise that, in any domain, powerful groups exercise political and

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intellectual powers and leadership that are cemented by their ideology, which is referred to as *hegemonic processes* (Gramsci, 1991). This ideological leadership is located in the orders of discourse as it reproduce and transform social structures through the exercise of power and, yet, to some extent, Fairclough (1992) is in accord with Foucault in how he views power as not only oppressive but also productive.

In CDA, power is always bound up with knowledge and it is responsible for creating our social world and how we can talk about the social world. Thus, power serves to produce the subjects we are and the objects we can know something about. Accordingly, Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) state that power can be studied in texts by showing how certain discourses are naturalised or how we take them for granted. Any naturalisation of discourse depends on legitimacy, and Fairclough (1992) believes that this can be identified, by analysing how certain social structuring of discourses may become hegemonic when they, as noted, legitimise beliefs that support suppression or domination. However, in CDA, unlike many discursive theories, hegemony can be resisted, implying that the order of discourse is not a rigid system, but subject to change springing from real interaction (Fairclough, 2003).

Furthermore, power is connected with social change, and, for Fairclough (1992, p. 85), to study social change through discourse can be performed by analysing the implicit or explicit discourse relations, such as searching for *intertextuality* and *interdiscursivity* features. *Intertextuality* is a term coined by Bakhtin (1981), which refers to how texts intentionally and unintentionally draw on or relate to other texts. Thus, it revolves around the historicity of texts or other literary devices and how they construct a relationship between texts. The term *interdiscursivity* represents a form of intertextuality that indicates how different discourses or aspects of discourses (in Fairclough's [2003] more recent writings are referred to as *discourses*, *genres* and *styles*), are articulated together by transforming the past into the present. Relevant to this study is how ideological power struggles in the discursive order may bring about a change to educational practice. Bernstein (1990) refers

to this as *recontextualisation*, a term that marks the relationship between different social practices, or how elements of one practice can be appropriated by, or relocated, in another social practice.

Thus, the integration of the radicalisation discourse in the world of education represents a potential *colonisation* of a security doctrine in education (Habermas, 1984). Borrowing further from Habermas, the logic of this security doctrine may inflict institutional authority, which can lead to a new discourse arrangement and changes to educational practice, even causing dysfunctions to social life in general. Therefore, key to interpreting the primary-data in this study is to analyse whether the radicalisation discourse is accepted or rejected by the interviewed practitioners, thus, drawing on aspects of both *hegemony* and *resistance*.

3.6 Critical considerations of CDA

Fairclough's dialectical-relational framework is naturally the centre of theoretical, philosophical and methodological criticism. One of the main criticisms directed at the CDA is its *criticality*, and it is often said that CDA is politically rather than linguistically motivated, which is demonstrated by how scholars cherry pick texts to support their existing political beliefs (Fowler, 1996). As Hitching et al. (2011) note, some believe that it is contradictory to be neutral and critical at the same time, and the mixing of description and interpretation risks making any conclusion invalid. Yet, for Fairclough (2013), the reluctance among social scientists to consider normativity is a problem, and he claims that CDA aims to integrate argumentation theory and critical analysis, thus combining normative and explanatory critique. Hence, the point is not to simply describe existing realities, but also to evaluate and assess them.

Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) state that the main problem with Fairclough's CDA is the consequences for empirical research of the theoretical distinction between the "unclear" discursive and the non-discursive elements, nor is it obvious how they influence each other, as

> [w]here does one locate the line of demarcation between two or more things that are in dialectical interplay? And how can one show exactly where and how the non-discursive moments influence and change the discursive moment – and vice versa? In specific studies, the problem often manifests itself in the presentation of the broader social practices as the background for the discursive practices (p. 89).

With relevance for this research, how does one go about differentiating between practitioners' care and concern for vulnerable young people, and, say, how the radicalisation discourse frames vulnerability as a risk factor for becoming a terrorist? According to Fairclough (2001), subjects and their social relations are non-discursive elements in social life, and the distinction between the practitioner genuine care for her student or client and the assumption that vulnerability can be a potential threat to national security interests is not easy to discern. Therefore, Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, pp. 89-90) believe that it is more convenient to treat the difference between discursive and non-discursive elements in social practices as analytical distinctions, and not as empirical ones. In practice, this may involve that the researcher points to non-discursive logics by theoretically drawing the boundary between discursive and non-discursive elements in the social practice (Fairclough, 2003).

CDA, alongside many forms of discourse analysis, is criticised for its weak understanding of "group formation, subjectivity, agency and cognition" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 34), which is a problem that Fairclough (1992) himself seems to acknowledge. Moreover, there is little regard for how texts are produced and consumed, as this is difficult to assess, since meaning making is predominantly a cognitive process (Fairclough, 2003, p. 11). To a certain degree, one can observe meaning making by looking at how research participants respond to different conversational turns during the interviews, but the capacity of CDA is often aimed at the concrete texts, this by identifying what discourses they draw on interdiscursivity, as well as how they intertextually or interdiscursively draw on other texts and discourses (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 82).

Chapter 4: Methodology and research design

Knowledge is a deadly friend, if no one sets the rules (Sinfield, 1969).

This chapter outlines the philosophy, methodology and research design in the study; it starts by introducing critical realism as a philosophy of science and by further drawing a line to *criticality* in social research. Thereafter, the study's purpose and objective will be briefly recapped, before the research design and method are outlined. Following this, attention switches to the literary and empirical corpus, which leads into different sections that discuss how this corpus was sampled, how it was analysed, and how the quality of these different processes was assessed. The chapter concludes with focusing on research ethics.

4.1 Philosophy of science

CDA is situated within critical realism, which is a branch of philosophy that is based on the ontological principle that there is a *real* world and an *observable* world. Roy Bhaskar (1944-2014) is considered the founder of critical realism, and he argued that critical realism is foremost a type of philosophical ontology with secondary epistemological consequences. Thus, critical realists interprets reality (ontology) as something that exists independently of how humans perceive it (epistemology) or independently of our theories of reality. Bhaskar (1997) believed there was a failure to distinguish between ontology and epistemology, which he called the "epistemic fallacy". The claim that there is a real world shares some similarities with post-positivism, yet, while post-positivists generally argue that it is the limitations of scientific inquiry that prohibit us from perceiving reality, realists believe that our many interpretations

allow for different understandings of the same universe (Yeung, 1997).

However, CDA also lends itself to post-structuralism in that it views discourses as ways of representing a situated view of the world (Foucault, 1971). On this, Fairclough (2003, p. 14) writes that humans perceive reality through language; this does not mean that we cannot produce knowledge of reality but that no study of a text can tell us everything there is to be said about reality. Yet Bhaskar believed that language was *real* and that discourses could have a causal effect. A realist view on causality involves showing how language in practice connects with the real world or material facts. This is illustrated through Bhaskar's (2011) multi-layered model that consists of 1) the *real layer*, 2) the *actual layer* and 3) the *empirical layer*. In this framework, these layers distinguish between *reality*, the *actual events* created by reality, and the *empirical events* that humans can experience or observe directly. Humans cannot fully apprehend reality, but its effects on the actual layer are researchable by investigating underlying social structures, which refer to mechanisms that are generated by reality (Bhaskar, 1997).

The 9/11 terrorist attacks, with the hijacking of the four planes, two of which were crashed into the Twin Towers on Manhattan, is (for most people) an example of a material fact. Yet, while the collapse of the Twin Towers is a material fact, how we produce and consume explanations for this event and their social consequences are relative. For instance, one can interpret this destruction in terms of skyscraper design safety, aviation safety, controlled demolitions or radicalised Islamic terrorists. While all these "causes" have been extensively discussed for nearly two decades, the essence of the realist perspective is that not all types of discourses carry equal weight in changing social practice (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). Concerning this study, CDA has been used to analyse what underlying powers have the greatest potential to cause social change and why, which can be illustrated through the performative power of the radicalisation discourse and how it frames terrorism and its preventions in social life and domains like education.

This connects with generality, yet differently from a post-

positivistic position, as critical realists place themselves in the theoretical middle ground (Fairclough, 2000). One needs to be clear about what is meant by *causality* in the CDA sense, as it is not based on a claim that language automatically brings about changes in people's knowledge or behaviours. Language can have a causal effect without it necessarily being a regular effect, and the assumption that this study is based upon is that language and social life are mutually constitutive.

Although ontological discussions have been de-emphasised in the appended articles, Bhaskar's (2011) model can be illustrated in the following way; the primary-data that was obtained by interviewing practitioners refers to Bhaskar's *empirical layer*. These are the observable events or, in this case, the practitioners' self-reported practices, which are formed by their *actual experiences*. Thus, the research aims to theorise about the actual experiences that have formed these self-reported practices, by analysing the discursive practices that are present in the interview data. Theorising about the discursive practices refers back to the *actual layer* (Danermark et al., 2005).

This abductive form of reasoning starts with an observation in which the researcher seeks to find the most likely explanation behind social practices (Hitching et al., 2011, pp. 18-19). Abduction raises the level of theoretical engagement beyond description of the empirical data but with an acknowledgement that the theoretical proposition is fallible (Fletcher, 2017). Hence, abduction can be seen as the inference from the best explanation or making statements based on the most plausible information at hand (Phillips, 2005). Yet, while CDA research adopts a realist philosophy, Bhaskar has stated several times that there is a need to develop the realist approach to CDA (Faure-Walker, 2019). For the purpose of this study, the critical commitment is related to describing and criticising social life, and for Skrede (2017), this connects philosophy with criticality, while shifting the focus from *is* to *ought* in research.

4.2   Approaching criticality

As noted, this research draws on *criticality* from several fields such as *security studies* (Booth, 2005), *terrorism research* (Jackson et al., 2011) and *educational studies* (Biesta, 2015). Critical research originates from the Frankfurt School of critical theory, which proposed the need to carry out research that acknowledged the reflexive role of the researcher, power-knowledge issues that focus on hidden causes and connections in social life, and the emancipatory potential of doing social research. CDA is in compliance with criticality in this Horkheimer sense, as it is both descriptive and normative (Fairclough, 1992, p. 9). Yet, this doctoral study suggests an alternative route to carrying out critical research, where the emancipatory potential lies not in the potential of freeing humans from suppression but in unsettling what can be taken for granted (Biesta, 2012). This is resonant of Foucault (1984), who viewed emancipation as a form of transgression by showing that things can be done differently, and what seems natural is not necessarily the way it should be. For Jørgensen and Phillips (2002), this requires giving people insight into the discursive practice in which they participate, and also into the social structures that are mutually constitutive by discourse.

Skrede (2014) relates normativity to the classical "is – ought" debate in social science, and he refers to Sayer (2001), who claims that critical research needs to overcome its aversion to making normative statements. It is simply not sufficient to describe cases, as researchers must also expose them to criticism. However, normativity is a subject of much concern, and some believe that it can compromise objectivity in research. Skrede (2014, p. 79) argues that this might be triggered by a tendency to confuse or conflate *objectivity* with value-neutral research and the search for true knowledge. Our perceptions are always theory-laden, and all human ideas are flawed, meaning that objectivity should refer to certain standards in research. Thus, the integration of values in social science is not a question of making unsubstantiated claims, but one where values are used to explain how some social practices do not

serve society well. Empirical findings do not by themselves determine what we ought to do by way of policy or practice (Phillips, 2005), meaning that, from a factual statement, one cannot logically deduce any conclusions regarding what one ought to do, but one can examine social practices in order to make deliberate democratic choices. Skrede (2014) refers to the critical project as founded in a realist ontology, relativist epistemology and judgemental rationality, where the aim is to further democratisation by creating awareness that discourse functions as a form of social practice (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

4.3 Research design

While this study has undergone theoretical and methodological changes through its course, it was always conceived as primary-data research. This because research on terrorism-related subjects is characterised by a dearth of empirical attention (Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Schuurman, 2018), which also seems to apply to research on counter-radicalisation efforts in education (Davies, 2018). In this context, *empiricism* is interpreted widely, including among other things, ethnographies, case studies and discourse analysis. On this, Neal (2013) reflects upon whether security scholars are too cautious to escape their theory "hats" to recognise other forms of empiricism, which he claim may allow for describing rich empirical landscapes and practices, especially when they do not fit nicely into our existing theoretical explanations (p. 44).

Considering, then, the near lack of primary-data on counter-radicalisation efforts in Norway, the purpose of this study has been to enhance our current knowledge on the intersecting of security and education, particularly by analysing empirically what discourses are present in Norwegian educational discussions and what their potential social consequences are. More specifically, the research objective was to *explore the risks and practices of integrating counter-radicalisation efforts in education*. Approaching this objective, the study applies a dynamic approach to research procedures, based on the premise of

exploring a social practice discursively (counter-radicalisation efforts). A dynamic qualitative design can be considered beneficial when the research subject is understudied or under-theorised, as it allows the researcher a higher degree of flexibility (Ragin & Becker, 1992).

The specific research design here involved three stages, as seen in *Figure 4*, with first, a literature review (Article I) being carried out. In addition to synthesising the current state of research, this review helped to formulate preliminary interview questions, based on theory. However, this theory was treated as initial theory (Fletcher, 2017). The second stage involved primary-data research, in which in-depth interviews were carried out with educators in secondary schools (Article II). These interviews were informed by the literature review; yet, themes emerging from the corpus revealed a need to expand the primary-data collection by including the narratives of social educators who are not directly involved in teaching (social workers, counsellors and health-care workers). The reason was that many educators described prevention efforts as structured in close collaboration with social educators, and, thus, interviews were carried out with educators and social educators; in total, these formed the primary-data for both Article III and Article IV.


Figure 4. Research design

The four appended articles that comprise this study have their own "sub" research focus, and they represent different stages in the research, including reviewing literature and policies, carrying out in-depth

interviews, and analysing the primary-data. An overview of this process, the four appended articles, their research sub-objectives and other important features can be found in *Table 1*.

Table 1. Overview of thesis and research articles

Research objective	To explore the risks and practices of integrating counter-radicalisation efforts in education			
	Article I	**Article II**	**Article III**	**Article IV**
Title	*Preventing extremism through education: Exploring impacts and implications of counter-radicalisation efforts*	*Preventing radicalisation in Norwegian schools: How teachers respond to counter-radicalisation efforts*	*When counter-terrorism enters the curriculum: How the global war on terror risks impairing good education*	*How the counter-radicalization discourse securitizes education and why this might not be an effective approach to preventing terrorism*
Sub-research focus	To investigate how education can contribute, if at all, to protecting young lives from radicalisation and violent extremism	To analyse how educators in Norway understand counter-radicalisation efforts, and how they describe translating these understandings into practice, under what circumstances, and why	To analyse what political, ideological or religious extremism risk signs practitioners in Norwegian schools are particularly observant of in their preventive practice	To analyse how practitioners in Norwegian schools describe being influenced by counter-radicalisation policies, and what preventive expectations are now placed upon them
Research type	Literature review	Qualitative study (in-depth interviews)	Qualitative study (in-depth interviews)	Qualitative study (in-depth interviews)
Research context	Global	Norway	Norway	Norway
Sample	Primary-data research Peer-reviewed & non-peer-reviewed studies	Educators Non-probability sampling (convenience and snowball methods)	Educators and social educators Non-probability sampling (convenience and snowball methods)	Educators and social educators Non-probability sampling (convenience and snowball methods)
Analysis	Thematic analysis	Critical discourse analysis (CDA)	Critical discourse analysis (CDA)	Critical discourse analysis (CDA)

4.4 The literary and empirical corpus

This thesis consists of four studies, one review and three primary-data articles. Article I synthesised primary-data studies on counter-radicalisation efforts in education. Considering the lack of effect evaluations of prevention efforts, the review took an indirect route in assessing the literature, by combining research on the narratives of students and educators, to provide insight into how preventive measures

are experienced by the target audience and stakeholders (Lindekilde, 2012c). Descriptive evidence of prevention efforts was prioritised, although some theory-driven literature was included for critical discussions. A total of 23 manuscripts were synthesised in Article I.

The primary-data in Article II, Article III and Article IV was formed from in-depth interviews with practitioners. In-depth interviews were selected for their potential to provide rich accounts of the practitioners' understanding and self-reported experiences in issues of preventing radicalisation and extremism (Bryman, 2008). Interviews are less structured and rigid, while being more adaptive than standardised queries. Yin (2003) calls in-depth interviews "guided conversations", which he claims is characteristic of their usage of open-ended questions that allows participants to provide authentic descriptions. An interview guide was used (see *Appendix C*), but the participants were given an opportunity to discuss other related subjects. In practice, this flexibility enabled revisions of the interview guide, adjusting the length of interviews and shifting focus thematically when necessary.

The interviews were structured on questions concerning i) how the practitioners understood radicalisation and violent extremism as phenomena, ii) what they considered to be the underlying causes of these phenomena, iii) what risk factors for radicalisation and violent extremism they observed from a preventive lens, iv) what political, religious or ideological movements or groups they considered to constitute a threat of violent extremism in Norway, v) encounters with radicalisation and violent extremism in their professional practice, vi) how they described handling educational prevention in practice, vii) the extent to which they described having knowledge of Norwegian counter-radicalisation policies, and viii) being influenced by political rhetoric.

The methodological reasoning for focusing on educators and social educators in this qualitative study is how this approach constitutes an indirect route to analyse counter-radicalisation efforts in education. Feddes and Gallucci (2015) state that, if primary-data cannot be collected directly by researching the target audience, an indirect route can be taken

that includes the social context of students as target audiences (family, educators and community). As Lindekilde (2012b) writes, such research does not aim to provide definitive answers on the effectiveness of counter-radicalisation efforts, but it may highlight how outcomes can be perverted in practice. Critical research is arguably just as interested, if not more, in the possible unintended effects of social practices (Skrede, 2017). For the purpose of this study, while some attention is focused on what can be described as policy-relevant issues, by theorising about the preventive potential of education, the research mainly conforms to the CDA principle of studying social problems (van Dijk, 2001).

4.5   Sampling the data

Sampling relates to the question of representation, and, while most social enquiries depend on a selection of participants or items for analysis, the term has traditionally referred to whether findings can be generalised to the larger population or body of work that the selection represents (Silverman, 2015). In that respect, sampling plays an important role in systematic reviews, randomised controlled trials and survey research, but it is also integral within qualitative research traditions (Yin, 2003).

Literature for Article I was sampled by utilising principles of realist review methodology (Gielen, 2019), most notably in that both peer-reviewed and non-peer-reviewed studies were considered, including journal articles, conference papers, evaluation studies and research reports. Being guided by realist methodology principles meant that no hierarchy was attributed to the quality of studies in which randomised controlled primary-data research was considered the best. Searches for literature were set from 2001-2018, and research from all levels of education and from different parts of the world were included.

The sampling of participants for the interviews was carried out with the use of *theoretical* or *purposive sampling* (Maxwell, 2012). Purposive sampling is a form of non-probability selection, based on different traits that the participants have (Bryman, 2008, p. 375).

Interviews were carried out during 2017, and 16 of these participants were educators working in lower and upper secondary schools, while the remaining seven were social educators (see *Appendix B* for an overview of the participants). The educators came from a varied background, as this research was not primarily focused on content-specific teaching or core curricula but, rather, on *education* in a more general sense. Hence, these participants represented many different subject areas in lower and upper secondary schools. The social educators consisted of different types of social workers, counsellors and health care workers who were working in or in close collaboration with secondary schools.

Universal schooling in Norway involves compulsory education, with a duration of ten years (Solerød, 2005). The Norwegian educational system is structured into three levels: primary school, ranging from grades 1-7 (ages 6 to 13); lower secondary school, ranging from grades 8-10 (ages 13 to 16); and upper secondary school, ranging from grades 1-2 for vocational education and from grades 1-3 for general education (ages 16 to 19). Educators for the study were selected from lower and upper secondary schools (seven and nine participants), to conform to the demographics of youth extremism, which are estimated to range from the ages of 15 years upwards (Christmann, 2012; Silke, 2004). The social educators (seven participants) were selected from some of the cities and municipalities that had been instructed by the Norwegian government to implement local prevention efforts, based on their being prone to having extremist milieus (Office of the Prime Minister, 2014).

The search for participants was done by contacting the administrative level of schools, with requests being sent to school administrators, asking them to identify practitioners for the study. The rationale behind this strategy was twofold: first, getting consent to contact potential participants and, second, allowing schools to define who key experts in this context are. One advantage of this approach was obviously that it allowed easier access to research participants; yet, this may easily be outweighed by how the study became more prone to participation bias. In four cases, participants referred me to other

practitioners, which enabled snowball-sampling (Bryman, 2008).

All the participants were interviewed individually, and these conversations lasted from 45-90 minutes each. Due to the relatively large geographical distance, fourteen participants were interviewed in person and nine were interviewed by telephone. Naturally, telephone interviews represent a challenge, since it is difficult to observe directly how the practitioners respond to different conversational turns, which may have implications for the quality of the conversations. Participants were sampled from both rural and urban areas, to gather rich descriptions from different educational and geographical contexts (Beach et al., 2018). The search for participants continued until theoretical saturation was reached, that is, when findings were somewhat repetitive (Bryman, 2008).

In addition, a range of textual sources has been analysed, to explicate counter-radicalisation efforts in Norway generally and in Norwegian schools specifically. These are textual sources that have not been produced specifically for the purpose of this study (Bryman, 2008) but are preserved in such a way that they are available for analysis. This includes a fairly heterogeneous collection of texts, such as counter-radicalisation policies and guidelines, threat assessments and newspaper articles, which were chosen selectively, rather than exhaustively.

4.6   Analysing the data

The literature review presented in Article I was the subject of a thematic analysis, which is a method for identifying and interpreting patterns of meaning across texts. It was carried out on the reviewed literature by familiarising oneself with the manuscripts, before sentences and phrases were coded to describe their content. This coding constituted the primary source for developing initial themes, and, after these had been developed, the themes were the subject of revisions and explanation. Article I also utilised an intervention model as a conceptual framework for the study, meaning that literature on educational counter-radicalisation efforts was analysed with reference to the categories, *primary level*, *secondary level*

and *tertiary level*. Intervention models were utilised in recognition of how radicalisation can be complex and multifaceted processes that necessitate the application of preventions that are dependent on the context and the scale of the intensity of the problem at hand (i.e. radicalisation). This rationale rests on a belief that a single form of prevention carried out in isolation might not be efficient for all students, nor will it accommodate their heterogeneity (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016).

The analysis of the interview data followed the tradition of Fairclough's (1992) classic three-dimensional model. However, it should be noted that the analysis *draws* on Fairclough's model rather than *uses* it in any rigorous manner. For instance, close linguistic reading were not prioritised, due to the large amount of transcript data (Fairclough, 2003). Furthermore, this study relies solely on the theoretical framework of CDA, meaning that no social theories have been used to describe non-discursive elements of social practices (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). Thus, the analysis is somewhat descriptive and resembles what Skrede (2014, p. 86) calls "an analysis of a discussion". However, each of the three primary-data based studies includes a critical assessment of the discursive practices and the ideological structures that influence these practices, meaning that the analysis may be read partly as the analysis of discussions and partly as analysis of discourses.

Following Fairclough's model, the interviews were transcribed verbatim, before they were analysed on a textual level to clarify the *textual content* (2003). In practice, this was done by searching for patterns in the texts regarding how the participants described their understanding of *radicalisation*, *violent extremism* and terrorism and, further, how they narrate the preventive responsibilities of schools in accordance with these understandings. A particular focus was centred on the beliefs and assumptions that seemed to underpin the participants' descriptions, in order to gain insight into how discursive processes operate linguistically in specific texts (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

Studying the texts for their embedded meanings makes it possible to venture into the next step: to analyse the transcripts for their discursive

practice. This entails a different analytical level, as it requires going beyond the individual stories to look at the occasion as a whole (Fairclough, 1992). At this level, attention is aimed at studying how linguistic events connect different objects and subjects (Mattsson, 2018b, p. 66). Analysing the transcript data for its discursive practices is directed at analysing not only the texts themselves but also the wider social context in which they are situated. Here, the analysis was focused on the preventive discursive practices that were normalised by the language use in the texts, or how language use in the text was reinforced by different discursive actions, such as what practices were prioritised over others. Furthermore, the analysis was oriented towards identifying the *order of discourse* in the texts, which allows one to see how particular sort of texts are connected with particular forms of discursive practice.

Lastly, the analysis brought attention to the possibility of *recontextualisation* that may appear when one discursive order merges with or colonises another discourse (Habermas, 1984). Searches were performed for *intertextual* and *interdiscursive* features in the texts, which can be articulations of discursive change and help to identify expressions of *hegemony* and *resistance* (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Mattsson (2019, p. 4) argues that analysing for recontextualisation requires looking for how different texts relate to each other. Here, it was approached by focusing on the security doctrine represented by the radicalisation discourse, which falls outside the educational domain. Practically, this was done by analysing whether the main assumptions behind the radicalisation discourse might be legitimised in educational discourse, thus focusing on the possibility of a recontextualisation in educational discourse and practice (Bernstein, 1990).

4.7 Validity, reliability and generalisation

The question of how qualitative researchers can demonstrate quality in their social enquiries is heavily debated among scholars and between different social scientific fields and traditions (Seale & Silverman, 1997).

As noted by Yin (2003), qualitative research is often criticised for having less scientific rigor than quantitative studies with much of the criticism being directed at how qualitative studies lack precise measures for *validity* and *reliability* and for their insufficient ability to *generalise* beyond the specific research context in which it is situated. While there are surely many scholars within qualitative research fields who would object to using this terminology, Yin (2003) argues that these criteria for judging scientific standards are also applicable in qualitative research.

Validity is concerned with whether a measure that is devised for a concept really does reflect the concept that it is supposed to (Maxwell, 2012). This naturally relates to *reliability*, and Silverman (2015) writes that ensuring validity is an ongoing process that must underpin the entire qualitative research process. Yet, how can qualitative researchers demonstrate that the primary-data constitutes accurate representations of what they are studying? According to Hitching et al. (2011, p. 20), validity can be strengthened by making the analysis more explicit, which involves providing a transparent research design and producing a clear chain of the theoretical and empirical evidence. In this study, transparency was approached by elucidating the theoretical and methodological CDA framework and also by presenting a clear audit trail for readers to follow (Fairclough, 2003; Skrede, 2014).

Furthermore, validity may be ensured through deep saturation, to demonstrate that the applied concepts actually reflect the object of study. The empirical data in this study are layered, comprising several textual sources, which are meant to highlight the same phenomena of study from different perspectives (Maxwell, 2012). By composing the empirical corpus this way, one can more easily demonstrate that the concepts that are used actually reflect the study's focus (Skrede, 2014). However, it is important to note that the goal of combining different textual sources is not to obtain objective knowledge but, rather, to uncover a deeper understanding of the social phenomena that are studied (Weber, 2011).

Reliability has traditionally referred to whether results can be repeated if studies are conducted in similar ways between different

contexts. Considering how qualitative research and discourse analysis often utilise *contexts* as an important feature when studying social life, it would seem paradoxical to try to repeat research between contexts. In addition, no social enquiry can accurately replicate the study of human behaviours. Therefore, *reliability* in this study relates to theoretically defined cases, where ensuring reliability becomes a question of planning, executing and documenting the operationalised design (Yin, 2003).

It is sometimes argued that reliability is dependent on presenting longer quotations for the reader, since transcript data are rarely available for public scrutiny. Longer quotations have been prioritised in the three primary-data studies, yet the interview data have been translated from Norwegian to English, which, although being inspected by a native English speaker, can be a source of bias. However, it is not sufficient to reiterate what other people have said; CDA is also about prioritising certain critical questions over others. Here, the researcher must make explicit their research position, which was emphasised in *Chapter 1.3* and *Chapter 4.2* of this thesis. In addition, the contributions from both supervisors have enabled critical reflection of the work at hand.

In terms of ensuring the reliability of secondary sources like media reports and articles, it is difficult for the researcher to establish whether one is analysing how media represents a case, instead of the view of the interviewees in these respective cases (Skrede, 2014). Still, unlike naturally occurring data, these documents exists independently of the study and are publicly available for anyone to scrutinise.

Reliability will also be influenced by political, cultural and social events, and the time spent writing this thesis has seen the rise, spread, and fall of ISIS in parts of the Middle East, where many Norwegian citizens participated in civil war. Several of these individuals were later prosecuted in court as foreign fighters participating in a global terrorist organisation. Questions regarding the (re)integration of foreign fighters and their families is a heated discussion in Norwegian society. On 10 August 2019, Norway was once again struck by right-wing terrorism, when the Al-Noor Islamic Centre in Oslo was attacked by a lone gunman.

In the political realm during this research period, the Ministry of Education (2019) introduced an action plan for the prevention of violent extremism in higher education, meaning that educators on all levels of education in Norway from pre-schools to universities are now expected to contribute to preventions. These developments form part of the context of studying counter-radicalisation efforts in Norway currently, and the reliability should be considered in relation to the larger political, social and historical context in which the research took place.

Generalisation is a contested topic within qualitative research, as it raises the question of whether findings can be transferred across contexts. Yin (2003) argues that a conventional understanding of generalisation is misplaced within most qualitative research, as it is more concerned with analytical generalisations, which combine theoretical and empirical evidence in the analysis by comparing the findings from a study to previously developed theories. Obviously, the scale and nature of this study restricts the impact of its findings, and the small number of participants that were interviewed limits any generalisation. Yet, these findings draw on a given probability in a theoretically defined situation (Maxwell, 2012), and this study aims foremost to explore an important social issue, by analysing the experiences and opinions of practitioners, which at a later stage could be the subject of more precise investigations.

4.8   Research ethics

Research ethics is a prerequisite for all scientific endeavours, and although ethical requirements are a relatively new feature in the social sciences, scholars have always been faced with ethical dilemmas (Bryman, 2008). The introductory chapter of this thesis focused attention on axiological considerations and personal bias, while the methodology and research design chapter placed emphasis on criticality in social enquiries. Such issues can be regarded as *foundational* ethical principles in research (Alver & Øyen, 2007), which will vary between different scholars, fields and research subjects. These ethical principles are

perhaps not something that can be ensured in a generic sense through the use of ethical laws or guidelines alone; rather, they require a reflexive approach, with the researcher critically and intelligently contemplating his or her own perceptions and beliefs, and how they will inevitably influence the research (Douglas, 2015; Hatch, 2002).

Research ethics also relates to *procedural* principles of a more general art. Examples of this can be the use of ethical guidelines, informed consent, while providing full anonymity and confidentiality. Informed consent and protection of research participants are usually considered the most important ethical principles in research (Rhodes, 2005), and this study was conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines that are proposed by the Norwegian Research Council (2019), in questions concerning harm versus benefit. Participants were provided with an information sheet and consent form during the initial contact by phone and email (see *Appendix E*). Consent was then discussed with the participants prior to the interviews, and they were informed about the possibility to withdraw their consent during or after the interview until 31 December 2017. Full anonymity and confidentiality were provided for the participants, their students, schools and local communities, and attention was paid to how practitioners are themselves obliged to maintain confidentiality of their own students, schools and communities.

Further, the National Ethical Review Board (NSD) approved the research project prior to the data collection (see *Appendix D*), and all data have been encrypted and stored according to national guidelines. Respondent validation, which concerns both validity and ethics, has not been carried out, due to the interpretive nature of this research (Maxwell, 2012). However, I have attempted to adhere to high standards concerning foundational and procedural ethical principles through *reflexive ethics* as explained by Alver and Øyen (2007). On one hand, this was done by designing and carrying out a sound social enquiry and providing ample transparency of the study, and, on the other hand, by ensuring that the participants were protected by reflecting on questions of harm versus benefit, in order to deal with ethical dilemmas when they occurred.

Chapter 5: Findings

Exaggerated perceptions of risk can lead to inefficient or ineffective policies such as zero tolerance that do little to create a sustainably safe and secure learning environment (Borum et al., 2010, p. 34).

This chapter summarises the findings from the four studies that comprise the doctoral research in terms of the research focus that has guided each respective study (see *Table 1*). In terms of the three primary-data studies (Article II, Article III and Article IV), they are structured according to the CDA framework, which in this chapter involves focusing on the textual analysis and the discursive practice analysis. This is what resembles Skrede's (2014, p. 86) description of research that can be read as partly an analysis of discussion, and partly an analysis of discourses. A more thorough analysis of the discursive practices and the discursive orders that have formed these practices follows in *Chapter 6*.

5.1 Article I: Preventing extremism through education

Article I (Sjøen & Jore, 2019b) synthesised primary-data research that explored how education can contribute, if at all, to protecting young lives from radicalisation and violent extremism. As mentioned, this literature was not analysed discursively, but relied on principles from realist review methodology that are also placed within critical realism (Gielen, 2019). In addition, the study used an intervention model as a framework for differentiating between primary, secondary and tertiary preventions (see *Figure 5*), to embrace the heterogeneity of students as target audience and to discern non-specific from targeted interventions, depending on whether they are aimed at non-radical, radicalising or

extremist students.

Figure 5. Intervening in violent extremism

5.1.1 Towards an educational preventive framework

Article I suggested that primary level prevention is dependent on assisting young learners in developing their capability for critical thinking, moral responsiveness and civic behaviours. The study found evidence that prevention efforts require support from the target audience (Gielen, 2019), and that anti-extremist attitudes cannot be instilled from above (Thomas, 2016). Hence, counter-radicalisation efforts should be based on student-centred and bottom-up initiatives that depend on active engagement from students and other stakeholders (Aly et al., 2014).

The secondary prevention (or intervention) level of radicalisation and violent extremism extends from the use of student-centred and progressive pedagogics; however, it also includes a stronger emphasis on inclusive and relational pedagogy. Thus, the secondary intervention level

is often associated with safeguarding principles that focus on reducing the risk factors of antisocial situations and behaviours for the young. Obviously, safeguarding principles pertains to all students, yet some argue that secondary level prevention becomes foremost a question of protecting vulnerable young people (Quartermaine, 2016). Findings from Article I indicate that intervening in radicalisation and violent extremism would benefit from inclusive educational environments in combination with supportive student-practitioner relationships (Busher et al., 2017; Mattsson & Säljö, 2018; Mitchell, 2016).

Research into the tertiary prevention (or countering) level reveal a need to use student-centred and inclusive education. Moreover, there are indications that efforts to increase moral responsiveness among students can play a role in countering extremist views. However, Article I found diverging views in the literature as to whether education is the correct medium by which violent extremism should be countered. Still, it appears that key to helping students unlearn extremism is the use of relational and humanistic pedagogics, as evidence suggests that self-identified extremist young people seek supportive relationships and to be treated with respect (van San, Sieckelinck & de Winter, 2013).

5.1.2   The securitisation paradigm in education

Moving from impacts to implications, Article I argued that there is growing evidence in the literature that counter-radicalisation efforts as practised around the world are causing a shift in educational practice. This is evident by how there are increased moral and legal duties on practitioners to foresee which student will eventually become a terrorist, as opposed to helping students develop resilience against extremism by strengthening their abilities to think critically and act morally. Panjwani et al. (2018) relate this to the mainstreaming of extremism in social life, which promotes an instrumental approach, aimed at instructing the radicals to think and act in certain ways. In Article I, it was argued that research on preventions reveals a practice of drawing on vulnerability

issues, yet vulnerability in this context remains disputed, as almost any type of attitude or behaviour can be interpreted as a sign of radicalisation (O'Donnell, 2017). Approaching prevention through this lens also risks impairing the agency and autonomy of young lives, which is not conducive to democratic education. Yet, for Ramsay (2017, p. 153), there is nothing intrinsically incoherent about thinking of particular subjects as both vulnerable and a threat at the same time. For him, what is problematic for education in this securitisation context is the focus on vulnerability itself, as being vulnerable to new ideas might be said to define the very condition of being a student in the first place.

A perplexing situation appears to be present where counter-radicalisation efforts that are advanced in different educational systems around the world, in order to provide security, may implicate educational prevention in practice, perhaps even rendering them ineffective. Article I argued that there are indications that counter-radicalisation efforts are attuned to instructivist modes of learning, resembling a pedagogy of control more than a pedagogy of emancipation (Mattsson, 2018b). Furthermore, safeguarding principles in this context have proven worrisome, and students who identify as extremists often report being discriminated against in school, as they narrate an educational experience of exclusion and stigmatisation (Taylor & Soni, 2017; Thomas, 2016).

5.2 Article II: Preventing radicalisation in Norwegian schools

Article II (Sjøen & Mattsson, 2019) was based on the qualitative research carried out by interviewing 16 educators working in lower and upper secondary schools in Norway. The research constituted the first in-depth exploration of Norwegian educational counter-radicalisation efforts and focused on investigating how selected educators understood counter-radicalisation efforts, and how they described translating these understandings into practice, under what circumstances, and why. This included analysing their descriptions of radicalisation and violent

extremism, and, what they believed to be their root causes.

5.2.1 Radicalisation as a source of confusion

The educational narratives that were presented in Article II revealed that the terms *radicalisation* and *violent extremism* were related with some ambivalence, confusion and even anxiety by the participants. Yet, while the study found ambivalence, many of the participants used the concept of *radicalisation* with individuals who are pursuing societal change. *Violent extremism* on the other hand, was more closely linked with an individual's pursuit of societal change by using extreme means. Moreover, *radicalisation* was often related to attitudinal aspects, while *violent extremism* was associated with behavioural aspects. However, the study also found that these concepts were conflated by some of the educators, meaning that they were used synonymously. The conflation of attitudinal and behavioural aspects is also found in the literature, yet there is little evidence to support any causal inference between radical thinking and extreme behaviours (Crenshaw, 1981; Horgan, 2014).

Further, Article II found that most educators in the study mirrored the dominant geopolitical assumptions that radicalisation processes are individualised and linear. When asked about factors that the educators considered fostered radicalisation, a common response was that young people who were experiencing personal difficulties were at a higher risk of becoming radicalised. This meant that they viewed radicalisation and extremism as end products of having psychological problems, personal adversity, marginalisation and disenfranchisement. When asked what psychosocial factors they believed may trigger such problems, these educators mentioned different vulnerability issues, including substance abuse, identity crisis, being bullied, neglect from caregivers, learning difficulties, traumas and language barriers.

Next to that of individual vulnerability, the participants discussed the issue of social functioning, as they described their views of youth extremism as being a social issue caused by adolescents with experience

of marginalisation and exclusion. Hence, the narratives here suggest that radicalisation and violent extremism are closely linked with social mechanisms, yet they seem to focus mainly on lower socially functioning students; thus, they neglect the important role of kinship, family and friends in the radicalisation process (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2016).

Most participants did not consider adherence to any political, ideological and religious groups or movements to be a direct cause of radicalisation; rather, these were understood as factors that could reinforce radicalisation processes at a later stage. Nevertheless, some stated that they would recognise such processes through visual representations, particularly through students' religious expressions, thus, revealing an implicit link between radicalisation and religious affiliation, which will be further discussed in *Chapter 5.3*.

5.2.2   Encountering violent extremism in schools

Although Article II found some consensus among the interviewed educators on what they believed to be the root causes of radicalisation, encounters with extremist students varied across the sample. Among the 16 educators, five described having experience with extremist students within the last five years. An additional seven had encountered right-wing extremist students during the 1990s. Nevertheless, all educators explained having had personal concern regarding students whom they feared could become radicalised. However, most seemed to agree that it would be difficult or rather impossible to predict which student could turn to violent extremism, and most stated that their concern for students usually turned out to be unrelated to violent extremism in retrospect.

The geographical locations of schools and urban-rural differences were not indicative of the prevalence of extremism in this study, although some participants believed that youth extremism was probably an urban phenomenon. However, there was a difference in experiences between educational levels, as educators working in lower secondary schools (ages 13-16) had generally fewer encounters with youth extremism than

educators working in upper secondary schools (ages 16-19), which is consistent with research on extremism demographics (Christmann, 2012; Silke, 2004). Despite variations in the prevalence of youth extremism, nearly all described considerably more societal attention on terrorism-related subjects now than before. When asked to reflect on whether radicalisation and violent extremism represented urgent and new threats, most believed that this was not the case, and several claimed that youth extremism had always existed, but that it just received more press now.

5.2.3 Discerning preventive discursive practices

Moving beyond professional encounters with youth extremism, when talking about their professional responsibility to prevent students from becoming extremists, Article II found that all the educators described having a professional pedagogical duty to do so. Yet, while they all recognised a pedagogical responsibility to prevent students from becoming radicalised towards violent extremism, two broadly defined views on prevention emerged on how this should be carried out, referred to by the study as *narrow* and *wide* preventive discourses respectively.

The majority of educators subscribed to the *narrow* preventive discourse that represents a situated view, where the role of education is foremost to alleviate students' vulnerability factors regarding radicalisation. This encompasses the aforementioned factors such as students having psychological problems, feelings of personal adversity, marginalisation, deprivation and experiences of social exclusion. Hence, for these educators, counter-radicalisation efforts in schools were integrated into their general safeguarding responsibilities to protect young lives, and they narrated an educational duty that extends far beyond just preventing radicalisation. In fact, they viewed radicalisation and violent extremism as just two of many anti-social behaviours that schools must prevent. When one considers the heightened duty on schools to protect students, the ease in which counter-radicalisation efforts integrate with existing safeguarding strategies is expected. After

all, schools are no longer only a place for just transferring skills, knowledge and attitudes between generations; they are now also expected to contribute towards the psychological well-being of students.

Yet, Article II also found that a smaller segment of these educators was not convinced by the idea that schools should prevent radicalisation mainly by alleviating vulnerability factors. For these educators, overly focusing on vulnerability may distract from the basic function of education, which is to help young lives to learn, develop and socialise. As O'Donnell (2016b) states, a vulnerability approach can imply that something is wrong with students, which is a disparaging view of them. This is not to say that these educators claim that schools should take a reluctant role in preventing extremism, nor that the safeguarding of vulnerable young people falls outside their duties; rather, they viewed their role as being inclined towards the educational aim of helping young people become independent subjects, participating citizens and fellow human beings. This is arguably a wider form of prevention than the narrow vulnerability approach, as it does not regard preventions as the main objective for schools; rather, its view is that building resilience against extremism may be accomplished through a good education.

5.3 Article III: When counterterrorism enters the curriculum

Article III (Sjøen, 2019b) drew on in-depth interviews with 16 educators and 7 social educators in Norwegian schools, while focusing on what political, ideological or religious extremism risk signs these practitioners were particularly observant of in their preventive practice. The study found that most practitioners viewed Islamist and right-wing extremism as constituting the greatest threats. This concerned both the recruitment of young people into extremist milieus and the actual threat of extreme violence. While Islamist extremism was the centre of most attention, the majority were vocal about the threat of right-wing extremist violence, perhaps expectedly, considering the historic experiences with right-wing

extremism in Norway (Bjørgo, 1997; Hardy, 2019).

Further, Article III argued that the focus on Islamist and right-wing extremism can be reflected in the recent wave of extreme violence across Europe (Hegghammer, 2016), which is mirrored in Norwegian counter-radicalisation policies (Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2014). Yet, the study also found a symbiosis between Islamist and right-wing extremism, especially regarding how they seem to be consolidating the radicalisation discourse in society. It was argued that this symbiosis between different extremisms was part of a process in which extremist narratives amplify each other (Crawford, Ebner & Hasan, 2018). As such, extremist ideologies feed into one another in a cumulative way, which may foster recruitment into extremist milieus (Panjwani et al., 2018). Such cumulative extremism caused considerable concern among the participants, who stated that increased societal polarisation could stimulate even more extremism in Norway.

5.3.1 The implicit nature of the radicalisation discourse

Much like Article I, Article III stressed that the practitioners described a professional responsibility to prevent students from being radicalised towards all forms of extremism. Yet, when moving beyond the ideal educational stage in a Goodlad (1979) "sense", where inclusive values, visions and ideals exist in a more general sense, to educational practice, where pedagogy is acted out in schools, an inconsistency emerged in some of these practitioners' narratives. This was demonstrated through how several of the participants described cultural and religious markers among students as potential risk signs of radicalisation. While this study found that the research participants did not necessarily state directly that religion was a root cause of radicalisation, religious students were often seen as being at a higher risk of becoming violent extremists.

When delving more deeply into this issue, some participants drew a link between Islam and extremism, which was demonstrated by how students who exhibit religiosity could often be seen as more vulnerable

to being radicalised. There were even cases where practitioners narrated an educational practice of monitoring students almost entirely based on their showing increased cultural or religious expressions. This is troublesome, considering how the framing of students based on their religious and cultural beliefs or expressions is a stigmatising practice.

The practice of framing immigrant and Muslim students was even present during the sampling process of this study, as certain schools were suggested for participation in the research, based on them having a high prevalence of immigrant students. On four occasions, I was advised to contact practitioners working within multicultural education, introductory language training and adapted learning for immigrant students. The study argued that these situations reveal a form of cultural and religious bias that resembles what O'Donnell (2017) calls *identity prejudice*, which is not necessarily at play because people hold prejudice against Muslims personally but because this type of bias underpins the entire radicalisation discourse (Kundnani, 2009).

5.3.2   Resisting polarising and stigmatising rhetoric

Yet, while Article III suggested the existence of a discursive practice that views Muslim students as being vulnerable to radicalisation towards violent extremism, the study also found signs of resistance among these participants to the negative framing of immigrants and Muslims in Norwegian politics and media. When speaking specifically about the young in Norway, many practitioners described what they understood as the mainstreaming of divisive politics, which, in their view, could result in increased societal polarisation and stigmatisation. Within a preventive lens, divisive rhetoric may push non-radical students towards extremism (Thomas, 2016). It was argued in the study that scepticism towards divisive rhetoric ties into how terrorism-related subjects tend to evoke feelings of fear and uncertainty, which does not help to create supportive educational environments. In fact, the study argued that the existence of divisive rhetoric can impair how practitioners carry out preventions in

practice rendering them counterproductive; yet, more concerning; it may impair their ability to provide inclusive environments in schools.

5.4 Article IV: How the counter-radicalisation discourse securitises education

Article IV (Sjøen & Jore, 2019a) extends from both Article II and Article III, with its research focus set on analysing the preventive expectations that were being placed on practitioners, and the degree to which they described being influenced by these expectations. The study revealed that counter-radicalisation policies in Norway were not well known among practitioners, yet, everyday political rhetoric and media portrayal of terrorism-related subjects appeared to have a substantial influence on how the participants made meaning of terrorism-related subjects, which are prone to the influence of "sensational" political agendas that are echoed in outrageous and sensationalist media claims.

The study suggested that it was naïve to assume that these practitioners should have in-depth knowledge of policies, but this does not imply that they are precluded from how dominant political ideas construe radicalisation and its prevention in society. In fact, the *narrow* preventive discourse that was discerned in Article II was very much consistent with how counter-radicalisation policies portray radicalisation and the societal prevention of it (Kundnani, 2009; Lindekilde, 2012a). Drawing on Norwegian policies and guidelines, the proposed causes of radicalisation and violent extremism include feelings of isolation, marginalisation, past traumas and low self-esteem (Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2015). Furthermore, a prevalent claim in Norwegian policies and guidelines was that cultural diversity in Norway could lead to increased polarisation, which would "probably" fuel recruitment to extreme groups (Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2014, p. 10). Thus, the study argued that there were many implicit and explicit links between immigration, Islam and an alleged growing threat of terrorism.

Article IV tackled the question of how the dominant assumptions

of the radicalisation discourse are mirrored by most practitioners in this study, when they have limited or no knowledge of counter-radicalisation policies in the first place. Here, it was argued that the media plays an important role in framing terrorism; perhaps more than official politics does. Furthermore, the media tends to reflect the "official position" of political ideas and ideals (Jore, 2016; Larsen, 2019; Solheim, 2018), perhaps similar to the "state centrism" of *terrorism studies* (Schuurman, 2019). Hence, it was suggested in the study that the securitisation of education in Norway was, in parts, driven by how the media informs the public about security issues, which more or less mirror how the political realm in Norway portray terrorism-related subjects in society.

Although Article IV argued that counter-radicalisation policies were not well known among the practitioners, the interviews provided the opportunity to present and discuss the content of these policies with some of the sampled practitioners. Overall, the practitioners' view of policies and guidelines was that they represented vague and generic descriptions of radicalisation, violent extremism and their preventions in schools. There were even participants who questioned whether these policies could be applied in educational practice at all, perhaps unsurprisingly, as counter-radicalisation policies are criticised for being probabilistic and de-contextualised (O'Donnell, 2017). Such traits do not correspond well with what we know about efficient preventions, as there are indications that counter-radicalisation efforts require contextual and locally based measures that accommodate the heterogeneity of the target audience and other stakeholders (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2016; Gielen, 2019).

Chapter 6: Discussion

[We] will only be able to understand—and so change—the social world if we identify the structures at work that generate those events or discourses (Bhaskar, 2011, p. 2)

This chapter will discuss the main findings from the literary and empirical investigations that are structured around the study's three main research questions. As the four studies that comprise this study have their own research focus and conclusions, they will not be reproduced in detail. Instead, here follows a more thorough discussion of the four studies than was offered in the appended articles, and with reference to the primary-data articles, emphasis is placed on discerning the discursive practices that were present in each study and, also by shedding light on the discursive orders that have formed them. The chapter is based on three overarching themes that have been extracted from the study:

I. The preventive potential of good education
II. Prevention as pedagogical and cultural control
III. The Global War on Terror's effect on inclusive educational practice

The chapter is structured into five subchapters, the first three of which will address the themes listed above; the fourth subchapter highlights key research implications and, the fifth subchapter will address some of the limitations in this research.

6.1   The preventive potential of good education

This subchapter highlights the first of the three overarching themes, as it focuses on educational counter-radicalisation efforts, impacts and

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implications in a more generalised sense, meaning that the section does not have a specific discursive focus, nor is the discussion restricted to education in Norway specifically. Instead, the focus is on examining research from different educational levels, systems and countries, as provided in Article I (see *Appendix A* for a more comprehensive overview of literature on educational counter-radicalisation efforts). This subchapter consists of three parts and is based on the first research question in the study, which asked

> How can education contribute to preventing students from becoming radicalised towards violent extremism, and what are the potential implications of integrating counter-radicalisation efforts in education?

6.1.1 The preventive impact of education

The state of art of research paints a complex picture of the preventive role of education; yet, despite the lack of effect evaluations in research and, while also looking beyond the theoretical and methodological difficulties of conceptualising counter-radicalisation efforts, there are indications that some social/pedagogical approaches to prevention may work better than others will. A common theme in much of the literature is how education is described as a primary preventer of radicalisation and violent extremism. From this premise, the preventive role of schools and universities is considered the promotion of resilience against extremist beliefs and attitudes, by helping all students to develop their political orientations in support of human rights and peace (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016). In itself, this is uncontroversial, as assisting young lives on their paths to democratic and peaceful living is constitutive of education.

In this research, the term *good education* (Biesta, 2015) was used to describe social/pedagogical activities aimed at helping young learners to develop their capabilities for critical thinking, moral reasoning and their prosocial values towards citizenship and diversity. Although Article I painted a rather descriptive role of social/pedagogical approaches to prevention, there is little new in entertaining the idea that education may

perhaps contribute, by doing what it ought to do in the first place, to provide liberal, progressive and inclusive education (Kyriacou et al., 2017; Panjwani et al., 2018). Having said that, at least two elements must be expanded upon, which are how curricula activities and educational relationships should be based on student-centred pedagogies.

There are few indications in the research that prosocial ideals and values can be learned or, perhaps more importantly, that extreme ideals can be unlearned by having them instilled from above by a moralising regime (Zembylas, 2020). In fact, there is consensus that young learners should *not* be instructed to think or act in certain ways but, rather, encouraged to explore different meanings and values through student-centred pedagogics, so the students can make informed decisions themselves. Much research on counter-radicalisation efforts reveals that instructivist pedagogics are not only problematic, but there are also some indications that such approaches can be counterproductive in practice (Sjøen & Jore, 2019b, p. 7), which is reminiscent of Biesta's (2010) criticism of the traditional authoritarian logic of educational instruction.

The second element is also central to the emancipatory role of education and it relates to how an instructivist pedagogy perpetually confirms the inequality between the authoritarian practitioner and the student (Biesta, 2017). This contradicts the ideals and values of democratic education (Dewey, 1966). In the literature, a reoccurring claim is present on the need to base students' environments on authentic inclusion and support, with students recognised as human beings and treated with respect (Sjøen & Jore, 2019b, p. 8). Here, we see the notion of *subjectivity* return, or how students and practitioners should be positioned as co-subjects, based on the claim that education is not only about the "perfection of students", through their engagement with curriculum, culture and history, but also related to their existence as subjects with freedoms, rights and responsibilities (Biesta, 2017). From this premise, the importance of using inclusive social/pedagogical strategies cannot be overstated, as practitioners must show real interest in their students and engage realistically and constructively with them.

Educational prevention efforts in this manner can be linked to Johan Galtung's (1969) notion of *positive peace*, that is, how education on one hand can be used to reduce or even prevent the existence of extreme violence, while at the same time enhancing students' well-being and emancipation (Lindahl, 2017). There are indications that the most important preventive contribution in education is intimately linked with how practitioners are able to establish supportive relationships and where students have a genuine sense of belonging in an inclusive educational environment (Sjøen & Jore, 2019b, p. 11). Yet, practitioners should, as previously mentioned, not only engage with their respective students, as the effectiveness of preventions depends very much on support from other stakeholders, such as local communities, families and friends (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2016; Gielen, 2019; Stephens et al., 2019).

Moving beyond the more general preventive role of education aimed at the "entire mass" of students to discuss how education can help students to unlearn or disengage from extreme ideals and behaviours, the importance of relational and humanistic pedagogics becomes even more pronounced. This point can be used to highlight what Davies (2014a) explains as the need to explore how young people can unlearn enmity and violence. In broad strokes, this question is not restricted to education as a domain, as Bjørgo & Horgan (2009) write that there has been little attention generally on processes of disengagement from extremism.

Although there is only a small body of research that explores these questions, nearly every study seems to point in the same direction, which is how the outcomes of preventions are linked to practitioners' ability to create supportive relationships with students who exhibit extreme ideals (Sjøen & Jore, 2019b, pp. 10-11). In practical terms, this is a challenge, as it requires practitioners to be able to identify and counter the complex dimensions and processes that can turn socialised young people into violent extremists. Of course, this may result in practitioners finding themselves in a difficult space, where their personal moral stance is challenged, as they become faced with students who express extreme ideals and views, and it is important to also remember

that practitioners have a duty to protect all their students from being the targets of intolerance and hatred from extremist students.

Yet, countering violent extremism in a productive way may involve students who express extreme ideals being allowed to voice their feelings and concerns, even on contested topics, without fear of being silenced, punished or ridiculed. Thus, the preventive role of education is linked with relational care, which allows for theorising about how practitioners can use different social/pedagogical strategies as prevention efforts that are aimed at all students (primary level), potentially radicalising students (secondary level) or extremist students (tertiary level) (Sjøen & Jore, 2019b). As seen in *Figure 6*, the rationale behind the model is as straightforward as it is persuasive; practitioners must engage with radicalising and extremist students with more inclusion, tolerance and care. In fact, practitioners should increase the relational approach in respect of the growing concerns they have that a student is moving towards an extreme position (Sjøen & Jore, 2019b, p. 12).


Figure 6. Educational preventive framework

6.1.2 The preventive implications for education

However, a common and concerning theme is also present in the literature: by how the politicised assumptions that are imbedded in counter-radicalisation efforts may differently impair the functions of education. This is reflected in how the preventive logic that drives these efforts is attuned to an instructivist mode of pedagogics (Sjøen & Jore, 2019b, p. 12), while the student-practitioner relationship in counter-radicalisation efforts is increasingly being characterised as one of pedagogical surveillance and control (Mattsson, 2018b).

The problem with these vulnerability approaches is not only that they can lead to many wrongful identifications of students (O'Donnell, 2016b), but, seeing individual vulnerability as a risk factor for becoming a terrorist is worrisome, as it can stigmatise those students who suffer from personal problems. How this may serve educational practice other than to perhaps alienate these students and even discourage them from seeking help for fear of being labelled a terrorist is unknown (van San et al., 2013). Of course, there are good reasons for practitioners to have professional awareness of different vulnerability issues, not just in terms of preventing radicalisation and violent extremism, but also in a broader social and educational context. However, practitioners should tread carefully as regards the ideological assumption that terrorism is a consequence of having psychological problems (King & Taylor, 2011).

Once again, while there is much uncertainty as to whether education can prevent radicalisation and violent extremism, it can certainly be seen as encouraging that research suggests that the most appropriate approach to preventing radicalisation and violent extremism in school is through the use of progressive, liberal and inclusive pedagogics (Davies, 2018; Kyriacou et al., 2017; Panjwani et al., 2018). As argued by Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks and de Winter (2015), education cannot take a reluctant role in preventing the young from engaging in extremism, and education is, as O'Donnell (2016a) writes, "anti-extremist" by nature. However, much literature on these matters reveals

a common narrative in how prevention efforts are failing that small group of students who exhibit extreme ideals, a small group of students who often express being excluded and stigmatised in their educational settings (Sjøen & Jore, 2019b). Now, for obvious reasons, there is little ground for this or other studies to conclude that the radicalisation discourse is the cause of this educational practice of exclusion, but at the least, it is reasonable to assume that the securitisation of education is reinforcing these detrimental practices in schools. Thus, it is relevant to repeat Davies' (2008) claim that formal education is not contributing sufficiently to preventing radicalisation and violent extremism.

6.1.3 An overlooked preventive potential of education?

In an attempt to make a closing statement on the preventive potential of education, while simultaneously avoiding being too repetitious from previous sections, attention here will be directed at an issue not discussed thoroughly in this thesis so far. For it seems clear that education may very well serve another but interrelated preventive function in society, and considering the findings in this study, one can surmise that schools and universities must contribute more to reducing *fear of terrorism*, by increasing constructive *debates about terrorism*. Naturally, this relates to how terrorism-related subjects evoke strong emotions in a society that is increasingly concerned with risk and security. As previously noted, our perceptions of the dangerousness of security risks are inaccurate, yet these perceptions can, nevertheless, have a large impact on social life.

What then can education contribute, in terms of reducing the *dread risk* that terrorism constitutes in social life (Slovic, 1987), or how can practitioners help to increase constructive debates about terrorism, a subject that has consistently been at the top of public fear and concerns for decades (Jackson et al., 2011, p. 125)? This is certainly no easy task, but it does represent one of the more palpable functions that modern education can have in social life. Addressing this would require schools to be moved beyond the rhetoric force of the radicalisation discourse,

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where practitioners are removed from the unjust and futile task of having to foresee future terrorists, which can result in many wrongful identifications and other harmful practices in schools. The issue at the heart should be that schools must constitute a safe arena, where students and educators can discuss controversial issues like terrorism constructively (Miller, Mills & Harkins, 2011). For McGlynn and McDaid (2014), this does not compromise preventive impacts as

> Encouraging students to feel comfortable to challenge and explore issues around terrorism in terms of both its social and its ideological context does not have to run counter to encouraging people to identify and understand threats (p. 14).

This should not be interpreted as the idea that "anything goes in education", but it draws on the notion of *tolerance*, which Bowie (2018) describes as a practical tool, through which differences can be resolved and reasonable actions are made possible. In this context, tolerance is not an outcome of inclusive education but a precondition for it. Thus, if we accept that promoting prosocial values is a key function of education, then recognising the emotions, questions and uncertainties that students bring into education can be used as the starting point of efforts to reduce the fear of terrorism. It also requires accepting that educational practice can never be risk-free. Human interactions always come with a chance of disagreement, but that risk should be used to better the conditions for talking about controversial subjects. After all, dialogue, unlike conflict, is not about winning or losing, but about ways of relating, in which justice can be done to all the students who take part (Biesta, 2015).

There is hardly any arena that is better suited in society than education to handle these issues. Given the key functions of education, it may ideally provide an arena where young people develop peaceful cross-curricular skills, knowledge and competency that enable them to participate as informed, responsible and well-functioning members of society. Yet, education can also assist these young learners to build

resilience against suppressive worldviews and exaggerated fears of terrorism. The latter point might even touch upon what is the most important "untold" preventive potential of education, as research seems to support the idea that democracy *with* education can influence citizens' fear *of* terrorism (Christensen & Aars, 2017). This is arguably an overlooked facet within educational counter-radicalisation efforts, yet the potential is there, and it deserves to be further explored.

It is appropriate to reference Albert Bandura at this point, after all, he is one of the few scholars who has significantly influenced both fields of *educational studies* and *terrorism research*. Writing explicitly about the dilemma of justifying security measures, Bandura (1990) argues that society is faced with a dual task: the first is to reduce violent acts, and the second is to reduce the fear of violence. There should be little doubt that Bandura considers the latter task to be more important, as terrorism fear is presumed to cause more societal harm than actual violence itself. As noted by Saeed and Johnson (2016), although intended to protect society, security measures often risk reinforcing cultures of suspicion; thus, paradoxically, they might create more insecurity.

6.2 Prevention as pedagogical and cultural control

This subchapter highlights the second overarching theme that relates to examining discursive practices of pedagogical and cultural control. It is based on the primary-data research that was carried out in Article II, Article III and Article IV. Since these studies have already been presented in terms of a textual and discursive analysis in Chapter 5, this discussion aim to provide a more thorough discussion of the discursive practices and the discursive orders that have formed these practices. This subchapter consists of three parts and is based on the second research question in the study that asked

How is the relation between education and radicalisation articulated in

educational discourses, and what discursive orders have formed these discursive practices in Norwegian schools?

6.2.1 Preventive discursive practices in Norwegian secondary schools

Article II (Sjøen & Mattsson, 2019) found that youth extremism was a limited problem in the sampled schools; yet, when faced with concerns about radicalising students, the majority of educators stated that they had adopted a *narrow* and therapeutic strategy, aimed at intervening and rehabilitating vulnerable students. A smaller segment of these educators was, however, critical of this therapeutic strategy, as they believed that it could obstruct key functions of education (Biesta, 2009). For them, preventing violent extremism in school should build on a *wider* and more indirect approach aimed at promoting civic values, human rights, critical thinking and *emancipation*, rather than profiling future terrorists.

The wide and narrow preventive discourse are contrasting (Sjøen & Mattsson, 2019, p. 16), yet they are not necessarily conflicting, and it is perhaps more constructive to view them as intersected where the wide discourse associates more with core curricula objectives, while the narrow discourse is closely related to safeguarding principles. To carry out individualised preventive strategies can be seen as a form of targeted intervention, and not necessarily in a problematic way. Still, the issue could very well be the fact that safeguarding principles within the global counter-radicalisation framework run a greater risk of being reconfigured into hard security measures that rely on profiling and controlling students (Mattsson, 2018b; O'Donnell, 2017; Taylor & Soni, 2017).

It is from this perspective that the controversial potential of the narrow discourse becomes noticeable. As Sukarieh and Tannock (2017) argue, the rhetoric force behind the radicalisation discourse is inclined to construe the social category of "youth" as a threat to security. This is problematic, and the assumption that young people are a potential threat is not only a detrimental discursive practice towards global youth, but it

can also have a social/pedagogical consequence by having practitioner overlook critical and politically engaged students, as these may now be viewed as a problem. Naturally, education has a moral responsibility to prevent young lives from becoming entangled in extremism (Sieckelinck et al., 2015), and liberal democracies may indeed resist some of the social negatives, by mobilising the public around educationally tolerant values (Christensen & Aars, 2017). However, education run arguably a greater risk of not recognising the inherent democratic value of encouraging young people who will one day shape our democracy by thinking and acting radically. Thus, passing judgement on the young for their radical views is at odds with an emancipatory education. In this regard, the wide and narrow preventive discourses can also be seen as constitutive of different orders of discourse, where the former is more closely associated with the different functions of good education, while the latter aligns with the securitisation paradigm that is the radicalisation discourse.

6.2.2   The dialectics of discourse

The narrow discursive practice contain certain language choices, such as an inherent focus on individual vulnerability as a societal risk, which align it more closely with the discursive order of the radicalisation discourse. However, it is arguably not only the securitising radicalisation discourse that advances this individualised focus, as there are clearly other rhetoric forces and ideological assumptions at play here. By analysing the orders of discourse, CDA allows for examining which discourses are present within a field, what interests they serve, and what ideological structures are prioritised over others. This can be done by analysing how discursive practices are networked together in the social ordering within a field, which draw attention to power, as some ways of making meaning are more dominant or mainstream in a particular order of discourse, while others are marginal or alternative (Fairclough, 2003).

Analysing the orders of discourse revealed not only the presence of the *narrow* and *wide* discourses on the prevention of radicalisation and

violent extremism but also a discourse on *neoliberal governance* (Lindekilde, 2012b) and a discourse on the *therapeutisation* of education (Biesta, 2009). Hence, the popularity of the psychological well-being of students can be an example of how the discursive practice of *therapeutisation* in education is dominating other educational discourses (Durodié, 2016). This may be suggestive of a hegemonic process in the orders of discourse or a particular way of conceptualising power to universalise a particular representation of the world, namely how radicalisation is represented as an existential threat caused by vulnerable young lives. Thus, the democratic and egalitarian elements of *good education* that promote subjectification, emancipation and resilience in schools, might be coexisting with a securitisation paradigm that manifests itself in an authoritarian element of detecting and controlling students as threat objects. The latter discourse is foremost a political and ideological project that restructures social relations in accord with the security demands of the unrestrained Global War on Terror doctrine.

Any capacity to exercise hegemony depends on the degree to which one representation dominates others, yet Fairclough (2003) argues that the effectiveness of hegemonic processes links to how pervasively the meaning relations are repeated in various types of texts and how alternatives are excluded. Thus, it might be that we are witnessing the securitising radicalisation discourse colonising other discursive orders, most notably the utilitarian and instrumental discourse on *neoliberal governance*, where students can be seen as subject to state interventions that promote competition and efficiency, and also the discourse on *therapeutic* interventions, with its emphasis on student pathology.

Yet, alternative explanations for this hegemonic process should be considered, and one interesting suggestion is provided by Durodié (2016) who argues that the focus on the securitisation of education might be one-sided. He claims that there is reason to surmise that fields of security and education could be understood to overlap and interact with each other through a dialectic relationship, in which it is worth exploring

> [W]hereby the language and practice of security appear to be being transformed by certain actions and assumptions already common to the world education. Instead of asking how the new security discourse and associated legislation affect education, we will examine aspects of how […] it may rather be the therapeutisation of security that we are really observing (pp. 21-22).

The same might arguably be the case with the neoliberal discourse on governance. For Lindekilde (2012b), the popularity of the radicalisation discourse is illustrated by the ease with which it *fuses* with neoliberal governance. He argue that the preventive ideals that are embedded in the radicalisation discourse connect with the mode of regulation of neo-liberal governmentality, where the individual's free choice is made the locus of change and regulation. Yet, Lindekilde (2012b, p. 115) recognises that there are matters at play within the radicalisation discourse that might not be very consistent with the democratic ideals of changing behaviours by influencing attitudes. For instance, there is the use of harder security measures, including profiling, surveillance and zero-tolerance strategies, which are problematic social practices.

Although the radicalisation discourse, with its emphasis on individual trajectories and vulnerability factors, has become accepted in the political realm, these approaches have produced inconclusive results in terms of preventing radicalisation and violent extremism (O'Donnell, 2016b). The dominant focus on individual vulnerability as a threat to security can also lead to a new discourse arrangement, where schools become arenas for instructing students to think and behave in certain ways, so as not to become terrorists (Mattsson, 2018b). This inherent focus on vulnerable individuals tends to divert attention from structural reasons for why people commit to terrorism (Pape, 2003, 2005), thus, it removes the *political* from *political violence*. Yet, any structural reasons driving terrorists will persist and, thus, may continue to enable people to commit to political violence and terrorism (Mattsson, 2018b).

These dilemmas are arguably one of the main reasons why this study discovered resistance towards the radicalisation discourse. After

all, people do not normally turn to teaching in order to prevent terrorism, and the idea of protecting the state from students may not sit easily with educators. This scepticism is mirrored in similar research (Busher et al., 2017; Kühle & Lindekilde, 2010; Mattsson, 2018a), as counter-radicalisation efforts can cause harmful and exclusionary practices that arguably do not reduce risk in schools, but may very well add to it.

6.2.3 The informal criminalisation of Islam

Article III (Sjøen, 2019b) drew on the empirical corpus from in-depth interviews with practitioners, while focusing on how young Muslims tend to be framed as vulnerable to radicalisation and violent extremism. The study found a common narrative among these practitioners as they described a need to prevent students from being radicalised towards any form of violent extremism. Nevertheless, Islamic extremism was at the centre of the greatest attention from the participants, often exemplified by how visual representations, such as students wearing Islamic clothes, were seen as at higher risk for being radicalised towards extremism. Thus, both *intertextual* and *interdiscursive* recontextualisation were found in the primary-data investigations demonstrated by how the dominant narrative aligns with the politicised radicalisation discourse in viewing Muslims as *risk groups* (Kundnani, 2009). Such a framing of young people implicitly removes Muslim students' autonomy, agency and perhaps accountability (Durodié, 2016).

Yet, there is evidence of a hegemonic struggle, as participants were critical of the stigmatising portrayals of Muslims in Norwegian politics and in parts of the media. In fact, there were concerns among many practitioners that polarising political rhetoric could affect their ability to create safe and inclusive educational environments. Hence, the study indicates that many practitioners are situated in a professional field where at least two conflicting discourses are operating at the same time, causing much confusion. According to Jørgensen and Phillips (2002), such conflicts are common, as discursive orders are not uniform but

heterogeneous. We may, therefore, interpret this as showing that many of the practitioners struggle to navigate between a discourse of inclusion and support, from the dominant logic of the radicalisation discourse that tends to frame vulnerable students and Muslim students as risk groups. Thus, the problem seems to be that the radicalisation discourse might be opposing inclusive educational values and principles in Norway.

However, it does also appear that this conflict is unconscious for many of the practitioners, and it was argued in Article III that this was caused by the fact that they do not necessarily relate the radicalisation discourse to the widely criticised Global War on Terror doctrine (Heath-Kelly & Strausz, 2019). Hence, the practitioners may not be aware of how the framing of Muslim students as being at a higher risk of radicalising than non-Muslim students is a stigmatising practice. This is because they arrive from a social/pedagogical position that focuses foremost on the well-being of their students, and not because they necessarily have any professional intention of providing homeland security. Furthermore, the radicalisation discourse seems to appeal to practitioners discursively, as it draws on their professional language of caring for and safeguarding vulnerable young people, which may explain the ease with which counter-radicalisation efforts are integrated in educational practice. In other words, any resistance to the radicalisation discourse also appears to be unconscious, as practitioners, who accept the responsibility to prevent radicalisation, are also critical of how immigrants and Muslims are framed in Norwegian politics.

Still, there should be little doubt that most practitioners view radicalisation as the master signifier of the modern terrorist, a view that is very much present in counter-radicalisation policies and political rhetoric. On one hand, what is going on here may be associated with what Habermas (1984) calls the *colonisation* of local practice by a new global discourse, where the radicalisation discourse is inflicting its institutional authority and assumptions that can lead to new discourse arrangements. According to Fairclough (2003), such assumptions reduce differences, by assuming common ground in such a way that a proposed solution to

a proposed problem appears so natural that alternatives are hard to find. The underlying assumptions of the radicalisation discourse were often viewed as legitimate and natural by the practitioners, who, for the most part, appeared unaware that this discourse represents an us-versus-them thinking of Muslim and non-Muslim citizens (Kundnani, 2009).

Article III argued that the stigmatising and exclusionary framing of Muslims that has been widespread in the post-9/11 era (Thomas, 2016), was also imbedded in Norwegian policies and in political rhetoric. The national action plans and guidelines are saturated with ideological effects underneath the structures of these policies, particularly in terms of creating an intertextual link between the threat of immigration and the need for societal preparedness against Islamic radicalisation and violent extremism. For Fairclough (2003), intertextual links are effective language choices to manipulate people, as they are difficult to challenge or resist. Moreover, linking radicalisation and violent extremism to immigration and Islam is characteristic of the radicalisation discourse (Kundnani, 2009; Sedgwick, 2010), and what is "said" in political statements is always said against the background of what is "unsaid".

For instance, in the aftermath of the right-wing terrorist attack against the Al-Noor Islamic Centre in Oslo on 10 August 2019, the Norwegian Prime Minister explained that one reason for the rise of right-wing extremism in Norway was the large waves of refugees that had arrived here since 2015 (TV2, 2019). Similar claims have been repeated in policies, statements and threat assessments several times between cultural diversity, immigration, Islam and terrorism (Sjøen, 2019b, p. 173), which demonstrates intertextual tendencies, as it relates the causes of terrorism to an increasingly multicultural Norwegian society.

Yet, Article III raised several problems with these political language choices. First, the assumption of what is "said" about how the growth of right-wing extremism can be triggered by the wave of refugees coming to Norway, can be measured against what is "unsaid" with this assumption, namely that right-wing extremism may not exist without the presence of immigrants. Naturally, this reveals both ahistoricity and

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acontextuality, as Norway has a rather extensive history of right-wing extremism that long precedes 2015 (Bjørgo, 1997). Secondly, and certainly of more concern, this political statement can be interpreted in such a way that, even when Muslims in Norway are the victims of extreme violence, they are simultaneously framed as one of the main causes of this violence. Thirdly, yet by no means very surprising, there is little regard in policies or politics for the fact that the political realm can itself be a source of societal polarisation and conflict, and, thus, it contradicts the fact that many practitioners describe politicians as the main drivers of societal polarisation in Norway (Sjøen, 2019a, p. 78).

6.2.4 Political expectations and educational realities

Article IV (Sjøen & Jore, 2019a) argued that counter-radicalisation policies were not well known among the interviewed practitioners; yet, political ideas that were conveyed through the media seemed to play an important role in shaping their interpretations of radicalisation and violent extremism and their preventions. While this research revealed a discursive practice, where practitioners accepted the duty to prevent students from becoming radicalised towards extremism, the sense of responsibility seemed to be directed at the well-being of young learners, more so than it resembled any response to national security interests. This is encouraging, and it resonates with the state of research and how it accentuates the importance of student-centred education (Davies, 2016). It is useful to return to the claim that the civic and moral virtues of democratic education can be a powerful antidote to extremism.

Nevertheless, these findings are indicative of a securitisation of counter-radicalisation efforts in Norwegian schools (Buzan et al., 1998), meaning that the practitioners appear to have accepted the dominant political framing of radical youth as a potential threat. Yet, it remains unclear whether, at the current stage, we can claim that the government has successfully implemented *exceptional emergency measures* in Norwegian schools. After all, the professional narrative that emerged

from the interviews was that any prevention should be grounded in relational pedagogy, social interaction and the genuine safeguarding of students, and not in the use of surveillance, monitoring and control.

Still, a discursive practice was also present in the practitioners' narratives, as the study discovered that some of the informants were apprehensive about how they could be held accountable for students committing extreme violence. This may suggest the influence of risk society thinking (Beck, 1992), where social life is continuously organised in response to risks, and where new sectors are systematically integrated into security efforts. It could even reveal the hegemonic power of a neoliberal discourse that prescribes changes in governing in terms of "transparency" (Fairclough, 2003). For Biesta (2015), these tendencies limit educational practice as educators are now supposed to enact their professionalism by treating students as customers, and by replacing subjective judgement with standardisation and accountability, which undermines, rather than enhances, opportunities for educational professionalism. While Article IV provides little insight into how the participants' understandings may have changed over time, several of the practitioners referred to how schools were now being instructed to focus more on preventing gang violence, school shootings and extremism.

Although all participants in the study accepted the duty to prevent young people from being radicalised and engaging in violent extremism, they had all limited awareness of national counter-radicalisation policies, as they described how political rhetoric and the media were stronger influencers on them personally. A common view on official policies (after having discussed them during the interviews) was that they were perceived as naïve, based on simple assumptions of how to handle youth disenfranchisement, and the proposed risk signs in them could in practice mean that almost any youth behaviour might be seen as a root cause of radicalisation and violent extremism. This would indicate a discrepancy between political expectations and educational realities, and, while there are elements of the radicalisation discourse integrated into the narrow discursive practice, as expressed by most practitioners in this study, it

appears unlikely that the politically envisioned counter-radicalisation efforts will have much applicational value for practitioners, or even produce the desired preventive effects in Norwegian schools (Sjøen & Jore, 2019a, p. 3979).

6.3 The Global War on Terror's potential effect on inclusive educational practice

This subchapter discusses the last of the three overarching themes and focuses attention on the possibility of recontextualisation that may appear when the radicalisation discourse merges with or colonises the educational domain (Habermas, 1984). While these processes can be both accepted and rejected, they are often seen as drivers of social change. Therefore, key to this subchapter is to discuss whether the radicalisation discourse is accepted or rejected, thus drawing further on both *hegemony* and *resistance*. This subchapter consists of three parts and is based on the third research question, which asked

> How may these discursive practices establish legitimacy in changing social practices, and how can this affect inclusive educational practice in Norwegian schools?

6.3.1 The legacy of the Global War on Terror

The Global War on Terror doctrine laid the foundation for the modern radicalisation discourse. Yet, are the Global War on Terror and the radicalisation discourse representations of similar discursive practices, and, if so, what are the potential consequences of these practices for social life? For Peter Neumann (2008, p. 4), the advent of the radicalisation discourse represented something new, and it gave scholars the opportunity to "talk about terrorism", thus, implying that the social and political climate after 9/11 had constrained much of the constructive discussions about security. Neumann (2008) believed that the hard-line counterterrorism atmosphere that was characteristic of the early 2000s

had muffled constructive discussions about terrorism, its causes and preventions. Nevertheless, as the radicalisation discourse gained currency, Neumann argued that it could shift the focus away from hardened views, by letting experts talk intelligibly about terrorism.

However, for scholars like Sageman (2014), the emergence of the radicalisation discourse did not move the field of *terrorism research* any closer to answering foundational questions about terrorism, its causes and how it could be prevented. Moreover, some are sceptical about whether the radicalisation discourse era differs substantially from the earlier periods of counterterrorism (Heath-Kelly & Strausz, 2019), as many would (and still do) contest the claim that the *radicalisation* concept represented something new that was detached from the normative and political connotations of the *violent extremist* and *terrorist* labels. In this study, the empirical findings support the claim that these terms share many of the same derogatory undertones.

Yet, while the radicalisation discourse can indeed by a rendition of the Global War on Terror, and the rhetoric force of these concepts may not have changed much, it appears that the global responses to terrorism have undergone significant change during the last decade. O'Donnell (2016a) has conceptualised this change by how, after the 9/11 attacks, counterterrorism was initially framed as a military concern, before attention on homegrown European terrorism softened up this view, by bringing greater attention to the "winning of hearts and minds" approach, which involved the promotion of democratic attitudes and values. This would lead into our current stage, where the radicalisation discourse was linked with a view on terrorists as vulnerable or deviant individuals who are in need of interventions and rehabilitation (pp. 3-5).

O'Donnell's (2016a) representation illustrates key changes to the radicalisation discourse over these last two decades; changes that might be expected, considering how the prevalence of terrorism seems unaffected by the Global War on Terror and the subsequent counter-radicalisation policies (English, 2016). However, while both the implicit and explicit solutions to terrorism have been what O'Donnell (2016a)

describes the centre of change, the main assumption of who the culprits of radicalisation and violent extremism are seems remarkably consistent throughout this period. That is, Muslims have been and remain being framed as *risk groups* (Onursal & Kirkpatrick, 2019). This derogatory framing reveals the hidden ideological assumptions of the radicalisation discourse, which Heath-Kelly and Strausz (2019) convincingly argue is not radically different from the dichotomous Global War on Terror.

This research has served to highlight potential harmful effects of a legitimisation of the radicalisation discourse, particularly as it may produce and distribute ideas that may socially and culturally exclude Muslims in Norwegian social life and education. The empirical data that were analysed in this study show intertextuality, especially by how many practitioners stated that young Muslims are more vulnerable to becoming radicalised, a sentiment clearly found in political discourse in Norway (Sjøen, 2019b). Coherence in the statement that Muslims are risk groups depends upon the assumptions that an audience brings to the process of interpretation (Fairclough, 1992), and here it points to a legitimacy for societal preparedness against threats of immigration and Islam.

Through a process of recontextualisation, certain elements of global counterterrorism ideals and assumptions appear to be dragged into the Norwegian educational system, by a strategic process of creating a hierarchy between different discourses in the order of discourse (Bernstein, 1990). The problem for education, as with other social fields, is that the preventive policies that are implemented do not make explicit the ideological assumptions that underpin them. These assumptions can be summarised in the following way: while the radicalisation discourse caters to the need for societal integration (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 486), it may be said to represent a divisive and polarising discourse, in practice, by framing Muslims as risk groups (Kundnani, 2009).

Looking to different research on these matters, there is reason to surmise that we are currently witnessing the problematic effects of this exclusionary framing in Norway, as studies suggest that Muslims sometimes turn to self-censoring practices, in fear of experiencing social

and cultural stigmatisation (Winsvold et al., 2019). Hence, it appears as if the informal criminalisation of Islam that has raised so much concern and criticism in the UK (Taylor & Soni, 2017; Thomas, 2016), and elsewhere (Lindekilde, 2012a), is now also happening in Norway. One of the most tangible forms of evidence comes from the study on Muslim youth in Oslo, who Pedersen et al. (2018) and Vestel and Bakken (2016) found, were more prone to hold the view that there is a "war" between Islam and the West, if they had been exposed to religious harassment. These Muslim students also showed the strongest support in defending the use of violence to achieve political change. Certainly, the findings from the study in Oslo cannot provide conclusions as to what may cause these attitudes, nor can they determine the relationship between radical attitudes and the potential for translating them into extreme behaviours. However, these attitudes are likely to be indicative of how negative experiences can affect attitudes, and it could be argued that the young people's narratives show how the suppressive effects of the polarising rhetoric can place Muslims in subordinate social positions.

6.3.2 Aspects of hegemony and resistance

In compliance with the CDA stance, this research argued that the radicalisation discourse is mutually constituted by the social practices that exist in Norwegian schools. This involves analysing the relationship between social practices, or how elements of one social practice can be relocated in another. In this research, interdiscursive and intertextual features has been identified, in terms of how most of the interviewed practitioners described having adopted a vulnerability approach to preventing radicalisation and extremism. Thus, the vulnerability concept in educational practice appears, as mentioned, to be colonised by a security doctrine, which may allow for a recontextualisation of counter-radicalisation efforts into educational practice. In particular, the radicalisation discourse has been found to potentially reconfigure the concept of *safeguarding*, which may be shifted from its conventional

meaning of protecting students, to creating legitimacy regarding how students who do not adapt to the ideal citizen, can be made subject to therapeutic interventions (Mattsson, 2018b; Mattsson & Säljö, 2018).

The therapeutic discourse of safeguarding vulnerable students' reinforces the existing geopolitical agenda by shifting the focus from the educational practice of emancipation towards an educational practice of controlling students that might one day threaten society. This can lead to further change in educational practice, where students are not only safeguarded for their own safety, but where the state is protected from the threat of vulnerable students. The empirical corpus comprise different textual content that seems to point in one direction. While the question of whether this framing has caused any changes to these practitioners' social practice falls outside this study, there is, as noted, concern that this particular discourse may lead to the social practice of policing students, based on cultural or religious grounds (Sjøen, 2019b).

Although there are indications that the radicalisation discourse is being recontextualised into educational practice through hegemonic processes, the interviewed practitioners also seem to be experiencing a dissonance that may constitute their social practice. This brings attention to the notion of resistance, that is, how these practitioners may consciously and unconsciously resist the dominant radicalisation discourse, which may also give some indications as to whether changes in social practice are occurring in Norwegian schools. Evidence of resistance is found in the practitioners' professional negotiation of accepting a duty to prevent vulnerable Muslim students from violent extremism and terrorism, yet, at the same time, expressing criticism of the stigmatising framing of Islam in Norwegian politics and media. Another sign of resistance pertains to how these practitioners narrate preventions grounded in the well-being of their students and not as a response to national security concerns (Sjøen & Mattsson, 2019).

Clearly, these professional narratives suggest a more complex situation in which there is resistance to the radicalisation discourse. Research presented in Article III (Sjøen & Jore, 2019a) and Article IV

(Sjøen, 2019b) suggested that this resistance remains implicit because these practitioners are relatively unaware of how the radicalisation discourse is a discourse on Islamic terrorism. This is reinforced by how counter-radicalisation policies often strategically frame prevention efforts as safeguarding, which naturalises the securitisation of education.

For O'Donnell (2017), the duty to predict future terrorists entails a form of "pedagogical injustice" for both students and educators. This unjust practice is currently being pioneered by the United Kingdom, and not in any particularly positive manner, as it was made a statutory duty for specific authorities to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism (Home Office, 2015). Placing practitioners at the frontline of predicting could-be terrorists is problematic; making it a statutory duty is not something one associates with liberal democracies. However, there is reason to conjecture that the preventive ideals that have been implemented in the UK are influencing counter-radicalisation polices across much of Europe (Bryan, 2017). Of course, this raises a host of different concerns, such as the placing of practitioners on the preventive frontline, where they are given the futile task of predicting who will eventually engage in extreme violence. Even security services cannot accurately predict who will turn to terrorism, so how can we expect practitioners to manage that very task?

Moreover, the problem with radicalisation in the context of education also concerns itself with deeper philosophical issues for practitioners. After all, critical pedagogies have long been influenced by radical theories. In fact, critical pedagogy is believed to be integral in preparing practitioners to identify and prevent harmful ideologies and educational practices (Bartolome, 2004). However, if practitioners merely comply with the securitised interpretation of *radicalisation*, they risk overlooking the rich philosophical influence that this word holds in education. Naturally, this can have practical implications, for what is deemed as radical in one context is perfectly accepted in another. So, how should one go about distinguishing between positive and negative forms of radicalisation? The distinction may be simple in policy, yet, as

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Sukarieh and Tannock (2016) write, it does not hold up in practice.

Moreover, it is ethically worrisome to hold the young responsible for the existing problems of the world. After all, this can pathologise what are essentially ordinary personal and social developments among the young. Throughout history, youth culture has been seen in opposition to parent cultures (Erikson, 1968). Yet, at present, it appears as if the radicalisation discourse is labelling vulnerable students and Muslim students as threats, thus, making them objects for interventions and control, if they do not adhere to the image of ideal citizens. In this securitised focus, the societal gaze may change from viewing students as subjects with rights, agency and capacity, to legitimising young lives being seen as threat objects that should be incapacitated by preventing their possibility to think critically and act radically.

6.4   Implications of the study

This study has sought to respond to the objective of exploring the risks and practices of integrating counter-radicalisation efforts in education. In so doing, a number of questions have been asked about the intersecting of security and education and, in particular, what preventive discourses on radicalisation are present in educational and political discussions in Norway, and how they can affect social and educational practice. Ideally, some of the answers to these questions can be of value in developing policy, practice and theory, which is the focus of this fourth subchapter.

The main purpose of this study has been to address the near lack of empirical data on counter-radicalisation efforts in Norwegian schools, and this study constitutes the first in-depth research of this subject in Norway since the government placed counter-radicalisation efforts on the political agenda. It is an exploratory study that has contributed to the empirical analysis of educational discussions and discourses, by focusing on how practitioners in Norway describe radicalisation and violent extremism and, furthermore, how these practitioners narrate the carrying out of prevention efforts in accordance with their understandings.

Among the key theoretical implications of this study is the literature review that was presented in Article I. This study argued for the need to ground counter-radicalisation efforts in genuinely good education, a claim that has been expressed previously (Kyriacou et al., 2017; Panjwani et al., 2018); yet, the study also contributes a theory-building framework on the preventive role of education. By applying a multi-levelled preventive model that aims to embrace the heterogeneity and complexity of radicalisation and extremism, the study reviewed primary-data studies to demonstrate how counter-radicalisation efforts in education should be grounded in the democratic ideals of liberal, progressive and inclusive pedagogics. This preventive model may allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the role of education, and it does so by conceptualising prevention as the increasing use of social and relational work in respect of the growing concern that practitioners may have regarding students being radicalised towards violent extremism.

The argument that radical and extremist students should be met with care, inclusion and tolerance in education seems perhaps elementary and maybe even "common sense". After all, this is what education should be providing for all students, regardless of any concern of radicalisation in the first place. Yet, as noted by Phillips (2005), research on educational practice often proves what should more or less be considered common sense; this is hardly surprising, as social science is little more than common sense, albeit a more detailed and circumstantial account of it. While this evidence is a theoretical implication, the added insight from it can affect social practice, as it demonstrates the need for practitioners to emphasise inclusivity and support in their approaches to prevention.

A second implication derives from the narratives of educators and social educators in Norway. Findings from these interviews can be used to discern different discursive practices on preventing radicalisation and violent extremism, and the study identified a wide discourse, which aligns with *good education*, and a narrow discourse that closely resembles the preventive solutions that are associated with the *radicalisation discourse*. In this sense, although the research falls short

of studying any social practice or applying macro level theories in its analysis (given its exploratory nature), the study is one of few that examine educational preventive discourses on a societal micro level. It reveals that the ideological assumptions that underpin the radicalisation discourse can place practitioners in a space of dissonance and conflict. There are at least three key challenges related to these underlying ideological assumptions: 1) the unrealistic preventive responsibilities that are placed upon them regarding the predicting of future terrorists, 2) the derogatory labelling of students who do not adapt to the image of an ideal citizen as *vulnerable* or *at risk*, and 3) the suppressive effects of the radicalisation discourse on Muslims in Norwegian society and schools.

Based on this study, it seems appropriate to suggest that society needs to abandon the futile and stigmatising task of having practitioners predict future terrorists. However, to change political or societal views on radicalisation and violent extremism and their inherent solutions is by no means a small undertaking, especially as the radicalisation discourse seems to fuse with the dominant neoliberal discourse. Yet, as Lindahl (2017, p. 530) notes, how states conduct counterterrorism changes over time, and envisioning how to get rid of the stigmatising and potentially suppressive radicalisation discourse does not require a giant leap of imagination. Considering how the practitioners in this study narrate that counter-radicalisation efforts should be grounded in relational pedagogy, social interaction and the genuine safeguarding of students, applying this is what Lindahl describes as a "proactive approach to preventions", which may actually enhance human security and emancipation (p. 528). This is also reminiscent of what Lid and Heierstad (2019) describe as how the ideals and values of the Norwegian counter-radicalisation model are based on a social crime prevention model that is dependent on human welfare, as well as societal and political trust.

Therefore, perhaps a reframing of the issue is more appropriate, that is, to create more awareness that this is a discourse on terrorism that may lead to harmful practices in education. This study contributes to this discussion by arguing that the integration of counter-radicalisation

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efforts in education generally and Norwegian schools specifically needs to be approached cautiously and critically. Overall, the findings imply that practitioners need to reflect on their professional roles so as not to let counter-radicalisation efforts impair the functions of good education.

The study could also have implications for policy, as the findings presented here indicate that security policies are not well known by sampled practitioners who, when confronted with these policies, usually describe them as having little applicational value, on the basis of their being probabilistic, generic and de-contextualised. In this sense, the study is especially timely, as the process of revising the action plan on preventing radicalisation and violent extremism in Norway is currently being undertaken. Thus, the study proposes that politicians must develop a better appreciation of the problematic experiences of counter-radicalisation efforts in educational systems elsewhere, and steps should be taken accordingly, to better understand these social concerns.

No prior in-depth study has investigated the intersecting of education and security in Norway. Thus, this work can be considered an original contribution to studying the fields of *educational studies*, *security studies* and *terrorism research*. It constitutes one of only a handful of studies that combine primary-data research on these subjects that are discursively analysed, and, consequently, this work makes a small contribution to exploring the securitisation of education from a CDA and critical realist position (Faure-Walker, 2019; Mattsson, 2018b). Although the theoretical and methodological aspects of CDA have been eclectically applied in the primary-data studies, the study has combined *description* and *critique* in the study of counter-radicalisation efforts in education, thus adhering to Fairclough's (2013) claim that it is simply not sufficient to describe existing realities, it is also necessary to evaluate and assess these efforts, with key a focus on studying *social wrongs*.

6.5 Limitations of the study

This research has yielded several interesting findings on an understudied subject in Norway, yet the implications of the study need to be considered against its limitations, to avoid over-generalising the results. However, these limitations can be used to suggest future research needs and priorities, which will be outlined in the final section of this thesis. Firstly, the empirical findings in this study are based on a small number of research participants, which obviously dictates that findings are not generalisable beyond their research context. Moreover, the scale and nature of this research, including the non-probability sampling strategy used to recruit participants, and the selective reading of policies and other documents, limit the impact of any conclusions that are drawn here.

Still, the aim of this study has foremost been to accumulate new insight into an important social issue through analytical generalisation, which at a later stage can be the subject of more precise investigations (Yin, 2003). Many of these findings do, nevertheless, confirm previous assertions about the negative consequences of securitising education (O'Donnell, 2017; Taylor & Soni, 2017), and, thus, the research should be viewed as part of a larger and important trend in the literature.

This research could also have benefitted from additional methods of data collection, including a longitudinal element. As such, the initially planned methodological pluralism could have combined exploratory and explanatory research, by using statistical inference to look at causal mechanisms of counter-radicalisation efforts. Methods' triangulation could also have helped to produce richer descriptions of these issues, for instance by applying focus group interviews and observations. Although the empirical part of this research has only focused on practitioners, since they are the most important factor governing educational practice, there is still a need to explore how these issues are experienced by students.

The research focus on practitioners has several other limitations that must be discerned. Firstly, the practitioners' narratives that were explored empirically consist of self-reported experiences, which may

represent their attitudes and beliefs rather than their actual social practices. Moreover, respondent bias may certainly have been present in the sampling process, meaning that participants who are more than averagely confident, who may have strong opinions on these issues, or who differ systematically in other ways from the target population of practitioners, may have been more willing to be interviewed.

My role as the researcher is also prone to limiting the study from its initial planning stage until the dissemination of the findings. Most of these limitations have already been discussed, particularly in terms of studying political and normative issues, the reflexive role of the researcher and the interpretive nature of this research. The cherry-picking of documents and political statements in a selective manner is another source of bias. In addition, participant expertise, or my previous background as a practitioner, may both enable and inhibit my ability to carry out critical research (Hitching et al., 2011, p. 21). Yet, CDA concerns itself with asking some critical questions over others, meaning that any conclusion will be open to a range of different interpretations, and, as researchers, we prioritise certain aspects and base our social enquiries on specific value-judgements, whether or not we are explicit and rigorous about spelling them out (Jackson, 2008). In accordance with the notion of criticality in CDA, these questions should be used to explain how some social practices do not serve society well.

Lastly, the analysing of discourse through the framework of CDA carries certain limitations, particularly in the sense that it is limited to the study of discursive practices, which could have been supplemented with a study of social practices (Mattsson, 2018b). On top of that, with this study focusing on discursive practices and potential changes to these, societal macro level theories have been neglected, which could have enabled a more thorough oscillation between the perspectives of structure and agency in the research (Fairclough, 2013).

Chapter 7: Concluding remarks

It would seem that education occupies a complex role here, being both a
cause and a result of economic progress, and yet also a source of
indoctrination (Davies, 2014b, p. 23)

The final chapter of this thesis concludes the study. Yet, as the previous
chapter has already alluded to the study's main findings, in light of its
research questions, their implications and limitations, this chapter will
briefly summarise the overarching objective of *exploring the risks and
practices of integrating counter-radicalisation efforts in education*.
Future research needs and priorities are outlined after the summary.

7.1   Summarising the doctoral study

Bhaskar (1986) argued that social enquiries should start from the point
of trying to solve a problem. The overarching objective of this study has
been to *explore the risks and practices of integrating counter-
radicalisation efforts in education*. One might, as mentioned, consider
that the problem this research aims to address is the prevention of
radicalisation and violent extremism among the young in Norway.
However, it could also be that the problem is defined as the indirect and
sometimes negative consequences of integrating counter-radicalisation
efforts in education. All interventions in social fields have unintended
consequences that may lead to detrimental practices (Phillips, 2005), and
these consequences do not have to be intended by the implementers to
warrant scrutiny (Bhaskar, 1986). Even though preventive intentions are
not negative, it does not mean that they are positive. Accordingly, the
research objective that has guided this doctoral study holds both a critical
element (*risks*) and an applied element (*practices*), which adheres to the

explanatory and normative nature of critical realist philosophy and CDA research (Bhaskar, 2011; Fairclough, 2013; Skrede, 2014).

Findings from this study can be viewed as both supportive and disruptive regarding the preventive assumptions of education. Although the state of research remains inconclusive as to whether education can prevent radicalisation and violent extremism, there is a convincing body of literature that argues for the need to base preventions on the ideals of progressive, liberal and student-centred pedagogics. However, given the complexity of radicalisation, violent extremism and their respective preventions, there is a significant risk that even the most student-centred pedagogies will not affect prevention as desired. Still, a solid argument can be made regarding the importance of using inclusivity and support and, it seems essential that practitioners utilise social and relational strategies in respect of the growing risks of radicalisation and violent extremism. Thus, exploring evidence from different educational levels and systems reveals a necessity to utilise genuinely good educational practice in the efforts to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism.

Turning to the evidence from Norwegian schools, it is obviously encouraging that the interviewed practitioners express a need to prevent radicalisation and extremism by focusing on relational pedagogy, social interaction and the genuine safeguarding of students. Moreover, it is evident that these practitioners believe that counter-radicalisation efforts must be grounded in the needs of the students, as opposed to providing security for the state. These narratives can be seen as approving of the claim to provide genuinely good education, as they describe prevention through student-centred pedagogics (Sjøen & Mattsson, 2019). Thus, research provides both encouraging and convincing evidence of what may work when approaching prevention in educational practice.

However, this doctoral study is in compliance with CDA's attempt to focus on *social wrongs* (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997), and it does so by showing how the ideological and political assumptions that underpins the radicalisation discourse may recontextualise and change educational discourse and practice in a negative way. Not only can this

securitisation paradigm impair the functions of good education, there are indications that counter-radicalisation efforts risk becoming harmful practices in schools. This is demonstrated in this study by the way most practitioners adopt the vulnerability approach to prevention, which aligns with the instructivist and controlling radicalisation discourse in geopolitics; it is also displayed through the way vulnerable students and Muslim students are often viewed by practitioners as risk groups.

Clearly, there is a dissonance between how prevention through good education is envisioned in the theoretical and empirical evidence and how the radicalisation discourse frames the causes and cures for violent extremism in educational practice globally and in Norwegian schools specifically. In fact, these different discourses do not appear to be compatible with each other. Considering, then, the implicit resistance that many practitioners describe against political polarisation and the political and negative framing of Muslims, it is rather tempting to surmise that practitioners might become stronger critics of the radicalisation discourse if they were brought to notice how it represent a stigmatising practice. Nevertheless, the radicalisation discourse appears to be quite effective, with its appeal for cultural integration, which in actuality distracts attention away from its exclusionary effects.

Whether the growing focus on radicalisation and violent extremism will bring scholars closer to answering foundational questions about terrorism (Neumann, 2008), or whether it will continue to have a "deleterious effect" on the field (Sageman, 2014), still remains to be seen. However, it does appear that the radicalisation discourse will not go away any time soon, despite the way it represent an impediment and risk to educational discourse and practice. Studying discourses can help to highlight that what makes the social world can partially be found discursively. Moreover, discursive theories are suitable for showing how some practices (counter-radicalisation efforts) that may seem natural are actually determined by historical and political aspects (the Global War on Terror and its informal criminalisation of Islam) (Kundnani, 2009).

Naturally, other discursive theories could have been used for this

purpose. Yet, CDA differs from other theories, with its view on how people are both "slaves" and "masters" of their language, implying that awareness of how discourses constitute and are constituted by social practices can help to bring about further democratisation (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Viewing practitioners as agents is in line with how Biesta through Rancière (2012) assumes the emancipatory potential of social critique, which is concerned with unsettling "what is taken for granted". Thus, the emancipatory project is not meant to solve problems for the practitioners but, rather, to do things differently, in order to show or to prove that things can be different, and that the way things are is not the way things should necessarily be. Thus, emancipation is largely a process that people do themselves, which is related to their own subjectification.

7.2   Future research needs and priorities

At the onset of this study in 2016, the amount of research on preventing radicalisation and violent extremism in Norway was scarce and scattered. Present day, however, research production in Norway and elsewhere is steadily growing. Most research on educational counter-radicalisation efforts is prescriptive, not unlike *terrorism research*, as these fields are conventionally oriented towards application. According to Davies (2018), this warrants a greater emphasis on describing the actual effects of prevention efforts. Despite the growth in research, primary-data studies are scant, although they have been on the rise since 2009 and then again from 2016 (see *Figure 7*). This coincides with the emergence of counter-radicalisation policies across Europe and the making of prevention a statutory duty in the UK. Much of this growth in primary research is owed to the advent of the *critical terrorism studies* subfield.

Naturally, research from England is overrepresented in the literature, as the UK has been pioneering counter-radicalisation policies in this post-9/11 era. Still, empirical research in England, as elsewhere, tends to be based on small-scaled exploratory studies, similar to this research, and there are few large-scale surveys and evaluation studies at

hand (Feddes & Gallucci, 2015; Gielen, 2019). This presupposes caution when attempting to draw conclusions from these studies. However, it can be beneficial to look at schools in America as they have been engaged in target hardening and other security measures for decades, and have also been the subject of more systematic research since the 1980s (Borum et al., 2010). Although political agendas can be argued to differ substantially between Europe and the USA, it is a powerful and alarming commonality that securitising education tend to suppress minorities and cause increased insecurity on both sides of the Atlantic. It seem to be the case that security measures in USA, which are implemented to help students feel safe, are actually experienced by students as a form of surveillance. Another commonality is how the increased emphasis on security can potentially compromise educational progress (Bartolome, 2004; Borum et al., 2010; Pegueor, Portillos & Gonzales, 2015).

Obviously, the extensive body of literature on the securitisation of American schools warrants greater concern for research, policy and practice, and this justifies more attention on how security measures are experienced by students in other countries. Particular attention should be aimed at students who actually adhere to different extremist beliefs, as only a handful of studies exists on this topic. Furthermore, there is a considerable dearth of empirical research on how students and educators experience prevention efforts in practice and, a greater use of methods triangulation may help to address the challenge of conceptualising radicalisation and extremism and their prevention efforts in practice.

Gender issues are almost absent in research, as are studies that include the perspectives of families, relatives and communities and, issues concerning foreign fighters, their families and how different systems approach and collaborate through prevention efforts also require more attention. This should be of great interest for policymakers, practitioners and researchers alike, particularly when contemplating the large cohort of foreign fighters and their families who are expected to (re)integrate into Western societies in the coming years.

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Part 2

Article I

Sjøen, M. M. & Jore, S. H. (2019). Preventing extremism through education: Exploring impacts and implications of counter-radicalisation efforts. *Journal of Beliefs & Values,* 40(3), 269-283

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Article II

Sjøen, M. M. & Mattsson, C. (2019). Preventing radicalisation in Norwegian schools: How teachers respond to counter- radicalisation efforts. *Critical Studies on Terrorism.*

Article III

When Counterterrorism Enters the Curriculum: How the Global War on Terror Risks Impairing Good Education

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Abstract

This article outlines and critically discusses the securitisation of the counter-radicalisation efforts in Norwegian schools. More specifically, it explores perceptions offered by educators and youth social workers through interviews with 23 practitioners on the topic of preventing youth extremism. Through the narratives of these practitioners, the paper reveals a belief that education can contribute to counter-radicalisation efforts, by focusing on relational pedagogy, social interaction and the safeguarding of vulnerable youth. Nevertheless, the article outlines a concerning discursive practice, in which young Muslims are frequently framed as vulnerable to being radicalised towards violent extremism. There is, however, evidence of both hegemony and resistance regarding the framing of Islam as a security threat, as many practitioners state that the stigmatising and polarising portrayal of Muslim youth in politics and the media can affect progressive, liberal and inclusive education. Finally, it is suggested that practitioners remain relatively unaware of how the assumption driven radicalisation discourse extends from the Global War on Terror, which is widely criticised for its informal criminalisation of Islam.

Introduction

The September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks constitute what Thomas Birkland (2004) calls a "triggering event", in the way that they brought tremendous attention to the issue of terrorism, essentially placing it at the top of geopolitical agendas. Congruously referred to as the "Global War on Terror" (Mattsson, 2018), this idiom used to describe this doctrine represents an array of security policies that have significantly influenced the way that terrorism is dealt with in politics, media and public life. Perhaps most notably through the

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construction of the "radicalisation discourse", where terrorism is portrayed as an end-product of individuals who have undergone radicalisation processes (Sedgwick, 2010). The radicalisation discourse is loaded with assumptions, and few have felt its derogatory effects more than Muslims who routinely find themselves being racially profiled or categorised as suspect communities (Kundnani, 2009). Nearly two decades after the 9/11-attacks, this framing remains profound as the securitisation of young Muslims as a social category has become all too real (Sukarieh & Tannock, 2017).

According to Silke (2008), some commentators have argued that we are, in fact, experiencing a new age of terrorism. This view, which is sometimes referred to simply as "new terrorism", sees terrorists foremost as devoted religious fanatics, who are committed to carrying out more brutal and indiscriminate violence (Laqueur, 2011). Policymakers have largely adopted this view, claiming under the pretext of counterterrorism, that urgency is the new normal, which, needless to say, requires exceptional measures (Ramsay, 2017). In this political climate, the integration, or rather "securitisation", of public sector services into the War on Terror is commonly occurring across Europe (Lindekilde, 2012a). Schools and universities are at the forefront of the securitisation of public sector services and, while an argument can be made that education should play a role in the formation of democratic attitudes in future generations, extremism-related issues are saturated with ethical, practical and philosophical dilemmas. Critics are, therefore, apprehensive about the chilling effects that the Global War on Terror with its radicalisation discourse can have on educational systems (Sjøen & Jore, 2019).

This article studies the securitisation of counterterrorism measures in Norwegian schools. By drawing on in-depth interviews with 23 practitioners (educators and social workers), the research presented in this article shows how there is an attempt to recontextualise the Global War on Terror's radicalisation discourse into educational discourse and possibly practice. Through detailed empirical research, the study pursues the question of *how counterterrorism measures can affect inclusive education in Norwegian schools.* Background questions are organised around the participants' understanding of:

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1. The political, religious or ideological movements or groups that they consider to constitute a threat of radicalisation and violent extremism in Norway.
2. The risk factors of radicalisation and violent extremism among students that they are particularly observant of in their professional preventive practice.

The research is influenced by Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as authored by Norman Fairclough (2010). A principal objective with CDA is to study how power is carried out, reproduced and legitimised by connecting power, dominance and injustice on a macro level, with language, discourse and communication on the societal micro-level (Van Dijk, 2017). This is fittingly for this research, which aims to show how counterterrorism measures are explicitly and implicitly framing Muslims in politics, media and public life, and how this may impair safe and inclusive educational environments in schools. Hence, we lean on what Lindekilde (2012b) describes as the need to understand the negative experiences of security policies, as this should be the most worrisome from a societal or policymaking position.

The present study finds that the framing of Muslims as vulnerable to radicalisation can be found in educational discourse and possibly practice, as expressed by the practitioners. Yet, there is evidence of both hegemony and resistance among these practitioners, who also state that the negative framing of immigrants and Muslims under the pretext of security can affect progressive, liberal and inclusive education. Foreseeable, as the radicalisation discourse blurs the lines between political agendas: here, national security concerns and immigration policies (Sedgwick, 2010). This blurring of lines places practitioners in the space of uncertainty, as the radicalisation discourse allegedly caters to safeguarding principles for first-line workers, while the stigmatising effects of extremism-related issues are more inclined to cause polarisation and disintegration. Thus, in the words of Heath-Kelly and Strausz (2019, p. 1), there really is nothing radically different between the criticised Global War on Terror and what appears to be a greater accepted responsibility, at least by practitioners (Sjøen & Jore, 2019, p. 8), for preventing youth from being radicalised towards violent extremism.

The counterterrorist classroom

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Historical analysis reveals that education, in its broadest sense, holds a long tradition as a promoter of peace and political stability (Sargent, 1996). This also applies in Norway, where the creation of public schools in the late 19th century was, in part, a political attempt to restrain young people from adhering to monistic or extremist doctrines (Solerød, 2005). The modern merger of counterterrorism and education, however, developed from increasing concerns about homegrown terrorism. Following the events of the 9/11 attacks and the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) bombings, a new policy field involving counter-radicalisation programmes[2] started to emerge in Europe (Lindekilde, 2012a). Driven by an innate fear of the threat from "within", European counterterrorism measures were reconfigured towards visible and overt counter-radicalisation efforts, as schools and universities were given an ever-greater responsibility to provide national security from threats of homegrown terrorists (Dresser, 2018).

Unsurprisingly, the role of educational systems as the first line of defence in counter-radicalisation efforts is a controversial subject (Gearon, 2013). Although it was envisioned, at least by policymakers, that the terms "radicalisation" and "violent extremism" would be less judgemental than "terrorism", the radicalisation discourse seems to have reinforced existing normative and political connotations of the terrorist label (Kundnani, 2009). Perhaps more concerning, the radicalisation discourse conflates non-violent political expressions with terrorism, which equates different forms of political activism with political violence (Onursal & Kirkpatrick, 2019). Moreover, placing education at the forefront of preventive efforts have revealed a host of challenges (Mitchell, 2016). For instance, education now holds the confounding role of being viewed as both the cause of and cure for terrorism, although this is certainly more the case for universities than it is for schools (Brown & Saeed, 2015). On the one hand, it seems reasonable to argue that perhaps education can and should do more to help

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[2] In this article, "radicalisation discourse" is used in respect of the prevailing belief that radicalisation comprises processes which can lead seemingly non-radical individuals towards violent extremism and terrorism (Sedgwick, 2010). "Counter-radicalisation" efforts, on the other hand, refer to the plethora of terms used to describe policies, programmes and initiatives aimed at preventing radicalisation and violent extremism (Gielen, 2017).

students unlearn, desist or disengage from extremist beliefs or behaviours (Davies, 2008). Yet, political agendas across Europe appear less attentive towards how liberal, progressive and inclusive pedagogy can be used to counterweigh extremist narratives, focusing rather on how educational institutions themselves are so-called "risky" contexts, where students might be exposed to radical and dangerous ideas (Streitwieser, Allen & Duffy-Jaeger, 2019).

Despite a proliferation of literature on counter-radicalisation efforts, the majority stemming from the UK, research on the effectiveness of such approaches in education remains inconclusive (Feddes & Gallucci, 2015; Gielen, 2017; Isabella et al., 2019; Sjøen & Jore, 2019). This comes as little surprise, as there are no rigorous effect evaluations of educational preventive efforts against radicalisation (Sklad & Park, 2017). Much has been written on the need to help students to think critically and to act morally (Davies, 2014; Miller, 2013), and there are indications that educators prefer to carry out counter-radicalisation efforts through civic education and democratic citizenship (Sjøen & Jore, 2019). This seems uncontroversial, as helping students to develop democratic and peaceful skills, competences and attitudes can fulfil key pedagogical functions in education, as well as contribute towards preventive interventions (Sklad & Park, 2017). Yet, as argued by Harris-Hogan, Barrelle and Smith (2019), there are clear limitations in the preventive expectations that are now placed on educators worldwide. Although education, as the common denominator for young people, cannot take a reluctant role in safeguarding students from a range of anti-social issues such as violent extremism, placing educators at forefront these efforts can result in wrongful identification and reporting of students. Such situations may further lead to feelings of discomfort, unsafety and exclusion for both students and educators alike. It seems that a more appropriate approach to preventing radicalisation and violent extremism in education can be achieved by facilitating learning environments and fostering social and democratic competences, which are required for "an individual to thrive in life and contribute actively in a democratic society" (Sklad & Park, 2017, p. 435). Consequently, a case can certainly be made for counter-radicalisation efforts being grounded in the different functions of what Biesta (2009) calls "good education". The securitisation paradigm that

drives these counter-radicalisation efforts is, nevertheless, more focused on the unrealistic task of having practitioners predict which of the "vulnerable" students will eventually become a terrorist (Panjwani et al., 2018).

From an educational perspective, a vulnerability approach to preventing radicalisation and violent extremism is preferred over the "vilification" of young extremists (Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks & De Winter, 2015). After all, the vulnerability approach relies on safeguarding the well-being of young lives, which, although a contested subject, is commonly applied in most Western educational systems. Yet, the vulnerability approach has its own set of challenges, and research remains inconclusive as to whether they work as intended (O'Donnell, 2016b). What is more, vulnerability factors as outlined in counter-radicalisation policies can render many types of behaviours or expressions signs of radicalisation (O'Donnell, 2017). This raises the question of support versus control, as the framing of prevention as safeguarding can result in the use of profiling and surveillance strategies (Dresser, 2018; Powell, 2016). An over focus on vulnerability approaches can also impair the agency and autonomy of those who will shape future democracy (Durodié, 2016). Yet, for Ramsay (2017), there is nothing intrinsically incoherent about thinking of particular subjects as both "vulnerable" and a "threat". What is problematic for education, he claims, is the focus on vulnerability itself, as being vulnerable to new ideas might be said to define the condition of being a student (p. 153).

Existing research in Norway, although at an early stage, indicates that first-line workers such as educators and social workers, accept the professional responsibility to preventing young lives from being radicalised towards extreme violence and terrorism (Lid et al., 2016; Lid & Heierstad, 2019; Sjøen, 2019). The preferred approach among the practitioners in this research is to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism through relational pedagogy, social interaction and the safeguarding of vulnerable youth. Thus, it would appear that the educational narrative expressed in this research aligns somewhat with how the political landscape envision prevention, as seen in national policies and guidelines.

Deep down, prevention of radicalization and violent extremism is nothing but general

crime prevention. Whether a person ends up with a substance abuse problem, as a criminal or as a violent extremist, usually happens by chance and depends on "who gets to you first". The common denominator is vulnerability (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police, 2010, p. 8)

According to Lindekilde (2012b), the logic of neoliberal governance, which decentralises governmental tasks on first-line workers, may explain the ease with which such policies are integrated into practice. Yet, practitioners in a previous study described having little direct knowledge of counter-radicalisation policies, and it appears that the "everyday" political rhetoric and media framing of security issues has a significantly greater impact on how they form their understandings (Sjøen & Jore, in press).

Lid and Heierstad (2019) reflect on the Norwegian counter-radicalisation "model" and whether it can be characterised as geopolitically unique, especially in relation to the criticised British Prevent Strategy (Kundnani, 2009). While the Norwegian government, similar to many other European countries, drew on the earlier policy contribution from the UK, counter-radicalisation policies in Norway are argued to compliment counterterrorism strategies, the latter of which should be carried out by the police, security and intelligence services. Thus, it differs somewhat from the British model, which made counter-radicalisation efforts a statutory duty under its Counter Terrorism Act (Home Office, 2015). It has also been stated that Norwegian counter-radicalisation policies build on a general crime prevention framework that is grounded in the ideals and values of a democratic welfare state (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2014, p. 13). This, writes Lid and Heierstad (2019), is a crucial feature in the Norwegian model, as efficient prevention depends on genuine social, institutional and political trust among citizens and institutions. Past studies have shown that the population responded to the Norwegian 2011 terrorist attacks with increased "tolerance, democracy and openness", which was different from recent responses to terrorist attacks in the Global War on Terror era (Solheim, 2018).

Perhaps there is some distinctiveness about the Norwegian model for preventing radicalisation and violent extremism. On this, Burgess (2009) has demonstrated that there is no European security, only European securities, each characterised by its own "national

cultures, institutional norms, political agendas, local perceptions and global needs" (p. 310). Yet, there seems to be something habitual and worrying about the integration of counter-radicalisation policies across Europe. For one thing, they appear to be driven more by geopolitical agendas than by any understanding or reflection of local needs and resources (Mattsson, 2019). Having examined media substantiation of counterterrorism measures in Norway, Jore (2016) argues that security policies are more influenced by international obligations as counterterrorism has gone from being a minuscule policy field pre the 9/11-attacks, to being described as a societal necessity and responsibility. Moreover, while democratic liberties were considered the main value when assessing counterterrorism measures in the past, such values are considered less important today (p. 111). A problematic consequence of this is shown in how the radicalisation discourse also affects Muslims in Norway, who sometimes turn to self-censoring practices in fear of experiencing social stigmatisation (Winsvold, Mjelde & Loga, 2019). This very much resembles experience from the UK, where the Prevent strategy has caused widespread informal criminalisation, targeting non-violent radicalism as if it were terrorism (Onursal & Kirkpatrick, 2019). Hence, caution should be issued in respect of any naïve assumptions about the "unique" Norwegian model and its impacts, as there is a good reason to suspect that much of the criticism that has emerged elsewhere in the world is also applicable in Norway.

Theoretical and methodological approach

This article studies the securitisation of counterterrorism measures in Norwegian schools. Based on a qualitative study carried out in 2017, the research explores how teachers and youth social workers perceive and approach the issue of preventing students from being radicalised towards extreme violence, as well as the potential risks and implications of securitising these preventive endeavours in education. The research is influenced by Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as authored by Fairclough (2010). Situated within a realist tradition, CDA draws from a school of linguistics that emerged in Britain and Australia during the 1970s, which studied

how powerful "groups" control public discourse. According to Van Dijk (2017), CDA emphasises the linguistic-discursive dimensions of social and cultural phenomena, and he sums up the core principles of CDA as the "interdisciplinary approach to study social problems by showing how discursive practices legitimise, reproduce or challenge power abuse in society" (p. 322).

Borrowing from Michael Halliday's (1925-2018) systemic functional linguistics, Fairclough (1992, 2010) has proposed the analytical approach of studying linguistic-discourse features through a three-dimensional framework. The framework comprises a "textual" level, a "discursive practice" level and a "social practice" level, although Fairclough later preferred the terms "events", "social practice" and "social structures". Analysis of the textual level involves studying any form of verbal and non-verbal linguistic features. The textual level is distinguished from the discursive level, which can be viewed as text in context (speech acts), although it cannot be separated from discursive or social practices. Discursive practices, where one produces and consumes texts are, nonetheless, also social practice. Yet, CDA differs from other discourse theories, as it views discourse as only one of many forms of social practice. Fairclough (2013) understands "social practice" as relatively stabilised forms of social activities; seeing discourse as social practice enables one to combine the perspectives of structure and action in research.

Definitional power is central in CDA, which relates to how "radicalisation", "violent extremism" and "terrorism" are defined by policymakers or other powerful groups. After all, with definitional power also comes the ability to assign solutions to what is considered a problem (Birkland, 2004). CDA is a promising tool when analysing why some solutions (i.e. counter-radicalisation efforts) are accepted by an audience. Yet, it does not aim to simply explain how discourses constitute and are constituted by social practices; CDA also offers a normative critique by showing how phenomena, which may seem natural, are in fact dependent on historical, cultural and political conditions (Fairclough, 2010). This can be achieved by demonstrating how discourses are prone to change by drawing from other discourses, either explicitly through "intertextuality" or implicitly through "interdiscursivity".

Another key concept in CDA is "recontextualisation", understood as the extrication (or "colonisation") of some parts of a text or discourse from of one domain to another (Fairclough, 2013). In this work, counterterrorism and education are understood as two different domains, each with its own discursive and social practices; this study is concerned with the recontextualisation of the radicalisation discourse into educational discourse and potential practice, and furthermore, whether the radicalisation discourse with its "apparent" solutions is accepted or rejected by the participants.

The primary data in this research is based on in-depth interviews carried out with 23 experienced practitioners during 2017. Sixteen of the research participants were educators working in lower and upper secondary schools, and the remaining seven participants were youth social workers. Practitioners were selected through non-probability sampling, with requests to participate in interviews being sent to small, medium and large schools in urban and rural places across Norway. Municipalities that had been encouraged by the Norwegian Government to introduce local action plans on the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism were prioritised in the sampling process (Office of the Prime Minister, 2014). These practitioners were selected based on them representing diverse social and pedagogical backgrounds in both lower and upper secondary schools. All the participants described incidents of personal concern of students radicalising in their professional practice, yet actual encounters with youth extremism varied across the sample. However, the sampling process in which request letters were sent to school leaders and administrators may have attracted research participants who hold strong opinions, or who are more than averagely confident about the subject at hand. Participation bias may therefore be present in this study, and this is further compounded by the small number of practitioners who were interviewed. However, the purpose of this exploratory research is to theorise about a crucial social issue, which at a later stage could be the subject of more precise investigation.

The interviews were loosely structured around an interview guide, but the participants were allowed to explore other related subjects. Findings presented in this article revolve around the main themes, namely the participants' view on 1) what political, religious or

ideological movements or groups they considered to constitute a threat of radicalisation and violent extremism in Norway, and 2) what risk factors for radicalisation among students they have particularly observed in a preventive lens. Excerpts from these interviews are marked with "interviewee" followed by a number in the article, and an overview of the research participants is appended at the end of the text. Placed within realist philosophy, this research will also attempt to explain what causes the participants' perceptions, by analysing policies, political rhetoric and media framing of these issues.

The participants were provided with information sheets and consent forms in respect of the research project, which adheres to the established ethics standards set by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD). All interviews were transcribed verbatim before being analysed on a textual and a discursive level, which, although constituting different analytical levels (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), are integrated together in the article's discussion. This article comprises three main sections. First, the empirical data exploring the two aforementioned themes are presented. Thereafter follows a section that brings attention to the hegemonic power of the radicalisation discourse, before educational resistance to the radicalisation discourse is discussed.

Safety for whom, security from what?

This study reveals a clear educational narrative on the need to prevent students from radicalising towards any form of extremism, with Islamic and right-wing extremist ideologies receiving the most attention from the participants. Previous research into this issue in Norway suggests that there are two different but educational approaches to prevention (Sjøen & Mattsson, in press). The first is a "narrow" form of prevention which sees practitioners as contributors to the alleviation of root causes of radicalisation, including feelings of personal adversity, deprivation, social exclusion, marginalisation and psychopathology. For these practitioners, counter-radicalisation efforts form part of a larger safeguarding duty aimed at protecting vulnerable students. The second and "wider" approach is aspired to by practitioners

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who see the role of schools as being more indirect arenas for prevention. They describe the vulnerability approach as verging on pedagogical control and, thus, state that the role of schools should rather be to help youth become independent subjects, participating citizens and fellow human beings. Religion is by most accounts not considered a root cause of radicalisation among most of the participants (Sjøen & Mattsson, in press), but, as will be featured in this article, when participants describe the risk factors of radicalisation they observed, increased religious and cultural markers or expressions among students are most frequently mentioned.

Participants were asked whether they considered any type of political, religious or ideological movements or groups constituted the greatest risk of attracting young lives into extremist milieus, and furthermore, what groups they perceived to pose the greatest threat of extreme violence in Norway. Broadly speaking, this question yielded two responses with the majority of participants (20 of 23) viewing a combination of Islamist extremism and right-wing extremism as the largest threats, while a smaller segment (3 of 23) focused exclusively on Islamist extremism as shown in these excerpts:

> It [terrorism] has become associated with Islam in recent years. I would like to say "obviously", as the attacks in London, Paris, and now even Sweden shows what can happen when vulnerable people are hijacked by fundamentalist religious ideas (Interviewee 17)

> Radicalisation and violent extremism are a problem that is of little relevance to us in our school. We are a small school with very few non-Western immigrants or Muslim students (Interviewee 13)

> I believe that it [terrorism] is largely caused by extreme Islamic practice. However, I also believe that Muslims are the largest victims of this religious terrorism (Interviewee 6)

Islamist ideology has been at the core of societal, political and media attention on terrorism since the 9/11 attacks, and one may certainly anticipate that many draw on the role of Islamic

extremism when discussing these issues. The majority of participants, however, acknowledged a substantial threat from right-wing extremism and midway through the interview, one educator even remarked on his own bias.

> I have been talking almost exclusively about Islamic terrorism throughout the interview, and I just realised that we [the school] were recently informed that the police had carried out a risk assessment and found that a local right-wing nationalist group constitutes the largest threat of extreme violence in this region (Interviewee 11)

Apparently, a right-wing group had established itself in the area of this participant's school; in its recruitment tactics, this extremist organisation specifically targeted young people. When asked why he would describe himself as being biased, he explained that he had not been accustomed to thinking of right-wing extremism in relation to terrorism prior to our interview, as it did not seem natural for him to associate these two issues together.

Most participants in this research, however, are quite vocal regarding the threat of right-wing extremism, as they are regarding Islamist extremism in Norway. This should come as little surprise, given Norway's historical experience with right-wing extremism (Bjørgo, 1997) and, the 2011 right-wing terrorist attacks in Oslo and Utøya (Solheim, 2018). The participants' awareness of both right-wing and Islamist extremism seems warranted; yet, according to Crawford, Ebner and Hasan (2018), there is a symbiosis between these two phenomena, which magnifies the attention on extremism in general. In particular, there are concerns that increased focus on extremism-related issues may cause societal polarisation, stigmatisation and fear. Specifically, in relation to youth, some participants consider divisive rhetoric, especially anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments, to have become more mainstream in politics, the media and public domains, and that this could affect educational inclusion and tolerance.

> A female Muslim student I know who was wearing a hijab had been harassed by an older woman on the bus. The woman had loudly declared to the girl and the rest of the passenger that come next election, the politicians would throw her "kind" out of this country (Interviewee 8)

> It is becoming increasingly difficult for immigrant students to repeatedly have to read negative stories about immigrants in the media and from politicians. Even the question of wearing a hijab has now become a question of terrorism. I have to say, I am not particularly thrilled about the way that some politicians talk about other human beings these days (Interviewee 12)

According to practitioners, polarising and stigmatising experiences like these may affect their ability to provide safe and inclusive environments (Sjøen, 2019). Safe environments here are interpreted as educational arenas, where students can discuss contested issues in a constructive way. In a preventive lens, divisive rhetoric can perhaps even push non-radical students towards extremism. Available research in Norway suggests that Muslim youths who have been exposed to harassment are more prone to holding the view that there is a "war" between Islam and the West, while also showing the strongest support in defending the use of violence to achieve political change (Pedersen, Vestel & Bakken, 2018; Vestel & Bakken, 2016).

As previously suggested, the interview data reveal an educational narrative on the need to prevent students from being radicalised into any form of extremism. Yet, when delving into the more practical sides of prevention, some participants, probably unconsciously, draw a link between Islam and the threat of terrorism, as cultural and religious markers including growing beards or wearing traditional Islamic clothing, are viewed as vulnerability factors.

> When students change their apparel and behaviours in this [religious] way, you have to be watchful of what is going on. For example, many of the foreign fighters who travelled from Norway were not deeply religious to begin with. They were perhaps struggling with personal or social problems. All of a sudden, they are dedicated Muslims with a clear purpose in their lives. These are situations where school and society have to be watchful (Interviewee 9)

> After reading the book *Two Sisters* by [Åsne] Seierstad [a book depicting how two Norwegian-Somali sisters ventured from seemingly ordinary adolescent trajectories to becoming devoted Muslims heading to Syria to aid the Islamic State in 2013], I

> realised that teachers should be much more observant of vulnerable youth who change the way they act and dress. This case shows what can happen when parents, teachers or society are not on proper alert (Interviewee 10)

Linking religious expression and vulnerability to radicalisation towards violent extremism in such a way brings to mind what O'Donnell (2017) calls identity prejudice. Although identity prejudice is not necessarily at play because practitioners hold such social stereotypes individually, it is rather because prejudice underpins the entire radicalisation discourse (p. 180). There were, rightly, some participants who had experience with students exhibiting extreme religious views in class or on social media, and one female educator talked about an encounter with a male Muslim student who did not want to participate during her teaching.

> After this situation [a male Muslim student, supported by his father, refused to participate in physical education with a female teacher], we became particularly concerned with Muslim boys who displayed certain oppositional behaviours. For instance, openly expressing anti-female or anti-gay sentiments in class or on social media has become a big "red sign" for us. While these signs are not necessarily linked to radicalisation, they are, nevertheless, issues which we have to deal with in school (Interviewee 3)

Naturally, a situation like this may warrant pedagogical actions, such as counselling, parental conversation or perhaps a referral to other relevant actors. However, there are some practitioners who describe a practice of monitoring students, almost entirely based on the latter showing (increased) cultural or religious expressions. While monitoring and profiling strategies are often placed at the centre of counter-radicalisation efforts, they are not without their own problems. For instance, they seem to place education in the space of "pre-crime" preventive strategies where the focus is to stop crimes (terrorism) yet to be committed (Dresser, 2018; O'Donnell, 2017). Yet, the transition from childhood to adulthood is, after all, supposed to be a period of personal exploration and experimentation where feelings of opposition and protest behaviours can be commonplace (Erikson, 1968). For some young individuals, these transitions will involve increased resistance and adventure-seeking;

categorising them as potential terrorists can have a detrimental effect on the development of their identities, worldviews and agencies. Moreover, while profiling strategies are often applied in counter-radicalisation efforts, they have arguably proved to be ineffective approaches to counterterrorism (Horgan, 2014).

To summarise, the interview data shows a clear educational narrative to prevent young lives from being radicalised towards violent extremism. Although, in this context, there are a small number of practitioners who focus exclusively on Islamic extremism, the majority are quite vocal regarding the threat of right-wing extremism in Norway. Despite the fact that the majority believe they have a duty to prevent students from being radicalised towards any form of extremism, students who exhibit increased religiosity are often seen as more vulnerable to such radicalisation. This is troublesome, considering that the framing of students based on their religious or cultural expressions is a stigmatising and exclusionary practice. Related to this, there is also widespread concern among the participants regarding the negative experiences that immigrant students have to endure in this Global War on Terror "era". According to participants, increasing polarisation is on the rise in Norway, which may affect their ability to provide safe and inclusive educational environments. Accordingly, it seems that these practitioners struggle to navigate between the educational discourse of inclusion and the dominant logic of the radicalisation discourse, with its negative framing of Islam as a threat to national security.

Counterterrorism as a hegemonic discourse of education

In analysis concerning how the radicalisation discourse, with its framing of Muslim youth as vulnerable "at risk" students, there is an attempt to recontextualise this political security paradigm into educational discourse and possible practice. Naturally, this research provides no insights into how the participants' perceptions may have changed over time, but their mention of the growing political and media framing of terrorism sees a strong call for urgency, regarding societal preparedness manifesting itself throughout the Norwegian political system.

While the first national policy on the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism stated that "Norway is one of the safest countries in the world", where the threat level is considered to be low (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police, 2010, p. 5), only four years later, counter-radicalisation efforts were being described as a societal necessity to ensure that "fundamental values such as democracy, human rights and security" are maintained (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2014, p. 5). The revised policy of 2014 makes frequent use of "presupposition" (Fairclough, 2010), with the threat of terrorism being described as more complex due to the ongoing "changes in [Norway's] potential enemies". Yet, despite the complex nature that is terrorism, counter-radicalisation efforts remain a "responsibility that rests with many sectors of society" (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2014, pp. 7, 9). Value assumptions (Fairclough, 1992) can be readily found throughout these counter-radicalisation policies as the aforementioned virtuous of democracy is argued to counterweigh extremist narratives.

Al-Qaeda-inspired extremism and right-wing extremists "who are hostile to Islam" (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2014, p. 10) are singled out as the two dominant threats of terrorism in Norway, a claim which certainly mirrors Crawford et al's., (2018) argument of the symbiotic relationship between Islamic and right-wing extremism. However, the ideological presupposition (Fairclough, 1992) that Islam is the "trigger" for a particularly dangerous kind of right-wing extremism in Norway exemplifies the performative power of the radicalisation discourse, which can convince an audience to believe that something is true. Similar language choices are used in the recontextualisation process, to construct manifest intertextuality between the perceived threat of Islam and the need for broad societal preparedness against (Islamic) terrorism. Coherence here, according to Fairclough (1992), would then depend upon the assumptions that the audience brings to the process of interpretation, and violent right-wing extremism is, thereby, portrayed as something that may not even exist in Norway without the presence of extremist Islamic groups.

It is further argued that "Polarisation among Norwegian extremist threat perpetrators will probably increase [...] recruitment to and radicalisation of various groups" (Norwegian

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Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2014, p. 10), a claim that is also found in the Norwegian Police Secret Service (PST) annual threat assessment released in 2014 (p. 1). Polarisation as a concept is not defined or specified in Norwegian counter-radicalisation policies or threat assessments, assuming that its meaning is already imbedded among the audience. For instance, when there is reference to the risk of "increased polarisation between different groups" (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2014, p. 9), it likely alludes to the increasing (culturally) diverse Norwegian society, which links the domains of immigration and national security together. This view was repeated immediately after the right-wing terrorist attack at a Mosque in Oslo on August 10, 2019, where the Norwegian Prime Minister, Erna Solberg, argued that a key reason for the rise of right-wing extremism was due to the large waves of refugees who arrived in Norway in 2015 (TV2, 2019). The assumption here is that increasing immigration triggers societal polarisation, which in turns heightens the threat of terrorism. Thus, it contradicts the dominant view expressed by the research participants who believe that the political climate in Norway is a major, if not the most important, contributor to increasing polarisation in society. Furthermore, this political assumption overlooks the fact that Norway has had an extensive contemporary history of right-wing violence (Bjørgo, 1997).

Part of analysing counterterrorism measures involves highlighting the implied securitised role of the radicalisation discourse. Tracking the derogatory connotations of the radicalisation discourse as caused by the multicultural society and Islam in particular is, after all, not shown only in policies and threat assessment but also in more general guidelines. An illustrative example of this comes to the surface when reviewing what the Norwegian Government suggests as appropriate literature on counter-radicalisation efforts for first-line workers. This proposed list of reading material includes six publications on "radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism", eight on "communication techniques", two on "crime prevention" and twenty-five on "migration, religion, multiculturalism, racism and globalisation" (The Norwegian Government, 2019). Thus, several genres of literature are included in the implicit understanding of radicalisation, which demonstrates interdiscursivity

tendencies that relates the causes of terrorism to a multicultural society and Islam in particular.

Policies, political rhetoric and security statements seems to play a role in shaping the dominant assumption of the radicalisation discourse, where terrorism is foremost a threat caused by Muslims. Islamic terrorism received, after all, the most attention in the interviews and, it was frequently suggested that Muslim students are more at risk of radicalisation towards violent extremism than non-Muslim students are. The preceding narratives may constrain inclusive educational practice as it is clear that they carry substantial negative connotations. Notwithstanding the fact that the political agenda continuously refers to the societal responsibility for providing security from threats of (Islamic) terrorism, counter-radicalisation policies are arguably not well known among practitioners (Sjøen & Jore, in press).

An important question remains regarding how the dominant counter-radicalisation discourse is recontextualised into educational discourse and possibly practice. Previous research indicates that political agendas are often transferred to an audience through the media, which tends to adopt official positions or "powerful" discourses (Birkland, 2004; Larsen, 2018; Solheim, 2018). This seems certainly to be the case here, as is also shown when the Norwegian Police Secret Service's (PST) annual risk assessment changed the threat of Islamic terrorist acts in Norway from "possible" in 2016 to "likely" in 2017 (PST[3], 2016, 2017). This change in risk assessment sparked massive attention on extremism-related issues, and the notion of "exceptionalism" (Fairclough, 1992), which was demonstrated through sensationalist language in the media, seems to have influence practitioners in their concern about vulnerable Muslim youths turning to violent extremism and terrorism.

Resistance in schools: Prevention as good education

It is noted that there is an attempt to integrate the radicalisation discourse into the educational

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[3] The Police Secret Service in Norway have devised a set of standardised terms to indicate estimated probability of a terrorist attack ranging from "very unlikely", "unlikely", "possible", "likely" to "very likely" (PST, 2017).

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discourse. Yet, as expressed by the participants, there are also signs that the framing of Islam and multicultural society as potential threats to national security is met with resistance from these practitioners. This is unsurprising, as neither security nor educational discourses are uniform; rather, they can be heterogeneous and even contradictory (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). The radicalisation discourse, as envisioned by policymakers, tend to appeal for cultural integration (Lindekilde, 2012b; Sedgwick, 2010), while, in practice, it more likely represents a divisive and polarising ideology (Kundnani, 2009). This contradictory practice concerning the radicalisation discourse connects with a wider geopolitical security paradigm that is manifesting itself around the world; yet, the boundaries between what these discourses actually represents is not well known among practitioners. A past study in Norway found that counter-radicalisation efforts tend to circumvent ethical dilemmas by appealing to safeguarding principles that are common in both education and social work (Sjøen & Jore, in press). Thus, the radicalisation discourse is often viewed as "natural" and "ordinary" by practitioners, who, for the most part, are unaware that it represents an oppressive discursive order. This contradiction is not uncommon within a preventive lens (Sjøen & Jore, 2019, p. 9), and Mattsson (2018) describes this as putting practitioners in a space of conflict where

> [...] what it all boils down to is that we have two discourses operating at the same professionals, in the same filed and at the same time – but without any clear signs of interdiscursivity and with a considerable amount of confusion (p. 124)

Resistance among practitioners can be both conscious and unconscious, and resistance against the radicalisation discourse as expressed by participants is presumably more inclined towards the latter form, which becomes evident when they speak about the framing of immigrants and Muslims. It is the author's contention that this ties into how extremism-related issues evokes feelings of uncertainty. As Burgess (2009) notes, a culture of fear is quite characteristic for European approaches to security in the Global War on Terror era, and fear and uncertainty are, obviously, ill-suited when attempting to create inclusive and supportive educational environments for young lives. Furthermore, if practitioners merely comply with the politically

envisioned radicalisation discourse, the risk is that they might overlook the rich philosophical history that "radicalism", "resistance" and "emancipation" holds in the field of education (Biesta, 2015). For, what is deemed radical or extreme in one context is perfectly accepted in another, and how do practitioners distinguish between so-called "positive" and "negative" forms of radicalisation? The distinction is perhaps simple in political ideology; yet, as suggested by Sukarieh and Tannock (2016), it does not hold up well in educational practice.

Although there are diverging scholarly views as to whether schools are the correct medium by which terrorism should be prevented in the first place, the professional narratives presented in this article presuppose that "good education" (Biesta, 2009), in its fullest and broadest sense, is what O'Donnell calls "anti-extremist" (2016a). This pertains to how educational counter-radicalisation efforts could be based in learning environments that have a great value also beyond preventing radicalisation and violent extremism (Sklad & Park, 2017). Lending on this belief, educational activities aimed at preventing students from becoming involved in violent extremism or terrorism should be grounded in genuinely good education. Hence, the narratives that are expressed by these practitioners align well with the current state of research on counter-radicalisation efforts, which stresses the importance of progressive, liberal and inclusive education (Davies, 2018; Kyriacou et al., 2017; Mitchell, 2016; Panjwani et al., 2018). However, the recontextualisation of the radicalisation discourse into educational discourse and possibly practice, which certainly does not make explicit the ideological assumptions that underpin this security paradigm, may have a chilling effect on schools and universities across continents (Sjøen & Jore, 2019). Educational prevention efforts appear to be based on a multitude of assumptions and there is little awareness of the limits of these efforts in schools. While this does not exclude educational systems in the task of preventing young lives from radicalisation, it highlights the need for educators to be given adequate training and resources in order for these efforts to not compromise the ideals and objectives of education (Harris-Hogan et al., 2019).

As argued by Biesta (2015) and O'Donnell (2017), who both draw on Hannah Arendt's seminal work, there is something ethically worrisome in politicising education in a

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way that holds youth responsible for the existing problems of the world. Thus, there should be strong caution against the utilisation of education as a cog in the Global War on Terror machinery. While the prevention of youth being radicalised towards violent extremism is certainly within the duties of democratic educational systems, the way in which schools carry out any preventive measures is central to its effectiveness. There is little evidence that access to education itself prevents radicalisation and violent extremism (Krueger & Malečková, 2003), and there is even the question of whether the current application of counter-radicalisation efforts are counterproductive (Sjøen & Jore, 2019, p. 11). It seems that more attention should be shifted towards how schools can approach counter-radicalisation through good education, to avoid the risk of the prevention efforts impairing the education.

Conclusion

This article has explored the securitisation of the radicalisation discourse in educators and social workers practice in Norwegian secondary schools. Viewed through the lens of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), a number of revealing and concerning conclusions have provided insight for in this article. The practitioners who have informed the research report having a clear responsibility to prevent young lives from being radicalised towards any form of violent extremism. There is, however, evidence for both hegemony and resistance towards the recontextualisation of the radicalisation discourse, as participants describe the stigmatising and polarising portrayal of Muslim youth in politics and the media as being at odds with liberal, progressive and inclusive education. Examples of the former, the hegemonic power of the radicalisation discourse, are shown through how students who exhibit increased religiosity are seen by many practitioners as being more vulnerable to radicalisation towards violent extremism. This is troublesome, considering how the framing of students based on religious or cultural markers and expressions is a stigmatising, exclusionary and perhaps even counterproductive approach to preventing radicalisation and violent extremism. Examples of resistance are, paradoxically, illustrated through how the participants problematize the

politically envisioned link of Islam as a societal threat, which they claim creates a divide between Muslims and non-Muslims. This resistance to the radicalisation discourse is, as with the acceptance of the same discourse, probably also unconscious, as most participants seem to concur that school should spearhead the societal efforts against predominantly Islamic radicalisation, while they are simultaneously sceptical of the negative political framing of immigrants and Muslims.

In terms of understanding how the radicalisation discourse shapes educational discourse and possibly practice, CDA provides an important framework for analysing linguistic-discursive dimensions of social and cultural phenomena. The exceptional security politics that drive the omnipresent radicalisation discourse appeal discursively to practitioners, and possibly also their practice, as they draw on an educational language of caring for and safeguarding "vulnerable" youth. Thus, the political apparatus circumvents any critical discussion of how the radicalisation discourse can cause polarisation and societal disintegration. On self-reflection by the participants, this professional narrative is clearly informed by political rhetoric and the substantial media attention on these issues, and it is the author's contention that this framing of radicalisation under the banner of "safeguarding" sanitises ethical dilemmas surrounding the radicalisation discourse, which Heath-Kelly and Strausz (2019) convincingly argue is in actuality an extension of the "us versus them" dichotomy that has characterised the Global War on Terror efforts.

These findings should be of concern, and, while this research does not offer any comprehensive evaluations of educational counter-radicalisation efforts, it does provide insight into how the selected practitioners understand and approach radicalisation and violent extremism in Norwegian schools. This is important knowledge because what the practitioner knows, does, and cares about, are among the most important factors governing educational practice (Biesta, 2015). These findings may not be generalisable to other contexts, as they are based on a limited range of empirical examples, which are surely open to a range of interpretations. The sampled practitioners who were interviewed in this research may also differ systematically from the target populations of educators and social workers in Norway.

Furthermore, the "cherry-picking" of documents and political statements that were analysed for this purpose is prone to personal bias (Fairclough, 1992). However, these findings form part of an emerging trend in the literature, showing a widespread criticism of the securitisation of counter-radicalisation efforts under the banner of preventing terrorism, which seem to impair progressive, liberal and inclusive education. A key focus in future research should be on understanding how counter-radicalisation efforts are experienced by students, particularly immigrant and Muslim youth as well as those within their immediate circles.

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Interviewees	Gender	Age	Profession	School type	Region
Interviewee 1	Male	46	Educator	Lower secondary	Western region
Interviewee 2	Male	56	Educator	Lower secondary	Western region
Interviewee 3	Female	52	Educator	Upper secondary	Southern region
Interviewee 4	Female	41	Educator	Upper secondary	Southern region
Interviewee 5	Female	59	Social worker	Municipality	Western region
Interviewee 6	Female	41	Educator	Upper secondary	Midlands
Interviewee 7	Male	47	Educator	Lower secondary	Eastern region
Interviewee 8	Male	41	Social worker	Municipality	Western region
Interviewee 9	Male	36	Social worker	Municipality	Northern region
Interviewee 10	Female	49	Social worker	Municipality	Southern region
Interviewee 11	Male	43	Educator	Lower secondary	Western region
Interviewee 12	Male	59	Educator	Upper secondary	Eastern region
Interviewee 13	Female	43	Educator	Upper secondary	Eastern region
Interviewee 14	Female	58	Social worker	Municipality	Eastern region
Interviewee 15	Male	42	Educator	Upper secondary	Western region
Interviewee 16	Male	48	Educator	Upper secondary	Western region
Interviewee 17	Male	54	Social worker	Municipality	Midlands
Interviewee 18	Female	49	Educator	Lower secondary	Midlands
Interviewee 19	Female	59	Educator	Upper secondary	Western region
Interviewee 20	Male	52	Educator	Lower secondary	Northern region
Interviewee 21	Female	59	Educator	Lower secondary	Northern region
Interviewee 22	Female	48	Educator	Upper secondary	Midlands
Interviewee 23	Male	63	Social worker	Municipality	Eastern region

Table 1: Overview of research participants

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About the JD Journal for Deradicalization

Article IV

How the counter-radicalization discourse securitizes education and why this might not be an effective approach to preventing terrorism

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This article draws on a qualitative study of educators and how they understand and experience the integration of counter-radicalization measures into Norwegian schools. Our study reveals that a securitization of education is made possible, as the dominant counter-radicalization discourse conforms to neoliberal governance, which decentralizes governmental tasks on first-line practitioners. While terrorism-related issues are a source of fear and uncertainty, the "remedy" for terrorism is portrayed as the identification and rehabilitation of individuals who are deemed vulnerable to radicalization. Thus, the counter-radicalization discourse appeals to the educational ideal of citizenship and the safeguarding of vulnerable youth, without paying enough attention to the ethical and practical dilemmas when education becomes securitized. Despite the ease in which this vulnerability perspective fuses with existing educational practice, our research shows that Norwegian policies are not well known and, therefore, offer limited applicational value for educators. This comes as little surprise, given that current research indicates that counter-radicalization policies can be probabilistic, generic and de-contextualized. A growing body of literature suggests, on the other hand, that preventing terrorism requires contextual and locally based efforts to accommodate the heterogeneity of the target audience and stakeholders. The authors, therefore, question whether the preventive responsibilities that are now bestowed on educators in Norway correspond to what we currently know about terrorism and its prevention.

Keywords: Radicalization1, violent-extremism2, counter-radicalization3, education4, securitization5.

1. Introduction

Europe has been experiencing increasing concerns about the threats of "homegrown" terrorism. With the recent wave of mass-casualty violent attacks across the continent, alongside the large outflux of foreign fighters traveling to the Middle East (Hegghammer 2016), there are now substantial fears that when the next terrorist attack occurs, the perpetrator will hold the same citizenship as his or her own victims. In fact, preventing homegrown terrorism is placed at the very top of political agendas in most Western countries (Sageman 2014).

A change has materialized throughout the European security landscape regarding these rising concerns about homegrown terrorism. This change, which scholars dub the "deepening" of security actors, has seen the gradual expansion of "non-military" sectors into national and global security interests (Buzan et al. 1998). Whereas counterterrorism would traditionally involve the military, security services, and law enforcement agencies, there are now increased demands for practitioners within education, health care, and social services to partake in these efforts.

Yet, for educators, the task of preventing young lives from committing to extreme violence is by no means a recent development; in fact, this has been an educational objective for millennia

(Østby and Urdal 2010). However, the ways in which educators are now expected to contribute to homeland security represents a significant change (Durodié 2016). No longer is the role of education limited to promoting values, skills and knowledge in support of human rights and peace. Educators are now also expected to aid security services by identifying and referring potential extremists to relevant authorities. Research from different educational systems around the world suggests, also, that educators, by large, have come to accept the responsibility to prevent students from being radicalized and becoming involved in violent extremism (Sjøen and Jore in press).

We ask the central question of how this securitization of education is made possible. After all, the domains of education and national security represent unique sectors with contrasting aims, approaches, and expected outcomes. Hence, to intertwine the educational world of learning, development and socialization, with the securitized world of counterterrorism, which relies more on surveillance, coercion and punitive measures, should perhaps cause greater unease among practitioners.

In this article, we explore the integration of counterterrorism measures into Norwegian schools. We expand on a forthcoming article by Sjøen and Mattsson, which argues that counter-radicalization responsibilities have been

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integrated into the mindset and practice of educators in Norway. The aim of our present article is to explicate the process of securitizing these responsibilities into Norwegian schools and further to analyze how educators are expected to contribute to these matters. As argued by Birkland (2004), at least a decade should pass before one can thoroughly study the impacts of policymaking within any domain in society. Now that we are closing in on the first decade since counter-radicalization policies were introduced in Norway (Ministry of Justice and Public Security 2010, 2014), it is essential to try to understand how these policies affect education.

By drawing on in-depth interviews with 23 practitioners in Norway, this article investigates the intersection of counterterrorism and education as articulated in policy, in theory, and as shown in our empirical data. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) constitutes our framework and, in pursuing our research objectives, three research questions have been formulated:

(i)   How are counter-radicalization efforts securitized into Norwegian schools?

(ii)   How do counter-radicalization policies correspond to educational practice as described by our informants?

(iii) How are Norway's counter-radicalization policies consistent with our current knowledge on preventing terrorism?

1.1 *Enter the counter-radicalization discourse*

The last decade marks an era in global politics in which most Western countries have re-assessed their counterterrorism policies. While many countries, including Norway, have had recent experience with extremist movements and so-called "exit-programs" (Bjørgo 2002, Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013), during this post-9/11 era, counterterrorism has become increasingly viewed as a societal necessity and moral responsibility (Jore 2016). Moving from the initial militarized response of the "global war on terror" doctrine, security services today pay far more attention to trying to understand the underlying causes of violent extremism and terrorism (Sageman 2014).

A common assumption in the field is that terrorism is foremost a culmination of radicalization processes (Borum 2011). This popular assumption serves as the basis for the politicized "counter-radicalization" discourse, an umbrella term for various efforts to prevent radicalization and violent extremism. Admittedly, radicalization is a highly controversial concept (Neumann 2013, Sedgwick 2010). In policy domains, it is commonly used to describe

sequential and rather linear processes where violent behaviors "inevitably" ensue from radicalized attitudes. Following this assumption, the disruption or removal of radicalization processes is now a key objective within contemporary counterterrorism.

Counter-radicalization efforts in education center on building resilience against extremist beliefs, as well as identifying and safeguarding students who are presumed vulnerable to radicalization (O'Donnell 2016). Both these objectives are problematic. Firstly, terrorism-related issues are surrounded by fear and anxiety, which are, naturally, ill-suited foundations for building inclusive educational environments. The notion of being "vulnerable" to radicalization and violent extremism is also controversial and, to approach prevention through a vulnerability lens, risks impairing the autonomy and agency of youth (Durodié 2016). In addition, the idea that anyone, let alone educators, can accurately predict future perpetrators of extreme violence is not supported by much evidence (Horgan 2008). This certainly raises the question of whether current prevention efforts could conflict with educational objectives.

Although research on whether education can counterweigh terrorism is inconclusive (Østby and Urdal 2010), the emerging literature suggests that prevention should be grounded in relational, humanistic and inclusive pedagogics (Gielen 2017, Davies 2018, Panjwani et al., 2018). For Lindekilde (2012), the effectiveness of prevention efforts is furthermore connected to the balance of providing societal security, whilst also accepting differences among its citizens. It follows from this claim that counter-radicalization efforts in school must not compromise the ideals, values, and objectives of democratic education.

2. Methodology

This article is based on qualitative research that was carried out by the use of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). According to Norman Fairclough (2010), CDA represents a linguistic approach to studying how discourse reproduces society, as well as how discourse is reproduced by society. Situated within critical realist philosophy, CDA entails normative and explanatory critique, aimed at producing middle-ranged theories.

CDA constitutes theory and methodology and is conceptualized through a three-dimensional framework, consisting of the "textual level", "discursive practice level" and "social practice level". Fairclough (2003) has since preferred the terms "events", "social practice" and "social structures". The textual level involves all forms of texts, verbal and non-verbal, while the discursive practice level is distinguished, but not separated, from the textual level as it contains "text in context". It is based on all forms of texts that are

interpreted and given meaning through discursive practices. Social practice level is an articulation of diverse social elements within a relatively stable configuration, e.g. education, which constitutes, and is constituted by, discursive practices.

Fairclough's (2010) conceptualization of discourse analysis combines linguistic features through texts, speech acts through discourses, and ideological effects and hegemonic processes through social practice. What is of particular interest in our work is how securitizing rhetoric (Buzan et al. 1998) is transferred to the educational world, by what Fairclough (2010) calls "re-contextualization", meaning that educational discourse, and thereby practice, is influenced by contemporary counterterrorism.

The primary data in this research is based on in-depth interviews with 23 informants in Norway, which is supplemented with policy document analysis. Sixteen of our informants were teachers and principals, while the remaining seven were social workers with close collaboration with schools. The interviews were carried out in 2017 and the informants were selected through non-probability sampling, to represent different teaching backgrounds and subjects across Norway. We used an interview guide but remained flexible, which in practice allowed informants to discuss other related issues. Thematically, the interviews were centered on making sense of how the informants form their perceptions of radicalization issues, to what extent these counter-radicalization policies correspond to their educational practice, and whether we should, or rather, could expect these preventive strategies to be effective in practice.

All the interviews were transcribed verbatim before being analyzed on a textual and a discursive level. The presentation and subsequent discussion of these levels are integrated before, in the concluding parts, we shed light on the potential for re-contextualization, or the transferring of the counter-radicalization discourse into the domain of education, and how this relates to our current knowledge on terrorism and its prevention.

These findings are based on a small sample; hence, the results are not generalizable beyond their research context. Furthermore, informants who are more than averagely confident or have strong opinions on these issues may have been more willing to participate in the research. However, to produce generalizable findings is not the aim of this paper, which uses CDA to analyze different forms of text to understand the logic of how counterterrorism policies affect education.

3. Findings

3.1 *How is education securitized?*

Previous research in Norway suggests that informants have come to accept the responsibility to prevent radicalization and violent extremism within their educational practice (Lid et al. 2016, Sjøen 2019, Sjøen and Mattsson forthcoming). This conclusion, which seems to mirror similar findings in different educational systems across the globe, also reveals that there can be some degree of skepticism among informants about the participation in counter-radicalization efforts (Sjøen and Jore in press). Yet, overall, the securitization of Western education appears to be an inevitable fact. The forthcoming article by Sjøen and Mattsson argued that the integration of counter-radicalization efforts into Norwegian schools corresponds with neoliberal governance, which decentralizes the task of identifying and rehabilitating vulnerable youth. In this section, we will explicate how this counter-radicalization discourse is securitized into education.

While being probed with questions of why the majority of informants viewed radicalization as caused by youth vulnerability, most educators explained that they were influenced by how radicalization is communicated in politics and the media.

> *I think the reason that I view radicalization as caused by youth vulnerability is that we are constantly shown examples of this in the media. I remember the trial of Anders Behring Breivik, where there was considerable attention on his upbringing and his problematic period in kindergarten and school. There were even some suggesting that the teachers and social workers who had been in contact with him [Breivik] had some blame for his tragic upbringing. Similarly, when we read about the Norwegian youth who traveled to Syria to become foreign fighters, there was always this backstory of marginalized youth who never quite fit in anywhere.* (Male, 52)

Overall, there was a sense of professional duty among the informants towards safeguarding students. This is not surprising, as issues of student vulnerability and therapeutic educational practice permeate Western educational systems (Biesta 2009). It is also apparent that the vulnerability approach permeates Norwegian policies, as shown in this statement.

> *Whether a person ends up having drug problems, being a criminal or a violent extremist is a random process, depending on what problem "reaches" the person first. The commonality between all these issues is being vulnerable.* (Ministry of Justice and Public Security 2010, 8. [our translation])

A conflation of violent extremism with other antisocial youth behaviors seems quite common within a preventive lens (Mattsson and Säljö 2018). Drawing further on the national counter-radicalization guidelines, we find many traces of presupposition (Fairclough 2003), where it is suggested that the root causes of radicalization are primarily individual vulnerability factors, deprivation, and psychopathology. For instance, proposed push factors for radicalization include isolation, marginalization, past traumatic experience, and low self-esteem, coupled with the search for identity, feelings of injustice and deprivation (Ministry of Justice and Public Security 2015, 18). Following this line of reasoning, terrorism is the "de facto" result of living an unfortunate life. Little attention is placed on political or structural reasons (Sukarieh and Tannock 2015), which, in all likelihood, constitutes a key factor for explaining the prevalence of terrorism (Pape 2003). In fact, when the Norwegian policies make mention of any structural or geopolitical factors, it is usually in the sense of how international relations and growing globalization exacerbate national prevention efforts in practice (Ministry of Justice and Public Security 2015, 9).

Most informants had, however, little direct knowledge of these policies, and it appears that "everyday" political rhetoric and media exposure had a larger impact, as represented in this excerpt:

It makes a strong impression when Erna Solberg [Norwegian Prime Minister] *declares on television that "we", the society, and particularly those working with youth, have a particular responsibility to prevent them from radicalization.* (Female, 41)

Moral and political evaluation (Fairclough 2010) is clearly present in this and similar statements, whether through official policy or more general rhetoric. There is an assumption throughout the policy literature that democracy will counterweigh terrorism. Yet, democracy is also described as being under severe threat from terrorism, and there is frequent use of the passive voice with a negative, for instance in statements that "Norwegian society is under threat from a more imminent and complex form of violent extremism" and "it is likely that the increased polarization will pose a greater threat to our security in the future") (Ministry of Justice and Public Security 2014, 9 [our translation]).

We find that such sentiments with their appeals for broad societal efforts to prevent violent extremism resonate well among our informants. In particular, we discovered a strong sense of accountability, and, although this was primarily directed at the well-being of students, more than being a direct response to national security, there was some concern among the informants that they could now be held accountable for students committing acts of extreme violence. Several also spoke with apprehension about an expectation that Norway would be the target of terrorism.

It causes some worry when the PST [the Norwegian Police Security Services] *claims it is likely that Norway will be struck by terrorism this year.* (Female, 59)

This concern was not only related to the potential of students developing extremist mindsets; it seemed to cause growing concern that schools could be the target of violent attacks. Many informants explained that their school or school district channeled significantly more resources into preparedness for potential school shootings or other violent attacks. Although all informants described working in safe schools, the growing attention on terrorism-related issues caused more anxiety and, in some cases, additional pressure to "do something". Thus, we are witnessing a clear rationalization of the need for better societal preparedness against terrorism.

To summarize, it is apparent that the educators have adopted the vulnerability approach on issues of preventing radicalization in school. Despite any fear and uncertainty that the informants might have regarding terrorism-related issues, the dominant vulnerability approach eases the fusing of counter-radicalization efforts into educational practice. The educational understanding does not seem to be influenced, at least not directly, by counter-radicalization policies. Rather, it appears that we are witnessing what Sageman (2014) calls the "alarmist" political rhetoric, which is playing a larger role in how these educators view counter-radicalization efforts. The ethical and practical dilemmas of securitizing education are not necessarily given much attention in this process.

3.2 *How does counter-radicalization efforts correspond to educational practice?*

The counter-radicalization discourse in Europe was developed in the aftermath of the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) terrorist-attacks, in part, to harmonize counterterrorism efforts across national borders. Although many countries had been severely affected, particularly by right-wing extremism during the 1990s (Bjørgo 2002, Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013), a wide range of national and international counter-radicalization programs has since been introduced in European countries, often with the commonality that educators are given a key role in preventing youth from being radicalized (Davies 2018). Policymakers and bureaucrats in Europe were central in developing the counter-radicalization efforts, which, by most

accounts, were not guided by either theoretical or empirical research (Borum 2011).

Although most of our informants understand and approach counter-radicalization through the dominant vulnerability lens, some educators are also skeptical of this, arguing that schools should serve a purpose of indirect preventive role (Sjøen and Mattsson forthcoming), perhaps demonstrating that, whilst educators accept the responsibility to prevent radicalization, there is little consensus on how this should be carried out in practice. Naturally, if there is little agreement on the "causes and cures" of radicalization to begin with (Borum 2011), how can we expect sectors like education to contribute in a meaningful way?

During our interviews, we discussed content from Norwegian counter-radicalization policies with our informants, to get a sense of how they interpreted these resources. It became evident that many viewed them as vague and generic, and some even questioned whether these policies would be easy to apply in educational practice.

It seems as if these action plans are telling us to care for our students, which I believe is an essential value for any teacher in Norway, regardless of radicalization. Nevertheless, how do we move from this stage to actually carrying out prevention in our classrooms? I am not so sure that I am better equipped to handle radicalization after reading that I have to care for my students. (Female, 41)

Many informants questioned the applicational value of the policies and guidelines, especially when confronted with the suggested "signs of radicalization". For instance, the action plan of 2014 (Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 29), states that "fascination for violence", "change of apparel", "lack of interest in school and homework", and "altered social network" [our translation], can be signs of radicalization. Yet, as noted by many informants, these can be quite common traits and characteristics among youth.

While there are some things that should concern a teacher, it seems like this list is a litany of anything that can happen when youth moves into adulthood. I think any student could be labeled as a potential radical if we used this list categorically. (Male, 52)

The presupposition that disenfranchised youth are vulnerable to radicalization is present in these policies. By defining the problem (radicalization) in a certain way (vulnerability), policymakers automatically assign solutions to it (Birkland 2004), in this case, to protect society by identifying and rehabilitating vulnerable youth. Yet, any oppositional youth behavior can now be characterized as "signs" of radicalization and violent extremism (O'Donnell 2016), which begs

the question of how helpful these "signs of concern" are for practitioners.

Another dilemma among the informants was related to how Norwegian policies described sectorial collaboration and communication as the core for more efficient counter-radicalization efforts. The linguistics device of nominalization (Fairclough 2003), whereby a noun stands for a process, for example, "increased collaboration between sectors" appears throughout the policy literature (Ministry of Justice and Public Security 2014, 20). This nominalization can reduce or remove the agency of preventive "actors" and it is unclear how the increased collaboration should be carried out in practice, as seen in this statement from one of the informants:

These policies seem to depict an ideal situation in which every municipality has sufficient time and resources to handle these concerns. In actuality, there are many problems with this claim. Who should I contact when I have a suspicion? Who will contact me? (Male, 43)

This latter point was vividly demonstrated by another informant, who described sectorial collaboration and communication as flawed.

We were recently informed by the police that a former foreign fighter had been reintegrated into a nearby municipality. However, we were not told who this individual was, which only causes suspicion and uncertainty for us in "the field". (Male, 48)

To summarize, when presented with Norwegian counter-radicalization policies, most informants do not perceive them to hold much applicational value. Although the objective of preventing radicalization and violent extremism is very much incorporated into the educational mindsets and practice of our informants, there seems to be a discrepancy between how the policymakers and the informants come to view counter-radicalization efforts in schools.

4. Discussion

4.1 *Appropriating security discourse into the educational world*

Our research demonstrates how the counter-radicalization discourse is integrated into school, as it corresponds to vulnerability approaches that permeate Western educational systems (Biesta 2009). Hence, the vocabulary of safeguarding vulnerable youth remains consistent across the domains of education and security, respectively. By framing counter-radicalization as citizenship and caring for the well-being of young lives, these preventive duties are integrated into the educational world of learning, development, and

socialization. Negative impacts, including the potential use of surveillance, profiling, and coercive strategies, as well as the stigmatizing practice of framing students as "vulnerable", is not necessarily given any attention in this process.

Teachers that view terrorism through this discourse could overlook important aspects of radicalization, such as the political aspect, and highlight individual characteristics that are not grounded in research when considering the potential for radicalization in students. This could lead to that major groups are perceived as possible radicals which can result in increased alienation and a lack of trust.

The assumption of terrorism that this discourse is founded on is the idea that terrorism is a product of social and psychological factors that motivate violent dissent. The idea is that alienated and marginalized individuals are more likely to engage with radical groups when they are isolated from the broader community or suffering mentally. According to this discourse, social and political factors are thus the explanation for why some individuals might not share the same political attitudes as the mainstream community. This approach could be an alarming trajectory for teachers because this can lead to that some student will refrain from sharing their political ideas in the classroom in fear of being stigmatized (Hardy, 2015).

This re-contextualization of the counter-radicalization discourse in schools sees the colonization of an ideological security doctrine into educational practice. While we do find some degree of skepticism among our informants on the integration of counter-radicalization efforts into schools, most recognize having a professional duty to contribute on these matters (Sjøen and Mattsson forthcoming). Interdiscursivity, or the "orders of discourse" (Fairclough 2003), demonstrates how these different genres (security and education) mix in the counter-radicalization discourse. We find, for instance, that the ideals of societal responsibility, safeguarding principles and citizenship are all brought together, which we argue, appeals to educators as well as other first-line practitioners. By connecting counter-radicalization to safeguarding, citizenship and empowerment, the focus shifts from surveillance of suspects to a focus on building strengths in students rather than deficits. This perspective is probably more appealing to the teachers, social workers and youth workers who are carrying out the counter-radicalization work. This could be one explanation for why counter-radicalization efforts have been securitized into Norwegian schools without raising critical voices.

Yet, we would add that national policies may have limited bearing on how the informants view radicalization and its prevention. Rather, it is

political rhetoric and the way that this issue is communicated in the media that primarily affects how informants come to view this issue. As argued by Fairclough (1992), the media play an important role in not only reproducing discourse but also reducing the causes of discourse, in this case by communicating that radicalization is primarily caused by individual traits and characteristics, which the vulnerability approach is based on. Previous research shows that the media tends to adopt the dominant political framing of terrorism and that media's efforts to bring personalized human-interest stories, serve to uphold civil society's belief that radicalization and terrorism is caused by social and psychological factors (Jore 2016, Larsen 2018, Solheim 2019), meaning that while policies are not well known, the political elite still has a significant impact on how terrorism is understood in society.

4.2 *What should be expected from the politically envisioned counter-radicalization discourse?*

The hegemonic struggle between the domains of education and security is primarily brought to the surface when our informants are faced with how the Norwegian government envisions counter-radicalization efforts through national policies. According to the educators, policy documents have little applicational value, and we find skepticism on how to translate the preventive ideas and assumptions from these policies into educational practice. As described by our informants, a finding that resonates with other research (Sjøen and Jore in press), is that counterstrategies are often probabilistic, generic and de-contextualized.

The question of whether counter-radicalization efforts are efficient remains difficult to answer (Lindekilde 2012); yet, available research can give some clues, at least to what may work better or not at all. As such, the growing body of literature suggests that counter-radicalization efforts in schools should foremost be grounded in what Biesta (2009) calls "good education". Furthermore, prevention should acknowledge local contexts and needs, whilst accommodating the heterogeneity of the target audience and other stakeholders (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2016, Gielen 2017, Davies 2018, Mattsson 2019). There is little evidence that the vulnerability approach, which now permeates education, is an effective approach to prevention (O'Donnell 2016), and there is even the question of whether this can impair the agency and autonomy of young lives.

The moral and political assumption that an "ideal" democracy, through "equality, inclusion and participation", can itself counterweigh extreme violence and terrorism is a claim that is

surrounded by much ambiguity (Østby and Urdal 2010). We, therefore, argue that, while research is very much inconclusive as to whether education can actually counter radicalization and violent extremism, it seems imperative that prevention should be grounded in the ideals of relational, humanistic and inclusive pedagogics. However, the political connotations that permeate the counter-radicalization discourse may constrain educational prevention, perhaps even rendering it counterproductive. It somehow seems unlikely that the politically envisioned counter-radicalization discourse will produce the desired effects in Norwegian schools.

Moreover, another consequence of this discourse is that it moves the focus away from structural and political factors, whilst reducing agency from the framing of terrorism, effectively making the individual the locus of change and simultaneously turning political opinions to a matter of therapeutic concerns. As a consequence, the counter-radicalization discourse that now penetrates current counterterrorism policies can end up not fostering diversity and democracy, which means that it may contradict the values that "good education" are based upon.

5. Conclusion

This study contributes to a greater understanding of how selected educators in Norway form their perceptions on radicalization issues, how national counter-radicalization policies correspond to their educational practice, and whether we should or could expect these preventive strategies to be effective in practice.

Our findings indicate that a securitization of education is made possible as it conforms to the dominant logic of neoliberal governance where counterterrorism has become a responsibility of individuals and local actors. The re-contextualization of a security doctrine in school is made possible as the counter-radicalization discourse appeals to educational ideals of citizenship and the safeguarding of vulnerable students. Thus, the counter-radicalization discourse circumvents both ethical and practical dilemmas that are commonly associated with terrorism-related issues. A hegemonic struggle between the domains of education and security, which, after all, represent sectors with quite contrasting aims, approaches, and expected outcomes, becomes evident when our informants are confronted with the actual policies that are now bestowed upon them.

The fact that we find resistance among our informants when confronted by security policies would suggest that there is a necessity for educators to be informed, or inform themselves, about the ethical and practical dilemmas of integrating the counter-radicalization discourse into education. While we cannot generalize or make inference on the basis of our small sample, the prevalent critique of the counter-radicalization discourse is also relevant when assessing policies in Norway. As such, the authors question whether these preventive duties correspond to our current knowledge on terrorism and its prevention.

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Appendix A – Table of reviewed literature

Appendix A provides an overview and an audit trail of the literature that was reviewed in this doctoral study (many of these do not appear in the references). To reflect the present focus on radicalisation and violent extremism (Sedgwick, 2010), the search period was set from 2001 to 2019, and, in order to concretise the study, search for literature was limited to a focus on *education* in relation to one or more of the following subjects: *radicalisation*, *violent extremism*, *political violence*, *terrorism* and *security*. Database searches were carried out on Google Scholar, Social Science Citation Index, PubMed, Web of Science and Science Direct. In addition, a scan was carried out on key journals such as *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *Critical Studies on Terrorism, Education, Citizenship and Social Justice*, *British Journal of Educational Studies* and the *Journal for Deradicalization*. Snowball sampling was also utilised by examining reference lists to find additional manuscripts. All manuscripts were published in English or with an English summary, and no exclusion criteria were used on the educational level or the geographical setting of the study.

Reviewed literature on educational counter-radicalisation efforts

Figure 7. Research publications per year

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Table 2. Reviewed literature

No.	Authors	Year	Title	Region	Methodology	Peer-reviewed	Type
1	Aly, A., Taylor, E. & Karnovsky, S.	2014	Moral disengagement and building resilience to violent extremism: An education intervention	Australia	Qualitative	Yes	Article
2	Amjad, N. & Wood, A. M.	2009	Identifying and changing the normative beliefs about aggression which lead young Muslim adults to join extremist anti-semitic groups in Pakistan	Pakistan	Quantitative	Yes	Article
3	Azam, J. P. & Thelen, V.	2008	The roles of foreign aid and education in the war on terror	Global	Quantitative	Yes	Article
4	Barakat, B. & Urdal, H.	2009	Breaking the waves? Does education mediate the relationship between youth bulges and political violence?	Global	Quantitative	No	Policy paper
5	Bartolomé, L. I	2004	Critical pedagogy and teacher education: Radicalizing prospective teachers	USA	Qualitative	Yes	Article
6	Benrebi, C.	2007	Evidence about the link between education, poverty and terrorism among Palestinians	Palestine	Quantitative	Yes	Article
7	Bizina, M. & Gray, D. H.	2014	Radicalization of youth as a growing concern for counter-terrorism policy	Unspecified	Theoretical	Yes	Article
8	Borum, R. Cornell, D., Modzeleski, W. & Jimerson, S.	2009	What can be done about school shootings? A review of the evidence	USA	Review	Yes	Artivle
9	Bowie, R. A	2018	Tolerance, its moral ambiguity and civic value for schools	United Kingdom	Theoretical	Yes	Book chapter
10	Brockhoff, S., Kreiger, T. & Meierrieks, D.	2015	Great expectations and hard times - The (nontrivial) impact of education on domestic terrorism	Global	Quantitative	No	Working paper
11	Brown, K. E. & Saeed, T.	2015	Radicalisation and counter-radicalisation at British universities: Muslim encounters and alternatives	United Kingdom	Qualitative	Yes	Article
12	Bryan H	2017	Developing the political citizen: How teachers are navigating the statutory demands of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 205 and the Prevent Duty	United Kingdom	Qualitative	Yes	Article
13	Busher, J., Choudhury, T. & Thomas, P.	2019	The enactment of the counter-terrorism 'Prevent duty' in British schools and colleges: Beyond reluctant accommodation or straightforward policy acceptance	United Kingdom	Mixed methods	Yes	Article
14	Busher, J., Choudhury, T., Thomas, P. & Harris, G.	2017	What the Prevent Duty means for schools and colleges in England: An analysis of educationalists' experiences	United Kingdom	Mixed methods	No	Report

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No.	Authors	Year	Title	Region	Methodology	Peer-reviewed	Type
15	Christensen, D. A. & Aars, J.	2017	Does democracy decrease fear of terrorism?	Global	Quantitative	Yes	Article
16	Cockburn, T.	2007	'Performing' racism: Engaging young supporters of the far right in England	United Kingdom	Qualitative	Yes	Article
17	Crawford, J., Ebner, J. & Hasan, U.	2018	The balanced nation: Addressing the challenges of Islamist and far-right extremism in the classroom	United Kingdom	Qualitative	Yes	Book chapter
18	Davies, L.	2008	Educating against extremism	Global	Theoretical	No	Book
19	Davies, L.	2009	Educating against extremism: Towards a critical politicisation of young people	Global	Theoretical	Yes	Article
20	Davies, L.	2014	Interrupting extremism by creating educative turbulence	Global	Qualitative	Yes	Article
21	Davies, L.	2014	Unsafe Gods: Security, secularism and schooling	Global	Theoretical	No	Book
22	Davies, L.	2016	Security, extremism and education: Safeguarding or surveillance?	Global	Theoretical	Yes	Article
23	Davies, L.	2018	Review of educational initiatives in counter-extremism internationally: What works?	Global	Review	No	Report
24	Davydov, D. G.	2015	The causes of youth extremism and ways to prevent it in the educational environment	Russia	Quantitative	Yes	Article
25	Diboll, M.	2018	Multiple ontologies of extremism: ISISes in education, a case study	United Kingdom	Theoretical	Yes	Book chapter
26	Dresser, P.	2018	Counter-radicalisation through safeguarding: A political analysis of counter-terrorism and Security Act (2015)	United Kingdom	Theoretical	Yes	Article
27	Dudenhoefer, A. L.	2018	Resisting radicalisation: A critical analysis of the UK Prevent Duty	United Kingdom	Mixed methods	Yes	Article
28	Durodie, B.	2016	Securitising education to prevent terrorism or losing direction	United Kingdom	Theoretical	Yes	Article
29	Elwick, A. & Jerome, L.	2019	Balancing securitisation and education in schools: Teachers' agency in implementing the Prevent duty	United Kingdom	Qualitative	Yes	Article
30	Ezegwu, C., Adedokun, A. O. & Ezegwu, C.	2018	Street children, integrated education and violence in northern Nigeria	Nigeria	Theoretical	Yes	Book chapter
31	Ezekiel, R. S.	2002	An ethnographer looks at neo-nazi and klan groups: The racist mind revisited	USA	Qualitative	Yes	Article
32	Faure-Walker, R.	2019	Teachers as informants: countering extremism and promoting violence	United Kingdom	Qualitative	Yes	Article

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No.	Authors	Year	Title	Region	Methodology	Peer-reviewed	Type
33	Ford, K.	2019	This violence good, that violence bad: Normative and state-centric discourses in British school textbooks	United Kingdom	Qualitative	Yes	Article
34	Gearon, L.	2013	The counter terrorist classroom: Religion, education, and security	Unspecified	Qualitative	Yes	Article
35	Gearon, L.	2015	Education, security and intelligence studies	Unspecified	Qualitative	Yes	Article
36	Gearon, L.	2017	Secularisation and the securitisation of the sacred. A response to Lewin's framing of the Gearon-Jackson debate	Unspecified	Qualitative	Yes	Article
37	Gearon, L.	2018	Terrorism and counter-terrorism policy and research in UK universities (1997–2017): An analytic-structural review of the literature and related sources	Unspecified	Review	Yes	Article
38	Gearon, L.	2019	Campus conspiracies: Security and intelligence engagement with universities from Kent State to counter-terrorism	Unspecified	Theoretical	Yes	Article
39	Ghaill, M. M. A & Haywood, C.	2014	Pakistani and Bangladeshi young men: Re-racialization, class and masculinity within the Neo-liberal school	United Kingdom	Qualitative	Yes	Article
40	Ghosh, R., Chan, W. Y. A., Manuel, A. & Dilimulati, M.	2017	Can education counter violent religious extremism?	Unspecified	Theoretical	Yes	Article
41	Gielen, A. J.	2017	Countering violent extremism: A realist review for assessing what works, for whom, in what circumstances, and how	Global	Review	Yes	Article
42	Goldberg, T.	2014	Looking at their side of the conflict? Effects of single versus multiple perspective history Teaching on Jewish and Arab adolescents' attitude to out-group narratives and in-group responsibility	Israel	Quantitative	Yes	Article
43	Haavelsrud, M.	2009	Review: Education, political socialization and extremism	Global	Theoretical	Yes	Article
44	Halafoff, A., Lam, K & Bouma, G.	2019	Worldviews education: Cosmopolitan peacebuilding and preventing violent extremism	Australia	Qualitative	Yes	Article
45	Harris-Hogan, S., Barrelle, K. & Smith, D.	2019	The role of schools and education in countering violent extremism (CVE): applying lessons from Western countries to Australian CVE policy	Global	Theoretical	Yes	Article

Appendix A – Table of reviewed literature

No.	Authors	Year	Title	Region	Methodology	Peer-reviewed	Type
46	Hirschfield, P. J.	2008	Preparing for prison? The criminalization of school discipline in the USA	USA	Theoretical	Yes	Article
47	Hirschfield, P. J. & Celinska, K	2011	Beyond fear: Sociological perspectives on the criminalization of school discipline	USA	Theoretical	Yes	Article
48	Krueger, A. B. & Maleckova, J.	2003	Education, poverty, political violence and terrorism: Is there a causal connection?	Global	Quantitative	Yes	Article
49	Kühle, L. & Lindekilde, L.	2010	Radicalization among young Muslims in Aarhus	Denmark	Qualitative	No	Report
50	Kundnani, A.	2009	Spooked! How not to prevent violent extremism	United Kingdom	Qualitative	No	Report
51	Kupchik, A. & Ellis, N.	2008	School discipline and security: Fair for all students?	USA	Quantitative	Yes	Article
52	Kyriacou, C., Szczepek, R., Said, F. & Davies, I.	2017	British Muslim university students' perceptions of Prevent and its impact on their sense of identity	United Kingdom	Quantitative	Yes	Article
53	Lankford, A.	2013	A comparative analysis of suicide terrorists and rampage, workplace and school shooters in the United States from 1990 to 2010	USA	Mixed methods	Yes	Article
54	Leeman, Y. & Wardekker, W.	2012	The contested professionalism of teachers meeting radicalising youth in their classrooms	Netherland	Qualitative	Yes	Article
55	Lid, S., Winsvold, M., Sobolt, S., Hansen, S. I., Heierstad, G. & Klausen, J. E.	2016	Preventing radicalisation and violent extremism: What is the role of the municipality?	Norway	Qualitative	No	Report
56	Lindekilde, L.	2012	Neo-liberal governing of 'radicals': Danish radicalization prevention policies and potential iatrogenic effects	Denmark	Qualitative	Yes	Article
57	Lindekilde, L.	2015	Danish prevention of extremism and radicalization 2009-2014: Developments and future challenges	Denmark	Theoretical	Yes	Article
58	Lindekilde, L. & Sedgwick, M.	2012	Impact of counter-terrorism on communities : Denmark background report	Denmark	Mixed methods	No	Report
59	Lockley-Scott, A.	2019	Towards a critique of fundamental British values: The case of the classroom	United Kingdom	Theoretical	Yes	Article
60	Lundie, D.	2019	Building a terrorist house on sand: A critical incident analysis of interprofessionality and the Prevent Duty in schools in England	United Kingdom	Qualitative	Yes	Article
61	Lundie, D.	2019	Social and civic education in an age of extremisms	Global	Theoretical	Yes	Article
62	Macaluso, A.	2016	From countering to preventing radicalization through education: Limits and opportunities	Global	Theoretical	Yes	Working paper

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Appendix A – Table of reviewed literature

No.	Authors	Year	Title	Region	Methodology	Peer-reviewed	Type
63	Macnair, L. & Frank, R.	2017	Voices against extremism: A case study of a community-based CVE counter-narrative campaign	Canada	Qualitative	Yes	Article
64	Marsden, S. V.	2018	Negotiating difference in education. Extremism, political agency and an ethics of care	Global	Theoretical	Yes	Book chapter
65	Mattsson, C.	2018	Caught between the urgent and the comprehensible: professionals' understanding of violent extremism	Sweden	Qualitative	Yes	Article
66	Mattsson, C.	2019	Policing violent extremism: How the global war on terror meandered into local municipal policies in Sweden	Sweden	Qualitative	Yes	Article
67	Mattsson, C. & Johansson, T.	2020	Life trajectories into and out of contemporary neo-nazism	Sweden	Qualitative	Yes	Book
68	Mattsson, C., Hammaren, N. & Odenbring, Y.	2016	Youth 'at risk': A critical discourse analysis of the European Commission's radicalisation awareness network collection of approaches and practices used in education	Europe	Qualitative	Yes	Article
69	Mattsson, C. & Säljö, R.	2018	Violent extremism, national security and prevention. Institutional discourses and their implications for schooling	Sweden	Qualitative	Yes	Article
70	McCully, A.	2006	Practitioner perceptions of their role in facilitating the handling of controversial issues in contested societies: A Northern Irish experience	Northern Ireland	Qualitative	Yes	Article
71	McGlynn, C. & McDaid, S.	2016	Radicalisation and higher education: Students' understanding and experiences	United Kingdom	Qualitative	Yes	Article
72	Miller, J.	2013	REsilience, violent extremism and religious education	United Kingdom	Theoretical	Yes	Article
73	Miller, J.	2018	Challenging extremism and promoting cohesion. National policies and local implementation	United Kingdom	Qualitative	Yes	Book chapter
74	Miller, D., Mills, T. & Harkins, S.	2011	Teaching about terrorism in the United Kingdom: How it is done and what problems it causes	United Kingdom	Mixed methods	Yes	Article
75	Mitchell, M. R.	2016	Radicalization in British Columbia secondary schools: The principals' perspective	Canada	Mixed methods	Yes	Article
76	O'Donnell, A.	2016	Contagious ideas: Vulnerability, epistemic injustice and counter-terrorism in education	United Kingdom	Theoretical	Yes	Article
77	O'Donnell, A.	2016	Securitisation, counterterrorism and the silencing of dissent: The educational implications of Prevent	United Kingdom	Qualitative	Yes	Article

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Appendix A – Table of reviewed literature

No.	Authors	Year	Title	Region	Methodology	Peer-reviewed	Type
78	O'Donnell, A.	2017	Pedagogical injustice and counter-terrorist education	United Kingdom	Theoretical	Yes	Article
79	Onursal, R. & Kirkpatrick, D.	2019	Is extremism the 'new' terrorism? The convergence of 'extremism' and 'terrorism' in British Parliamentary discourse	United Kingdom	Qualitative	Yes	Article
80	Orlandrew, E. D., Yes, Y. Y. & Pfannenstiel, M.	2018	Does education mitigate terrorism? Exameming the effects of educated youth cohorts on domestic terror in Africa	Africa	Theoretical	Yes	Article
81	Panjwani, F. & Khimani, Z.	2018	Misplaced Utopia Education and extremism – the case of Pakistan	Pakistan	Theoretical	Yes	Book chapter
82	Panjwani, F., Revell, L., Gholami, R. & Diboll, M.	2018	Introduction	Global	Theoretical	Yes	Book chapter
83	Pedersen, W., Vestel, V. & Bakken, A.	2018	At risk for radicalization and jihadism? A population-based study of Norwegian adolescents	Norway	Quantitative	Yes	Article
84	Peguero, A. A., Portillos, E. L. & González, J. C.	2015	School securitization and Latina/o educational progress	USA	Quantitative	Yes	Article
85	Pels, T. & de Ruyter, D. J.	2012	The influence of education and socialization on radicalization: An exploration of theoretical presumptions and empirical research	Europe	Review	Yes	Article
86	Piazza, J. A.	2006	Rooted in poverty?: Terrorism, poor economic development, and social cleavages	Global	Quantitative	Yes	Article
87	Powll, L.	2016	Counter-productive counter-terrorism: How is the dysfunctional discourse of PREVENT failing to restrain radicalization?	United Kingdom	Theoretical	Yes	Article
88	Qurashi, F.	2017	Just get on with it: Implementing the Prevent Duty in higher education and the role of academic expertise	United Kingdom	Qualitative	Yes	Article
89	Quartermaine, A	2016	Discussing terrorism: A student-inspired guide to UK counter-terrorism policy implementation in religious education classrooms in Britain	United Kingdom	Qualitative	Yes	Article
90	Quartermaine, A	2018	Education, freedom of belief and countering terrorism. The minefield between UK policy and school implementation	United Kingdom	Theoretical	Yes	Book chapter
91	Ramsay, P.	2017	Is Prevent a safe space?	United Kingdom	Theoretical	Yes	Article

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No.	Authors	Year	Title	Region	Methodology	Peer-reviewed	Type
92	Revell, L.	2018	Resilience and soft power. An analysis of UK government and international guidelines and resources to address radicalisation and extremism in education	United Kingdom	Theoretical	Yes	Book chapter
93	Saeed, T.	2018	Education and disengagement. Extremism and the perception of Muslim students	United Kingdom	Qualitative	Yes	Book chapter
94	Saeed, T. & Johnson, D.	2016	Intelligence, global terrorism and higher education	United Kingdom	Qualitative	Yes	Article
95	Sandberg, S., Oksanen, A., Berntzen, L. E. & Kiilakoski, T.	2014	Stories in action: The cultural influences of school shootings on the terrorist attacks in Norway	Norway	Theoretical	Yes	Article
96	Sandford, L.	2019	Exploring the capabilities of Prevent in adressing radicalisation in cyberspace within higher education	United Kingdom	Qualitative	Yes	Article
97	Scott-Baumann, A.	2017	Ideology, utopia and Islam on campus: How to free speech a little from its own terrors	United Kingdom	Theoretical	Yes	Article
98	Sewell, A. & Hulusi, H.	2016	Preventing radicalisation to extreme positions in children and young people. What does the literature tell us and should educational psychology respond?	Global	Review	Yes	Article
99	Sheikh, S., Sarwar, S. & Reed, C.	2010	Teaching methods that help to build resilience to extremism. Rapid evidence assessment	Global	Review	No	Report
100	Sieckelinck, S. M. A. & de Ruyter, D. J.	2009	Mad about ideals? Educating children to become reasonably passionate	n/a	Theoretical	Yes	Article
101	Sieckelinck, S. M. A., Kaulingfreks, F. & de Winter, M.	2015	Neither villains nor victims: Towards an educational perspective on radicalisation	Netherland	Qualitative	Yes	Article
102	Sjøen, M.M.	2019	School in the age of prevention	Norway	Qualitative	Yes	Book chapter
103	Sjøen, M.M.	2019	When counterterrorism enters the curriculum: How the global war on terror risks impairing good education	Norway	Qualitative	No	Article
104	Sjøen, M.M. & Jore, S. H.	2019	Preventing extremism through education: Exploring impacts and implications of counterradicalisation efforts	Global	Review	Yes	Article
105	Sjøen, M.M. & Jore, S. H.	2019	How the counter-radicalization discourse securitizes education and why this might not be an effective approach to preventing terrorism	Norway	Qualitative	Yes	Article

No.	Authors	Year	Title	Region	Methodology	Peer-reviewed	Type
106	Sjoen, M.M. & Mattsson, C.	2019	Preventing radicalisation in Norwegian schools: How teachers respond to counter-radicalisation efforts	Norway	Qualitative	No	Manuscript
107	Sklad, M. & Park, E.	2017	Examining the potential role of education in the prevention of radicalization from the psychological perspective	Global	Review	Yes	Article
108	Slater, A.M.	2018	Challenging the legitimacy of extremism. Critique through education in the work of Khaled Abou El Fadl	United Kingdom	Theoretical	Yes	Book chapter
109	Standford, B. & Ahmed, Y.	2016	The prevent strategy: The human rights implications of the United Kingdom's counter-radicalization policy	United Kingdom	Theoretical	Yes	Article
110	Stephens, W., Sieckelinck, S. & Boutellier, H.	2018	Preventing violent extremism: A review of the literature	Global	Review	Yes	Article
111	Streitwieser, B., Allen, K. & Duffy-Jaeger, K.	2019	Higher education in an era of violent extremism: Exploring tensions between national security and academic freedom	Europe	Qualitative	Yes	Article
112	Sukarieh, M. & Tannock, S.	2016	The deradicalisation of education: terror, youth and the assault on learning	Global	Theoretical	Yes	Article
113	Sukarieh, M. & Tannock, S.	2017	The global securitisation of youth	Global	Theoretical	Yes	Article
114	Taylor, L. & Soni, A.	2017	Preventing radicalisation: A systematic review of literature considering the lived experiences of the UK's Prevent Strategy in educational settings	United Kingdom	Review	Yes	Article
115	Thomas, P.	2009	Between two stools? The Government's 'preventing violent extremism' agenda	United Kingdom	Mixed methods	Yes	Article
116	Thomas, P.	2012	Responding to the threat of violent extremism: failing to prevent	United Kingdom	Mixed methods	No	Book
117	Thomas, P.	2016	Youth, terrorism and education: Britain's prevent programme	United Kingdom	Mixed methods	Yes	Article
118	Thomas, P.	2017	Changing experiences of responsibilisation and contestation within counter-terrorism policies: the British Prevent experience	United Kingdom	Theoretical	Yes	Article
119	Thornton, P.	2011	Counterterrorism and the neo-liberal university: Providing a check and balance	United Kingdom	Theoretical	Yes	Article

Appendix A – Table of reviewed literature

No.	Authors	Year	Title	Region	Methodology	Peer-reviewed	Type
120	van San, M., Sieckelinck, S. & Winter, M. de	2013	Ideals adrift: An educational approach to radicalisation	Netherlands	Qualitative	Yes	Article
121	Vestel, V. J. & Bakken, A.	2016	Attitudes towards extremism. Results from 'Young in Oslo 2015'	Norway	Quantitative	No	Report
122	White, J. A.	2018	'Mine own familiar friend …': education and extremism, within historic culture	n/a	Theoretical	Yes	Book chapter
123	Wilner, A. S. & Dubouloz, C. J.	2010	Homegrown terrorism and transformative learning: An interdisciplinary approach to understanding radicalization	n/a	Theoretical	Yes	Article
124	Wilner, A. S. & Dubouloz, C. J	2011	Transformative radicalization: Applying learning theory to Islamist radicalization	n/a	Theoretical	Yes	Article
125	Wolton, S.	2017	The contradiction in the Prevent Duty: Democracy vs 'British values'	United Kingdom	Theoretical	Yes	Article
126	Wood, P.	2018	Teaching early Muslim history: Facilitating criticality through a source-based approach	United Kingdom	Qualitative	Yes	Book chapter
127	Young, H. F., Rooze, M. & Holsappel, J.	2015	Translating conceptualization into practical suggestions: What the literature on radicalization can offer to practitioners	Global	Review	Yes	Article
128	Østby, G. & Urdal, H	2010	Education and civil conflict: A review of the quantitative, empirical literature	Global	Review	No	Background paper

Appendix B – Table of research participants

Table 3. Overview of research participants

Participants	Gender	Age	Profession	School type	Region
Interviewee 1	Male	46	Educator	Lower secondary	Western region
Interviewee 2	Male	56	Educator	Lower secondary	Western region
Interviewee 3	Female	52	Educator	Upper secondary	Southeast region
Interviewee 4	Female	41	Educator	Upper secondary	Southeast region
Interviewee 5	Female	59	Social worker	Municipality	Western region
Interviewee 6	Female	41	Educator	Upper secondary	Midlands region
Interviewee 7	Male	47	Educator	Lower secondary	Southeast region
Interviewee 8	Male	41	Social worker	Municipality	Western region
Interviewee 9	Male	36	Social worker	Municipality	Northern region
Interviewee 10	Female	49	Social worker	Municipality	Southeast region
Interviewee 11	Male	43	Educator	Lower secondary	Western region
Interviewee 12	Male	59	Educator	Upper secondary	Southeast region
Interviewee 13	Female	43	Educator	Upper secondary	Southeast region
Interviewee 14	Female	58	Social worker	Municipality	Southeast region
Interviewee 15	Male	42	Educator	Upper secondary	Western region
Interviewee 16	Male	48	Educator	Upper secondary	Western region
Interviewee 17	Male	54	Social worker	Municipality	Midlands region
Interviewee 18	Female	49	Educator	Lower secondary	Midlands region
Interviewee 19	Female	59	Educator	Upper secondary	Western region
Interviewee 20	Male	52	Educator	Lower secondary	Northern region
Interviewee 21	Female	59	Educator	Lower secondary	Northern region
Interviewee 22	Female	48	Educator	Upper secondary	Midlands region
Interviewee 23	Male	63	Social worker	Municipality	Southeast region

Appendix C – Interview guide (Norwegian)

Bakgrunn

Hva legger du i begrepene *radikalisering*, *voldelig ekstremisme* og *terrorisme*?

Hva tror du er årsaker til at noen mennesker kan bli radikalisert eller trukket mot ekstreme miljø eller grupper?

Hvilke radikale eller ekstreme grupper, bevegelser eller ideologier opplever du at utgjør en trussel i Norge i dag?

Opplever du at denne tematikken er en økende problem nasjonalt eller internasjonalt?

Opplever du at fokuset på denne tematikken er økende nasjonalt og internasjonalt?

Andre ting?

Styringsdokumenter

Har du kjennskap til regjeringens handlingsplaner eller andre styringsdokument og bestemmelser som kan relateres til forebygging av radikalisering og voldelig ekstremisme?

Har du kjennskap til lovverk som kan relateres til forebygging av radikalisering og voldelig ekstremisme?

Har du kjennskap til organisasjoner, aktører, nettsteder eller andre ressurser som kan knyttes til denne tematikken?

Har du kjennskap til om din kommune/fylkeskommune har utarbeidet lokale handlingsplaner og/eller prosedyrer i forebyggingen av radikalisering og voldelig ekstremisme?

Andre ting?

Skolens rolle

Hvem mener du har det overordnede ansvaret for sikkerhet og beredskap i skole og utdanning i Norge?

Hvem mener du har det overordnede ansvaret for sikkerhet og beredskap på den enkelte skole i Norge?

Har skolen etter ditt syn et ansvar i det forebyggende arbeidet mot radikalisering, og hva mener du eventuelt at det bør være?

Er radikalisering og voldelig ekstremisme en tematikk som er eller har blitt diskutert på din arbeidsplass?

Har du fått opplæring eller informasjon om forebygging og forhindring av radikalisering og voldelig ekstremisme på din skole?

Opplever du at du har tilstrekkelig med kunnskap om radikalisering og voldelig ekstremisme?

Andre ting?

Praktisk forebygging

Har du erfaring med å forebygge eller forhindre at elever blir radikalisert gjennom ditt eget arbeid i skolen?

Kjenner du til noen prosedyrer for å forebygge eller forhindre radikalisering av elever?

Hvilke bekymringstegn ser du etter hos elever som kan være i faresonen for å bli radikalisert?

Har du vært i dialog med elever som du opplever er eller kan være i faresonen for å bli eller å være radikalisert?

Har du drøftet elever som du opplever er eller kan være i faresonen for å bli radikalisert med ansatte i skolen, pårørende eller andre aktører?

Har du samhandlet med andre aktører om elever som er identifisert i faresonen for radikalisering og voldelig ekstremisme?

Hvilke samarbeidspartnere opplever du som viktige i dette forebyggingsarbeidet?

Har du meldt ifra bekymring til SLT, Barnevernet, politiet eller PST?

Har du erfaring med oppfølgingsarbeid av elever som har vært identifisert i faresonen for å bli eller å være radikalisert?

Andre ting?

Andre forhold

Hvilke tanker har du om skoleskyting eller andre trusselsituasjoner som mulig scenario i norske skoler?

Mener du det er god sikring mot skoleskyting eller andre trusselsituasjoner i norske skoler generelt eller på din arbeidsplass spesielt?

Er det andre tiltak som kan styrke sikkerhet og beredskap i norske skoler generelt?

Utfordringer

Er det noen utfordringer du ser ved at skolen trekkes inn i arbeidet med å forebygge radikalisering av unge mennesker?

Ser du noe spenningsforhold og konflikter mellom skolens overordnede formål fra politiske og samfunnsmessige forventinger om å forebygge radikalisering og voldelig ekstremisme?

Har du egne erfaringer med at tematikken forebygging av radikalisering kan skape usikkerhet og frykt for deg eller dine kollegaer?

Hva er dine tanker om å kategorisere enkelte elever eller elevgrupper som «sårbare» for radikale eller ekstreme tankegods?

Har du noen tanker om at økt fokus på sikkerhet i skolen kan stå i motsetning til andre grunnleggende verdier eller idealer i den opplæringen?

Andre ting?

Appendix D – Research approval NSD (Norwegian)

NSD

Martin Meggele Sjøen
Institutt for medie-, kultur- og samfunnsfag Universitetet i Stavanger
Postboks 8002 Postterminalen
4068 STAVANGER

Vår dato: 29.05.2017   Vår ref: 54062 / 3 / BGH   Deres dato: Deres ref:

TILBAKEMELDING PÅ MELDING OM BEHANDLING AV PERSONOPPLYSNINGER

Vi viser til melding om behandling av personopplysninger, mottatt 08.04.2017. Meldingen gjelder prosjektet:

54062	*Preventing Radicalization through Education. The securitization of public education in Norway*
Behandlingsansvarlig	Universitetet i Stavanger, ved institusjonens øverste leder
Daglig ansvarlig	Martin Meggele Sjøen

Personvernombudet har vurdert prosjektet og finner at behandlingen av personopplysninger er meldepliktig i henhold til personopplysningsloven § 31. Behandlingen tilfredsstiller kravene i personopplysningsloven.

Personvernombudets vurdering forutsetter at prosjektet gjennomføres i tråd med opplysningene gitt i meldeskjemaet, korrespondanse med ombudet, ombudets kommentarer samt personopplysningsloven og helseregisterloven med forskrifter. Behandlingen av personopplysninger kan settes i gang.

Det gjøres oppmerksom på at det skal gis ny melding dersom behandlingen endres i forhold til de opplysninger som ligger til grunn for personvernombudets vurdering. Endringsmeldinger gis via et eget skjema, http://www.nsd.uib.no/personvernombud/meld_prosjekt/meld_endringer.html. Det skal også gis melding etter tre år dersom prosjektet fortsatt pågår. Meldinger skal skje skriftlig til ombudet.

Personvernombudet har lagt ut opplysninger om prosjektet i en offentlig database, http://pvo.nsd.no/prosjekt.

Personvernombudet vil ved prosjektets avslutning, 31.12.2019, rette en henvendelse angående status for behandlingen av personopplysninger.

Vennlig hilsen

Kjersti Haugstvedt

Belinda Gloppen Helle

Kontaktperson: Belinda Gloppen Helle tlf: 55 58 28 74
Vedlegg: Prosjektvurdering

Dokumentet er elektronisk produsert og godkjent ved NSDs rutiner for elektronisk godkjenning.

NSD – Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS   Harald Hårfagres gate 29   Tel: +47-55 58 21 17   nsd@nsd.no   Org.nr. 985 321 884
NSD – Norwegian Centre for Research Data   NO-5007 Bergen, NORWAY   Faks: +47-55 58 96 50   www.nsd.no

Personvernombudet for forskning

Prosjektvurdering - Kommentar

Prosjektnr: 54062

INFORMASJON OG SAMTYKKE

Utvalget informeres skriftlig og muntlig om prosjektet og samtykker til deltakelse. Informasjonsskrivet er godt utformet, men det må presiseres at datamaterialet skal anonymiseres ved prosjektslutt 31.12.2019.

TAUSHETSPLIKT

Lærere og øvrige ansatte som er deltakere i prosjektet har taushetsplikt. Dette innebærer at de ikke kan uttale seg på en måte som identifiserer enkeltpersoner eller taushetsbelagt informasjon. Vi anbefaler at du er spesielt oppmerksom på at ikke bare navn, men også identifiserende bakgrunnsopplysninger må utelates, som for eksempel alder, kjønn, tid, diagnoser og eventuelle spesielle hendelser. Vi forutsetter også at dere er forsiktig ved å bruke eksempler under intervjuene. Personvernombudet legger med dette til grunn at du ikke innhenter personopplysninger om noen elever, og at taushetsplikten ikke er til hinder for den behandling av opplysninger som finner sted.

Stipendiaten og informantene har et felles ansvar for at det ikke kommer frem taushetsbelagte opplysninger under intervjuene. Det kan derfor være hensiktsmessig om stipendiaten avklarer dette med informanten i forkant av intervjuet.

INFORMASJONSSIKKERHET

Personvernombudet legger til grunn at forsker etterfølger Universitetet i Stavanger sine interne rutiner for datasikkerhet.

PROSJEKTSLUTT OG ANONYMISERING

Forventet prosjektslutt er 31.12.2019. Ifølge prosjektmeldingen skal innsamlede opplysninger da anonymiseres. Anonymisering innebærer å bearbeide datamaterialet slik at ingen enkeltpersoner kan gjenkjennes. Det gjøres ved å:

- slette direkte personopplysninger (som navn/koblingsnøkkel)
- slette/omskrive indirekte personopplysninger (identifiserende sammenstilling av bakgrunnsopplysninger som f.eks. bosted/arbeidssted, alder og kjønn)
- slette lydopptak

Appendix E – Information and consent form (Norwegian)

Forespørsel om deltakelse i forskningsprosjektet

Skolens rolle i forebygging av radikalisering

Bakgrunn og formål

Hvordan kan skolens forebygge at unge mennesker radikaliseres og trekkes mot voldelig ekstremisme? Dette spørsmålet skal jeg forsøke å finne svar på i et nytt doktorgradsprosjekt ved Universitetet i Stavanger. Hva er skolens ansvar og hvordan kan offentlig opplæring forebygge eller forhindre at unge mennesker trekkes mot ekstreme miljøer eller ideologier. På bakgrunn av denne problemstillingen inviterer jeg et utvalg lærere, skoleledere og andre profesjonsarbeidere til deltakelse i prosjektet.

Hva innebærer deltakelse i studien?

Jeg vil gjennomføre semistrukturete intervju hvor det på forhånd er notert en del temaer og spørsmål som jeg ønsker å fokusere på.

Hva skjer med informasjonen om deg?

Alle personopplysninger vil bli behandlet konfidensielt. Det er kun autorisert personell tilknyttet prosjektet som har adgang til informasjonen. Det vil ikke være mulig å identifisere deg i resultatene av studien når disse publiseres. Informasjonen som registreres om deg skal kun brukes slik som beskrevet i hensikten med studien. Denne delen av prosjektet skal etter planen avsluttes 31.1.2018

Frivillig deltakelse

Det er frivillig å delta i studien. Du kan når som helst og uten å oppgi noen grunn trekke ditt samtykke til å delta i studien. Dette vil ikke få noen konsekvenser. Om du sier ja til å delta nå, kan du senere trekke tilbake ditt samtykke inntil fristen 31.12.2017. Dersom du senere ønsker å trekke deg eller har spørsmål til studien, kan du kontakte Martin Sjøen på 466 82 895 eller martin.sjoen@uis.no

Studien er meldt til Personvernombudet for forskning, NSD - Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS.

Samtykke til deltakelse i studien

Jeg har mottatt informasjon om studien, og er villig til å delta

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(Signert av prosjektdeltaker, dato)