Rational beliefs
- inconsistent practices.

Civil Military Coordination in North-Afghanistan.

By

Lillian Katarina Stene

University of
Stavanger

Do not be too hard,
Lest you be broken,
Do not be too soft,
Lest you be squeezed.

Ali ibn Abi Talib.

To my father Arnold,
- a wise and caring soldier.

Preface

The reason for my interest in civil military coordination originally stemmed from my Master's thesis in Risk Analysis and Societal Safety. The master thesis displayed coordination problems between the civil and military actors, and I wanted to examine what the reasons for this might be. Another motivation was my participation in the NATO-led Multinational Experiments (MNE) during my employment at the Norwegian Joint Operational Headquarter (FOHK). The MNE work represented interesting theoretical ideas and insight in the complexity and challenges in civil military coordination. Besides, how can one *not* be interested in international relations, societal safety, conflicts and complex emergencies which have such major influence on people's lives? I started to play with the thought that it might be possible for me to deploy to a mission in a conflict area to have my own experiences, and maybe find some of the reasons for why it seemed so difficult for the international response system to succeed.

Because of my reserve officer background, I had the opportunity to go to Afghanistan to study the response system or to be more exact - the civil military coordination aspect - from the inside of an international organization such as the NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). My first intent was to study the relations between civilian and military actors in Afghanistan from both sides, what was it that made the coordination so difficult? For various reasons, the focus changed toward ISAF, how it handled the civil military coordination in North Afghanistan.

My struggle to gather data, to handle classified information, and to analyze and display these data coherently has taken more than four years. It has been an interesting journey in many ways, and the learning curve has been both steep, and not at least, a long one.

This thesis could not have been done without the positive attitude from the Norwegian Armed Forces. Even though I am a reserve officer, it was not a matter of course that my abilities was of the level that I would be trusted and trained as a civil military coordination (CIMIC) officer, representing the Norwegian Armed Forces in the German led ISAF Regional Command North (RCN) in North-Afghanistan. Here I would like to thank Kristin Lund as a

Summary

What was the idea?

Coordination is a vital element of crisis management (Turner, 1978; Minear et al., 1992; Schneider, 1995; Rasmussen, 1997; Strand, 2003; Boin et al., 2005; Kruke and Olsen, 2005; Keen, 2008). The coordination between civil and military actors is especially crucial and complicated if the crisis is characterized by political (military), economic, and social conflict, as displayed in Afghanistan.

Civil and military actors have different organizational cultures, standard operating procedures, aims and priorities. Still, they are often forced to coordinate in order to perform their humanitarian, political and military tasks in joint efforts to assist the local populations in a complex emergency.

To manage this coordination, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in North-Afghanistan operated under three concepts: the Comprehensive Approach (CA), Counterinsurgency (COIN), and the NATO civil-military coordination (CIMIC) doctrine. These three approaches, to some extent, overlapped, to some extent were contradictory, but most important; they were differently understood and implemented with various levels of success.

ISAF, as a powerful military actor in Afghanistan, consists of many high qualified and capable soldiers at all levels. The question is whether it is possible for such an organization as ISAF to handle crisis management under the guidance of these coordination concepts and the broad mandates operational in Afghanistan?

To enlighten this, the structures and processes in ISAF organization are studied in order to assess how these structures/ processes influenced the civil military coordination in the field. With the aim of contributing to the enhanced knowledge about civil military coordination, I put forth the following research question:

- *How do ISAF structures and processes influence civil military coordination in North Afghanistan?*

In the analysis I have applied theories of security and the new wars, complex emergencies and, in particular, organizational theories with a basis in bureaucracy-theory and new-institutional perspectives. The rationale behind this choice was that military organizations are normally viewed as representatives of rational bureaucratic organizations, having structures and processes that characterize rational organizations (Weber, 1971; Banfield, 1959; Lindblom, 1959). The new-institutional perspective is meant to be a tool to explain the shortcomings of rationally built organizations and the influence of the surrounding environment (Greenwood et al., 2008; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Further, the use of Turner (1976/1978) and Turner and Pigeon's (1997) theories of man-made disasters enlighten the crisis management perspective.

What was done?

To be able to understand and collect genuine data about ISAF's influence on civil military coordination, it was essential to get personal experiences from the field**.** After attending pre-deployment courses I was sent to North Afghanistan as a CIMIC officer, doing participant-observer research for a seven month fieldwork. Back home, the data was systematized and followed up the year after by a new field work in the same operation area, then in the role of a declared researcher, for enhanced data collection based on interviews and meetings.

As a CIMIC officer I followed the ISAF "project factory" in North-Afghanistan. The "project factory" were local, regional or national ongoing projects characterized by military involvement and extensive civil military coordination, - through which I studied many parallel processes. I did not have the opportunity to follow any of these projects from planning to implementation and evaluation, as projects at this level often were ongoing for years, and my deployment represented seven months in line with the military rotation system. Consequently, to many ISAF officers including myself, these projects represented "a running train" in which one had to jump on and off on the way. Still, the processes in the six projects in which I participated became vital sources of information in my data collection.

After getting a picture of ISAF structure and processes during my first field-work, I focused more on the understanding and interpretation of ISAF mandate and civil military concepts in the second follow up field-work. Civil and military personnel representing three levels were interviewed: ISAF Joint Command (IJC) in Kabul, the subordinated Regional Command North (RCN) in nearby Mazar-e Sharif and the RCN subordinated Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), representing many countries, stationed in different provinces. Also document analysis, meetings, discussions and field conversations contributed to my data collection.

What came out of it?

By studying ISAF organization in North Afghanistan, influential aspects to civil military coordination became apparent.

It is essential to acknowledge the importance of cultural awareness and understanding of the context in a so-called "out of area" operation such as the one ISAF conducted in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Western way of conflict management based on Western logic, rationality, expectations, and traditions might not be appropriate. One also needs to acknowledge the difference between civilian and military actors.

As experienced in the studied projects military tend to be action-minded with a high sense of responsibility and control. This might result in narrower thinking in line with their own training and experience for accomplishing a mission with a specific, usually short timeline. Civilian actors, even though they are very varied, more often have a long term perspective and focus on the local structures and processes. Successful, sustainable projects presuppose local ownership, which mostly requires a long term perspective. Accordingly, when military actors are engaged in the civilian sphere as presupposed in the overall civil military coordination concepts applicable for ISAF, this requires a long term perspective, consistency, and clear lines of role performance and responsibility.

This was not the case. ISAF displayed internal diversity in preparedness, priorities, and policy. The practice of ISAF civil-military coordination did not

ensure local ownership of projects, as they were mostly ISAF planned and executed, within a strict timeline.

An important source of ISAF coordination problems were the unclear civil military concepts of CA, COIN and CIMIC or Civil Affairs doctrine. The concepts were differently understood, prioritized, and interpreted in different NATO and non-NATO ISAF participating nations, as well as on the different ISAF organizational levels, being well known in upper headquarters and more or less unknown or ignored out in the field. Besides, this diversity of interpretation of the concepts also led to organizational inconsistency, hampering appropriate coordination with the local environment and other actors presupposed for an appropriate crisis management. The ISAF inconsistency gave a picture of an organization with many nuances which coordinating actors found difficult to read.

Findings show how ISAF, an intended rational bureaucratic organization, was faced with diversity and inconsistency in organizational structures, as well as training, planning, and role performance. Accordingly, ISAF strove to keep the needed unity of effort that characterizes a functional military organization.

Structural problems such as a very top heavy organization, different organized headquarters, and multiple reporting lines influenced and complicated civil military coordination processes in general, as well as in the planning and execution of projects.

Military planning and decision-making processes were exigent, with no overall clear end-state[1] or aim to measure the activity against and the multiple reporting lines complicating the information and communication processes. Besides, the vague and broad ISAF mandate gave plenty of room for varied interpretation and practice.

Additionally, internal coordination were hampered by different national policies and trainings before mission, as well as the fact that ISAF-participating nations had different national caveats that blocked the unity of effort as well as an efficient command and control structure.

---

[1] End state is a military term used in this thesis, meaning the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the Commanders' objectives.

Findings also indicate that theories like rational and new-institutional organization theories are applicable when analyzing the military structures, processes, and role performance, and how this affects civil military coordination. Nevertheless, the most important contribution of this thesis is empirical, composed as it is of a data collection that would have been very difficult to achieve without being on the inside of the organization.

This research shows how important it is to make clear distinction between civilian and military responsibilities, in time and space, if and when military is involved in civilian projects. If military actors are engaged in civil military coordination tasks and projects they should not be a subject to the same logic of action as the kinetic units. Further, if military is supposed to keep security, a more strict and joint military command and control system, as well as a more specific defined concept of action and tasks is necessary.

Content

XIV

XV

XVI

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
ACO	Allied Command Operations
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AIA	Afghan Interim Administration
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANBP	Afghan National Border Police
ANDMA	Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghanistan National Security Forces
ANSO	Afghanistan NGO Security Office
AOO	Area of Operation
APRP	Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program
AREU	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
ATA	Afghan Transitional Authority
BMTF	Border Management Task Force
BXP	Border Cross Point
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CAAT	Counterinsurgency Advisor and Assistant Team/ COMISAF Advisor and Assistant Team
CAT	Civil Affairs Team

CCOE	CIMIC Centre of Excellence
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CFC	CIMIC Fusion Centre
CIDNE	Combined Information Data Network Exchange
CIMIC	Civil Military Coordination/Cooperation
CJ	Combined Joint
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COM	Commander
COMISAF	Commander of International Security Assistance Force
COS	Chief of Staff
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
DCOM	Deputy Commander
DCOS	Directing Chief of Security (or Directing Chief of Support)
DDP	District Development Program (Afghan/United Nation led)
DDP	District Delivery Program (Afghan/ ISAF led)
DOS	Deputy of Staff
EU	European Union
EUPOL	European Union Police
FEY	Feyzabad
FOB	Forward Operation Base
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
F-RIC	Force Reintegration Cell

GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GO	Governmental Organization
GPPT	German Police Project Team
GS	General Staff
GTZ	Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HIG	Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin
HOTO	Handover/take over
HSTY	Hærens Styrker (Norwegian Army)
HTT	Human Terrain Teams
HQ	Headquarters
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDLG	Independent Directorate of Local Governance (Afghan)
IDP	Internal Displaced Personnel
IED	Improvised Explosive Devise
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organizations
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISI	Inter-Service Intelligence (Pakistani)
JAW	Jawzjan
JCMB	Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board

JFC	Joint Force Command
JHQ	Joint Headquarter
JOC	Joint Operation Centre
JWC	Joint Warfare Center
KAIA	Kabul International Airport
KDZ	Kunduz
LNO	Liaison officer
MAI	Maimana
MeS	Mazar-e Sharif
MNE	Multi-National Experiment
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MOT	Mobile Observation Teams
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-commissioned officer
NGO	Non- Governmental Organization
NMT-A	NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NTG	NATO Training Group
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIM	Organization for International Migration
OMLT	Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team

OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDPA	Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PEK	Pul-e Khumri
POERF	Post Operation Emergency Relief Fund
POMLT	Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSC	Private Security Company
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
RCN	Regional Command North
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROL	Rule of Law
SCNR	Senior Civilian National Representative
SCR	Senior Civilian Representative
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SMEC	Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation (Consultants)
SOE	Special Operations Element
SOP	Standard Operation Procedure
TCT	Tactical Civil Military Coordination Teams
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Security and Safety
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolutions
U.S./US	United States
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UTY	Uzbekista Temir Yullari (Uzbek Railway)
WFP	World Food Program
WTO	World Trade Organization

1   Background and Main Research Question

This chapter introduces the thesis, its structure and limitations, and the development and background influencing the interest in and choice of research question.

1.1   *Background*

Following the Balkan wars in the 1990s, the wars in Afghanistan, and the Iraq war, there was a growth in the "soft power" in Europe. Soft power was a combination of diplomacy, persuasion, and influence on opinions caused by the rising engagement of the non- governmental organizations (NGOs), which promoted security discussions and new security concepts. The European Council adopted a security policy strategy in 2003.[2] This policy emphasized that new security challenges in a time of globalization introduced both distant and local threats. Furthermore, a country's zone of defense could be somewhere abroad in a distant country. This document also underlined that new threats of the world are no longer purely military, but rather a complex mix of problems that must be met by a combination of political, civilian/humanitarian and military means.

A NATO think tank claimed in a report; *Alliance Reborn; An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century* (Hamilton et al., 2009) that the global has become local. The report focused on how North American and European Allies have allowed their relations to become discordant at a time when vigor and unity is demanded, underlining the need for unity of effort to tackle the serious challenges at "home and abroad."[3] Serious challenges, exemplified by the terrorism and turmoil in the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands were mentioned

---

[2] European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12th of December 2003. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf downloaded 12.04.2011.
[3] Politicians in European countries sending troops to Afghanistan argued, as had Defence Minister Struck in Germany, that by participating in Afghanistan, Germany defended their country from Hind Kush. See Netzeitung.de, Dec 2002; http://www.netzeitung.de/deutschland/276992.html downloaded 12.08.2012.

as critical to manage. The report expressed: *"Afghanistan has become a crucible for the Alliance. NATO's credibility is on the line."*

Globalization makes the world smaller in the sense of mutual dependence. From this perspective, conflicts and complex emergencies in distant areas are of interest to Western countries. At the same time, there has been an increasing practice to link military, humanitarian, and political means to gain political and economic advantage in conflict and crisis areas (Duffield, 2001; Kaldor, 2007).This blurs the lines between the civil and military actors, leading to new problems such as the need to protect the humanitarian principles (Weissmann, 2004; Sommerfeldt, 2005; Cornish, 2007).

During the paradigm shift following the end of the Cold War and fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO reached out to former opponents or enemies in Central and Eastern Europe, and initiated a collective security role in Bosnia and Kosovo (Aybet and Moore, 2010). Further, Aybet and Moore (2010) stated that the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the USA in 2001 changed the role of NATO to being more mission-driven. This was a consequence of NATO being the only international existing institution with an integrated military structure. However, the mission driven focus has "*eclipsed the importance of the Alliance's normative origins and the role of the liberal democratic values embedded in the preamble to the original North Atlantic Treaty in defining both NATO's identity and larger political purpose*" (Aybet and Moore 2010:1). Some of the most important changes in NATO's concepts to meet the new paradigm included:

- The Prague Summit (2002)
- The Comprehensive Political Guidance (2006)
- The Declaration of Alliance Security (2009)
- NATO"s New Strategic Concept (2010)

According to Aybet and Moore (2010), *The Prague Summit* focused on military transformation, including adding new capabilities, new partners, and new members. The US used the summit to expand NATO's focus beyond Europe. Some of the decisions made in this summit can be seen as the first step to a joint US/European view on the so-called "out of area" policy, meaning NATO allied handling of conflicts outside the North Atlantic area.

Less than a year after the Summit, in April 2003, NATO took command responsibility for the *International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)* in Afghanistan.

The Comprehensive Political Guidance (2006) [4] set the framework and priorities for NATO's capability issues for the next decade. It analyzed the most likely security environment for the future and the possibility of unpredictable events in order to set the framework for future operations the Alliance must be able to perform (Aybet and Moore 2010).

The Declaration of Alliance Security (4th of April, 2009)[5] was a more debated document, according to Aybet and Moore (2010). This document was drafted by the NATO Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer and contains a future vision for NATO strategy, the security obligations of member states, and issues concerning missions beyond NATO territory. [6]

NATO's New Strategic Concept 2010 (Lisbon Summit Declaration) focused on the Comprehensive Approach (CA) strategy, involving political, civilian and military instruments in crisis management (Wendling, 2010b; Rynning, 2011; Stavridis, 2011). See chap 2.4. for elaboration.

The challenges and risks anticipated by NATO in this new paradigm are very different from the Cold War paradigm. It involved NATO adopting a new platform, along with the development of conflict and complex emergencies or new wars (Kaldor, 1999; Smith, 2005; Aybet and Moore, 2010). The coordination between civil and military actors changed character and became more complex (Weiss, 2005; Brocades Zaalberg, 2006; Keen, 2008; Rietjens and Bollen, 2008; Egnell, 2009).

This change to multinational, out of area operations and after more than a decade of Western involvement in Afghanistan, Afghanistan has become a laboratory for the development of new civil military coordination concepts.

---

[4] The full text can be read at NATO homepages;
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b061129e.htm downloaded 23.05.2011.
[5] The full text can be read at NATO homepages;
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts.htm downloaded 23.05.2011.
[6] This new "out of area policy" concept has met criticism. Some critics claim that NATO changed from a military defense concept to a military attack concept, as expressed by Professor Arne Linneberg in the Norwegian Newspaper *Klassekampen*, 26 September 2009.

ISAF engagement, thus, has attracted attention in the global debate. Militaries building schools or medical centers in complex emergencies have become a problem for humanitarian actors. Since the Balkan wars, civilian actors have claimed that military actors, in the struggle to find new purpose and assignments, threaten their humanitarian space by taking actions far into the civilian dimension by dominating with logistics and other resources that politicize and militarize aid and relief (Maley et al., 2003; Weissmann, 2004; Sommerfeldt, 2005; Cornish, 2007).

From a military point of view, there has been an ever-increasing set of demands for new types of operations, complex emergencies that change and differ from each other, more often far from home base, demanding adequate crisis management, cultural awareness, and appropriate coordination between the civilian and military actors. This is why civil and military coordination is important to study.

The key questions to examine in this context are whether the main actors in the field, such as ISAF in Afghanistan and their coordinating bodies understand and accept the content of the joint coordination concepts? Concerning ISAF, between strategic and tactical levels in the organization do the understanding of civil military coordination concepts differ? Do actors at ISAF hierarchical levels communicate, coordinate and understand each other in order to have a unity of effort towards coordinating actors? And how do ISAF internal processes, such as training, role-performance, or planning and decision making influence the civil and military coordination?

1.2 *Main Research Question*

Afghanistan represents a complex context. After decades of conflict, the region is unstable with poor and damaged infrastructure. The security and administrative capacity also is very weak. Additionally, political and ethnic tensions, power struggles and corruption have made joint politics and stability efforts very difficult. This, in part, is rooted in the fact that ethnic identity and local traditions matter more than nationality and national politics.

In this setting ISAF, which represents 28 NATO countries and 20 non-NATO countries[7] with different backgrounds, training, culture, priorities, and policies was established to handle complex tasks such as creating and maintaining security and stability as well as supporting reconstruction, development, and governance issues. Policy and mandates of the mission in Afghanistan, thus, tend to be broad and vague, with room for interpretation and change along with the development of the crisis.

ISAF, as a part of the international response system, together with coordinating actors, has had to cope with an intractable situation in which mixed roles, asymmetry, and blurred lines of authority are more typical than rare. Moreover, the comprehensive response system in itself makes the emergency area even more complex to navigate, frequently resulting in new challenges and risk occurs.

To handle this situation several concepts have been outlined. NATO's top management's arguments for introducing the Comprehensive Approach (CA) strategy in 2006 included better mutual understanding, trust, and coordination between the civil and military actors in the field for current and future complex emergencies. Nevertheless, experience and critical research concerning strategies in conflict areas have suggested that the CA blurred the lines between military and civilian actors, which are likely to have undesirable consequences (Sommerfeldt, 2005; Lindley-French, 2006; Cornish, 2007; Wendling, 2010b; Friis and DeConing, 2011). This includes aspects such as broad and unclear mandates, substantial differences in views and values, competition, different training and interests, lack of mutual trust, and joint a conflict picture.

Despite this, with arguments that have pointed out the lack of security, ISAF, as a military organization, has taken the lead of the crisis management in this complex emergency in Afghanistan, where activities have been conducted using different concepts for civil military coordination. With such a large and powerful military organization at the head of the crisis management, the organizational structures and processes involved are important to study. This leads to the main research question:

---

[7] 2010 Figures.

- *How do ISAF structures and processes influence civil military coordination in North Afghanistan?*

This thesis looks into ISAF Regional Command North's (RCN) area of operation in North Afghanistan.[8] The focus is on how coordination within the organization as well as towards coordinating actors outside ISAF was conducted to create stability, reconstruction, development and governance related work and projects.

1.3 *Thesis' Limitations*

This thesis does not consider any processes in Afghanistan's civil society. It is not a thesis about Afghanistan. It is not about military operations, even though military operations are mentioned when elaborating other relevant factors. Further, the thesis does not study processes ongoing in the coordinating organizations represented in the international response system, such as the UN, EU, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or Afghan civil organizations. Neither does this thesis study the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), though it is mentioned to the extent needed to explain the relationship with ISAF.

When studying ISAF, it should be noted that only *parts* of ISAF organization have been studied. ISAF represented in the Regional Command North (RCN) operational area in North Afghanistan has one main focus. It represents, mainly, the RCN and, partly, the subordinated Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the upper headquarters ISAF Joint Command (IJC) in Kabul. The PRTs and IJC parts studied were structures and processes relevant for the civil military coordination activities and projects in RCN area of responsibility. The Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) are only mentioned as a part of the ISAF organization to give the complete picture, but they are *not* studied in this thesis.

The aim of this thesis has been to study the ISAF work organization structures. More exactly, how reporting lines, information and communication systems/procedures, the rotation system, national caveats and divergent PRTs,

---

[8] This area covers the following nine provinces in North Afghanistan; Faryab, Jawzjan, Sar-e Pul, Balkh, Samangan, Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar and Badakhstan. See Map No 6.

among other aspects, influence the civil military coordination. Further how processes like training, role performance and planning influences the civil military coordination. This is done in order to enlighten coherence in contributing aspects to the ISAF struggle with crisis management in North-Afghanistan.

1.4   *Related Research*

Two of the most influential books written about civil military relations are the classic works of S. Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* (1957) and M. Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier* (1960), which described military professionalism from the perspectives of political science and sociology and addressed both military effectiveness and civilian control. Huntington described a theoretical framework about civil-military relations and national security. Janowitz focused on military elites, the decision-making process, and the narrowing gap between military and civilian spheres. This narrowing gap between the spheres is relevant to this thesis, as the narrowing gap has continued and became more debated in public after NATOs civil-military coordination and engagement in the Balkans in the 1990s.

Other studies concerning this subject are T. Brocades Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power* (2006), and T. Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions* (2005). Zaalberg discussed the gaps between the tactical level of operations and strategic decision making. Weiss focused on the complication of having military interventions with political objectives and the resulting humanitarian emergencies that develop under conditions dictated by military occupation. They both outlined the historical development of civil military interactions and challenges and offered case studies highlighting this history.

One of the recent contributions to the civil-military debate related to NATO organizational issues is R. Egnell's *Complex Peace Operations and Civil-Military Relations* (2009), which explored the impact of different civil military structures on operational effectiveness in complex emergencies. Egnell argued that the civil-military interface should be integrated within the interagency arena as well as within the defense ministry, advocating a comprehensive approach to operations. *Managing Civil-Military Cooperation,* a study authored by S. Rietjens and M. Bollen (2008), discussed different

types of civil military cooperation in complex emergencies, with a focus on the interface between the actors on the operational and strategic level, with regard to what works and what does not. Another study dealing with the civil military cooperation issue is C. Ankersen et al. (2008), *Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations*, which analyzed the emerging civil-military cooperation theory and practice in post-conflict operations, the tension between classical humanitarian principles, and political-military decision making.

C. DeConing (2007) discussed the confusion of ideas, definitions, and the UN's coordination challenges that have arisen as a result of the diversity of the participating nation's representation in complex emergencies. W. Maley et al. (2003), *From Civil Strife to Civil Society* illuminated the nature of the challenges and responsibilities of civilian and military actors in conflict areas, especially the problem of being forced to coordinate with each other, despite having different organizational cultures and operational procedures. This study also identified steps to make better progress. Soeters and Manigart (2008) examined the problem of cultural diversity in a civil military crisis response system in *Military Cooperation in Multinational Peace Operations,* and how military personnel manage cultural diversity within their own organization as well as and the demand for intercultural competence needed to operate in foreign cultural environments devastated by war.

D. DeRoos (2003) gave a comprehensive account of the problem of blurred lines that often follow civil military coordination in his article about civil military humanitarianism. S. Cornish (2007) also shed light on this in his article, "No room for humanitarian in 3D politics*,*" as did the study *In the Shadow of Just Wars*, edited by F. Weissmann (2004). On the other hand, Hoogensen Gjørv, (2011) in *Irresponsible Idealism, the Challenges of the Norwegian Approach to Civil-Military Interaction* has a critical view on the Norwegian model, which keeps the civilian and the military efforts divided. My own master thesis, *Utfordringer i sivil militært samarbeid i internasjonale operasjoner* (Stene, 2005) focuses on the problems between the military and NGOs in civil military coordination.

Representing an overall perspective, J. Callaghan et al. examined key issues in global security and the relations between the armed forces and society around

the world in *Armed Forces and International Security* (2004). J. Nye (the inventor of the concept of soft power) wrote about historical and current complex emergencies and asked questions about future conflicts in *Understanding International Conflicts* (2009) in order to examine the logic of conflict in world politics. M. Berdal, in his book, *Building Peace after War* (2009), had a critical look into how governments and international organizations respond to complex emergencies, and how international organizations meet such situations with too little resources and too little time.

In the area of organizational studies, March and Weissinger-Baylon (1986) in *Ambiguity and Command: Organizational Perspectives on Military Decision Making,* is of interest, as it discussed military decision making under conditions of ambiguity. Since ambiguity is rarely associated with military traditions, these authors studied aspects of command decision making in the US Navy as an example of a large public bureaucracy, using the so-called garbage-can model.

There have also been many research studies of civil-military coordination in Afghanistan from different research institutions, with different angles and perspectives. But to my knowledge, there has not been a research on how ISAF structures and processes in North-Afghanistan influence civil-military coordination.

1.5   *Structure of the Thesis*

The thesis is written as a monograph. The reasons for this choice are first and foremost to be able to describe the complexity of the relations and to give an overall picture. A monograph is most appropriate to explore the organizational relations and connections needed for understanding the structures and processes that influenced the coordination challenges ISAF has faced in northern Afghanistan and to elaborate on the complexity in the military context, the doctrines, and the organization.

After the introductory Chapter 1, Chapter 2 focuses on complex emergencies, coordination and civil military coordination concepts. First the chapter offers a description and the characteristics of complex emergencies, followed by a description and definition of coordination. Finally, this chapter introduces the

overall civil-military coordination concepts that constitute the framework of ISAF operations; the Comprehensive Approach (CA) concept, the Counterinsurgency (COIN) and NATO civil-military coordination (CIMIC) doctrine.

In Chapter 3, a description of the "outer" and "inner" contexts of Afghanistan is drawn. The division between "outer" and "inner" contexts has its explanation in the methodical idea that the outer context will be unique, and the inner context, at least parts of it, will be recognizable in other contexts (see Methodology Chapter 5). The outer context, represented by North Afghanistan and its people, power structures and events influencing the background and setting for the complex emergency, is outlined. The inner context begins with a description of NATO's organization (Chapter 3.3.) to give an understanding of the worldwide command and control system, and also to underline the difference between NATO and ISAF. Then the ISAF organization is described from upper headquarters via regional commands down to provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and tactical teams. This chapter is meant to give an overview of the military organization structure and its reporting lines, and to give an overall sketch of the context, or to "set the scene."

Chapter 4 discusses theory, first with a short introduction on security and the "new wars" as the borders between peace, crisis, conflict and war seem to have become more complex. Next is an introduction to organizational theory. Rational theorists such as Weber (1922/71), Banfield (1959) and Lindblom (1959) among others are used to shed light on basic bureaucratic structures and processes in ISAF organization. Further, the new-institutional perspectives represented by theorists, like Meyer and Rowan (1977), Scott (1983/95/98), DiMaggio and Powell (1983/91) are used to explain some of the non-rational elements that characterize ISAF and the civil-military coordination, as well as how ISAF related to, and has been influenced by the outer context. Turner (1976/78/97) is referred to in order to explain aspects influencing information and coordination processes in the operational environment. The chapter is summed up in the three operational research questions.

Chapter 5 describes the methodology applied, and gives an overview of research design, data gathering and the challenges and dilemmas related to the fieldwork and the participant observer role.

Chapter 6 begins with a short outline of challenges related to the overall coordination concepts, Comprehensive Approach (CA), Counterinsurgency (COIN) and civil military coordination doctrine (CIMIC). Next, ISAFs main coordinating actors, international organizations (IOs), governmental organizations (GOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) representing the international response system, such as the UN, EU or the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) are described. Then with a basis in the civil-military coordination executed in six types of projects and the "daily business" activities observed, empirical contributions related to ISAF organization structure and processes are outlined. Especially, RCN organizational challenges and processes such as training, role performance, and planning, and how this influenced the civil military coordination is given attention.

The discussion is elaborated in chapter 7, beginning with the overall concepts and strategies' influence on the background, policy and execution of ISAF activities. This, along with project data and observations are then discussed in the light of the chosen rational and new-institutional theories and perceptions.

Chapter 8 offers a conclusion to the study, highlights the contributions of the thesis and makes suggestions for future research.

2 Complex Emergencies, Coordination and Civil Military Coordination Concepts

This chapter begins with a definition and description of complex emergencies, followed by a discussion and definitions of coordination as it relates to the research question. Then overall civil military coordination concepts framing ISAF coordination activity is outlined.

2.1 *Definition of Complex Emergencies*

How to define a complex emergency?

The short and easy definition is provided in Segen's Medical Dictionary, which states that a complex emergency is: "*a natural or man-made disaster with multiple, economic, social, and political dimensions.*"

According to Kruke (2010), complex emergencies have been otherwise described as slow burning crises ('t Hart and Boin, 2001), creeping disasters (Dynes, 2004), man-made disasters (Maynard, 1999), or permanent emergencies (Duffield, 1994). According to Rosenthal, Charles, and 't Hart (1989), the conflict dimension is apparent in many of today's crises. These crises are often catastrophic events which, by their nature are messy, often life threatening, and challenging for the response system. Furthermore, a crisis, in whatever form it occurs, will leave in its wake physical and psychological devastation for the involved parties. These authors define a crisis as "*a serious threat to the basic structures or fundamental values and norms of a social system, which—under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances— necessitates making critical decisions*" (Rosenthal, Charles and t' Hart 1989:10).

Duffield (1994) describes a complex emergency as a major humanitarian crisis of a multi-causal nature that requires a system-wide response. Commonly, a long term combination of political, conflict and peacekeeping factors are involved.

13

In December 1991, the general assembly of the UN adopted resolution 46/182, designed to strengthen the UN response to complex emergencies and natural disasters. It also created the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, IASC, which defines complex emergencies as follows:

"A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme." (Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), 1994).

This definition of Complex Emergencies is the preferred one in this thesis. The UN also underlines the three main pillars in the response to a complex emergency: political, humanitarian and military. The number of actors in complex emergencies has been rising over decades, displaying the importance and challenges of coordination now and in the future. Moreover, vital actors usually have no chance to train together before they join together in the operation area, again reinforcing the importance of coordination in the field.

In line with David Keen (2008) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the term complex emergencies will not include natural disasters. Keen (2008) described a complex emergency as a humanitarian crisis that is linked with a large scale violent conflict, such as civil war, ethnic cleansing or genocide. Complex emergencies are conflict-generated emergencies, he argued.

To leave out natural disasters from the use of the term does not imply that a violent conflict and natural disasters might not interact or that natural disasters might occur as a crisis within the crisis and make the response challenges even more complex. But natural disasters often necessitate a qualitatively different responses, in which the coordination between military and civilian actors is not as problematic (or even infected) as it often is in a conflict situation. (See Figure No 2-1, below).

Figure 2-1 Civil-military coordination influential factors

Figure No 2-1 shows the difference in the coordination climate between military and civilian actors in complex emergencies whether the situation is affected by an ongoing conflict or not. In a natural disaster, especially if roles and mandates are clearly drawn, the coordination will not have severe difficulties.[9] In many countries, national militaries are organized responders following natural disasters. Additionally, military actors have obligations toward the civilian population embodied in international humanitarian law (IHL) that might overlap with the mandates of humanitarian organizations (Haysome, 2013). However, in conflict situations where the military often has been used as a political tool, it becomes more complicated. The United Nations Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) acknowledged the need for civil and military coordination, but problems occur in disasters which result in conflict when mandates and roles blur. Military actors are political tools, and accordingly, when they participate in conflicts, they are perceived as a part in the conflict. Accordingly, humanitarian actors do not want to be associated with military conflict and seek to protect their humanitarian principles and space. In conflicts such as in Afghanistan, humanitarian aid becomes politicized when incorporated into the stabilization agendas of the Western

---

[9]For example, the Pakistani flood of 2010, or the Haiti earthquake in 2011.

donors, who see militaries undertake humanitarian assistance activities primarily to achieve strategic or tactical goals (Haysome, 2013).

Natural disasters will be referred to only to the extent necessary to understand the problem of interventions with armed conflict in the same way as managing a natural disaster, especially as it focuses on civil military coordination. As Keen puts it: *"Interventions have often been hampered by treating complex emergencies as if they were natural disasters. We need to understand the profound differences that armed conflict can make."* (Keen; 2008:3).

Complex emergencies can also be seen as an ambiguous term. The term emergency is often associated with urgency, used in cases of unforeseen accidents, for example, but today we use this term for conflicts like Afghanistan, which have been in an emergency-like state for many years. Some have claimed that the unforeseen combination of circumstances in the Afghanistan conflict is, in fact, a combination of several factors that have been building up over a long time.

2.2 *Characteristics of Complex Emergencies*

Turner (1978) was a pioneer in questioning the preconditions and underlying causes of a disaster. He distinguished between natural disasters and the so-called man-made disasters, the latter being the one in focus here. Man-made disasters were divided in two groups: those caused by accidents or those caused by warfare. Studying these disasters, Turner became preoccupied by the failure of foresight, a view that has become a vital part of modern sociological disaster research (Reason, 1997; Perrow, 1999; Rosenthal et al., 2001; Boin, 2005; Rodrigues et al., 2007). Turner also pointed out that man-made disasters often have preconditions that have common characteristics—such as long failure incubation periods studded with early warning signs that were ignored or misinterpreted. Man-made disasters are distinguished in institutional, organizational, administrative structures as well as processes, he claimed. Disasters are not cataclysmic; they have long incubation period (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997). Further, the sociological context is underlined by claiming that disasters can only be fully understood when placed in the context of the social setting from which they emerge, and upon which they have an effect (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997).

P. Bucle in Perry and Quarantelli (2005) described disasters as complex events or processes, nested within a wider social context. The rapid rate of change, the unexpectedness of the occurrence, the intensity of dislocation of the social relations and networks, and the uncertainty generated by damage to life, property, organizations, and social networks combine to make disasters significantly more complex over a given period of time than most other social phenomena.

Typically, such complex emergencies are (according to the IFRC)[10] characterized by:

- extensive violence and loss of life
- displacement of populations
- widespread damage to societies and economies
- the need for large-scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance
- the hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance by political and military constraints
- in some areas, significant security risks for humanitarian relief workers

The complex emergency in Afghanistan has been a situation affecting the civilian population, involving a combination of war or civil strife, widespread damage to the society and economy, increasing mortality among the civilian population, population displacement, food shortages or famine—often with insurgent and/or government policies that contribute to food insecurity and the resulting need for a large-scale humanitarian assistance. The situation resulted from decades of deliberate political and military strategies and policies from the local to the international levels.

The nature of complex emergencies and crisis management has changed considerably over the last decade, increasing in frequency, size, and complexity. The erosion of state structures, civil wars, and the dissolution of entire states created opportunities for armed groups, terrorists, organized crime, corruption, and trafficking (Smith, 2005; Kaldor, 2007; Keen, 2008;

---

[10] International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). Retreived from http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-disasters/definition-of-hazard/complex-emergencies/

Polman, 2010). International experience in crisis management has shown that only the political milieu has the ability to find solutions to root causes and to end the crisis. These solutions have been closely related to the local politics, politicians, and population. Solutions must be sought in close collaboration with the local population, because it is the fighting parties and the local people who own the key to the solution to the problems (Kruke, 2010).

International military forces, whether they are UN, EU, or NATO soldiers, are mainly sent to the emergency area to establish stability and security or to win a war. Their main role is to hold struggling parties away from each other, whether they are armed forces, warriors, guerrillas, or rebels. The international forces are also responsible for the security of the local population and civil environment. Military forces are tools used to promote political interests, which, in some situations, are ordered to neutralize or defeat a defined enemy. When the enemy becomes difficult to define, and there is a situation with a *war amongst people,*[11] as in Afghanistan, complex challenges are identified (Mack, 1975; Bellamy et al., 2004; Smith, 2005).

Some claim that the politicization of complex emergencies has been increasing. Former ideas and ideals about humanitarian principles seem to be threatened, or set aside, to meet political agendas (Duffield, 2001/2004; DeRoos, 2003; Cornish, 2007; Keen, 2008). Some countries, such as Scandinavian countries, have stronger ties between the NGOs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and research has indicated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs influences the NGO agenda (Kristoffersen, 2009). Politics decides the way military forces are used and, to some extent, where NGOs work based on bilateral agreements, or the prioritization of funding and regulations (Polman, 2010). Kaldor (1999/2007) argued that the visible impact of globalization in complex emergencies is seen by the presence of international organizations such as the UN, EU, AU, OSCE and military

---

[11] The term "war amongst people" was communicated to the public through UK General Rupert Smith. He explained the expression briefly as being characterized by six major trends: "**1)** The ends for which we fight are changing, **2)** We fight amongst the people, not on the battlefield, **3)** Our conflicts tend to be timeless, even unending, **4)** We fight so as not to lose the force, rather than fighting by using the force at any cost to achieve the aim, **5)** On each occasion, new uses for old weapons/organizations are found **6)** The sides are mostly non-states." R. Smith (2005:17/269).

forces, mercenary groups, military and political advisers, international
reporters, NGOs and diasporas volunteers. The globalization of complex
emergencies results in the involvement of more participants, faster, earlier,
and with expectations of direct contributions. Globalization makes politics
important and indisputably linked to complex emergencies (Kaldor,
1999/2007; Duffield, 2001/2004; Keen, 2008).

2.3   *Coordination*

During the past decade, the international community has tried to advance their
responses to the consequences of complex emergencies. When political,
military, and humanitarian actors are engaged in complex emergencies,
planned and skilled coordination is required. This can be a considerable
problem in some situations, and is sometimes almost impossible; for example,
when actors refuse to be coordinated, even when there is little doubt that
mission success depends on working in coordination and cooperation with
others. In some situations the coordination is successful and is approved by all
parties and some situations not.

The challenges and dilemmas regarding the coordination between involved
organizations and their organizational level are important to consider. One
level can operate with what might be an appropriate interaction and
coordination at that own level without coordination with the other levels in
the system. In this case the vertical integration or coordination will not
function, which leads to that the organization as a whole not functioning as
designed (Rasmussen, 1997).

What exactly *is* coordination in complex emergencies?

2.3.1   *Definition of Coordination*

Coordination, or the act of coordinating, makes different people, actors,
organizations, or things work together for a joint goal or effect. According to
the Oxford English Dictionary coordination can be defined as *"The action of
arranging or placing in the same order, rank, or degree; the condition of
being so placed; the relation between things so placed; co-ordinate condition
or relation: opposed to subordination*." The meaning of coordination can vary

19

according to what field it is related to: anthropological, physical, linguistic, political, etc.

Looking at ISAF as a complex organization with coordination challenges at several levels, there are two definitions that make sense in this context. For the overall picture and coordination challenges, the definition of Larry Minear (1992), who for many years has been working with diplomatic, humanitarian, and development concepts in complex emergencies, defines coordination in a way that shows the increase in overall challenges:

Systematic utilization of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner include: 1) strategic planning; 2) gathering data and managing information; 3) mobilizing resources and assuring accountability; 4) orchestrating a functional division of labor in the field; 5) negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities, and 6) providing leadership. Sensibly and sensitively employed, such instruments inject an element of discipline without unduly constraining action. (Minear et al., 1992:1295).

Even if this definition has a humanitarian perspective, the six points describes the vital coordination areas ISAF was faced with in the operational area in north Afghanistan. The definition describes the complexity that was the foundation for both the Comprehensive Approach (CA) and the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy used by ISAF. Further, it also describes the strategy of the UN, EU and NGOs that accept the CA as an overall strategy or approach to crisis management (humanitarian NGOs, different from development NGOs, were skeptical of the CA approach, as well as the COIN strategy, which will be discussed later).

Minear's definition underlines vital aspects of coordination, aspects that went along with typical military planning and activity in a complex emergency such as in Afghanistan. The actors in the response system are many, and the overall picture complex, highlighting that coordination is essential for success. The actual actors in the response system need to coordinate both among themselves, and even more importantly with the local actors at all levels. To implement coordination systems has been a challenge for different

reasons (Kruke, 2010; Rasmussen, 1997; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997) which this thesis will discuss.

Minear's definition underlines the overall need for coordination between actors in the international response system and is the preferred definition in this thesis.

Other definitions have more focus on the *internal* coordination of an organization. This definition is mentioned to draw attention to the need for internal coordination in an organization, as a vital crisis management tool. This definition is drawn from a business dictionary:

The synchronization and integration of activities, responsibilities, and command and control structures to ensure that the resources of an organization are used most efficiently in pursuit of the specified objectives. Along with organizing, monitoring, and controlling, coordinating is one of the key functions of management. [12]

Both internal and external coordination is important to consider in crisis management. In complex organizations operating in a complex context of planning and coordination, internally and externally, horizontally and vertically coordination is a demanding and critical exercise.

2.4   *Civil Military Coordination Concepts*

To be able to better coordinate with civilian actors, The Comprehensive Approach (CA), Counterinsurgency (COIN) and NATO CIMIC doctrine has been used as tools to meet the objectives of the new NATO strategic concept (2010), which required effective coordination and information sharing between civil and military actors. This strategic concept stated:

The lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of

---

[12] See http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/coordination.html

activities on the ground, in order to maximize coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort.[13]*(NATO, 2010).*

The focus on civil-military coordination in recent years has led to some important international policy documents, working groups, and research, as well as several definitions and guidelines. The UN policy and definition of civil-military coordination is described in their Civil-Military Guidelines.[14] The EU policy and civil-military coordination definition is described in EU Note No 14457[15] and EU Note No 11716.[16]

NATO coordination concepts, applicable for ISAF civil-military coordination in Northern Afghanistan is the Comprehensive Approach (CA), Counterinsurgency (COIN) and the NATO civil military coordination (CIMIC) doctrine. These concepts are used on strategic, operational, and tactical levels in the area of operation, as shown below:

- Comprehensive Approach (CA) strategy
- Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine
- NATO Civil-Military Coordination doctrine (CIMIC)

Figure 2-2 ISAF civil-military coordination concepts

---

[13] "Active engagement, modern defense"; Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted by Heads of State and Government in the NATO summit in Lisbon 2010.
[14] Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies, UN & IASC, OCHA, New York 2008.
[15] EU Note No 14457/03, from the Secretariat to Delegates, 7 Nov 2003,concerning CMCO.
[16] EU Note No 11716/08, from European Union Military Staff to European Military Committee, 11 July 2008, concerning EU Concept CIMIC for EU-led Military Operations

NATO's definition of strategy is: *"presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations."*[17] Military strategy provides the rationale for military operations, as in this case of the Comprehensive Approach (CA) strategy.

NATO's definition of a doctrine is: "*Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.*"[18] A doctrine seeks to provide a common conceptual framework, uniting all three levels of warfare (strategic, operational and tactical). A doctrine reflects the judgments of professional military officers about what is and is not militarily possible and necessary. COIN and CIMIC represents such doctrines.

The frame for ISAF civil military coordination activities and operations are the Comprehensive Approach (CA) as an overall political strategy for all actors representing the international response system in the complex emergency in Afghanistan. The international response system includes the UN, NATO, the EU and other large IOs, GOs and NGOs.

ISAF operations were planned to be COIN operations, as settled in COMISAF Initial Assessment, edited by ISAF Commander General Stanley McChrystal (2009),[19] and confirmed by the ISAF Commander General David Petraeus (2010).[20] Despite the many national COIN definitions among ISAF contributing nations, NATO has outlined a Joint Doctrine in Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.4 (2011), which was developed for use at operational and tactical levels in North Afghanistan.[21]

On the operational and tactical levels in the sharp end of North Afghanistan civil   military coordination and cooperation has its basis in the NATO CIMIC

---

[17] AAP-6, NATO Glossary of terms and definitions. Retrieved from
http://nsa.nato.int/nsa/zPublic/ap/aap6/AAP-6.pdf.
[18] Ibid.
[19] See COIN guidance:
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf .
[20] See COIN Central; The Counter Insurgency Journal, 29 July 2010. Retrieved from
http://coincentral.wordpress.com/2010/07/29/gen-petraeus-issues-new-coin-guidance-to-isaf-troops/.
[21] See appendix 3 for COIN references.

doctrine, as laid down in Allied Joint Publications.[22] Further, after the US
Forces arrival in North Afghanistan in summer 2010, this level was also
influenced by the US training and handling of civil military coordination in
line with the US Field Manual of the Civil Affairs Teams, FM 3-05.40
(2003).[23] Accordingly out in the field, different practices were conducted,
which will be further outlined later.

2.4.1 *Comprehensive Approach (CA) Strategy*

There is no commonly accepted definition of the Comprehensive Approach,
but from workshops I attended (MNE5)[24] and conferences, it is a joint
understanding that the term applies to the integration of the political, security,
rule of law, human rights, and humanitarian dimensions of international
operations. In this context, the description by Friis and DeConing, which also
corresponds with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) definition of
Complex Emergencies (Cf. Chapter 2.1.)[25] is a suitable definition, which will
be the main reference for CA in this thesis:

*The comprehensive approach concept should be understood in the context of
an increasingly complex and interdependent international conflict
management system. The scope of the crisis faced by the international
community is often of such a scale that no single agency, government or
international organization can manage them alone. In response, a wide range
of agencies, governmental and non-governmental, and regional and
international organizations have each developed specialized capacities to
manage various aspects of these complex crisis systems, and together they
have been able to respond with a broad range of interlinked activities."* (Friis
and DeConing, in Friis and Jarmyr (eds.), 2008, p.2).

---

[22] AJP9; Allied Joint Publication 9: "NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine"
(2003), and AJP- 3.4.9 (A); "Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil- Military Cooperation" (NATO;
February, 2013).
[23] FM 3-05.40 (2003); "Civil Affairs Tactics Techniques and Procedures," Headquarters,
Department of the Army, Washington DC.
[24] MNE; Multinational Experiment, NATO initiated. See note 103.
[25] See also; IASC, Inter-Agency Standing Committee (1994): *IASC Working paper on
Definition of Complex Emergencies*. New York,ISAC.

The CA strategy had its origin in a Danish initiative in 2004 to put the CA on the agenda of the NATO alliance. Whether the CA strategy should be a part of NATO's assignment was a discussion between NATO nations until the 2006 NATO Riga Summit, where the policy was adopted. [26] A series of international roundtable discussions were held in Washington during the period 2007-2009, to explore the elements and potential of implementation of the CA in NATO.[27]

When the CA strategy was approved in the Riga Summit in 2006, France underlined that NATO should not develop civilian capacities. At this summit, the Comprehensive Political Guidance was announced (Aybet and Moore, 2010). [28] The guidance was a political direction for NATO's continuing transformation, dealing with capability issues, priorities, planning disciplines, and intelligence, and was also aimed at increasing coherence. The CA strategy was further discussed in the Bucharest Summit Declaration of April 2008.[29] The NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration described the CA as follows:

... the cooperation and contribution of all major actors, including that of Non-Governmental Organizations and relevant local bodies. To this end, it is essential for all major international actors to act in a coordinated way, and to apply a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments in a concerted effort that takes into account their respective strengths and mandates [...] improve the coherent application of NATO's own crisis management instruments and enhance practical cooperation at all levels with other actors, wherever appropriate, including provisions for support to stabilization and reconstruction.

Very likely the CA, being so broad and vague, can be understood and interpreted differently by military and civilian personnel inside the alliance, as well as outside the alliance. Politicians and bureaucrats in the allied nations

---

[26] Riga Summit 2006: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm
[27] See also final Roundtable report:
http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/NATO%20CA%20-%2021%20May%2009%20Danish%20Embassy-NDU%20Roundtable%20Final%20Report%20-%2018%20June%2009.pdf
[28] Comprehensive Political Guidance:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_56425.htm
[29] The Bucharest Summit Declaration:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm

had different understandings and perspectives of the term, rooted in their own distinctive character, culture, history, experience and way of thinking about crisis management. Some claimed that NATO, as a military tool, could not be as broad as the UN or the EU in crisis management (Mølling, 2008; Hofman, 2008; Jacobsen, 2008; Williams, 2011). Both inside NATO, and in the political milieu, there have been discussions as to whether NATO should be defined as broadly as the CA implies. Some high level military commanders wanted to take the "comprehensive" out of NATO (cf. discussions in the MNE5).

The CA strategy had been developed to meet the need for comprehensiveness in complex emergencies, and covered a whole spectrum of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information activities as a way to approach these conflicts.

2.4.1.1   Military in Comprehensive Approach (CA)

The global response to the 9/11 attacks in 2001 led to the United Nations Security Council (UNSCR) Resolution 1378 which was the foundation for the broad strategy manifested in the CA strategy and COIN doctrine in Afghanistan.

Notes from the Security Council 4415th Meeting (concerning Resolution 1378) underlined the Comprehensive Approach:

The resolution also called on Member States to provide: support for the interim administration and the ensuing government; urgent humanitarian assistance to Afghans, both inside and outside the country; and long-term assistance for the socio-economic reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan.

The Afghan aid effort was described by Richard Holbrooke as "*the most wasteful, duplicated and uncoordinated effort he has witnessed in a lifetime of dealing with internal conflicts*" (Aybet and Moore, 2010, p. 24). Rynning (2011) argued that it was this situation in Afghanistan that led to the compromise in NATO to pursue the CA strategy as it "screamed" for comprehensiveness. It became impossible to not address the need for cooperation between ISAF and other international actors such as the UN,

despite the reluctance from Germany, France and Belgium, who were uncomfortable with the military intrusion into a civilian domain, and also worried about political prerogatives (Rynning, 2011).

The CA strategy implies that ISAF has a focus not only on stability and security, but also on governance, development, and reconstruction as their operational pillars (ISAF Mandate 2010). In the NATO Strategic Concept of 2010, the CA strategy is implemented. The core task and principles were collective defense, cooperative security and crisis management. Paragraph 4 states: *"NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts,"* and goes on to state that experiences from the Balkans and Afghanistan made it clear that crisis management demanded a comprehensive political, civilian, and military approach. Further, it stated that the alliance will engage actively with other international actors in the analysis, planning, and conduct of activities on the ground before, during, and after the crisis (paragraph 21). It also stated that NATO is capable and prepared to contribute to stabilization and reconstruction in close cooperation with other international actors (paragraph 24).

2.4.1.2   The Action Plan

NATO has conducted a Comprehensive Approach Action Plan for Afghanistan (as decided at the 2008 Bucharest Summit). The Action Plan for CA states that NATO seeks to partner across the international community, and with the NGO community would seek to engage as wide a spectrum of civil and military instruments as possible. On a strategic level, NATO would focus on building mutual understanding and confidence between itself and other international actors. On the operational level, it would seek to cooperate in the overall planning for operations where civil military capabilities will be required. On the tactical level, NATO would seek to provide commanders with the necessary authority and means to engage with local leaders and relevant international actors in order to make NATO's crisis management procedures more coherent. The Acton Plan also urged more consideration of the roles of NATO senior civilian representatives and political advisors, to bring together the internal military and civilian expertise, and called the enhancement of NATO's ability to improve the military support of civilian

stabilization and reconstruction efforts (Aybet and Moore, 2010; Østbø, 2011).

Allied leaders agreed to NATO's new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, which enhanced NATO's contribution to the CA in crisis management.

2.4.2 *Counterinsurgency (COIN) Doctrine*

Many NATO and non-NATO countries that contribute to ISAF have their own counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, definition, or policy. Despite this, ISAF has been operating with a joint COIN policy using as its source the US COIN doctrine, which itself is based upon classical COIN theory. ISAF has laid down a policy based upon this definition.[30]

2.4.2.1 COIN definitions

Despite the many national definitions, NATO has outlined a Joint Doctrine in Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.4 (2011), which was developed for use at operational and tactical levels. The doctrine describes COIN as the predominate campaign. In AJP 3.4.4, insurgency is defined as: "*the actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion*."

And the counterinsurgency (COIN) is defined as: "*the set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances*."

Even if one had a joint doctrine in ISAF and also agreed on the main references for COIN as defined above, some nations have their own way of understanding and conducting COIN, related to their history and experiences with insurgency and counterinsurgency, despite efforts to coordinate with the agreed references (Rid and Keaney, 2010).

---

[30] See Appendix 2 for detailed COIN references.

2.4.2.2   COIN phases and principles

According to former ISAF Commander General Stanley McChrystal's'
"Commanders Initial Assessment" of 30th August 2009, ISAF operations in
Afghanistan were defined to be counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. This
strategy was also underlined by the subsequent ISAF Commander General
David Petraeus' Counterinsurgency Guide (2010). In his report, McChrystal
underlined that ISAF has to conduct an integrated civil military COIN-
campaign. He also refers to classical COIN, in which the local population is to
be the main focus in operational planning, underlining that civilian efforts are
rapidly needed as soon as military forces have ensured a minimum of security.
The Unity of Effort or integrated approach is the main drive, which also
conformed to the Comprehensive Approach (CA) policy and strategy
(McChrystal, 2009).

Both General McChrystal's and General Petraeus' views are based on
classical COIN that has been described by military theorists such as D. Galula
(1964). According to Galula, classical COIN claimed that to win the battle
against insurgents, all resources and contributions needed to be steered or
commanded in the same direction toward the same objective. Unity of effort
is vital to success. Who did what is of lesser importance, and the civil and
military contribution could not be clearly divided because they overlap at
many levels. Clear lines of demarcation would not be possible to maintain,
and a soldier must be prepared to do any civilian type of work in areas where
the civilian actor cannot remain due to poor security (Galula 1964). The
COIN doctrine, which called for having the local population as the center of
gravity, required a deeper contextual knowledge from the soldiers.

Even if ISAF nations had other ways to conduct COIN, in the mission they
tried to adjust own policies to the classical COIN phases used in Afghanistan,
known as SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD, cf. ISAF Counterinsurgency
Guidance, issued and sent out to ISAF Forces 29.07.2010.[31]

---

[31] See COIN Central; The Counter Insurgency Journal, 29 July 2010. Retrieved from
http://coincentral.wordpress.com/2010/07/29/gen-petraeus-issues-new-coin-guidance-to-isaf-
troops/.

The classical COIN phases are listed in the Figure No. 2-3.

Figure 2-3 ISAF COIN Phases. (Source ISAF)

The first step of the SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD operations is to use intelligence and assessments in an area regarded as an actual operation area. According to Counterinsurgency Training Centre Afghanistan (CTC-A), the intelligence prepares a coordinated integrated civil military operation in the area. Then, in the CLEAR phase military forces go in to take out insurgents. When the area is secured, and can be maintained as secure (HOLD) the civilian actors enter the area to start development and reconstruction (BUILD) while being given security by the forces.

The COIN strategy contains some challenges and paradoxes. In COIN courses, it is underlined that one needs to know the paradoxes and understand them. These COIN paradoxes are described in the US Counterinsurgency Field Manual [32] and in NATO AJP-3.4.4.[33]

Conceptions of the COIN strategy are closely related to training and knowledge of the COIN concept, and how civil-military cooperation and coordination are carried out. ISAF COIN guidance states that COIN differs

---

32 From The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, by the United States Army and United States Marine Corps, University of Chicago Press (2007).
[33] AJP-3.4.4.; Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN), February 2011. Retrieved from https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/CTCA/References/AJP%203.4.4%20Counterinsurgency%20(NATO)%20(2011).pdf

from other civil-military operations both in the methods employed and in the purpose of the undertaking. The purpose of COIN is to build popular support for a government while suppressing or co-opting insurgent movements. The strategy of winning hearts and minds is vital.

2.4.2.3   Hearts and Minds

According to the US COIN manual FM 3-24, the strategy of winning hearts and minds is a population centric strategy that presumes a legitimate government which can sway the population away from the insurgents if they are given better benefits from the government.

The challenge was to make people see the formal government (here GIRoA) as legitimate. In Afghanistan ISAF supported GIRoA in developing local infrastructure in areas where the government did not have control in order to win the trust of the population.[34] This was often done by the so-called Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). To win the hearts and minds of the population, villages were visited by ISAF soldiers. Soldiers conducted meetings with local authorities, governors or Elders or Shuras to gain knowledge and prioritize the needs of the villages, such as aggregates, road improvements, security walls around schools, or access to clean water.

2.4.2.4   Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)

The civilian efforts and achievements in the COIN strategy were often related to the so-called Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). QIPs were composed of both military and civilian actors. While it is not a military doctrine, the UN and some nations have worked out guidelines or handbooks for military use.[35]

The UK Department for International Development (DFID) prepared a QIP handbook for the military. Here QIP was defined as follows: *"QIPs are usually short term, small scale initiatives that are designed to have an immediate impact contributing to post-conflict stabilization or recovery. They*

---

[34] Personal experience and participant observation of activities taking place in Kunduz, Baghlan and Faryab Provinces, 2010.
[35] DPKO QIP Policy Directive, 12 February 2007, see also UN QIP Provisional Guide. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/416bd5a44.pdf

may also have an impact on longer-term development, and this should be taken into account in the planning stages." [36]

QIPs are normally funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or State Department of the nation executing the QIPs, or with the military's own funds. For example, the Post Operation Emergency Relief Fund (POERF) of German origin used by ISAF in North Afghanistan, or The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) of US origin, also used by ISAF in North Afghanistan.

These projects can be undertaken by a nation's own military forces or in coalition or with a multinational force. QIPs are carried out in order to meet urgent stabilization and reconstruction needs such as repair to infrastructure or utilities. They are designed to contribute to the resumption of normal life in conflict and crisis areas.

Even though the US COIN policy (followed by ISAF) presupposes QIPs in the aftermath of an COIN operation, the UK DFID QIP handbook states: *"Military forces should not, if at all possible, be involved in bringing emergency humanitarian assistance to civilians in the immediate aftermath of an intervention where they have been used as an instrument of political power. To do so blurs the identity of military and humanitarian actors, and threatens the principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality. It is not recommended that this type of activity is considered when designing QIPs."*

QIPs were used by many actors in the field. Besides the UN, UN-related organizations, NGOs, or EU/EUPOL, ISAF military forces, especially the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan were all using QIPs.

2.4.3   *NATO Civil Military Coordination (CIMIC) Doctrine*

NATO CIMIC is the military function through which the military Commander was linked to the civilian actors in the area of operation, and covered all actions and measures that concerned the organized relationship between military units and civilian entities and/or individuals.

---

[36] DFIDs Quick Impact Projects, a handbook for Military, UK, Glasgow (ISBN: 1 861927991).

NATO CIMIC is conducted both on an operational and tactical level. On the tactical level, Tactical CIMIC Teams (TCTs) assess situations in the field and report their work according to specified procedures. CIMIC is both a function and a capability, meaning that there were specially trained and employed CIMIC officers. Even though CIMIC officers are not the only ones doing civil military coordination activities, they are supposed to be the Commander's experts and advisors in CIMIC matters (CIMIC Field Handbook, 2008).

In addition to NATO CIMIC, some nations have their own national CIMIC policy, doctrines, education, and practice. Some of these are more or less in line with NATO, others not. Especially the US (and to some extent the British) Civil Affair Teams (CATs), which represented different regimes of civil military coordination, operated in a different way than the NATO CIMIC doctrine. [37] Generally one could say that European countries mostly followed the NATO CIMIC doctrine, and the US followed their Civil Affairs Doctrine. In the RCN area of operation, German or Scandinavian military actors on tactical level did not have the funding which gave the "boots on the ground" flexibility to do QIPs in order to win hearts and minds. This "hand money" or to use a US term, "money as weapon," [38] in CIMIC issues, was integrated in the US Civil Affairs system.

2.4.3.1   Definition and Background

At the operational or tactical level, NATO established a NATO CIMIC doctrine in the AJP9 (2003).[39] NATO CIMIC doctrine defines civil military coordination (CIMIC) as:

"The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and Civil actors, including national population and local

---

[37] The CATs are also used by the British to some extent, but the British had no vital formal positions in North Afghanistan in 2010-2011. In addition, they also approved and complied with NATO CIMIC doctrine.

[38] "Money as weapon," as laid down in US CERP documents. See; http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/09-27/09-27.pdf downloaded 12.02.2012.

[39] AJP9; Allied Joint Publication 9: "NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine" (2003), and AJP- 3.4.9 (A); "Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil- Military Cooperation" (NATO; February, 2013).

*authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental
organizations and agencies."* (Allied Joint Publication No 9 (AJP 9).

The NATO CIMIC doctrine was used in areas of operation between the
deployed military forces and IOs, GOs and NGOs.

The NATO definition underlined the military aim—the support of the
mission. Also the NATO CIMIC Field Handbook[40] underlined that CIMIC
was an integral part of the Commander's plan, conducted in support of the
mission, related to the implementation of the overall end-state strategy,
conducted in the operation area within military means and capabilities. The
purpose of NATO CIMIC was to establish and maintain coordination and
cooperation between the Commander (on strategic, operational, and tactical
levels) and civilian authorities, organizations and the population within the
Commander's area of operation in order to allow him to fulfill his mission.

During the Balkan wars in the 1990s, the CIMIC element in NATO nearly
became a profession of its own, drifting away from the military core
functions. CIMIC officers were often reserve officers with a civilian
education, profession, and experience found useful for the coordination work.
This led to critical questioning from civilian actors, especially NGOs,
claiming that military forces entered and threatened their area of responsibility
and expertise (Maley et al., 2003). It also led to a discussion in both NATO
and non-NATO countries and in both civil and military environments on how
to conduct CIMIC (Rietjens and Bollen, 2008).

This debate was articulated in NATO by the so-called traditionalists and
enthusiasts. The "traditionalists" claimed that CIMIC activities were designed
to support to the Commander and belonged in the line of a military
organization. Furthermore, they argued that CIMIC was logistic in nature,
technical, and fully concerned with providing resources to the force. The
"enthusiasts," on the other hand, viewed CIMIC as reconstruction and
development units, independent of the commander's needs and the military
mission. They believed that the CIMIC troops required civilian skills to
conduct civilian tasks. Within NATO, the traditionalists won the argument.
For both conventional warfare and peace operations, it was emphasized that

---

[40] Issued by CCOE; Civil-Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence, Netherlands.

NATO CIMIC units were to be perceived as traditional operational units in support of the field commander performing his military mission (T.B. Zaalberg, in Rietjens and Bollen, 2008). [41]

In response to the lessons learned at the Balkan wars in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, the NATO CIMIC doctrine AJP 9 and CIMIC policy MC1 411/1 were established. [42]

In addition to this, several civil military coordination documents are written to guide and direct the coordination activity in complex emergencies. Documents relevant for civil military coordination are listed in Appendix 2 and 3. The CA, COIN and CIMIC concepts are further discussed in Chapter 6 and 7.

2.4.4 *Summary*

This chapter has given a picture of the difficulties and characteristics of complex emergencies and the need for coordination between the actors involved in crisis management. Definitions of coordination and a description of the civil military coordination concepts prevailing for ISAF in North-Afghanistan are outlined.

The civil military coordination concepts of CA, COIN and CIMIC are the bridging tools of ISAF when operating in the meeting points of the "outer" and "inner" context. "Outer" and "inner" context is the topic of the next chapter and are therefore defined and described in the following.

---

[41] The scope of CIMIC activities and policy remains a debated issue, cf. Hoogensen Gjørv (2011).
[42] MC1 411/1, NATO Military Policy on CIMIC, see also Appendix 1.

3   "Outer" and "Inner" Context

This chapter starts with a short explanation of "outer" and "inner" contexts and clarifies the networks and frameworks in which NATO/ISAF had to conduct their crisis management efforts. Following a short introduction to Afghanistan's main figures, the background of the complex emergency is described to give a picture of the outer context. Then, this chapter will provide a description of the NATO and the ISAF structure, with special emphasis on Regional Command North (RCN), to give an understanding of important organizational structures and relevant reporting lines.

3.1   *Definition of "outer" and "inner" context*

The focus of this thesis is civil military coordination in a complex emergency. When studying activities such as civil military coordination within a real-life context, a distinction is made between inner and outer contexts (Kruke, 2010). When studying how ISAF structures and processes influence civil military coordination in a complex emergency area, the distinction between outer and inner context is defined as below:

- *The outer context is defined as North-Afghanistan, the context in which the civil military coordination is conducted.*
- *The inner context is defined as the NATO/ISAF organizational structures, guidelines, procedures, standards, statuses and responsibilities conducting civil military coordination.*

This distinction between inner and outer context is made to underline that the outer context may have limited potential for transferability. One will not meet exactly the same conflict picture as in North-Afghanistan in another future complex emergency. Even though complex emergencies have similarities (cf. definition of complex emergencies), every emergency is unique and will represent different and new contexts and challenges. However, characteristics from the inner context might be adaptable to other similar contexts, for example NATO forces in future "out of area" operations. NATO will probably use the same generally accepted structures, standards, procedures and guidelines concerning civil military coordination in future operations.

The outer context, North Afghanistan, is the outer frame and conditions in which ISAF coordinated their activities. More specifically, this represents North Afghanistan with focus on Afghan governance and power structures, overall economy, security, ethnicity and history relevant for the background of the conflict.

The presence of the international community, the international response system, represented by actors as the UN, the EU, embassies or international NGOs, as vital coordinating bodies to ISAF, are also operating in the outer context (see figure no. 3-1 below).

The inner context is understood as ISAF organizational structures, frameworks, processes and responsibilities. In order to explain ISAF organization and to position it, NATO's organization and the lines of authority in NATO command is described. Further, ISAF lines of command from ISAF Headquarters (HQ) in Kabul, down to the regional command in North Afghanistan further down to the troops in the field are outlined. The main focal point for this thesis is the area of operation under the responsibility of Regional Command North (RCN), and its lines to the superior ISAF Joint Command (IJC) in Kabul and to the subordinated six Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in different provinces.

Figure 3-1 Outer and Inner Context

Figure No. 3-1 visualizes the inner and outer contexts, as well as the influencing actors and politics, setting the frameworks and terms for crisis management. As shown in the figure, both NATO and contributing nations influence ISAF as the inner context, which then influences the outer context and vice versa. Additionally, the contributing nations, whether they are ISAF contributing or not, also have influenced the outer context through international organizations (IOs) such as the World Bank or the International Organization for Immigration, Governmental organizations (GOs) such as consulate and embassies, NGOs as humanitarian or development actors, or private security companies (PSC).

3.2 *"Outer" Context*

As mentioned, the outer context is understood as North Afghanistan, with main focus on Afghan governance and power structures, overall economy, security, ethnicity and history relevant for the background of the conflict, and the international community presence which represents vital coordinating actors with ISAF.

Afghanistan is a large, landlocked, multiethnic country in the heart of south-central Asia with an area of 645,807 sq. km and a population estimated to be approximately 30 million. The country is bordered by Iran to the west, Pakistan to the south and east, and by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the north. A narrow strip extends in the northeast along Pakistan to Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China (See Map No 3-1 below).

Afghanistan is steep-sloped with mountains fanning out from the towering Hindu Kush (24, 00ft/7,315m) across the center of the country. Between the mountain ranges are many fertile valleys and plains. Great stretches of desert are found in the southwest. In fact most of the land is dry, even if the regions vary widely.

Kabul is the largest city of Afghanistan and has been its capital since 1776. It lies along the Kabul River at an elevation of about 5,900 feet, in the east central part of the country. It is located in a triangular valley between the two steep mountain ranges, the Asmai and Sherdawaza, and is the economic, political, and cultural center of the nation. The population of Kabul is

estimated to be 2.5 million and the language is mainly Dari, though there is a large Pashtu population, who speak mainly Pashto. The Afghan parliament and government ministries are located in Kabul, and the presence of the international community has also put its mark on the Kabul community with embassies, multinational organizations, NGOs, along with UN and ISAF headquarters.

Map 3-1 Afghanistan, typography. Source: ISAF.

3.2.1 *Governance Structures*

According to the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), Afghanistan is a republic with two legislative bodies, the House of Elders (Meshrano Jirga) with 102 members, and the House of the People (Wolesi Jirga) with 249 members. On the sub national level, Afghanistan has elected Provincial, District, Village and Municipal councils, as well as governors and mayors appointed by each governor. The president is the head of state and government. The country is divided into 34 provinces and 398 districts. This number of districts is expected to change with further administrative reorganization. The districts are the basic units of the local administration (AREU, 2008).[43]

The history of today's central Government, led by President Hamid Karzai, began in the aftermath of the collapse of the Taliban Regime in 2001, when the UN sponsored a conference in Bonn, Germany, where Afghan factional leaders came together to sign the Bonn Agreement (2001). The terms of the Agreement dictated the Afghan Interim Administration (AIA) and set a timetable for re-establishing permanent government institutions. [44]

In June 2002, the AIA was replaced by Afghanistan Transitional Authority (ATA), and Hamid Karzai was appointed as temporary head of state and head of government in the absence of a legislature (AREU, 2008). In line with the Bonn Agreement timetable, a new Constitution was endorsed by a Constitutional Loya Jirga (an assembly of regional leaders and tribal chiefs in Afghanistan) and signed in January 2004 by President Karzai. [45] In 2004, Karzai became the first elected president of Afghanistan, with 55 percent of the votes, and the transitional state officially became the new Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Karzai also chaired the interim cabinet, which acted

---

[43] AREU; Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit. See www.areu.org.af for further information.

[44] The Bonn Agreement has been criticized as not representing all fractions, being dominated by the North Alliance, members of whom received all the important ministerial offices. On the other hand, the Pashto people, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, were severely underrepresented (Afghan representatives at the Oslo meeting, arranged by Norwegian Foreign Ministry).

[45] The Constitution can be read in English at AREU website, www.areu.org.af.

as Afghanistan's legislative body until the National Assembly was elected and convened. Legislative, provincial and district elections were postponed due to lack of security. Elections for Provincial Councils were held in September 2005, and the first-ever elections for District Councils were held in September 2010 (AREU, 2010).

Though the September 2005 elections officially ended the Afghanistan's transitional phase, the government was still in transition during 2010. This transition situation was more transparent at the provincial and the district level.

Although they do not hold formal power, community leaders, Shuras (Islamic scholars or elders) and Jirgas (a tribal assembly of elders, mostly Pashtun, consensus driven) are influential local actors (Barth, 2008). These Jirgas (Pashtun term) or Shuras (Dari term) exist on the provincial, district and village level. As long as many district councils that have not been elected or been elected but function only as empty shells, Jirgas and/or Shuras, even on ad hoc basis, are often the ones ISAF soldiers in the field meet for discussions or negotiations. Additionally, in areas that are insurgent strongholds, a shadow structure of power is held by insurgents or insurgent sympathizers. The historically defined zones or regions or Hawzas, used primarily for military purposes, are also still used for administrative convenience, though they have no official legal standing as administrative units.[46]

According to the author's observations, interviews and experiences, one consequence of these traditional power structures is that many districts in North Afghanistan had no functional formal authorities, but were often only "empty shells" with no real resources.[47] The establishment of new

---

[46] See: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, "Public Administration Country Profile," January 2006.
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan023299.pdf
downloaded 16.05. 2011. Also supported in interviews with TCT soldiers.
[47] Confirmed by meeting with UN local office at PRT Maimanah, August 2010.

government agencies and merging of ministries is still an ongoing process likely to continue for the next several years.

In civil military coordination issues, ISAF related both to the Elders and Shuras as well as the formal province and district governors and mayors. In formal meetings formal authorities, representing the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) were represented. Out in the field, Elders and Shuras were also often the contact. Who ISAF met as counterparts could be influenced by the particular situation. In insurgent stronghold areas formal authorities, meaning GIRoA representatives, were difficult to meet. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), representing ISAF ground level, often met formal (GIRoA) local authorities, on district level, but also on provincial level. Additionally and even more often they met traditional authorities as Elders and Shuras or other so-called strongmen; people with influence and power. Regional Command North (RCN) level also met with district and provincial GIRoA authorities, as well as Elders and Shuras. ISAF Headquarters in Kabul mostly met with central GIRoA representatives (Cf. Figure 6-4, chapter 6.2.3.).

Figure No 3-2 gives an overview of the Afghan structures with which ISAF developed relationships and supported with security, stability, development, governance, and reconstruction (in line with ISAF mandate and objectives 2010-2011). Figure No. 3-2 shows the levels of the Afghan formal governance power structures (in red) that represents the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Other traditional, religious and political Afghan influencers are visualized in the box on the right side (in pink).

Figure 3-2 GIRoA structures and influential Afghan power structures

3.2.1.1   Afghan National Security Force (ANSF)[48]

According to ISAF documents and personal observations, the Commander of ISAF as well as the Commander of RCN in 2010 underlined that all ISAF military operations should be joint operations with the ANSF, and planned and coordinated as such. This intensified the ISAF coordination and cooperation with the ANSF, also in planning and execution of projects requiring civil military coordination. In RCN, the ANSF counterpart was the 209th Corps, located in the ANSF headquarters in Camp Shaheen, nearby Mazar-e Sharif. Representatives from the 209th Shaheen Corp of the ANA were regularly represented in RCN meetings, both in operational and project planning and coordination. In some civil military coordination projects representatives from the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Border Police (ANBP) were also represented alongside local politicians as the district and/or provincial Governor or Mayor.

---

[48] ANSF: Afghan National Security Force consists of both, the Afghan National Army (ANA), and the Afghan National Police (ANP). The ANP is further divided into different units, as Afghan National Border Police (ANBP/ABP) or Afghan Local Police (ALP).

3.2.2 *Economy and Security*

As a landlocked country in an unstable region, with poor infrastructure and poor accessibility, Afghanistan has geographic disadvantages. The infrastructure was damaged by decades of conflict, even though a few main cities have begun rebuilding. The security situation worsened after 2006 (Giustozzi and Reuter, 2010), and aspects such as corruption, poor administrative capacity, and political tensions have influenced the political uncertainty, which makes policy implementation difficult.

Despite these difficulties, GIRoA did implement an economic program that was designed to tame inflation, raise tax collections, and implement structural reforms such as mobilizing domestic revenues and monitoring public enterprises. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Country Report No. 10/22, 2010, which described the situation, showed some optimism, despite the lack of reliable and comparable data. It is estimated that 97 percent of Afghanistan's official gross domestic product comes from international development aid and military spending by foreign troops. Thus, as troops leave, future growth will be slower, especially in urban areas and areas of conflict (New York Times, 2012). Since 2001, more Afghans have access to schooling and healthcare, but Afghanistan is still one of the poorest countries in the world, lacking such reliable basic services as clean water, electricity, and jobs according to several UN reports. Both the Afghan and the international press have had critical articles about GIRoA being unable to generate enough revenue to cover its budget, while a few rich Afghans have transferred billions of dollars to Middle East countries, actions that hamper the country's ability to grow (Najafizada, 2013).

The Afghan economy is largely based on agriculture (mainly grains, wool, fruits and nuts), even if only a small percentage of the land is cultivated, and a large percentage of the arable land was damaged by warfare during the 1980s and '90s. The damaged irrigation systems have been one of the reasons for the growth in poppy production, which needs less water. Opium has been the most important cash crop, making Afghanistan the world's largest producer of opium. Traditional handcrafts also have been important, and the well-known woolen carpets have been a major export, but significant mineral resources

remain largely untapped because of the decades of wars (AREU, 2008/2010; Civil Military Fusion Centre, CFC, 2010).[49]

The security situation in North Afghanistan has worsened since 2006. According to Foschini (2011) information from ISAF, the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) and the local population one agreed that the threat to security comes from factional rivalries among local strongmen and politicians as well as the Taliban. Local power struggles between illegal armed groups have outweighed problems with the Taliban in this region, although the borders between these insurgents and the ideologically committed Taliban are blurred. In the Balkh province, the Hizb-i Islami[50] networks are accused of disrupting the security situation by hampering the hegemony attained by Governor Mohammed Atta Nur, who also is regarded as a strong prospective Jamati[51] leader. The Balkh Province Governor Atta accuses local Hizb-i Islami networks for providing grounds for the insurgency to develop, and that the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) has supported Hizb-i Islami insurgents in the North Afghanistan region.

In the Faryab area, the Jamiatis were accused of supporting the Taliban in opposition to Dostum's Jonbesh,[52] while the Jonbesh were said to join the Taliban in the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). It was a situation in which armed groups were able to rule outside major urban areas. These groups and local tribal militias, called *arbaki*, have been strongly represented in provinces such as Kunduz, though relations with local villagers have not always been good (Giustozzi and Reuter, 2010). Moreover, many of these groups escaped the disarmament and demobilization programs. In 2008, UNAMA estimated there were 40,000 illegal weapons in four Northern provinces, Balkh, Jowzjan, Sar-e Pul and Samangan.

Nevertheless, ISAF sources[53] regarded Balkh province as a relatively secure area until 2006. In recent years, however, pockets of insecurity related to

---

[49] See https://www.cimicweb.org/Pages/v6/welcome.html
[50] Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, is an insurgent group active in Afghanistan. It is a splinter group of one of the prominent, and the most radical of the seven mujahedeen factions fighting the Soviets in the 1980s.
[51] Muslim freedom fighter group known as "Eh le Jamati Taliban."
[52] A mainly Uzbek freedom fighter group known as "Jonbesh-e Melli Islami."
[53] Information from CJ2 (Combined Joint Staff Branch for Intelligence) in RCN. July, 2010.

criminality and insurgency have been increasing. Unemployment, ethnic factors, and poverty were drivers of insecurity. ISAF underlined that the three districts considered most dangerous due to lack of security in North Afghanistan were predominantly Pashtun, and the insurgency has been considered essentially ethnic. Insurgents from south Afghanistan were said to be using ethnic networks to establish pockets in the north (ISAF PRT information).

Fishstein (2010) has claimed that social and political exclusion, alienation from the state, economic vulnerability, ethnic bias, and religious or ideological beliefs should be considered as drivers of insecurity in the north, as in Balkh province. Fishstein points to the fact that ISAF forces were not considered a de-stabilizing factor in this area until 2008-2009. Interviews and personal observations indicated that security was an aspect which was changing; the insecurity in the area was getting worse, and the attacks on military units increased.

The attack on the UN compound in Mazar-e Sharif on the 1. April 2011, where several unarmed UN employees were killed, showed that the atmosphere had changed. The attack was the first time in a decade that Mazar-e Sharif had been hit by such a degree of violence and had made a significant impact. Insurgent's efforts to strike inside the city multiplied with a marked increase of improvised explosive devices (IED) attacks. Another area of increasingly instability and high insurgent activity in 2010 in the north was along the Highway 1 (Ring Road) from Mazar-e Sharif to Shibergan, where joint military operations between ISAF and ANSF had been ongoing to meet this threat, without sustainable success.[54]

According to personal experiences, the security situation also changed dramatically between 2010 and 2011. In 2010, visits to local villages, transportation between RCN and other camps, PRTs, ANSF camps or local coordinating civilian bodies were done mainly by car. In 2011, these movements were done mainly by helicopter, due to the insurgents increased use of IEDs.

---

[54] Personal observation and ISAF information.

3.2.3 *Balkh Province*

Balkh Province (see Map No. 3-2 below) in which ISAFs Regional Command North (RCN) was located, is one of Afghanistan's five traditional *daraja-i awwal* (level one provinces), or regional centers with special economic, political and geographic importance. It is also the most influential province in North Afghanistan.

Map 3-2 Afghan Provinces. (Source: UN 2006)

Balkh has a large number of government employees and has been an important growing area for wheat, almonds and pomegranates. One reason for its national economic importance was the Afghan town named Hairatan near the Uzbek border along the Amu Darya River, where the border trade and marginal revenue was of very high value, not just locally, but also for the whole nation (Fishstein, 2010). Moreover, a key factor in this region was that it was populated by tradesmen, who had been businessmen for generations. Thus, they had positive attitudes toward modernizing and already had a somewhat developed economy and social structures before the most recent war.[55]

In 2010, Uzbekistan was the largest supplier of imports to Afghanistan, which included vital ISAF logistical support. Afghanistan's first modern railway was built from Hairatan by the Amu Darya River, along the border across from Uzbekistan. The conflict was less in the northern area during the first years of the war (until 2005/2006), local structures were quite functional, and the economy prospered. However, the rising insecurity contributed to a greater instability in the area as the years have gone on (Fishstein, 2010; Giustozzi and Reuter, 2010).

The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) have regional headquarters (HQ) in Balkh Province, as does ISAF with the Regional Command North (RCN). The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) had their regional HQs in this area as well, with one in Kunduz Province and one Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh Province, in addition to several district offices. Mazar-e-Sharif also housed many other IO/GO/NGOs. According to AREU (2008), More than 60 international assistant organizations, government agencies and foreign missions, in addition to private companies, were based in Balkh.[56]

---

[55] Information from Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and UN representatives in North Afghanistan, meeting in RCN April 2010.
[56] An overview can be found in AREAU, 2011. Retreived from http://www.**areu**.org.af/ .

Mazar-e Sharif[57] is the fourth largest city in Afghanistan and the main city in the northern region, with an estimated population of 300,000. The Blue Mosque is a landmark placed in the center of the city, which is a historic center for pilgrimages. Commercial and economic activities are also concentrated in this city. The infrastructure is relatively good compared to other provincial centers in the northern area. Signs of this include the existence of both public and private universities, technical training centers, an airport, and foreign consulates.

Barth (2008) described Mazar-e Sharif as an important "resistance town" under the Taliban regime in that the resistance toward the Taliban was strong, and the North Alliance had strong support in the city. This may have contributed, in 2010, to the fact that the insurgents still had less support in this area compared to other parts of the country.

3.2.4   *Population[58]*

Afghanistan is a patchwork quilt of different ethnicities. The people of Afghanistan are related to ethnic groups in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and Iran, the borders between these groups are arbitrary. Despite the diversity of ethnic groups, their way of life has many similarities, including most importantly, that the family is the mainstay of Afghan society. Close bonds between generations, family honor, pride and respect towards each other is emphasized (Barth, 2008; Barfield, 2005a). Among villagers and nomads, the family lives together and forms a self-sufficient group. Afghanistan has more than 10,000 small settlements, each with less than 100 normally mud-brick homes.

The Pashtuns, about 40 percent of the population, are the largest ethnic group and consist of different tribal groups. They are traditionally farmers or nomads, and most are located in the south and east of the country; they are

---

[57] Mazar-e Sharif means "Noble Shrine" which is a reference to the large and famous blue-tiled Shrine of Hazrat Ali, or the "Blue Mosque" as it is often called.
[58] Information from AREU, Britannica World Data, 2009, Washington Post Country Guide, 2010, Lonely Planet Afghanistan 2007, Afghanistan information Centre. Retreived from http://www.afg-info.com/, Institute for the study of war; see also http://www.understandingwar.org and https://www.cimicweb.org.

Muslims (Sunnites) and represent the group that provides the most support to the Taliban. The Tajiks are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and are mainly merchants, craftsmen or farmers. The Hazara (descended from Xinjiang, China), the third largest ethnic group, is composed of mostly farmers and sheepherders. They traditionally have been discriminated against, in part due to the fact that they follow Shia Islam in a country that is predominantly Sunni Muslim. Other important ethnicities include the Uzbeks, Turkmens and Baluchs, further Tatars, Taimuris, Persians, Nuristaris, Kirghizs, Chahar Aimaks, Brahuis and Arabs.

The towering Hindu Kush range both dominates and divides Afghanistan. The northern plains and valleys are mostly home to Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen. Pashtuns inhabit the desert-dominated southern plateaus. Hazara live in the central highlands (see Map No 3-3 below). The wide range of different ethnicities makes this country fascinating, complex and difficult to organize for the interest or benefit of the whole population. This makes politics, security, and joint efforts very challenging.

The most spoken official languages are Dari (Afghan Persian) and Pashto (Afghan), but there are also 6 other official languages: Uzbek, Turkmen, Baluchi, Kafiri (Nuristani), Pashai and Pamiri together with several minor languages. The Pashtuns speak Pashto, the Tajik and Hazara speak Dari. The people of northern Afghanistan mostly are Dari-speaking, and the Pashtun minority also speaks, or at least understands, Dari. Several groups in the north, especially along the river Amu Darya, also speak Turkic languages.

The official religion is Islam, predominantly Sunnites. More than 90 percent of the population is Muslim. Three-quarters are Sunnites from the Hanafi branch. Approximately two million of the total population is Shiites (mainly Hazaras). Sufism is also widely practiced.

Map 3-3 Ethnicity, (Source: UNOSAT)

The warfare in Afghanistan during the late 20th century caused substantial population displacement, with millions of refugees fleeing into Pakistan and Iran. Figures from the UNHCR show that more than 5.7 million refugees have voluntarily repatriated to Afghanistan in the last 10 years. Many of the refugees have become internally displaced personnel (IDPs) in Afghanistan, and sheltering and housing still is a major problem (NRC, 2010).[59] The security situation continues to be volatile, which makes humanitarian access to many areas impossible. The lack of security is regarded as the main reason for displacement, and the UNHCR estimated that by mid-2012, 425 000 Afghans were internally displaced.

3.2.5 *Background for today's complex emergency.*

Afghanistan has a long history of wars and conflicts, but as a background for today's conflict, 19th century events have relevance for the course of events today. The modern boundaries of Afghanistan were established in the late 19th century in the context of a rivalry between the British Empire and the Tsarist Russia. The British actively fought to get control of Afghanistan, and fought several Anglo-Afghan wars, ending in the beginning of the 19th century, without being able to conquer the Afghans.

3.2.5.1 The Kings

After the third Anglo-Afghan war, which ended in 1919 when the Brits gave up, King Amanullah Khan established a government structure with all ethnicities represented. He was succeeded by King Muhammad Nadir Shah in 1929, and then by King Muhammed Zahir Shah in 1933. The Afghans had a stable period under the leadership of King Muhammed Zahir Shahs monarchy until the mid-1970s. A constitution was promulgated in 1964 that established a national legislature. The countryside was secured by local tribal militias called "arbokai." King Shah also established good connections with the Soviet Union, which built large infrastructure projects in Afghanistan, including the North-South Salang Pass and the Bagram airfield. The US countered Soviet

---

[59] The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) has carried out programs to assist the most vulnerable ones in different areas of the country. See also, http://www.nrc.no/?did=9510581

influence by providing agricultural development assistance for irrigation and dam projects (Marsden, 2009; Katzman, 2013).

3.2.5.2 The Communist Regime

Communist and Islamic movements grew in strength in the 1970s, and the King was overthrown by the military leader Mohammad Daoud, who himself was overthrown and killed in 1978 by the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in the so-called *Saur* revolution, led by Hafizulla Amin and Nur Mohammad Tarki. The Marxist reforms launched by PDPA led to uprisings and rebellion in the country, which led to the Soviet invasion of 1979. The Soviets were trying to prevent further gains by the Islamic militias, especially the most important one known as the Mujahedin. In 1986 the PDPA leader under the Soviet regime, Babrak Karmal was removed and replaced with the leader of the Afghan Intelligence, Najibullah Ahmedzai, most known by his first name Najibullah (Bearden, 2001; Marsden, 2009; Katzman, 2013).

During this Soviet war, the combined Soviet and Afghan forces were consistently plagued by desertions and the effectiveness of the forces was limited. The Mujahedin benefited from US-supplied weapons and assistance in cooperation with Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). After years of fighting, the Mujahedin and other Afghan guerrillas, with support from Western countries took over the majority of the country in 1989 when the Soviets withdrew. The withdrawal left a country with a leadership vacuum filled with warlords, militia groups, strongmen and criminals (Marsden, 2009).

3.2.5.3 The Civil War

The Mujahidin were quite well organized, coordinated by seven major parties.[60] Najibullah was able to beat back the first Mujahedin offensives, but

---

[60] The seven parties and their leaders, the "Peshawar 7" were Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi (Islamic Revolutionary Movement of Afghanistan); Sibghatullah Mojaddedi (Afghan National Liberation Front); Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (Hezb-i-Islam-Gulbuddin, Islamic Party of Gulbuddin); Burhanuddin Rabbani (Jamiat Islami, Islamic Society); Yunus Khalis (Hezbi-Islam); Abd-i-Rab

is position was weak, and he was forced to step down in 1992. The fall of Najibullah exposed the differences among the Mujahedin parties and lead to rebellions by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern Afghanistan, who joined mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masoud of the Islamic Society (led by Burhannudin Rabbani). This was the start of the civil war (1992-1996). The Islamic insurgent factions that had overthrown the Najibullah government established an Islamic Republic in 1992, which, according to an agreement, was to be led by Rabbani until 1994. In 1994 Rabbani refused to step down, leading to new clashes and armed combats between Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hikmatyar who led the more conservative Islamist Hizb-e-Islam Gulbuddin party. At the same time, Afghan Islamic students, mostly Pashtuns, formed the Taliban movement under the leadership of Mullah Muhammad Umar (Katzman, 2013; Fitzgerald and Gould, 2009).

The civil war (1992-1996) brought a variety of social problems such as poverty, inter-ethnic strife, criminality and kidnapping. It also fueled the noted Afghan tendency toward the legendary blood feuds and revenge handed down through generations.

3.2.5.4   The Taliban and Bin Laden

The Taliban viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt and anti-Pashtun, and gained support on the promise to create stability. The Taliban militia managed to take power in Kabul in 1996, ending the civil war and enforcing a harsh Islamic order in the country.

In May 1996, Osama Bin Laden relocated from Sudan to Afghanistan, Nangarhar province, which was under the control of the Yunus Khalis led by Hezbi-Islam (Mullah Umar's party). The Taliban's hosting of Al Qaeda's leadership and Osama Bin Laden was a problem for Western countries. The Clinton administration in the US pressured the Taliban to extradite Al Qaida leaders after the bombings of US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya 1998, which was refused. Then after the 9 September 2001 attacks on the US, and the Taliban's continued unwillingness to extradite Osama bin Laden and the key members of his al-Qaeda network, US President George Bush began one

---

Rasul Sayyaf (Ittihad Islami, Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan); and Pir Gaylani (National Islamic Front). See Kenneth Katzman (2013).

of the longest wars in Afghan history. The US led a "Coalition of the Willing"
that entered Afghanistan in October 2001 to capture Osama bin Laden and
eliminate the possibility for the al-Qaeda network to operate from a "safe
haven" in Afghanistan (Katzman, 2013).[61]

3.2.5.5   The "Coalition of the Willing"

Upon first arriving, the "Coalition of the Willing" or Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF), was welcomed by *parts* of the local population, because the
operation overthrew the Taliban. When it turned out that Osama bin Laden
was not quickly captured, the mandate of the international military forces
changed from one of seeking out Bin Laden toward a focus on development
and reconstruction. However, this continued military presence of the West did
not have a fundament of legitimacy among much of the Afghan population
(Joya, 2009).

Moreover, Afghanistan's rugged landscape and tribal "patchwork" has never
been conducive to a strong central government. This might explain why the
attempts of the international community to build a central government met
greater challenges than ever expected. Prior to the US-led "Coalition of the
Willing" entering Afghanistan in 2001, there were already many warlords,
factions, and militia groups who had been fighting for influence during the
1990s civil war. The strongest threat for the Taliban in 2001 was the popular
and charismatic Ahmad Shah Massod and his United Front (Northern
Alliance) forces. Massod was killed two days before the September 11
attacks, and the first US and UK forces in Afghanistan joined the Northern
Alliance to defeat the Taliban. By joining one of the military factions, the
Western initiative became a part of the long-lasting internal conflict. This
made it difficult for parts of the local population to see the coalition forces as
friendly foreigners who are there to help them to help themselves. This mixed
message led to insecurity and resistance in the population and militia groups,
which has only grown since 2002 (Giustozzi, 2009/2010). See Map No. 3-4,
below.

---

[61] For further reading, see International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 210, 4 Aug 2011.

Map 3-4 Spread of the Neo-Taliban insurgency 2002-2006 (Source: Giustozzi, 2009).

The map shows in green the spread of the neo-Taliban influence. The dark green represents core areas and the light green represents the expansion in 2005-2006. The striped and dotted green shows expansion in 2003 (striped) and 2004 (dotted).

By establishing a government in Kabul based on the Afghan Interim Administration put in place by the Bonn agreement—an agreement that has been criticized for not allowing all parties to participate—a government was established without the needed legitimacy among parts of the population.

A well-known Afghan politician Malalai Joya underlined that the problem with legitimacy in the population is that as long as what she calls "warlords" and "war criminals" are part of the sitting parliament, the government will not gain legitimacy among the population. Joya even suggested that these politicians should have been brought to court for the crimes they committed during the Afghan civil war in the 1990s. She suggested that NATO and the Western interference in the country is of geopolitical interest, and that foreign troops only fuels the rival factions of the civil war, while filling the country with more weapons. "*No nation can donate liberation to another nation,*" she said. [62]

The conflict also has depended on regional interests. Both interviews with ISAF officers and various articles underline this problem. [63] One of the several meddling neighboring countries, Pakistan, seems to have played a dual role in Afghanistan. Officially, they have been a key partner for the international engagement in Afghanistan in the effort to fight terrorism; on the other hand, they are accused of giving sanctuary to the Taliban leadership they once helped into power. According to Barth (2008) the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), known as being a very conservative Islamic organization, has considerable influence on Pakistani politics towards Afghanistan. This is only one of many internal and cross-border conflicts rooted in regional interests. Furthermore, the competition for regional

---

[62] Malalai Joya's message at the Gwangju award ceremony, 18 May, 2006. Retrieved from http://www.malalaijoya.com/gwangju2.htm.
[63] See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/05/06/is-regional-strategy-viable-in-afghanistan/4xy6

hegemony cannot be ignored. There will always be outside forces that use instability and conflict as an opportunity to press their own political agendas, as neighboring countries play influential roles, often supporting different militia groups and fuelling the conflict.

Afghanistan today is a tough, hard place to live. It is ranked as number 155 of 169 countries on the UN development index. Life expectancy is 44 years, and during the 10 year long war from 2001-2011, with nearly 60 billion dollars being spent by the *international community*[64] for support, 80 percent of the population still was living in poverty (Bolle, 2011). Estimates from the World Food Program (WFP) stated that 2.86 million people were food insecure in 2011. OCHA reported that nearly 70 percent of water points in northern Afghanistan were non-functional due to reduced groundwater table levels and poor maintenance. Frequent disasters and conflicts since 2002, have displaced populations and generated humanitarian needs throughout the country.

According to the UN, floods, landslides, droughts, earthquakes, and avalanches affect approximately 400,000 Afghans each year, which particularly affects the displaced persons and those living in conflict areas. The UNHCR figures show that the number of internally displaced people in August 2011 had nearly a 50 percent increase since 2010. Frequent displacements has contributed to the loss of working age community members and also has led to an influx of displaced persons in communities with scarce resources, which results in further instability and increased humanitarian needs. The governmental capacity and infrastructure are insufficient, basic services often cannot be offered, which has made the local communities very vulnerable.[65]

3.2.6 *Summary of outer context*

The outer context is drawn to give a picture of the poverty, unrest, and uneasiness in this country. Further, the history and current context suggests how this poorly governed country, after decades of war, has been in need for

---

[64] International Community meaning; UN, NATO, EU, other big IOs/GOs and NGOs.
[65] For more information see the Relief Web Report: http://reliefweb.int/node/450134.

improvements in infrastructure and institutions in order to be able to offer service to a suffering population. These aspects have been a contributing factor to ISAF's engagement in the civilian dimension. With military resources and logistic capability, ISAF has been able to support civilian efforts to build up damaged or missing infrastructure in order to create stability and security. Such an extensive civil military coordination required military insight and understanding of the outer context for both planning and decision-making. Meetings with local authorities and populations to promote mutual understanding has been a huge challenge, which might push military actors, coordinating bodies, and the local population out of their "comfort zone" regarding joint understanding and objectives in the coordination efforts.

3.3   *"Inner" Context*

The inner context is defined as ISAF organization, and especially ISAF structures and processes relevant for the civil-military coordination in North Afghanistan.

In order to position ISAF, NATO lines of upper command are also described briefly in this chapter. NATO has provided the framework for ISAF in Afghanistan. But NATO is not the same as ISAF. While NATO consists of NATO nations, ISAF consist of the 28 NATO nations and an additional 20 non-NATO nations.[66]

During this study (2010-2011) there were two main military operations in Afghanistan, one US-led operation called Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and one NATO-led operation called International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

3.3.1 *Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)*

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan was a joint US, UK, and Afghan operation, which ran parallel to and separate from ISAF. It only focused on counterterrorism or conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. OEF had its Headquarter (HQ) at Bagram Air Base, outside

---

[66] The figures represent the situation in 2010 and they are very changing.

Bagram town in Parwan Province. (OEF was supported from several additional nations in the period of 2001-2003 before ISAF forces were in place). The presence of actors operating under the US-led OEF was defined in a bi-lateral agreement (2005) between the participating actors and the GIRoA.[67] The OEF coalition is referred to in United National Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1510 (2003) and subsequent resolutions, which call for ISAF to work with OEF in the implementation of both forces mandates. UN resolution 1510 (2003) "*.... calls upon the International Security Assistance Force to continue to work in close consultation with the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as well as with the Operation Enduring Freedom Coalition in the implementation of the force mandate.*"

Since this thesis is concerning the ISAF mission, OEF is only mentioned in relation to ISAF.

3.3.2 *North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)*

The North Atlantic Treaty (1949)[68] is the foundation of the NATO organization. The development and focus of the alliance was expressed in following concepts;

- The Alliance's Strategic Concept - 1991
- The Alliance's Strategic Concept – 1999
- Lisbon Summit Declaration/NATO's New Strategic Concept – 2010

NATO has a civilian and a military structure consisting of 28 member countries (2011), with the upper-level headquarters (HQ) stationed in Brussels, Belgium. The supreme Headquarter of *Allied Command Operations* is Supreme Headquarters Allied Command Europe (SHAPE), stationed in

---

[67] According to the "Guidelines for the interaction and coordination of humanitarian actors and military actors in Afghanistan," provided by the Afghanistan Civil–Military Working Group, May 2008. Retrieved from http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Temabilder/Tema%20sikkerhetspolitikk/Afghanistan/Guidelines_Afghanistan%5B1%5D.pdf.
[68] The North Atlantic Treaty. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/pdf/nato_treaty_en_light.pdf .

Mons, Belgium. SHAPE is one of NATOs two military strategic commands. The main task of this HQ is to lead NATO's military operations, as the HQ of Allied Command Operations (ACO). Consequently, this is the ongoing upper strategic command of the NATO operations in the Afghanistan area of operation. The other strategic command is the Headquarters of Allied Command Transformation (ACT), located in Norfolk, Virginia, US. The main task of this HQ is to lead military transformation of alliance forces and capabilities, education, research and testing new concepts and doctrines to improve the alliance's military effectiveness. The transformation command, ACT, is involved in Afghanistan in that they are responsible for the education and training of ISAF soldiers, through various subordinate commands such as, for example, the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in Stavanger, Norway and other NATO schools.

Organization Chart No 3-1, the NATO Command Structure (below) shows the lines of command in operations. The operations command ongoing in Afghanistan reports to the Allied Joint Force Command (JFC HQ) in Brunssum, The Netherlands, which is responsible for the daily follow up of military operations in Afghanistan.

Organization Chart 3-1 The NATO Command Structure. . [69]

The Organization Chart No. 3-1 shows the NATO organization and how ISAF is connected to the command structure. The first and second levels (light brown) are the strategic level in the Euro-Atlantic area. The third level (brown) is the operational level. The upper Headquarters in Afghanistan (green) is ISAF strategic level in Afghanistan.

In addition to the 28 member countries, NATO has cooperation with 22 partnering countries in the so-called Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Outside the formal partnerships, NATO also cooperates with other non-NATO countries such as Australia, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand, which also were represented in the operational area of Afghanistan. [70]

---

[69] Figure is based on NATO orientation and organization charts, 2011.
[70] See NATO's homepage, http://www.nato.int/ and Appendix 4.

3.3.3 *International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)*

3.3.3.1   ISAF Mandate

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is a multi-national force acting under a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The mandate of ISAF was provided by UNSCR in resolution 1386 (2001) provided by the Bonn Agreement (5th December 2001). Based on this agreement, ISAF was mandated to "*assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security of Kabul and its surrounding areas*." In addition, the Bonn agreement led to a Military Technical Agreement of January 2002 between the ISAF Commander and the Afghan Transitional Authority that provided guidance for ISAF operations. Later a declaration was written declaring an enduring partnership between NATO/ISAF and Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) 2010.[71]

Upon the request of the UN and GIRoA, NATO took command of ISAF in August 2003. ISAF mandate was expanded in Resolution 1510 (2003):

Expansion of the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force to allow it, as resources permit, to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement.

---

[71] See the Declaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on an Enduring Partnership. Retrieved from
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_11/20101120_101120-declaration.pdf

The mandate was later extended or affected by new UNSCR resolutions as follows: 1563 (2004), 1623 (2005), 1707 (2006), 1776 (2007), 1817 and 1833 (2008), 1890 (2009), 1917 (2010), 1974 and 1988 (2011).[72]

According to NATO HQ, Allied Command operations (ACO), the mandate implied ISAF assistance to GIRoA in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance.

To carry out its mission in 2010/2011, ISAF aimed to conduct population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in partnership with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and also provide support to the government and the international community, including the training and mentoring of the ANSF.

The ISAF mission was planned to cease at the end of 2014, but at the Chicago Summit in May 2012, the leadership agreed that NATO will lead a new mission to continue to train, assist and advise the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) after 2014.

3.3.3.2   ISAF Upper Command Structure

In addition to the 28 member states of the Alliance, there were 20 other contributing countries participating in Afghanistan in 2010. This meant 48 countries on the ground provided roughly 130,000 troops (cf. Appendix 4).

---

[72] For overview of UNCSR resolutions concerning ISAF, see http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/un_resolutions_and_reports.php?id_state=1

Organization Chart 3-2 ISAF command structures 2010. Command of the civilian component of the PRTs was run by the nation leading the PRT. (Source: NATO).

Organization Chart No. 3-2 continues organization chart No 3-1 (cf. brown boxes) and shows the main ISAF organization in Afghanistan (green). ISAF HQs in Kabul has consisted of one overall and three operational headquarters, as shown in Organization Chart No. 3-2 above. Supreme headquarters is HQ ISAF, which has been under the leadership of the US. This HQ represents the strategic level of ISAF. The Commander of ISAF (COMISAF) is a four star General who works in close cooperation with Afghan politicians and Parliamentary representatives, the UN Special Representative, and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (NATO SCR). The Commander of ISAF focuses on strategic political-military aspects of the ISAF mission, synchronizing ISAF's operations with the work of Afghan and other international organizations in the country. ISAF HQ also had a reporting line toward the ISAF contributing nations' governments.

The three other headquarters, which were in Kabul, also US led, were ISAF Joint Command (IJC),[73] ISAF Special Operations Element (SOE), and NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), each led by a three star General. The last two organizations are *not* included in this thesis. The main levels studied are marked with a *red frame* in the Organization Chart No.3- 2 above: the IJC, one regional command and its six subordinated PRTs.

ISAF Commander (COMISAF) had a dual leadership role as the Commander of ISAF and as the Commander of the US Forces in Afghanistan, thus coordinating and reducing conflict with ISAF operations and the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). COMISAF had command responsibility over the IJC Commander, the Commander of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) and the NATO Special Operations Element (SOE), as shown in Organization Chart No.3- 2 above.

The *Commander of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)* had a dual leadership role, as well. He was responsible for ISAF activities in NTM-A, a multinational support to GIRoA, which generates and sustains the ANSF, and additionally, took command of the US-led Combined Security Transition Command, Afghanistan (CSTC-A), whose primary role was the training and development of the Afghan National Army (ANA).

The *ISAF Joint Command (IJC)* Commander was responsible for executing the full spectrum of tactical operations throughout the country on a day-to-day basis. He took over command of the Regional Commands, and also ensured the coordination and cooperation of the ISAF and ANSF operations. The Commander of IJC is also had dual leadership authority as US and ISAF Commander and was responsible for both ISAF and OEF military operations. Accordingly, he reports through both national and NATO/ISAF channels. IJC, with a staff number close to 2000,[74] worked according to an information dominance operating model, emphasizing coordination with GIRoA, civilian agencies, the international community, UNAMA, ANSF and Regional Commands (IJC information). This will be further outlined in Chapter 6.

---

[73] IJC later changed name to *Intermediate Joint Command*, with the same acronym.
[74] This number does not include all support units stationed at IJC HQ in Kabul.

3.3.3.3   Regional Commands

At the next level of the command structure were six regional commands (2010/11). The regional commands (RCs) focused on geographically smaller areas, and they coordinated military operations and civil military activities conducted by the military component of the subordinated PRTs. They had logistic installations to provide and supply medical and transport support needed to support the PRTs in their mission. The RCs reported to the IJC, and were the responsible and coordinating actors in their area of operation, as shown in Map No. 3-5 below. The largest RC in 2010 (RCN) contained a staff of approximately 300 personnel (increasing to 700 during 2010).[75] The smallest regional command, Regional Command Capitol, was led by a one star general. The five other regional commands were led by two star generals.[76]

The mission of the regional Commands were: "*To conduct operations in the assigned area of operations to assist GIRoA in the establishment and maintenance of a safe and secure environment with full engagement of ANSF in order to extend government authority and influence, thereby facilitating Afghanistan's reconstruction and contributing to regional stability.*"[77]

---

[75] These numbers only cover staff members. The accurate size of the RC is not available information.

[76] The regional Commands were led by countries as follows: Regional Command Capital (RCC) in Kabul was led by Turkey. Regional Command East (RCE), stationed in Bagram, was US-led. Regional Command North (RCN), stationed in Mazar-e Sharif, was German-led. Regional Command West (RCW), stationed in Herat, was Italian-led. Regional Command South West (RCSW), stationed in Lashkar, was also US led. Regional Command South (RCS), stationed in Kandahar, was British led (as of 2010/2011).

[77] As stated in ISAF documents, see also: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/C31D1E2E4B1B6B878525721F007626A7-nato_OPR_afg051006.pdf

Map 3-5 Regional Commands Area of Operation (AOO). (Source; UN, Oct 2011)

3.3.3.4   Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) were the next level of command, and reported to the RCs. There were 28 PRTs in Afghanistan in 2011. The PRTs were spread out all over the country and led by different nations, including nations outside the NATO membership, such as Sweden, Korea, or New Zealand.[78] That said, the military parts of the PRTs were under the command and control of the Regional Command in the area in which they belonged.

The PRTs were invented as small, interagency organizations for executing civil-military coordination, and were designed to maximize the synergistic effects among various agencies working towards reconstruction and peace building. Their overall mandate in Afghanistan was the ISAF mandate. The mission of the PRTs was to assist the Afghan government in security and development within their province. This broad mandate gave them room for operating in different ways, according to national priorities and caveats. Additionally, they had guidelines in the ISAF PRT Handbook, and the US PRT Playbook (2007). The ISAF PRT Handbook (2009) and the ISAF Operation Plan states the PRT mission as follows:

"PRTs will assist The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts."

This PRT mission statement was agreed to on 27 January 2005, as part of the PRT Terms of Reference by the PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC)[79] in Kabul, an ambassadorial-level body chaired by the Minister of Interior. Most PRTs consisted of military personnel with a small critical civilian staff. The civilian component in the PRTs usually consisted of civil affairs officials, ambassadors and/or diplomats. Most PRTs were military lead, some had a

---

[78] See ISAF Key Facts and Figures for detailed information. Retrieved from http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/14DEC%202010%20Placemat.pdf. See also, listed NATO and non-NATO countries in ISAF, Appendix No 4.
[79] PRT Executive Steering Committee. Retreived from https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/PRT%20CONFERENCE%202010/PRT_ESC_Charter.pdf downloaded 10.04.2012.

dual-headed leadership and a few were civilian-led. An ISAF agreement that there should be civilian PRT leadership in the future was established.

Being led by different nations, the PRTs displayed a variety of cultures, training, focus, and resources. PRTs reported to the regional Commands (RCs) in military operation activities and issues. In addition, they reported through national channels to national authorities, both military and civilian, which will be further discussed in Chapter 6 and 7.

3.3.3.5   Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs)

The Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) was a vital element for the international exit strategy in Afghanistan. The important part of the OMLTs task was to train, mentor and coach the ANA (Afghan National Army), to support the development of a self-sufficient professional ANA force. In 2011 there were more than 150 OMLTs in Afghanistan, 76 of them US teams.[80] Normally these units were small, consisting of approximately 15-30 personnel, but also could be bigger. They could be composed of one or several nationalities, but would be led by one nation, usually OMLT soldiers deployed for a minimum period of 6 months. The OMLTs reported to NMT-A HQ in Kabul as well as to national governmental channels.

The OMLTs, like the PRTs, often had their own way of doing things, depending on nationality, training, culture, etc. Consequently, the way things were done often varied from OMLT to OMLT, even though they had to relate to the ISAF Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Partnering Directive (2009)[81] and the Guideline for Transmission (2011),[82] both produced by the COMISAF Advisory and Assistant Team (CAAT). The Operational Monitoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) are not in focus of this research.

---

[80] These are 2011 NATO numbers. Note that the figures change over time as new concepts and/or strategies are adopted.
[81] See NATO/ ISAF directive: http://publicintelligence.net/isaf-afghan-national-security-forces-ansf-partnering-directive/.
[82] See: NATO/ISAF directive: http://publicintelligence.net/isaf-caat-afghan-national-security-forces-ansf-guidelines-in-partnering-for-transition/.

3.3.4 *Regional Command North (RCN)*

The participant observations and interviews in this thesis were gathered mostly in the regional Command North (RCN) during 2010 and 2011. The RCN area of operation contained nine provinces, as listed in the Factbox below (see also Map No. 3- 6 below). The RCN HQ was placed nearby Mazar-e Sharif, at the foot of the Marmal Mountains, in Camp Marmal, Balkh Province.

FACTBOX RCN 2010/11:

Mission: ISAF Regional Command North supports Afghan National Security Forces in close coordination and collaboration in providing security and disrupting activities of the insurgents in order to protect the population, secure the highways, and support the Afghan Border Police (ABP) operations in the border areas and crossing points in order to set the conditions for economic, social and cultural development in key terrain districts.

Area of Responsibility: RC-North includes the provinces of: Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Samangan, Sar-e Pul and Takhar.

Contributing Nations:
NATO Nations: Albania, Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, U.S., U.K. and Turkey
Non-NATO Nations: Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mongolia and Sweden

Major units assigned:
• PRT Kunduz, Kunduz Province, German-led
• PRT Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh Province, Swedish-led
• PRT Maimanah, Faryab Province, Norwegian-led
• PRT Pul-e Khumri , Baghlan Province, Hungarian-led
• PRT Faizabad, Badakhstan Province, German-led
• PRT Jawzjan, Shibirghan, Jawzjan Province, Turkish-led
• Logistics Support Battalion (LOG SPT BN)
• Air Wing (AW) Mazar-e Sharif
• 170th Infantry Brigade Combat Team
• 1st Calvalry Brigade, 1st Calvarly Division
• Task Force Kunduz
  Task Force Mazar-e Sharif

Source: NATO, ISAF, 2011.

Map 3-6 RC N area of operation (AOO) marked in blue. The six PRTs in the district of Faryab, Jawzjan, Balkh, Kunduz, Baghlan and Badakhstan are marked with the flags of the nation which lead them. (Source: ISAF)

Camp Marmal, in which the RCN HQ was placed, consisted of approximately 700 staff officers after the US troops came in the summer of 2010. Approximately 5000 soldiers, from eighteen countries, including some 1000 local Afghans working in different positions (such as cleaning personnel, construction workers, interpreters, academics, liaisons to the Afghan Army and communication experts, etc.) were also stationed in Camp Marmal. Germany was ISAF lead nation for the command, and the deputy was from the US. An airport, a 4th Combat Aviation Brigade, CH 53 Sea Stallion (heavy lift transport) and UH 60 Black Hawk helicopters, a military hospital, a Norwegian camp, and US soldiers from the 1/10 Mountain Division were among others also stationed at Camp Marmal in 2010/2011. The RCN HQ consisted of both military and civilian personnel, in staff and support units.

Big development organizations such as Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) also had their offices and personnel placed in Camp Marmal, working closely with the RCN staff, sharing offices and conducting regular meetings. Even though they were not a formal part of the formal RCN organization, grey zones/ blurred lines occurred, for example, when representatives from GTZ or USAID also worked as development advisors for RCN management. [83] This will be further discussed in Chapter 6 and 7.

The mission of the RCN HQ, according to ISAF documents, was to assist the Afghan government in security governance and development within the RCN area of operation in North Afghanistan (Map No. 3-6). This focus on ISAF/ RCN support for GIRoA in security, governance, development and reconstruction, was later changed to a more security focused mission statement:

 "to support Afghan National Security Forces in close coordination and collaboration in providing security and disrupting insurgent activities in order to protect the population and secure the highways. Also to support Afghan Border Police operations in the border areas and crossing points in order to set the conditions for economic, social and cultural development in key terrain districts." (ISAF/RCN Homepages, 2013).

---

[83] A practice which had its origin in US led HQs and PRTs. See PRT Playbook, Handbook 07-34, Sept. 2007, US Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL).

The RCN worked in cooperation with ISAF Joint Command (IJC) as their upper command. Except for the command, control and support of the six subordinate PRTs, the main work in Camp Marmal was related to stabilization and security issues, combat operations, and civil military coordination. The cooperation and coordination with Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) had a high priority. Combined operations, with ISAF and ANSF, in line with the COIN strategy were undertaken, as well as local, regional, and national civil military coordination projects.

The RCN was organized into traditional NATO Combined Joint Staff (CJ)[84] branches from CJ1 to CJ9, as follows:

- CJ1: Manpower and Personnel Branch
- CJ2: Intelligence Branch
- CJ3: Operation Branch
- CJ4: Logistic Branch
- CJ5: Strategic Plans and Policy Branch
- CJ6: Communication Systems/IT Branch
- CJ7: Interoperability/Lessons Learned Branch
- CJ8: Finance Branch
- CJ9: Civil Military Coordination (CIMIC) Branch

The command also consisted of military and civilian advisors as political, development, legal, and cultural advisors. In addition, the civilian part of the organization was built up in 2010 by enlisting a regional German Senior Civilian Representative **(SCR)**[85] who gradually built up this branch in governance, development, and stability areas (see organization chart below). Additionally, he had a link to the German Police Project Team (GPPT). As shown in the RCN organization chart below, civil military coordination focused on top level between the Commander **(COM)** and the national Senior Civilian representative (SCR). The SCR organization was not a direct part of

---

[84] The term Combined Joint has its origin from World War II when one established Combined Chiefs of Staff for the Western Allies. Combined Joint here means a branch with participation from several nations.

[85] Bold font made to better explain the organization chart.

the RCN command and control system, but had close cooperation with it. Further the SCR had links (dotted line) to the operational level and the main actors. These actors (dotted line) were also the main players in civil-military coordination issues.

Organization Chart 3-3 Simplified RCN Organization Chart of 2010/2011. (Source; ISAF). See abbreviation list for short terms/acronyms

From 2010 onward the Commander was always German and had a US Deputy Commander **(DCOM)**. The Chief of Staff **(COS)** and his deputy (DOS) altered between several nationalities. In level four of the organization chart are the Directing Commander of Staff **(DCOS) Security**, directing the information and operational part of the organization, and the Directing Commander of Staff **(DCOS) Support**, directing the support organization. DCOS Support led branches as CJ1: Manpower, CJ4: Logistics, CJ6: Communication, CJ8: Finance and Medical Branch, which were mostly *not* in the scope of the civil military coordination activities, except from CJ4 and CJ6 support for project planning and execution. The DCOS Security had two subordinates, Director Operations **(Dir Ops)** responsible for operations, and Director Theatre Information **(Dir Theatre Info)** responsible for intelligence

and information. The CJ9: CIMIC Branch, CJ Engineers, CJ2: Intelligence, CJ3: Operations, CJ5: Plans and Policy and CJ7: Lessons learned as the DIR OPS responsibility were vital coordinating and cooperating branches in civil military coordination activities.

3.3.5 *The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in RCN*

The six PRTs in the RCN area of operation varied in size and composition. They were differently organized due to national caveats, regulations, and guidelines, described briefly here. Organizational aspects will be discussed later.

Organization Chart 3-4 PRTs in RCN area of operation i 2010/ 2011

PRT MAI

The Norwegian military led **PRT MAI** located nearby the town of Maimanah in Faryab Province had mainly a security focus. The aim of PRT MAI was to ensure security that could enable IOs, GOs, and NGOs to carry out their development efforts. PRT MAI separated development and military functions in line with the Norwegian policy, meaning that development and security was not integrated. Nevertheless, the PRT also consisted of a collocated civilian side with political and development advisors who were in charge of the development and governance part in their area of operation, with development funds administrated through civilian channels.

PRT JAW

The civilian led Turkish **PRT JAW**, located in Shibirghan in Jawzjan Province was mainly conducting development projects. The military component was primarily tasked to protect the PRT compound and its personnel, as well as liaise and coordinate with ISAF, especially the RCN. But the military component could also implement CIMIC projects or activities.[86] In 2010/11 very little RCN cooperation or coordination with the Turkish PRT concerning CIMIC issues occurred, except for mutual information exchange.

PRT MeS

The larger Swedish military led **PRT MeS** located in Mazar-e Sharif in Balkh Province, also had a mainly security-focused approach, even though there was with a small civilian component focused on development. A Swedish FOI[87] evaluation report concluded that the PRT had had too much focus on security, and that this did not bring the desired development. In the Swedish PRT a close civil military coordination was an assumption, and the plan was to have a civilian led Swedish PRT in 2012. In 2010, this seemed to be difficult to achieve, as long as the security situation was deteriorating, strong military units were needed and civilian personnel were hard to recruit.

PRT KDZ

The largest and German led PRT, located in Kunduz Province, **PRT KDZ**, was placed under the dual leadership of a military commander and a diplomat from Foreign Affairs. PRT KDZ had a quite good reputation among RCN CIMIC officers being able to balance the military and the civilian tasks in line with NATO doctrine, emphasizing cooperation, operating with a long term perspective in the projects. Still they struggled with having reporting lines to four federal ministries, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defense, and Economic Cooperation and Development.

PRT PEK

The Hungarian PRT located in Pul-e Khomri, Baghlan Province, named **PRT PEK,** was a military led PRT, which included national civilian development

---

[86] For further information see: http://www.cevizcanprt.org/icerik.php?no=9 .

[87] FOI; Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, report No--2802─SE, 2009.

advisors. PRT PEK conducted development and Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). Their military duties included the improvement of the living conditions of residents, and emphasized finishing projects that provide preparations for infrastructural development as part of CIMIC.[88] In the RCN, PRT PEK was called "the green NGO" as the military conducted humanitarian activities such as providing the local population with clean water, blankets, or clothing. (This was a CIMIC understanding or practice that was very different from, for example, the Norwegian one, which kept the military apart from humanitarian or development issues).

PRT FEY

The smallest PRT, also German-led, was located in the town of Feyzabad, in the calmer area of Badakhstan Province and was named **PRT FEY.** The main focus of PRT FEY was the maintenance of security, but they also conducted many projects such as supervising an airfield for the provincial capital. During 2011/12, the PRT downsized and changed from PRT status to a Military Support Unit (MSU), becoming solely a civilian led unit.

3.4   *Summary of the "outer" and "inner" context*

In this chapter, I have outlined the inner and outer context from which this research is done. The outer context can be described as Afghan governance and power structures. Security, economy, local elements, and historic events that might have played a role in the development of the complex emergency, have been mentioned to give a picture of the security situation as well as characteristics and challenges of the so-called new wars that challenged and influenced civil military coordination. The development of the new wars relating to civil military coordination is further elaborated in the next chapter.

The inner contexts, the ISAF structures, have also been outlined. The military organization, the lines of command and control, from NATO policy and strategic levels in upper Headquarters outside Afghanistan through to the upper Headquarters in ISAF, Kabul, down to regional commands (RCs) and

---

[88] According to Hungarian Ministry of foreign Affairs. See; http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/en/bal/foreign_policy/security_policy/hungary_in_nato/hungary_role_in_afghanistan/ downloaded 12.02.2012. Supported by personal interviews with Hungarian CIMIC officers.

further down to the PRTs. This gives an overview of the lines of command and an idea of how complex the ISAF organization is.

The three levels of ISAF organization described here, from the IJC to the RCN to the PRTs, with the main focus on the RCN, have been the subject matter of this research. Even if the IJC level was located in Kabul and, accordingly, was not physically represented in the RCN area of operation, this level was important to consider. As the upper command and normative frame for actions carried out in the RCN area of operation, IJC was an important organizational element, especially when considering how civil military coordination was understood and conducted in projects and at different levels of the organization.

Although the studied ISAF organization represented a bureaucracy, such a complex organization with distance between the units, operating in a complex emergency, is likely to challenge the smooth planning and decision-processes as well as reporting and coordination efforts characterizing a functional bureaucracy.

This large bureaucracy, representing many cultures, education, training and understanding, also challenged the unity of effort in the performance of the military role and the joint understanding and emphasis on ISAF prevailing doctrines and policies. To be able to say something about this, and how it might influence civil military coordination, it is beneficial to use relevant theoretical perspectives as tools. The next chapter outlines theoretical perspectives.

4   Theory

In this chapter, I will describe development in a security-challenged environment, as this is the background in which the modern world defines terms such as war, crisis, conflict and complex emergencies. With globalization, the borders between peace, crisis, conflict, and war seem to have become more complex. In our time borders are blurred, and the grey zone (in which confusion or insecurity concerning roles and tasks of the military occurs) grows larger than during times of conventional wars.

Further, I discuss rational and new-institutional perspectives. Rational perspectives emphasize bureaucracy, rational planning, and decision-making, upon which military organizations are built. Next, new-institutional perspectives are described in order to explain ISAF dilemmas and processes which deviate from the rational perspective.

Finally, I describe how crisis management and interaction between human and organizational arrangements suffer from poor information processing, by using Turner's theory of man-made disasters.

Considering the main research question on *how does ISAF organization affect civil military coordination in North Afghanistan,* the answer will vary according to the perspective adopted.

4.1   *Security and the New Wars*

To understand the complexity in today's conflicts, or complex emergencies, one needs to have an international security perspective as a framework for what is considered as insecurity, instability, or war (Kaldor, 1999/2007; Duffield, 2001; Smith, 2005).

The term security carries weight in "the real world" politics because security of states has a high priority for governments all over the world, and the threats to the lives of people are increasingly accepted as most important.

Security in global politics focuses mostly on the state being free from danger or threat, and the threats to the lives of people, but security is a fairly elastic

term. Security is also an elusive term; like peace or justice, it denotes a quality of relationship that makes a good definition quite challenging. The noun "security" evokes different images. On one hand it is likely to be associated with solid objects used to protect or defend against intrusion or attack. On the other hand, one may associate security with vulnerability (McSweeney, 1999).

Kolodziej pointed out that the state may be both the protector and the source of threat to its population at the same time. He also pointed out that security arises, paradoxically, from human freedom, and the designation of threats cannot be separated from the values that are at risk or what people value and care about; consequently, there is a political element at its core (Kolodziej, 1992).

During the last century, the emphasis in how we think about critical security issues has fluctuated with changes in international politics and paradigms, and changing conditions affect how to consider and prioritizes threats.

Baldwin (1995) discussed how security thinking between World Wars I and II emphasized international law and organizations rather than military force. During that period, many people believed that democracy, international understanding, national self-determination, disarmament, and collective security were the most important ways to reach international peace and security. According to Baldwin, realism emerged as the dominant framework for understanding international relations after 1945, and the so-called Golden Age of security studies (1955-65) was preoccupied with nuclear weaponry and deterrence. Realist theory explained international relations in terms of power, and nuclear strategy dominated the field of international relations until 1965. Then, the decreased importance of the Cold War in the fifteen years after 1965, contributed to a period of decline in security studies, which had become so preoccupied with war as an instrument of national policy that it had slighted the legal, moral, cultural, and other important aspects of war. Nuclear strategy offered little help to those seeking to understand the Vietnam War (Baldwin 1995).

The need to widen the meaning of security in global politics was recognised in the late 1970s. The Independent Commission of International Development Issues (ICDI) stated that an important task of constructive international policy

would have to consist of providing a new, more comprehensive understanding of "security" which would be less restricted to purely military aspects, noting that world survival depends not only on military balance, but on global cooperation to ensure a sustainable environment based on shared resources (ICDI, 1980).[89] This conceptual focus highlighted change from the more traditional approach to security that dealt with military to a more critical approach, studying how the world has developed and become a different place (Fierke, 2007).

In the aftermath of the Cold War, constructivism emerged, underlining that international politics was not static. The application of security to a range of new and different threats, and the analysis of how threats are constructed, gave rise to a large body of literature on critical security studies. Still, some security researchers assert that in the aftermath of the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 and the "war on terror" the focus has returned back to a more narrow definition of security and away from critical security thinking. The "war on terror" drew attention to the utility of military force at the expense of far greater threats to the world such as poverty and destruction of the environment (Fierke, 2007). According to Duffield (2001) and Kaldor (2007) among others, underdevelopment itself can be seen as a source of instability.

Today, the military dimension itself has changed, with new roles for international operations, conducting military interventions as peace-keeping or peace enforcement operations, even doing nation building and development tasks. Furthermore, the number of security actors has increased (Bellamy et al., 2004). The state, the primary actor of the Cold War, is now joined by intergovernmental organizations, sub-national political groups, and transnational organizations right down to the individual. With the expanding spectrum of security dimensions and increasing scale of actors, it is even more difficult to define security in a universal and limited expression.

According to Kaldor (1999/2007), the new wars must also be understood in the context of globalization of the 1980s and 1990s, the revolution in

---

[89] ICIDI: Independent Commission of International Development Issues. ICIDI 1980*: North-South: The report on the Independent Commission on International Development Issues,* London, Pan Books.

information technologies and dramatic improvements in communication and data-processing, the intensification of global interconnectedness – political, economic, military and cultural. Kaldor described features of the new wars as follows: *"new wars involve a blurring of the distinction of war (usually defined as violence between states or organized political groups for political motives), organized crime (violence undertaken by privately organized groups for private purposes, usually financial gain) and large scale violence of human rights (violence undertaken by states or political organized groups against individuals)."* (Kaldor, 2007:2).

This development brought about new political and military thinking, especially with regard to the civilian dimension. The changes in the militaries since the Cold War period, with new challenges connected to the asymmetric warfare with a missing exit strategy, the blurred lines, and the lack of joint doctrines are great challenges to joint military units operating in complex emergencies, as well as the civil military coordination.

Civilians and civil institutions and infrastructure have always been an important aspect of warfare, but they have become more vital in today's conflicts because modern warfare takes place beyond traditional borders and increasingly exhibits *"the war amongst people"* (Smith, 2005). As civilians play an increasingly more important role in today's armed conflicts, the line between civilians and "combatants" is becoming blurred.

Kaldor's (2007) description of the new wars is an adequate description for the outer context of this thesis, in which ISAF organization is studied, and which influenced the overall concepts of civil military coordination. To be able to say something about the inner context and the interaction with the surrounding environment, organizational theoretical perspectives have been adopted.

4.2 *Organizational Theory Perspectives*

Traditionally, military organizations such as ISAF have been organized according to bureaucratic principles with their hierarchic organization and command and control approach to crisis handling. The ISAF organization challenged the idea of a military organization being a traditional bureaucracy,

but Scott's definition of organizations, which is the preferred one in this thesis, described more or less the characteristics of the ISAF organization: *"Organizations are collectivities oriented to the pursuit of relatively specific goals and exhibiting relatively high formalized social structures"* (Scott, 1998, p. 23).

To assess and understand the complexity of the ISAF organization and the implementation of civil military coordination strategies, this thesis has adopted primarily three theoretical perspectives. Among organizational paradigms used to explain organizational behavior, theories focusing on rational and institutional perspectives will be discussed. First, a rational perspective with basis in classical scholars is outlined, beginning with Weber's (1971) bureaucracy model to explain some basic fundaments on which the ISAF organization is built. Further Banfield's (1959) article "Ends and Means in Planning" and Lindblom's (1959) article "The Science of Muddling Through" added perspectives on rational planning and the struggle to keep goals and means in an adequate level and comprehensiveness.

New-institutional perspectives are used to display influential aspects from external environments which effect bureaucracies in our modern society, such as rapid political and environmental changes and comprehensiveness, as well as the influence from identity, norms, or values. New institutional perspectives explain some deviations from the rational perspective.

DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) article on institutional isomorphism, collective rationality, and the so-called myth or institutionalized environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) explains how the context, surroundings and environment influence an organization.

In addition, Barry Turners (1976, 1978) theory of man-made disasters shed light on organizational elements that might allow a disaster to develop, pointing to the lack of information flow and misunderstandings among individuals as root causes. Turner focused on how information processing influences the crisis management, and how the breakdown in information and communication flow hampers the needed coordination.

4.3   *A Rational Perspective*

> "I never made one of my discoveries through the process of rational
> thinking." - Albert Einstein.

4.3.1   *Rationality, Rationalism and Rationalization*

According to various dictionaries rationality is regarded as "sane" or "functional," a thoughtful way to balance cost and benefit in order to maximize one's own advantages or aims. In this thesis, rationality is viewed as an exercise of reason, logic reasoning and problem solving. A description in which the quality of behavior is the main focus, rationality here is the null hypotheses from which deviations are discussed.

Rationalism forms the foundation for how we behave as organizational and societal members, which according to Røvik (2007) was the dominant epistemology of administration and organizational theory during the 20th century. However, this might differ in meanings depending on the kind of theory to which it is opposed. Rationalism here is focused on the means-ends, based on the conception that one acts rationally (on reflection) in the way one believes best suits achievements of one's own aims, both individually and organizationally.

The term rationalization in sociology,[90] often associated with bureaucracies and the process of bureaucratization, was first put forth in Max Weber's (1904/05) *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,* [91] considered to be central to the concept of modernity. Meyer et al. defines rationalization as: *"the structuring of everyday life within standardized impersonal rules that constitute social organizations as a means to collective purpose"* (in Greenwood et al., 2008:452). Drori, in Greenwood et al., (2008) defines rationalization as the systematization and standardization of social life.

---

[90] The term rationalization is also used in psychology, as a term expressing the way of reducing cognitive dissonance. (See for example C. Travis & E. Aronson (2007).
[91] Written by Weber in 1904 and 1905, translated into English by Talcott Parsons in 1930.

4.3.2 *Definition of Rational Perspective*

The rational perspective, also called the instrumental perspective, views organizations as an instrument to achieve specified objectives or purposes. Rationality is an important aspect concerning construction of organizations referring to the general attribution of rationality and intention of such systems (Weber, 1971). In this perspective, organizations are seen as creating specific goals, involving formal structures, rules, roles, and relationships, emphasizing efficiency in achieving well-defined objectives. These organizations represent bureaucracies that comprise standard operation procedures and formal structures which specify responsibilities and ensure reliable performance (Baum and Rowley, 2002).

Barnard (1938/1968, p.4) characterized rational organizations as; "*a formal organization is known by a kind of cooperation among men that is conscious, deliberate and purposeful,*" while Etzioni (1964) defines formal organizations as social units (or human groupings) deliberately constructed and reconstructed to seek specific goals. These two definitions describe recognizable aspects in the ISAF organization.

Scott and Davis (2007) claimed that a rational perspective focused on the organization as an instrument designed to gain a goal or an objective. They stated that the rational perspective has two main characteristics: goal and formalization. The goal is characterized by conceptions of desired ends, clear preferences, and support of rational behavior. Formalization is characterized by making behavior predictable through standardization and regulation. The organizational structure is an instrument to achieve specific goals and to make changes. The formal structure canalizes the organizational behavior; the rationality is in the organization itself and not in the individuals.

4.3.3 *The Main Focus of Rational Perspective*

According to Røvik (1998) the rational perspective was rooted in the technical-economic rational paradigm of the social sciences and had its origin in theories prescribing guidelines for how to govern activity and achieve rationality, as in the classic works of Weber's Ideal Bureaucracy Model and administration theory. Røvik argued that the common trait of rational theories

is that organizations are perceived as tools for effective coordination, material production or services. Consequently, this is also called the "tool-perspective," underlining the use of the organization for effective goal achievements. The rational perspective is rooted in Western rational ideal image and holds hegemony over the institutional theories (Røvik, 1998).

From the rational organization perspective, actual individual behavior is strongly connected or related to the formal normative structures of the organization. The formal normative structure in the organization represents a manipulate variable to influence actual behavior. Formal structure influences organizational behavior. In the rational perspective, this connection is strong and underlines that the organization is used as a rationale to gain desired objectives (Egeberg, 1984). This "objective-means" logic, in which the organization is driven by consequence-oriented rationality or "the logic of consequence," is a characteristic of the rational perspective and means that activities are based on expected and desired consequences. Consequently, if the formal normative structure of the organization (such as job descriptions and regulations) is expected to steer the behavior of the organization, decision-processes will regulate activities and participation. This implies a belief in the effect of reforms and changing strategies, according to Røvik (1998), and a belief in that the normative structure can be a manipulative variable in control of the management.

The construction of organizations, in itself, implies that organizations are rational, that they represent a joint logic and common sense, which leads to the conception of organizations as groups of humans with joint behavior and similar functionality. This presumed joint logic separates organizations from other structures of social intercourses such as family or ethnical groups (Røvik, 2007).

The organization has no value in itself; it is only a tool to achieve a goal. Røvik (2007) pointed out that the two most important characteristics of a rational organization are the tool-goal focus and the rational leadership. The leadership is assumed to be the rational authoritarian center, where skills and knowledge are combined with authority, followed by power and the will to make the necessary directing governance. An important aspect of the construction of a rational organization is the idea that powers of the rational

and reasonable thought overrule actions and activities. Accordingly, the organization will display the management visions, analysis and strategies materialized in procedures, routines and structures with clear lines towards the external environment.

This assumption about joint rational logic leads to regularity and conformity in the way organizations function. Even if organizational theorists (Simon, 1947; March and Olsen, 1984/2005) claimed that organizations rarely or only exceptionally function according to principals of rationality, the idea of organizations as rational, or that they *should* be rational, are very strong. (Røvik, 2007).

Rational theory is not open to local adjustments and transformation processes when a new concept is implemented (Røvik, 1998). Nevertheless, management can choose what kind of concepts and what they emphasize within these concepts. Røvik called these actors "rational shoppers," meaning that the management chose their concepts or parts of concepts (like ISAFs concepts of the Comprehensive Approach (CA) and counterinsurgency (COIN) that will fill the need of the organization).

Still, there might be tension between images of organizational adaption. On one hand, organizational behavior is directed toward performance improvement in line with rationalistic assumptions of the firm. On the other hand, behavior can be complex, slow and sensitive to organizational conditions. This leads to the result that *intended* adaptive organizational behavior might not necessarily result in performance improvement. Structures developed to promote rationality may, under some conditions, even have the opposite effect (Baum and Rowley, 2002).

Rational perspectives in its ideal form can be referred to as a constitutional theory or classical administration theory (Greenwood et al., 2008). Constitutional theories represent elements such as official politics, ministries, government administration, or public management and classical administration theory as, for example, Max Weber's model of bureaucracy does.

4.3.4 *Weber and the Bureaucratic Approach*

Weber, clarifying the connection between rational organizations and Western development, noted that bureaucracy and organizations were both a product and a source of modernity. He outlined that the Western vision of progress and improvement was based on a continuous renewal of science, democracy, and rationality to gain a higher level of civilization and welfare (Weber, 1971). According to Weber, the bureaucracy was inevitable, together with the development of the modern (mass) democracies. He determined that capitalism was a facilitator for bureaucracy in private organizations, and that the modern state was a facilitator for the official bureaucracy. Rational organizations were both a symbol and a tool for the support of modern democracies. (This perception is also displayed in a global perspective, how presumed rational organizations (as ISAF) are built to handle international crisis management).

Weber's Ideal Bureaucracy Model is characterized by the following aspects: a professional corps of permanent officials organized in a pyramid hierarchy, functioning under impersonal uniform rules, procedures, and standardization along with a highly developed division of labor achieved by detailed definition of duties and responsibilities of each position. Each position operates according to the principle of fixed jurisdictional areas determined by administrative regulations. The authority structure is legitimized by the belief in the correctness of the rules and the loyalty to superior position— loyalty to each position, not the person filling it. The expectations linked to the positions are made visible through organization charts, job descriptions and regulations. Training and knowledge are important. Tasks can only be fulfilled by deploying managers at all levels that have been trained and selected for their specific jobs. Any engagement or appointment will follow formal qualifications; any decision will be based on neutrality, objectivity and justifiable basis. All administrative acts or ceremonies are formulated and kept in written form, and resources held in the organization are kept separated from resources or capacities employees may hold as private persons (Weber, 1971).

The position and role of individual members in the Ideal Bureaucracy Model are characterized by rational and impersonal relationships. The clear-cut

separation between the official bureaucrat and the individual and his private life means that positions cannot be inherited and family positions, networks or political loyalties do not influence whether a candidate enters the organization. A position in the organization is lifelong work, which also constitutes career development. Promotion is based on seniority and achievement, while the salary is based on position rather than performance.

Further, rules are meant to design and regulate the organization based on technical knowledge and the aim of maximum efficiency. All tasks are organized on the basis of clarified rules along every unit's defined or restricted area of responsibility. Rational rules and control regulate the relations between the organizational members. Weber called this an exercise of control on the basis of knowledge (Weber, 1971). These characteristics of the ideal bureaucrat model, in which power is concentrated and provides the objectives, tools and framework, are all familiar elements in military organizations.

Bureaucracies presuppose politically defined objectives, which, according to Weber, should be clear enough to be a foundation for a clear division of labor. Every unit should be organized hierarchically with clearly defined rights and duties (a command and control system), meant to promote competence or prevent power conflicts. The importance of a hierarchical work organization, based on a solid and adequate education and specialization was underlined by Weber as an important element for the organization.

Quoting Trotsky, Weber stated that every state has to be built upon violence. He claimed that if social forms or units were not aware of the use of violence as a means to keep the state control, the term "state" would fall apart. This authoritarian aspect is critical to the bureaucratic model, and it presupposes legitimacy. Weber listed three main reasons for the legitimacy as: legitimacy based upon custom or years of common practice, a leader's "gift of grace" or authority that is charismatic (Weber also states that a bureaucracy needs charismatic leaders to have a life), or the belief in laws, rational rules and factual knowledge. The last reason for legitimacy, intellectual and rational understanding pervades Western institutions, resulting in an orientation towards effective means to reach the goals (Weber, 1971).

Weber stated that the growing acceptance and success of the bureaucracies and their authority became a threat to the politicians, the power elite, and the diplomats, as the bureaucrats took on positions as being a well-educated staff of permanent officials. This also occurs in military political environments, nationally and internationally, for example, in discussions and negotiations following the outline of new organizational strategies and concepts.

The bureaucratic model also provided motivation, since authority used both power and reward. Power ensured obedience and motivation as carrier systems give individuals social prestige, payments, and benefits that creates loyalty. The acceptance and understanding of one's rank, class, and position in the system was vital to the regulation of the system, recognizable aspects of military organizations such as ISAF.

Weber noted that the bureaucracy he has described is an ideal model in which he has underlined the peculiar distinctive characteristics of such a model, which means that the substantial informal parts of the organization are not included. He claimed that there is a relentless antagonism between "is" and "should" among ideals, values, and reality. Through his term "*verstehen*," Weber developed a basic view of humans as active beings where meaning plays a central role. Human beings act on the basis of meaningful motives and orientations that have to be understood on its own terms. Weber's own criticism of the bureaucracy was that humans easily were reduced to small pawns or pieces in a large picture. The institutions lose their sacred or spiritual character and humanity disappears. The functions of the society increasingly lose their clarity, and the environment becomes too complex, cold and meaningless. Further he stated that especially under capitalism, the rational order could become an "iron-cage," [92] in which humanity was imprisoned, thereby causing the imprisonment of the low-level worker in obscurity and details (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Clegg and Haugaard, 2009).

Weber was of the opinion that bureaucracy facilitates the development of rationality and objective standards. He suggested that bureaucratic organizations were technically superior to other organizational forms because

---

[92] Weber wrote about the iron-cage in "Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism," 1905.

of the continuity, the lack of ambiguity, its accuracy and speed (Weber, 1971). But these technical advantages of a bureaucracy require certain conditions. According to Olsen (1988), a cultivated bureaucracy presupposes authority and division of powers which sets the goals, laws and regulations and a machinery of governance in a line of command that strictly divides superiors and subordinates and division of labor. Further, it presupposes a power relation between the bureaucracy, the external environment, and its citizens, which presupposes that bureaucrats should not be influenced or involved in negotiations with the public who represents the ones who are administered.

Weber's bureaucratic model described a mass production of standardized decisions or outputs. Critics began to challenge Weber's rational bureaucracy model in the late 1940s, Selznick (1948), for example, pointed out that the model did not take into consideration the aspects such as the irrationality of human beings, and that humans cannot be regarded as machines. (Clegg and Haugaard, 2009). Further, Weber did not outline the organizations relation to the external environment.

Olsen (1988) pointed out the weakness of this bureaucratic model when procedures and causes of action are influenced by complex, special or coherent affairs, which all require different frameworks. The more complex, unknown and rapidly changing the external environment becomes, the harder it will be for the organization to develop plans and programs, objectives, and procedures that can cover alternative development processes. Through enabling acts and general grants, decisions and assessments are collected in the administration system. As interest groups try to influence these assessments and decisions, legislators are squeezed between power centers, even though there are clear rules and objectives. He also argued that even though a single production or administrative unit may act rationally on its own terms, the overall picture might be irrational and chaotic (Olsen, 1988).

Moreover, modern official bureaucracies, increasingly, hire external consultants, experts, and advisors, which is indicative that the administrative system does not possess all knowledge within itself, and that modern bureaucracies face increasing external interaction (Olsen, 1988).

Bureaucracies, in Weber's time, introduced concepts of fairness and equality of opportunity into society, giving more people better opportunities of making career on neutral grounds as displayed in his Ideal Bureaucracy Model. Further, the bureaucracies became successful in that they were efficient and reliably accomplished their goals. But today, different from in Weber's time, the term bureaucracy is used negatively to describe slow and inefficient organizations. The way one tries to solve coordination problems in bureaucratic organizations by coordination and cooperation project groups across the defined units challenges the idea of the benefit of strong authority and the division of labor as Weber described it (Olsen, 1988).

Moreover, people rarely work their whole life in the same organization. Turnover and rotation characterize many modern organizations. In a postmodern world, bureaucracies (such as ISAF) must consider objectives, tools and institutional knowledge as well as creativity and rapidly changing technology. And still, in today's bureaucracies, planning and programming to handle any upcoming situation is essential for survival.

4.3.5   *Ends and Means in Planning*

Banfield (1959) outlined rational planning in a way recognizable to the strategy and training of military planning.[93] Banfield stated that his article is normative, describing how planning should be done in order to achieve the fullest attainment of the ends sought, and not how it actually is done, even though he also described why there is so little rationality in planning. Lindblom (1959) took this further and described both the ideal way of rational planning, and the way it is actually done—or *not* done—pointing out that rational planning is more or less impossible.

According to Banfield (1959), planning can be everything, it has a variety of meanings as in infrastructure, socialism or business cycle control, but the logic structure of the method for decision making is called planning theory. Banfield called planning "…*the process by which one selects a course of action (a set of means) for the attainment of one's ends,*" and pointed out that it is through rational choice that the best adaption of means to ends is likely to

---

[93] As for example, the US Field Manual (FM) 5.0 *"The operation process"* or US FM 3-07 *"Stability operations."* Cf. Chapter 6.6.

be achieved. He viewed planning and rational choice as a rather common method of making decisions. Banfield discussed how planning has to be done in order to achieve the fullest results of the goal sought. He claimed that a rational decision using rational choice thinking occurs when:[94]

- The decision maker lists the opportunities for actions
- All consequences which would follow each possible action are identified
- The selection of an action that would be followed by the preferred consequences

A rational decision is one in which alternatives and consequences are considered as fully as the decision maker, given the time and other resources available to him, can afford. Consequently, no choice can be perfectly rational if one presupposes that there are a number of possible actions. Further, it is not possible to have complete knowledge. Making a rational plan involves the same procedure as the rational choice. Banfield listed the process of making a rational plan in a four-step model, as follows:[95]

1. Analysis of the situation
2. End reduction and elaboration
3. The design of courses and action
4. The comparative evaluation of consequences

---

[94] The rational choice theory developed into a methodology for assessing decision-making by using empirical evidence to understand revision and choice, a methodology of systematic evaluation of options trough analysis of various consequences, based on the judgment of aspects like rationality, validity, value, and risk assessments.

[95] These steps were later developed in new various, both simple and comprehensive multi-step, rational planning models and rational decision making models. As for example the US Army's Crisis Action Planning Model, a linear decision-making model containing the following steps: 1)Set Organizational goals and objectives, 2)Develop alternatives, 3)Compare/evaluate alternatives using objective criteria and weights based on the leader's guidance, 4)Choose among alternatives the one that best matches the criteria, 5)Implement the decision, 6)Command, lead and manage, 7)Feedback loop-observe results and begin process again as required. See Army War College, U.S.Army,http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/stratdm.htm#RATIONALDECISIONMODEL

The first step is the resource dependent aspect (like possessions, authority, information, time, skills etc.) in which the planner is influenced by the obstacles in his way. His opportunity area consists of the courses of actions that are really open to him, meaning with no limiting conditions. The second step, the formulation of the end (goal or aim), might be diffuse (as in ISAF mandates) and one must have to operationalize it before it can serve as a criteria for choice in concrete circumstances. One should consider both active and contextual elements, the active being the future situation which is sought. The contextual end is that which cannot be sacrificed without loss. Banfield gave an example: if you burn down your house to get rid of the rats in the cellar, you have ignored the contextual end in your effort to achieve the active elements.

A planner's task is to identify and clarify both the active components of the ends and the aims as well as the contextual ones, and if they are not consistent, the relative value attached to each must be displayed.

Regarding step three in Benfield's plan, courses of action tended to be of a general character. The *key actions*, the *program* or *the operations* represent the general decision taken. It is the decisions of less general character representing choices among alternatives which are not included in the general decision. A developing course of action might be chosen arbitrarily, and the course of action based upon it may be selected with complex and accurate consideration of alternatives and its consequences. Banfield called this a functional rationality, but substantive irrationality. This lays the groundwork for internal inconsistency.

Step four underlined the need for looking out for unintended consequences. If the plan is rational, all consequences need to be taken into account, even the ones the planner did not intend, so it is vital to search for the unintended consequences. The evaluation must be the value attached to each set, but as the value is difficult to estimate in order to compare, priorities must be made as they cannot be expressed in terms of a common numerical index. The planner needs to find a balance between unlike intangibles, for example, freedom and security; how much freedom are we willing to offer to have a higher security?

Banfield claims that in real life, there is little planning and even less rationality. He goes on to state that in most organizations, there is often more engagement in opportunistic decision-making than planning or long-term planning. Rather than laying out a course of action to accomplish objectives, organizations tend to meet each crisis individually. A course of action is a result of accident more than design, and it is an unintended outcome of the social process rather than conscious product of calculation. Why there is so little rational planning? He explains in twelve points in his article. The most relevant points for this thesis can briefly be summed up as follows:

- Organizations do not lay out courses of action because the future is highly uncertain.
- To avoid opposition, even when it is possible to decide a course of action in advance, officials tend to not make plans public.
- Many organizations strive to find real alternatives because of obstacles preventing them to do anything different from what they are already doing; besides they have a decided preference for present rather than future effects.
- Often, to keep it going is more important than providing new incentives which may create instability. Furthermore, to keep going for the sake of keeping going is more important than any substantive goal. This is due to that fact that the goal at the end is rarely, if ever, a clear and coherent picture towards which action is directed.
- Moreover, if one state clearly ends in precise and realistic terms, it might be destructive to the organization; if the ultimate end is the maintenance of the organization, how indeed is maximization possible?

Public organizations might be less rational because a public agency's ends often reflect compromise among incompatible interests. Further, taking all costs into account, it may be rational to devote little attention to alternatives and their consequences, Banfield argued.

4.3.6 *Incrementalism – the Science of Muddling Through*

Lindblom (1959) questioned the dominant rational approach of the time that believed that scientific analysis could solve political problems faced by public administrators. He did not think that a fully rational, technical approach was possible and offered an alternative—the theory of incrementalism[96] in policy and decision-making. He pointed out that changes are made incrementally. Lindblom argues in his article, "The Science of Muddling Through" that the traditional way of thinking about policy—rationally or setting up a goal and then a plan to reach it—is a theoretical approach which does not work in reality. Public administrators should concentrate on agreement on actions related to the current situation and political policies, not on "abstract arguments" for adopting those policies. One should use the step-by-step, or a muddling through, approach.

In his article, Lindblom contrasted the rational comprehensive method, the so-called *root-method*, and the successive limited comparison method, called *branch-method*, in decision making and rational planning (See figure no 4-5 below).

---

[96] In public policy, incrementalism refers to the method of change by which many small policy changes are enacted over time in order to create a larger broad based policy change. This theoretical policy of rationality developed by Lindblom can be seen as a middle way between the rational actor model and bounded rationality.

The Science of Muddling Through	
The "Root-Method," Rational Comprehensive	**The "Branch-Method," Successive Limited Comparisons**
1. Classifications of values or objectives distinct from and usually a prerequisite to empirical analysis of alternative policies.	1. Selection of values, goals and empirical analysis of the needed action are not distinct from another but are closely intertwined.
2. Policy formulation, therefore, is approached through means-end analysis; first the ends are isolated, then the means to achieve them are sought.	2. Since means and ends are not distinct, means and ends analysis is often inappropriate or limited.
3. The test of a good policy is that it can be shown to be the most appropriate means to meet the desired ends.	3. The test of a good policy is that various analysts find themselves directly agreeing on a policy (without their agreeing that it is the most appropriate means to an agreed objective).
4. Analysis is comprehensive: every relevant important factor is taken into account.	4. Analysis is drastically limited: Important possible outcomes are neglected Important alternative potential policies are neglected Important effective values are neglected.
5. Theory[97] is often heavily relied upon.	5. A succession of comparisons greatly reduces or eliminates reliance on theory.

Figure No. 4-5; "The Science of Muddling Through," *(Lindblom, 1959).*

---

[97] Lindblom explains what he means by the term theory as the attempt to push categorization as far as possible and to find general propositions which can be applied to specific situations.

The root-method has its fundament in a rational legal perspective, a rational legal bureaucracy, and a technocratic political system. It is rational comprehensive decision making, and the goal of the policy process is optimizing and maximizing. The branch-method is based upon a political perspective with administrative authority in a pluralist political system. The decision making is limited rational and the goal of the policy process is sufficiency.

The rational comprehensive method (root-method) requires comprehensive evaluation of options in the line with defined objectives. Lindblom claimed that this method required more than human beings are capable of working out; how to give an account of all possible alternatives and accompanying consequences? The successive limited comparison method (branch-method) is the step-by-step method, incrementally making changes from the current situation. Lindblom claimed that the root-method could be used in simple processes, but was not appropriate for complex problems like policy questions, and suggested the branch-method was a more practical way to solve complex problems.

As an alternative to the more accepted way of rational decision making explained by the root-method, Lindblom formulated "muddling through" as a process, and formalized this activity in the branch-method. He also noted that while the literature and theories concentrated on the root-method, organizations in the real world, and especially official organizations, were using the branch-method.

4.3.6.1   Muddling through

First, Lindblom pointed out that people do not have the same values and do not always agree on values. Besides, values are difficult to define, and they vary depending on the situation. In reality, one agrees on overall value goals implying room for the participants to maintain their own values and reach their own goals. As a result, more energy and focus on an agreed policy follows, Lindblom claimed. This is done to be able to choose both a goal and a policy at the same time and make them closely intertwined. This is seen, for example, in NATO and ISAF when discussing how far into the civilian sphere the responsibility of the military alliance can go, and also is displayed with

the different views in countries as the US, Britain, Germany and France. None agree on the boundaries of the military role, but still they agreed upon the Comprehensive Approach (CA) for a civil military strategy with an understanding that the implementation would depend on individual countries decisions.

Lindblom suggested that the more complex a situation is, the more the overall goal was reduced to a policy based on unclear goals. The great challenge is to rank the priorities of the conflicting values. So, the solution was that one chooses among values and policies at the same time.
In the second step of the "branch-method," Lindblom asked: when one cannot list all alternatives with their relevant consequences, how can one set priorities? He pointed out to that a means-ends relationship is possible only to the extent that values are agreed upon, reconcilable, and stable at the margin. So, there is no means-ends relationship as in the root-method. Accordingly, the means and ends analysis is limited due to that means and ends are simultaneously chosen.

In point three, discussing how to decide the best policy, Lindblom underlined how politicians from different parties, based on different values, can agree on a policy on how to handle old-age insurance. Even if they discuss the means (which politicians normally do) and also without agreeing that this is the most appropriate means, they can agree upon a policy to reach the agreed objective. That is an example on a "good policy," according to Lindblom. This differs from the "root-method" where a decision is *correct*, *good* or *rational*. In the "branch-method" when policy is decided, there is no point in discussing values, the goals have no other validity than that they are decided through agreement. The "root-method" requires agreement on what elements in the decision constitute objectives, and on which of these objectives should be pursued. The "branch-method" falls back on agreement wherever it can be found. In this view, one cannot show that a policy is mistaken by offering an abstract argument that important objectives are not achieved; instead one must argue that another policy is to be *preferred*.

Point four of the "branch-method" explains how simplifying makes policy-making comprehensible and manageable. The primary focus is on the

alternatives that will make a difference from the status quo. All policies, especially in democracies, must have a certain fundament of understanding and agreement to be able to survive. Western democracies use incremental policy making, or gradual political changes to make sure they are relevant. There is, however, the danger that when trying to be relevant, one might end up irrelevant, as when political parties become too similar. This is why important values, important alternatives, or possible outcomes are neglected.

According to Lindblom, democracies hold a many-sided, varied regard of values, and most values and interests have their own "watchdogs." The variety of values must be maintained to make room for the values of the whole society, rather than dare to focus on a deeper intellectual understanding of only *some* of them, leaving other values with less focus. Lindblom underlined how the incremental pattern of policymaking fits with this multi-pressure pattern of democratic societies. When decisions are only incremental, related to known policies, it is easier for a group to anticipate the kind of move another group might make, and also easier to make correction for already apparent mistakes.

In his last point, Lindblom argued that by using a succession of comparisons, incremental changes is less troublesome. In this way, one applies one's own experience, not aspire to a level too complicated to handle, test out expectations, and repair errors along the way. Because of the modest aspirations, the branch method is not so theory-dependent.

The "branch-method" is explained as a comparative analysis. Lindblom claimed that comparative analysis is a systematic alternative to theory. He discussed how administrators or practitioners feel more confident with "flying by the seat of their pants" rather than following advice from theorists. They know that theory will work less well than modest incremental comparisons, in fact, practicing a systematic method in which the theorists might not be aware of. The reason why theory is so unhelpful, according to Lindblom, is that theories require many facts and observations. This is not inadequate for policy-processes characterized by little steps and small changes. In this case, a succession of comparison economizes the need for facts and steers the focus toward the relevant facts for decision making. Further, theories are not precise

enough to predict consequences of policies, which is what the practitioners really need.

Lindblom underlined that the process practitioners usually perform is a method. The method is good guidance for complex administration, and is superior to attempting a superhuman comprehensiveness. (The overall theory of the Comprehensive Approach in ISAF HQs might be such "superhuman comprehensiveness").

Etzioni (1967) criticized Lindblom and Banfield in the article "*Mixed scanning: A third approach to decision-making*" Etzioni pointed out that rational decision making does not take into account a specific agreed upon set of values, which provides the criteria for evaluating alternatives. In addition, information is not complete, and decision makers have neither the resources nor the time to provide the information necessary for a rational choice.

Etzioni further pointed out the weakness of the incremental approach as a normative model by stating that decisions would reflect the interests of the most powerful (the underprivileged, political unorganized being underrepresented). Further incrementalism would neglect basic societal innovations, focusing on the short term, and leaving out variations from past policies. These past policies may provide guidance for change, but cannot. Accordingly, the steps might be circular, leading back to the starting point, or be dispersed leading in all directions (going nowhere).

Etzioni also underlined that incremental decisions are greatly affected by and related to fundamental decisions, such as the decision to go to war, and that, as a result, fundamental decisions often set the context of the incremental ones.

By criticizing both rational decision making and incrementalism, Etzioni argued for his own model: mixed scanning. This meant using both a high order, fundamental policymaking process with basic directions combined with an incremental process undertaken before fundamental decisions are taken and after they have been reached.

4.4 *The New Institutional Perspective*

The new institutional perspective emphasizes the norms, values, and identities that explain behavior and activities in organizations. People do not only act according to what pays (instrumental calculation), but also according to what is proper. This perspective on rationality is more complex than the rational perspective, and a different view on the rationale for organizational activity and change.

The 1970s was a decade where organization theory developed resource dependent theory, ecological theory, and institutional theory. The new institutionalism was introduced in several papers between 1977-1983, beginning with Meyer and Rowan's article "*Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony*" and Zucker's article "*The role of institutionalization of in cultural persistence*" in 1977, followed by DiMaggio and Powell's article, "*The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields,*" and Meyer and Scotts article, "*Organizational environments*" in 1983 (Greenwood et al., 2008). This was supported by Powell and DiMaggio (1991) who suggested that the birth of new institutionalism in organizational studies came in 1977 with the two papers of John Meyer: "*The effects of education as an institution*" and the before mentioned "*Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremony,*" (with Rowan).

4.4.1 *New institutionalism versus "old" institutionalism*

Powell and DiMaggio (1991) underlined that institutionalism in organizational analysis is linked to the sociological tradition, but that new institutionalism diverges from sociological approaches to organizations in systematic ways. New institutionalism has its origin in the "old" institutionalism of P. Selznick and his associates. Both perspectives were skeptical towards rational-actor models of organizations, and they all viewed institutionalism and the process of system change as a state-dependent process. This makes organizations less instrumentally rational because of their limited options.

According to DiMaggio and Powell, institutional and new-institutional perspectives reinforced the link between an organization and its environment, and noted that reality often is inconsistent with the formal accounts of the organization, and that culture has an important role in shaping the organizational reality. But while the original institutional perspective was more straight-forwardly political, the new-institutional perspective downplayed conflicts of interest within and between organizations, and focused on how organizations respond to such conflicts by developing administrative structures. The "old" institutional perspective highlighted influence patterns (such as coalitions and cliques) to illustrate how informal structures deviated from formal structures, while new-institutionalisms located irrationality in the formal structure itself (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).

The old institutional perspective viewed organizations as an organic whole, while the new- institutional perspective viewed organizations as loosely coupled arrays of standardized elements. Further, old institutionalists viewed the organizational environment as local communities, tied by multiple loyalties of personnel and inter-organizational treaties, in which the organization is embedded. New-institutionalism focused on non-local environmental view, viewing the organizational environment as more subtle (sector, fields, society), which penetrated the organization and influenced the actor's view on the world and the categories of action, structure and thought (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). [98]

Even if both perspectives rejected organizational behavior as merely the sum of individual actions, they differ in the conception of the cultural or cognitive bases of institutionalized behavior. Powell and DiMaggio (1991) claim that for old institutionalism, cognitive forms were values, norms, and attitudes. Organizations became institutionalized when they were infused with value; commitment is here viewed as cognitive basis of order. New institutionalists argued that institutionalism was a fundamentally cognitive process; normative obligations enter into social life as facts one must take into account.

---

[98] For more details and further reading; Powell and DiMaggio (1991) made a schematic overview of the differences between the "old" and new institutional perspective in their book; *The New institutionalism in organizational analysis* (1991, p. 13), Table 1.1. The Old and the New Institutionalisms.

Institutions, therefore, are not made of norms and values, but taken-for-granted scripts, routines or classifications. Habit and practical action are the cognitive basis of order.

Thus, old- institutionalism and new-institutionalism perspectives differ in analytic focus, approach to the organizational environment, views on conflict and change, and images of individual action.

4.4.2 *New Institutional Definitions*

Powell and DiMaggio defined new intuitionalism as a perspective that *"emphasizes the ways in which action is structured and order made possible by shared systems of rules that both constrain the inclination and capacity of actors to optimize as well as privilege some groups whose interests are secured by prevailing rewards and sanctions"* Powell and DiMaggio (1991, p. 11).

To understand an institutional perspective, institution needs to be defined.

Following Weber, Meyer and Rowan (1977), and later DiMaggio and Powell (1983), were interested in the rationalization of formal bureaucracies in modern society, and underlined that relational networks were seen as important influences in an institutional context. The main idea of the new institutionalism was that organizations were deeply embedded in political and social environments, and that organizational practice often was a reflection or response to beliefs, rules, and conventions built into the wider environment (Greenwood et al., 2008).

Selznick made a distinction between organizations and institutions, saying that the term organization was describing administrative and task solution activities, while the term institution occurs when an organization includes values outside the technical requirements for internal activities (Selznick, 1997).

Greenwood et al. (2008) pointed out that institutions can be described in two ways. One is the institution as model, an institution within a cultural context. Another perspective looked upon institutions as regulatory agencies of

political economy, viewing the institution in a regulatory framework, pointing out that the latter became the focus of the term new institutionalism.

Goffman (1961) used the definition: *"Social establishments—institutions in the everyday sense of that term—are places such as rooms, suits of rooms, buildings or plants in which activity of a particular kind regularly goes on,"* and Douglas (1986) suggested that institutions are legitimized social groupings (Greenwood et al., 2008, p. 769). According to Czarniawaska, in Greenwood et al. (2008, p. 770), institutional theory is not a theory at all, but rather a framework, a way of thinking about social life that may take many paths. Greenwood et al. defines institution as "*more- or- less taken for granted repetitive social behavior that is underpinned by normative systems and cognitive understandings that give meaning to social exchange and thus enable self-reproducing social order*" (Greenwood et al., 2008, pp. 4,5).

Meyer and Rowan (1977) did not define institution, but defined institutionalization as the process through which social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take a rule-like status in social thought and action. Something is institutionalized when it has that rule-like status.

In the context of this thesis – the study of the ISAF organization in North Afghanistan – Scotts' (1995, p. 33) definition of institution is appropriate and the preferred one, because it is a good description of the complexity, challenges, and abilities of a multinational organization such as ISAF:

Institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior. Institutions are transported by various carriers – culture, structures, and routines – and they operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction.

4.4.3 *Main Focus of New-Institutionalism*

The underlying focus of early institutional theorists was the role of institutional processes, institutional conformity, and shared meanings. These theories were a reaction to the rational "logic of consequences" and became the "logic of appropriateness" (March and Olsen, 1999). From this perspective, an organization becomes institutionalized when it starts to have a

value in its own in the eyes of the actors. This meant that the organization in itself becomes a source of identity, values, understanding of reality, and personal satisfaction. It also influences norms, informal rules, identity, and values in the actions of the actors, as well as the instrumental calculation. Accordingly, the conditions for rationality become more complex when explaining the rationale of organizations or organizational changes (March, 1994; Selznick, 1997; Peters, 1999).

New institutionalism presupposes that the political organization of society is important, and political institutions are the main "building blocks" in political life (Olsen, 1988). The new institutionalism developed as scholars studied life inside organizations and found that much of what happened had little to do with the objective tasks of the organization and much more to do with social relationships. The new institutional perspective found its basis in how an organization is influenced by its environment and surroundings, and how this also will influence organizational changes. This new orientation proposed that formal organizational structures were shaped by institutional forces such as rational myths, public opinion, law, and professional knowledge, and not only by resource dependencies and technical demands. The *corporate structure* was more important and in focus than *who* represented and carried out the management (Olsen, 1988; Greenwood et al.; 2008; Christensen et al., 2009).

According to Olsen (1988) the new institutionalism represented a renewed interest in institutions as a fundamental political process, in which an essential achievement was to use institutional development as a political instrument. The interest in institutional reorganization and design questions was based on the acknowledgement that official and political institutions were based on not only the mutual dependency between state and society but also many complex loosely coupled systems and changing processes that needed to be coordinated. Laws and regulations were only one of many policy instruments. Olsen (1988) also underlined that new institutional perspectives took into account that institutions were not functional in the short run. In the long run, changing processes occurred, but were often slow. An organization appearing as loosely coupled systems might seem complex in terms of its decision making processes, priorities, and responsibilities. If the formal structure leads to ambiguity, the actual behavior will be perceived as non-predictable and chaotic. Nevertheless, this can be an advantage in an innovation or

development process, or as a support to the formal organization (Egeberg, 1984).

Palmer et al. (2008) pointed out that the new institutionalism explained why organizations tend to looked similar even if they were engaged in different activities and in varied contexts, and how management and administrative practices developed in dissimilar industries could be adopted across industries. It recognized that organizing was not only about efficiency but also about the presentation of the organization and its management as compliant or "up-to-date " (Palmer et al., 2008). Scott supported this view, pointing to reputation as an important incentive. It is by "appearing to be rational" that an organization can avoid social censure and minimize the demands for external accountability as well as secure the necessary resources for their survival (Scott, 1983).

The new institutional perspective does not necessarily see organizations as rational uniform actors, as they open up to the non-planned, non-hierarchic or non-rational effects outside the control of the management. Organizations are seen as institutions with intrinsic value to their members, as these member or actors of the organization also have invested identity, feelings, and values in the existing structure. In order to protect these investments, they will more or less resist structural changes (Selznick, 1997).

Accordingly, one could say that the new institutional perspective also is a theory about why changes do *not* happen, or happen in other ways than planned. "The logic of appropriateness" (identity, norms and values) will steer or hamper structural changes which are not in line, meaning that organizations also are resistant towards changes, cite and new concepts.

4.4.4 *Institutional Isomorphism[99]*

DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) idea has its basis in Weber's bureaucracy, where the three main reasons for inducement of bureaucracy were competition among capitalists and states (for efficiency), the rulers increasing need to

---

[99] DiMaggio and Powell (1983) with reference to Hawley (1968) described isomorphism as; "*a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions.*"

control the staff and citizenry, and meeting the bourgeois demand for equal protection under the law. DiMaggio and Powell noted that the reasons for rationality and bureaucracy have changed; efficiency was no longer vital, and in the second half of the twentieth century, the state and professions, not the market, became the great rationalizers which led to bureaucracy developed as a part of a process where organizations became more equal. DiMaggio and Powell sought to explain this process towards homogeneity.

There are two types of isomorphism: competitive and institutional. Organizations compete not just for customers or resources, but also for *political power and institutional legitimacy* as well as economic fitness. This was evident to organizations like NATO/ISAF and the coordinating actors as the UN, the EU, and large NGOs.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) described how organizations copy each other all over the world, how they, in the struggle to be viewed as modern, progressive, and rational, incorporate the same structural elements and became more similar to each other. First, the authors listed three main motives for this adaptation: the first, "coercive isomorphism" is adaptations one needs to do due to laws and regulations. Coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressure exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent, or by cultural expectations in the society in which they function, or as a direct response to government mandate. The formal requirements form the organization, and politically constructed organizations (like NATO/ISAF) have two characteristic features: politician decision makers often do not directly experience the consequences of their actions, and political decisions are applied across the board to entire classes of organizations. Accordingly the decisions are less adaptive and flexible.

Secondly, they presented "normative isomorphism," which represents the ideas of professions, intellectuals, or subject matter experts that are formalized in joint norms and principals. Here professionalism is understood as *"the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work"* (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p.152). Professionals have to compromise with non-professionals. The two most important aspects of isomorphism are educational legitimacy and professional networks. Professional training institutions are important centers for the development of

organizational norms, and organizational and professional behavior. Important aspects for encouraging normative isomorphism are the filtering of personnel through recruitment and a narrow range of training institutions. Typical of this is military officer training. Many professional career tracks are closely guarded, both at entry and throughout the career. In this way, some individuals who make it to the top become homogenous or indistinguishable. DiMaggio and Powell also stated that professionalization of management tends to proceed in tandem with the structure of organizational fields. Information exchanges among professionals contribute to a commonly recognized hierarchy of status, a center and periphery in the information flow (matrix), and personnel movement across organizations.

The third and last motive is described as "mimetic isomorphism" where organizations in situations of insecurity try to copy organizations that are viewed as successful or having influence. This adaptation is described as a poor imitation done without any prior analysis. When organizational technologies are badly understood, goals are ambiguous or the environment creates uncertainty; Organizations, then, may model themselves on other organizations. Facing ambiguous causes or unclear solutions, an organization might find a viable solution at little expense by mimetic behavior. Some of these developments have ritual aspects, such as adopting innovations to strengthen legitimacy. Scott (1983) supported this view; he pointed to reputation as an important incentive.

4.4.5 *Myths and the "Logic of Fashion"*

Organizations do not live in a social vacuum; they live in environments confronted by socially created norms creating expectations about design and activities. They incorporate these norms and reflect them outward, even if the result it no greater effectiveness. This mechanism tends to make organizations similar on the surface. This is the Myth Perspective, identified in Meyer and Rowan (1977) article about formal structures as myths and ceremony.

Meyer and Rowan (1977) defined formal organizations as *"systems of coordinated and controlled activities that arise when work is embedded in complex networks of technical relations and boundary-spanning exchanges (p. 340)."* They stated that organizations, in order to be accepted, have to

show how they comply with fundamental Western norms of modernity, progress, and rationality. These norms are displayed in a broad repertoire of ideas and recipes of how modern, legitimate organizations should be organized into structural components, management, procedures, and routines. But as institutional environments are complex, parts of the organization might seek legitimacy from special external factors, such as professions, media, politics, or academia, meaning that an organization has to confront many, and often inconsistent recipes to create a legitimate structure.

Meyer and Rowan call these ideas from the external environment "institutionalized elements," which, they noted, were symbols of progress and rationality. These symbols are institutionalized as accepted correct efficient ways of organizing inner activities, and adopted by many organizations. These ideas are the basis for the new institutional theory on how and why organizational recipes are produced, spread, and adopted.

While DiMaggio and Powell described homogenization, Meyer and Rowan focused on what happens with the adopted elements when they are implemented in organizations. They argued that the adoption of new ideas and elements are mainly to satisfy the environment. The new elements will be decoupled from the organizational praxis. They are taken on to make the organization look modern and fashionable, but are *not* used as tools to steer the inner activity. This is often referred to as the decoupling theory.

According to Meyer and Rowan (1977):

- Institutional rules are functioning as myths as the organization incorporates to gain legitimacy and stability
- When, or if, structures of the organization become isomorphic with myths of the institutional environment – often in contrast with the needed technical/ production structures – internal coordination and control are decreased to maintain legitimacy
- Structural subunits are decoupled from each other and from ongoing activities.
- Confidence and good faith are employed in place of coordination, inspection, and evaluation.

Meyer and Rowan distinguished between institutionalized rules and social behavior. They describe institutional rules as the process by which social processes, obligations or actualities come to take on a rule-like status in social thought and action. For example, what is the social status of an ISAF soldier? The social status of a soldier is an institutionalized rule, both normative and cognitive, for managing combat. But he also has a social role made up of particular behaviors, relations, and expectations. For example, the expectations of ISAF soldiers coming from the surrounding environment are that they are friends, enemies, political supporters, or reconstruction-workers. Expectations are many and varied.

Institutional rules can affect organizational structures and their implementation in actual technical work or production. This is different from effects generated by networks of social behavior and relations surrounding the organization.

4.4.5.1   How do bureaucracies function?

Meyer and Rowan suggested that rational formal structures arise in two contexts:

- Demands from networks, efficiency and
- In interconnection with social relations.

What makes a formal structure is the blueprint for activities linked by goals and policies that make a rational theory on how and to what end activities should fit together. Modern bureaucracies are triggered by the need to effectively coordinate and control activities and the complex relational networks involved. The increasing need for coordination (coordinated work has competitive advantages), centralized states and political centers also lead to the spread of formal organizations. Bureaucracies offer possibilities for control of economic activities, political management, and sub-units. Bureaucracy theories assume that coordination and control of activity are the critical dimensions for success. The problem is that organizations do not function according to their formal blueprints, and a gap between the formal and informal organization is the result.

The formal structure is one thing, but the day-to-day work activities are something else. Meyer and Rowan noted that organizations are often loosely coupled, decisions are often not implemented and have insecure consequences or evaluations are so weak or vague that they provide little coordination. That is why the authors question the argument that formal structures control and coordinate the activities in a positive manner. In addition, the need for legitimacy, underlined by Weber, is an aspect overlooked in modern bureaucracies, according to Meyer and Rowan. They observed that norms of rationality are *not* simply general values, but powerful rules, understandings, or opinions attached to institutionalized social structures. The importance of this in the bureaucratization process has been neglected.

Formal structures are not only created from relational networks in the social organization, but are also reflections of social reality. The inner life of an organization, its procedures, positions, policy etc. is influenced by knowledge from the education system, laws and regulations, public opinion, and social prestige. These elements are powerful institutional rules, which function as rational myths in the organization. They are rationalized and impersonal prescriptions identifying various social purposes and specifying the appropriate means to push their purposes. And since the myths are institutionalized, they are seen as legitimate and held apart from evaluation of their impact on the work outcome.

4.4.5.2   Institutional environment

Organizational structure does not necessary display the environment in which an organization operates, this will depend on the possible mutual benefits. The interaction between the organization and its environment needs to have a mutual advantage. Formal organizations often match with their environment through technical and exchange interdependencies. Some incorporate structural elements isomorphically with the environment by managing to balance the mutual interdependency. Others reflect the social reality of the environment to such an extent that they lose their distinct character, and then, they often decouple formal structures from the day-to-day activities, to keep their character and still survive.

4.4.5.3   Rational Myths

Meyer and Rowan claimed that when rationality becomes institutionalized, it becomes a myth with explosive organizational potential. These myths are defined; they spread rapidly, and realize and legitimate the rational structures in bureaucracies. New domains of rational activity are defined, and then the formal structures expand to become isomorphic with the new myths. There are two types of environmental isomorphism: either keep the environment at the boundary or implement environmental elements into the structures of the organization. This will influence the internal processes and its implications.

Modern societies need bureaucracies because of the complex relational networks and the institutional rules which functions as myths. Societies need to have order and overview so regulations are created. Bureaucratization develops because of rational myths in society, leading to a whole system of institutional organizations. Relational networks increase and create organizational standards. The legitimacy of the myths in national or international organizations is based upon their official legitimacy or on the assumption that they are rational.

How does a bureaucracy secure a good reputation or gain legitimacy? Official organizations like militaries or universities that cannot be measured on their production in the same way as private industry are even more dependent on legitimacy in the surroundings in which their value is calculated. To create myths formal structure becomes important for survival.

4.4.5.4   Isomorphism with environmental institutions

When incorporating externally legitimated elements into an institution (which might not benefit efficiency) possibly losing or weakening one's distinctive character or foundation, one might get more dependent on other external institutions and let these external criteria decide the value of own structural elements.

Meyer and Rowan discuss how organizations work to be regarded as a part of the hegemony of large, leading organizations. Organizations incorporate external legitimate formal structures, to be regarded as sub-units, into the leading powerful institutions. This is done to gain legitimacy and to create a

buffer against the vulnerability that exist in when a sub-unit stands alone. By using this legitimacy to strengthen itself, a sub-unit can gain support and avoid questioning. Official organizations, especially, are trusted. Once trusted that these organizations follow the rules of the game in official administration and management, they are accepted and safe. (The little unique organizations, doing something special will meet more skepticism and be more vulnerable). But public organizations cannot be measured as easily on their output as private organizations; accordingly, they are more dependent on the judgment from the surrounding environment. Their prestige and reputation, and being with the "right circle" are important buffers against vulnerability. Another way to gain legitimacy is to display expertise and ceremony, which give an appearance of social strength in the organization.

Organizations that are stable also gain more support and are more easily regarded as part of a wider collective system. Support is not dependent entirely on performance. For example, the military has a strong support system, and yearly funding is almost automatic. But if it started to take this support for granted, the inner stability as well as the performance or outcome might be threatened. As national forces with broad support in the people, for example, it still can lose its legitimacy and support when participating in wars or conflicts that do not have public support.

It is possible for organizations to work their way into the corridors of power and, for a while, be left in peace, even if not delivering the expected outcome. Meyer and Rowan underlined that this will not work unless one responds adequately to the surrounding environment. Organizational success is not only coordination and control; external legitimacy also needs to be carefully maintained. A management challenge is to balance production and acceptance. For example, if a country participates in a war with support from the people, the support may be withdrawn when a certain number of casualties are exceeded, or the expected progress is not displayed. The organizations that survive are the ones who understand the politics, the environment, and public opinion. That is, they do not push the limits of their external legitimacy.

An organization's communication and ability to speak the same language as the surrounding environment, as well as understanding the possibility to work on a joint basis will enhance the strength of the organization. This is also why

organizations use energy to communicate with the surrounding environment, to get acceptance and support. If an organization does not adjust to the environment, it loses external support and also risks greater internal turbulence. Mutual dependence between the organization and its surroundings might weaken inner organizational turbulence, according to Meyer and Rowan (1977).

4.4.5.5   How to survive the demands?

Meyer and Rowan claimed that the rise of collectively organized society and increasing inter-connectedness excludes creative sources and markets of organizations that use clearly defined technologies to produce outputs that are easily evaluated.

Public or official organizations use different techniques to survive demands on them. When outputs are socially defined and do not exist concretely in a way that allows them to be empirically discovered, environments and organizations redefine products, service and technologies to introduce ambiguity and lower the control rights of inspection. As Meyer and Rowan put it (1977); *"governmental bureaucracies use variable, ambiguous technologies to produce outputs that are difficult to appraise* (p. 354)."* Organizations give up strict criteria and introduce vague terminology to prevent output from being controlled. This makes it easier to create a myth, as some organizations do to survive.

4.4.5.6   What to do with structural inconsistencies?

An efficient organization is known by a close relationship between its structure and activities, where goals are coordinated and unified, efficiency is evaluated, and output monitored. But attempts to control and coordinate activities in institutionalized organizations lead to conflicts and loss of legitimacy. Therefore, the organization has to protect its structures from evaluation, so elements from structures are de-coupled from activities and from each other. Further, coordination and mutual adjustments among structural units are handled informally, Meyer and Rowan claimed. This view was also supported by Turner (1978) and Rasmussen (1997).

Trying hard to become isomorphic with the institutional rules, technical or efficiency requirements might be come under pressure, and ceremonial rules which have their origins from myths in different parts of the environment, might be inconsistent. This leads to less control and fewer coordination possibilities. With too many considerations, the organization might end up quite blurred or indistinct. Still, the activity goes on. To keep up the activity has a ritual significance; it maintains an appearance and validates the organization. Politically blessed or professionalized organizations are often difficult to justify in terms of improved productivity, but they may be important to maintain internal and external legitimacy (cf. Motivation speeches held by commanders to their soldiers, when they know that things are developing in the wrong direction, regarded as a necessary action to keep it going until an appropriate political decision is taken).

Standardized activity might also be a problem when these activities meet situations that do not "fit in." It is not easy to create mechanisms for the unexpected when operating with standards. Conflicts between categorical rules and efficiency might arise. A governmental mandate might not suit the activity on the ground level, and generalized rules of the institutional environment might be inappropriate in specific situations.

Organizations adapted to too many elements become overly complex and difficult to follow. If there is a concern for the day-to-day efficiency, this will create an enormous uncertainty in the organization.

4.4.5.7   De-coupling, logic of confidence and good faith

To manage inconsistency Meyer and Rowan made some suggestions: organizational management could resist ceremonial requirements, cut off external relations, be cynical and acknowledge that work requirements are inconsistent with the structure, and, finally, promise reforms. But experience shows that diplomacy works better, so one tries to find an in-between method, such as de-coupling. Instead of relying on one solution, or relying on a partial solution, two interrelated devices are employed: de-coupling and the logic of confidence and good faith.

Formal structures do not work automatically. With de-coupling, disputes and conflicts are minimized, and support can be mobilized from a broader range of external actors. It enables the organization to maintain standardized, legitimating formal structures, while activities can vary in response to practical considerations. Human relations become very important. If formal rules generate inconsistency, then individuals are left to work out technical interdependencies informally. Accordingly, the ability to coordinate in violation of the rules is highly valued.

The logic of confidence and good faith is based on the idea that institutionalized organizations survive on confidence and good faith from both the internal and external environment. Despite the lack of coordination and control, organizations are not anarchies, and de-coupling makes it possible to have an accepted shell that make the internal and external goodwill possible. As a result, then, the activities are considered "business as usual."

Delegation, goal ambiguity, professionalization, elimination of output, and maintenance of face are mechanisms for absorbing uncertainty, while preserving the formal structure. Absorbing uncertainty and maintaining confidence requires that everyone assume that all are acting in good faith. This assumption (that things are as they seem) allows the organization to perform with a decoupled structure.

The more the myths are incorporated into the organization, the more self-confidence the organization has. This does not happen in a vacuum, and to reach this point one has to work out things in the background. Organizations and their external constituents both avoid inspection and evaluation that might reveal illegitimacy. Societal control of inspection and evaluation might violate the assumption that everyone is acting with competence and good faith, which would lower morale and confidence, and, in turn, undermine the ceremonial aspects of the organization.

Meyer and Rowan concluded that to some extent, loosely coupled systems and isomorphism can be structures that buffer activity from efficiency or validity criteria, and they sum up the article as follows:

Organizational structures are created and made more elaborate with the rise of institutionalized myths, and, in highly institutionalized contexts,

organizational action must support these myths. But an organization must also attend to practical activity. The two requirements are at odds. A stable solution is to maintain the organization in a loosely coupled state." (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, pp. 359-360).

Organization researchers have commented on and developed this classical work by Meyer and Rowan (1977). Rationalized myths have two vital key points, according to Christensen et al. (2009). First the myth has to be rationalized—meaning developing scientific or convincing argumentation that this is an effective way to reach the objectives of the organization. Secondly, independent of whether the myths are effective or not, they need to be institutionalized. This means that they are seen as modern, natural, and effective, and that they have become a matter of course and almost a reason in itself. Institutionalized products, services, techniques, and programs function as powerful myths, and many organizations adopt them ceremonially. Rational myths are accepted as prescriptions of appropriate conduct. These ideas often lead to myths as fashion, as for example how the structure of all official organizations should look like within a specific time period. Christensen et al. (2009) describes these norms as general ideas or recipes on how modern organizations should be structured.

The myths are "authorized" recipes on how to shape parts of the organization. Myths spread fast, through imitation, and are often a "display window" or "fashion" to uphold legitimacy in the surroundings. This leads to many leaders' talks about or display of the organizational image as acceptable to the prevailing norms or fashions. Still, the core of the activities in the organization is often "business as usual," -- meaning that the change is only on the surface and does not really include the core activities. This decoupling between surface and core to satisfy the current fashion was called hypocrisy by Brunsson (1989).

Critics of the myth-perspective and the idea of decoupling (like Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008) pointed out that the decoupling will not last over time and that, sooner or later, the surface and the core will interact. Further, Røvik (2007) argued that the decoupling theory has a weak empirical substantiate, due to the lack of process studies of what happened to implemented ideas.

4.4.6 *"Misdirected Energy"*

A supplementary theory in safety culture approaches that might shed light on challenges in concepts and strategies of crisis management is Barry Turner's "Failure of Foresight" theory (Turner, 1976/78; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997). Turner's theory illuminated unwanted and unforeseen actions and deviations, such as why projects or operations do not work as planned. He also illuminates how poor relations between organizational levels allow different working practices and cultures to grow, which consequently limits rationality.

Turner published *Man-Made Disasters* in 1978, describing disasters and disaster management. He conceived disasters as a process rather than a sudden happening. Turner made an important contribution to the debate regarding normal accident theory (Perrow, 1981) versus high reliability theory (Roberts, 1990; Weick, 1998). He contributed with interesting ideas to the discussion on how energy within the organization might take undesirable directions, representing organizational vulnerability and focused upon the underlying reasons for this.

According to Turner and Pidgeon (1997), all disasters can be regarded as the outcome of misdirected energy. Consequently, the origins of the crisis have to be examined in the circumstances which enable the energy to be misdirected so that a situation is transformed in undesirable ways. They also point to how Western societies think their affairs are conducted rationally, and explain how our organizations put this belief into practice by surveying rational courses of organizational action. When disasters occur, it is a particularly threatening failure, because it indicates that the rational thought and action failed, undercutting one of Western society's central beliefs. As a result, it is necessary to examine the kind of rationality which society possesses and how organizations try to conduct their affairs on such rational basis.

4.4.6.1   Growth of organizations

Turner and Pidgeon (1997), supporting Perrow (1991),[100] pointed out that organizations have grown more dominant and far-reaching in the last two

---

[100] Charles Perrow claimed that organizations have taken over society through the factory-like bureaucracies, people's wage dependency and externalization of social costs.

hundred years. Accordingly, organizations are increasingly influencing our individual and social lives, as well as the nature and origin of disasters. Pointing to the fact that in large scale accidents or disasters of our time, big organizations are often involved one way or another. They wrote:

. . .we find ourselves dependent on those few executives with national and international responsibilities taking "correct" decisions about energy and hazards. The overall benefits which we and our society gain from standardization and uniformity of action are often achieved by sacrificing the opportunity to generate a variety of options, in situations in which we do not necessarily know which option will be the best (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997, p.5).

4.4.6.2   Information/ Communication Process

Appropriate coordination presupposes appropriate information and understanding and knowledge. Turner (1978) moved the borders between known and "thinkable" knowledge, noting that the imagination of an organization seems to fail even if the relevant and vital information is available, because the information is ignored or misunderstood. His point is that in the aftermath of a disaster, it is easy to look back and see what was ignored and what came as a surprise in the moment of the disaster. The root cause is often misinterpretation. Turner focused on organizational vulnerability, rejecting, for example, that industrial accidents could be understood in technological terms or statistics. He argued that disasters are a result of an incubation period characterized by a series unintended human failures such as complex information and communication systems that lead to wrong decisions or wrong risk assumptions, which in turn, results in disaster.

Even if Turner focused his attention on sudden disasters such as terror attacks, nuclear accidents, fires, or typhoons rather than a long lasting conflict as seen in Afghanistan, his ideas about problematic information processing and communication is transferable to this thesis. This is especially true when it

comes to unintended actions or incidents related to information processing, communications, and decision making.

4.4.6.3   Precondition focus

Turner and Pidgeon argued for a broader theoretical approach towards organizational factors in order to understand implications of unexpected combinations of situations and incidents and their dynamic interplay. They drew the attention to the causes of disasters as in line with traditional accident theory, but instead of a theory with a technological and statistical focus, they offered a more rationalistic, managerial perspective. Turner did not concentrate solely on engineering problems, but also highlighted social problems and causes.

More than the onset and response to disasters, therefore was not only discussed', an examination of the preconditions that were located in organizational systems was also highlighted. Turner explained how technical, social, institutional, and administrative arrangements in combination systematically produced disasters. His core idea was the "failures of foresight" (Turner, 1976, Turner, 1978, Turner and Pigeon, 1997). This led to the composition of his six step model included in: *The sequence of Events Associated with Failure of Foresight"* (Turner, 1976, p.381). A model is recreated and visualized below:

Figure 4-1 "Failure of Foresight." (Source; Turner, 1976: 381)

4.4.6.4   The Failure of Foresight Model

Stage one in the model, normality or the starting point, is the place where matters are reasonably normal. In this stage, the set of culturally held beliefs about the world and its hazards are accurate enough to enable individuals and groups to survive successfully. The level of coping is achieved by adherence to culturally accepted precautions such as laws, regulations and codes of practice, and habits. Stage two is the incubation period, known by an accumulation of unnoticed events which are at odds with the accepted beliefs about hazards and the norms for their avoidance. The incubation factors are the stage in the model that are of most interest for this thesis (and will be further examined below). In stage three, the precipitating event transforms perceptions from stage two toward the immediate consequences and characteristics of the upcoming disaster that cannot be ignored. Further a new interpretation of the situation needs to be recognized. If facing a progressive disaster (in contrast to an instantaneous one), two different developments occur: either one precipitating event is followed by many after-effects or a series of precipitating events produce successive surprises and a need for successive readjustments.

The onset of stage four is the immediate collapse of cultural precautions which are the consequence of the failures of foresight, which will be elaborated below. Stage five, the rescue and salvage stage is the first state of adjustment. Turner called this stage ad-hoc adjustment, which permits the work of rescue and salvage to be started, with a first state cultural readjustment with a minimal recognition of changed circumstances necessary to deal with immediately pressing problems of rescue. Stage six is the stage of full cultural readjustment. Beliefs and precautionary norms are adjusted to fit the newly-gained understanding of the world.

4.4.6.5   The Incubation Period

Turner's model was a simple, straight-forward statement of incubation factors that dealt with the causes and the development of crises and disasters. Within the incubation period one or more chains of discrepant events develop and accumulate unnoticed. To be able to develop this way, these factors are not known and their full implications are not understood by all concerned. The

unnoticed events that occur are not at odds with organizational norms about safe operations. Turner described the incubation factors as perceptual rigidities and information ambiguities, such as the disregarding of rules and instructions, overconfidence, and organizational arrogance. These are the main focus of his disaster incubation theory. Based on some of his organizational studies,[101] Turner characterized the incubation period as having seven causal factors:

- Rigidities in perception and belief in organizational settings;
- The decoy problem;
- Organizational exclusivity; disregard of non-members;
- Information difficulties;
- Involvement of strangers;
- Failure to comply with existing regulations;
- Minimizing emergent danger.

The first point highlighted collective blindness, and how a society or organization develops collective attitudes, tolerance borders, expectations and understandings within the organization. In this way, some vital factors are left outside the framework of bounded rationality. The decoy problem in point two is described as a contributing problem, overlooked by focusing on the wrong issues or, for example, by concentrating on well-defined problems or sources rather than the ill-structured ones. The third point noted on the lack of trust toward individuals outside the principal organization, and how advice or ideas from these individuals are met with skepticism and low response, even though they might represent a "new eye" or new angles on hazards.

The information difficulties discussed in point four are multi-fold, especially in complex or large organizations. Information and communication difficulties will occur because of ambiguities in signs, orders, procedures, responsibilities, and control. Information is very vulnerable and personally-dependent. Interpersonal difficulties can unintentionally disorder information,

---

[101] Turner studied the Aberfan tip slide in Wales in 1966, which killed 144; the Summerland fire in the Isle of Man in 1974, killing 50; and the Hixton Rail crash in England in 1968, killing 11, and injuring 45. He later investigated 84 disasters that became the basis of his book, *Man-Made Disasters*, 1978.

because it is individually estimated, and therefore sometimes overlooked or ignored. Disagreements about what is relevant information, based on a different understanding of the context among the personnel involved are also frequent.

Discrepant events might go unnoticed or be misunderstood as a result of problems in handling information in complex situations. Turner's studies showed that there may have been a surplus of information, but vital information was often concealed in a mass of "noise." Further, some warning events that signaled danger went unnoticed or were misunderstood due to a common human reluctance to fear the worst.

Another important aspect noted regarding the information and communication process is that management groups distant to the situation adopt unrealistic and idealistic views of the problem area; it is easy for management to assume that the organization has effective precautions and adequate problem solving skills when they are remote from the core activities.

In point five, Turner discussed how members of the public, which he entitled "strangers," those people and groups that are difficult to define insofar as they are outside the control of the organization, do not get adequate communication or information. Accordingly, these "strangers" might be a potential risk since they are likely to be untrained and uninformed about critical factors that might represent danger or organizational vulnerability. This group may also unintentionally manipulate an incident in ways not foreseen by those who are trained to handle the situation.

In point six, Turner discussed how not implementing rules and regulations can become a threat to adequate situation handling. This often has its source in lack of knowledge or organization members ignoring regulations based on personal perceptions of adequacy or fitting in. This attitude can be the result of outdated rules and regulations or difficulties in implementation due to technical, social, or cultural conditions. The last point focused on how dangers and risks are underestimated, even when they is clearly visible. Ambiguity and disagreement among groups concerning the status and significance of the situation (pointing to possible vulnerability, risk or danger) also lead to

undervaluing the evidence, especially if the more complacent group is the powerful one.

Turner focused on how organizations tend to build in disasters, unwanted events or "misdirected energy" in the organization, long before they actually happen. He claimed that this happens through the development of cultures that overlook vital information and important signs. Or, one simply does not take interest or not understand the possible impact the situation.

4.5   *Summary of theoretical assumptions*

The main purpose of this chapter is to sum up the theoretical basis for developing operational research questions. Rational and new-institutional perspectives help to describe features and characteristics of the ISAF organization in North Afghanistan, its structure, processes, and activities and how this influences the inner and outer context.

4.5.1   *Training and Coordination*

Weber's ideal Bureaucracy Model described capacities and qualities an organization like ISAF was striving for in order to optimize efficiency, strength, and reliability.[102] The weakness of the bureaucracy theory is that it does not take the outer context into consideration. Bureaucratic organizations often have to deal with issues coming from the outside or influential internal factors such as the background, norms, and values of the employees. These aspects are compensated for by the new-institutional theories of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Meyer and Rowan (1977), which focused on the environmental or contextual influence on the organization.

From his rational perspective, Weber argued that top management is responsible for new strategies and changes that are implemented in an organization. The organization relies on the command and control system in the hierarchic and bureaucratic structure. The actors in the organization are seen as rational and uniform because it is a precondition that they have been sufficiently trained and are specialized in their area of responsibility, with the

---

[102] One might keep in mind that Weber's Ideal Bureaucracy Model, was inspired of the Prussian Military Concept (Weber, 1971).

necessary knowledge and understanding of role and context. According to Weber (1971), any appointment or engagement will follow formal qualifications. Organizational success depended on adequate knowledge, specialization, and training for the defined tasks, tasks that only can be undertaken by deploying managers that have been trained and selected for their specific jobs in a professional corps at all levels.

Appropriate coordination presupposes appropriate training, understanding and knowledge of one's *own* role capability and expectations, as well as the role, expectations, and capability of *coordinating* actors. According to Weber's Bureaucracy Model, any engagement or appointment will follow formal qualification, and any decision will be based on neutrality, objectivity, and justifiability as a result. These are elements that ideal military organizations try to ensure through their emphasis on regular training and promoting educational systems in order to reach all levels of needed skills and understanding. The first operational research question is thus:

1.   How does military training influence civil military coordination?

4.5.2 *Role Performance and Coordination*

The new-institutional perspective represents a more complex approach than the rational one, not only seeing organizations as rational, uniform actors under the control of management, but also taking into consideration that people's norms, values, and identity are invested in the organization. Assumptions from this perspective are that change and adaptation might come from the inside, or that new strategies might be rejected according to whether the prescribed changes are in line with the perceived inner values of the organization.

Additionally, various cultures and background, training, knowledge, and focus might influence how one views own identity, role, and responsibility. According to rational theory and the bureaucratic model, the role expectations are very clear and linked to the position one possesses. The new institutional perspective argues that such clear links to role performance are not possible and not even always appropriate. Organizations are deeply embedded in the political and social environment. New institutionalists stated that rational

networks are important influencers to the institution. Institutional role performance will affect the outer environment, coordinating actors, and the local population. Accordingly, understanding of own role and role performance is vital for the organizational coordination success, which leads to the second operational research question:

2.   *How does role performance influence civil military coordination?*

4.5.3   *Planning, Decisions and Coordination*

Traditional rationalist might believe that management decisions are sufficient to implement and carry out organizational performance, but there are some dilemmas. The rational theories of Banfield (1959) and Lindblom's (1959) incremental perspective both focused on planning and decision making, suggesting that adequate planning processes can be normatively prescribed, but are very difficult to implement in large and complex organizations. To handle these problems complex organizations might implement both formal and informal methods for survival. For example, to establish informal ways to cope with the situation when the formal system does not work, or the plans fall apart as "the map does not fit the terrain." This makes planning and decision processes an important influencing aspect of the main research question.

Information and communication in bureaucratic organizations are highly formalized, while the new institutional perspective described a less formal and more complex communication systems in which things are easily misunderstood. This pitfall of misunderstandings was further discussed by Turner (1976, 1978). He questioned the information and communication processing of the organization to determine whether these were adequate in terms of awareness and handling of internal and external ambiguities, educational and cultural diversities, and effectiveness for crisis management. Turner questioned the rationality of human behavior and pointed out its limitation in his "failure of foresight" model. Turner's "variable disjunction," which means different groups and individuals in the organization receiving and formulating information in different ways, makes local theories in different organizational sub- units possible to establish. This leads to different

role performance, understandings and estimations of vulnerability, risk, and danger in different levels or parts of the organization.

Turner (1976, 1978) as well as Rasmussen (1997) underlined the importance of a horizontal and vertical internal planning and coordination, and pointed out how the organization as a whole would not function if one level conducted an appropriate interaction without coordination with the other system levels. However, if the coordination and mutual adjustments among structural units are handled informally, the organization is more confused and management has difficulty directing its course. Organizational units might be able to "live their own life" inside the organization, especially in complex de-coupled organizations. Weak connections between the levels in the organization create different cultures, which, in turn, limit the rationality of the organization. This leads to the third operational research question:

3.   How does planning and decisions influence civil military coordination?

From the new-institutional perspective, the outer context plays a vital part in influencing the quality of coordination. Organizational changes are influenced by external environmental pressure, and are forced to follow "fashion" or modern concepts to maintain legitimacy, despite whether it conforms to the inner organizational norms and values.

Legitimacy and reputation in the outer environment or context are important incentives in the struggle to "*appear to be rational,*" as Scott (1983) describes it. In this struggle, organizations compete not just for resources but also for political power and institutional legitimacy. To achieve this institutional legitimacy, multi-faceted organizations adapt into a "normative isomorphism" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) that formalize into joint norms and principals the ideas of intellectuals or subject matter experts. This might threaten the core activity in the organization, leading to the de-coupling of the "shell" and the "core," or the outer and inner activities that Meyer and Rowan (1977) described. Further they outlined how structures of the organization become isomorphic with myths of the outer environment, internal coordination and control then *decreases* to maintain legitimacy.

The next chapter will elaborate on important issues as of methodology used to capture the sources or realities from which this research has it basis.

5   Methodology

This chapter describes the scientific affiliation, research design, preparations, contextual challenges, fieldwork, and the methods of data collection and production for the thesis. Finally, I do some ethical reflections, on the trustworthiness of the thesis and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of my methodological experiences.

5.1   *Scientific affiliation*

According to Arbnor and Bjerke (1994), the philosophy of science has developed a language to describe relations between ones ontology and the different use of methods, crystallized in different paradigms (Kuhn, 1962). The relation between ones ontology and choice of research methods is influenced by the paradigm in which one belongs. The researcher's ontology expresses the aim or the purpose of the research, directing the knowledge development process.

I find it difficult to place myself in one paradigm. On one hand, this researcher finds that she is comfortable with the objective rationalistic world view expressed through the works of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. I find Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) important in all social science research. He established a framework for the analysis of social systems and emphasized the relationship between the system and the individuals. The way Max Weber (1864-1920) made the subjective reality objectively understandable through his theories of bureaucracy is a very useful way of establish understanding of bureaucracy, from which one can develop new insights. This provides a relevant basis for my research, studying an intended bureaucracy and how the organizational structures influenced civil military coordination.

On the other hand, I also find the subjective relativistic understanding of reality represented by Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) or C. Wright Mills (1916-1962) in line with my own understanding of the world, especially the view of reality as social construction, seeing the world as a continuous process. This is linked to my scientific ambitions to understand how social reality is constructed. Schutz's method, which emphasized questioning, and his focus

on the methods and processes we use, as humans, to establish, construct and uphold structure in our existence is important to understand for this research and the relevant aspects to consider when for example studying role-performance or information and communication processes. Hermeneutic diagnoses are also important knowledge techniques. According to Heidegger (1962), understanding is a hermeneutic cycle, moving from a pre-supposed meaning of an event, to an interpretation of the event based on the pre-understanding. Then, with evidence gained with interpretation, it goes back to a revision of the pre-understanding. This means that every interpretation is unique, a construction contingent on historic and social world views, like an evolving ontology.

I use a subjective relativistic understanding to explain the deviations from rationality. I did not see these deviations before the analysis; the picture drawn by the informants turned out to be a dualism between rationality and inconsistency.

Since institutions are an important element of my study, I found Powell and Di Maggio's (1991) description of institutionalism relevant, representing aspects from both the above mentioned paradigms. According to Powell and Di Maggio (1991), institutionalism represented a distinctive approach to the study of social, economic, and political phenomena. The reasons for this ambiguity are that scholars, writing about institutions, have been quite causal about defining them. Institutionalism has different meanings in different disciplines. Even within organization theory, institutionalists vary in their emphasis on micro and macro features or their emphasis on cognitive and normative aspects of institutions. In this thesis, the understanding of institutionalism related to sociological theory is the focus. Thus, institutions are regarded as basic building blocks of social and political life, meaning is socially constructed, and individual preferences, social action, the state and citizenship are all shaped by institutional forces (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991).

Epistemological questions connected to the ongoing debate in science about knowledge—how do you know something, what knowledge is or is not, how it emerges and what criteria are needed to accomplish true knowledge—leads to a variety of different theories about knowledge and methods for qualitative

research. To be able to answer my research question about *how ISAF structures and processes influence civil military coordination in North Afghanistan,* using traditional scientific theories, my paradigm is one of coherence rather than the paradigm of correspondence.

This said, the experiential realism, or embodied realism theory of Lakoff and Johnson (1999), is also a fruitful way of analyzing organizational structures and processes. Experiential realism bridges the traditional scientific theories of correspondence and coherence. Coherence theory is acknowledged in the agreement that the outer world is understood through our experiences as active part of the surroundings. Under the theory of correspondence, on the other hand, there are things in our surroundings which are independent of our perception and understanding. Given the complexity of this situation, the perception and analysis of an organization in a complex emergency could maybe benefit from the understanding of elements from these two traditional scientific theories.

I do not believe in the existence of an objective truth of sociological and organizational research, which is needed to measure correspondence. According to Aase and Fossåskaret (2007), it is difficult to segregate true or good knowledge from false or bad knowledge when the objective true world in which to measure correspondence is missing. Accordingly, coherence becomes important in my research.

To be able to discuss ISAF structures and processes and how these effect civil military coordination, my research is placed in the coherence paradigm, with a constructivist epistemology view. A constructivist approach to organizations focuses on participation. In this perspective, organizations are viewed as continuous construction and reconstruction of organizational reality as groups, and individuals decide their local reality through everyday practice (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Gjersvik, 1993).

Gjersviks (1993) model of the social construction of reality in organizations is a useful analytic framework. Gjersvik described a process that begins with local reality. The local reality of the actors in an organization is their subjective beliefs, views, and values, all of which are systems of meanings perceived by the actors to be valid. To construct local reality also relates to

groups of actors. Then the local realities are made accessible to others through externalization, done by actions and communication manifesting itself in language, objects, and institutions. This implies technology, routines, history, roles and knowledge (Gjersvik, 1993).

This organizational reality structures human action, and, thereby, makes it to some degree predictable and controllable. Organizational reality is interpreted and made sense of by individual actors through the process of internalization, which represents an interpretation of elements of the constructed organizational reality in terms of the actors' local reality (Gjersvik, 1993). Externalization and internalization of realities occurs as an ongoing part of all human activity.

Figure 5-1 Social construction of reality in organizations (Gjersvik, 1993)

This analytical framework is considered as a useful tool for my research and a supporting model for understanding the organization of ISAF.

5.2 *Research Design*

The research design includes the research strategy, how to address the objectives of the thesis, and the methods of data collection (Scott and Marshall, 2009). Research design varies according to the problem structure. If the problem structure is unclear, exploratory research design may be preferred

(Hume, 2000; Patton, 1990). An exploratory design is distinct from a descriptive design according to the completeness in description. Where the descriptive design presents a complete representation of the case(s), the explorative design underlines important issues and creates a foundation for further research (Yin, 1989).

The research design on which this thesis is based is exploratory. Social exploratory research *"seeks to find out how people get along in the setting under question, what meanings they give to their actions, and what issues concern them. The goal is to learn; what is going on here? And to investigate social phenomena without explicit expectations"* (Schutt, 2006, p.14). The question "what is going on here?" was a guiding principle for my research. This was due to the need for a more insight understanding of the ISAF organization structures and its coordination challenges. This was also chosen to meet the need for flexibility, to take into consideration new problems and fields of interest that could emerge or become visible during the data collection and might influence the research design and upcoming interviews (Repstad, 2007)—as it did. Originally, the main focus was upon coordination between civil and military actors over the course of the research. This changed to a focus on the ISAF organization and, in particular, how the internal structures and processes influenced the coordination challenge, how ISAF soldiers understood their role, and how they related to the overall coordination strategies.

The exploratory research design gave me the possibility to get a richer understanding of the social constructions that were the products of the sense making (Weick, 1995). Sense making for a constructivist is the process of attributing meaning to constructions; how an actor interprets a phenomenon or whether it makes sense or not depends on the local reality of the actor. I needed to grasp the social constructions that determined or influenced the will to respond to interactions, events or situations. This was necessary in order to get a richer understanding of civil military coordination, how the ISAF organization in the area handled this in their crisis management efforts, when and where civil military coordination took place, what ISAF organizational structures that influenced on the coordination, and how it was conceptualized.

During my first fieldwork, I was studying these challenges as a participant observer stationed in the RCN, Mazar-e Sharif as a military CIMIC NATO officer, exposing myself to ethical and methodological dilemmas (see chapter 5.8 and 5.9. for elaboration). To be able to grasp the complexity and challenges of ISAFs ability in civil military coordination, it seemed advantageous to use the participant observer method firstly. Moreover, I had the opportunity to study an organization as ISAF from the *inside*. First of all, the fieldwork was on the premises of the RCN, with as little as possible interruption from me as a researcher. I took a role in line with what Gold (1958) describes as *participant-as-observer*, where the researcher spends more time and energy participating than observing. I was, first of all, a CIMIC officer and, thus, followed my fellow officers in their daily activities. I regarded becoming a part of ISAF officers' natural environment as crucial for the data gathering (Hobbs and Wright, 2006). Through this position I acquired first-hand experience of naturally occurring events, got an intuitive understanding of what was going on in the operation area, and developed sufficient insight to ask relevant questions (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002; Fangen, 2004; Bernard, 2006; Wolcott, 2008).

This research approach was also chosen to make possible the opportunity to get access to the non-verbal knowledge, skills and experience of the officers and their coordinating fellow actors on the civilian side. Additionally, this gave me insight into the contextual and cultural conditions of the ISAF organization, and I was able to familiarize myself with the documents, rules, regulations and procedures governing the daily business, meetings, planning and running operations. The participant observation strategy also reduced the problem of reactivity, such as people changing their behavior when they knew they were being studied, becoming suspicious or introverted, or the opposite, telling stories they wanted to underline, or telling the researcher what they think she "wants" to hear (Miles and Huberman, 1994;Bernard, 2006).

Throughout the entire fieldwork period, both my first fieldwork as a participant observer (se section 5.5.3. for elaboration) and my second and next field work as a researcher alone, I kept updated field notes through a diary. I kept notes from meetings, discussions, conversations and observations. I also raised questions, noted responses, tension, disagreements, and challenges and so on. This was very helpful both to organize my thoughts about my

experience, and to remember and analyze it later when I had got some distance to the field.

During my second stay in the field as a civilian and researcher, I mainly conducted interviews, but I also attended some meetings and discussions. The interviews were taken in the same environment in which I worked as a participant observer for 7 months, a half a year earlier. Going back to the operation area for follow up research was a part of the planned research strategy. The Emergency Management group at University of Stavanger has a policy to first deploy the emergency researchers in the emergency area as regular field officers in order to learn about the central characteristics of the case studied. Back home, this first data is then systematized and analyzed. The second fieldwork was more strictly data collection. Going back to the area of operation for interviews was designed to illuminate, deepen, complement and concretize my first data and impressions, in line with Heidegger's (1962) idea about the hermeneutic cycle, and to try to fill the gaps of information and understanding I had after analyzing my first data.

5.3   *Access to the field*

Normally it is very difficult, or more likely impossible, for a researcher to get access to a military organization operating in a field mission. Even on a regular basis, this might be very difficult, as described by Spencer (1982), when he studied recruitment and socializing at West Point Military Academy in the US. Spencer listed three main reasons for why elite organizations (like ISAF) shut out or exclude researchers. First, the researcher represents an uncontrolled element moving up and down the hierarchy in a bureaucratic organization used to movements only through official channels. Besides, career and promotion is important and members of the unit may be afraid of that a research evaluation can ruin his or her career. Secondly, a critical report might weaken the organizational power, reputation, and prestige in society. Thirdly, a critical inquiry might threaten the organizations interpretation of reality, and by this weaken the organizational "mental strength." With these elements in mind, I was anxious to learn about the possibilities for my planned research.

For some years, the Risk Management and Societal Safety section at the UiS (University of Stavanger) and the Norwegian Joint Operational Headquarters (Forsvarets Operative Hovedkvarter, FOH) have been working together on Societal Safety issues, and organized an annual Societal Safety Conference, in Stavanger, Norway. UiS had some discussions with the (at the time) Chief of the Army (HSTY) to find out about the possibilities for me to get access to the field. Since I had background as a former officer in the Norwegian Armed Forces, this was made possible, on the condition that I met the mandatory requirements for health, fitness and training/ knowledge, as well as the needed security clearance. Further, I undertook the necessary military update and education to fill a CIMIC officer position. After basic, mission specific, and subject specific preparation courses, I was sent to the operation area as a CIMIC officer in the German-led RCN on the same conditions as any other ISAF officer.

5.4 *Data Collection*

5.4.1 *Studying a "Project Factory"*

As a CIMIC officer, I followed the ISAF "project factory" in North-Afghanistan. These projects, national, regional, or local, were ongoing projects in which I studied many parallel processes. The projects represented important civil-military coordination issues, in which I followed mainly six projects. I did not have the opportunity to follow a project from planning to execution and evaluation, as projects at this level often were ongoing for years, and my deployment was only for seven months. To me the civil-military coordination projects represented "a running train" which I had to jump on and off on the way. Still, the processes ongoing in six projects in which I participated became vital sources for my data collection.

5.4.2 *Data Collection Overview*

In qualitative research, one does not talk about collection of data in the same way as for quantitative research methods. The data does not just lie there waiting to be collected, it is more like the researcher produces the data during an interpretation process; data is conceptualized observations (Wadel, 1991).

Phenomenon is categorized based on interpretation of the informants or actors meaning and intentions. Data is placed in the categories as the researcher decides, based on the data analysis. As Aase and Fossåskaret (2007) described it: observations + terms = data. The only way to give an observation meaning is to interpret and conceptualize it.

Data for this thesis was mainly collected or produced during the two fieldwork periods in North Afghanistan, applying participant observation and various types of interviews, with follow-up interviews in Norway and Germany. Data was also collected or produced during participant observation and observation in different military (and one civilian) courses, trainings and meetings during preparations for the deployment to the operation area. Document analysis and literature surveys have also been an important source for data collection; see Table 1 below for overview of data production/ collection.

Overview of the data production/ collection:

Period	Activity	My action	Outcome
2007 (preparations before starting my PhD work)	Participating in MNE[103] 5 and MNE 6 Norwegian working group (led by NUPI[104]) as the representative of the Norwegian Operational Headquarter (FOHK).	Literature Survey. National and international meetings, seminars and working shops. Formal and Informal discussions. Back briefs to the Headquarter (FOHK).	Knowledge about and awareness of the thinking behind the Comprehensive Approach strategy, challenges of the civil military coordination in general, and under specific circumstances. Established Network. *(The MNE community developed structures, processes and tools designed to make future multinational engagements in complex emergencies more effective and efficient).*
Winter 2008 (17-28 November)	Preparing the PhD subject. Participating 14 days in NATO CIMIC Basic Course, CCOE, in Enschede, Netherlands.	Literature Survey. Participant observation. Formal and Informal discussions. Field notes.	Tools and knowledge of NATO CIMIC documents, doctrines and practices. Training in NATO CIMIC basic skills. Building network. Notes.
Winter 2009 (09-13 February)	Participating one week in NATO CIMIC Staff Course, CCOE, in Enschede, Netherlands.	Literature Survey. Participant observation. Formal and Informal discussions. Field	Knowledge about CIMIC tools, leadership and challenges in a multinational environment. Challenges of CIMIC

---

[103] MNE: MNE 5 (and 6) is a comprehensive international program for concept development within multinational and multi-functional interagency peace support operations. The project period was from autumn 2006 to summer 2009. The aim was to achieve a satisfactory way of coordinating and organizing the DIME (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) efforts of the international community in complex emergencies. The MNE series was initiated by the American Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in 2001. For further information, see: http://www.uscrest.org/files/mne5.pdf

[104] NUPI: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt. (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs)

Period	Activity	My action	Outcome
		notes. Case study (international complex emergency, - case study training).	work in complex emergencies. Practice in working with interpreters. Practise /tested in leadership. Documents. Notes. Network.
Spring 2009 (14-30 April)	Participating in a three week mandatory initial course for officers leaving for mission at Terningmoen / Sessvollmoen. Under supervision of the Norwegian Armed Forces.	Participant observation. Field notes. Formal and informal discussions with fellow students and instructors in classroom and field situations.	Knowledge of and training in military skills in general, and mission specific knowledge (Afghanistan) from well experienced military and non-military persons. Awareness of military security thinking and mission training. Notes. Practical and mental field preparations. Network.
Summer 2009 (05-10 July)	Participating in a one week UN (OCHA) CM-Coord Course in Spain. Hosted by City Council of Barcelona, executed by Barcelona International Peace Centre.	Participant observation. Network development. Literature Survey. Workshops and discussions with "the civilians" (IOs/ GOs and NGO community).	UN information/knowledge, books and booklets on civil military coordination policy and challenges. Awareness of the difference between NATO and UN approach towards coordination in complex emergencies. Notes. Network.
Late Autumn 2009 (30 Nov- 08 Des)	One week participating in NATO JWC (Joint Warfare Centre), training, Stavanger, Norway. First	Observer in "Grey Cell". Observing the role-play, the questions raised and the suggested solutions to civil military	Awareness of how NATO strategic level is trained before mission. Awareness of the different attitudes towards civil military coordination. Access to

Period	Activity	My action	Outcome
	joint multinational training of ISAF Headquarter and IJC (ISAF Joint Command) deploying to Afghanistan in 2010.	coordination challenges occurring in the play. Discussions with the role players in "Grey Cell". Attending some lectures.	military CIMIC web sites. Impressions of the international military culture. Field notes.
01 March - 01 October, 2010	A 7 month Deployment to Afghanistan as CIMIC officer in CJ9 Branch, as CIMIC planner, at NATO Regional Command North, RCN, in Camp Marmal nearby Mazar-e Sharif.	Participant observation. Qualitative interviews, field conversations. Field notes. Formal and informal discussions. Meetings with civilian actors (NGO/GO/IO) and Afghan actors and authorities. Project participation. Planning. Current/ daily business.	Better understanding of the operation area, the NATO organization and the crisis management. Filed notes. Meetings. Discussions. Project experience. 16 Interviews and many field conversations. Experience in how to be a CIMIC officer in an international complex emergency.
Spring 2011 (14 Feb- 03 March)	A 14-days trip to Afghanistan, Camp Marmal, RCN, Mazar-e Sharif, as a civilian/ researcher.	Conducted semi-structured interviews in Camp Marmal, covering IJC level, RC N level and PRT level.	25 semi-structured Interviews. Field notes. Better, or more nuanced, understanding of the operation area. Filling gaps.
Summer 2011	Follow up interviews of personnel I could not reach in Afghanistan due to security reasons. The interviews were conducted when	Conducted 4 semi- structured interviews, in person and by phone.	4 Interviews. Filling gaps in missing information or perspectives.

Period	Activity	My action	Outcome
	the respondents came home.		
Autumn 2011-2013	Follow-up discussions. Clarification of data. Systematize.		

Table 5-1 A Chronological Overview of Data collection

I also used some time to find civil military coordination and NATO organization literature and military documents available to make my preparation for the fieldwork as strong as possible, and I joined some military websites and CIMIC information sites such as the www.cimicweb.org (administrated by Civil Military Fusion Centre in Norfolk, Virginia) to keep updated.

5.5 *"Capturing" Experience*

Wolcott (2008) wrote that fieldwork is a way of seeing, a mind-work, the foundation of ethnography, but not exclusive to ethnography. He underlined the difference between doing ethnography and borrowing some ethnographic techniques. He argued that the phrase "*borrowing ethnographic techniques"* is adequate and appropriate when the link to ethnography is essentially methodological, as when a fieldworker uses some standard fieldwork procedures for gathering data.

The core of my data was collected through semi-structured interviews, field conversations, observation, participant observation, field notes, and document studies/analysis as listed in Table 1. There are many choices to be made as to how the fieldwork is designed, such as field length (the duration of the study), full time/part time, field breaks, field notes (what and how to write), interview techniques, and tools to insure the quality of the field data (such as validity, reliability, objectivity). In my case some of these dilemmas were determined beforehand, as with all the preparation courses. The overall framework was fixed, so I could concentrate on gathering data and focus on how to ensure the data was gathered in all activities from observation notes to interview data.

This was the case for the first fieldwork conducted from my position in RCN; the length was predetermined to be 7 months, including two breaks of 14 days. This implied that during my first stay, I lived full time with the people I studied in their natural environment. I carried out direct observations of the interactions between them and, at the same time, participated fully in the interaction. The second stay in the operation area was fixed at 14 days. This meant that I was a researcher only, a civilian, someone from "outside." According to a plan the Chief of Staff (COS) had sent out to every unit in RCN, it was known that I would be conducting interviews full time so my task and presence was known. The only fieldwork where I determined the period of my stay and participation myself were the observations I did in the so-called "grey cell"[105] of the ISAF Headquarters training at the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), further explained in section 5.5.1.

During both my stays in the operation area, I established a routine for writing field notes every evening. I started with one page for purely professional activity notes and one page for my feelings and opinions of the day and activities done. It became very difficult to keep the discipline in this two page division of the notes, due to the variety of the days, both in length of working hours, intensity, and the difficulty of keeping the two apart. As a result, I switched to only one page for all the happenings of the day, with focus on the professional activities. I attended internal meetings and meetings at the PRT level and the IJC level within the ISAF organization. I also attended external meetings with GOs/IOs/NGOs and Afghan military, Afghan Police and Afghan local authorities. I followed different projects, plans, working groups and discussions. During normal working hours, I had dialogues with my colleagues, and other less structured interviews, or field conversations, where I asked questions connected to the information I needed about the ISAF structures and policies in order to find out how the coordination and cooperation with other actors worked or did not work.

I was the representative of the RCN CIMIC branch and participated in several working group planning projects. These planning meetings became one of my main sources of data for the civil military coordination activities. During

---

[105] "Grey-cell" is a common military expression for the cell that plays the civilian coordinating actors in a table top exercise in military HQs.

visits from other units or social gatherings in evenings, I also discussed situations and incidents I found interesting with colleagues or visitors. These discussions often widened my understanding of ISAF organization, because the context was more relaxed, the tone and the information provided was more informal and often different. This gave me a more complete picture and a broader perspective.

How ISAF cooperated with local authorities and organizations, from the perspective of the *local population* was too difficult for me to cover.

5.5.1   *Observing mission training and preparations*

Before attending the field, NATO officers have to prepare themselves by getting to know the emergency area through documents, experience reports, different general training courses, and mission specific courses. This preparation varies according to national and individual experience, skills, focus, profession, etc. Some courses are national, conducted in the home country with national resources. Others are NATO courses, conducted in a NATO country with resources such as subject matter experts and instructors mainly from the coalition's member nations. The national courses vary according to each nation's resources, the focus and tasks of the individual nation. The background and policy for the joint training is drawn up by the NATO Training Group (NTG).[106]

5.5.1.1   NATO CIMIC Training

To be able to fill the CIMIC officer position in RCN, I applied for several courses that could give the necessary education and background for my stay. First, I participated in a two week NATO CIMIC Basic course in November 2008, at the CCOE[107]in the Netherlands. Then I participated in a one week

---

[106] For more basic information and detailed information, see MC 238/3, 22 January 2004, and NATO Training Group Handbook, September 2004. Retrieved from: http://www.nato.int/structur/ntg/docu/mc238-3.pdf & http://www.nato.int/structur/ntg/docu/1.pdf .
[107] CCOE: CIMIC Centre of Excellence in the Netherlands. For further information see: http://www.cimic-coe.org/

CIMIC Staff Course also at CCOE, Netherlands, in February 2009. The courses gave the students an understanding of the official NATO view on CIMIC's role and challenges to CIMIC's work as a military tool in a complex emergency.

These courses gave me insight into the training and preparation of the NATO CIMIC officers. I used the participant observation role to understand how the training was conducted and how the different nationalities handled the training. In informal conversations, I questioned my fellow students about the benefits and content of the training.

The method of working with NATO documents and to get to know them by applying the information during tasks given in working groups was quite effective. Representatives from the NGOs/GOs/IOs also participated and initiated tasks based on problem situations from the operations area. The participants were also trained to work with interpreters, which gave many a new perspective and consciousness about the importance of proper communication.

5.5.1.2   National Basic Military Training

In the spring of 2009, I participated in a three-week initial mandatory national military training for international operations, executed by Norwegian Armed Forces, taking place at Sessvollmoen and Terningmoen. We were trained in basic military skills and mission specific subjects, such as cultural awareness and how to manage the climate or a hostage situation. The aim of this training was to prepare the officers physically and mentally for the upcoming deployment.

The conversations were free both in the classroom and out in field training, even with the differences in age, profession, rank, and background. To share experiences was emphasized. This made the discussions interesting for my research. Some staff officers, who had been in office for a while had to undergo a steep learning curve in practical and tactical issues.

5.5.1.3   UN Training

I participated in a one week UN Civil Military Coordination Course in Spain in the summer 2009. This course consisted of half civilian and half military participants. The goal of this course was to get an impression about the differences between NATO and UN policies on civil military coordination in a complex emergency. NATO seemed to be more eager and positive about coordination, and the UN seemed more skeptical toward coordination issues, especially in the context of Afghanistan. The UN course made it possible for the NATO officers to be more prepared to meet the UN approach in later meetings with UN people and organizations in the operation area.

5.5.1.4   ISAF HQ Training

In November/December 2009, I participated in NATO Joint Warfare Center (JWC) training in the new multinational ISAF Headquarters that was designed to man ISAF HQ and IJC (ISAF Joint Command) in Kabul, 2010. These two HQs had, for the first time, a joint pre-deployment training. I participated as an observer in the "grey cell." The grey cell was manned with civilians from different nations and backgrounds, (former officers, diplomats, NGO workers, academics) with special skills to play the role of GO/IO/NGOs and the Afghan local authorities during the training.

During the training, approximately 360 persons were hired to train approximately 260 persons. EXCON (the Exercise Control Team) included the exercise leaders, key personnel, and subject matter experts and a few special invited officers from the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The Training Audience (TA) was trained both in their own specialties and in cross-functional teamwork before the Mission Rehearsal Exercise. During the exercise the TA was to also look outside the HQ, to see his or her own role in the operation area from a broader perspective.

The participants trained both individually and in teams and were closely followed and measured. The aim of the training was to make sure that the staff was familiar with procedures, standard operation procedures (SOPs), IT systems, and operational plans. Furthermore, the goal was to create a sound working relationship among the staff members (according to the written aims of the training). I listened in on meetings where policy and roles were

discussed, and was interested in what the challenges and limits of the military role and tasks were.

I gathered data on how the strategic military level was trained before deployment, what was viewed as more or less important. I also received insight into the planning of the training and policy documents. I was allowed to take notes during my stay as long as I did not quote classified information; this was based on trust alone.

5.5.2 *Contextual Challenges*

To do research in a complex emergency has some inherent dilemmas. The surroundings are often dangerous and unpredictable; it demands a high level of flexibility and ability to adapt to demanding and complicated situations. It can be difficult to keep the focus on the research role when people are suffering, being wounded, or even dying. In such a situation, I needed to keep the "academic eye" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Repstad, 2007), which can be a problem especially in a role as a participant observer because it is easy to get involved in the context. The consciousness of being offered and then taking the role of participant and observer is vital for securing needed information or data (Gold, 1958).

5.5.2.1   First Fieldwork

In my first fieldwork as a participant observer, most of the staff in the RCN was not aware of my Ph.D. work back home; though I told my nearest colleges about this when we had time to get more well acquainted. I was, above all, a CIMIC officer and was treated as any other officer at the Headquarters.

Acceptance

Despite this, I had some other worries about challenges and acceptance in the field. Since it was my first mission as an officer and also my first fieldwork as a participant observer, I was quite anxious about how the environment would meet me. This changed over time. As soon as I felt accepted in my work as an officer the concerns about the researcher role had more focus. Again, the

consciousness of the roles and statuses was vital for the data collection (Gold 1958, Aase and Fossåskaret, 2007). (See 5.5.4. for elaboration).

Language

Even if English is the working language in NATO, there were language issues. Some lower ranked officers did not speak very much English. Sometimes also officers of higher rank from a variety of nations had a language that was difficult to understand, leading to misunderstandings and problems. As a researcher, I received an informant's interpretation of situations, which in turn, then needed to be interpreted by him or herself. This two-step interpretation, or "double hermeneutics," (Aase and Fossåskaret, 2007), was a source of potential misinterpretation.

Classified Information

Another difficulty was the security and classification of information. It was a fine line to balance the experiences and information given in different situations without harming or challenging the boundaries of NATO classified information. Access to internet and other media used for research was (due to security) very limited or nonexistent. Some briefs and documents with interesting information were not clearly classified according to the NATO classification system, so I often had to leave it to be on the safe side.

Working Environment

The working environment, at times, could be very challenging and stressful. Though the working hours' guideline officially was set from 0800 until 2000, many officers (especially in the CJ3 Branch, operations/Joint operation center) were still working until 0100 or 0200 in the morning, depending on the situation. This made it difficult to arrange a regular time for the consolidation of my fieldwork notes; some days and weeks field notes were even not done because of this. Further, the heat and the dust during July and August with temperatures up to 52-54 degrees Celsius also made health conditions, concentration, and work difficult. It also influenced people's behavior, patience, motivation, and attitude. I even partly lost my researcher motivation or ability during some harsh periods.

The "Academic Eye"

Being in a warzone, I was prepared for possible deaths and wounded colleagues. But one cannot be fully prepared; when this happened it had an influence on feelings and thinking. The comradery felt very strong in these situations, and it became very difficult to keep a distance to the field, to keep the "academic eye" as a researcher should do (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Repstad, 2007). This was also the problem when I faced problematic or dangerous situations together with my colleagues; my experience was that a researcher's needed distance became quite problematic, sometimes impossible to keep in such situations, and it was very easy to "go native" (Gold, 1958; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Bernard, 2000; Repstad, 2007; Aase and Fossåskaret, 2007) .

5.5.2.2   Second Fieldwork

In my second fieldwork in February 2011, I travelled back for follow up interviews to the same environment at RCN as I had been before as a researcher.

Access

Travelling to a warzone as a civilian was very different from being a member of the military. Civilians have to take care of everything on his or her initiative. In the military, everything was handled by the military. When travelling as a civilian, the need and the reason for travel were questioned in detail by both the Afghan Embassy and the Norwegian Military Forces. Due to my military network, I was allowed to join military transport to and from Mazar-e Sharif, and I was given a 14 days stay in RCN for my interviews. This was 14 days shorter then I had hoped for. The Norwegian Army (which had taken responsibility for my security during my stay) explained this as being due to the challenges military often have with journalists and researchers "running around in their environment" in a situation where the stress and lack of security easily and suddenly can make the situation very challenging. Despite this, I was met with openness and politeness, given a helmet, bulletproof vest, a bed in a tent, and access to the dining facilities. ISAF organization in RCN was surprisingly curious about my work, and the CIMIC section, in which I had my base during my stay, was supportive. But as a civilian, even if I still had my security clearance, I was not allowed to

walk around in the Class One area (highest classified area) without being followed closely.

Planning

The Norwegian Military Forces required a plan[108] for my stay as a researcher doing interviews; this plan was also forwarded to RCN. The RCN Chief of Staff sent the plan to every unit at the Command and asked for willingness to cooperate if possible; this was a good facilitator for the conduct of interviews. The plan gave me a framework for my work, though the security situation was highly flexible and changed often during my stay. The ongoing conflict and the "hands on" needed in the crisis management influenced who I was able to interview. Fixed times for interviews often had to change, and sometimes no one was able to participate, so I had to look for someone else to interview on a more ad hoc basis. This made it difficult to get the desired representatives from different levels and actors as planned. One person I made an appointment with for an interview died in action before the interview was conducted. To meet these challenges I arranged some follow up interviews to take place after my return back home, via meetings, e-mails and telephone calls.

5.5.3 *Participant Observation*

I formed the majority of my data collection by participant observation. One could say that all humans are participants and observers in their everyday interactions, but as I understood from my readings the *method* of participant observation is something different, and that this method requires a particular approach to recording observations, to conduct behavioral analysis and recording the information gathered (Aase and Fossåskaret, 2007).

5.5.3.1   Definition

Bernard (2000) argued that there is no single agreed-on definition for what constitutes participant observation. Nevertheless, he offered a description which makes sense, and helped me to keep the focus during my stay in the operational area as a participant observer:

---

[108] See Appendix 4.

Participant observation involves immersing yourself in a culture and learning to remove yourself every day from that immersion so you can intellectualize what you've seen and heard, put it into perspective, and write about it convincingly. When it is done, participant observation turns fieldworkers into instruments of data collection and data analysis. (Bernard, 2000, p.344).

According to Aase and Fossåskaret (2007), it is essential to distinguish between observation and participant observation. They underlined the importance of being a participant observer if the research design includes an interaction perspective. They pointed out that observation alone, or together with interviews, *can never give the same understanding of interaction as being a participant*. In an interaction, the researcher is *not* a participant observer if she stands outside the interaction being observed. To really be able to go "behind the scenes" and get access to processes normally hidden, for a "fleeting moment" one needs to interact, to engage in a dual position, both as an observer and as a participant. As an ideal position in fieldwork, Aase and Fossåskaret suggested the possibility of interacting in a local social status or position similar to the persons being observed, to be one's own informant as Wadel (1991) described it. From this perspective, I had the very best starting point or position for my research as a participant observer, since I was an ISAF CIMIC officer myself.

5.5.3.2   Degree of Participation

Bernard (2000) argued that fieldwork can involve three very different roles: complete participant, participant observer, or complete observer. The first role describes when one becomes a member of a group without letting anyone in the group know that you are there to do research. The second role, participant observer, is working as an insider, being in interaction with people and the milieu observed and recording some aspects of the group's activities or condition. The third role involves following the people studied and recording their behavior with very little or no interaction. In my case, I was somewhere between the two first types, insofar as I was a fully member of the group in the same conditions as the other officers, but I also did observations which some in my surroundings knew about, but most did not.

To be placed in a totally unknown environment in a multinational military camp in Northern Afghanistan was an interesting challenge. On the first drive into the camp, we passed military vehicles which had been destroyed by Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs). I never found out whether this was on purpose to keep us sharpened or just incidental, but it made us feel the heartbeat and the strange feeling of being in a warzone. At this first experience with the unknown light, smells, view, sounds and temperatures, the senses were sharpened, and we stayed very vigilant. It was a mixture of fear and delight. It was too much to take in; I needed some days to mentally "land," to be able to think about being a participant observer. So, how to systemize the impressions and observations in such a context?

5.5.3.3   Observation Techniques

When I tried to find a strategy in my way of conducting the participant observation role, I sought some adequate guidelines. This was very important to me as soon as I realized the need for defining the field and understood that I faced a multi-sited field. Techniques that were able to cover such a multi-sited fieldwork were needed in order to able to arrange or systematize my impressions and observations.

In such an intense and, at times, chaotic context as a complex emergency, the need for guidelines to conduct participant observation led me to Marcus (1998). Marcus suggested techniques that I found quite useful in observing such a complex organization such as ISAF.

Follow the People
One of Marcus' techniques is *"follow the people,"* suggesting that the researcher follow the people in the organization to see how and with whom they communicate within their own and coordinating/collaborating organizations. Every time possible, I followed the CIMIC LNO in all the meetings he conducted with civilian actors (IOs, GOs, and NGOs). This gave me the opportunity to get a picture of the network, to see the coordination and to ask about their attitude and priorities. This I also did with representatives from the CIMIC Engineers and Tactical CIMIC Teams (TCTs) operating out in the Afghan villages. Further, I followed my colleagues in the Planning

Branch to find out about how the networks, power, and influence worked in current and long-term planning.

Follow the Things

The second technique of Marcus (1998) was *"follow the things,"* meaning tracing the circulation and distribution of physical objects, such as procedures, reports, and important documents within and between the organizations. I found it important to follow the overall strategies as well as Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs), the Standing Operation Procedures (SOP), the money flow, and other regulations and policy documents, who orders them, who carries them out, who is *not* involved, why, how are the processes conducted and who is, in the end, regulated and governed by these documents? Finally, who has influence, what is there to gain, and if there is resistance or discussions, what are they based on and how does this influence the crisis management?

Follow the Metaphors

Thirdly, one can, according to Marcus, *"follow the metaphors,"* by which he meant the discourses and modes of thought. In my case, this was an appropriate tool to find the differences in interpretation of mandates, roles, and lines between civilian and military actors internal in ISAF. I had to be conscious of possible hidden agendas or power struggles within the organization. For example, how different nations interpreted objectives and roles with different emphases, and how levels in the organization had dissimilar focus on overall civil military coordination concepts.

Follow the Story

Marcus named the technique *"follow the story,"* meaning paying attention to how stories are told and narratives develop in everyday situations. I found it useful to follow stories because these tend to illuminate both organizational and the military culture and attitudes, the myths that serve the institutional orders, and how these were understood in a civil-military coordination context.

The characterization and limitations of the field influenced which techniques were relevant to use in which situation, but all the mentioned techniques were relevant for my stay as a participant observer. This gave me a possibility to

organize my thoughts around the observations, and made it easier to find coherence in my notes.

Participant observation involves managing deception and impression. For me it meant that I, as a researcher, was very close to my colleagues whom I studied, and that I was accepted in a way that made them comfortable with my presence, especially when they knew that I was observing and recording information about their way of handling and coping with everyday life in under difficult conditions. This part went quite well, and I never had the feeling that someone "put up a face" or hid something for me because of my special interest in data collecting. On the contrary, I often was met by colleagues who gave me information they thought might be of interest for my work. Of course, one could say that this could be "planted" information, but I found no reason to believe that.

Other important aspects of the participant observer role are to build writing skills, have knowledge about and awareness of ethical dilemmas, and strive to meet the academic objectivity and neutrality requirements. Being in the field, often with unfamiliar codes, awareness of gender, sexual behavior, and field survival are also important. I concentrated on role challenges and issues of proximity and distance, because I think these aspects were the greatest challenges in my research situation.

5.5.4   *Role Challenges*

Different situations create different role expectations. Each role is affiliated with its own rights and obligations (Aase and Fossåskaret, 2007). This requires that the researcher keep track of "who is talking to whom," meaning which role or ascribed status is active in the situation studied. Participant observation is about taking on a given status, the need to identify role expectations connected to the status being activated, and taking action according to the role expectations (Aase and Fossåskaret, 2007).

5.5.4.1   **Role Awareness**

When I joined ISAF as an officer, I moved into a situation that was defined by a number of specific rights and obligations. The sum of all these expectations

and obligations was my role or ascribed status in the operation area. Every time I moved from one situation or function to another, the expectations shifted. I was aware of shifting roles many times a day. An individual often activates more than one role/status in the same arena at the same time, which makes the role awareness very essential in the work of participant observation.

As an officer, I met formalized rights and obligations which were determined by my status. But I also met informal, unwritten rules that formed the expectations of the role as officer. Staying in a German military camp, I saw differences in Norwegian, Croatian, Latvian, Hungarian, American, and German role expectations for a CIMIC officer's role. I also had to be aware of the possible differences in the approach towards a female officer, and try to understand what kind of expectations and associations the local people of Afghanistan had towards a female ISAF officer. The consciousness about these things was essential to understand my own position in the research field.

5.5.4.2   Balance the Role-Play

Every fieldwork role is a social interaction device for securing information for scientific purposes and a set of behaviors in which an observer's self is involved (Gold, 1958). Gold argued that the more successful the field worker is in playing her role, the more successful she must be in taking the informant's role. Success in role-taking and role-playing requires success in blending the demands of self-expression and integrity with the demands of the role. Being a participant observer, one plays both the role of a field worker and the role of an informant. This implies attempts to master universes of discourses relating to many attitudes and behaviors, and, thus, it becomes vital to be introspective when raising questions and developing relationships in the field. Introspection will allow one to balance the role-demands and self-demands in the operational area. In some situations the demands of the role and the demands on the self are out of balance as a result of perceived threats, (as earlier mentioned, how easy it is to "go native" in threatening or dangerous situations). Gold suggested that the balance can be restored by appropriate introspection, and this can be done in two different ways. Either you use the role to protect the self, or you use the self as a source of new behavior to protect the role. Gold explained this as follows:

The case of using role to protect self from perceived threat is one of acute self-consciousness, a matter of diminishing over-sensitivity to self-demand by introspectively noting corresponding demands of role. The case of using self to protect role from perceived threat is one of acute role-consciousness, a matter of diminishing over-sensitivity to role-demands by introspectively indicating that they are disproportionately larger than those of self. (Gold, 1958, p.218)

5.5.4.3   Role "Threats"

In the operation area, I had to play my role in varied situations, from having a barbeque together with colleagues, joking , having small talk, to being threatened by weapon at a checkpoint by (an assumed drugged) Afghan Policeman at night, or driving on dirt roads in a hostile environment where there were often IEDs, not knowing what could happen. According to Gold, playing a role in varied situations will from time to time result in threat experiences that impair the field workers' effectiveness. He goes on to state that threatened or stressed situations can make the field worker unable to meet role-taking and role-playing demands, such as using experiences and observations to raise meaningful questions and perceive meaningful answers. This happened to me. This said, the threat in my case never came from the environment I was a part of during my research, it was most often a threat from the outside, a joint threat, which of course also made me closer to my studied colleagues in the internal environment.

5.5.4.4   Going "Native"

Instead of being threatened from the internal organizational environment, I felt a great degree of trust. This represented a new challenge, knowing that too much mutual trust can lead to what I, as a researcher, and my colleagues, as informants, may interact in a way that the informants identify too much with me as a researcher, and become too much of an observer themselves. Or, more likely in my research situation, I could tend to identify too much with the informants and lose the research perspective by "going native." The knowledge that over-identifying with an informant or going native is more common when the researcher is inexperienced made me very aware of this aspect (Bernard, 2006). Still, I knew this would be difficult. Military

161

camaraderie is very strong, and is one of the pillars that make military education and thinking sustainable. With this camaraderie in ones "backbone," living in dangerous environment with many external threats, ties among the teams easily become very tight and strong. This increased the challenge to maintain my academic eye. What would happen if I went native? Would my research be worthless?

Bernard (2006) asked whether going native means loss of objectivity. His own answer was: perhaps, but not necessarily. He suggested that objectivity, by definition is a myth, and one should worry more about producing credible data and strong analysis, and less about whether going native is good or bad. Going native may also be a paradox because the researcher is seeking the viewpoint of the actors in the field, and at same time supposed to *not* go native. However, participant observation allows the researcher to "know" in a unique way because she becomes a participant in what is observed, and at the same time attempts to remain an observer of action and behaviors. Bernard argued that this maintains a certain distance between the people studied and the researcher.

It was important for me as a fieldworker to focus on and try to recognize limitations and potential problems in my own ability to develop relationships in various roles and situations, and to find out how to adjust my own role repertories to my research aims. I found some comfort in Gold noting: "*when the researcher begins to utilize theory of role and reflects on her own assets and shortcomings in the field, a purposeful dealing with challenges in controlling own interactions with informants in all likelihood will occur*" (Gold, 1958).

5.5.5 *Interviews*

Wolcott (2008) suggested maintaining a distinction between the two major activities in fieldwork, participant observation and interviewing, although they are closely interrelated. Interviewing, in a broad sense, can include everything from casual conversation to the formal structured interview. By making the distinction among them, Walcott argued for the importance of interview techniques and the fieldworker's conscious decision to decide how to use them.

5.5.5.1   Field Conversations and Interviews

During my second stay in the field, I chiefly conducted interviews, but was also allowed to join meetings. The fieldwork was limited to 14 intensive days with semi-structured interviews. I had already gathered data in 16 unstructured qualitative (explorative) interviews during my stay as participant observer. After coming home from my first fieldwork, grouping and analyzing my data, I had a better understanding of what I was looking for in this second round, though I was open to that upcoming data could influence the weight, importance or priorities in the data gathered. The interviews from my first fieldwork were more an interview as conversation, field conversation (Wadel, 1991), or an unstructured interview with a non-standardized format (Guba and Lincoln, 1981). These interviews lasted about two hours and were constructed around 5-6 main topics. Aase and Fossåskaret (2007) emphasized the advantage of field conversations, which are dialogues characterized as natural conversations with the questions consciously selected in order to understand the setting more entirely. I started these field conversations very late in my deployment, because I needed to have an overall situation awareness and understanding. Besides, I needed to be accepted as a team-member and to know that the informants trusted me.

I had produced an interview guide for my interviews (Appendix 6 and 7). The interview guide listed topics I wanted to cover, though I had a very open dialogue to make it possible for my respondents to share knowledge they viewed as relevant. During the interviews, I decided to be flexible in order to adjust to the different personalities and create an atmosphere for trust. This way, I was able to get the information I needed and also allowed to gather potentially relevant information. I often let the interviewees tell me their story, including their good and bad experiences, adding my questions along in the story. This functioned quite well in order to have my interviewees open up, but could have meant that some valuable details could have been left out.

5.5.5.2   Timing and Access

In round two, I was more confident that I knew the environment, despite being familiar with the military view on civilians coming in from outside, which are often considered as an interference. The fact that I knew some

officers who were still in the area from my first stay helped me to get the needed acceptance also as a researcher.

Even if this was a chaotic and stressed period, I had put some pressure on the idea of going back to the area in February/March 2011 for interviews—when the main military rotation was ongoing. This was due to that I wanted to catch the people who had finished their deployment. They had fresh field experience, and had probably mentally also evaluated their deployment.

This was a good approach, even though I would like to have been able to carry out more interviews, especially on the strategic and tactical level, to widen my understanding and discover more relations and connections. Unfortunately, this was not possible due to the security situation. The Norwegian unit (NCC) made clear that if I was going anywhere, they had to do some assessment before making any decision on my freedom of movement. From their point of view, I would be taking unnecessary resources since they had to accompany me when I was moving around in a bigger area.

Nevertheless, using these 14 days, I conducted 25 interviews, representing individuals focused on the tactical, operational, and strategic level. The operational level, RCN, however was the main focus due to the restrictions in my freedom of movement.[109]

5.5.5.3   Practical Execution

I never met anyone who refused to be interviewed; some interviews could not be conducted due to other obstacles, but the attitude towards my research was surprisingly positive. I never used a tape-recorder; all interviews were handwritten, and most of them were transferred to my PC while I was in the field. Some of the interviews were conducted in a CIMIC office I was allowed to use as a base for my research, but most were conducted in the office of the interviewed, in the welfare area, or outside the barracks on a bench. Even if I was closely followed, I was always allowed to be alone with my informant during the interviews. I also conducted an interview on a flight from Afghanistan to Turkey. These interviews had a timeframe of approximately two hours; most often I asked for one hour, but it seemed that when we had

---

[109] See appendix 5 for list of interviewed personnel.

been talking for some time, many of my informants became very talkative. I saw this as an engagement in their situation and tasks.

5.5.5.4   Atmosphere and Trust

I also noticed that as soon as the interviewees got known to my military background, the language and the terminology changed quite noticeably; the atmosphere became more relaxed and the talk more open. The fact that I was familiar with the military, the local jargon, and the humor made the atmosphere of the interviews better. This was obviously one of my benefits to get information "behind the scene." I also was trusted with information on which the interviewees did not want to be quoted. On the other hand, I had to address my preconceptions about what I perceived as a shared culture with the officers I interviewed; I had to be very aware of my proficiency in the military language and acronyms so I did not overlook nuances due to the more relaxed and known situation, compared with the situation during interviews with civilian actors.

Back home again, I conducted some follow up interviews. This was necessary to get vital contributions. I conducted 4 follow up interviews during the summer and autumn 2011, two by face to face meetings and two by phone.

5.5.5.5   My Informants

My informants were primarily RCN officers and civilians engaged in civil military coordination issues, as they were naturally the easiest ones to make contact with. These soldiers and civilians represented levels from RCN management to Tactical CIMIC teams (TCTs) operating out in the field. Further, officers from IJC working with civil military coordination issues, information processing, and planning of projects were interviewed. PRT officers (mostly CIMIC officers) from the German, Norwegian, Swedish and Hungarian PRT were also represented in the interviews. This was to ensure the three levels from PRTs representing the ground level—RCN as regional and IJC as the Headquarter in Kabul—were represented. Further, civilian coordinating actors as representatives from the UN, USAID and GTZ were interviewed to illuminate how ISAF coordination efforts were perceived from a civilian point of view. Unfortunately, I did not manage to contact

representatives from the Afghan authorities for an interview. I planned to get representatives from the areas I considered important representing the ISAF organization and its counterparts (but due to unforeseen occurrences and the rapid changes and priorities which often characterize a conflict area, this was difficult to achieve.) My informants were young and elderly, less and more experienced soldiers, and represented both genders and several different ranks.

5.5.6 *Document Analysis*

Written documents constituted an important component of my data collection. Some of these documents were a picture or a description of the ideal way, theoretically and strategically, to handle the crisis management; from military operations to development and governance issues. I used the documents both to learn the idea behind the policies, regulations, and guidelines, and to hold them up against the reality I experienced on the ground. The gap between the "real world," referring to the operational and tactical level, and the strategic level was illuminating.

The study's documents were both classified[110] and unclassified. Open policy and guidelines documents were from the ISAF Commander, NATO documents and doctrines on different levels, classification, and tasks, such as CIMIC documents[111] but also related international documents from the UN, EU and other important IOs/GOs/NGOs on the civil military coordination issue. I found that besides CIMIC documents, documents from PSYOPS, Fusion Centre, the RCN Senior Civilian Representative (SCR), operations (CJ3), intelligence (CJ2), and planning (CJ5), were documents that could have had a great influence on the civil military coordination issue. During operations, the Operation Order especially, the so-called Annex Whiskey (CIMIC issues) was of special interest. As participant observer, I had the same access to all the data systems and programs as my colleagues had, such as

---

[110] Classified documents are material that a government body, here NATO, claims is sensitive information that requires protection of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Access is restricted by law or regulation to particular groups of people, and mishandling can incur criminal penalties. A formal security clearance is often required to handle classified documents or access classified data.

[111] NATO CIMIC guidelines and doctrines. Cf. Appendix 2.

project reports, evaluations, mail, assessments, plans, correspondence with other civilian actors, and internal tactical and strategic level communication.

Overall strategy documents concerning the Comprehensive Approach (CA) or Counterinsurgency (COIN) were mostly examined before and after the first fieldwork. In the operation area CA and COIN documents were often represented by the bits and pieces of the overall documents broken down into the information assumed to be needed on the ground. [112] NATO/ISAF steering documents were an important source of information and knowledge before, during, and after my field work. Further, the Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs) and Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs), directing the activity in the operation area, drew a picture of the thinking, strategy, and priorities of ISAF management, both concerning daily activity as well as planning, executing, and summing-up of operations.

I also went through many Afghan-related documents and undertook other research to gain knowledge of the outer context in order to be more able to analyze the meeting-points between the outer (North-Afghanistan) and inner (ISAF) contexts.

5.6   *Data analysis: proximity and distance*

I early discovered that the balance between proximity and distance can be very challenging in a situation like mine; a fieldworker needs to move back and forth between involvement and detachment – stranger and friend. Although I strived to establish mutual trust, a friendship or a good colleague relationship with the informants, I needed to keep the necessary distance to retain the sufficient elements of research—the mentioned "expert eye" or "academic eye." In order to make this determination, I read of Georg Simmel (Wollf, 1959), who made a distinction between intimate *content* and intimate *form*. Intimate form is inimical to field observation in Simmel's opinion, who argued that certain external situations or moods may move us to make very personal statements or confessions to people who are relative strangers, still feeling that this intimate content does not yet make the relationship an

---

[112] See Appendix 2 and 3 for an overview of vital working documents.

intimate one, as long as it is based on general un-individual ingredients. In this way, intimate content can stay outside the sphere of intimacy. On the other hand, if the *form* of interaction is intimate, the continuation of the relationship may become more important than keeping the roles in which the relationship was initiated. This describes very much the situation I was in, and also how the balance of role demands and the challenge of proximity and distance are quite demanding. But the awareness of this distinction was helpful to me both for my awareness in the field and during my data analysis.

5.6.1.1   Passive or Active?

Wolcott (2008) made a distinction between experience and inquiring to underscore the critical difference between being present as a passive observer of the activity and taking the active role of asking questions. Experience is what a researcher gains through participant observation, while inquiring (which varies from spontaneous and informal conversations to formal arranged interviews) may intrude upon natural activities and conversation. This is a dilemma: asking questions may put one's own agenda into the setting, affecting the studied persons' presentation of challenges or picture of his or herself. On the other hand, if one does not ask questions, important information and understanding could be lost. As mentioned, I felt that both the arranged interviews and the more spontaneous conversations were very open and relaxed, and I think this was due to trust and the feeling or idea that I was "one of them," a comrade. This was due to the fact that they knew I had experienced their challenges myself by being a complete participant.

5.6.1.2   Their view?

Repstad (2007) underlined the importance of not only finding answers to the question about "what do I see them doing?" but also understanding the nuances and finding answers to the question "how do they see themselves, and what they are doing?" to grasp *their* view. In my research on how ISAF handles cooperation issues, it was essential to grasp the rationality and the way of thinking of the members of the organization. This entailed the acceptance of me as a convincing officer. How convincing should one be? This is another important balance, being a skilled role player without influencing the milieu with the observer effect. In some situations, I totally

forgot about the observation role and was a convincing officer much more than an observer, especially when "things got hot." In other situations, it was easier to keep up a distance, to be the observer, such as in meetings, working groups, or when there were fundamental or policy discussions or at social gatherings.

5.6.1.3   Attachment

In my work as participant observer in an ISAF officer position, being a convincing officer required attachment to the work being done. Knowing that relationships in military groups tend to be strong, I tried to meet these challenges with as much focus as I could on the need for the necessary distance for scientific objectivity. It was a strain to identify and sympathize with the community and at the same time strive for objectivity. Besides, observation requires detachment, yet I got emotionally involved. As earlier mentioned, when going native, as I did at times, I tried to keep consciousness about how this affected my research.

5.6.1.4   Identification

However, knowing and working in the military milieu challenges the necessary academic distance, and the tendency is to take a personal interest in what happens in the field. According to Repstad (2007) the main challenge, to maintain distance and impartiality, will be really challenged when the researcher has personal relations with the field. To be an expert or do research on one's own or known areas is difficult to manage. One can tend to appraise or consider the activities, rather than gather precise descriptions from the point of view of the actors. For me, this was a challenge, and it became vital for me to be aware of these potential problems. On the other hand, the advantage of being on home ground made it possible to avoid embarrassing misjudgments or misunderstandings, and it also gave me access to the field. My informants shared thoughts, feelings, frustrations, challenges, and even "secrets" with me that I am quite sure they never would have shared if I was only a researcher, and not a participant or a colleague.

But where does one draw the line between identification and over-identification? The fact that I was a reserve officer and normally do not

identify with the officer role made it a little bit easier for me to not to over-identify. I could be accepted as one of them, yet at the same time was able to observe the officer role as something outside my own identity. I had other identities that gave me the necessary ability to keep the distance needed for the academic eye.

Qualitative method experts (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Repstad, 2007) underlined that the methodological virtue or success lies in describing the actors in the field in an understanding way, managing to make them emerge in a way that they themselves render as rational on their own terms, from their own situation. Repstad (2007) stated that the researcher, to some extent, may act professionally or ethically as a "lawyer of the actors," but the line is crossed as soon as one begins to ignore the actors' less sympathetic actions or attitudes or exaggerate the positive ones. This was also a good tool to give myself the necessary distance. My greatest challenge in this was to have awareness of the psychological mechanisms to control these aspects, be able to balance them throughout the fieldwork, and correct them in the analysis phase of the research assignment.

Working with categorizing, I also tried to be very strict with terms and categories to make sure that I did not interpret but just used the raw material/observations as they emerged, according to advice given in Aase and Fossåskaret's (2007) work. Still, the first time I wrote down my data from my notes to the PC, I realized that I had put some interpretation into it. That led me to go back to my original field notes where I found the most adequate categories for my raw material.

5.7   *Triangulation and Crystallization*

Triangulation is used to indicate that more methods than one are used in a study to double-check the data or results, and is defined as "*an attempt to map out, or explain more fully, the richness and complexity of human behavior by studying it from more than one standpoint*" (Cohen et al., 2000, p. 112). It is a technique to facilitate the validation of data or results through cross verifications from different sources, based on the idea that this will increase the credibility and validity of the results.

Denzin (2005) suggested four types of triangulation

- Data Triangulation (the use of a variety of data sources in a study)
- Investigator triangulation (the use of several researchers or evaluators)
- Theory triangulation (use of multiple perspectives to interpret a single set of data)
- Methodological triangulation (use of multiple methods to study a single problem)

Since objective reality never can be captured (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005), I used methodological triangulation in attempt to get a deeper understanding of the research question, to add richness to the inquiry, as well as to avoid jumping to conclusions. Triangulation in method was done by conducting participant observation, interviews, and document analysis as tools to clarify meaning or verify my observations or interpretations. Considering that humans and organizations are ever changing and complex, triangulation was used in attempt to validate my findings. But, as Silverman and Marvasti (2008) argued, there is no "golden key" to validity in qualitative research. So how can one know the truth?

In aspiring to capture the depth and variation of opinions and perspectives among observed and interviewed personnel, my selection of informants represented different units, levels of authority, and professions, and included civilian and military personnel. I conducted source/data triangulation by interviewing and observing personnel from Upper Headquarters as represented by IJC, Regional Command as represented by RCN, and PRTs as represented by RCN's subordinated PRTs. Further, the very sharp end[113] out in the field of ISAF organization represented by tactical CIMIC teams (TCTs), Mobile Observation Teams (MOTs) and Civil Affairs teams (CATs), which represented different nations, as well as civilian coordinating actors were also interviewed and observed.

As noted above, participant observation gave me access to projects, meetings and other arenas for civil military coordination in the field. The field

---

[113] The sharp end, is military jargon, also called the 'boots on the ground.'

conversations and interviews provided an opportunity to clarify misunderstandings and to widen the understanding of what was ongoing in these arenas. The document analysis and literature surveys provided opportunities for comparison of my understanding and findings with other researchers' study of civil military coordination in complex emergencies and crisis areas. This also gave an indication of the transferability of my findings.

Richardson and St. Pierre (2005), however, claimed that there are far more approaches to analysis than triangulation can cover. They stated that triangulation carries the same domain assumptions, including the assumption that there is a "fixed point" or "an object" that can be triangulated, and argued not for triangulation but for crystallization. Richardson and St. Pierre described crystals as prisms that reflect externalities and refract within themselves creating different patterns, colors, and arrays that go in different directions. What we see depends on our angle of repose. Crystallization without losing structure, deconstructs the traditional idea of validity, we realize that there is no single truth and that texts validate themselves. Crystallization gives a partial understanding of the topic, in which one more than before yet maybe what one knows, only to realize that there is more to know (Richardson and St. Pierre, in Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). Nevertheless, I have confidence that the personnel working in similar situations, with multiple organizations in complex emergencies, will recognize the main facts addressed.

5.8   *Reliability and validity*

Creswell (1998) emphasized that it is important to remember that qualitative methods require multiple perspectives and commitment to extensive time in the field to gain the "insider" perspective as well as a commitment to complex, time-consuming processes of data analysis.

Dilemmas occur in the effort to judge the reliability and validity of qualitative research and its empirical findings. A qualitative research project on human social life is not performed under controlled circumstances, and the number of variables is indefinite, and impossible to reproduce in total. Accordingly, the reasoning followed is that this thesis has criteria that are not fixed by which it is possible to assess the validity of its interpretations or conclusions;

additionally, there is subjectivity involved in the analysis of the data gathered. The validity of the findings is dependent on how valuable and applicable they are for comparable contexts and to what extent informants and observed personnel recognize the findings.

5.8.1 *Reliability*

As earlier mentioned, due to the harsh and dangerous environment during this research, it was, at times, hard to uphold the research role and the academic eye, even though I tried to keep high focus on this challenge. Further working with classified information which might have enlightened some aspects and given valuable nuances to the research was problematic. None of the informants had the working language, English, as their mother-tongue which also could have been a source of misinterpretation. I tried to compensate by double-checking their statements.

Researchers often explain reliability as how precise and accurate the methods and measurements reflect the studied area, how reliable and precise the information gathered is, and how able the researcher is to analyze without slips, failings, or shortcomings (Repstad, 2007).

Silverman and Marvasti (2008) underlined that reliability refers to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on different or similar occasions. They also pointed out how the scientific investigations to document the procedures used and to demonstrate that the categories have been used consistently rest on the researcher.

Whether the scientific findings can be replicated under identical conditions is a concern in qualitative research, because human behavior is never static. These studies cannot be replicated exactly, regardless of the methods or design deployed (Le Compte and Getz, 1982).

On one hand, the traditional requirement of reliability seems more reasonable in research of phenomena that does not change over time or in context. Reliability in the sense of being able to replicate an experiment or study with the exact same methods in order to give the same results independent of the

researcher, is difficult to achieve in qualitative research. On the other hand it is possible to achieve reliability adjusted to qualitative research when adopting some methods suggested by LeCompte and Getz (1982).

To achieve reliability adjusted to qualitative research LeCompte and Getz (1982) suggested that the researcher should make sure that the limitations of the work is clear and closely related to the research design and the use of methods. Further, different information sources and data must be thoroughly described, as along with the theoretical premises and defined concepts.

Even though the outer context of my research –North Afghanistan – cannot be repeated or reconstructed and ISAF officers are not static, as the actors filling the different roles were changed frequently, some characteristics will remain intact for follow-up or new research. Notably, this includes the military organizational structure and culture, as well as the command and control system.

The qualitative researcher is left with a big responsibility in self-critical quality assessment. In my position as a participant observer, not actually being viewed as a researcher, my influence on the informants or studied objects was insignificant. And I was always aware of the observer effects. Further, due to my long observation time during my first fieldwork, I found very relevant informants for enlightening the research questions in my second fieldwork. This has strengthened the data relevance. Further, I assume that some organizational challenges and vulnerabilities found from this research also would have been found by other researchers in the same setting.

5.8.2   *Validity*

"By validity, I mean truth: interpreted as the extent to which an account accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers" (Hammersly, 1990, p.57).

In a qualitative research, it is hard to be convinced that the findings are based on an investigation of all data and not just chosen examples because it is impossible to have the full overview of such a complex area. In order to consider the validity of my data, I questioned whether the data used in my

thesis were the right data for answering my main research question and conclusion. Did my empirical examinations enlighten the research question?

5.8.2.1   Internal Validity

Internal validity is often an issue of the researcher's skills in asking the right questions and measuring what is expected to be measured (Patton, 1990; Kvale, 1989). It is also about the degree to which the findings of the study make sense to the respondents and others, and the degree to which they are credible (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). How can one know whether the findings are meaningful to the respondents?

To get an answer to this, I often discussed my views and understandings with my co-workers during the participant observation period. Field conversations and discussions about relevant subjects came easily. Most officers were engaged in these questions and had a point of view. Through these conversations, I could test whether my findings had meaning for them. Usually they did, even though they sometimes had different opinions about the facts.

In the field, my interviews were all done face to face and all without a tape-recorder. A tape recorder would not be possible to use in this environment; we were not even allowed to use our own cell phones due to security issues. I wrote down the answers during the interview. This might influence the validity of my findings, as there might have been some aspects that were lost during the conversation/interview. After the interviews, I read the answers back to the respondents in order to make them confirm whether I had understood the message or main point of view. Since I did not start interviewing before I had been a participant observer for four months, I had a sense of what would be unnecessary or important questions to ask. Further, I formulated my questions more strictly in the follow up interviews during my second fieldwork, based on the knowledge from first set of interviews.

Some follow-up interviews were also done by phone after I came home. This was done to reach people regarded as important, which I had not managed to reach in the field due to distance or security issues. Also in this case, I read

back the answers to them so they could confirm whether I had understood their statements correctly.

My interviewees were chosen because of their relevance to my research topic, working in areas influencing civil military coordination. They were also chosen according to how representative they were of actual levels and units, being affiliated with the IJC, RCN and the PRTs. Still, the desired representation could not always be met due to the field situation, with people suddenly being indisposed, leading to a few respondents being "accidental substitutes."

Was I actually observing what I thought I observed? Were the findings authentic representatives of the reality? In this question I am quite confident. The informants understanding of concepts, structures and processes were tested in a direct communication with them, and were also studied over a long time period, in which I also participated myself. I was conscious on the observer effects and did cross-over interviews which represent some suggested elements to ensure internal validity (LeCompte and Getz, 1982).

5.8.2.2   External Validity

External validity is, according to Lincoln and Guba (1985), the degree to which the conclusions of the study are transferable to other contexts.

The transferability of my findings and conclusions about ISAF structures and processes influencing civil military coordination in North Afghanistan was an aim of the thesis. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the distinction between inner and outer context was done to underline that the descriptions of the outer context of the study (North-Afghanistan) has little potential for transferability as it is unique, a situation that will not be possible to fully recreate. But characteristics from the inner context, that of ISAF structures and processes and their influence on the civil military coordination may have the potential for transferability. Besides, if NATO deploys in future complex emergencies, it is likely that a similar organizational structure and processes will be conducted, as well as the deployment of many of the same officers, who already have many international UN, EU or NATO missions behind them. It is likely, therefore, that the aspects found that influence civil military

coordination in North Afghanistan is likely to be valid elsewhere. Besides, some of the organizational challenges will be valid in other large international organizations with many contributing nations holding their own culture and priorities.

Moreover, Brocades Zaalberg's (2006) description of the gaps between the tactical level and strategic decision making, Rietjens and Bollen's (2008) discussions of dilemmas with civil military coordination, as well as the problems Friis (2010/2012) addressed concerning the prevailing civil military coordination concepts in Afghanistan are in line with my findings. This also gives validity to my research.

Does this study have any relevance for others? Generalization as proof of extensiveness is limited, as qualitative research tradition learns more about the research question in depth. Nevertheless it has relevance for others. Within a framework of limited generalization other researchers can relate their findings to comparable contexts or cases. This way one can extend the understanding of similar contexts, cases or phenomena found in other studies. In addition, the findings of vulnerability in a multinational military organization, as in this case, might inspire further investigation in order to make future improvements.

5.9   *Methodological strengths and weaknesses*

The strength of this thesis is that findings should be valuable for social considerations related to aspects of the international response system in complex emergencies, more specific the vulnerability attached to ISAF structures and processes as well as the way the military is employed in civil military coordination.

Further strength lies in my ability to do research in a normally closed environment. My military background helped prevent me from making mistakes and jumping to conclusions that I might have without this background. It also gave me the opportunity to grasp the setting and to understand the language, jargon, and culture. I also was accepted as a colleague and co-worker on the same level as any other ISAF officer, giving me opportunity and access without much hindrance. It also strengthened my

work that in my role as participant observer, I was not outspoken, so that the reality of everyday life and work was very open and could be captured or mirrored in a natural way. It was also a strength that the first fieldwork was followed by a second round with fieldwork in the same environment.

The weakness of this thesis are linked to the problem of the neutral eye, or the struggle between the needed intellectual distance and the emotional "ties of blood" that easily occur in environments as studied here. Goffman (1968) argued that any group, whether they are inmates, primitive, pilots, or patients, develop their own kind of social structure or social life that becomes meaningful, reasonable and normal when you come close enough. In this case, I came close enough. One of the reasons for this closeness and openness was the low profile of the research during my first fieldwork. This was a debated research ethical dilemma (cf. next chapter). This closeness to the field might have resulted in me overlooking aspects that other researchers would have questioned.

If I went native in some situations without being aware of this, I might have lost valuable data and analysis. This problem is difficult. It is impossible to know what could have been seen by another. On the other hand, by attending the field for a second time as an outspoken researcher, my follow-up research might have captured some aspects I could have lost without this follow up round.

What I lost from the chosen methodology was the insights and knowledge about the Afghan counterparts, who were peripheral insofar as the main focus was on ISAF organization. The fact that I belonged to ISAF forces would very likely be a hindrance to getting valuable inside information from the Afghan side.

Except from civil military coordination related to ISAF organization in North Afghanistan, there were many unknown aspects concerning who, where, and what would be the basis for my research. So, I prepared myself with literature surveys both concerning complex emergencies in general and specifically for Afghanistan, as well as researching the history and development of civil military coordination theories and experiences. I talked with officers with experience from "out of area" missions, as well as representatives from the

NGO community, to learn about relevant problems they had experienced in emergency areas. I participated in civil military coordination meetings arranged by military or political actors and used the opportunity given to follow the pre-training of ISAF HQs, even though I did not know at that time how relevant this would be.

On one hand I felt well prepared due to my earlier civil military coordination studies settled in my master thesis, my literature studies and the CIMIC training before mission, representing a theoretical perspective. On the other hand I did not know anything about the specific ongoing activities in the field. I did not know anything about my possibilities to study, and what to study, before I was out in the field. In my field research, I studied ongoing activities containing many parallel processes and projects, without being able to follow any process or project from start to end. This felt like being thrown into a river, in which I struggled to keep my head above water and to observe when the possibilities showed up. From this point of view Marcus' (1998) observation techniques were excellent tools to use.

To be "thrown into the field" like this was a methodological challenge, leading to focus on the projects and processes possible to capture, instead of knowing first what decisions about where and what to study should be, which would have given me a chance to prepare and focus in a more narrow defined or deep way. This led to more information and understanding about output than outcome because I was not able to follow a process or a project to completion and evaluation.

5.10 *Ethical considerations*

Constructing knowledge from activities and situations where opinions of others play a vital part requires ethical consideration. The protection of the integrity and privacy of the informants in general and, in particular, the observation of their activity and behavior in stressful situations is important. It was essential that observations, discussions, and interviews mirror the informants' real choices and intent, which will still be influenced by the perspective of me as the observer. Accordingly, the content of and responsibility for the text rests on me alone. When quotes from interviews are

used to underline a point of view, I have tried to make sure that these are not misused or taken out of their original context.

Fontana and Frey (Denzin and Lincoln (eds.), 2005) claimed that, traditionally, ethical concerns regarding interviews have been concentrated on three aspects; *informed consent*, *the right to privacy,* and *protection from harm.* New trends have highlighted additional issues such as the researcher's degree of involvement in the studied group, such as the controversy over overt or covert fieldwork in participant observation. The arguments for the use of covert methods (Warwick, 1973; Douglas, 1985) are that they mirror the deceitfulness of everyday life, whereas others like Erickson (1967) opposed the study of uninformed respondents (Fontana and Frey, in Denzin and Lincoln (eds.), 2005).

The special situation in my case was that I was able to study an environment that was highly inaccessible from the inside. This was burdensome in that I did not want to destroy the trust given to me. In a case study like this one, those who are studied risk exposure and embarrassment, leaving me a moral obligation to protect the well-being of my informants. It was a difficult to balance not compromising my colleagues and still live up to the requirements and standards for quality research.

My military background gave me advantages and disadvantages. My officer background clearly was a condition for the access to the field, and I easily picked up jargon and distinctive characteristics, which also raised some dilemmas. First, it challenged my ability to be neutral. Additionally, I may have tended to understand and sympathize with the military role in difficult civil military coordination issues, which is a bias dilemma.

Secondly, many fellow officers did not know my research role. The issues of participant observation were not discussed in advance with them. In addition, some key-personnel, including most of personnel during my preparation and training for access to the field did not know about my research role. This was also the case when I went into the field. I was more a participant than an observer, and I did not conduct interviews until very late in my deployment. But, I was always honest and open about this issue when I was questioned about my civil profession.

From my relationships in the field, I learned that it was very difficult to keep a distance from my nearest colleagues, whom I frequently observed in meetings, planning and coordination sessions as well as daily activities in the operation area and in the field. Several ISAF officers were my friends. We worked together all day, we went out in an unknown environment together, we met in the little spare time we had together, and we lived in the same barracks and tents— we trusted each other. Keeping a distance was my main challenge.

In other situations, for example, interviewing and observing personnel that I knew less well made the use of the academic distance and neutral eye easier. I tried to keep the neutral eye in focus when writing down my data. I knew that not compromising my security clearance and trust was important, and that this might cause me some dilemmas when I found particularly interesting material.

I also learned that my informants and the personnel observed were more open, outspoken, and trustful than I had hoped for. I was prepared to meet resistance towards my questions and interviews, but surprisingly, I did not. It was more difficult to get access to the top management. One reason was that my rank was that of a major, and I worked at a lower level of the organization. Accordingly, I did not work with colonels and generals in daily work. This was a participant observer limitation. Another reason was the busy schedules of the top management, though representatives from this level arranged time for interviews and appeared to be open.

Feedback to the research subjects will be necessary and useful. Several interviewees pointed out that they looked forward to the findings of this research in order to use it as basis for future improvements. Others might question the findings. The most important ethical imperative is to do ones very best to tell the truth, to be a moral person, which I tried my best to uphold.

6 Findings

In this chapter, the findings will be presented, beginning with a short description of dilemmas related to the civil military coordination concepts described in chapter 2.4. These concepts represent the bridging tools of ISAF when operating in the meeting points of the "outer" and "inner" context.

The studied meeting points of outer and inner context outlined in this chapter are arranged as follows:

- Civil military coordination in regional and local projects
- ISAF coordination with IOs/NGOs
- ISAF coordination with Afghan Authorities

First, six different projects are briefly described in order to give a picture of the situation and activities in which civil military coordination was carried out and emphasized.

Then, ISAF coordination with IOs such as the UN and the EU on strategic and operational levels is outlined, as well as coordination with NGOs on operational and tactical level. This is followed by a description of ISAF coordination with Afghan authorities on different levels.

Next, a description of ISAF organizational structures and dilemmas linked to this structure is outlined. The main focus is on RCN structures, but important aspects of the superior IJC and the subordinated PRTs are also described, such as, for example, reporting lines and other coordination premises. This provides an understanding of organizational structures and dilemmas that influence civil military coordination within ISAF organization.

Following this, processes are described, beginning with military training, such as preparations before the mission and training in the operational area. The focus on training is motivated by the need to understand how this influences ISAF soldiers understanding of their own role, as well as how this influences planning, decisions, and coordination issues.

The next section describes ISAF soldiers' role performance, with expectations, responsibilities, and diversity in attitude and understanding as the primary focus. This is described in order to explain the challenges of different understanding of roles and performance as displayed in daily work and projects. It also deals with the problems of blurred lines and the importance of cultural awareness in civil military coordination activities.

The following section discusses planning and decision-making in general, and their relationship to projects listed in the beginning of this chapter. The rational-based policies for planning and decision-making processes, typical for military organizations, are outlined. Similarly, aspects that challenge this rationality and are related to the project plans and decision process are discussed.

The categories were chosen with a basis in my empirical data, and also with a view to my research questions.

Figure No. 6-1 below gives an understanding of the structure, processes, and impact relevant for the findings. The figure is constructed to display how the civil military coordination concepts, the Comprehensive Approach (CA), Counterinsurgency (COIN) and NATOs civil military coordination (CIMIC) doctrine influence the training, role performance and preparation of ISAF soldiers before deployment. It also shows how the training influences both the structure and the ongoing processes in the operational area. Further, the organizational structure influences the processes studied, as well as the quality of the civil military coordination activities executed through these processes. The connection between the training and role performance influence on planning and decisions as well as the coordination and implementation activities, as visualized in Figure No. 6-1 below.

Figure 6-1 ISAF Concepts, structures and processes influencing civil military coordination.

6.1 *ISAF Coordination Concepts*

The concepts of CA, COIN and CIMIC are comprehensive (cf. chapter 2.4.). However, they appear in different versions in different ISAF contributing countries. Thus, the definitions often are vague leading to a disparity in focus. Furthermore, the many concepts lead to confusion about which concept to use as well as when and how.[114]

Political management determines the prevailing frameworks and concepts such as the Comprehensive Approach (CA). The paradox is that as crisis management actor, the military is not in a position to consider or evaluate the political situation. Similarly, the politicians who could have done this evaluation have not been on the ground where the action takes place. This requires high focus and precision in information and communication

---

[114] Personal observations

processes in the coordination process between the political and military levels. This civil military coordination, with both vertical and horizontal coordination at all organizational levels, is vital for crisis management but also reveals gaps and grey zones complicating coordination and information processes leading to organizational vulnerability as described by Rasmussen (1997) and Turner and Pigdeon (1997).

The synchronization and coordination of activities is difficult enough in small homogeneous organizations. In multinational environments such as ISAF, internal coordination has additional challenges related to unity of effort and joint understanding that presupposes an efficient coordination. The outlined prevailing civil military coordination concepts, CA, COIN and CIMIC doctrine, highlight the picture of the challenge to reach the unity of effort and joint priorities not only inside ISAF coalition itself, but also towards external coordinating actors.

The many civil military coordination concepts and different versions of each one, as well as vague definitions and the varied focus of each concept, made it difficult to understand how and when to follow a concept, as well as understanding how they were related to each other. Nevertheless, these concepts were the formal frames for civil military coordination in the projects and other civil military coordination activities described in this research, influencing the civil military coordination out in the field, which will be further discussed in chapter 7.

6.2 *Meeting points of "outer" and "inner" contexts*

This chapter describes six of the civil military coordination projects ongoing in RCN area of operation in 2010 and 2011 in which I observed and participated. These projects are presented as a part of the meeting points of the outer and inner contexts.

The planning and coordination of the project work displays the characteristics and degree of success of the civil military coordination, both between ISAF and outer context, and ISAF internal challenges.

Figure No. 6-2 is drawn to visualize the need and efforts of civil military coordination both internally in ISAF and externally toward coordinating actors in strategic, operational, and tactical levels in the daily business and within the project work.

Figure 6-2 Inner and outer coordination.

6.2.1 *Civil Military Coordination Projects*

The main ongoing projects in the RCN area of operation in 2010-2011 that involved RCN in civil military coordination are as follows:

- The implementation of DDP (District Delivery Program) Project, planned to affect Balkh, Faryab, Kunduz and Baglan Province in 2010/2011.
- The development of Hairatan Border Crossing Point (BXP) Project, Balkh Province.
- The construction of the Hairatan to Mazar-e Sharif Railway Project in Balkh Province.
- The sudden need for reintegration of HIG[115] fighters in Pul-e Khomri, Baghlan-e Jadid in Baghlan Province better known as the Reintegration Project.
- The reconstruction of Highway 1 (formerly the Ring Road) project in Faryab Province.

---

[115] HiG fighters: Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

- The follow up on the "Blue Box" projects, affecting three districts in Balkh Province.

The five first mentioned projects were part of national planning led from GIRoA together with actors representing the International Community such as the UN, EU, NGOs or ISAF, in which the RCN participation and tasks were under the control and command of IJC. The "Blue Box" military projects were regionally planned and executed, and formally led by the RCN, as these projects were funded by POERF[116] money, and, later CERP[117] money.

6.2.1.1   The District Delivery Program (DDP) Project

The DDP project represented an umbrella approach to ensure that the Afghan central government reached out to the provinces and districts. The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), several Afghan ministries, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), USAID and ISAF (with IJC as the responsible body) were among the main participants. The IDLG, supported by IJC, had the coordinating leadership. The DDP was, according to project aims, supposed to make visible the local government presence, to be a tool to enable and empower *local* governance to serve the needs of the people. The key sectors were health, education, agriculture, justice, and district government. The purpose was to demonstrate that the Afghan people were better off with the government than being under the control of the insurgents, in line with the COIN strategy. To make this happen, the DDP was rolled out as part of a District Delivery Package; the deployment of which was synchronized with the military activity with consideration to freedom of movement within a district and between the district and the provincial center, in line with the COIN strategy.

---

[116] POERF: ISAFs Post-Operations Emergency Relief Fund (POERF) which provides speedy humanitarian assistance, such as the supply of food, water, and shelter, or the repair of buildings or key infrastructure, immediately following sizable ISAF military operations. With the incoming US Forces in the summer of 2010, funding of Blue Box projects also came from CERP.

[117] CERP: The Commander"s Emergency Response Program (CERP), see CERP Handbook. Retrieved fromhttp://publicintelligence.net/ufouo-commander%e2%80%99s-emergency-response-program-cerp-handbook/ CERP typically funded little projects as Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and infrastructure to win hearts and minds in the operation area.

Factbox 1: District Delivery Program (DDP)
Project Goal: To demonstrate to the Afghan people that their government is strengthened and able to deliver services.
Project Objectives:
Visible local government presence
A government system beginning to function and providing basic services
Provide a foundation for economic stability and sustainable infrastructure
Project Duration: 2 years
Implementing Partner: Various: Donors were primarily the US and the UK, CIDA. Key partners: UNDP's Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Program (ASGP), The Asia Foundation, USAID's capacity development program (DGP).
Project Location: Primarily in South and East with pockets in West and North
Outcome/Output:
Majority of Government Tashkel filled *(Tashkel meaning wished filled positions).**
A district council present and representative
Enabled and empowered local government, with support from Kabul
Needs of people are starting to be met – according to the locals
Workplan (2010): 38 Key Terrain Districts in a 12 months period

Source: The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) 2010. * My own explanation of the word Tashkel is used in this setting.

In the DDP project, RCN was tasked by IJC/ IDLG to come up with district proposals for DDP implementation, and to assess, with a view to security and existing infrastructure, whether the proposed districts for a DDP implementation were adequate. There was a disagreement between the IJC and RCN level leading bodies related to process and priorities in this project, as will be further discussed in this chapter as well as chapter 7.

6.2.1.2   Hairatan to Mazar-e Sharif Railroad Project

Hairatan is a border town in the north of Balkh province, along the Amu Darya River. The river forms the border between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, and the two nations are connected by the Afghanistan-Uzbekistan Friendship Bridge, built by the Soviets. The bridge also has a railway line. This line was

planned to be elongated to the Mazar-e Sharif area, mostly funded by the
Asian Development Bank (ADB). [118]

Factbox 2: Hairatan Railroad Project

Project Goal: In 2010, the flow of goods from Central Asia to Afghanistan
was estimated to increase from 25,000 tons to 40,000 tons per month in the
next few years. To prevent bottlenecks at the border area, and to stimulate the
local economy, the existing Uzbek railway at Hairatan was to be extended
into Afghanistan, firstly to Mazar-e Sharif, the main city of Balkh Province.

Implementing Partners: Asian Development Bank (ADB) as main donor,
Uzbekistan State Railway Company, Uzbekistan Temir Yullari (UTY) as
construction company, Boshtransloyiha as designers, SMEC International[119]
as construction supervision (including security), and an Uzbek consultant firm
Islohotkonstaltservis (IKS). The project was supervised by The Afghan
Ministry of Public Works.
Construction period: January 2010 to November 2010.
Length: 73.47 Km
Starting Point: Friendship-Bridge, Hairatan (east of Termez, Usbekistan).
End Station: Gur-e-Mar (18 km east of Mazar-e Sharif), close to RCN Camp
Marmal and the airport.
Gauge: Single track, 1520 mm gauge non-electrified line, designed for speeds
of 80 km/h.
Cost: $170 million. The grant of the ADB covers 97 percent of the total
project cost of $170 million, with the Afghan Government contributing $5
million. This rail link was the first phase of a larger rail network planned for
the country, including further links to Herat in the west and to Shir Khan
Bandar in the northeast.

The Hairatan-Uzbekistan rail project was the first substantial common carrier
railroad project in Afghanistan. UTY was awarded the $129 million

---

[118] See;
http://pid.adb.org/pid/LoanView.htm?projNo=42533&seqNo=02&typeCd=2&projType=GRN
T See also; ADB August 2009;Project Number: 42533. Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif Railway,
Development Project.
[119] SMEC; Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation is an Australian firm with a global
footprint that provides consultancy services for infrastructure projects, as in this case, security.

construction contract in November 2009. (As an exception to the usual procurement rules, tenders were not invited because it was unlikely that any other company would bid for the project due to security reasons). UTY would also operate and maintain the line, but the contract included the training of Afghan workers so that they were able to take over the operation of the line within a timeframe of 3 years.

Source; Asian Development Bank (ADB).

Map 6-1 The Hairatan to Mazar-e Sharif Railway Track (in red). (Source: ISAF).

ISAF was involved in the Railway project during the planning and construction of the project, with plan officers from IJC and RCN taking care of ISAF interests in meetings with representatives from GIRoA, ANSF, UTY, SMEC, UNAMA and ADB. ISAF had no direct interest in the project as such, but kept in close contact with participating actors to keep informed and discuss security and logistic issues that might influence ISAF activity. Besides, the Swedish PRT in Mazar-e Sharif (PRT MeS) who was ISAF's

191

leading end of the Force and ISAF *battle space owners*[120] also followed the
project closely with their Mobile Operation Teams (MOTs) in order to
monitor the state of security and development. Some information and
planning meetings were held in RCN, some in UTY localities at Hairatan.

6.2.1.3   Hairatan Border- Crossing Point (BXP) Project

<u>**Factbox 3:**</u> **Hairatan Border-Crossing Point (BXP)**

Project Goal: GIRoA focused on securing the borders and developing the
necessary infrastructure and human capital to maximize customs revenue.
GIRoA in close cooperation with the international community began a pilot
project to operationalize the Border Management Model at the Hairatan
border crossing point in Balkh Province. The Ministry of Finance and the
Ministry of Interior signed a Border Management Model in June 2011.

Work plan: Guidelines and Standard Operation Procedures were outlined to
regulate how Customs and Afghan Border Police (ANP) should cooperate.
The idea was to improve border procedures at the border crossing point, to
increase cooperation between various Afghan agencies as well as to promote
efficiencies in border security, improving narcotic/contraband interdiction,
increasing revenue, and facilitating international trade.

Implementing Partners: Afghan Customs, Afghan National Border Police
(ANBP), the Border Management Task Force (BMTF), ISAF, USAID.

BMTF was a civilian military mixed force, consisting of experts and advisors
working together with the Afghan National Border Police (ANBP) leadership
and ISAF to develop a training plan focused on customs-specific training.
This training included contraband identification, seizure, and Afghan customs
law, along with vehicle, rail and container searching. The training was the
first of its kind in Afghanistan, and the training module set the standard for
other border crossings across the nation.

---

[120] Battle Space Owner: The battle space is the environment, factors, and conditions that
must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the
mission (achieve military goals). This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy
and friendly forces in a defined area. As battle space owner, this area is your responsibility.
(US Department of Defense).

ISAF was also involved in the construction site, assisting the buildup of the necessary infrastructure for the Border Cross Point, as well as the construction of its own operational bases, security, and logistics.

Source; ISAF/RCN documents and US department of Defense.[121]

Map 6-2 Amu Darya River, the Friendship Bridge, and Hairatan Border Cross Area.

The RCN was involved in the Hairatan Border Cross Point (BXP) project on the planning side. In addition to security issues such as assessments of the risks related to the oil/gas storage in the area, preparedness, and crisis management coordination, RCN and PRT MeS together with ANSF and representatives from local authorities planned location and operation of a new Border Crossing Center. After the US force came to the RCN area of operation in the summer of 2010, the US Forces were stationed at the Hairatan border area from 1 August 2010, with the 1/10th Mountain Unit, building a forward operating base (FOB) in the area. This FOB was planned to accommodate specialist supporting personnel, as well as to support ANSF to maintain the security in the area. Among other tasks, these forces, in

---

[121] US department of Defense; Report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan, 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_27_12.pdf

conjunction with the Border Management Task Force (BMTF), trained members of Afghan National Border Police (ANBP).

6.2.1.4   The Highway 1 Project

Factbox 4: Highway 1 (former Ring Road)

Background: Highway 1 forms the country's ring road, connecting Afghanistan's major population centers. With more than 13 million Afghans living within 50 kilometers of the ring road, the corridor is a vital link for promoting economic activity and providing access to basics such as health care and education. Originally paved in the 1960s by US foreign aid grants and the Soviets, its surface and several bridges had suffered severely from decades of neglect and lengthy wars. In the worst sections, speeds were limited to 10 kilometers per hour. Countless land mines hidden at the road edges made conditions even more hazardous and significantly prolonged travel times. As a result, reconstruction of this road became a key element of Afghanistan's economic renewal and improvements in the quality of life. The Highway 1 Project (also called the Ring Road Project) was a high priority of the Karzai government.

Location: Highway 1 is a 2,200 kilometer nationwide highway network around Afghanistan, connecting Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar, Farah, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif. It has extensions that also connect Jalalabad, Delaram, Islam Qala, and other cities.

Funding: It is being refurbished with funds provided by the international community, mostly by the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Construction: Mostly by Turkish and local companies, but India, Pakistan, and Iran also contributed to some parts of the road network. ISAF built parts of the Highway up to modern standards.

Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB), and ISAF.

The RCN was engaged in the missing link of the Ring Road/Highway 1 in Northwest Afghanistan, the 233 km distance from Qaisar in Faryab province (RCN area of operation) to Laman in Badghis province (RCW area of

operation). It was funded by ADB with a grant of $340 million. The project completion was set to 2016. More specifically, RCN's contribution in this project together with IJC, ANSF and the Norwegian PRT MAI was to plan and implement the reconstruction of the road distance between Qaisar and Ghormach in Faryab Province (see map No. 6-3 below).

The RCN conducted several planning meetings to ensure and maintain the pressure on the construction work in its own area of responsibility. Meetings with Regional Command West (RCW), ANSF, and PRT MEI as ISAF battle space owners, as well as local authorities and ADB were held. The problem was to create enough security in the area to get construction companies to do the work. Maintenance of the already built road mainly fell on the military due to the bad security situation.

The Highway 1 Project had a high priority and prestige from the Karzai government. GIRoA through IJC, pushed RCN and PRT MEI in the planning and follow up of the project.

Map 6-3 Highway 1 (Ring Road), with the missing section (in red).

(Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB).

6.2.1.5   *The Reintegration Project*

Factbox 5: Reintegration

APRP: The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) provided for both reintegration (where fighters leave the fight and peacefully rejoin their communities) and reconciliation (where entire insurgent groups reach a settlement with GIRoA that ends hostilities). Since late 2010, GIRoA, supported by the international community, tried to reintegrate insurgents under APRP.

APRP Goal: The APRP aimed to encourage insurgents to leave the battlefield and reintegrate back into their communities to support their families and contribute to the development of a stable Afghanistan. Further, to

reintegrate insurgents in return for security, jobs, and protection and in their communities—provided they renounce violence, respect Afghan law, and cut ties with terrorists/insurgents.

APRP Process: The APRP brings reintegration through three phases:
• Social Outreach, Confidence Building, and Negotiation.
• Demobilization.
• Consolidation of Peace.

APRP Funding: By the end of 2010, the APRP was formally launched by GIRoA and backed by more than $200 million pledged by donor nations to a reintegration trust fund called Reintegration Financing Mechanism (RFM). The bulk of the funds came from Japan ($52.0 M) and the United States ($50.0 M).

Partners: The program was led by the High Peace Council (HPC) and was created in September 2010, and implemented by a Joint Secretariat in which ISAF and UNAMA participated with GIRoA.

F-RIC: ISAF established the so-called Force Reintegration cell: FRIC. The Mission of FRIC was to optimize ISAF support for the GIRoA-led Peace and Reintegration Program in order to accelerate the move to conflict resolution.

Source: NATO, ISAF.[122]

The FRIC was located under IJC, which had the overall command of the RCs and PRTs reintegration involvement or activities. In RCN's area of responsibility, during some fighting between the Taliban and HiG fighters[123] on the west side of Baghlan river, Baghlan- e Jadid district (see Map No 6-4

---

[122] See also ISAF Afghan Reintegration Guide 22 Nov 2010. Retrieved from http://publicintelligence.net/isaf-afghan-insurgent-reintegration-guide-and-soldier-information-cards/

[123] HiG fighters: Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, is an insurgent group active in Afghanistan. Hizb-i-Islami (HIG) aims to create a strict Islamic regime in Afghanistan. Since the Soviet-Afghan conflict, Hekmatyar had a close relationship with Osama bin Laden. After the end of the war, the HIG founder managed several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan; he also has offered consistent support and allegiance to the al-Qaeda organization. See http://vkb.isvg.org/Wiki/Groups/Hizb_I-Islami

below) in early March 2010, the Taliban took control of the area. Sixty-eight insurgents (HiG) surrendered to the ANP in Pul-e Khomri. The insurgents stated that they wanted to reintegrate and the event was treated as a reintegration. This happened before the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) was active or known throughout the civilian and military system (e.g. the reintegration guidance for the PRTs did not come until October 2011). The 68 HIG fighters that surrendered in Pul-e Khomri became a touchstone on how to handle such an event. Neither the Hungarian PRT PEK who was ISAF battle space owner or the RCN, as the upper command, knew how to deal with such a situation, and had no advance or available plans to handle it. The situation led to hectic cooperation and coordination between the ISAF organizational levels; PRTs, RCN, and IJC, as well as toward ISAF coordinating actors as UNAMA, local authorities, and the local population.

Map 6-4 Pul-e Khomri, the capital city of Baghlan Province. (Source: WFP).

6.2.1.6 The "Blue Box" Projects

Fact box 6: Blue Box Projects

Blue Box area: The Tactical Operation Area (TOA), called the "Blue Box" area, covered the area around Camp Marmal, where the RCN and its airport was located. It was 25 kilometers-wide security zone, called the Blue Box, surrounding the airport and the RCN Camp, designed to ensure safe flight operations. The area was enlarged in 2011, and covered three districts in Balkh Province: Marmul, Mazar-e Sharif, and Nahr-e Shahi.

This area became RCN's responsibility, even though it was located in the area where the Swedish PRT MeS was the ISAF battle space owner. The area was frequently patrolled, both by military (RCN or PRT units) and civilian actors, which with different missions and funding, were conducting projects in the villages. The military projects in these villages were the responsibility of the engineers in the RCN CIMIC Branch, funded by Post-Operations Emergency Relief Fund (POERF) money. The projects were mostly Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), done to win hearts and minds, as part of a broader security strategy. This said, other military units also conducted projects in the area, which increased by the incoming US forces into RCN in the summer of 2010, with new funding through Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP). Additionally, civilian units also conducted projects in this area. Coordination was a great challenge.

The Blue Box area, which was frequently visited by different ISAF forces units, Police units, Private Security Companies, NGOs and other civilian actors, had no formal coordinating body. This challenge was met by holding regular coordinating meetings held at the RCN, conducted by the CJ-9, CIMIC Branch. Still, this coordination could only cover the military coordination and actors relevant for civil-military coordination. Many actors and activities were still not reached.

The Blue Box projects showed the importance of coordination and the importance of cultural awareness, in order to avoid inner tribal dynamics or land disputes, which often got fueled with projects that were perceived as unjust or favorable to some, and not others, for no obvious reason. There was no overview of who did what or how projects were done.

6.2.1.7   Other projects in the area

Outside the scope of projects involving RCN CIMIC, several other projects were ongoing in the area of operation that were national, international, or NGO-funded. The CIMIC Branch in RCN made efforts to keep informed and updated on all projects in the area, trying to get an overall view. This did not succeed, but the map below shows some of the main projects going on in the area of operation at the time. Some actors, such as NGOs, oversaw the projects they were participating in themselves; USAID had the overview of their projects; GTZ of their projects, etc. Further, the coordination with the NGOs went primarily through the PRTs, who could not always list the projects ongoing in their area of responsibility. A database called CIDNE[124] was established to keep an overview of the projects in which military actors where involved. CIDNE projects were mostly conducted by CERP funding; accordingly, most US projects were registered here since CERP was US funded. Nevertheless, a complete overview was not possible to provide either civilian or military actors. To give a brief idea of ongoing projects, Map No. 6-5 shows some of the major projects in RCN area in 2010.

---

[124] CIDNE; A US Combined Information Data Network Exchange, Retrieved from
http://www.issinc.com/programs/cidne.html

MAJOR PROJECTS IN RC N AOO
(as of March 2010)

Ongoing
Planned

EQUIP (construction of rural schools)
(All RC N AOO)
appr. Multi Mio $
Ongoing   US, NOR, GER, SWE

Basic Education Programme Afghanistan
(Feyzabad,, Kunduz, Takhar, Balkh, Sar-i-Pul)
appr. 25 Mio $ Ongoing   GER

Urban Water Supply (drinking water)
(Feyzabad, Kunduz, Emam Saheb, Balkh City)
appr. 25 Mio $ Ongoing   GER

BPHS/EPHS/ SHARP
(Health service)
(All RC N AOO)
appr. Multi Mio $
Ongoing
EC, USAID, WB

IDEA NEW (Alternative Development
Programme) (All Afghanistan)
appr. 150 Mio $ (~8.5 Mio $ RC N in
2010) Ongoing till 2014
USAID

Airport MAZAR-E SHARIF
appr. 70 Mio €
2009 - 2011

KHANABAD I Powerstation
appr. 3,5 Mio €
2008 - 2011

DDP PEK and KDZ
Sept./Oct. 2010

Airport FEYZABAD
appr. 3,8 Mio €
Will end on 2010

**Rural Development
in GHOWRMACH**
appr. 4 Mio €
Ongoing

**Gas fields
exploration
Jowzjan,**
2011

BALKH Medical Hospital
appr. 12 Mio €
2009 – Mar 2011

**CHAHAR DARREH Bridge &
Road construction**
appr. 7 Mio €, started end 2009

FEYZABAD Hospital
appr. 6 Mio €
2009 -2013

**Ring Road
GHOWRMACH**
appr. 4 Mio €
Start end 2010

**Road Construction
Keshem - Feyzabad**
appr. 118 Mio US$
Will end 2010   USAID

**Kunduz River Basin
Project**
(Baghlan, Kunduz,
Taloqan)
appr. 65 Mio €
2004-2014 EC

**NSP - Rural
Development
program**
(Ghorwmach,
Kuhestan)
appr. 4 Mio €
Will start early
2010

Rural Development
appr. 1 Mio €
2006-2009

Reactivation Sugar Factory
appr. 2 Mio €
Ongoing since 2004

North East power System
(Balkh,Samangan,Baghlan (substations in Mazar,
Aybak, Pul-i-Khumri)   appr. 73 Mio $
Nearly completed & in use ADB, WB, US, GER, India

Railroad construction
(Heiratan to Mazar)
appr. 170 Mio $
Started in early 2010   ADB

**Road Construction
Bamjan – Dushi**
appr. 80 Mio US$
2009-2012   USAID

**Water Resources Development
Investment Program**
(Balkh, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Takhar)
appr. 65 Mio €   Ongoing   ADB

**GTZ development Oriented Emergency &
Transitional Assistance**
(Balkh, Samangan, Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan)
appr. 20 Mio $ Ongoing   GER

GTZ NaWi (strengthening the private sector)
(Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, Balkh)
appr. 40 Mio $ Ongoing   GER

Regional Development in the NE
appr. 17 Mio €   Ongoing

Sustainable Economic Development
appr. 4,5 Mio €   Ongoing

Reconstruction Infrastructure in the N
appr. 20 Mio €   Ongoing

Map 6-5 Overview of projects in RCN area of operation in 2010. (Source: RCN).

6.2.2 *ISAF Coordination with IOs and NGOs*

The coordination between ISAF and International Organizations (IOs) like the UN and EU/ EUPOL had its challenges strategically as wells as in projects and daily work. As part of the Comprehensive Approach (CA) strategy, at the strategic level, NATO placed a Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) alongside the Military Commander for the first time ever, to work on political issues in order to meet the coordination premises of the CA strategy. The NATO SCR was appointed by the NATO Secretary General on ad hoc basis and he carried forward the Alliance's political-military objectives in Afghanistan. He liaised with the Afghan government, civil society, representatives of the international community, and neighboring countries (ISAF sources, 2011).

Some politicians and influencers opposed this and argued that ISAF put up institutions redundant to the EU or UN, as a result of the CA strategy, considering it interference in the civilian sphere, which created a tension among the biggest international organizations (Wendling, 2010b). Others argued that any ISAF activities in Afghanistan outside the scope of pure military actions were of a supportive character in the absence of civilian capability (ISAF Commander, General McChrystal, 2010). Some argued that the slow pace of improvement in civil military coordination in Afghanistan was due to lack of strategic understanding between the major capitals and headquarters at the UN, EU, and NATO/ISAF (Rynning, 2011). The lack of, or problematic, coordination between, the strong international actors and the GIRoA led to a situation such that ISAF often found itself in the lead for issues and projects normally carried out by civilian actors. This led to tension between the UN and ISAF. The UN criticized ISAF for moving too far into the civilian sphere and controlling the resources without having the necessary contextual understanding (Eide, 2010).

This also led to strained relations between ISAF and the humanitarian NGOs. The main purpose of NGOs doing aid was to alleviate the humanitarian symptoms, not the political aspects of complex emergencies, by meeting the most basic needs such as water, food, shelter and sanitation. Many NGOs faced the challenges of obtaining mission security in the increasingly

politicized and militarized environment, which further weakened their security (Friis, 2012). Accordingly, these organizations were resistant to coordination with military actors, referring to the codes of conduct in aid. [125]

ISAF and other International organizations all had interpretations of the CA and Counterinsurgency (COIN). The interpretation was influenced by the different backgrounds, knowledge, training, culture, or ethical principles. This increased the challenges in the operation area. For example, if a sudden crisis happened (such as natural disasters, war activities/ battles or alteration in power constellations), coordination issues were differently understood and emphasized. What was difficult was to agree on was the lines of authority, who did what, and, especially, what were the boundaries for military in the civilian dimension. The UN, for example, criticized ISAF PRTs for operating too far into the civilian sphere, pressuring out capable civilian IOs and NGOs (Eide, 2010).

When sudden humanitarian needs or sudden natural disasters turned up, coordination between civilian and military actors were needed. Even though the civil military coordination, in general, was poor, in a crisis in the crisis, such as a sudden earthquake or flood, better coordination was forced upon the actors. They functioned as long as it was civilian-led and ISAF was in the support role. For example ISAF was asked by the UN to blow up a big loose mountain rock hanging over a little village and the project was managed with smooth coordination.[126]

The problem occurred when militaries *planned* their activities in development and governance issues as a natural part of their "portfolio." The resistance from NGO-coordinating actors against ISAF taking increasingly greater part in civilian issues was known as the blurred line debate, which started during the Balkan wars and got fueled by the Iraqi and Afghanistan wars. But also

---

[125]Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster relief; Retrieved fromhttp://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p1067.htm

[126] UN OCHA asked RCN in March 2010 to demolish a dangerous block hanging from a mountain over Pasachunda village in Samangan province, which they feared would destroy the village. People were evacuated from their homes and settled in a UN tent camp. RCN conducted four rock/village assessments, done by RCN CIMIC and engineer officers, together with UN military advisor. The rock was finally demolished by RCN engineers in September 2010, and the village people could return to their homes.

internal resistance was rising among ISAF soldiers, who pointed out that they were not NGO workers. An RCN officer called the military engagement in the civilian sphere a paradox: *"If we are supposed to do governance and development work, then there is no need for NGOs, either we should go for this or keep completely out of these things. NATO will break their back trying to cope with everything. When we are asked to contribute to long term planning on governance and development. . . what can we do? We do not have enough knowledge about this . . . This is a paradox. "*[127]

6.2.2.1   Coordination with United Nations (UN)

The political framework for cooperation between Afghanistan and the international community, representing the international response system, is laid down in "The Afghanistan Compact," launched at the London Conference, January 2006.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is a political mission established in 2002 by the UN Security Council at the request of GIRoA. In March 2012, the UN Security Council adopted the Resolution 2041, renewing UNAMAs mandate. This reaffirms that UNAMA would continue to play a role in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan. Cooperation is underlined as a key factor. From Resolution 2041, 6.b: *". . . continue the cooperation with ISAF and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative at all levels and throughout the country in support of the ongoing transition to full Afghan leadership and ownership agreed to at the Kabul and London Conferences and the Lisbon Summit, in a sustainable manner to ensure the protection and promotion of the rights of all Afghans, in accordance with their existing mandates, in order to optimize civil-military coordination, ...including through engagement with provincial reconstruction teams and engagement with non-governmental organizations… "*

Both UNAMA (Resolution 2041) and EU followed and underlined the CA strategy (Gross, 2008). But even if the UN-NATO declaration was signed in September 2008, nations such as China and Russia (permanent members of

---

[127] Interview with officer in RCN Fusion Centre, 28.02.2011.

the UN Security Council) looked unfavorably on any move to bring the UN closer to ISAF and the NATO Alliance. This resulted in missing institutional cooperation and coordination. The missing institutional cooperation and coordination led to continuing ad-hoc exchanges in the area of operation (Wendling, 2010b).

On the RCN level, RCN-UN coordination was not institutionalized. The UN military advisor and representatives from the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) had coordination and liaison meetings with the RCN CIMIC Branch, more or less regularly, and especially when the security situation became worrying. RCN, furthermore, coordinated with the UN representatives in some project meetings, such as the Hairatan BXP Project or the Reintegration Project in Baghlan Province.

In general, the RCN CIMIC branch conducted meetings with UNDSS every second week to discuss security in addition to all other relevant issues dependent of the current situation. In these meetings, OCHA, the UN military advisor, the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) or regional GTZ representatives also joined occasionally, as well as representatives from engineering and security companies, such as SMEC and project donors such as ADB (Asian Development Bank). The meetings were very security-focused and negotiations about information characterized the meetings.

When there were movement restrictions and difficult security situations, civilian actors seemed more eager to coordinate with the military. As an RCN officer put it; *"when they* (meaning UN/NGOs) *are afraid they want to cooperate, 'behind the scenes' or openly. . . .When they are not afraid, they are not interested in cooperation."*[128]

To visualize important meeting points of the outer and inner context, the main external coordination bodies seen from a RCN CIMIC Branch perspective is drawn in Figure No. 6-3 below.

---

[128] Interview with RCN officer 27.06.2010.

Figure 6-3 RCN CIMIC External Coordination. (See abbreviation list for explanations).

6.2.2.2   Coordination with the European Union (EU)

The European Union (EU) is one of Afghanistan's largest donors. The EU Country Strategy Paper for Afghanistan 2007-2013 was drafted based on the need for political and economic development. [129] In Afghanistan, the EU conducted the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) in parallel with NATO's intervention, without any institutional coordination, even though the EUPOL mandate states that close coordination will be ensured (Wendling, 2010b). This said, coordination and cooperation between EUPOL and the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) were ongoing, as the EUPOL mandate stated:

The EU police mission will be set in the wider context of the international community's effort to support the Government of Afghanistan in taking responsibility for strengthening the rule of law, and in particular, in improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity. Close coordination between the EU police mission and other international actors involved in security assistance, including the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), as well as those providing support to police and rule of law reform in Afghanistan, will be ensured.

---

[129] See http://eeas.europa.eu/sp/index_en.htm

In the RCN, the coordination with EUPOL was mostly linked to the Blue Box Projects. The RCN CIMIC Branch tried to coordinate projects in the Blue Box Project area where EUPOL built and supported local police stations and check points. Further the RCN coordinated at the information exchange level with the German Police Project Team (GPPT) stationed in RCN Camp Marmal.

EUPOL also had representatives in some of the PRTs; here, the coordination also mostly was on an information exchange level.

In the Blue Box, the RCN CIMIC had only oversight of the projects they had the responsibility for, such as the ISAF led QIPs that were a part of the COIN strategy. The civil side of the Blue Box Projects (such as the police) normally went through GIRoA to work in this region. This might have been an issue for the RCN SCR to keep oversight, but it was still challenging. According to an IJC stability officer, GIRoA had no oversight itself. Besides, there were many interests and actors hampering the motivation for coordination. As one TCT officer put it; *"The problem with CIMIC here in RCN is that the CIMIC activities are not coordinated, we have the US, the Croatians, the Germans and the Police, some private guys, and different funding systems for the Blue Box area. Everyone wants to do some projects in the same city. Ali Chopan is the biggest village in the Blue Box, everyone wants to do something here and not in all the other little villages.* "[130]

A total overview of projects in the Blue Box was not possible to calculate, without any real overall control of projects or coordination of activities in the area.[131] EUPOL was represented in some RCN information exchange meetings, but the coordination was informal.

6.2.2.3   Coordination with NGOs

Civil military coordination between ISAF and NGOs in the RCN area of operation was not institutionalized either. This was very difficult due to the fact that some NGOs considered the CA and COIN concepts as hampering useful or rational civil- military coordination. They claimed that COIN and

---

[130] This was due to the fact that local authorities in Ali Chopan area were viewed as easy to cooperate with, which biased the village support, fueling local conflicts. Interview with TCT officer, 21.02. 2011.
[131] Author's observations and field conversations.

CA's use of political, military and development instruments to stabilize and improve the conditions in the area militarized and politicized their working space, which threatened the humanitarian space and principles, which, in turn, reduced their security. (Cf. Duffield, 2001; DeRoos, 2003; Sommerfeldt, 2005; Cornish, 2007). Accordingly, many NGOs were skeptical or resistant to civil military coordination, which was expressed through the Afghanistan NGO security office (ANSO).[132]

Nevertheless, some steps to define criteria for coordination were taken, for example, the establishment of RCN CIMIC-conducted meetings with ANSO and the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), as well as some international organizations in the RCN area with significant civil-military coordination.[133]

Civil military coordination meetings were difficult to convene; they were often cancelled or postponed, often because of sudden activities in the field changing the priorities. When held, besides OCHA being the UN civil military coordination body, the local Afghan organizations seemed more interested in regular contact with the military than the international NGOs did. ACBAR, for example, even suggested that they could establish their own local liaison officer (LNO) in RCN Camp Marmal, since they had a provincial office in Mazar-e Sharif.

When a new NGO was established in the area, they often wanted to have security information from ISAF. These meetings were the most focused on information exchange or inputs to discussions about evacuation plans and available resources from ISAF. NGOs also had an interest in the Female

---

[132] ANSO: Afghanistan NGO Security Office, which often met with military to prevent the direct contact between the NGOs and the Military. ANSO also provided the NGOs with security, and is supported by the European Commission, the German Welt Hunger Hilfe and the Norwegian Department of Foreign Affairs.
[133] For example, Human Rights Watch (HRW), UN organizations (OCHA, UNDSS and UNICEF), Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the International Red Cross. Relevant coordinating NGOs were USAID, GTZ, SIDA, WHH (Welt Hunger Hilfe), Swedish committee for Afghanistan (SCA), Finish Lutheran overseas Mission (FLOM), Swedish Pentecostal churches (PMU), Norwegian Refugee Council and Hungarian church aid.

Engagement Teams (FETs)[134] that were operative in Balkh province in 2010/11. How relevant was this actor in the field? The RCN intelligence branch informed NGOs about FETs attending female Shuras. Information from these female Shura meetings was interesting and important information for both the NGOs and military units to bring about a better joint understanding of the civilian picture.

In bigger coordination meetings, between the RCN, PRTs and OCHA, UNICEF, ANSO and ACBAR, issues discussed included, for example, the Pakistani flood (2010), its impact on the Afghan society, and how to handle upcoming requests for support from the local authorities without undermining the local abilities and structures. Such meetings also brought up principal discussions concerning how far the military role and responsibility should go. Or they were designed to solve practical issues such as UNICEF's trouble purifying water after ISAF stopped the distribution of chlorine due to rumors about insurgents using the chlorine to build homemade explosives.

COIN strategy and discussions on how and when the NGOs were supposed to start development in secured areas were discussed. NGOs had heard about COIN and wanted to understand the content, and what it would actually mean for their work in areas close to military activity. The civil military coordination in the HOLD- and BUILD-phase of the COIN strategy was focused on, for example, in a meeting with Welt Hunger Hilfe (WHH) and GTZ in August 2010. Most NGOs refused to be regarded as actors in military COIN planning and activity; others were more open and curious.

The Red Cross (ICRC) did not attend joint regular meetings, but they asked for meetings with the RCN CIMIC branch on their own. They also held open meetings inside RCN Camp Marmal to create a better dialog and gain a better understanding of the Red Cross role and activities. They wanted to hold an

---

[134] FETs are made up of female soldiers and have been developed to enable the military to better engage with communities in Afghanistan. In some provinces many Afghan women are rarely seen by or communicate with people outside their immediate family, particularly if they are male. Therefore, the average male ISAF soldier is unable to freely communicate with nearly 50 percent of the adult population in some areas. The FETs, by virtue of being exclusively female had the potential to bridge this divide. See: http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/newsroom/534-female-engagement-teams-prepare-for-deployment-to-afghanistan.html or http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/04/13/gailforce-afghanistan-update-%E2%80%93-female-engagement-teams-and-afghan/ .

information exchange seminar in Camp Marmal on this issue, being very concerned about the deteriorated security situation, but they were turned down by the RCN leadership due to other priorities. According to the LNOs in the CIMIC branch, this was a blow to the civil military coordination, as meetings with the Red Cross could have given needed information about the civilian picture in the field. Due to the absence of freedom of movement, ICRC was the only NGO that had good relations with the insurgents, and were left in peace when driving through insurgent strong hold areas at the time.[135]

ISAF also coordinated with Private Security Companies (PSC). The widespread availability of small arms and light weapons as well as local fighters and Private Security Company (PSC) were increasing. Paramilitary and mercenaries entering the conflict made the picture more complex. To distinguish between military and civilian actors became more difficult, which challenged both military and civilian actors as to how to relate to the Geneva Conventions, as discussed in Bellamy et al., (2004).

In the RCN areas of operation, the PSC were used both to secure UN organizations and estates as well as national business organizations and formal local authorities representing the GIRoA. They also protected key infrastructure and projects such as the construction of the railway from Hairatan to Mazar-e Sharif, the Highway 1/Ring Road Project, or the Hairatan BXP Project. The RCN CIMIC branch had regular meetings with PSCs and representatives of this branch, in order to exchange information and get to know each other to ensure a better overall security, especially in relation to the project works.

The PRTs were the main military actor coordinating with the NGOs, which also had some challenges. In meetings, the NGOs complained about military actors showing less understanding of the civilian dimension and operating with unrealistic time perspectives. The frustration was mutual. One PRT PEK officer commented: *"We are the ones that see what the population really need, we are out there every week; NGOs are sitting behind their desks. They do not know the field. We get an overload of phones and visits from the local population with needs for everything; they ask us for help all the time. The*

---

[135] According to ICRC information given in meeting with ICRC representative and CIMIC branch, 26.02.2011.

NGOs cannot do anything because it is too dangerous for them to be out there. We cannot ask them for help; we have to do these things on our own."[136]

It was not possible to conduct regular meeting or coordination with most NGOs, except from PSC, and some NGOs following the CA and COIN strategy, like USAID and GTZ. These NGOs were more development-driven than pure humanitarian.

Coordination with USAID and GTZ

USAID and GTZ were in a special situation in North Afghanistan, not only being based in the RCN Camp Marmal, but they also had free access to the military facilities and were regular participants in the RCN management, the RCN Fusion Center, and the RCN CIMIC meetings. Above all, they were regular participants and influencers in the so-called "deep dives" led by the RCN units C-J5 (planning) and C-J9 (CIMIC). The deep dives were weekly meetings and their main task was to paint the civil situation picture for the RCN Commander. These assessments were vital fundaments for the decision-making process of the RCN Commander.

Coordination in the project planning was not that smooth. In project planning meetings of the Hairatan BXP or the Highway 1 project, representatives from USAID/GTZ seldom attended. When questioning this, different opinions emerged. Representatives from USAID said they were not invited; the CJ-5 planning officers said the civilians were not interested in the military planning meetings. Staff from USAID or GTZ complained about the missing understanding of the civil dimension among military personnel. On the other hand, a CIMIC officer said; "*without our gathering of information and feeding the civilian staff with this, they would not have known anything about the picture out there. . . .Our TCTs are working like NGO fact finders,*" referring to the fact that the freedom of movement for civilian actors was limited due to the lack of security.[137]

---

[136] Interview with PRT PEK officer, 22.02.2011.
[137] According to interview with CIMIC officer, 15.08.2010.

Still, both military and civilian actors were conducting key leader engagements (KLE)[138] and meetings with district and provincial authorities as well as Elders and Shuras to gather information and understanding of the civilian dimension and to contribute to building an operational situational picture. In the RCN, the understanding of the situation was regularly discussed with the UN and IO/NGO representatives in information exchange meetings, so one could revise and update each other's understanding. Some provinces and districts were assumed to be more important than others, due to population density, logistics, important infrastructure, or insurgency support. These factors decided whether the area (from an ISAF point of view) was considered as "*key terrain,*" and therefore, would be more in focus than other areas.

6.2.3 *ISAF coordination with Afghan Authorities (GIRoA)*

An important coordinating body for ISAF was the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), being the organization ISAF was supposed to support for security, stability development, governance, and reconstruction matters (ISAF Mandate 2010). Figure No. 6-4 below gives a picture of the levels of coordination between the Afghan authorities and ISAF. The thickest arrows represent the main formal coordination, the thinner black arrow shows that there is also a second line to support the main one that goes both to the level above and the level beneath.[139]

---

[138] Key Leader Engagement (KLE): KLE is an important aspect of civil military coordination, with no well recognized definition. KLE is a way to influence a population by ways of important local formal or informal leaders. Described by NATO to soldiers as;
'[...]commanders and leaders at all levels are encouraged to conduct "engagements" with decision makers at their respective level (strategic, operational, tactical) and create an influence that will be beneficial for the NATO goals and objectives.' (NATO Bi-SC (2009), Information Operations Reference Book, p. 55). NATO specified KLE activities to include: bilateral talks, speeches, featured interviews and conferences.

[139] That the thin arrows only go in one direction is based upon my field experience with ISAF as the initiator. I had no experience with informal lines from GIRoA to ISAF, which probably happened, *if* it happened, mostly at a strategic level.

Figure 6-4 Coordination and cooperation between ISAF and Afghan authorities. . *140*

As shown in Figure No. 6-4, ISAF HQ has the overall strategic responsibility for keeping in contact with the contributing nations and international community as well as liaison with the GIRoA ministries and ministers, working "up and out" at the political level. At the next level, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) oversaw the training and the equipping of Afghan forces, mainly working toward steering and managing the OMLT efforts to mentor, support, and educate the ANSF, in preparation for the upcoming transition. This presupposed official lines to GIRoA ministries and directorates involved.

ISAF Joint Command (IJC), responsible for operations throughout Afghanistan, and the upper command of the Regional Commands (RCs), steered and followed up on the actions regarding security, governance, and development in which the RCs were involved. Accordingly, they had lines to the actual GIRoA ministries, directorates and province authorities.

---

[140] ANSF, which had connections to all these blocks, especially NMT-A and OMLT, is left out of the figure. So are the contributing nation's "difficult to follow" national lines towards ISAF or GIRoA.

On the RC level, the operations in the area of responsibility was planned and directed along with the follow up and information gathering to and from the PRTs regarding of security, governance, and development actions. Big projects were directed from this level, which involved a close coordination and contact with the provincial and district level of local authorities. In projects such as the District Delivery Program (DDP), The Hairatan BXP, and the Reintegration Project, this was vital.

In the RCN, there were also a line all the way down to the Shuras and Elders (red arrow in Figure 6-4 above), representing village talks and assessments, mostly performed by the TCTs. This was questioned by the RCN officers, as it was regarded as a tactical level that should be taken care of by the PRTs and their Mobile Observation Teams (MOTs). Nevertheless, several RCN units[141] conducted meetings with village people and their local formal or informal leaders, in the effort to build a situational picture of the current situation, for example, in Baghlan province, even though the PRT PEK were the battle space owners. Moreover, these assessments often were not coordinated.

On the operational level, the RCN coordinated with the local authorities through the regional projects, the infrastructure projects at the Hairatan area, the Highway 1 project, the DDP project and the Reintegration Project. A coordination problem in the Hairatan BXP and Highway 1 projects was that the RCN often did thorough planning and decisions before local authorities were properly involved. This minimized the influence of local authority. Moreover, when they were involved, they were not treated as an equal. For example, they did not get the papers beforehand to prepare themselves, and were seldom listened to when they came up with proposals, or the meetings were held in the Afghan prayer time (cf. elaboration in 6.5.).

In the Reintegration Project, local authorities in Pul-e Khumri were of a different opinion than ISAF. Local authorities were against reintegration as such, which also was reported to be the opinion of the local population. With so little local interest, it was difficult to coordinate and get a response from local authorities, which left ISAF (and the UN) as the acting bodies. But, in

---

[141] RCN units including intelligence (CJ-2), the tactical CIMIC teams (TCT), Civil Affairs teams (CAT), the Human Terrain Teams (HTT) or COIN Assistance and Advisory Team (CAAT).

case of the Uzbek /Afghan driven Hairatan Railway Project, local ownership the frequent coordination with the RCN was marked by a good atmosphere and mutual trust. This might have been related to the need for security along the railway line. Even though this officially was an ANSF responsibility (supported by ISAF), ISAF with its dominant resources played a vital role.

On a tactical level, as shown in Figure No. 6-4 above, we find the PRTs and the OMLTs. The PRTs were the "boots on the ground" in the overall picture, meaning the actors that were out in the so-called *sharp end*[142] of the military operations, and had the closest contact to the local population. The PRTs had meetings regularly with local authorities mostly at the district and village level, but also at the provincial level.

6.2.3.1   Coordination challenges

PRTs coordinated with local authorities and also hired local contractors to conduct projects and activities. The PRT PEK conducted several infrastructure projects in their area of responsibility, in which they used local contractors. The coordination with local authorities met with some challenges. Two PRT PEK officers explained:[143] *"We have meetings with the local governor, district governor, or police about projects, we try to follow the rules, but they are often not in place, difficult to meet, and we often try to do something without the local authorities because they are not functional, and they are very corrupted. . . . But, it is not only their fault that we do not find them at their office when we arrive, because we cannot tell when we arrive due to security reasons; this is a dangerous area. . ."*

In the work with local contractors, the communication was often conducted with frustration and mutual distrust. Projects conducted in the Blue Box area led from RCN were often executed by local contractors, especially the ones

---

[142] The sharp end: the sharp end represents the tactical part of the organization, such as the mobile observation teams (MOTs) or tactical CIMIC teams (TCTs). This is the part of the organization which represents the activity out in the field. The activity represented the most difficulty, risk and danger, an activity which was an important and very influential part of the ISAF activity, also named as"*the boots on the ground*.'"

[143] Interview with two PRT PEK officers, in RCN, 22.02. 2011.

that were RCN CIMIC-led. These small infrastructure projects were funded mostly by German POERF money, and later (when the US forces came) US CERP money. After some experiences with project money disappearing before projects were finished—or even started— the projects were more closely followed by CIMIC engineers, and money was paid in part after the project was finished. To know which contractors were reliable or not was a game of chance, until a register was established.

Personal relations also played a part and in relationship building. In the RCN area of operation, the Tajik Governor of Balkh province, Atta Mohammad Nur was regarded as a vital coordinating actor. Atta had governed Balkh Province since 2004, when he was appointed. Through careful cultivation of militia leaders and local strongmen, he had been able to keep political control; it was even a common understanding that he had established his own private militia (Mukhopadhyay, 2009). As one ISAF officer said: *"When Atta is out of town, he underhandedly arranges some uprisings, and then, officially calms it down when he is back in place. This is his way of showing that he has full control in the area."*[144]

It seemed like the actions of the international community, especially the UN and NATO actors, needed close cooperation and coordination with Atta to be able to act appropriate in security issues.[145]

Another aspect was that the officers who were close to the ground were outspoken in their doubt about whether the intervention had given the Afghan people better living conditions. Projects and supporting activities did not rely on local structures—the level needed to be sustainable—and would break down as soon as ISAF was gone, according to field conversations. As an RCN officer said: *"We are building a system that does not exist, if we take away the fundament for this, the funding stated in the Bonn agreement, everything will fall apart, the ANA or ANP for example, will not be able to continue their work… it will soon fall apart."*

---

[144] ISAF officer in interview 24.02.2011, (a statement difficult to prove, but it represented a general opinion among RCN officers).
[145] Personal observations and interview with RCN officers, 24.02.2011 and 28.02.2011.

This looked different from the level of ISAF HQs, whose civil military coordination contacts were mostly towards GIRoA. These GIRoA representatives who had benefited from the intervention by acquiring jobs, wealth, influence and better living standard for themselves and their families, were more optimistic. The coordination on this level was easier, but was it sustainable? An RCN officer with seven deployments behind him commented on ISAF coordination with GIRoA in this way: " *The politicians in GIRoA will tell you what you want to hear. It is different with the Taliban. They are more honest, they are concerned about corruption. Local cultural traditions and structures have ways of controlling this. Now, politicians as individuals in GIRoA steal from the people. ISAF is part of the problem since we are supporting GIRoA, which is why we fail. We bring in more soldiers, more weapons, building more camps... In the opinion of the Taliban and many other people in this country,... we are feeding the monster.*[146]

6.2.4   *Summary of Meeting Points*

This chapter has given an overview of meeting points of "outer" and "inner" context, representing important civil military coordination arenas and sources for the findings of this thesis. The described projects presupposed close civil-military coordination in planning and follow up implementation, involving actors as displayed in Figure No. 6-3.

The main IOs and NGOs, who represented the coordinating actors towards IJC, RCN and subordinated PRTs in both daily work and projects, are described to give an overview. Further, some civil military coordination dilemmas which will be elaborated later are mentioned.

A description of the coordination between ISAF and GIRoA is outlined to give an overall picture of the lines of communication and information between these coordinating actors. ISAF used much energy to communicate with the surrounding environment, where Afghan coordinating actors were vital in the struggle to find a joint basis of mutual understanding and coordination. The need for organizations to communicate with their surrounding environment was critical to get the needed legitimacy as claimed

---

[146] Interview with officer in RCN Fusin Centre, 26.06.2010.

by Meyer and Rowan (1977). ISAF worked to get the needed acceptance from local surroundings, underlining that the possibility to work on a joint basis would strengthen the organization and better the activities for everyone's benefit. Additionally, this was a premise for the civil military coordination concepts. A joint concept, in ANSF/ISAF military operations as well as civil military coordination in project development, required appropriate coordination.

This makes civil military coordination a complex affair, presupposes mutual understanding, respect, and trust, as well as understanding of the local context, which proved to be hard to achieve for ISAF and its representative bodies.

A more comprehensive account for civil military coordination challenges will follow in the following section through the description of ISAF structures and processes linked to project work as well as daily business.

6.3   *Problematic Organizational Structures*

This chapter describes some hindrances for implementation of good coordination activities in ISAF, beginning with an outline of the top-heavy ISAF organization, the triple reporting lines, and the challenge with the IJC being differently organized than regional commands and PRTs. Internal coordination challenges, structural difficulties, and inconsistency in RCN organization is also described, before a summary and discussion is drawn.

> *"Nothing in war is more important than unity of command.*
> *. . . better one bad general than two good ones."*
> Napoleon Bonaparte

6.3.1   *ISAF Top Heavy Structure*

Leaving the upper headquarter (HQ), ISAF HQ, to concentrate on strategic/political issues (Cf. Org. Chart No 2, section 3.1.8.) ISAF Joint Command (IJC) was established in October 2009 to run the tactical battle, to be in charge of the operations as the ISAF Operational Command. The

traditional way of organizing HQs and commands in NATO structures, and also national HQs in NATO member countries, was to use the CJ 1-9 structure. [147]

Instead of the CJ functions, which were how RCN and the subordinated PRTs were organized, IJC was designed to have a flat command structure in which NATO's traditional CJ-functions were replaced by four cross functional teams. These were: Current Operations, Future Operations, Future Plans and the Information and Dominance Centre (IDC). The cross-functional teams were designed to deepen the understanding of the interdependence between governance, development, and stability/security across the IJC staff. The IJC task to analyze the information and create an operational situational picture had high priority and focus. The information or required data were gathered from the information collectors on the ground (like the PRTs) making the connection to the lower levels in the organization and local population vital.

When asked why they established cross functional teams, the answer was: *"to communicate better with the civilian society,"* meaning the outer context such as GIRoA, the UN and other IOs. Each cross-functional team had experts from the traditional CJ-functions. IJC HQ consisted of approximately two thousand staff officers, a number of support units, and Afghan workers which included many highly ranked officers. [148]

One of the cross functional teams, the Information and Dominance Centre (IDC) had the mission to enable situational understanding and provide a dominant understanding of the operational environment. IDC is of special interest for civil military coordination activities because they aggregated and fused governance, development, and security reports across the full range of available resources. The system used to report this information was the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE). [149]

---

[147] CJ- functions; Combined Joint Staff Branches, often only called J functions. The so-called J-functions describe the discipline/ specialized area of the branch. J3 is operations, J2 is intelligence, J5 is planning etc. See Work Organization Chart No 3-3, Section 3.3.4.
[148] According to organization charts and field conversation with IJC staff officers, February 2011.
[149] Combined Information Data Network Exchange. CIDNE was a computer system, originally a US military system, but also used by ISAF, to collect tactical information and project information from the troops.

During my seven months stay at RCN from March 2010, the Staff Personnel in RCN grew from approximately 300 to 700.[150] The number of highly ranked officers grew as well, from one to five generals. The HQs in Kabul also grew, and the number of Generals increased. ISAF HQ had 29 and IJC had 14 Generals in August 2010 according to the ISAF organization charts.[151] One general brings along a whole crew to serve him, such as military assistants, adjutancy, secretaries, advisors, etc., and the growth of the HQs represented a problem when they became so large that people easily could "disappear into the organization" to quote an IJC phrase. This also led to the situation that some staff officers created projects, tasks, or exercises to make him or herself visible or to find enough work to justify his or her position.[152]

The problem with the top-heavy HQs was mentioned in several field conversations and interviews with IJC and RCN personnel.[153] According to my own observations, interviews, and discussions in RCN, there was a general concern about the fact that HQs and Regional Commands grew while there were missing resources on ground level, meaning that the PRTs had too little resources to follow up the requests from the HQs.

Normally, a military organization is organized as a pyramid where the General is to be found at the top and the staff officers, lower officers, and soldiers increase the further down in the pyramid one goes. Even if taking into consideration that the HQs in Kabul were the head of 6 Regional Commands, and 26 PRTs in the whole country, seen from a tactical level, the organization looked very top heavy. In north Afghanistan, according to the organization charts and manning data, to push things a bit to the extremes, the

---

[150] The number of heads includes only Staff Officers, if one counts all support units and people working in camp it would be much more.

[151] In 2010, NATO had 130 Generals and Admirals in Afghanistan; that is one General for every 1000 soldiers. In contrast the U.S. military has a total of 650 Generals and Admirals to manage a combat force of 1,420,000. Matthew Nasuti, in Kabul Press, Thursday 11 Nov 2010. Retrieved from http://kabulpress.org/my/spip.php?article39416

[152] According to personal observations and field conversations.

[153]The problem was entertainingly put on paper by a US Colonel working at IJC HQ at the time (which resulted in him being fired).See article written by US Col Lawrence Sellin, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/09/army-colonel-fired-for-powerpoint-rant-090210w/

ISAF organization could be seen as an upside down pyramid, in contrast to how military organizations normally are organized in battle.

Figure 6-5. The upsides down ISAF pyramid organization, 2010/2011.

As the figure above shows, the HQs in Kabul were heavily manned with many highly ranked officers. The largest regional command (RCN, about 700) were smaller, the PRTs (about 200-400 heads) smaller than the RC, and the OMLTs (70-100) even smaller that the PRTs. The more out towards the sharp end, the fewer soldiers were present. On the RCN level, TCTs (tactical CIMIC teams) or CATs (Civil Affairs Teams) consisting of 3-5 personnel represented the sharp end.[154] On the PRT level, MOTs (Mobile Observation Teams), or FNTs (Field Nachrichten Trupps) consisting of 4-5 personnel, led by one lower ranked officer represented the "boots on the ground." These small teams were considered as the fact-finders, the ones who were out in direct contact with the local environment and population most of the time.

---

[154] The TCTs (or CATs) are normally not linked to a Regional Command as they represent the tactical level, and normally would belong to a PRT. But in this case they were said to be needed as the RCN Commanders eyes on the ground in the area of the Hungarian PRT (PRT PEK) area of responsibility, due to that the Hungarian caveats limited the PRT PEK operational and assessment abilities.

6.3.1.1   The "FRAGO Factory"

This mismatch (Cf. Figure No. 13) in personnel resources between upper HQs and the sharp end led to some organizational challenges. For example, in both the RCN and the PRTs, there were frustrations about all the fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) [155] tasking RCN and the subordinate PRT personnel at all times. IJC was nicknamed the "FRAGO-Factory" in daily speech among officers in the RCN and PRTs. An explanation could be that IJC had organized their work into cross functional working groups instead of the NATO traditional CJ functions (combined joint staff branches), which brought about many FRAGOs on efforts and supporting efforts that were often not set in a context of an overall plan (also outlined by Klingenberg Vistisen, 2012). The lines, tasks, and responsibility to follow up and execute the FRAGOs were not always clear, or recognizable, due to the missing CJ-structure in IJC. It was often questioned in the RCN to which branch the FRAGO actually belonged. Sometimes FRAGOs were ignored, because the responsible branch did not see the connection to their branch work, or they had other priorities than the FRAGO assumed. This displayed a different understanding of the situational picture in the IJC and RCN levels, and strained the relations between them.

The relationship between the IJC, the RCN, and the PRTs was also a matter of available time. According to the RCN officers and personal observation, it was a problem that IJC had more staff on duty than the RCN had, so frequently FRAGOs with short time frames became a problem to accomplish. Thus, RCN had problems meeting the time demand of the requests, or to see the coherence or priorities. As a result, the communication and cooperation between the IJC HQ and RCN, at times, were tense. The problem was discussed in branch meetings, when discussing how to fulfill the FRAGO requirements. Many FRAGOs were postponed due to this, leading to a negative attitude towards the higher command, since RCN personnel felt they were being forced to use time on "meaningless" work, or work that did not fit

---

[155] FRAGO: Fragmentary Order, a (hasty or sudden) change or amendment to a previous operational order.

with own resources, or perception of the needed priorities. The list of untouched FRAGOs waiting to be followed up was at times quite long.[156]

IJC FRAGOs brought extra work for both the RCN and the PRTs by requiring field information. This frustration seemed to get stronger, the lower down in the organization one got. The PRT level often had a different view on priorities than upper headquarters, in combination with fewer resources.

6.3.1.2   Command from a distance

The HQs do the overall planning give the directions, commands, guidelines and priorities concerning the activities in the field. But, it was a well-known fact that many HQ staff officers were rarely outside the HQ camp and had no real picture of the reality on the ground (which might give associations to Plato and the allegory of the cave). This was a challenge for communications and information exchange with the PRTs and their fact finder teams, and also a problem related to trust, when the "map did not fit the terrain." For example, if the PRT underlined that ISAF should not conduct the planned meetings before one managed to arrange representatives of all involved ethnicities to be present, higher command would override this imperative referencing to the time pressure. ISAF HQs would press for activities and results. An example: three different PRT MAI Commanders during their deployment period underlined that the problem of growing support of insurgent groups in Pashto villages in Faryab Province was related to the fact that ISAF did not use enough time and resources to get the Pashto people represented in the negotiation table for reconciliation. Their villages were not prioritized for development and reconstruction efforts, leading to an ethnic bias in the reconciliation negotiations. This fueled local conflicts.[157]

The tendency with the top heavy HQs and Commands and their increasingly large and inaccessible camps was that there was less contact with the local population. Even the PRTs were more isolated in their camps in 2010 than they were in the period 2003-2006. Both the PRT Maimainah and the PRT Kunduz had been located in the towns of Maimanah and Kunduz and were in close contact with the local population. After increased insurgent attacks in

---

[156] Personal observations
[157] Interview with PRT MAI Commander, 29.04.2011.

Kunduz from 2006, and local demonstrations and attack on the PRT Maimanah in February 2006,[158] the PRTs moved into more secured and more isolated camps outside town. This resulted in less contact with the population, even at the ISAF field level.

6.3.2 *Diversity in Reporting lines*

In the ideal military organization, reporting lines are vital, clear, and easy to follow, as in Weber's Ideal Bureaucracy Model. The reality in North Afghanistan was more complex. The reporting system relied on the transaction of horizontal and vertical data and reports inside the organization as well as data acquired outside the organization, such as data provided by the international community, coordinating actors and/or the local population. The reporting system was supposed to support management at all levels in the organization, from those in charge of short-term plans, schedules and budgets to mid-term and long-term plans and budgets for the whole ISAF organization. The reporting system provided routine, detailed, and voluminous reports specific to each manager's areas of responsibility. Generally the reports focused on present performance, but also projected information and offered proposals for future performance. Focus on experience, lessons learned, and background was often missing (Laugen Haaland, 2011).

All reporting lines to and from units or organizations under ISAF command followed both ISAF command lines and military and civilian national lines. This meant there were triple reporting lines. Inside ISAF, the PRTs were reporting to the RCs, the RCs reported to IJC which again reported to ISAF HQ. ISAF HQ reported to Brunssum (Cf. Organization chart No. 1 and 2 in section 3.2.) *Outside* the ISAF structure, the PRTs also reported to their respective nations, one military channel and one civilian. The RCN also reported to Germany, both on military and civilian channels, as it was a German led HQ. Further, both the IJC and ISAF HQ, which were US-led, also

---

[158] On the 7th of February 2006 the PRT Meimanah camp was attacked by about 300 armed persons. See
 Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) report, 20 Jan 2011. Retrieved from http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2010/02151.pdf

reported to ISAF/NATO channels, to the US Central Command, and to civilian national authorities. Accordingly, national reporting was done for both military and civilian channels.

Several reporting lines were problematic, e.g. military units might get directions and guidance from ISAF channels that did not correspond with national directions, or even were contrary to them, due to national caveats. For example, when conducting operations in Baghlan Province, PRT PEK area, PRT PEK had national restrictions on participations in the operations.

Both the military and the civilian part of the PRTs also reported to both civilian and military channels in ISAF, even though the civilian part was missing a command and control system that could systematize and follow up. Additionally, PRTs also reported to both civilian and military national authorities (Defense Department, Ministry of Development and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all of which were different ministries, directorates or departments in each country).

6.3.2.1   Military Reporting Lines

The triple reporting lines, meaning that each nation had to relate to the ISAF control and command system (black reporting lines in the Figure No. 14 below) as well as to their national military lines (light green in the figure) and their national civilian lines (blue in the figure), made reporting information and communication very complex.

Figure 6-6 The triple reporting lines.

If the PRTs had disagreement with overall plans and priorities, they could express their views and suggestions through the RCN as their superior command. But often, communicating through the RCN was viewed as an unnecessary delay. This would result in the RCN being bypassed. For example, one (military) PRT Commander did not want to roll out the planned DDP Project (Fact Box 1) in a district in the area of his responsibility, and wrote a report to GIRoA about this. Operating outside the military lines, he managed to stop a planned DDP project that even was promoted as a *civilian* program. The RCN was surprised. However as an RCN officer said: *"This shows how personally dependent things are. The PRT Commander managed to stop a civilian program, just to keep focus on national or personally interesting projects..."*[159] This also happened the other way around, the IJC gathered information directly from the PRTs (through intelligence reports) when time was short or the situation was critical.[160] When this happened and one forgot to notify the RCN about it, RCN had an information problem (cf. Turner, 1978).

---

[159] Interview with CIMIC officer, 19.02.2011.

[160] As discussed in interview with an IJC officer, February 2011.

On the military side, there were established routines for regular reports from the PRTs to RCN in the different CJ-functions, and also on CIMIC issues. This represented a problem if national policy did not match with NATO/ISAF policy. For example, PRT MAI in Faryab Province, which, due to national policy, had no CIMIC function (until 2011) and, accordingly, never reported on CIMIC issues as they were commanded to do. This led to the RCN missing information from the PRT MAI area of responsibility in CIMIC issues.

In the IJC, they received most of their information in reports from the RCs, even if they did some assessment themselves at the provincial level in coordination with the RCs. The RC key leader engagement (KLE) reports, human terrain analysis, intelligence, single reports, PRT reports all represented information the IJC used to create an overall picture. This picture was used as the basis for discussions and meetings with GIRoA, as well as planning operations and projects. This information was also used to exert influence, for example, over the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), which was a vital cooperating and coordinating unit in civil military coordination issues.[161]

6.3.2.2   Civilian Reporting Lines

In contrast with the traditional civilian and military advisors supporting the Commander (such as the legal advisor, political advisor, development advisor or cultural advisor), the German RCN Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) was positioned at the same level as the RCN Commander (cf. organization chart No. 3). This was to underline the importance of the civilian perspective and the civil military coordination inside the ISAF organization. The RCN SCR staff developed in 2010/11 into sections for governance, development, and stability. But, it was a problem to fill the positions; civilian experts were not easy to recruit due to the poor security conditions.[162]

---

[161] According to personal observations, and interview with IJC officer, February 2011
[162] According to interview with RCN SCR staff, February 2011, and interview with COS. Enquiries were sent to all PRT nations in the RCN area to contribute with civilian personnel. The request was not met.

The reporting system on the civilian side was not similar to that of the military. In the RCN, the SCR did not have lines of command, or any hierarchy of reporting lines similar to that of the military. Reporting from the PRTs was totally up to the PRTs, even if RCN SCR was encouraging the PRTs to report on regular basis, it was often a problem to get reports or necessary information.[163] Regular contact with the PRTs from RCN SCR was only established with the German PRTs. As they were German, they were easier to keep in touch with, because they had national channels and networks, not to mention national funding. RCN SCR had no power to request reports or data from the Swedish, Turkish, Hungarian, and Norwegian PRTs, since their civilian reports were sent through national channels only, to national embassies and authorities. Accordingly RCN SCR had no total overview of civilian projects ongoing in the RCN area of responsibility.

The RCN SCR underlined the weakness of the civilian reporting system.[164] The PRTs should have been better coordinated with the RC level, both on the military and the civilian side. Knowing that the civilian and military actors in the PRTs talk to each other but report to different channels. RCN SCR underlined the advantage it would have been to have both sides reporting to the RC level in the command and control system, making the RCN able to put together a more comprehensive picture, and get faster and more transparent information and reporting systems.

6.3.2.3   Reporting Lines in Operations

The RCN officers were worried about how the ISAF organization worked during operations, especially with regard to reporting lines. To keep the command structures in the field was very difficult, because the command structures used in Afghanistan did not always fit naturally together. This became even worse during operations; when command structures did not fit each other, necessary information was lost. This was experienced during the joint ISAF/ANSF COIN operation Thaoid II.[165]

---

[163] Mentioned in discussions and interviews with RCN SCR and his staff.
[164] Interview with RCN SCR advisor, 14.09.2010.
[165] Interview with operation participating officer after returning to RCN Camp from Thaoid II, 29.06.2010.

Coordination in the field was occasionally hampered by national caveats, such as the Hungarian PRT (PRT PEK) in the insecure area of Baghlan Province. PRT PEK's national caveats did not allow them to take part in kinetic[166] military operations, which led to many other units operating in their area. During military operations, such as the Taohid Operations (I-III)[167] in Baghlan, at least one US unit, a German Task Force, the PRT PEK, and the Special Forces were all stationed in the area with different commands; the coordination and the effort to build a joint structure became a problem.[168]

One interviewee mentioned that during a Thaoid operation, he had no information about the operational status before they saw a general with staff "walking around" in the area to observe the situation. At that point, he and his fellow soldier determined they could leave their trenches, make an assessment, and reorganize.[169]Accordingly, the expected reporting lines, chain of command, did not function.

6.3.3 *RCN Structural Challenges*

As described, the RCN was organized in the traditional NATO CJ- structure (cf. organization chart No. 3) and the IJC was not. For the RCN, it was not easy to determine who did what and where, and who to contact in the IJC concerning dilemmas or needed support. The RCN CJ-9 (CIMIC) branch and CJ5 (Plans) travelled to IJC, Kabul, to straighten out the coordination lines

---

[166] *Kinetic* military action is a euphemism for military action involving lethal force, like dropping bombs, shooting bullets, killing people. The non-kinetic parts are often euphemism for motivation and recruitment patterns, as winning hearts and minds. Civil Affairs and CIMIC were often viewed as non-kinetic military resources. For more information, see article by Jordan Stern (2011) in *Small Wars Journal*. Retrieved from http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/civil-military-operations-military-information-support-operations-coordination

[167] The Taohid I –III COIN operations were conducted in the period from March to September 2010. These operations were combined operations, meaning ISAF and ANSF joint operations. The operations were conducted in Dahanah-ye Ghori District, and the Pul-e Khumri and Baghlan-e Jadid area in Baghlan Province. The object of the Taohid operations was to disrupt insurgent leadership infrastructure in the Baghlan- Kunduz corridor near Highway 1 (former Ring Road), and to establish freedom of access to the Chahar Darah district in order to support provincial level training of local village security, support local shuras/ local authorities by promoting governance and provide development projects and key-leader engagement.

[168] Interview with COS and interview with CAT officer, 28.02.2011.

[169] Interview with TCT officer, 22.06.2010.

and key personnel involved in the projects listed in this thesis, which they had difficulty in understanding from the organizational charts. Personal contact and mutual understanding were very important for coordination and support. This might have been connected to the fact that the IJC organization was new and differently organized than the traditional CJ-1 to 9 functions, and that it was so big that people could easily "disappear in the organization."

The military parts of the PRTs were constructed generally[170] in the same way as the RCN, with the CJ- structure, making the communication lines to the PRTs easier to handle than the lines to the IJC with their cross functional teams.

On the RCN level, there were discussions whether the TCTs (Tactical CIMIC Teams) belonging to the RCN CIMIC Branch should be located at a regional headquarter at all, as they actually belonged on the tactical level. TCTs did assessments in areas like Baghlan-e Jadid, which PRT PEK as battle space owner could not conduct due to their national caveats. The TCTs would be the only tool for the RCN Commander to have his "eyes on the ground" in this important insurgent stronghold. Besides, the TCT reports were regarded as important fact-finder information for the overall situational picture, which were also valued by the civilian coordinating actors, because they could not do their own assessments due to security considerations. Moreover, the CERP and POERF money probably would disappear from RCN CIMIC branch if the TCTs were cut off from the RCN level, which implied no possibility for RCN CIMIC branch to do QIPs, needed to keep security in the Blue Box area, as an example.

The exigent organizational structures that led to RCN organizational problems were:

- Unity of effort
- Disconnected communication systems
- Rotation
- Handover/takeover
- Caveats and the divergent PRTs

---

[170] Divergence could happen; for example, the Norwegian PRT did not have the CIMIC (CJ9) element at the time.

6.3.3.1   Unity of Effort

A military command like the RCN on paper might look like a very functional rational system. The reality was more complex and problematic. In a warzone, issues and unexpected events direct the focus. A joint approach to meet these problems in an adequate way was needed. With so many nations with different cultures, languages, attitudes, understanding, and training, management is challenged in many ways. The Chief of Staff, according to his military assistant, had to work hard to bring leaders in compliance with the NATO/ISAF procedures. Nations interpreted and practiced NATO procedures, applicable for ISAF, in different ways, creating too many sub cultures.[171] The same problem was present in the subordinated multinational branches, the CJ-functions, and in the subordinated PRTs, which also contained representatives from several countries.

Further in RCN, the Chief of Staff (COS) had no possibility to move, replace, or change people who could not fill the job. A Norwegian or Hungarian Chief of Staff, for example, could not remove an American or German branch chief that was not able to fulfill his/her responsibilities, as this could easily become too political inflamed.

At times one had little information concerning who was working on what in the different branches. This led to redundancy and missing coordination between branches that should have used their resources to a more competent and effective execution of tasks. Many officers claimed that they were missing information regarding the current overall tasks in the RCN HQ. This led to questions about staff meetings, which, during 2010, were asked for, but never occurred.[172] The overall view was not easy to get, which led sub-units to focus more on their own tasks and issues, and less on coordination.

---

[171] Personal observation and field conversation with the Military assistant of the COS, spring 2010.
[172] CIMIC branch asked for this in meeting with COS, March 2010.

Fusion Centre[173]

The Fusion Centre was mainly manned by civilians, or former military personnel now working as subject matter experts. Fusion Centre was not easily accessible to other personnel due to the code-locks on their barrack doors. Inside in Fusion Centre barracks, the CAAT (COIN Advisor and Assistance Team), the CAT (Civil Affairs team) and the HTT (Human Terrain Teams) (among others) were located, and *also* had additional code locks on their *branch* doors. As a first impression, this did not correspond to the idea of easy coordination, or eagerness to coordinate at all. The Fusion Centre was, colloquially called the "Confusion Centre," suggesting that the unit was less accessible or "secret," but still had great influence. This uncertainty regarding the Fusion Centre was contrary to the whole idea of a Fusion Centre.

Some RCN officers complained about the Fusion Centre making assessments which they did not share or communicate with the military, e.g. The Human Terrain Teams (HTT), and underlined that without sharing assessments it was difficult to gather the reality of the civil dimension. When questioning this, HTT explained that military officers did not use them or ask for the information they needed, because this demanded (extra) work outside their "line." In addition, according to the HTT, the military officers had a skeptical view towards the HTT academics, viewing them as "*too soft, emotional, and not capable to take care of themselves.*" [174]

On the other hand, the Fusion Center became very important to all branches and especially the CIMIC branch when the forces were suddenly faced with the HIG-fighters who wanted to be reintegrated. As the Reintegration Project started, the physical "unavailable" setting of the Fusion Centre changed. According to personal observations in 2011, the Fusion Centre opened its

---

[173] CIMIC Fusion Center is an Information and Knowledge Management organization staffed by civilian and military subject-matter-experts with education, organizational knowledge and field experience in the areas of economics, governance, humanitarian assistance, infrastructure, justice and reconciliation, security and social well-being. They worked to facilitate information sharing between NATO forces and civil actors to provide a sense of shared situational awareness of a complex crisis, by interacting with applicable actors in the area of interest while also monitoring, gathering, storing, processing, and disseminating relevant information pertaining to the conflict. Source: CCOE: retrieved from http://www.cimic-coe.org/content/scope/cfc_cmo.php.

[174] Interview with HTT representative, 20.02.2011.

doors, was accessible, and appeared more integrated with regard to both RCN CIMIC and RCN SCR staff issues.

"Flag Planting"

Another complicating issue was that different ISAF participating countries and their representative officers sometimes set priorities to make visible national achievements outside the priorities and planning of the CIMIC branch. One example: a CIMIC officer, working within the Blue Box projects, was tasked by his national senior officer to prepare for a Mosque project in one of the villages in the Blue Box, which would be funded by national money and promote the flag of the nation. The CIMIC officer told him that this was not a need in the village, and not in line with NATO CIMIC policy as to how to conduct projects. He was, nevertheless, pressed hard by his fellow countryman. A weaker CIMIC officer might not have been able to stand up against such a pressure from a higher ranked officer. Additionally, when the system did not have a formal coordinating body for a Blue Box project, it was too easy to go behind the "official lines" in the Blue Box, to do national (even personal) so-called "flag planting."

The Blue Box was filled with different actors, civilian and military, that did all kind of projects in little or bigger villages without coordination. The Swedish led PRT MeS, RCN Croatian Quick Reaction Force (QRF), RCN German Task Force, RCN multinational Tactical CIMIC Teams (TCTs), RCN US Civil Affairs Teams (CATs), and the RCN multinational Intelligence (CJ2) and PSYOPS[175] teams all did their own assessments and QIPs in the Blue Box villages. Coordination was occasional. Additionally, there were numerous external actors doing projects in the same area. A frustrated liaison officer said it this way: *"Here we do not know anything, even what PRTs are doing or the US is doing, we do not know. There should be a united approach,*

---

[175] PSYOPS means: Psychological Operations. Defined as; *Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP.* US Department of Defense, retrieved from:
http://www.military.com/ContentFiles/techtv_update_PSYOPS.htm

and CJ-9 should be in lead of this, not like now when the US is going alone with some projects we even don't know about."[176]

The RCN internal military and civil-military coordination, visualized in Figure No. 6-7 below, shows the most important coordinating units from a RCN CIMIC point of view. (The dotted line indicates that these units were not a formal part of the RCN organization).

Figure 6-7 RCN CIMIC internal coordination.

6.3.3.2   Disconnected Communication Systems

Ensuring unity of effort and joint understanding became even harder when the coordinating units used numerous different communication and information systems.

The Internal communication systems in RCN were debated among RCN officers because they were so varied and disconnected. A mobile and satellite communication systems, and a formal communication system inside the Headquarters were established as one international (secret phone system) and one German phone system (DEUMILNet). In addition, one international (ISAF Secret) computer network, as well as one national German (German

---

[176] Interview with RCN CIMIC officer, 27.06.2010.

eyes only) computer network for reporting to and from Potsdam,[177] was established. When the US Forces attended the Camp beginning in the summer of 2010, additional networks were installed: two independent US computer networks and two US phone systems (including a US eyes only system). This made it even more difficult to share internal information, i.e. transferring data from one system to another. This problem was discussed among the RCN officers (including the Germans and Americans) who were of the opinion that there should be only joint communication systems in a joint headquarters. These separate systems were looked upon as excluding systems, and fueled internal distrust between the nations. This also made the communication systems more complex; communication and information sometimes became very difficult to track. Moreover, it was not very time-efficient. As one interviewee put it; *"... we have so many systems, internal systems, German systems, US systems; we should have one system for the PCs and one for the phones, even if we have national lines too. There are some important people I need to stay in contact with in my work whom I cannot reach by phone or e-mail because of this. . . .that is problematic, and unnecessary"*[178]

Also, the PRTs had their national communication systems in additional to the joint ones. During my stay at RCN, I was tasked to get an overview of the communication systems at PRTs as part of RCN information. It was a challenge to keep an updated overview of all the communication systems in the regional area of operation.

Additionally, ANSF had their own communication systems that ISAF could not join (or were not aware of) and vice versa. As a Finnish senior officer from the RCN intelligence branch (J2) explained:

---

[177] The "Operational Leadership Command" was established in Potsdam-Geltow near Berlin since July 2001. It planned and controlled the operations of all the German fighting forces, whether national or international, and so corresponded to the earlier German "General Staff" Amongst other things, it housed the German-Dutch Operations and Coordination Centre for the International Protection Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

[178] Interview with US civilian, Fusion Centre, RCN, 28.02. 2011.

"Like the Germans, the US have their own communication systems, they do not trust the Europeans, as we do not trust them, and no one trusts the Afghans, as they of course also do not trust us." [179]

This was not exactly the best situation for a smooth coordination.

6.3.3.3   Rotation

The valuable process of getting known to each other, as a basis for good coordination and cooperation, was challenged. ISAF soldiers had little time to get known to their counterparts, whether they were Afghan authorities or IOs/ NGOs. The frequent rotation of staff officers was a well-known problem, both to the military organization itself and to the coordinating actors. Different nations had different regulations on the timeframe for a deployment to ISAF. In the RCN deployments lasted anywhere from one or two months to three years. Coordinating actors such as the UN OCHA, UN Military advisor, ANSO and ACKBAR, as well as local authorities were often stressed about new staff entering. For example, during my stay in 2010, the Personal Recovery (PR) Director in the Joint Operation Centre (JOC) changed four times during a 7 month period; this was very problematic and led to frustrations in the ongoing cooperation with UNAMA and local authorities who sought to develop a plan for crisis support.

Further, the rotation led to a very weak institutional memory in the branches or in the organization as a whole. What was experienced was that a new team in a branch started with a "blank sheet" to do the tasks their own way, instead of being able to use the already experienced data, recommendations and lessons learnt from the former team. Different nations did their tasks in different ways, depending on the national training and understanding (interpretation) of NATO procedures. Besides, a change of branch chief from one nationality to another could make the same branch look quite different than before, even with the same branch members present, priorities and focus changed.

---

[179] Field conversation with CJ-2, intelligence officer 23.04.2010.

6.3.3.4   Handover/ Takeover (HOTO) [180]

Related to the rotation problem, an effort was undertaken to ensure an appropriate handover/takeover (HOTO). There was a 14 day HOTO, following procedures. Still, the HOTO varied in effectiveness. Some individuals had a good HOTO, some had a bad one and some had none at all. Countries did not always have successor come in the right time, so the position was not filled until after the pre-successor had left the operation area. These replacements then had to learn the hard way, by trying and failing, despite the HOTO procedures. One interviewee put it this way: *". . .this should be done in a proper way, not dependent on each person to do it or not or how to do it . . .There should be some form for quality assurance in this, due to the frequent turnover."*[181]

When I visited the PRTs to gather information about local projects and coordination with local authorities as an RCN CMIC representative, the PRTs complained about the need to provide different units and branches in RCN with the same information over and over again, and how this occupied too much of their already pressed time and resources. The PRTs questioned why the branches in RCN did not put more effort into information sharing, and suggested that the rotation system contributed to the problem, as when an insufficient or missing HOTO led to repeating work. A report was written about this issue,[182] but no one in RCN seemed to accept ownership of the problem, and things proceeded as normal. Some would claim that this lack of ownership was also due to the rotation system.

6.3.3.5   Caveats and Divergent PRTs

Different countries had different caveats due to political decisions about what type and level of risk the nation was willing to carry. The balance between risk, vulnerability, and security had to be weighed out according to the national caveats. To find a joint practice was very difficult as long as the coalition nations had different caveats, understandings, and rules of

---

[180] HOTO: the hand over and take over process (one or two weeks), where holder of the position introduce the successor in the vital content of the responsibilities, the current "picture" network and priorities related to the position.
[181] Interview with RCN officer, 27ᵗ June 2010.
[182] Together with a colleague, I wrote a report on this subject, August 2010.

engagements (ROE).[183] This made it very difficult for a Commander or branch chief of multinational troops to make them work in a unified way. Also, he had no or little possibility of sanctions toward soldiers/nations that prioritized their national regulations and policies to ISAF ones. Accordingly ISAF appeared as an ambiguous or inconsistent force. This was a great internal management challenge. The missing unity of effort made difficulties for partnering ANSF, civilian coordinating actors, and the local population to communicate, interpret and understand ISAF. This, in turn, reinforced uncertainty.

As mentioned, the RCN also used the tactical CIMIC teams (TCT) to do assessments in the area where the PRT PEK normally would have done them. The US used the Civil Affair Teams (CAT) to do the same, which meant double the work in the villages in Baghlan Province. As one interviewee put it; "*If you look at the Hungarian PRT, they could have done something, but because of their caveats they are not allowed to go out, so how to assess the area? Then we need to find a way to go around this, to get the job done. We use the CAT teams and find out ourselves, we cannot wait, we create so many lines, cross lines in this way due to the caveats.*" [184]

The "hard policy" of Norway to strictly divide the lines between the military and the civilian actors, required a smooth and tight coordination between the civil and military elements in the PRT. This turned out to be very personally dependent on "good chemistry," and the ability to communicate, according to interviewees in PRT MAI. This policy was problematic in the RCN and the IJC because the CIMIC reporting lines were based upon NATO CIMIC doctrine, and Norway had no CIMIC officer, which also was a problem. As one US RCN officer said:

---

[183] ROE: *Rules of Engagement* are rules or directives to military forces that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force, or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be applied. They provide authorization for and/or limits on the use of force and the employment of certain specific capabilities. In some nations, ROE gave guidance to military forces, while in other nations, ROE were lawful commands. See international Institute of Humanitarian law, ROE handbook: Retrieved from http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/7b0d0f70-bb07-48f2-af0a-7474e92d0bb0/San-Remo-ROE-Handbook.aspx.

[184] Interview with CAT chief, 28.02.2011

"We are in a postmodern warfare here, you cannot cut the lines like they do in Norway, and the ideal and real world is two different things."[185]

The Swedish and Norwegian PRT development funding was nationwide and all went through GIRoA. This meant that CIMIC officers in the PRT MeS had little or no money, for example, to do quick impact projects (QIPs) in their own area. This was a point of contention at the Swedish PRT CIMIC branch. Swedish CIMIC officers asked how they could win hearts and minds with so little ability to do QIPs or other needed projects in the nearby villages.[186] When the US entered the RCN in the summer of 2010, funding became easier since the possibility of using US CERP money also applied to other ISAF nations, something the Swedish and, later, the Norwegian PRT (through US supporting units), made use of to make improvements in their own area.[187]

The differently organized PRTs were also an organizational problem. The mandate of the PRTs (as for ISAF Forces in general, cf. Section 3.1.8.) was broad and vague, which meant the PRT contributing countries had varied foci. The original idea for the PRTs was that they should have a *national* responsibility to succeed in the area of responsibility, as battle space owners. But the establishment of the regional commands changed this. Then all operations in the area were steered from the regional commands in line with the NATO/ISAF command and control system. In the RCN area of operation, operational decisions were taken in the RCN, but in civil military coordination issues, the lines were more blurred and complex.

The PRTs, as the ones with the firsthand information about local areas, both on villages, district, and sometimes provincial level, were an important information source to the RCN planning, coordination, and implementation. Still, the coordination between the RCN and the PRTs regarding projects was only occasional. There might have been many reasons for this. On one hand, the PRTs seemed like willful satellites with a strong independence and ownership of their area of responsibility. During the RCN planning meetings related to the Highway 1 Project, Hairatan BXP Project, or the District

---

[185] Ibid.

[186] Interview with PRT officer, 22.02. 2011.

[187] Personal observations and information from US J2 officer who had been working with projects in Faryab and Balkh Province, summer 2010.

Delivery Program (DDP) project, the PRTs attended only meetings dependent their own priorities and activities.

On the other hand, coordination could be personally dependent, based on how good the understanding between the RCN and the PRT points of contact were. Another reason for lack of close coordination was that RCN officers, instead of getting the information from the PRT, wanted to do reconnaissance themselves, to see and know the reality on the ground, and for some, to achieve a longed-for opportunity to get out of the camp. The problem with this was that it was often not coordinated either between branches inside RCN or with the PRT as battle space owners.

When the US entered the RCN area, new discussions about the way to do things in the PRTs began. An overall NATO goal was to gradually change the PRTs into civilian units. In reality this did not look possible (or even a good idea) at the time in 2010/11. Even if development agencies were much needed in the area, a war was ongoing, and PRT MAI, PRT MeS and PRT KDZ conducted more kinetic military operations than ever before. As the security situation in the north deteriorated,[188] the military part of the PRTs, their combat abilities as well as support from incoming US troops, were more needed. The same PRTs were also building bigger and stronger camps to protect themselves against the local population in case of demonstrations or attacks.[189] In this way, COIN was a challenging military strategy; how to find an adequate balance between kinetics and development could be very difficult, and to keep the local population as the center of gravity became increasingly harder to accomplish.

---

[188] From 2006, the Taliban reorganized and conducted new offensives, with support from other countries, such as Pakistan. NATO approved more robust rules of engagement (ROE) in February 2006. There was a proliferation of suicide-bombings and Taliban attacks. ISAF Commanders and the PRTs were short in resources and asked for more troops. See Security Council Report; Profile Afghanistan, 7 November 2006. Retrieved from http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2232713/
[189] Personal Observation. See also VG, 12 March 2012. Retrieved from http://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/artikkel.php?artid=10078849

6.3.4 *Summary of Organizational Structures*

To be able to implement the strategies and tasks needed, smooth and extensive coordination between internal and external bodies was essential. The RCN CIMIC Branch had a multitude of internal and external coordinating bodies to relate to, as shown in Figure No 6-8 (below), challenging this effort.

Figure 6-8 ”CIMIC moon with satellites.” See abbreviation list for short terms/acronyms).

This figure shows the most regularly coordinating bodies, some being closer and coordinating more frequently than others. The dotted lines indicate that the bodies were not a formal part of the RCN organization but they were located in the RCN Marmal military camp and had extensive coordination with RCN CIMIC branch. Green circles represent internal coordinating bodies; red circles represent external coordinating bodies, cf. Figure No. 6-4; external coordination actors, and Figure No. 6-7; internal coordination actors.

A military command is known by its clear command and control system and rational built organization structure. As such, one would expect to find ISAF

with a rationally functioning organizational structure with single, clear reporting lines, a common situational awareness, or operational picture, a powerful management and unity of effort in its main activities. This section has given a description of an organization more characterized by inconsistency and overly complex structures.

Taking into consideration the pyramid organization chart that characterizes a bureaucracy, and look into the upside down pyramid based on the data in this thesis that characterized ISAF (cf. Figure No. 6-5), it is not in line with Weber's bureaucracy model. With so many people and high ranked officers in upper headquarters (HQ), a situation that by 2010 increasingly characterizing the regional commands, and so few troops on the ground. The result was disparity and imbalance. The term "FRAGO-factory," referring to the IJC in the RCN and the PRTs, in itself, told something about the mismatch between the resources in upper HQs and RCs/PRTs, matching the upside-down pyramid.

The distance between the top heavy HQs in Kabul, with little or no field experience, and the PRTs with their Mobile Observation Teams (MOTs) spending most of the time in the field, was too great to establish a joint situational picture. The RCN was the middle link between the two, with its own tactical units such as TCTs and CATs seeming to have a better understanding of the PRT situational picture in civil military coordination. Still, in the PRTs, the IJC and RCN was viewed as distant with unrealistic views and ideas. [190]

The double and triple reporting lines that characterized ISAF organization were a problem to the information and communication processing, making reporting more complex, less transparent and even personality dependent. Even though there was a command and control system on the military side of the reporting lines, there were apparently no sanctions used if, for example, a PRT did not report on requested information from the RCN.

The many reporting lines meant it was also difficult to keep an overview of information and communication processes, as presupposed by appropriate crisis management (cf. Turner, 1978; Rasmussen, 1997). Besides, the IJC,

---

[190] Personal observations.

with its new established cross functional teams, also complicated the reporting, information and communication processes.

Due to the ISAF rotation system, people rapidly came and left. The organization had no dependency on people, but on positions, meaning that the system did not fall apart when people changed. Still, the rotation system was problematic in relationship to coordination with external actors. Further, personality had a strong influence on coordination issues, a problem put on the table by OCHA in civil military coordination meetings. OCHA pointed to the stress this put to the coordination, not knowing how carefully reached coordination achievements would be maintained or destroyed.

When management had no real power to enforce efficiency, by replacing unfit people, or to use sanctions when procedures were not followed, the organization was not "rational." To ensure a predictable rotations and HOTO were built in procedures, but they were often not followed (or even known). It was a problem that the contributing ISAF nations had power at the expense of ISAF command and control system. The organization had grown too big to control.

This could be one of the reasons for ISAF officers tended to focus on the time of their own deployment and activities that could promote their own career, rather than focus on what would benefit the organization as a whole. The organization, as well as its aims and goals, were too distant or abstract, too difficult to define or understand.

The national caveats and diversity in culture and focus of the participating nations represented the main problem, underlining the inconsistency. It was a paradox that even in military operations (for example, the Taohid operations in Baghlan) one did not operate with a unity of command. Here ISAF was represented by more than four different units with different lines of command. Additionally, when national policy, guidelines, or orders laid down in caveats did not correspond with the prevailing ISAF policy, it also contributed to the lack of ownership to joint challenges or problems. This all damaged the unity of effort, supposed to characterize military organizations holding a functional command and control system.

An interviewee stated: *There is a NATO statement that says: preparation is interoperability...we do not use one language as prescribed in radio procedures, the use of national language should not happen. . . . but, some cannot even speak English. Nations are sending persons to important positions which they may not be able to fill. Additionally the COM does not have the opportunity to change people in posts, to make better operability. Efficiency must be more important than politics in war zones.* [191]

This statement underlines, among other things, the vulnerability in the information and communication process as well as inconsistency and lack of relevant authority following responsibility. It also says something about the lack of training and education needed to fill positions. Inconsistency in the organization starts with divergence in policy, training and education. To manage a unity of effort, which should be the hallmark of a military organization, training is a good place to start, an aspect which will be outlined in the following chapter.

> *"Preparation is interoperability."*
> (NATO).

6.4   *Training and Education Diversity*

This section discusses the divergence in training and focuses on different organizational levels in contributing countries. Basic military training, training of Staff Officers (CIMIC education) as well as training of the strategic level (HQ personnel), and training in the area of operation are outlined.

Training in this thesis is understood as knowledge, skills, and competencies that occur as a result of theoretical and practical teaching in military basic skills or national/ international higher military and civilian education from military academies or civilian universities. It also includes the national and international deployment training conducted by their own forces, NATO schools, as well as the UN or EU courses.

---

[191] Interview with CIMIC Officer, 27.06.2010.

Military training is the main element to ensure that the strategies function out in the field. This presupposes that soldiers are able to fill their positions according to job description and expectations. Recruitment according to job descriptions and expectations is a prerequisite for a rational organization. Either one has the needed training to fill the position or not. Training is also vital for the communication and information processes to proceed as assumed.

To be able to act rationally in a warzone, the organizational management needs to rely on sufficiently trained personnel, something much emphasized by NATO and NATO participating countries, and discussed in the many NATO schools, education, and training centers worldwide.

6.4.1 *Military Training/Education Regimes*

Training is an area that traditionally has high priority in the military environment, and has been regarded as professional, especially basic military training. Basic military training includes physical ability, shooting ability, first aid, familiarity with one's own equipment and resources, understanding of military basic command and control systems and tactics. Basic military training forms the core of military skills that are needed to enable soldiers to handle any upcoming military task. This training is quite similar in most ISAF contributing nations.

In addition to the basic training, and the upgrade and update skills needed for professional development, the need to continue training beyond initial qualifications to meet the challenges in new types of postmodern wars and conflicts has been increasingly recognized. For example, the Norwegian Defense University College conducts studies such as Cultural Awareness in Military Operations. In the US, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Culture Centre was established in Arizona (Hajjar, 2010). Military training differs in different countries, especially when it comes to the training beyond basic skills. New wars and conflicts require more strategic soldiers. To accomplish the Comprehensive Approach (CA), the COIN strategy, or CIMIC doctrine, soldiers need to manage foreign languages, cultural awareness, negotiation techniques, conflict resolution skills, and media training. Some ISAF contributing nations have military academies offering college or university degrees in a variety of subjects, similar to other

colleges or universities[192] which might give officers a broader perspective and better grip on the complexity of the situation. However, many officers have no such education.

Officers attending higher education such as war colleges normally are familiar with terms such as Comprehensive Approach (CA) and Counterinsurgency (COIN) and their content and intention, even though this also varies. In the NATO Joint Warfare Centre (JWC),[193] training of ISAF HQ and the IJC (in which I participated as an observer 2009),[194] COIN was the focus in most parts of the training. The participants from ISAF contributing nations were educated in the COIN mindset. From this experience and the experience in the area of operation with IJC officers, these participants became familiar with COIN thinking and made efforts to keep planning and strategies in line with COIN. This, interestingly, looked very different at the RC level and the PRT level.

The training of higher HQs focused on COIN and CA, but the RCN and the PRTs often had different perspectives and knowledge. Some officers claimed they had never heard about these terms. This seemed to be related to their training. If one were trained to fill positions in a regional command or a PRT, the training given might not even have discussed these terms. Still, one heard the terms in the area of operation, in meetings, briefs, discussions, FRAGOs, and commands at all levels. For example, an ISAF Commander sent out a document to all ISAF soldiers concerning how to work with Afghan contractors in line with COIN strategy (COMISAF's Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting Guidance, 2010)[195]. The problem with these overall strategies was that if one did not understand or act in line with the terms, most likely, nothing would happen.

---

[192] As for example: United States Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), UK Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Collège d'enseignement supérieur de l'armée de terre or Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr.
[193] JWC: Joint Warfare Centre, Stavanger, Norway. A NATO joint and combined training centre for operations. See:
http://www.jwc.nato.int/category.php?categoryID=17&PHPSESSID=96c12ab63e96a1343e51e30431766f75

[194] See Methodology, Chapter 5.
[195] ISAF non official, internal document.

Moreover, sitting in a HQ in Kabul planning big civil military projects was very different from being part of a tactical CIMIC team (TCT), mobile observation team (MOT), or other forms of patrol or activities in the sharp end. These "boots on the ground" did what they always do, what they were trained for—basic military tasks, and information gathering according to their procedures—the overall strategies did not seem to matter much to them.[196]

6.4.2 *Headquarters (HQ) Pre-deployment Training*

As mentioned in Chapter 5, I participated as an observer on the first training ever of both ISAF Headquarters and IJC HQ together, at the Joint Warfare Center (JWC) in November and December, 2009. The keywords of all the training were security, stability, development, and governance in the comprehensive Approach (CA) strategy and "new" military concept of COIN. The main military task was security and stability.[197]

Security meant:

- Protect the population
- Enable the ANSF
- Neutralize malign influences

Stability meant:

- Support socio-economic development
- Support extension of governance

During the discussions about the content of COIN, what it was all about, how to interpret it, different attitudes emerged.

One COIN lecturer explained: *"we are not an occupying force, always remember that we are guests there and the Afghan partnership is critical to success. We cannot trust targeting and intelligence alone; we get the best information from the people, the local population is the center of gravity. To*

---

[196] Personal observations.

[197] From lecture given at HQ ISAF/IJC training at Joint Warfare Center (JWC) 26 Nov- 11 Dec 2009.

secure the population has high priority and is the only way to get legitimacy from the people."

An Officer questioned: *"If we are guests, why then be military? If we are not there to fight, why are we there?"*

During these discussions, a picture of divergence between the elder and younger officers, and also between more kinetic- trained officers and officers with civilian education emerged. Some younger civilian-educated officers wanted to widen the military role, finding it interesting to be engaged in governance and development. One Danish officer (holding a Master's Degree in social science) said; *"We have enough training and education to fill some holes outside the military stuff!"*

An elder German officer replied: *"We are only there for security; we are not 'good guys' in uniform."*[198] These different views on the military role also emerged in the area of operation.

General McChrystal gave a lecture via video, where he underlined that COIN in all levels was the steering course. He pointed out that civilian actors in the operation area were not well enough coordinated. According to McChrystal, the military had to keep tighter ties on these actors and if "things need to be done" the military has to do it when no one else has the ability. This sound clear and straightforward if one does not ask questions such as: Who defines the content of "things need to be done," or what perceptions decide when, who, or what acting is needed?

6.4.3   *CIMIC Staff Officer Pre-deployment Training*

Outlined below are examples of a typical staff officer preparation for mission, in this case a CIMIC officer, and further the subject expert training that is offered from NATO schools to CIMIC staff officers, based on interviews and personal experiences.

CIMIC staff officers have varied COIN training and understanding. Professional officers are likely to have more knowledge than reserve officers.

---

[198] From discussions under training at Joint Warfare Center (JWC) 26 Nov-11 Dec 2009.

Knowledge level also depends on the preparation courses, what lecturers are available, and what is focused on the most. In 2010, there was no mandatory COIN training in the Norwegian preparation course for deployment to Afghanistan. However, the German army did have such training.[199] The Norwegian three week mandatory course in basic military training and mission specific training was concentrated on basic military skills. Additionally, lectures in cultural awareness, handling of kidnapping situations, and health and climate issues were given.

Further, subject matter expert courses in the management of NATO schools (like NATO CIMIC Basic and CIMIC Staff courses)[200] were offered to give joint understanding and training among NATO officers. At the NATO school in Enschede, The Netherlands, these courses conducted CIMIC education with a Comprehensive Approach focus, but COIN was not a subject. Role playing and training in work with interpreters, as well as syndicate work, and realistic scenarios in which one was trained to be a CIMIC staff officer in a complex emergency were the main focus. Emphasis was on understanding the role of a CIMIC officer, especially with regard to the problem of blurred lines in coordination with NGOs. The blurred lines discussions in this NATO course were conducted together with representatives from IOs/NGOs/GOs, who were also attending the course.

Some CIMIC officers also joined the UN CIMIC education as the UN CMCoord[201] training which also focused on the military role in the Comprehensive Approach (CA) strategy, and gave military attendants comprehensive insight in the civilian side of the crisis response system. UN courses had a more civilian perspective, displaying the problem the UN and NGOs face in coordination with the military. Both NATO and UN CIMIC training were essential for CIMIC Staff Officers' understanding of the CIMIC role in mission. The problem was that NATO countries, as well as non-NATO countries, decided themselves which officers to educate and to which courses they were sent.

---

[199] Confirmed information from Force protection officer at RCN, 2010.
[200] Conducted, for example, in Germany, Oberammergau, or in The Netherlands, in Enschede.
[201] For example, at a UN (OCHA) Civil Military Coordination (CM-coord) Course in Spain. Hosted by City Council of Barcelona, executed by Barcelona International Peace Centre, July 2009.

Out in the field, CIMIC officers, who had undertaken both NATO and UN CIMIC training, had the same basis and the same perspective in difficult discussions about what is, and what is not, a military task in coordination with the civilian community. For example, the question was asked whether the military should be involved in local flood handling or leave this to Afghanistan National Disaster management Authority (ANDMA) or the Provincial/District Disaster Management Commissions and NGOs. The strength to keep CIMIC in line with NATO CIMIC doctrine depended on the training of the CIMIC personnel. This was demonstrated by the difference in NATO CIMIC-trained officers and the officers with none or only national CIMIC training.

Both strategically and at the field level, what is part of or outside the military role, there was a different understanding of what the CIMIC activities were. The difference seemed to be rooted in the variety of trainings and understanding.

6.4.4   *Training Maladjustment*

If the training and preparedness for the mission had failed, which did happen, it was difficult for soldiers to fulfill their responsibility in the area of operation. One example is explains this: one of my interviewees, who worked in a leading position in the US CAT (Civil Affairs Team), told me that he had no background, education, or training in CIMIC issues or tasks at all. He was "*thrown into the position to fill a hole,*" as he articulated it. This situation might not be the regular situation but it happens now and then in many contributing nations that people without the necessary background or training are placed in a position to fill gaps in manning. This was related to the fact that nations are struggling to find enough personnel for the ISAF mission, especially skilled personnel in specialist positions.

Officers were also moved from one position to another to fill gaps occurring during the mission. In RCN CIMIC Branch, one officer was moved between three very different positions during a six month period: as administration officer, as liaison officer, and as member of the Tactical CIMIC Team (TCT). Two other CIMIC officers, trained to do staff officer work, were placed in the TCTs, a very different position from what they were trained for, and a much

more vulnerable position which required special abilities. One of them managed this well, due to his long experience, another less experienced officer had a very hard time mentally, according to own account. A CIMIC officer from PRT KDZ visited the RCN CIMIC Branch to discuss his main tasks and get a copy of a job description; he had been in the mission area for two months without a job description, which also displayed an organizational vulnerability.

A synchronized procedural CIMIC fundament seemed to be missing. One of my *experienced* interviewees from US Civil Affairs Team in RCN did not know the NATO CIMIC doctrine at all. To my question, he answered; *"NATO CIMIC doctrine? What is that? Never heard about it…"* This different education and understanding of CIMIC and where the lines between civilian and military tasks are, is an internal maladjustment in the ISAF structure, in addition to the overall civil military discussion about roles, lines, and tasks.[202]

6.4.5 *Training in Area of Operation*

Entering the RCN, individuals were required to participate in mandatory "theatre training," meaning training in the field, to ensure a basic level of common understanding and capacity in different disciplines. Disciplines such as first aid, Personal Recovery, communication systems, security issues, test of weapons and shooting ability, as well as COIN information, and organizational and a cultural awareness lectures were also given. This field education was insured by written RCN procedures, where each lecture and training sequence had to be crossed out before the training was acknowledged and the soldier was regarded as fully operational.

In a multinational environment, the level of military training was very varied, both among the high ranked soldiers and at the lower levels. There were very professional highly-trained and competent officers, and some staff officers with less up-to-date training. To meet this COIN training in the operation area was offered.

---

[202] Work to better this situation has started; a research on CIMIC - Concepts & Capabilities, c.f. CCOE. Retrieved from http://www.cimic-coe.org/content/info/download.php#doctrines

Courses in COIN strategy were conducted in the RCN camp and also in Kabul, a two-day course and a week-long course, respectively, but one had to apply. If one had no COIN education from national training, one could get a COIN course during the mission. Personal interest and the goodwill of the branch chief decided whether one was able to participate in these courses or not, meaning that there might have been staff officers in the command with no knowledge or understanding about COIN during their whole deployment. This was a weakness in light of the fact that COIN was supposed to be the overall ISAF strategy, especially when plans, operations, and other ISAF activities assumed COIN knowledge and understanding.

Even when ISAF Commander General McChrystal in 2009, and ISAF Commander General Petraeus in 2010 launched the COMISAF Counterinsurgency Guidance,[203] one could not know whether this was read or understood by all personnel. Another complicating aspect was that the combined COIN operations (such as Taohid I-III), meaning ISAF-ANSF joint operations, required a joint COIN understanding. The ISAF COIN training of ANSF soldiers was questioned because of the different training given in different OMLTs, again due to the different background and training of the OMLT officers from different countries. Italian officers emphasized one approach, Danish officers might have another approach, and the Americans a third approach.[204]

6.4.6   *Summary of Training*

This chapter describes the training regimes at different levels, before and during mission. Even if the CA and COIN was the framework of all ISAF field activities, soldiers had varied knowledge and training in these subjects. This contributed to the difficulty of managing and maintaining a unity of effort.

---

[203] See COIN Central: The Counter Insurgency Journal, 29 July 2010, Retrieved from http://coincentral.wordpress.com/2010/07/29/gen-petraeus-issues-new-coin-guidance-to-isaf-troops/

[204] The Afghan frustration about this diversity is displayed in "*Camp Victory*," a documentary produced and written by Carol Dysinger who followed OMLTs in Afghanistan for 3 years, from 2005 to 2008.

COIN education and CA knowledge and understanding were implemented at upper HQ levels, as this was a core subject in the pre-deployment mission training of the HQs. On lower levels, at the RCN and PRTs, these concepts were not so familiar due to divergence in training and knowledge. Some knew them well, others not.

Also CIMIC training and CIMIC understanding varied among CIMIC officers. NATO CIMIC Doctrine was well known among some and not known to others, even though NATO schools were meant to ensure a joint understanding. Some NATO countries educated their CIMIC officers in national courses only (if at all), which was not always in line with the NATO CIMIC doctrine. The US soldiers working with CIMIC in the RCN area were more familiar with the US Civil Affairs policy and doctrine than the NATO CIMIC doctrine.

The training and understanding of the prevailing coordination concepts (CA, COIN, and CIMIC) were based on different training and understood by nations and levels of the organization differently. One could meet officers that "*had no clue*" or were "*thrown into a position to fill a hole in the manning plan,*" to use the words of the interviewees. It was a paradox that one had to train officers in the war zone to ensure they had a minimum of qualifications to be operational after arrival in the RCN area of operation.

Finally, the training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) also had a diversity of focus and background because their mentors were from different ISAF contributing countries. This influenced their CA, COIN, and CIMIC knowledge and understanding, which led to organizational inconsistency.

These training aspects influenced the unity of effort, coordination ability, and efficiency, vertically and horizontally, internally and externally.

Military organizations put much effort into training and education to ensure professionalism such as is described in bureaucracy theories. In multinational forces like ISAF, the military training is influenced by various cultures and values, understandings, and foci derived from the contributing countries that influenced military conformity and professionalism. This creates a dilemma as to how far into the civilian dimension the military can go without blurring the lines coordinating civilian actors or finding themselves in civilian situations

they are not trained to handle. It also questions whether the soldiers have the necessary or appropriate training and knowledge to fulfill their mandate by comprehensive coordination along the lines of security, development, and governance as presupposed in the ISAF mandate and overall strategies.

Training has a major influence on how one understands one's own role and activities, which is looked into and described in the following chapter.

6.5   *Various Role Performance and Understanding*

This chapter describes the problems and dilemmas related to the military role and role performance among military actors in ISAF, and their coordinating actors. The vague ISAF mandate, the complex coordination strategies, and the different training and focus by participating nations all contribute to confusion and uncertainty among ISAF soldiers and their coordinating actors about the military role and responsibility.

In this chapter, the overall framework of the military role on the strategic level will be outlined first, then the different ways of understanding the military role and responsibility in the US and Germany/ Scandinavia is discussed, followed by role expectations and diffuse responsibility from the surrounding environment and coordinating actors. Lastly, the blurred line dilemma in coordination with the IOs, NGOs and GOs as well as the internal ISAF role confusion is discussed.

6.5.1   *Role Definition*

What is meant by role? The functionalist approach to role theory, borrowed from anthropology, sees a "role" as the set of expectations that society places on an individual (Wadel, 1991; Aase and Fossåskaret, 2007), a view relevant for this thesis. Here a role is understood as a prescribed and expected behavior associated with a particular position or status in an organization. It is the formal role that is in focus, the role given by position and the rules, regulations, or authority that follow this position. The soldier role, thus, incorporates the responsibility and expectations following the uniform, rules, law, training, and authority attached to it.

Among the many different role definitions and role theories, a short definition that might be useful is Lintons. Linton defines a role as *"the dynamic aspect of a status"* and status is defined as *"simply a collection of rights and duties"* (Linton, 1936, p. 114). A status is a social position recognized and occupied by an individual, a position most often consisting of a combination of ascribed and achieved factors (Linton, 1936).

6.5.2   *The scope of the Military Role*

In security issues, there is a common understanding between ISAF nations about what security implies, as this traditionally has been a military task. The support given to GIRoA in governance, development, and reconstruction as laid down in the ISAF mandate (below) was more difficult. Experience from the RCN showed diversity between nations in how they understood and performed the military role related to these aspects. The German and Scandinavian attitude toward governance and development issues was that this was not a military task.[205] This attitude is in line with NATO CIMIC doctrine as it is understood and taught in NATO CIMIC training courses in Scandinavia, Netherlands, and Germany. Additionally, this corresponds with the UN opinion of the military task and role.[206] The US and Hungary, at least on field level in the RCN area of operation, seemed to be more pragmatic when it comes to the framework of the military role in complex emergencies.

It was difficult to find a common practice in the following part of the ISAF mandate formulated in the UN Security Council Resolution 1943 (October 2010):

Recognizing once again the interconnected nature of the challenges in Afghanistan, reaffirming that sustainable progress on security, governance, human rights, the rule of law, and development, as well as the cross-cutting issues of anti-corruption, counter-narcotics, and transparency are mutually reinforcing and welcoming the continuing efforts of the Afghan Government

---

[205] Cf. description of the Comprehensive Approach (CA) strategy, chapter 2.4.
[206] As discussed and underlined in the 92sd UN Civil Military Coordination Course in Barcelona, July 2009. Also underlined by UN Special Representative in Afghanistan, 2010 (Eide, 2010).

*and the international community to address these challenges through a
comprehensive approach.*

What did that really mean to support GIRoA? The answer to this seemed to be
differently understood by different ISAF participating nations. This was
displayed in discussions between the US-led IJC level and the German-led
RCN level, inside the IJC, the RCN organization itself, and in the different
PRTs, representing different nations.

German policy was relatively concerned about keeping the civil and military
roles apart, and Germany was faced with a challenge by the US incoming
forces in the summer of 2010. The US forces had many resources and a more
pragmatic view on the military role towards the civilian dimension. Meetings
were held in RCN to create a joint understanding on these issues, usually
related to implementation of different projects, such as establishment and
running of the Border Cross Center at Hairatan BXP, the reintegration process
in Baghlan, the local governance conducted through the DDP project, and
even how to use CIMIC/CAT, and understand the COIN strategy. The RCN
CIMIC officers, the RCN SCR staff and the GTZ representatives were
somewhat withholding in supporting military involvement in the local civilian
sphere. US Forces, the Hungarian PRT, and USAID did not share the same
concerns.

On my question to a US CAT representative about how they worked
according to the mandate, the answer was: *"We are now discussing about all
this in our cell, how we work towards GIRoA and the PRTs. The PRTs are
working very differently; Kunduz* (German) *are working with a lot of time to
get known to the local GIRoA representatives. They do a good work on this;
they use time to get the relationships built. We* (US) *have kind of a trade-off;
we have fewer projects, and we don't have the time to build relationships. . . .
What exactly lies in the concept of governance and development? If you ask
the military about this, they cannot give you a very good answer, so what are
they doing then when they work with development and governance?"*[207]

This statement mirrored the uncertainty concerning the role and tasks as well
as the approach of different nations. It showed the doubt about whether the

---

[207] Interview with CAT representative in RCN, 28.02.2012.

training and education of military actors matched the tasks they were given in the operation area, and even questioned where their actions would lead.

6.5.3   *"The US Way" and "The European Way"*

An example of the different US and German/Scandinavian role understanding (and performance) was the DDP Project (Factbox 1), which created internal disagreements and understandings of the military role as well as the process for governance support. In the DDP Project, the IJC established close cooperation and coordination with the Afghan Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG). The DDP project was said to be Afghan led by GIRoA through IDLG. It looked much more as though it was IJC led, as the IJC was the outspoken body on information, opinions, guidance and commands, led the meetings, produced the papers, planned and executed civil military workshops. For example, when the IDLG held DDP briefings, the PowerPoint presentations were made by the US-led IJC.

The DDP goal was visible local governance, for the districts to be self-sustaining. In order to do this, close contact and negotiations with, and an assessment of the local district authorities were vital. Assessments were supposed to give an overview of the district needs. Based on this a plan, a timeline for implementation of the needed improvements in the actual districts would be conducted.[208]

The German led RCN CIMIC branch was skeptical of the DDP as being a top down process and of the timeline focus and even the military involvement in such a project at all. RCN CIMIC Branch underlined that there was not enough time to do the necessary assessments, key leader engagements, and ensure local ownership, suggesting that the time constraints might not be an adequate way to handle the issue. These were common RCN attitudes and opinions in relation to the DDP project, often displayed in meetings between the IJC and the RCN during the summer of 2010.

---

[208] This work had to be coordinated with, and not confused with, the UN led program with same abbreviation; DDP (district *development* plans) implying NGO contact as NGOs often were the follow up body in that project.

257

Underlining the time limits of the process and to the pressure, the IJC made it clear that the process had to proceed as planned, independently of any skepticism from the RCN CIMIC branch, and that this was regarded as an order.[209]

The IJC responsible body also underlined that this was not a top down process, but rather a bottom up process, pointing to the PRTs as the main players in the field. The PRTs were supposed to engage in the fact finding, determine the key figures and the governance needs for the villages in the district areas, and make suggestions for the DDP program, as laid down in the IJC FRAGO.

In RCN CIMIC and RCN Plans (CJ 5) branches, as well as in the PRTs, DDP participating representatives expressed uncertainty as to how to cope with a project so complex and difficult to handle militarily with time-limits. Among the questions were the following:

If the PRTs were to have a vital role in this, did they have the resources, or the ability to find out what the districts needed or lacked from governance? How to enable the PRTs to work with this? Were they capable of evaluating the situation, knowing what to look for or to ask for? As main actor in the field, the PRTs already did a lot of fact-finding work, assessing the districts, but to consider *governance* issues? If they needed guidance, information and support, how should this is conducted, and by whom? What to do if one met local resistance? Furthermore, did ISAF, or even the IDLG, as GIRoA representatives, have legitimacy in the population? Or would one build only a shadow governance system in this project? These questions were not answered.

There were also different views on the process or strategy. The IJC wanted implementation of DDP to follow the operations in difficult areas like Bhaglan e-Jadid, in line with the COIN doctrine.[210] The RCN CIMIC Branch, with support from GTZ, claimed it would be more rational to prioritize calmer

---

[209] Made clear in a Video/Tele Conferencing (VTC) meeting between responsible IJC body and RCN CIMIC Branch, July 2010.
[210] Note that Germany also was skeptical about the COIN process and involving the military too far into the civilian dimension. Cf. chapter 2.4.

areas and strengthen the already existing local structures to ensure local legitimacy, suggesting Mazar-e Sharif would profit better from the program. This way one could avoid building a "shadow governance system" in insurgent stronghold areas such as Baghlan e-Jadid.

ISAF coordinating bodies involved in the DDP project, as UN representatives, pointed to the extensive buildup of shadow governance in rural areas. UN representatives underlined that official governance positions (as DDP was supposed to develop and support) were actually empty shells in some districts, as experienced for example, in Baghlan, Kunduz, or Faryab Provinces. The real power lay in local traditional Elders and Shuras, or in the hands of warlords or insurgents. This meant that a roll out of DDP in Baghlan e-Jadid following COIN strategy was not a good idea at the time. Still the IJC responsible body pressed the process and the overall plans were pushed by the project management in IJC, Kabul. Either the attitude or picture of the reality on the ground at the different levels of the organization (IJC, RCN, and PRTs) was split on what was happening *or* the need for results or "good stories" overruled other opinions.

To support GIRoA in the development and governance issues, moreover, created uncertainty inside the RCN. In the RCN, the lead of the DDP project altered between the CIMIC branch and the CJ 5 (Plans). This showed the internal inconsistency in where to find the needed competence and how to handle this project.

The DDP Project was a good example of the dilemmas that occur when military actors are involved in areas as governance. The different understanding of the roles among the leading bodies in the RCN and the IJC displayed the variation in emphasis and understanding countries had regarding the military's role in governance related issues, here represented by US and Germany. It also displayed the disadvantage of the timelines and time pressure in such projects. Further, these projects were difficult to handle using a military method of planning and executing projects. Military actors had no qualifications for undertaking governance projects. The one day workshops designed to give them this qualification only underlined the lack of understanding of the complexity. One interviewee from US CAT pointed to the timeline focus: *"Everything is supposed to be in line with GIRoA, but we*

259

tend to find projects and give GIRoA the papers to sign. We do not have the time to do this in a proper way. The military wants results fast; now military leaders want results during their period in office. . . this will influence their career back home. In the US; I build this…'is a very important drive for the short timetables we operate with."[211]

The changing security situation influenced the plan for the roll out of DDP in some areas, which forced a change of focus. Mostly this led to a postponement of plans, but Mazar-e Sharif was incorporated into the project in accordance with what RCN CIMIC branch originally suggested.

6.5.4 *Role Expectations and Diffusion of Responsibility*

Responsibility in this context is a duty or obligation to satisfactorily perform or complete a task, which had a consequent penalty for failure. In a military environment, responsibility is an often used and underlined term. Responsibility is assigned by someone in the system, but can also be created by a soldiers own promise or circumstances. Military actors are trained to take responsibility, and very easily do so. This has been criticized by, for example, NGO workers, pointing out that military takes *too much* responsibility, especially outside their own sphere, which the aid workers argue threatens the humanitarian work.

How ISAF soldiers understood their own responsibility was related to understanding and interpretation of the ISAF mandate, the procedures and the doctrines, as well as national caveats. Also, it was about experience, training, and understanding of what was *not* their responsibility; this required a certain insight and knowledge of the civilian dimension and acquired cultural awareness.

High-ranked officers with an overall perspective knew the content or words of the ISAF mandate, but often interpreted it differently. Among the mid-level officers, most saw the mandate as something vague and distant. When questioned about the mandate, most interviewees were not interested or did not know the details. As one officer put it; *"it is about supporting GIRoA, whatever that means."* Some officers showed little interest, having their hands

---

[211] Interview with CAT representative in RCN, 28.02.2011.

full of the daily business, working hard to make sure their contribution was satisfying and visible. Consequently, the lower down in the organization, the more these soldiers were concerned about their own area of responsibility, job descriptions, and the local influence of their tasks, than in the overall mandate.

In civil-military coordination projects in which ISAF was engaged, the expectations of the military (due to their capabilities, logistics and power) from coordinating actors sometimes were greater than ISAF could fulfill. It was known that the PRTs were overrun by "wish lists" from local authorities, village spokesmen, and individuals. It was also an RCN policy to hold back and to not get involved in local power conflicts or in actions whose outcome one could not foresee. Nevertheless, the PRTs had different policy and practice on these issues. PRT PEK was quite involved in local civilian projects and PRT MAI stayed out of the civilian sphere, as will be outlined later.

Despite the vague mandate, there was an understanding in the RCN that one should not get involved in local politics. Nevertheless, this was hard to avoid in some situations, as the ISAF engagement in the Hairatan Railway Project (Factbox 2) showed. Here the expectations of ISAF's role from the locals did not correspond with ISAF's own role understanding.

The CIMIC branch liaised with and monitored the construction work. It had contact with the construction company and other key personnel related to the construction in order to be updated and discuss security issues. The Hairatan to Mazar-e Sharif railway track was the first modern railway track in the country, and had a high prestige and priority for GIRoA. Coordinating meetings related to the railway project were held in the RCN. The RCN CIMIC branch conducted the meetings. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), as donor, the private security company SMEC, which was responsible for security, Uzbekistan Temir Yullari (UTY) as the Construction Company, and representatives from the local authorities and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) among others, were represented.

Due to some extra project money, the construction company had flexibility with the last five km of the rail, and where to locate the last station. They

wanted to discuss construction and location of the last station, culverts, and ISAF freedom of movement along the railway track with ISAF/RCN.

The construction company (UTY) and local representatives from the province and district authority wanted ISAF to decide, or at least give their opinions about, where the last station should be located. ISAF, represented by RCN CIMIC Branch, underlined that this was not an ISAF issue, and that ISAF had no opinion on this. The RCN CIMIC branch pointed to the fact that this was a national track and had nothing to do with ISAF (who was a temporary actor in the area), and that the focus should be on what is best for the national and local future logistics and needs. It turned out to be quite difficult to make a joint understanding of the fact that ISAFs view was "no view."

The Ministry of Interior (MOI) representative was quite surprised and irritated by the fact that ISAF was better informed about plans and details of the project than they were. This led to some heated arguing between local and central authority representatives about who was the legitimate authority. It revealed the mistrust between the local district authorities and the national GIRoA level, represented by the MOI. The local authority trusted ISAF and other local actors more than the GIRoA level of own authorities.

The local authorities and the construction company's trust in ISAF to make a decision were strong. They seemed frustrated of being "left alone" in this, underlining the need for an ISAF view or statement. Obviously, ISAF was looked upon as the strong actor in the area, but the perception of ISAF as the "big brother" was strange and unexpected in the eyes of the RCN CIMIC Branch.[212] This led to speculations about whether the (US led) IJC had given different signals to the local authorities or Uzbek Railway; Uzbekista Temir Yullari (UTY) than the (German led) RCN had done.

Similar experiences in which local population trusted ISAF superiors over their own authorities, occurred, for example, when it came to other infrastructure projects, especially hospitals or medical care facilities and equipment. In such cases the local population often searched for ISAF

---

[212] Later it came up, through unofficial information, that local authorities were afraid of that ISAF would change their decision if they themselves decided where the end station should be located, without a supporting ISAF statement.

support, which *principally* could not be met (even though exceptions were occasionally met in cases of complex medical situations).

These were situations that also stressed the military and how it should cope with the different and sometimes contradictory expectations from the local environment.

6.5.5 *The Blurred Lines Dilemma*

Since the Balkan wars, coordinating actors, especially UN units and NGOs, have questioned the military's role in the "new wars" and conflicts, pointing to the negative effects of the blurred lines between military and civilian actors in conflict areas (Duffield, 2001; DeRoos, 2003; Weissman, 2004; Smith, 2005; Kaldor, 2007; Keen, 2008;).

In military doctrines such as the NATO CIMIC doctrine, the term coordination and cooperation is used as if they have the same content or meaning. Humanitarian actors seem to have a more detailed focus on the difference between the two terms, underlining that coordination with military forces sometimes is necessary, but cooperation is very difficult and most often undesirable. Some NGOs are very clear that they will not have any coordination or cooperation with military forces—notably Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC)— but still, they have pragmatic views on this issue in situations where coordination between the actors can be critical to avoid chaos and human suffering. The situation becomes very difficult when the environment is highly politicized and militarized and the humanitarian actors strive to protect their humanitarian sphere from becoming a battleground (Sommerfeldt; 2005; Cornish, 2008; Friis, 2011).

In a war zone, as in Afghanistan, the humanitarian sphere can be difficult to protect. The result was that many influential IOs/GOs/NGOs laid down procedures, guidelines, and policies for the civil-military coordination work. Some of these were general like the Department of Peacekeeping Cooperation (DPKO) Guidelines[213] used by many NGOs, and some had more specific

---

[213] See http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/451ba7624.pdf

agreement with the military such as the IOM (International Organization for Migration) in Afghanistan.[214]

The IOM worked closely with governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental partners as well as working and coordinating their activities with PRT units in Afghanistan. The PRTs were involved to help implement IOM projects. PRTs also contacted IOM for reconstruction and humanitarian help when local civilians suffered from military activities.[215]

6.5.5.1   Coordination in Natural Disasters

In North Afghanistan during the summer of 2010, the annual flooding was severe and affected many provinces of the RCN area. Mainly the PRTs coordinated with UNAMA and Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) to assist in these situations. This was done by supporting the provincial officials in providing basic services during emergency situations and also improving disaster management and preparedness. Discussions about the military role and responsibility in these situations were frequent.

ISAF was approached by local authorities to help with natural disasters, using the argument that this would make the local population and media have a positive view of local leaders and ISAF. Some military leaders were eager to interfere to make a "good story," both to "sell back home" and to win hearts and minds of the local population. The German led CIMIC Branch, on the other hand, used much effort to make the RCN and PRT managements understand the necessity of ISAF soldiers staying out of natural disaster management, if possible. This view was supported by representatives in UNAMA and GTZ, using the argument that the civilian population and the ANDMA needed to develop their own ability to cope. They claimed that help from military logistics would only undermine the local structures built for these events.

---

[214] MoU. Retrieved from
https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/EnhancedCi/Documents/MOUamongIO/file/_WFS/MOU%20IOM-NATO%20NOV%2007.pdf
[215] Information from IOM representative in CIMIC course at CCOE, Enschede, Netherlands, November 2009

UN OCHA underlined the danger of "acquired helplessness" in the population if the military was too helpful. In areas where no help was given, the population adjusted and handled the situation in an appropriate way. OCHA claimed that military personnel were usually not trained to see the differences between annual flooding and a special massive life threatening emergency, as were civilian actors and, therefore, should stay out of the handling of these situations.[216] This said, it was difficult when natural disasters happened in insecure, high conflict areas, where military actors already were heavily involved, and the conditions for the local population was much worse than normal. Still, the local population mostly managed. Flash flooding and heavy rains struck thousands of Afghans in conflict-affected areas such as Kunduz, Baghlan, and Ghor in spring 2010.[217] It was a problem for many NGOs to help in these conflict areas, but the Red Cross managed, in close cooperation with Afghan Red Crescent Society. This was done without too much military interference, as ISAF needed to focus on their main responsibility of security and stability, and the ISAF/ANSF joint military operations (Taohid I-III) ongoing in the area.

Still, the discussions and different views inside the coalition on the military role in local emergencies such as floods or earthquakes showed the different approaches and the eagerness to "do well" among ISAF officers. It also showed that if the CIMIC branch, on occasions like this, had been led by another nation with another view, for example the US, the military might have been more involved. What was the military responsibility, then? The policy that emerged was quite personal and nation-dependent, in accord with national training, policies, and attitudes.

6.5.5.2   PRTs Role Performance

As mentioned, the attitudes towards the blurred lines dilemma were also different among the various PRT nations, from the more pragmatic Hungarian view on one end, to the Norwegian view of keeping military engagement

---

[216] Discussed in civil military meeting between RCN CIMIC branch and the UN and NGOs, July, 2010.
[217] Personal observation, see also CPHD: Afghan Humanitarian Development Report, 2011: Retrieved from http://www.cphd.af/Downloads/Background%20Papers/Flood%20and%20drought%20-%20The%20Afghan%20water%20paradox.pdf

apart from civilian activities, on the other end. According to PRT PEK CIMIC officers[218] they did CIMIC projects, like school repair and road improvements, they also delivered food items and school equipment such as QIPs. The QIPs were based upon requests from the local population. This was a CIMIC that was at a distance from the Norwegian understanding of keeping military away from any civilian activity, with the German and Swedish attitude and practice being somewhere in between. These different practices made it difficult for coordinating actors as NGOs to relate to the military. Moreover, the civilian regularly criticized the military on their blurring of the lines when doing civilian projects.

Nevertheless, both the civilian and military parts of the PRTs were needed in the bigger projects as there was a close coordination of their activities. The PRTs, on the military side, were engaged in Afghan national civilian projects in close coordination with the UN and NGOs, as fact finders and local/area experts in such matters as the highly profiled Hairatan BXP (fact box 3), the Highway 1 (fact box 4) and the DDP projects (fact box 1), even though this also had its challenges. PRT officers claimed that the NGOs were only sitting behind their desks due to the security situation, so they had to do everything themselves, and NGOs complained about military being too involved in civilian projects.

With the support of the mandate and the Comprehensive Approach strategy, many infrastructure projects (schools, roads, bridges, etc.) were done by the PRTs in support of GIRoA. Also many QIPs (wells, power lines, generators) were managed by the PRTs, especially through the COIN operations in the Kunduz and Baghlan provinces, as well as the Highway 1 project in Faryab province.[219]

Whether military involvement in infrastructure projects was correct was often discussed among both CIMIC officers and other military support units. A CAT interviewee said it this way: "…*having the PRTs responsible for big projects like roads and dams is not the way to do this, these are long term projects. But the US does this because the money is quicker through the military and is a quick fix, as through ISAF CERP money, not using a lot of*

---

[218] Interview with two PRT PEK CIMIC officers, 22.02.2011.
[219] Personal observation.

time through the GIRoA channels."[220] Many projects ended up like this. The problem was that many of these projects, such as schools or medical centers, deteriorated after a time from lack of use and no local ownership.

Nevertheless, some PRT soldiers understood the local codes and managed to engage well with the local environment. One example was "Captain Tom." In the Hairatan Railway Project and the Hairatan Border cross Project (BXP) project RCN branches conducted several assessment trips to Hairatan. During these trips RCN officers were often met, both by the railway construction company (UTY) and the local authority representatives, with talk about "Captain Tom."[221] Captain Tom was a man they trusted, respected, and had built good relations with. In discussions, they often referred to what Captain Tom had said, done, or recommended, and the locals were not eager to make any changes from what he had said. Obviously, Captain Tom had understood how Afghans (and Uzbeks) build up relationships, and was a door opener to coordination and cooperation with local authorities and companies. The PRT MeS through soldiers such as Captain Tom had firsthand information and connections which the RCN/ IJC should have used and coordinated in a better way when operating in the Hairatan area with big projects as the Border Cross Centre or the Railway to Mazar-e Sharif.[222] The local knowledge and capability was not always sufficiently recognized.

Still, officers, because they are officers, and not humanitarian workers, tended to focus on their time frame rather than the long term perspective that might improve relations with the local environment and local population. Nevertheless, COIN and CA concepts presuppose that the military has a more desired relationship with the local population than only as aggressors, and that they build relations. But as a military, force is used, so the balance between being a support and being aggressive is very difficult to find and handle. In the Afghan context the expectations and requirements linked to the performance of the soldier role was extremely difficult, shaded and, at time, even contradictory.

---

[220] Interview with CAT representative, 28.02.2011.
[221] Personal observation. "Captain Tom" turned out to be a former officer in the Swedish PRT, belonging to a MOT (mobile observation team).
[222] Personal observations in meetings with UTY Construction Company and local authorities, spring/summer 2010.

Besides, when the ISAF mandate (2010) focusing on GIRoA support in security and stability along the lines of governance, development and reconstruction met the new strategy of General Petraeus in 2010, called the "kill or capture" missions[223] this fueled the role confusion (Strick van Linschoten 2011; Friis, 2010/2011). How the ISAF strategy of "kill or capture," which was conducted during night time, conformed to the CA and COIN concept of supporting governance, development and reconstruction role during daytime was difficult to understand, and fueled the role confusion. There were not only a role confusion or uncertainty inside the military organization; this also questioned the ISAF legitimacy and confused coordinating actors and the local population as how to deal with or how to understand the military role, as well as how to coordinate or act in accordance with the soldiers.

6.5.6   *Summary of Role Performance*

This chapter has discussed some dilemmas related to role performance. What was within the scope of the military role and what was not? This again leads to different interpretation and practices among the contributing ISAF nations. The handling of the DDP Project illustrated how various cultures, values, training, understanding, and focus influenced how one viewed the military's role, both on an individual and organizational level.

Nations with different backgrounds and ideologies led to inconsistency in role performance in the operation area, as the vague ISAF mandate and the lack of clarity in overall coordination strategies led to diffusion of responsibility. The expectations from the local environment towards ISAF suffered from this confusion about role and responsibility, leading to unrealistic expectancies, confusion, and disappointments. This confusion was displayed, for example, in the Hairatan Railway Project. It became increasingly difficult for ISAF soldiers to balance their role when central GIRoA authorities (which ISAF was supposed to support) were not trusted by the local population. Despite these complications, ISAF still worked to meet expectations and take responsibility.

---

[223] "Kill or Capture" mission: the kill or capture missions by U.S. and allied forces is a part of the counterinsurgency in ongoing operations in Afghanistan. See analyst, Alex Strick van Linschoten (2011) .

The blurred lines problem is described to underline the security problem some IOs and NGOs faced when they were associated with the military. The only security IOs/NGOs often had was the mutual trust among the local population, which they might lose, especially in insurgent stronghold areas, if they were associated with the military. Besides, ISAF with its visibility, resources, and logistic capacity could easily push away civilian actors, so it was essential to clarify the military role towards IOs, NGOs and GOs when the overall strategies presupposed such a close coordination. This became difficult when the ISAF role expectations were inconsistent and even contradictory (as the "capture-or-kill" versus "development and governance" support). Most of all this was a challenge for the soldiers themselves, who were more or less left to find out themselves what, how and when to act in civil military coordination issues.

The PRTs, also representing different cultures, training, policy, and focus, displayed various involvements in civilian projects and QIPs. This is mentioned to display coordination dilemmas with civilian actors and how important cultural awareness and understanding of local codes were. The different experiences and levels of contact with the Afghan population influenced the understanding of the soldier's role, and how successful a soldier could be in their role. To have success presupposed cultural awareness, respect, and time, which in most cases, the military structure did not allow. The "Captain Tom" types were rare, but *they were there* on the ground level; still their abilities and knowledge often were not used by the higher levels of the ISAF organization.

The debate on how "military" the military role and responsibility should be in the context of the new wars was vital inside ISAF as well as in external political environments and the official debate. In a "war amongst people," as we see in Afghanistan, there were always discussions and questions as to how far into the civilian dimension the military could go without losing their military perspective, blurring the lines by coordinating with civilian actors or finding themselves in civilian situations they are not trained to handle. When military actors are set to conduct activities outside the purely military ones, this presupposes deep contextual knowledge, cultural awareness, and long term perspectives, which traditionally are not associated with the military.

How one understands a role influences the way one plans and makes decisions, which is the main topic in the following chapter.

"No plan of battle ever survives contact with the enemy."
Helmuth Johann Ludwig von Moltke (1848-1916).

6.6   *Planning Dilemmas*

Planning and decision processes in NATO, ISAF and the contributing countries is an enormous field which cannot be covered here, only aspects relevant for this thesis will be mentioned. NATO and ISAF's overall organizational structures and the planning and decision-making processes are based upon the principles of consultation and consensus, which made it a challenge to get a good overview and understanding of the many influential aspects playing a part.

This chapter starts with a short introduction to overall planning aims and principals. Then ISAF, here represented by IJC, RCN and the subordinated PRTs, planning and decision-making process in general and related to projects (listed in chapter 6.1.) are described. This includes internal planning between ISAF organizational levels, as well as project planning and decision processes involving coordination with external actors and environment.

6.6.1   *NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP)*

To be able to ensure that so many member countries' political, military and other resources were working together, NATO conducted a Defence Planning Process in which allies contributed, to ensure the necessary forces and capabilities needed to achieve the prevailing objectives. The aim of NATO defense planning process (NDPP) is, according to NATO: *"to provide a framework within which national and Alliance defense planning activities can be harmonized to meet agreed targets in the most effective way. It aims to facilitate the timely identification, development and delivery of the necessary range of forces - forces that are interoperable and adequately prepared, equipped, trained and supported - as well as the associated military and non-*

military capabilities to undertake the Alliance-s full spectrum of missions." [224]
The NDPP consisted of five steps;

1. Establish political guidance
2. Determine requirements
3. Apportion requirements and set targets
4. Facilitate Implementation
5. Review results

This way of carry out planning is normal practice, which is supplied by
planning guidelines, directives, reports, decision documents, templates, and so
on. Further, NATO, by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
(SHAPE), has developed a Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive
(SHAPE, 2010) to provide a common framework for collaborative operations
planning within a comprehensive approach philosophy.

All military planning has to be within the framework of the prevailing
strategies, doctrines, and operation plans. NATO operations, of which ISAF
in North Afghanistan was one, followed the AJP-01,[225] which was the
capstone doctrine for Allied Joint Operations. In line with this, an overall
operation plan and more detailed operation orders for a course of action have
been outlined at different levels.

In ISAF, the strictness, rules, and requirements for planning were tighter
further down in the organization. On the RCN, level the Standard Operation
Plans (SOP) and the FRAGOs had to follow quite detailed and accurate
prescribed formats.

To keep all military planning in line with the overall strategy, doctrines, and
the operation plan were a challenge. Due to the complex multinational IJC
and RCN structures, and having different nations lead PRTs, a unity of effort
in planning and execution were difficult to achieve, *especially* when it came
to civil military coordination issues over projects. Planning operations were

---

[224] Cf. NATO homepage. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49202.htm
See also: http://www.act.nato.int/transformer-2012-01/article-25
[225] NATOs Allied Joint Operation Capstone Doctrine,, AJP-01 Allied Joint Publication, issued
Dec. 2010.

easier, and followed the known military way of planning as laid down in Operational Plan and the more detailed Operation Orders.[226]

Project planning did not entirely fit into this structure. The plans were not so detailed, leaving room for influence and adjustments, even though FRAGOs were frequently used. Military planning is based upon rational planning with emphasis on timelines. This was difficult because ISAF worked on a shorter timeline than civilian coordinating actors did.

6.6.2 *Rational Planning*

The simple rational planning and decision making which characterize the military planning processes is built upon ideas represented by the work of Mannheim (1940) or Banfield (1959).[227] A typical military planning process in a joint operation such as Afghanistan follows the Joint Operation Planning Process, illustrated in the Figure No. 6-9 below.

The reason for referring to US models is that all overall plans for civil military coordination, especially in project planning in North Afghanistan, were made in the upper-level US led HQs, from plan officers known to these models.

---

[226] An operation plan is a plan for the conduct of military operations in a hostile environment prepared by a commander of a unified command in response to a requirement established by the joint military strategic management. It represents the full development of the concept of operations of the commander in chief (here the ISAF Commander) and has to be consistent with the joint military doctrine of the troops involved as well as domestic and international law. The concept of operational plans is based upon phased gradual situation-adjusted application of the forces, dependent on political and military developments. Further, an operation plan and operation order follows a prescribed format to ensure that important matters are addressed.
[227] See for example: NATO Operational Planning Process as laid down in AJP-3 (Allied Joint Operations) or US Field Manual (FM) 5.0 *"The operation process,"* or US FM 3-07 *"Stability operations,"* Chapter 4.

THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS

Step 1: Initiation

Step 2: Mission Analysis

Step 3: Courses of Action (COA) Development

Step 4: COA Analysis and Wargaming

Step 5: COA Comparison

Step 6: COA Approval

Step 7: Plan or Order Development

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Operation Planning, 2003, III-20

Figure 6-9 "Joint Operation Planning Process"

The figure above is taken from the US Joint Operation Planning Process, but this process is very similar in most NATO participating countries, which use NATO doctrines and planning process as template for national developed planning process.[228] The planning process in Figure No. 6-9 displays the main elements of Benfield's (1959) four step rational plan model, which he claimed involved rational choice thinking (cf. section 4.3.5.), by first analyzing the situation, then listing the opportunities for action and their consequences, making choices by selecting the preferred actions, and designing the course of action. The Joint Operation Planning process deviates from Banfield's model in evaluation of consequences, which are not displayed in *this* military

---

[228] NATO Operational Planning Process as laid down in AJP-3 (Allied Joint Operations) and Bi-SC Guidelines for Operational Planning – GOP (Final Revision 1), June 2005. Retrieved from http://pksoi.army.mil/doctrine_concepts/documents/UK/jwp5_00.pdf

planning process. Additionally, the figure displays the need for approval at higher levels of command when developing plans.[229]

The overall plans prepared by the IJC, contained short-term, mid-term, and long-term planning for national and regional projects. These plans represented the directions for all RCN planning, and the guidelines for the command and control of the PRTs, which also had their short-, mid- and long-term planning. "The planning regime" made sure that plans always were connected with the higher level and gave the framework for command and control to the lower level, even though this was complex with the new cross-functional teams in the IJC, since they did not display the traditional CJ functions (Cf. chapter 3).

6.6.3 *RCN Internal Planning*

The IJC overall plans regarding civil military coordination, in general and concerning projects, often was accompanied with different FRAGOs, representing the RCN structure for its own planning and actions, as well as that of the PRTs. RCN did not always agree with the IJC plans (cf. the DDP Project). The root of disagreements often was in the different understanding of the situational picture and the military's role: The RCN argued against too much involvement in the civil dimension as well as the short timeline focus that characterized the project plans from the IJC.

6.6.3.1   Mutual understanding in RCN branches

Some planners, especially in CJ5 (plans branch), the Fusion Center, and the CIMIC branch were frustrated about all the IJC FRAGOs and their short time limits, claiming the work directed needed real analysis and long-term thinking. These time pressure situations sometimes led to the production of a quick answer to please the IJC FRAGOs no matter how unsustainable the content was perceived by the RCN. Some RCN and PRT officers lost motivation in this battle about strategies when faced with the reality on the ground, became resigned and adjusted to the system rather than fighting for a better joint understanding. On the other hand, some officers also had

---

[229] Another example of a rational planning model is the US Army;'s Crisis Action Planning Model, Army War College, U.S. Army. Retrieved from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/stratdm.htm#RATIONALDECISIONMODEL

influence. The PRT MAI, for example, was able to win first RCN and then IJC support for their priorities in the in the Highway 1 Project.

Most branches in the RCN had planners. Non-operational issues like project planning and implementation were influenced by CJ3 (operation branch) activities. This was because most projects also were related to operations to be aligned with the COIN strategy. During CJ3 planning and execution of operations and activities, information and coordination was important, but occasionally scarce. The CIMIC branch used informal discussions and connections to collect the needed information related to their own planning and executing of projects. This was especially true for those connected to COIN operations, where CIMIC played a role in QIPs and coordination with the civilian community. It was difficult from a CIMIC point of view to coordinate and sell CIMIC aspects to the CJ3 branch. The CJ3, being very kinetic, did not always see the point of CIMIC aspects during their planning and execution of military operations, even though the operations conformed with the COIN doctrine of the local population being the center of gravity.

In order to build a good situational picture of the civil dimension, CIMIC needed close coordination with CJ2 (intelligence); this coordination was influenced by personal relationships. When this did not work, the CIMIC personnel had to address PRTs intelligence branch to get the needed information.[230]

This said, the cooperation between the CIMIC branch and CJ5 (plans) was considered good. CIMIC branch and CJ5 had close cooperation in the working groups dealing with regionally important projects such as the Hairatan Railway Project, the Hairatan BXP Project, DDP Projects and the Highway 1 Project. These two branches also worked closely on the mentioned "deep-dives" to build a comprehensive picture of the civilian dimension. This was relevant for the decision process of the Commander as well as an

---

[230] On several occasions, civilian personnel in the CIMIC branch addressed J2 (intelligence) in PRT MAI to get the information RCN CJ2 did not share. This led to the PRT questioning the RCN inner communications and coordination. (Personal observations).

important basis for implementation of RCN planning, considering the project planning.[231]

The many countries represented in the RCN planning, with their different backgrounds, languages, and foci challenged the information and communication process in the effort to find a joint understanding. Such a joint understanding was an essential aspect of the planning for appropriate crisis management (Turner, 1978) and project handling, which was difficult in such a large and loose coupled organization, with willful subunits.

6.6.3.2   Redundant work

Even if the PRTs did their own planning, the overall framework and priorities of *key districts*[232] were established by the IJC/RCN. The fact-finding and district information gathering from the PRTs also influenced the IJC/RCN information analysis. In this way, the bureaucratic command and control system was functional.

The PRTs as battle space owners knew their area best, as they were the boots on the ground, and were the main information source for RCN, and further for the IJC. The PRTs had their own intelligence officers who made reports, which were sent to the RCN intelligence branch, as they also did on other military subjects, such as operations, logistics, CIMIC, or planning.

The RCN CIMIC branch drew the picture of the civilian dimension based on the information they got from (among others) the PRTs. Sometimes it was difficult to get needed information. The communication between the PRTs and the RCN varied greatly. This was one of the reasons for the RCN, using its own forces for weeks and months in PRT responsible areas to gather information from the ground about security, governance, and development. (These units were often the tactical CIMIC teams (TCTs), the civil affairs teams (CATs) or human terrain teams (HHTs)).

Another important information channel in the RCN was the CIMIC Fusion Centre, where CIMIC experts gathered. The actors in the Fusion Centre (such

---

[231] Personal observations and discussions with CIMIC and CJ5 branch.
[232] Key District: ISAF prioritized areas by their evaluation of which district had special importance.

as PRT liaisons, CAATs, CATs or HTTs) were all vital information sources. But, all these units were more or less out in the field gathering information about the civilian dimension, resulting in redundant work, which likely occurred, and could have been avoided with a better internal coordination and information exchange. This challenge was discussed in joint meetings for building the civilian situational picture on behalf of the Commander, but did not improve during 2010 and 2011. These units all continued to gather information on the same subjects in the same areas. For better and worse, personal relations occasionally influenced information gathering and sharing.

During the planning and construction of the Hairatan Railway Project and the Hairatan BXP Project, officers from the RCN planning branch (CJ5) used their own reconnaissance to assess the situation, as did the CIMIC branch (CJ9), the logistic branch (CJ4) and the US, with their newly arrived 10th Mountain Unit. Neither the accomplishment of the reconnaissance trips, nor the assessments made were coordinated.[233] From a security and a resource utilization perspective, this was an inefficient method to conduct assessments. On several occasions, branch chiefs underlined the need for coordination, and noted that any kind of "war tourism"[234] was not acceptable. Still, this was an ongoing problem.

From the perspective of the local population, it must have been quite strange to witness all these different units in the rural areas, doing similar assessments and asking similar questions. The "light footprint" (Andersen, 1999), important in COIN strategy, was not light at all.

6.6.3.3   Decision influence from lower level

The Highway 1 Project (Factbox 4) had been going on for many years, and many ISAF contingents had been working on it. The framework for the actual

---

[233] In working group meetings, planning actions related to the Hairatan BXP area, vital information about the RCN firefighters (CJ-4) assessments, and risk analysis of the preparedness related to the oil and gas storage in the area, were not known until very late in the process, after someone in a meeting suddenly remembered that the firefighters probably had done some earlier assessments in the area.

[234] War tourism was a nickname used for trips that were not really necessary, but were conducted with the strong motivation to get out in the field. These were often driven by energetic convincing argumentation related to the "nice to know" aspect rather than the need to know.

RCN project—from March 2010 through the end of the year—was to fulfill the missing link of the Highway from Qaisar to Ghormach in Faryab Province. The plan was to reconstruct together with the IJC, ANSF, local authorities and PRT MAI this distance, which had been destroyed by floods.

Meetings with PRT MAI revealed that it was they who often drove on this road and visited local villages, and who had different opinions than the IJC planners about priorities. Instead of using time and resources on improvement and maintenance of parts of the road that had already been built in the more secure areas, PRT MAI wanted the dirt road to the insecure Ghormarch Bazaar area to be prioritized and paved. At the time, this was considered very dangerous as it was an insurgent controlled area.[235] The PRT argued that a paved road would give more security as that had been the experience with other parts of the road building efforts. They argued that both local prosperity and security became better along the paved parts of the road. Moreover, this would create more security against IEDs, both for the local population and ISAF vehicles, and would create a better situation for a civil military coordination. This view eventually received support, first from the RCN, and then the IJC.

Some internal ISAF planning struggles has been outlined above, but the planning and decision-making process faced greater struggle when it came to planning involving the surrounding environment.

> *"You have the clocks.*
> *We have the time."*
> Taliban

6.6.4 *Project Planning*

In the planning of projects with regional importance, planning working groups with many CJ-function branches, mostly intelligence (CJ2), operations (CJ3), logistics (CJ4), planning (CJ5), CIMIC (CJ9), and sometimes communication (CJ6) were represented. Additionally, representatives from other branches or units were invited, depending on the subject, as well as others that CJ5, who

---

[235] According to the PRT MAI Liaison Officer, PRT personnel were regularly under fire when entering this area.

led the meetings, found to have an interest. For these meetings, RCN often conducted internal meetings first, sometimes with PRT representation, and then joined together with ANSF representatives or local authorities. Projects like the Highway 1 Project and the Hairatan BXP Project were conducted this way. This way, all branches could be updated (depending on whether they were represented in the group) on the ongoing project planning.

Highway 1 Project's primary problem was to find civilian contractors who could or would do the work, due to poor security. This was also the case for the overall project of the missing 233 km. between Qaisar and Laman as well as the Qaisar to Ghormach distance in which the RCN was involved. Six or seven planning meetings and additional discussions were held to find a solution.

When the US forces first came during June and July 2010, the flow and the coordination of information and plans had focus. The US did have its own reconnaissance teams in the Qaisar to Ghormach area, which was not coordinated with the RCN Highway 1 planning group. This created some irritation. But soon, there was recognition in the planning group that the US was the only ones who had sufficient resources to push forward the paving of the Qaisar to Ghormach road. Fast, visible and measurable results mattered most, and this was what the US could supply with the existing understanding in the RCN of the command given by IJC HQ. When civilian actors could not stay in the area due to poor security, military actors were the only solution if the project needed to be executed in a time frame under conditions set by the international community and their donors.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB), which came up with a grant to fulfill the missing link in the Highway, did negotiate with the US Corps of Engineers, but later withdrew, with the argument that they did not want to fund a "military operation," or use military contractors, such as the US Corps of Engineers. ADB then searched for civilian entrepreneurs without luck. Civilian entrepreneurs and contractors doing work in the area earlier were attacked and killed by insurgents, and the security needed for civilian contactors was hard to accomplish. Since Highway 1 had such high priority

from GIRoA, the pressure on the project was high so, in the end, the US engineers came back on the project, as an ISAF contribution.[236]

To ensure freedom of movement and minimize the insurgency, some COIN operations were planned and conducted in the area. As with the project planning, the PRT MAI together with US forces and ANSF conducted operations in Pashtun Kot, Almar, Qaisar and Ghormach districts in Faryab Province to improve freedom of movement and create the necessary security pre-conditions to complete the construction of Highway 1 in the Ghormach area. ADB underlined that it was necessary to supply money and resources for QIPs and projects along with the construction work to win the hearts and minds of the nearby population and villages. Fifteen percent of the funding was earmarked to conduct development and governance projects and 25 percent was earmarked for QIPs as security support. This presupposed close planning and coordination between ISAF and ANSF to execute military operations and maneuvers, as well as using QIPs to maintain security.

6.6.4.1   Involving local actors

During a Highway 1 Project planning meeting, an ANSF (ANA 209th Corps) colonel, suggested using the *necessary time* to engage local leaders, strongmen, and locals with influence and money in the villages and rural areas along the road. He argued that using the locally-owned tractors and machinery would to engage the local population in the project and give them work, which is a way to limit the insurgent influence. The colonel also asked why there were no local key leaders in the planning meetings, and why dialogs or "bridge building" with local key leaders had not been conducted. Acceptance by the elders and important men in the villages was an important aspect, he added.[237]

The power-point slides used in the working group meetings were in English. ANA officers asked for slides in Dari, the local language, and after a while, they were made in both Dari and English. ANA officers also asked to get the

---

[236] Later in September 2011, an American company, Hill International, received a 4-year contract for construction management of the missing 233 Qaisar to Laman road project, funded by ADB. A Turkish construction company, ECCI-METAG also got a 4-year contract in 2012 to rehabilitate and reconstruct the missing part.
[237] Personal observation, as participant in the working group.

slides before the meetings so they could be discussed. This request was not met, with the argument that this was NATO secret information.

In September, 2011, the part of the road in Faryab Province was finally taken care of by the US engineers, using their own dozers and heavy military machinery, with US Army and ANSF (3rd Kandak, 209th Corps) protection. This displayed poor civil military coordination, if any. [238]

The Afghans had time, ISAF did not. This was why the Afghans were not thoroughly involved in the projects.

Another example is taken from planning meetings on the Hairatan BXP Project (Fact box 3). In these meetings, ANSF participants were not given the time necessary for their interpreters to give a proper translations; thus, the local leaders never really participated in the discussions as equals due to this problem in addition to the problem of not getting the information before the meeting. In addition, the meetings were held in RCN Camp Marmal and not, for example, in the ANA 209th Corps HQ at Camp Shaheen, nearby. The meetings also sometimes collided with the Afghan prayer time. While this was pointed out by an ANA colonel participating in the planning meetings, now and then still the meetings were held in the prayer.

In the planning meetings, the Border Crossing Center (BCC) location was discussed with ANSF. PRT MeS, as the ISAF unit with most local knowledge, came up with four proposals. An ANSF colonel and a district governor representative were given the time until the next meeting to decide which one of the proposed four locations was the most convenient. The ANSF colonel came up with a location for the BCC in the next meeting; they had agreed on alternative 4, arguing that this land was governmental and not private-owned, so one could avoid a land dispute. In the meantime, the RCN representatives together with the IJC representatives had also discussed this internally and came up with another alternative due to new security

---

[238] I followed the project to September 2010, and had follow-up interviews in February 2011. This Information is from RCN CIMIC, on phone, also described in US 170th Infantry Brigade Combat Team News: Retrieved from http://170infantry.armylive.dodlive.mil/2011/10/05/isaf-bridges-new-road-toward-change-for-faryab-citizens/

assessments. The ISAF alternative was rapidly pushed through as the final decision of the BCC location.[239]

6.6.4.2   A "muddling through" process

The RCN interdisciplinary working groups were important in planning and decision making. They were also criticized for being "foggy" in relation to the traditional military command and control system. As one RCN officer said; *"… we have a lot of working groups, but there are no clear leading or responsibility of these groups, or clear results to reach…"* It *was* difficult to see the aims and responsibilities, even though the planning branch (CJ5) often had the lead, delegating supporting issues to other branches, which were more or less done or followed up, depending on the engagement of the management.

Still, the planning working groups were vital for the outcome of the brainstorming and handling of muddling-through planning or a more mixed strategy, in line with Etzioni (1967) so-called mixed scanning strategy that forced its way during upcoming, unforeseen issues, similar to unforeseen political, environmental, or organizational dilemmas. A good example, which also displays the close connection to politics and its influence on the decision making, was the Reintegration Project (Fact box 5).

Before the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP)[240] was active, the RCN had a situation in March 2010 with 68 insurgents (HiG fighters) surrendering to the Afghan National Police (ANP) and PRT PEK in Pul-e Khomri. This was a result of fighting between two insurgent groups, the Taliban and HiG fighters, on the west side of Baghlan River, when the Taliban took control of the area. This led to hectic meeting activity in the RCN to find a way to handle the issue; pushing the reintegration focus in CJ-9 (CIMIC Branch) and CJ-5 (Plans Branch) in the command.

The local UNDP, Kunduz, was responsible for the reintegration program in the area, but the APRP program had been predicted to start after the big event of Karzai's "Peace Jirga" planned to take place on 2 May 2010. Civil military

---

[239] Personal observations as participant in the working group.
[240] APRP; See Factbox 5. Chapter 6.2.1.5.

cooperation in this setting was vital, and the discussion focused how to handle this case. The Force Reintegration Cell (F-RIC) that belonged to the IJC pushed the RCN to come up with suggestions about how to cope with the surrendered insurgents. RCN CIMIC branch, as the leading unit, conducted internal coordination meetings. The involved RCN branches did not know what to do. Brainstorming meetings were held and revealed different opinions and understandings of the subject and the role of the military.

To strengthen the planning process, NGOs were contacted to come up with supplementary ideas to fill the gaps, along the lines of the CA. The NGOs, through ANSO, made a statement in their answer that they would not join any meeting, underlining that they would never be a part of any military plan or strategy, also claiming that the CA strategy would never be successful.

One meeting in the RCN was conducted 2 April 2010. The IJC HQ stated that they wanted a framework suggestion before the 7th of April. It was decided to make a quick reaction plan in addition to the more middle- and long-term plans, despite the argument of one RCN planner: *"We cannot make a plan just to make plan; we need something more, this has to be hung on something."* The pressure from the IJC towards the RCN to come up with "something" on this issue, was driven by the GIRoA-announced "Peace Jirga" planned to take place on the 2th of May (it was later postponed). The organization had to come up with something that could be presented by GIRoA for the "Peace Jirga".

By cooperating with the local authorities and UNAMA in Baghlan Province, the reintegrates were placed in a safe house in Baghlan. The funding (from ISAF/UNAMA to GIRoA) covering rent and food was given for one month at the time. Later, the funds were administrated directly from ISAF/UNAMA through the provincial governor, who remained non-comitial toward the overall process and the idea of reintegration.

Internal fractions among those the reintegrates led to insecurity; safe house neighbors were concerned, and they reacted to the treatment of the reintegrates. PRT PEK soldiers in the area were asked why they gave the insurgents housing and food if they represented the "wrong" side, while they, the local population, had nothing and were supposed to be on the "right" side.

It also led to questions such as; "*If the insurgents are cooperating with the Taliban, why do you not shoot them? ISAF soldiers only talk; they do not act. We do not want these people back in our villages. Are you cooperating with the Taliban?*"[241]

In the planning of the reintegration project, RCN officers felt pressed by the IJC Force Reintegration Cell (F-RIC) to make things happen, without being comfortable with the situation or knowing what to do. UNAMA had no means (besides funding) to handle the situation, and the local authorities, such as the governor or the ANP representatives, did not seem to have an interest in the project.[242] This left ISAF to plan and execute the handling of the reintegrates and come up with plans that could be presented in the GIRoA-held "Peace Jirga," despite the fact that the coordination with local authorities or NGOs with reintegration knowledge was poor.

The IJC ordered weekly updates and close monitoring of the situation. RCN CIMIC branch was put in charge. RCN tactical CIMIC teams (TCTs), as well as Civil Affairs (CATs) and CAAT representatives all went to Baghlan, the PRT PEK area of responsibility to keep in contact with the UN and local authority representatives and report any movements or information of interest. The lines of command and responsibility were not clear due to the many actors involved. Discussions regarding roles were frequent.

There was still some resistance in the working group related to the RCN's role. German and Scandinavian officers, pointing to the UN, and questioned whether this should be a military task. The US CAAT did not agree with this, underlining the UN's lack of ability to work in dangerous areas. A CAAT representative put it this way; -"*it's better to get things done out there in the field, than to have these academic discussions. We can discuss all day and, yes, maybe we should divide the roles more clearly, but out there, we really don't care, we all just work to get the job done, military or not.*" [243]

---

[241] Experience of PRT PEK officer. This attitude was also found in area assessments done by the Fusion Centre.
[242] This was noted in ISAF internal reports about the project.
[243] Interview with CAAT representative, RCN, August 2010.

The US way of getting civilian projects done was met by divided attitudes among other RCN officers. Either it was welcomed (finally something was done) or criticized for interfering in civilian tasks, or undermining the local ownership.

6.6.4.3   To get things done

It was no secret that the border planning had high priority both from the GIRoA and from ISAF. This because it was a supply route from Uzbekistan, which became very important when the supply routes from Pakistan via Jalalabad, were sabotaged, as frequently happened.

To ensure customs and revenue at the border, the Hairatan BXP Project (Fact box 3) had high priority for GIRoA and was also pushed on the military side by ISAF. The RCN working group was a part of the larger overall Hairatan BXP project. On behalf of GIRoA and IJC command, RCN and PRT MeS together with ANSF, the UN and representatives from the local authorities conducted planning meetings to follow up the plans to build a Border Crossing Center (BCC) at Hairatan. The aim of the RCN planning was to support the buildup and activity of the BCC. Planning meetings started in March 2010, and were concentrated on location, buildings, manning, and operation of the BCC.

GIRoA, along with the UN and ISAF support, wanted a BCC to monitor the border crossing at Hairatan, to make relations better between the two countries in the border area and to monitor and train the people manning the center. The Center was planned to be Afghan led, under the Ministry of Finance (MOF), assisted by the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and ANSF, supported by ISAF and US experts.[244]

In spring 2010, internal discussions in RCN focused on how ISAF in this border area could manage to be not so visible and still be able to keep control "behind the scenes"—enough to be able to handle the situation if something got out of control. Internal RCN discussions (between working group representatives from J5, J2, J9, J4) also focused on preparedness linked to the gas and oil storage, the logistic channels and protection of the population at

---

[244] According to internal ISAF planning papers and FRAGOs.

Hairatan town. Coordination with Private Security Companies (PSC) in the area was also conducted. The balance between too much interference and enough support was very difficult. Much effort and patience was put into motivating local authorities to engage and take ownership to the process.

When the US forces became involved in the summer of 2010, the environment changed. The RCN working group quickly decreased its meetings and influence, as US troops took the lead. With a different perspective and many resources, US forces were not so concerned about ISAF visibility in the BXP area. From August 2010, US Forces were stationed at Hairatan border crossing area, where they built a forward operating base (FOB). Among other tasks, these forces, in conjunction with the Border Management Task Force (BMTF), trained members of Afghan National Border Police (ANBP). During August and September 2010, the infrastructure was built, and the US took responsibility for the running, support, manning, and education of the BCC and its employees.

When I came back in February 2011, the US had two platoons in the area, supporting ANSF with the security, logistics, training, and equipment necessary to run the border activity.[245]

6.6.5 *Summary of Planning and Decisions*

This chapter covers how the planning, internal and external, and the consequent coordination between the involved actors were challenged by timeframes and unforeseen surrounding environmental affairs that made both rational planning and the required coordination difficult.

The military was often left to conduct projects that normally would have been conducted by local authorities, contractors and entrepreneurs, with or without help from the IOs or NGOs. In this effort, military actors often found themselves in new and unknown territory, struggling to cope and do the right actions, having been caught in the middle, as exemplified by the case of the

---

[245] Later, in September 2011, a pilot project was established at Hairatan BXP, cooperation between GIRoA and IOs/NGOs with ISAF support. There was a new border management model (BMM), implementing streamlined procedures, a strict corruption policy, and a 24/7 custom presence. Customs and Afghan Border Police (ANP) did joint examinations.

Reintegration Project. It also shows how easily military actors, due to their resources, can dominate plans and vital projects, especially in areas regarded as important from a political point of view, such as in the Hairatan BXP Project, the Highway 1 Project, and the Reintegration Project.

The project planning, coordination, and implementation showed several tendencies: military confusion about the task, problems about ensuring local ownership, creating real interaction, and mutual understanding, and the tendency to "just get things done."

Development and governance took time, far beyond the military scope of planning, and the RCN as well as the PRTs were always pressed by time limits from upper HQs. In the planning of the Hairatan BXP, much effort had been put down to ensure a local ownership of the process, but the lack of cultural awareness on the part of the military made this difficult. Involving the local population and authorities in development projects, for many reasons (culture, experience, resources, traditions etc.) took time, more time than ISAF could afford. Additionally, there was insecurity in the RCN project working group as to what extent it should be involved, since the support role of ISAF were not clearly defined. There was a pressure from upper HQs to come up with results, which officers on the ground believe was a hunt for results and "good stories" for the politicians back home. The time pressure and pressure for results led to that ISAF went in with new and more (US) resources to the project in 2010. This was done to make sure that the area was developed according to the plans, and that the Border Cross Center was built, manned, and operational during 2010/11. This also resulted in ISAF becoming the leading actor in the area.

Pressure also was on both GIRoA and the upper HQs to prioritize the work on the Highway 1 Project, and get manifest results, as this was a politically important issue. This project displayed how difficult it was to involve civilian actors in dangerous areas, and how ISAF forces took the lead after several attempts by the donors to keep it as a civilian project, even with security and CIMIC/QIPs support from the military. Despite the fact that the donor (ADB) did not want to engage the military in this project, it ended up doing exactly that. When ISAF finally went in to fulfill the road reconstruction from Qaisar to Ghormach Basaar, it had become a military ISAF/ANSF project.

287

The Reintegration Project was an example of a "muddling through" process. No military actors in the RCN or in the PRT PEK, which were the responsible ISAF unit in the area, had education or training in reintegration issues. The PRT PEK did not even have any positions or persons with this responsibility. The local governor seemed uninterested, the local population did not want reintegrates in the area, the UN had no means to take action, and it was up to ISAF to handle the situation. It was difficult to plan when the objectives as well as ISAF roles were so unclear. The situation was handled by everyone doing their best, with support from the Fusion Centre and the IJC FRIC, trying to back up the people on the ground. FRIC was, at the same time, pressing GIRoA to speed up the delivery of the reintegration guidelines, of which they were deeply involved themselves.

Even though the theories of Banfield (1959) and Lindblom (1959) focusing on planning and decision-making suggested that adequate planning processes are possible in a normative theory environment, it is difficult to create such processes in large and complex organizations, even though planning is an emphasized and vital aspect in military organizations. To handle the problem with inappropriate plans, an organization such as ISAF implemented both formal and informal, but compromised methods for survival. Often ISAF had to establish informal ways to cope with the situation when the formal systems did not work, or plans fell apart or "the map did not fit the terrain."

How to do rational planning when it assumes a clear and consistent set of aims and objectives? In large, de-coupled, and complex organizations such as ISAF, with vague mandates and objectives, planning is problematic to operationalize. As one interviewee put it this way: *"What exactly are we trying to accomplish here?"* Since the many national, civilian, military, and personal values and goals in ISAF competed with the overall goals and policies, incrementalism was a simpler approach, to be on the safe side. This means not making too much noise or disturbance, but rather adapting to the local situation in the best possible way, even though it might not correspond with the policy.

The processes studied in this thesis have been training, role-performance, planning and decisions and how they influenced coordination. They have been studied in relation to the projects and other activities, such as in pre-

deployment situations or daily work in the operation area. To sum up and give a rough overview of some of this, the processes related to the projects are listed in the Table 2 below.

6.6.5.1   Overview of Projects and Processes

Below is listed the projects and the main processes studied.

	Hairatan Railway Project	Hairatan BXP Project	Highway 1 Project	DDP Project	Blue Box Projects	Reintegration Project
Training	No project-specific training Learning by doing	No project-specific training Learning by doing	No project-specific training Learning by doing	Work shops Learning by doing	CIMIC engineers' professional skills	Seminar-/FRIC meeting Learning by doing
Role Performance	Supportive of GIRoA. (Local authorities relied on ISAF to make decisions, role confusion).	ISAF mostly running the project. Different role understanding in different ISAF nations. ISAF missing cultural awareness.	ISAF mostly running the project. Different role understanding in different ISAF nations. ISAF missing cultural awareness.	ISAF in the front seat. Different role understanding/interest in different ISAF levels and and/or nations.	In the front seat. Cooperation with locals. Mixed role performance.	In the front seat. Mixed understanding and motivation in different levels and nations about ISAF role.

	Hairatan Railway Project	Hairatan BXP Project	Highway 1 Project	DDP Project	Blue Box Projects	Reintegration Project
Planning	Decentralized, security-focused. Nationally run, ISAF supportive Mutual information sharing. Confusion about decision authority.	Centralized/ Top Down. Rational planning concept. When disagreement/ discussion: "ISAF/US took action."	Centralized/ Top Down. Rational planning. PRT influenced decisions. When discussion: "ISAF/US took action."	Centralized/ Top Down. Rational planning, COIN concept, timeline pushed, regional and local resistance.	Decentralized Incremental. Regional and local, RCN/PRT and national – military and civilian (NGO, UN, EUPOL) decisions.	Centralized. Muddling through, - Incremental at all levels. Pushed from top management and politically inflamed.
Coordination and Implementation	<u>Internal coordination</u>: IJC, RCN CIMIC-CJ5 (plans), PRT MeS <u>External coordination</u>, liaison: Donors (ADB), UN, local authorities, contractors, PSC. <u>Implement</u>: local/ regional	<u>Internal coordination</u>: IJC, RCN CIMIC,CJ5, 1/10 Mountain, PRT MeS <u>External Coord.</u>: Donors(ADB), local auth., ANSF, UN, PSC. <u>Implement</u>: US domin.	<u>Internal coordination:</u> IJC, RCN, PRT MAI, RCW <u>External coord.:</u> Donors (ADB), ANSF, UN, PSC. <u>Implement.:</u> US dominated.	<u>Internal coordination:</u> IJC, RCN; CIMIC/ CJ5., PRTs, <u>External coord.:</u> IDLG, NGOs and local authorities. <u>Implement:</u> ??	<u>Internal coordination:</u> RCN CIMIC branch. <u>External Coord.:</u> missing <u>Implement</u>: civil or military project owners, or local contractors.	<u>Internal coordination:</u> Ad hoc, IJC, RCN; CIMIC/Fusion Centre/CJ5, PRT PEK. <u>External co-ord.;</u> local authorities, ANSF and UN. <u>Implement.:</u> UN, ISAF, GIRoA

Table 6-1 Overview of main kind of projects and processes

How did the ISAF structure, organizational dilemmas and processes of training, role-performance, and planning actually influence the civil military coordination? This is discussed in the next chapter.

7   Discussion

The overall ISAF task of assisting the Afghan government in extending its authority involved extensive civil military coordination. This resulted in many opinions, interpretations, and suggestions, especially when working with such broad and vague mandate and goals. Was the military task just to keep security on a level so that it was possible for central and local authorities to do their work? Or was it also to plan and execute the running of border crossings, handling revenue, undertaking governance programs, building infrastructure, etc.? These questions raise different points of view as to how far the military involvement should go, as displayed in described project work and other activities studied in this thesis. This diversity might also be due to the different interpretation of the overall concepts for civil military coordination.

In the following, some dilemmas of the overall civil military coordination concepts which contributed to the various focuses in ISAF are elaborated. Then a discussion related to ISAF structures is outlined, examining how rational these structures were in relation to an appropriate civil military coordination. This is followed by a discussion of the operational research questions related to training, role performance, and planning, and how rational or non-rational these processes appeared in a civil military coordination context. These ISAF structures and the processes influencing civil military coordination are discussed in the light of the empirical data and theories used in this thesis to enlighten the main research question; "*How do ISAF structures and processes influence civil military coordination in North Afghanistan?*"

7.1.   The Civil Military Coordination Concepts

ISAF concepts as the Comprehensive Approach (CA), Counterinsurgency (COIN) and the CIMIC doctrine, from a rational perspective, were to be regarded as concepts or strategies that represented solutions to concrete problems, such as whether NATO can still be a tool to rely on in today's wars

and complex emergencies. [246] On the condition that new strategies and doctrines would be implemented in the correct way, the desired change in attitudes, behavior, and practice was to occur among ISAF soldiers at all levels. This was based upon an understanding of the formal structure of the organization as a tool for efficient implementation of policy, decisions and regulations according to prescribed objectives (Weber, 1971). Behavior is expected to be steered by a formal normative structure in a rational organization as ISAF was perceived to be.

From the rational perspective, rapid changes and adaptation creates expectations and behavior changes will follow the new intentions. Further, the new strategies will ensure desired behaviors, and the results will be visible. Additionally, consistency is expected between the intention, efforts, and results in a classical military homogeneous unit (Egeberg, 1984). Does this apply for ISAF? The answer is yes and no.

First, ISAF represented NATO and non-NATO member nations as an official formal military organization, an organization which, for political purposes, was a tool or instrument. The organizational structure was built upon the rationale that the organization is used as an instrument to accomplish important political and economic objectives, and to gain certain military—politically-determined—objectives. Even though ISAF is composed of many nations and cultures, it also exhibited a supra-national military culture and understanding of the military command and control system (Soeters, 1997; Stewart, 2007; Soeters and Maginart, 2008). ISAF, thus, was viewed as a rational organization where concepts might be relatively easily implemented.

On the other hand, ISAF structures represented the heterogeneity of the cultural differences of each nation's military including civilian personnel. The establishment of the German SCR and his staff in RCN, the Fusion Centre with subject matter experts and Human Terrain Teams, are examples. The political and development advisors, which were from different nations and cultures, had different views from each other and from the military. Furthermore, on the civilian side, ISAF had no supranational culture that

---

[246] The Comprehensive Approach and COIN strategy (FM 3-24) were implemented in ISAF beginning in 2006. The CIMIC doctrine was established in the aftermath of the Balkan wars; see chapter 2.

united them together, to give them a joint basic platform. ISAF represented an increasingly less homogenous organization, with the many "old" and "new" NATO and non-NATO nations and increasingly more civilians. Further, the arrangement of the PRTs and the OMLTs, as willful nationally led satellites, with different focus, training, and culture, led to a more complex and decoupled organization. This made the prevailing civil military coordination concepts difficult to implement.

7.1.1. Comprehensive Approach (CA)

NATO top management's arguments for introducing the Comprehensive Approach (CA) as an overall crisis management strategy included better mutual understanding, trust, and coordination between the actors in the field in current and future complex emergencies. The CA strategy implied that ISAF had focus not only on stability and security, but also governance, development and reconstruction (NATO Political Guidance, 2010). Nevertheless, experiences and critical research concerning strategies in conflict areas suggest that the CA strategy blurred the lines between military and civilian actors. This seemed to have had have some undesirable consequences, including the politicization and militarization of humanitarian work and over-stretching of the military capability (Lindly-French, 2006; Friis and Jarmyr, 2008' Cornish, 2007/2008; Bellamy, 2008; Wendling, 2010b; Friis and DeConing, 2011).

Broad and unclear mandates, substantial differences in views and values between the internal and external actors, internal and external competition, different training and interests, and lack of knowledge and joint conflict are some of the elements that generated resistance towards coordination in both military and civilian organisations. ISAF is a powerful organization, but internal diversity and resistance from coordinating actors challenged the military's power and validity. ISAF had national cultural differences and disagreements as to how to relate to the local population in spite of the joint military supranational understanding (Stewart, 2007; Soeters and Manigart, 2008). All of these challenged the CA concept.

ISAF had problems implementing the overall strategy in its own organization. Interviews and field conversations with the PRT and RCN officers revealed

little interest and knowledge, especially about the CA strategy, but also the COIN strategy, among ISAF soldiers. These strategies were not considered very important for their daily business, and rather, represented politics. The PRTs as well as some RCN units had their own methods to deal with planning and coordination activities which were closer to their own reality, avoiding what Lindblom (1959) called "superhuman comprehensiveness" as the CA and COIN strategies were perceived to be. Knowing that overall theories work less well than a step-by-step method related to the reality on the ground, the lower level of the organization practiced methods of which upper HQ probably was not aware. The overall policies were not precise enough to predict the consequences of their practical use, which was what the troops in the sharp end really needed.

7.1.2. Counterinsurgency (COIN)

The ISAF mission statements and operations did adapt to the changing conditions on the ground in the beginning of the war in 2003, but many ISAF contributing nations struggled to define their operations. Each country had a different approach (Beljan, 2013). Under COIN, a unity of effort was to be achieved. But this was difficult. COIN was differently understood and practiced by ISAF contributing nations and was mostly neglected or even opposed by lower levels of the ISAF organization. (This opposition also occurred in higher levels, cf. the Colonel Tunnell Case).[247]

The COIN doctrine was a US doctrine, insofar as sensitive counterterrorist responsibility remained under US control (Hoehn and Harting, 2010). Thus, it was met by scepticism from other ISAF countries. This was notable in Northern Afghanistan where Germany was the leading nation. According to Schreer (2010) Germany had some challenges adapting to the ISAF COIN concept. He argued that prevailing German strategic thought made it very hard for the Bundeswehr (The German Federal Defense Force) to adjust to

---

[247] Some officers expressed criticism of the COIN strategy in Afghanistan. This started a debate in the operation area as well as in some participating ISAF nations, starting with Col. Harry Tunnells' letter to the US Secretary of Army. Col. Tunnell was the Brigade Commander of 5/2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team in Afghanistan. For Tunnell's letter to Secretary of the Army, 20 August, 2010: See http://www.michaelyon-online.com/stunning-letter-infantry-colonel-communique-to-secretary-of-the-army.htm

COIN in a comprehensive way. While adjustments were made, these were largely on the operational and tactical level. Schreer claimed that the political and the strategic level of the armed forces were far from embracing COIN as a concept or major task for the Bundeswehr. Additionally, the research in this thesis also reveals that COIN adoption on the operational and tactical level among European countries represented in the RCN area of operation was also lacking.

Further, the NGOs and other civilian coordinating organizations were insecure and resistant to the COIN concept. In North Afghanistan, NGOs, through ANSO, were outspoken that they would not be a part of a military strategy, as was presupposed by the COIN strategy. COIN assumed close communication and understanding (even planning) between the civilian and military actors in the different stages (Shape-Clear-Hold-Build), especially the so-called BUILD phase. In some civilian environments, this was a controversial issue.

COIN, like CA, was undercut by having an unclear end-state and the different understanding in ISAF contributing nations and their caveats. More than the CA, COIN as a military doctrine, also suffered from the complex ISAF command and control structure because there were too few COIN educated soldier capabilities on the ground level. Besides, as presupposed in COIN doctrine, with current training and education regimes for deployment for complex emergencies, it was optimistic to expect that soldiers on the ground would be able to do comprehensive assessments concerning governance and political purpose or to understand the human terrain. The COIN doctrine, called for having the local population as the center of gravity; this required a deeper contextual knowledge from the soldiers. As noted in the aforementioned RCN COIN lecture; *"We need to educate the soldiers to also become politicians."* With such episodes as the one in which US soldiers were found to have peed on dead Afghan Taliban insurgents, [248] it did not seem as though the soldiers on the ground level had any understanding of the ideas behind the COIN doctrine, which was winning peoples' hearts and minds. If one is "trained to kill" as described by Grossman (2001), it can be difficult to

---

[248] In January 2012, US Marines urinated on dead Taliban fighters, pictures of which were posted to websites and caused anger and outrage in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/24/us-marines-charged-dead-taliban

"resocialize" these soldiers to a COIN mindset. A COIN mindset implies a comprehensive and political view on the environment, in which violence is used as the last resort.

Another severe problem for both the CA and COIN concepts is that it presupposes that GIRoA had legitimacy among the Afghan population. It was a known fact that GIRoA did not have support in large parts of the Afghan society (Joya, 2009; Barth, 2008). Moreover, even though one could say that ISAF formally had international legitimacy through the UN Security Resolution 1386 of December 2001, the role and participation of ISAF was debated in many contributing countries. Even more importantly, this western legitimacy outside the country did not automatically mean that ISAF also had legitimacy within Afghan society. The idea that ISAF should help GIRoA to gain legitimacy, seem a bit naïve, if not unrealistic. The development of a functional civil military coordination based on such a brittle basis was problematic and difficult.[249]

7.1.3. NATO CIMIC Doctrine

According to Brocades ZaaIberg (2006), it was the US who pushed the European CIMIC capacity within NATO, based on their experiences with a serious drain of their army reserves serving as Civil Affairs Teams in the Balkan wars. Still, the form of NATO CIMIC concept developed in another direction than US Civil Affairs, in a European way. Instead of the Civil Affairs more "action-minded" policy, broad elbowroom, and generous funding resources, CIMIC doctrine had a strict emphasis on the importance to keep all activities in line with the Commanders intent. This meant that activities which could not be clearly seen as necessary to reach the Commanders intent, was not a military task.

---

[249] Also, the unsuccessful Taohid Operations I-III in 2010, which were joint ISAF/ANSF COIN operations showed that COIN was not understood, accepted, or implemented as a military strategy in ANSF. This lack of implementation probably related to missing ANSF ownership (CJ-5 (planning) officers expressed in field conversations that ANSF representatives were not really included in the Taohid planning, even though they attended meetings and signed the papers).

This said, findings from the RCN CIMIC-managed Blue Box Projects displayed both civilian and military "national flag planting." Projects in the Blue Box which were out of the coordination or control of the RCN CIMIC management, deviated from the rationale in CIMIC doctrine. RCN CIMIC suffered from too many uncoordinated activities and actors. Coordination was also confused because of the diversity among nations in practicing CIMIC; European countries mostly following the NATO CIMIC doctrine, and the US followed their Civil Affairs Doctrine. German or Scandinavian military actors on tactical level had no 'hand money' to do QIPs in the effort to win hearts and minds, while US had a great deal of money to do QIPs, when they found it appropriate. This "money as weapon" [250] in CIMIC issues, was integrated in the US military system.

Whether this diverse practice was good or bad or effective from a crisis management perspective in Northern Afghanistan is maybe too early to conclude. But, the varied practices gave a picture of an inconsistent organization. The borders around military intervention in the civilian environment appeared unclear, which, in turn, made civilian coordinating actors confused and insecure.

This also confused the local population, whose primary concern was security and clean water. ISAF CIMIC and Civil Affairs units assessed the local villages; some did QIPs, some did not; some were generous and some not. They followed different policies with different resources and approaches. The fact that some US civil affairs soldiers had never heard about CIMIC doctrine, supports the argument that CIMIC tasks were inconsistent.

Weiss (2005) claimed that CIMIC, after being very independent during the Balkan wars, now has been marginalized as being the responsibility of the Commander. This implies that CIMIC had to be in line with other operational elements, as underlined in the NATO CIMIC doctrine definition, while the Civil Affairs Teams operated more independently. Still, experience and data from this thesis support the idea of keeping CIMIC tasks strictly in the line of operational elements, in line with the Commander's intent. This would give coordinating actors and the local population a clearer picture of the military

---

[250] "Money as weapon," as laid down in US CERP documents. Retrieved from http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/09-27/09-27.pdf

tasks and its framework. This would also make it easier for CIMIC officers to grasp the intent their own work.

7.1.4. Summary of Coordination Concepts

CA, COIN and CIMIC concepts represented several levels of confusion. Definitions and guidelines were broad and unclear. First of all it was a problem with many concepts, and different versions of the same concept—for example, the different countries use and understanding of COIN or CIMIC. Vague definitions resulted in unclear focus and confusion about when and how to use what policy. Besides, the concepts were not fully understood or implemented.

The concepts such as crisis management strategies did not appear in commonly adopted ISAF strategies, and coordination problems both inside the coalition and toward coordinating actors occurred. What influenced this in North Afghanistan were the different understanding, motivation, and emphasis of these concepts. For example:

- The German skepticism, the US emphasis, and other nation's ignorance or pragmatism towards COIN, due to the difference in education, knowledge, or politics toward the COIN concept.
- The emphasis and education on CA by the Upper Headquarters (ISAF HQ and IJC in Kabul) as distinguished from lack of knowledge and interest among the lowers levels (regional commands and PRTs).
- German and Scandinavian (even non-NATO members, Finland and Sweden) emphasis on NATO CIMIC doctrine while the US was ignorant of it and preferred to use its own Civil Affairs Doctrine (which is more in line with COIN; presupposing a deeper military intervention in the civil dimension).

Due to the divergence in knowledge, training, and the idea of how useful they might be, the concepts for civil military coordination seemed to be both confusing and even contradictory in some respects. As long as nations had different emphases and understanding of the civil military coordination concepts, the view of ISAF as a rational organization was undermined.

7.2. Rational ISAF Structures?

ISAF, with its command and control system, was the most powerful crisis management organization in North Afghanistan. As Mayer and Rowan (1977) suggested, most organizations adapt to the organization or authority holding the power. Powerful organizations force others to adapt, and powerful organizations build goals and procedures into societal institutional rules. This was how it looked on the surface with local authorities adapting to ISAF views or presumed ISAF needs, as displayed in the Railway Project. Moreover donors, IOs, and NGOs related to ISAF, with less or more enthusiasm, as they could not ignore it. But, to be a strong and visible player in the field does not automatically mean suitability and appropriateness.

The reintegration project or the DDP project including governance and rule of law work was an example. This was rather a UN task, but as long as the need to embed people into different ministries was important, ISAF was easier to use, due to its strong presence and ability to put all the nations on board for the discussions. ISAF officers that were interviewed viewed the UN as a weak organization that was hampered by a weak structure, political baggage, and difficulties in internal coordination. ISAF was considered as an organization with a better and more efficient structure.

A closer look into the ISAF organization revealed that ISAF also struggled with much of the same *political baggage* and *difficulties in the internal coordination*. Internal inconsistency and resistance from coordinating actors challenged the idea of ISAF as a rational, valid, and powerful organization.

Weber's Ideal Bureaucracy Model describes the capacities and qualities of an organization that intended bureaucracies such as ISAF should strive to accomplish, structured upon the idea of bureaucratic efficiency. [251] The assumption based on this rational perspective was that the top management (such as political and military management) dictated the strategies (as CA, COIN and CIMIC) in the organization. The management relies on the command and control system in the hierarchical and bureaucratic structure, seeing the actors in the organization as rational and uniform. Further, it was

---

[251] Weber's Ideal Bureaucracy Model was inspired by the Prussian Military Concept (Fivelsdal in Weber, 1971).

assumed that the personnel have been sufficiently trained and specialized in their area of responsibility that they understand and have the necessary knowledge of their role and the context in which they operate. An organization operating under the a rational perspective would have confidence that management decisions would be enough to make strategies occur as prescribed at all levels of the organization. A military organization, to a large extent, functions according to these ideals. As this thesis shows, this becomes more complex when military actors are multinational, representing different backgrounds and involved in civilian areas which challenge their role and understanding.

To some extent ISAF can be viewed as a bureaucratic organization, in line with Weber's Ideal Bureaucracy Model. Military organizations are built as bureaucracies even though, in line with what Olsen (1988) claim characterizes modern bureaucracies, flexibility and alternative organizational element has forced its way inside them. Cf. the buildup of internal civilian expertise units. Consequently parts of the Weberian bureaucracy model are relevant and descriptive of ISAF and some are not.

According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983) the original inducement of rationality by Weber explained as; competition among states and capitalist firms, rulers' need to control their staff and citizenry, and equal protection under the laws, has changed. Competition based on efficiency is not that important anymore, and the state and professions has become the great rationalizers. The motive behind this is that highly structured organizations should provide a context in which individual efforts to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint lead to homogeneity. Even though ISAF could be seen as a highly structured organization in some matters, ensuring homogeneity and unity of effort, many aspects predicted the opposite.

ISAF displayed the bureaucracy model through its emphasize on training and detailed reporting lines, regulations, organization charts, job descriptions, clarified responsibility, doctrines, directives, standard operation procedures, and even fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) to ensure unity of effort and a functional command and control system. Additionally, great importance was attached to loyalty, which was regarded as a matter of course. Also, work done well in international operations would be a boost to one's career.

However, the rapid ISAF soldier rotations, the ad-hoc conducted HOTOs, the triple reporting lines, redundant village assessments and the up-side down pyramid all deviated from the bureaucratic model. Additionally, the outer context, as well as the diversity of the PRTs and the ISAF contributing countries' national caveats made the picture more complex. This, together with the complex character of the human beings also led to a dilemma among the soldiers.

When a PRT soldier represented ISAF and his or her own nation, who and when does he represent whom or what? Which reporting lines to prioritize, and which way to go when national orders or guidelines clash with equivalent ISAF orders?

According to Røvik (2007), a rational organization has no value in and of itself; it is only valuable as a tool to achieve a goal. Rational leadership and the tools and goals are characteristic of a rational organization (Lindblom, 1959; Banfield, 1959), which corresponds superficially to a military organization such as ISAF. The military leadership seemed to have the authority and power to govern and lead. But as the data in this thesis show, ISAF struggled to define and prioritize its means and ends, challenging this authority and power.

First of all, ISAF needed to define a clear end-state that might lead to the right tools to achieve the goals. Next, the political compromises that led to many civil military coordination concepts blurred the management guidance and needed to be adjusted. These aspects made it difficult for ISAF to display rational and reasonable management goals and strategies in the crisis management concepts, which, in turn, could be materialized in plans and structures with clear lines inside the organization.

This internal struggle in ISAF influenced the relation towards the external environment and coordinating actors, who would benefit from a more readable and uniform ISAF role understanding and performance. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) claim that organizations operating with ambiguous goals, like ISAF, especially use effort to build up an image that will give them legitimacy in the environment in which they operate. This might be a reason

for ISAF emphasizing support to civilian issues as development, governance and reconstruction, - which turned out to be a challenging way to go.

<div align="right">

"Where you stand depends on where you sit"
Graham T. Allison (1969).

</div>

7.2.1. Organizational Inconsistency

Were the ISAF structures appropriate for a good civil military coordination? In addition to the mentioned divergent conceptual understanding, ISAF had some structural dilemmas in the efforts to stand out as a rational and unisonous organization. First of all, it had a problem getting a joint situational picture and conceptual understanding between the different levels of the organization. Secondly, the command and control system had its weaknesses. Thirdly, the divergent PRTs' practice and focus, as well as the participating nation's caveats, represented huge challenges in coordination.

7.2.1.1 Divergent Situational Understanding

An important ISAF organizational aspect to consider was that the upper HQs relationship with the local population was accomplished through GIRoA and GIRoA-related organizations and personnel, who did not necessarily represent the view of the Afghan population (Cf. Figure No 6-4, chapter 6.2.3.). As a result, ISAF HQ was unable to be directly in contact with the real situation on the ground. On the regional command level, the contact with the local population was more diversified (as shown in Figure No 6-4) and the PRTs had the most contact with the population in towns, villages, and rural areas. This strengthened diversity in the ISAF levels' opinions of the context in which they operated; upper HQs contact with GIRoA or GIRoA supportive personnel had a more optimistic view on development in the Afghan context than the PRTs who met with people in villages and rural areas, who often had no relationship or trust in GIRoA representatives, and did not experience much positive (if any) changes.

The upper HQs of ISAF received GIRoA support for their ideas and views, as was apparent in HQ planning documents.[252] In contrast, according to both civil and military PRT representatives, the Afghan villagers mostly lived as they had done for decades, trusting traditional systems with elders and Shuras to make decisions, despite the existence of any established local formal GIRoA representative body. This was supported by RCN Tactical CIMIC Teams (TCTs) doing assessments in the Kunduz and the Baghlan Province in villages like Mangal, Jada Khel, Arab, Kuk Chenar or Qaysar Khel of the west side of Baghlan river. Representatives from the UN district office in Maimanah faced similar issues in districts in Faryab Province. So, both in within the ISAF organization and GIRoA, there were different perceptions of local reality, depending on the level represented.

Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Turner and Pidgeon (1997) discussed the problem of decision makers being distant to practical problems in the sharp end of the organization. Turner suggested that management groups distant to the situation on the ground adopted unrealistic and idealistic views of the problem area. Management easily assumed that the organization had effective precautions and adequate problem solving when it is remote from the core activities. This is the challenge for instituting a joint situational understanding, having appropriate information and communication process, as well as undertaking rational security handling (Turner, 1978; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Besides, when one operate from HQs and mostly stay in guarded military camps, in reality being quite distant from the field, one cannot make relevant risk assessment needed for necessary decision-making and appropriate crisis management (Kruke, 2012).

The different understanding of the situation on the ground and the confusion among the prevailing coordination concepts in ISAF made relationships with other actors difficult. Crisis management theories claim that one needs to solve issues on the lowest level possible (Boin et al, 2005). Accordingly, the framing of a multinational operation should be planned on the level on which it is supposed to work and in cooperation with the involved parties (Anderson, 1999; Duffey, 2000). In the end, it is the decisions and assessments out in the sharp end, on the lowest levels of the bureaucracy, which really defines or

---

[252] Also supported by interview and field conversation with IJC representatives.

determines if an operation is successful or not. ISAF was challenged when the levels in the organization each had different understanding of the situation, and the orders came from upper HQs (cf. the upside down pyramid).

7.2.1.2 Lack of Command and Control

In ISAF, crisis management was *international*, along the command and control lines of the military organization, but the caveats or rules of engagement were not; they were *national*. When they did not correspond with the prevailing ISAF policy, it damaged the unity of effort. In fact, the IJC and RCN management had limited real command and control, and limited influence on the PRTs. This is a significant deviation from rational bureaucratic organizational theory. Further, it was difficult to maintain the documentation to be able to use of lessons learned, which often led to redundant work. For example, if a branch deliberately deleted the notified experiences of the former team, in order to find their own way of handling issues (which happened). This represented a deviation from the rational bureaucracy model.

The national caveats were named as the major problem by most of the interviewees. Due to the political will or climate in participating countries, caveats led to an unfair burden out in the field, in which US soldiers often had to take more responsibility, as it had the most resources and fewest caveats. The US had to step in when other nations were prevented from doing so, due to national politics (Hoehn and Harting, 2010). This policy led to anger and frustration among some soldiers, weakening the supranational mutual understanding among them. This supranational mutual understanding was to be the strength of an international military organization, as underlined by Soeters and Maginart (2008). Furthermore, due to Hungarian caveats, the manner in which the Taohid I-III Operations were conducted in Baghlan area, led to many units to operate under own command systems, creating a picture of an inconsistent command and control system. The result was a major deviation from both a typical military and a rational organization.

Additionally, the aforementioned divided national communication and IT networks, both displayed and created mutual misunderstandings and poor coordination even under good circumstances. This mirrored the participating

nation's power and refusal to conform to a joint organizational concept, and the missing ability to steer in a common direction with unity of effort, which was an ISAF premise. It also mirrored the organizational vulnerability according to Turners emphasize on how problematic information and communication processing influence decision-making and vital aspects of crisis management (Turner 1978; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997).

Furthermore, the PRTs, who were each under their own national flag, struggled to have influence and so operated with different emphases in an effort to be visible. This made creating a unity of effort with ISAF a continuous struggle. According to Turner and Pidgeon (1997), the disagreements about what is relevant is often based on a different understanding of the context, and vital information might be concealed in a mass of "noise," which easily happens in large and complex organizations. The different cultures and understandings represented in ISAF, and the mistrust represented by the diverse communication networks, was likely to have influenced information flows, leading to the information disappearing in the mass of "noise." This weakened ISAF as a crisis management tool.

In what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) names as - predictors of ismophoric change- they explain how little organizations, or little units in a large organization try to model itself after the organization it perceives to be successful. Little ISAF or NATO nations are looking to the powerful USA when they model themselves. But the problem is that these nations at the same time try to keep their distinctive characteristics they view as beneficial; for example national caveats, or projects done by national funding, carried out as "flag-planting." According to DiMaggio and Powell such issues contributes to the inconsistency in the organization, an aspect characterizing the studied organization in this thesis.

If a nation, through their PRT, did anything in the operation area on their own that was not be in the line of what their superior Commander ordered or might even be in contradiction to it, the Commander had no authority but to complain to the ambassador of that nation. According to discussions with representative from RCN management, this was a problem in a military structure where strategy was built jointly. This was also one of the reasons nations conducted activities they found beneficial outside the command

line.[253] ISAF with its different nationalities and multiple reporting lines added complexity and made an organizational overview difficult for everyone, especially with regard to the PRTs, it was difficult to get an organizational understanding. This mirrored the problematic command and control system. When PRT MeS had such good relations with the UN Military Advisor that the Advisor was more informed about PRT MeS activities and challenges than the RCN, as the upper command was, this revealed a weakness in the command and control system. Personal relations were very influential[254] as well as whether a nation had resources. Nations which desired to "flag plant" to stand out, conducted nationally- funded QIPs outside ISAF channels. This often occurred in the Blue Box area, when nations used their own military to build such projects as medical centers or schools.

What was the reason for this? Was it competition among nations and the need to manifest national power as one among the ISAF participating nations? Did national "flag planting" happen at the expense of the village needs? A better internal mutual understanding and trust in ISAF would be the place to start to make progress towards this problem. Unity of command is critical to ensure that a military organization works as presupposed.

If an allied organization such as ISAF does not succeed internally with mutual trust and joint efforts, external coordination will also suffer. Internal differences of focus, culture, and understanding among the allies needed to be understood and dealt with to gain mutual trust and an appropriate coordination on a micro-level to succeed on the macro-level.

7.2.1.3 Various PRTs

What exactly *was* a PRT? Were they reconstruction teams or combat teams? The name, provincial reconstruction team, was misleading as long as the PRTs conducted military operations and lived in military camps. During 2010, the Norwegian PRT in Maimanah (PRT MAI), the Swedish PRT in Mazar-e Sharif (PRT MeS) and the German PRT in Kunduz (PRT KDZ) all

---

[253] For example: A PRT Commander conducted his own, privately financed CIMIC projects in his area of responsibility, supported by gifts collected from his network at his home nation. This was against CIMIC doctrine. (Events that took place in RCN subordinated PRTs in 2010/11).
[254] Personal experience.

conducted more military operations than ever before. With their heavy military equipment, they were more likely to be perceived as combat teams than reconstruction teams. Even if all the PRTs in the RCN area of operation also had a civilian unit, it was not likely that anyone outside the military viewed them as reconstruction units. The intention of the PRTs was that CIMIC should be the core of these organizations, but it did not turn out this way. The PRTs developed in a wrong direction. Instead of reconstruction teams, they became a strike force, especially beginning in 2010, conducting more military operations than ever before.

Meyer and Rowan (1977) claimed that rational formal structure is assumed to be the most effective way to coordinate and control complex relational networks, - an assumed primary task in the PRTs. The idea of the PRTs was that they should establish contacts with local and regional officials to promote the legal administration in their area, to find facts, and to assess the situation in terms of security, development, and governance. They also proposed assistance focusing on development, social and economic infrastructure such as road construction or water supply. The idea was that personal presence and personal contacts would influence the security and stability in the area, as presumed in the COIN doctrine. But, local authorities and the local population were challenged as how to interpret and understand the different PRTs. Due to different training and culture, the PRT way of prioritizing, coordinating, or conducting activities varied from nation to nation. Additionally, some PRTs took over their area of responsibility from other countries,[255] which displayed different focus, priorities, and approaches towards the local population in the same area. Accordingly, the presumed rational formal structure of the PRTs was not so easy to read or understand for coordinating actors.

Germany, with their civil-military led PRTs and focuses on long term planning and local ownership, was challenged by the incoming US force flow in 2010, with its action-minded attitude. The US focus on QIPs and using "money as a weapon" principle, used a fundamentally different method, which was displayed in the planning and implementation of the projects.

---

[255] The PRT MeS (in 2006) and PRT MAI took over the area from the British forces in 2004, and PRT KDZ (in 2003) took the area from US Forces, leading to different approaches in the areas of operation.

Further, the development-oriented Turkish or Hungarian PRTs and the more combat-oriented PRTs of the Norwegians or Swedish had very different organizational ideas and structures. More harmonized PRTs would have the benefit of better internal coordination, and also easier communication and coordination toward external actors, especially the local population. Inconsistency made proper crisis management very difficult. [256]

Moreover, the PRTs moved from towns into highly guarded camps outside the cities (as in Maimana and Kunduz), resulting in less direct contact with the population. Military units living their daily lives in military camps behind high walls did not have a real opportunity to understand or improve the lives of Afghan families through coordination with local authorities and NGOs in the area. The question arises as how to understand or support sustainable reconstruction in an environment without a deep contextual knowledge? In light of the mandate and the aims of coordination concepts, now at odds with the COIN strategy, which made the population the center of gravity, the answer seems that it would not be very successful.

Could this be appropriate crisis management? Kruke (2012) explained how the focus on one's own security and distance to the field (such as a remote management) weakened the quality of risk assessments and reliable decision making. Presence in the field is necessary to be able to have effective risk management. Further, in order to gain legitimacy, presence is also required to cultivate relations with the local population. Without being on the ground, the ability to have the knowledge and resources to update the threat-profile is poor.

7.2.1.4 Summary

ISAF was operating in a complex emergency in a war zone, so coordination was a great challenge. The problem of internal coordination is well formulated by the aforementioned business definition (Chapter 2.3):[257] *"The*

---

[256] Problems related to PRTs in Afghanistan are outlined in several reports and articles. See, for example, N.T. Adams (2009), M.J. McNerney (2005/2006), P. Runge (2009), O. Eronen (2008).
[257] Business Dictionary . Retrieved from http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/activity.html

synchronization and integration of activities, responsibilities, and command and control structures to ensure that the resources of an organization are used most efficiently in pursuit of the specified objectives." The synchronization and integration of activities is hard to accomplish even in small homogeneous organizations. In multinational organizations as ISAF this is a huge challenge. The reporting lines were many and over-complex, the needed joint communication and reporting that presuppose joint understanding and efficient coordination, which Turner (1976, 1978) presupposes as a crisis management criteria, was hard to achieve.

Olsen (1988) underlined how political organizations (such as ISAF), based on mutual dependency between state and society, also consisted of complex loosely coupled systems (such as IJC, RCN and PRT) and changing processes (as overall concepts and crisis development) that needed to be coordinated. This dilemma characterized ISAF. It was too easy for the organizational levels represented by IJC, RCN, the PRTs, or the different branches in the RCN, to "live their own life" within the ISAF organization. This often meant that the organization as a whole could not function rationally or as intended (Rasmussen, 1997; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997). ISAF lacked the power to force the unity of effort that is inherent in the concept of a military organization.

Bureaucracy theories assume that coordination and control of activity are critical dimensions to succeed, but organizations do not function according to formal blueprints, and a gap between the formal and informal organization is often the result of this Meyer and Rowan (1977) underlines. ISAF had such a gap. The formal command and control system did not seem to work according to the organizational intention, creating lack of coordination and control.

7.3.   ISAF Processes - Appropriate or Inexpedient?

Military organizations need to ensure effective data gathering, information and communication processing, planning, implementation and feedback to manage appropriate coordination with civilian actors.   Drawing from Weber's Ideal Bureaucracy Model (1971), this presupposes adequate training,

joint understanding, and trust in one's own role and responsibility, as well as rational planning and decision processes. How did this function in North Afghanistan? To be able to discuss this, three operational research questions were posed in chapter 4.5.

The *first* operational research question is: *"How does military training influence civil military coordination?"*

7.3.1. Training and Education

Training is the basis for all activities. The understanding of one's role and performance was founded in the training and education of ISAF soldiers. ISAF/NATO emphasized training in line with Weber's ideal of seeking unity of effort. But, is this training enough for today's new wars and conflicts where skills other than military basic and military specialist skills are needed, especially as militaries are pushed into new areas as development and governance issues? Besides, in current international operations, the action of one or few soldiers on the ground might have unsuspected diplomatic or security policy consequences (as, for example, when US soldiers urinated on dead Afghan insurgents). This underlines the importance of cultural awareness.

Understanding of new concepts, as CA or COIN focus on local populations as the center of gravity, presupposes knowledge about civilian coordinating actors and cultural awareness in general. Such awareness has become more important and influential for today's militaries in the complex situation of the new wars (Olsen and Øyan 2007; Weiss, 2005; Barth, 2008; Barfield, 2005b; Smith, 2005).

According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), formal structures not only are created from relational networks in the social organization, but also reflect understandings of social reality. The inner life of an organization, its procedures, positions, policy, etc. is influenced by training and knowledge from the education system. This underlines the power and influence of the educational system, and how vital it is for the direction and capacity in the organization. Despite NATO's emphasize on joint education and training, some NATO countries decided or emphasized different policies. This was

what the US did when it adopted the US Civil Affairs Doctrine instead of NATO's CIMIC Doctrine. ISAF represented these many cultures and perspectives. Some education and training was joint and some different, which led to variations and sometimes inconsistent understanding of social reality.

Professionalism is understood as *"the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work"* (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:152). "Normative isomorphism" represents the ideas coming from professions, intellectuals, or subject matter experts that formalize joint norms and principals. Militaries seek professionalism, which is emphasized in both basic and specialist military training, but professionals often have to compromise with non-professionals.

For example, as military is a political tool, the generals occasionally had to compromise with politicians to get support for the troops back home, resulting in military building mosques, medical centers or schools. This was not what the military is trained to do. To complicate conditions, the allies most often had different backgrounds, education, and training.

To meet the challenges of the new wars NATO began to educate ISAF management, (for example, the NATO education of upper ISAF HQs in CA and COIN concepts and understanding). The limitation was that each coalition country differently emphasized the depth and extent of these new policies. Further, the training and education diverged between the upper levels of the organization and the sharp end. The professionalism of management did have some influence on the understanding between the levels within the organization. The result was less management understanding and contact with the ground in the organization, as well as less focus on inputs from the sharp end, and vice versa. The lack of understanding between the levels, leading to poor coordination and information exchange was a major crisis management problem as described by Turner (1976/1978) and Rasmussen (1997).

Professional training institutions are important centers for the development of organizational norms, as well as organizational and professional behavior according to DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Important aspects for encouraging normative isomorphism are the filtering of personnel through recruitment and

a narrow range of training institutions, as in military officer education. Many professional career tracks are closely guarded, both at entry and throughout a career. In this way, some individuals who make it to the top become homogenous. This might be a good thing in order to keep the supranational military culture Soeters and Manigart referred to–the collectivistic and hierarchy-oriented culture that makes it possible for military personnel of different origin to function better than many other international organizations, as for example NGOs (Soeters and Manigart, 2008)—but this might also be the problem.

Military organization and activity often represent a military culture with drilled methods of action. In tense conflict situations, one acts as one is trained. Soldiers, who are drilled in their actions to a high extent, might more easily and automatically do so, - whether it is appropriate or not. This is effective when the actions are appropriate, as military basic skills used in security issues. But in areas outside the traditional military scope, as with development and governance issues, were not always appropriate. This was experienced in both the planning and execution of the described projects. Project work usually displayed how ISAF soldiers had no time and did not understand the importance of using the local structures to ensure local ownership. The focus was to take responsibility and carry out action.

Furthermore, in project work, military isomorphism hampered needed perspectives regarding the complexity of the situation and contributes to the tendency to overlook suggestions or inputs from coordinating civilian actors. This could be reasoned in what Turner calls the decoy problem- one overlook some issues and focus on some issues by concentrating on what one can handle, or understand, instead of the incomprehensible ones, - especially if one work under strict timelines. Or, it could be reasoned in what Turner calls the collective blindness, one do not take into account the suggestions from representatives outside own principal organization, and by this losing new angels to the problem, cf. the incubation period in Turners Failure of Foresight Model, (Turner 1978).

To meet the need for cultural awareness, some countries made efforts to educate soldiers at all levels in cultural awareness, for example in pre-

deployment training.[258] Additionally, some ISAF participating nations had anthropologists or other social scientists attached to units to meet the challenges of conflicts in unfamiliar environments. This was controversial as it raised the debate about the military role and its tasks and the increasing involvement of the military in civilian activities (Rohde, 2007).

But as this research show, ISAF officers tended to be skeptical of the civilian experts, not asking their advice or consideration because of the different culture, training, "language" and understanding between the experts and the officers. The "new eyes" or perspectives which Turner (1978) emphasized, were not so easy to "sell" to the core organization.

Why was additional training in the RCN operational area arranged? The acknowledged problem was the fact that the ISAF participating countries decided themselves about the training of their soldiers back home, including which NATO courses to attend, if at all. This made consistency in training difficult to achieve. The additional training or training quality assurance, established in the RCN operational area (which seemed appropriate) was an effort to secure a joint basis, which should characterize a military unit.

To accomplish adequate training in NATO to handle conflicts as in Afghanistan, a narrower definition of the military role and responsibility would make it easier to keep a focus on training and education related to civil military coordination by emphasizing the joint approach and quality assurance of the training before deployment. For example, joint mandatory CIMIC education would give more confidence to the content of the military CIMIC role.

What actually was the military role and responsibility, and how was this perceived by the soldiers and their coordinating bodies? This question leads to the *second* operational research question: "*How does role performance influence civil military coordination?*" which is discussed below.

---

[258] See, for example, the Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine (Norwegian Forces Joint Operative Doctrine) (FFOD), 2007.

7.3.2. Role Confusion

People maintain a repertoire of roles and identities that provide rules of appropriate behavior in situations for which they are relevant. Most of the time, people take action by asking themselves three questions: what kind of a situation is this? What kind of a person am I? What does a person such as I do in a situation such as this? (March and Olsen, 2009). These basic questions sometimes became difficult to answer for ISAF soldiers due to the vague mandate, varying concepts, and inconsistent practice described in this thesis.

According to Brocades Zaalberg (in Rietjens and Bollen, 2008), the military role is squeezed between the traditional combat role and the soldier of postmodern warfare. Soldiers often find themselves in the middle of an unpredictable territory, without functioning civil institutions or infrastructure, and with complex ethnic and cultural revolts they are supposed to stabilize and secure. Without a clear mandate or end state, how can they perform this role? This becomes more complicated when the overall civil military coordination concepts are also vague and complex.

Since the Balkan wars, coordinating actors, especially the UN units and NGOs, have questioned the military's role in the new wars and conflicts. They point to the negative effects of blurred lines between military and civilian actors in conflict areas, and criticize the military engagement in development and governance issues which threaten their security and humanitarian space (DeRoos, 2003; Sommerfeldt, 2005; Cornish, 2007; Friis, 2010). Still, military actors seem to get more involved in these events, especially in the new wars under the Comprehensive Approach in which all actors involved were supposed to use the same toolbox. This resulted in the aforementioned blurred lines and increasing difficulties for local population to determine who the "good guys" were and who were the "bad guys." When the picture gets blurred as it often did in Northern Afghanistan, many actors seek coordination or cooperation with the strongest player in the area, the role which ISAF was perceived to hold.

However, how to coordinate with an organization so difficult to read or understand? ISAF's organization was inconsistent, striving to find its role both as an organization representing the international response system and

also on the individual level, soldiers being confused about the many different expectations to their role.

In the beginning of the war, after the fall of the Taliban, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and ISAF had very different concepts and tasks. OEF soldiers were in the role of the "the bad cop," running counterterrorism (isolating and killing terrorists), while ISAF was in the role of "the good cop," running operations designed for peace building, such as reconstruction and development projects. These different military roles must have been confusing to the Afghan population and the national/international coordinating actors that military actors had such a different appearance and tasks. Years later ISAF soldiers suddenly held both roles, which made the confusion among coordinating actors even worse.

The confusion about the roles or the activities for the military followed the many unclear and contradictory tasks. ISAF soldiers had to meet many expectations, and their tasks were spread out in so many areas that understanding their own role became difficult. This role confusion was well described by Friis (2010). He described that the military had three main approaches in the operation area of Afghanistan: the conventional approach, the stabilization approach, and the COIN approach. The first approach gave a very clear role of a solider: to kill or capture the enemy and destroy his infrastructure. The second approach was quite the opposite: to assist ANSF and build up their competence, support development (building infrastructure), coordinate with civilians. Deadly force reserved for self-defense. The third approach, the COIN approach, assumed an understanding of the local environment and focused on the wellbeing of the population, a strategy that could not succeed with military means alone, presupposing a comprehensive civil military coordination.

General McChrystal introduced so-called "kill-or-capture" raids which mushroomed under General Petraeus (20 rides every night, at least 600 a month, in 2010).[259] This was explained as part of COIN and CA, just as reconstruction, development, and governance were said to be, creating more

---

[259] Numbers taken from Frontline,Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/afghanistan-pakistan/kill-capture/night-raids-disrupting-or-fueli/

ISAF role confusion. The strategy of "kill or capture" during night time went along with a governance, development, and reconstruction role in daytime. This not only created a role confusion and insecurity inside the military organization. It also called into question ISAF's legitimacy and also confused coordinating actors and the local population as to how to deal with or how to understand the military role, as well as how to coordinate or act in accordance with the soldiers.

The "kill or capture" strategy was mostly associated with military specialist groups, and from some soldiers, was even not considered as a good crisis management strategy. Night rides were controversial and they violated the Afghan cultural norms:[260] *how was it possible for soldiers to win hearts and minds of a population that felt dishonored?* The negative effects of the night rides was easier for the TCT and CAT soldiers, the "boots on the ground" to grasp than the generals, as they were the ones sent out in the villages to win hearts and minds. What was experienced in the RCN area of operation during 2010 was less security, more uprisings and more military operations than ever before.

The many role expectations are examples on how organizations as ISAF had to confront inconsistent expectations for legitimate structures to get legitimacy. As Meyer and Rowan (1977) mentioned, organizations meet different expectations from different actors in the crisis area, like politicians, professions, media, coordinating actors and local population and environment. Moreover, beliefs, values, norms and the role perception of interviewees or observed soldiers in this research often did not correspond with the expectations in overall civil military coordination concepts. On the ground level, especially, CA and COIN strategies were mostly looked upon as political norms with which the soldiers did not identify. In upper HQs, identification with these political norms was highly correlated. This, of course, confused the role understanding.

Despite the inconsistency which made ISAF a difficult organization to understand for both coordinating actors and the local population, it was,

---

[260] As underlined by President Karzai's Chief of Staff, Mohammad Daudzai in an interview of Jan 30th 2011. Retrieved from; http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/afghanistan-pakistan/kill-capture/interview-mohammad-daudzai/

nevertheless, viewed as a capable and resourceful organization in the RCN area of responsibility. Local authorities came with wish lists for help and support for local infrastructure issues. The local population asked for medical support, NGOs and other coordinating actors now and then sought assistance from ISAF for information or protection when security deteriorated, PSCs wanted to be involved in security and intelligence issues. Further, the UN leaned on ISAF when problematic dangerous situations turned up, as in the case of the surrendered HIG fighters in Baghlan Province who wanted to be reintegrated. ISAF role expectations from coordinating actors, and international or national politicians and generals were many and sometimes contradictory. In the Reintegration Project, ISAF soldiers were thrown into a role they had not prepared for, but still managed to handle during the emergency phase, probably due to the rationality which, after all, characterizes the command and control system and that they took responsibility. Further, the local authorities and population trusted ISAF for things they were not in the role or position to fulfill, as in the case of the localization debate of the end station for the Railway Project, when local authorities, donors and the Construction Company all trusted ISAF to clear up and decide. Why were ISAF representatives better informed and trusted about the Railway Project than central GIRoA representatives? The reason for this might be that ISAF was the strongest organization in the area. As noted by Meyer and Rowan (1977), organizations tend follow the most powerful, which also put a pressure on ISAF to take the acting role and handle the situation.

In the effort to handle the situation and take action, planning and decision-making processes became important aspects of the coordination with other actors in the conflict area, which raises the third operational research question: *"How do planning and decisions influence civil military coordination?"*

7.3.3. Planning

ISAF overall planning processes was executed according to an analytic rational planning method, based upon classical normative approaches to decision making, as in Banfield's (1959) four step model for rational

planning.[261] This model presupposed that a plan or decision is correct, good or rational, which Lindblom (1959) questions.

Banfield (1959) defined planning as "*…the process by which one selects a course of action (a set of means) for the attainment of one's ends.*" This was difficult for ISAF which had not clear goal or end state. Banfield viewed planning and rational choice as a method of making decisions. He also argued that making a rational plan involves essentially the same procedure as rational choice. It is by the process of rational choice that the best adaptation of means to ends is likely to be achieved. Banfield's aforementioned four step model for rational planning has been developed into a range of varied, simple or comprehensive multi-step, rational planning models or rational decision making models in civilian and military organizations. (For example, the mentioned NATO (2010) AJP-01 - Allied Joint Doctrine or the US army's Crisis Action Planning Model).

If the goal or mandate is too diffuse or vague, as in the case of ISAF, Banfield suggested that during the operationalization of goals, one should consider both the active and contextual elements. The contextual end is especially important to consider, if one cannot sacrifice without loss. Banfield underlined that planning must identify and clarify both the active components of the goals as well as the contextual ones, and, if they are not consistent, then the relative value attached to each must be displayed. An important aspect of planning is evaluating for the unintended consequences as well as to balance between unlike intangibles. In organizations like ISAF, operating in a complex, unknown environment, striving to understand the context, planning for unintended consequences, or to balance between unlike intangibles becomes very difficult. Additionally, caveats and inconsistent strategies influenced the decision-making process and outcome. Nevertheless, short term, middle term and long term plans were made and action taken, because

---

[261] Though, after entering conflicts and complex emergencies such as Afghanistan, this is discussed and new concepts like SOD (Systematical Operational Design) have been considered. For further reading Matthew Lauder, Retrieved from http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo9/no4/08-lauder-eng.asp

the military, fundamentally, has an action-minded training and attitude based upon the need to take responsibility.

Further, Banfield pointed out the importance of knowing the context and contextual end when planning, or else the result can make the situation even worse.[262] In civil military coordination activities such as Highway 1, the Hairatan BXP, DDP, or the Reintegration Project, ISAF struggled with planning and execution. Even though the ideas for the overall strategies were for ISAF to only support GIRoA in development and governance issues, this was a challenge. First because it presupposed a deep contextual knowledge, which most military actors did not possess. Secondly GIRoA was not very operational, accordingly ISAF were more in the leading role than the supporting role. ISAF had changed focus from pure security to development and governance, being involved in development and governance planning, presupposing a competence that the planners did not possess. Accordingly, one could not predict the outcome or the "contextual end."

To make a rational choice or a rational decision, one needs to consider all alternatives and their consequences as fully as possible, given the time and resources (Banfield, 1959). In civil military coordination, this was exactly what ISAF did not have either the time or the resources. Nor did the organization have the knowledge to consider the best alternative and the consequences, especially regarding decision making on development and governance.

Lindblom (1959) claimed that rational planning or decision making is not possible, suggested that if one cannot list all alternatives and all their consequences, one cannot set rational priorities. From this perspective, one might say that ISAF did not conduct rational planning. Further he explained how people with different values can agree on a "good policy," even if they don't agree that they are using the most appropriate means. Yet, they can agree upon a policy to reach the agreed objective. This is what military and civilian actors did in coordination issues in Afghanistan when they agreed on the CA strategy, even if some civilian actors were in opposition. For ISAF, this meant finding good policy to fulfill the mandate, despite any

---

[262] Banfield illustrated this with an example: if you burn down the house to get rid of the rats in the cellar you have not considered the contextual end, or relevant in this case, the outcome.

disagreement in the means among participating countries. To meet this political acceptable policy, NATO doctrines were leading documents for ISAF planning.

Still in reality, the planning process in ISAF was disturbed by the role confusion and the lack of a defined course, clear strategies, and goals (outcomes). Even though plans were formed according to prevailing procedures, the planning and decision processes linked to projects and other civil military coordination activities were more characterized by ad hoc activity and solutions rather than the prescribed rational planning process. Handling of the DDP project displayed lack of understanding of the content of governance, both on IJC and RCN level. In RCN the lead of the DDP project alternated between CJ-5 (plans) and CJ-9 (CIMIC) branches, one did not know where to place the responsibility in a military system. Further, the DDP Project displayed the disadvantage of timeline stress and time pressure in governance projects, and that it was difficult to handle such subjects in the military way of planning and executing projects. Military actors had no qualifications for doing governance projects, and the one day workshops planned to educate them in this subject, only underlined the lack of management understanding.

According to the local UN representatives in Maimanah, the DDP focus on the establishment of local governance also seemed very strange and distant to the local population. The same concerns regarding the DDP were reported back to the IJC from PRTs and RCN CIMIC, and supported by GTZ representatives in Kunduz and Baghlan. Still, the overall plans were pushed by the project management in Kabul. Either attitudes or view of ground level in the different levels of the organization were divided, *or* the need for results or "good stories" overruled other opinions.

These actions may be explained in the light of Banfield's argument regarding opportunistic decision making and missing rationality. Banfield (1959) claimed that there is little planning and even less rationality in real life, and he lists twelve points as reasons why organizations engage in opportunistic decision making. Relevant here is the argument that organizations keep going for the sake of keep it going, because the goal is unclear, so there is no picture towards which action can be directed.

Lindblom's "muddling through," or step-by-step approach is less problematic to apply to this situation. Personal experience can be applied and aspirations need not be high. Expectations can be tested and errors repaired. ISAF followed this procedure, especially in smaller units or out in the sharp end. This approach is not so theory dependent, and fit in well at the sharp end of an organization such as ISAF. Upper HQs emphasis on rational planning, however, hampered understanding between the levels of the organization and the perception of the overall situation. The result was that within ISAF, policies were developed on the ground which upper HQs may not have been aware of.

This represents an organizational de-coupling, as described by Meyer and Rowen (1977), Olsen (1988) and Brunsson (1989) among others. Here the overall strategies are viewed as ideas designed to satisfy political or environmental expectations from the "boots on the ground" who rather focus on the organizational core activity or what they find situational relevant.

A rational choice planning and decision making policy might have worked if ISAF were concentrating only on security issues, which, as their specialty, was something they were trained for and able to handle. But, as ISAF was forced to plan and execute activities in governance and development support the result was that even security issues became a problem to manage. Their resources were spread over so many non-core military tasks that ISAF became overstretched, in accordance with what Lindley-French (2007) explains as military actors vanishing in a black hole of reconstruction and development, not being able to handle their main task; security. Not surprisingly, this influenced the quality of both security and the civil military coordination activities on the ground.

7.3.4. Coordination and Legitimacy

The crisis management response system in Afghanistan was comprehensive and complex. In North Afghanistan, ISAF joined a complex response system in which they had to play their part and find their role, which was never clear.

ISAFs coordination with other actors in the operation area was an exigent exercise, and characterized in the six points of the Minear (1990-92) definition:[263]

1) *strategic planning;*
2) *gathering data and managing information;*
3) *mobilizing resources and assuring accountability;*
4) *orchestrating a functional division of labor in the field;*
5) *negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities, and;*
6) *providing leadership.*

Military units have long traditions of providing leadership, conducting strategic planning (cf. point 1), emphasizing data gathering and information processing (cf. point 2), as well as being able to mobilize great resources in a short timeline schedule (cf. point 3). Problems related to these aspects have been discussed earlier in the thesis; what is in focus here is point 4 and 5 in Minear's definition.

Starting with Minear's point 4:—*orchestrating a functional division of labor in the field,*—Rasmussen's (1997) socio-technical system has relevance. Rasmussen elaborated on the challenges and dilemmas regarding the coordination between involved organizations and their organizational levels. In complex organizations operating in a complex context of planning and coordination, internally and externally, horizontally and vertically coordination is a demanding and critical exercise. Rasmussen (1997) outlined in his safety management model that one level can operate with what might be an appropriate interaction and coordination at that own level without coordination with the other levels in the system. In this case the vertical integration or coordination will not function, which leads to that the organization as a whole will not be functioning as designed. Thus, the IJC operated well on its level as did the PRTs at their level, but they did not coordinate well when they interacted. This problem was a challenge in ISAF.

---

[263] Minear definition; see Chapter 2.

With regard to Minear's point 5: *negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities,"* it was a challenge to find good communication and mutual understanding between Afghanistan as a host nation and the response system. There were many reasons for this, but legitimacy played a vital role. In civil military coordination in complex emergencies, legitimacy is the basis for the presence of the participating actors.

A public organization as ISAF (being an item of expenditure) was especially dependent on the judgment from the surrounding environment to gain legitimacy. Civil military coordination concepts as CA, COIN and CIMIC were supposed to ensure ISAF support in the surrounding environment. This did not work as planned and ISAF was viewed as an occupation force, which created little or no improvement in security or stabilization conditions. Further, living standards in rural areas were slow to develop or nonexistent. ISAF lost support and became vulnerable to legitimacy.

Organizations such as ISAF are, to some extent, regarded as rational bureaucracies, but can also represent an institution or an agency of the political economy. It is quite obvious that ISAF, as a political tool, represented a political framework. In the struggle to "appear to be rational", organizations like ISAF compete not just for resources, but also for political power and, most of all, institutional legitimacy. The political power and institutional legitimacy became more important than pure efficiency as described by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). This also was related to the vague military end-state mandates and role definition, which made it hard to measure whether activities were in the direction of the objectives.

The prestige and reputation, and to be inside the "right circle" are important buffers from this vulnerability Meyer and Rowan (1977) claims. It is possible for an organization to work its way into the corridors of power and take advantage of being left in peace for a while, even if not delivering the expected outcome. This aspect characterized ISAF, some would say, after more than a decade with crisis management in Afghanistan without the expected results. Meyer and Rowan (1977) underlined that this will not work unless one responds adequately to the surrounding environment, which was

also was a struggle for ISAF, due to their activities in areas and topics they were not trained to handle, which, in turn, further weakened their legitimacy.

7.4.   Summary of Discussion

The numerous actors inside the ISAF organization and the needed coordination and cooperation between these actors was vital for the organization to function as an appropriate crisis management organization, as both Turner (1978) in his *"failure of foresight theory"* and Rasmussen (1997) in his *"socio-technical model"* have underlined. This thesis has mentioned different areas representing poor or failed internal coordination. If the internal coordination failed, the external coordination and unity of effort would also suffer, as coordinating actors then have to relate to an organization characterized by diversity and inconsistency.

Further, military units represented different cultures and views on how to plan and conduct projects, share information, communicate and coordinate with civilian actors, or understand the prevailing strategies. To bridge these differences, political and military representatives needed to understand the importance of mutual trust and unity of effort. What characterized the ISAF organization was difficulties in internal coordination as well as not having a settled organization culture to accept information and points of view from the outsiders, such as the IO, GO or NGO representatives, as they reflected different perspectives and understanding. With reference to Turner and Pidgeon (1997) this represented an organizational vulnerability in a crisis management perspective.

7.4.1. Timeline focus and cultural awareness

The timeline focus in ISAF was a problem in the coordination with Afghan authorities and the IOs and NGOs. According to the mandate, ISAF was in the *supporting* role, which turned out to be very difficult in an action-minded, sense of responsibility culture such as ISAF, especially in activities demanding a long term perspective, cultural awareness and deep context understanding.

As displayed in the project work, ISAF's overconfidence and action- minded attitude combined with the focus on timelines, did not give the necessary room for local participation and ownership of the process. This conformed to Turner's "incubation factors," which he explained as perceptual rigidities, overconfidence, and organizational arrogance, all aspects that hampered the needed coordination (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997).

ISAF, as well as other Western organizations, tried to solve tasks, projects, and conflicts based on Western traditions, expectations, and rationality. ISAF was often in the role of the organizer or arranger for internal conflict negotiation, or project implementation projects along a strict timeline, as displayed in the project works.

According to complex emergency researchers, the Western way of conflict handling has often been characterized of "we know what is best for you" kind of thinking (Anderson, 1999; Duffey, 2000; Duffield, 2001; Barfield, 2005b; Kaldor, 2007; Barth, 2008; Polman, 2010), an attitude recognizable in the project works described in this thesis. This attitude did not stimulate the Afghan motivation to coordinate and participate for real, but rather only to make the impression that they were.

7.4.2. ISAF Inconsistency and De-Coupling

Standardized activities are characteristic of military organization, but they create training and role dilemmas when these standards confront situations that do not "fit." It is not easy to handle situations and create mechanisms for the dealing with unexpected events when operating with standards. The PRTs displayed examples of this when they unwillingly became involved in the DDP and the Reintegration Project. Moreover, conflicts between categorical rules and efficiency might arise, such as the discussion among military and civilian personnel interpreting doctrines concerning how far into the civilian dimension the military intervention might go. Due to political pressure on ISAF to create results, dilemmas occurred. How far could the military operate without interfering with the humanitarian area or principles, or how far into nation-building could the military participate without fueling the conflict with the local population? These questions and issues had different answers depending on the different ISAF nation's policies and understanding.

Political mandates might not fit the activity on the ground level, and generalized rules of the institutional environment might be inappropriate in specific situations, which is a planning and decision problem. The political decision-makers often do not directly experience the consequences of their own decisions or actions. Accordingly, the strategies or policies which are adopted at the upper levels (such as the CA and COIN concepts) might not be adaptive or understood as relevant to the sharp end of the organization, as was the case in ISAF.

When the lower levels of an organization such as ISAF was critical or even did not take into consideration new strategies or concepts, the result was to focus on daily business. The result was problems of coordination and implementation. This represents the decoupling theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Røvik, 2007; Olsen, 1988; Brunsson, 1989) in which new strategies and ideas are perceived as elements that are designed to satisfy environmental expectations. Accordingly, these elements will be decoupled from organizational praxis. Implementation of the concepts and strategies for civil military coordination in ISAF, like CA and COIN, were differently understood and emphasized in the upper and lower parts of the organization. CIMIC doctrine, which represented the operational and tactical level, was better understood and conducted in the lower level of the organization, although there were some national differences. Nevertheless, this decoupling tendency was definitely not in line with the idea of the model of a rational organization.

To sum up, the ISAF organization, built up as a rational bureaucracy, deviated from rational bureaucracy assumptions in several respects. Blurred lines of authority, confusing concepts and unclear mandates fuelled the military role confusion and pushed soldiers into settings outside their comfort zone. ISAF soldiers met expectations from the surrounding environment that was far beyond their training, skills, and contextual understanding. Civil military coordination was impeded.

The national caveats, divergent PRTs, numerous reporting-lines, and different situational understandings made coordination of civil and military planning and decisions problematic. ISAF was the strongest organization in terms of resources and power and, accordingly, was faced with great expectations from

coordinating actors and the local population. Nevertheless, they struggled with an internal bureaucracy that was not built for the expected or needed flexibility. Despite the power, inconsistency and decoupling weakened ISAF as a strong and rational organization.

8. Conclusion

8.1.   Overall Considerations

To take responsibility includes the risk of making mistakes; on the other hand, if no one takes responsibility, nothing will happen. The complex emergency in Afghanistan required international support. This support, mostly adequate crisis management efforts, should not be the type of efforts that will render superfluous the involvement of the local population, their local structures and way of handling things. This presupposes a fine balance requiring extensive cultural awareness. The idea of the international response system, as laid down in the overall policy and concepts such as the Comprehensive Approach (CA), was that one should strive to find a sensible level of coordination and lines to make the areas of responsibility clear and mutually acceptable, leaving the necessary room for action and involvement of the local population in order to guarantee Afghan ownership of any process. This was an important objective of the civil military coordination. It turned out to be very difficult to implement.

By studying the ISAF organization in North Afghanistan, the problems to the approach was related to following factors: First, it is essential to acknowledge the importance of cultural awareness and understanding of the context. Moreover, the Western way of conflict management based on Western logic, rationality, expectations, and traditions might not be appropriate.

Secondly, one needed to acknowledge the difference between civilian and military actors; the military tend to be more often action-minded, with narrower thinking in line with their own training and experience for accomplishing a mission with a specific, usually short timeline. Civilian actors, even though they are very varied, more often have a long term perspective and focus on local structures and processes. It might be of benefit for an appropriate civil military coordination that military and civilian actors have clear lines and duties, to improve each other's understanding of their role. Further, this would make it easier for the local population to grasp and relate to the different civilian and military actors, especially in complex

emergencies and conflicts characterized by the so-called "new wars" (Kaldor, 2007) or the "war amongst people" (Smith, 2005).

Thirdly, the overall civil military coordination concepts were differently understood and implemented at different levels of the ISAF organization, as well as among the participating countries. Influential organizations as the UN, NATO, and the EU all embraced the Comprehensive Approach (CA).Their strategies, procedures and doctrines concerning civil military coordination, therefore, became more similar. When the civilian and military organizations tend to look similar, however, the picture became more complicated. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) explained that in the drive for homogeneity—or what they called institutional isomorphism—the idea of keeping the organization alive becomes more important than the efficiency. From this perspective, political power and institutional legitimacy becomes more important to some organizations than efficiency or action. This increasingly seemed to characterize ISAF under the CA. The organization was stretched into too many areas, which complicated the coordination and weakened the efforts to achieve security.

The last and most important points to underline here regards ISAF's organizational challenges, as derived from the research question, which will be listed in the section below.

8.2.   Main Research Question

The main research question outlined in this thesis was: *"How do ISAF structures and processes influence civil military coordination in North Afghanistan?"*

What stands out from this study is that the ISAF organization, built as a rational bureaucracy (Weber, 1971) with a thorough command and control system was also characterized by diversity and inconsistency on several levels and areas. It was, as a result, a major deviation from the rational model and rational crisis management. Combined with complex and unclear civil military coordination concepts, this made civil military coordination in North Afghanistan disorderly and exigent.

330

The national restrictions or national caveats were regarded as a huge problem among ISAF officers that threatened the goals of a unity of effort for ISAF. Further, ISAF's effort to utilize the benefits of the command and control system was difficult to implement because there was no clear mandate or exit strategy leading to different interpretations and practice in participating countries. This made it difficult to measure success against objectives.

ISAF structures were too top-heavy with too many generals and high-ranked leaders representing different thinking and priorities, struggling with overly complex reporting lines. Further, the varied PRTs and divergent situational understanding between the HQs and the ground level, contributed to organizational inconsistency. Additionally, rapid rotations followed by no handover-takeover (HOTO) or use of lessons learned, also led to inconsistency. This, together with a different organization model in ISAF Joint Command (IJC) than in the subordinated units, made rationality difficult. Accordingly, an appropriate civil military coordination was problematic, as ISAF was not understood by the external coordinating actors.

Additionally, the differences in training and understanding of the civil military concepts at the military levels in the upper HQs and the "boots on the ground," led to a decoupling in the organization, creating diversity in priorities and approach. It seemed as the overall concepts represented theories not precise enough to predict consequences of their policies, which was what the sharp end really needed. Accordingly, the ground level rather concentrated on CIMIC/ Civil Affairs doctrines and technical tactical procedures they knew and were trained to do, while upper HQs were engaged in overall coordination concepts such as CA and COIN.

The mandate, policy, and guidelines were vague and changing leaving the military role and responsibility to become blurred and differently interpreted among participating nations and organizational levels. Besides, interpretation of the overall mandates and concepts pulled ISAF out of its military "comfort zone," and into civilian areas of responsibility they did not have the qualifications to handle. Nevertheless, when things became complicated it often resulted in ISAF having to take action alone, rather than to coordinate with other actors. Local actors were, for example, overlooked in project planning. Accordingly, the projects, in which civil military coordination was

the driving force, did not achieve the needed local ownership but rather caused dissatisfaction and skepticism among the local actors.

The character of the complex emergency ongoing in Afghanistan, and the way it was handled by ISAF blurred the lines between military and civilian actors, and created role confusion. To the military such a complex emergency represented new challenges. The end-state or exit strategy that the military is trained to plan for was shifting and seemed to be "unending," which made it difficult to plan as military were trained to do. In addition, the battlefield, as well as the enemy, were difficult to define, frequently changing, and could be located anywhere. Additionally, contributing ISAF nations, due to politics, were not willing to use the force at any cost, (cf. the caveats) resulting in the military developing large camps, more often conducting their warfare from a distant "safe haven" with less contact to the realities on the ground.

The situation in Afghanistan incorporated many elements of the definition of the new wars which blurs the distinctions of war (Kaldor, 2007). This made the civil military coordination more easily inflamed, as the military still is a political tool, which contributed to the resistance of the civilian actors to coordinate with the military.

8.3.   Thesis Contributions

8.3.1 Practical

This thesis contributes to a foundation for further empirical inquiry of the military role and engagements in what Kaldor (2007) names "the new wars" or wars characterized by the "war amongst people" (Smith, 2005).

It has given an insight into a less accessible organization, ISAF, which is regarded as an important and powerful actor of the international community's response system to the complex emergency taking place in Afghanistan. NATO will probably use an analogous organization in future deployments, hopefully some of the structural problems listed in this thesis can be improved in future operations.

This research shows how important it is to make clear distinction between civilian and military responsibilities, in time and space, if and when military is involved in civilian projects. If military actors are engaged in civil military coordination tasks and projects they should not be a subject to the same logic of action as the kinetic units. Further, if military is supposed to keep security, a more strict and joint military command and control system, as well as a more specific defined concept of action and tasks is necessary.

The study also laid open the vulnerability and the challenges of multinational military coalitions' ability to handle civil military coordination in a complex emergency.

8.3.2 Theoretical

Findings indicate that bureaucracy theory and rational and new-institutional organization theories are applicable when analyzing a military organization's structure, processes, and roles, and how this affects civil military coordination. This is a study of an intended bureaucracy in line with Weber's theories and the various analysis elaborations and deviations from it, by using of new-institutional theories. The theories applied were beneficial theoretical tools. The use of these theories provided an important context for the study of ISAF in Afghanistan.

Further, the use of Turner's theory of man-made disasters can be a useful support and supplementary elaboration of the bureaucracy and new-institutional theories—in addition to enlighten the organizational vulnerability in information processing and coordination efforts which are vital elements from the perspective of crisis management.

8.4.   Future Research

Modern multinational military coalitions have a dilemma. They operate under wide mandates, are designed to cover wide areas, and must be prepared and have a built in flexibility to cope with any emergent situation. At the same time they are designed as intended bureaucratic organizations, characterized by clear division of labor and clear distinctions between superiors and

subordinates, needed in a military command and control system, which challenges the flexibility.

"Militaries today are organized to fight industrial wars whilst engaged in war amongst the people" (Smith, 2005, p. 269).

According to Smith (2005), traditionally, military organizations are not designed for long term deployments to handle the conflict picture that characterizes the "war amongst people" and conflicts of today. Future research would benefit from examining the role of multinational military coalitions in future deployments:

More research needs to be pursued into whether Multinational military coalitions should undertake more or less governance and development tasks in complex emergencies. This is a controversial issue. A follow up study to assess what remains of projects, reconstruction, and development work after ISAF withdraws would be valuable supplement to this study. Such a study could suggest how to set future priorities for an organization such as ISAF. Further one should look into how long term deployment of multinational military coalitions in crisis areas will affect the local population and an appropriate crisis management.

9. References

Anderson, M. (1999*). Do no harm; How aid can support peace - or war.* London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Ankersen, C. (2008). *Civil-military cooperation in post-conflict operations.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Arbnor, I. and Bjerke, B. (1994). *Foretaksekonomisk metodlara.* Lund, Sweden: Studentlitteratur.

Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) (2008). *The A to Z Guide to Afghanistan assistance.* Kabul. Afghanistan: AREU.

Aybet , G. and Moore, R. (2010). *NATO in search for a vision.* Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Baldwin, D., (1995). Security studies and the end of the Cold War. *World Politics Vol. 48(1),* 117-141.

Barnard, C.I. (1938/1968). *The Functions of the Executive* (30th Anniversary Ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Barakat, S., Chard, M., Jacoby, T. and Lume, W. (2002). The composite approach: research design in the context of war and armed conflict. *Third World Quarterly, 23(5)*, 991-1003.

Banfield, E. (1959/73). Ends and means in planning. In A. Faludi (Ed.) *A reader in planning theory*, 139-149. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Barfield, T. (2005a). Afghanistan is not the Balkans: Central Asian ethnicity and its political consequences. *Central Eurasian Studies Review, Vol. 4(1)*, 2-8.

Barfield, T. (2005b). An Islamic state is a state run by good Muslims: Religion as a way of life and not an ideology in Afghanistan. In *Remaking Muslim politics: pluralism, contestation, democratization*, 213-239. Robert Hefner (Ed,). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Barth, F. (1959). *Political leadership among the Swat Pathans.* London, UK: Athlone Press.

Barth, F. (2008). *Afghanistan og Taliban,* Valdres, Norway: Pax Forlag.

Baum, J.A.C. and Rowley, T.G. (2002). *Companion to organizations: An introduction.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

Bearden, M. (2001). Afghanistan graveyard of empires. *Foreign Affairs, November/December,* Vol.80 (6), 17- 30.

Beljan, R. (2013). Afghanistan: Lessons learned from an ISAF Perspective. *Small Wars Journal, May 30.* Retrieved from; *http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/afghanistan-lessons-learned-from-an-isaf-perspective.*

Bellamy, A., Williams, P., and Griffin, S., (2004). *Understanding peacekeeping*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Bellamy, A. J. (2008). The responsibility to protect and the problem of military intervention. *International Affairs Vol. 84(4)*, 615-639.

Berdal, M. (2009). *Building peace after war.* The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). London, UK: Routledge.

Berger, P.L. and Luckmann, T. (1966). *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge.* New York, NY: Doubleday.

Bernard, H.R. (ed.) (2000). *Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Bernard, H. R. (2006). *Research methods in anthropology: qualitative and quantitative methods* [4. ed.]. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.

Boin, A., t'Hart, P., Stern, E. and Sundelius, B. (2005). *The politics of crisis management: Public leadership under pressure.* New York. NY: Cambridge University Press.

Bolle, T.A. (2011). Millioner trues av sult i Afghanistan. *Bistandsaktuelt No. 8.* Oslo, Norway. Retrieved from; www.bistandsaktuelt.no

Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2008). Isomorphism, Diffusion and Decoupling (78-98). In Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Sahlin, K. and Suddaby, R. (2008). *The SAGE handbook of organizational institutionalism.* London: Sage Publications.

Brocades Zaalberg, T.W. (2006). *Soldiers and civil power. supporting or substituting civil authorities in modern peace operations.* Amsterdam: Amsterdan University Press.

Brunsson, N. (1989). *The organization of hypocrazy. talk, decisions and actions in organizations*. Chichester, England: Wiley and Sons, Ltd.

Burchell, G., Gordon, C. and Miller, P., (eds.) (1991). *The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality. With two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Callaghan, J. and Kernic, F. (2004). *Armed forces and international security, Global trends and issues.* Munster, Germany: LIT Verlag.

Christensen, T., Lægreid, P., Roness, P.G. og Røvik, K.A. (2009). *Organisasjonsteori for offentlig sektor*. Oslo, Norway: Universitetsforlaget.

Civil-Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence (CCOE), (2008). *Guidance for CIMIC operators, NATO CIMIC field-handbook.* Enschede, the Netherlands: CCOE.

Clegg, S. and Haugaard, M. (2009). *The SAGE handbook of power.* London, UK : Sage Publications, Ltd.

Cohen, L., Manion, L. and Morrison, K. (2000). *Research methods in education*.[5th edition] New York, USA: Routledge.

Cornish, S. (2007). No room for humanitarian in 3D policies: Have forcible humanitarian interventions and integrated approaches lost their way? *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol.10, Issue 1.* Calgary, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary.

Cornish, S. (2008). *Civil-military relations: No room for humanitarianism in comprehensive approaches.* Oslo, Norway: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee (Den Norske Atlanterhavskomite), Security Policy Library No 5-2008.

Creswell, J.W. (1998). *Qualitative inquiry and research design, - choosing among five traditions.* London, UK: Sage Publications.

Czarniawaska, B. (2008). How to misuse institutions and get away with it: some reflections on institutional theory(ies). In Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Sahlin, K. and Suddaby, R. (2008): *The SAGE handbook of organizational institutionalism,* London, UK: Sage Publications.

DeConing, C. (2007); Civil-military coordination practices and approaches within UN peace operations. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol.10, Issue 1.* Calgary, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary.

Denzin,N.K. and Lincoln, Y. S.(2005). *The Sage handbook of qualitative research* [3rd ed.]. London, UK: Sage Publications, Inc.

DeRoos, D. (2003). C*ivil military humanitarianism in complex political emergencies: desirability and possibility of a cooperation.* Ghent, Belgium: Centre for Third World Studies, Ghent University.

DeWalt, K. M., and DeWalt, B. R. (2002). *Participant observation: a guide for fieldworkers*, Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.

DiMaggio, P.J. and Powell, W.W (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. *American Sociological Review 48 (2)*, 147-160.

Dipali, M. (2009): *Warlords as bureaucrats: the Afghan experience*. Carnegie Papers, No 101, 13.

Douglas, J.D. (1985). *Creative interviewing.* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Drori, G., Meyer J. and Hwang, H. (2006). *Globalization and organization: World society and organizational change.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Duffey, T. (2000). Cultural issues in contemporary peacekeeping. In I.T. Woodhouse and O. Ramsbotham (Eds.). *Peacekeeping and conflict resolution.* London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers.

Duffield , M. (1994). *Global governance and the new wars.* London, UK: Zed Books Ltd.

Duffield, M. (2001). *Global governance and the new wars: The merging of development and security* [2nd edition]. London, UK: Zed Books Ltd.

Duffield, M. (2004). Carry on killing: Global governance, humanitarianism and terror. Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Copenhagen, Denmark. *DIIS Working Paper 2004:23*.

Duffield, M. (2007). *Development, security and unending war: Governing the world of peoples.* Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Dynes, R. R. (1993). Disaster reduction. The importance of adequate assumptions about social organization. *Sociological Spectrum, 13 (1)*, 175-192.

Egnell, R. (2009). *Complex peace operations and civil-military relations. Winning the peace.* New York, USA: Routledge.

Egeberg, M. (1984). *Organisasjonsutforming i offentlig virksomhet.* Oslo, Norway: Aschehoug.

Egeberg, M. (2003). How bureaucratic structure matters: An organizational perspective. In B.G. Peters and J. Pierre (Eds.) *Handbook of public administration*. London, UK: Sage Publications.

Eide, K. (2010). *Høyt spill om Afghanistan.* Oslo, Norway: Cappelen Damm.

Engelstad, E., Grenness, C., Kalleberg, R., and Malnes, R. (2005): *Samfunn og Vitenskap*. Oslo,Norway: Gyldendal Akademisk.

Erickson, K.T. (1967). A comment on disguised observation in sociology. *Social Problems*, 14, 366-373.

Eronen, O. (2008). PRT models in Afghanistan. Approaches to civil-military integration. *Findland Civilian Crisis Management Studies*, Vol. 1(5).

Etzioni, A. (1964). *Modern Organizations*. Engelwood Cliffs, New Jersey, USA: Prentice –Hall, Inc.

Etzioni, A. (1967/73). Mixed scanning: A third approach to decision making. In A. Faludi (Ed.) *A reader in planning theory*. Oxford,UK: Pergamon Press.

Fangen, K. (2004). *Deltagende observasjon*, Bergen, Norway: Fagbokforlaget.

Fierke, K. M. (2007). *Critical approaches to international security*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Fishstein, P. (2010*). Winning hearts and minds? Examining the relationship between aid and security in Afghanistan's Balkh Province*. Boston, MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.

Fitzgerald, P. and Gould, E. (2009): *Invisible history. Afghanistan's untold story*. San Francisco, CA: City Lights Books.

Fontana, A. and Frey, J.H. (2005). The interview. From neutral stance to political involvement. In Denzin,N.K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.). *The Sage handbook of qualitative research*. [3rd edition]London, UK: Sage Publications, Inc.

Forsvarsstaben (2007). *Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine (FFOD),* Oslo, Norway: (Norwegian Armed Forces): Brødrene Fossum AS.

Foschini, F. (2011). The Enteqal Seven (7): Opportunities and concerns in the north. Afghan Analyst Networks. Retrieved from http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=2068

Friis, K., Jarmyr,P. (2008). *Comprehensive Approach; Challenges and opportunities in complex crisis management.* Security in Practice no 11. Oslo. Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).

Friis, K. (2010). *The Politics of Comprehensive Approach; The military, humanitarian and state-building discourses in Afghanistan.* MNE 6 / Working Paper 773. Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).

Friis, K., de Coning,C. (2011*).*Coherence and coordination. The limits of the Comprehensive Approach. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 15, 243-272.

Friis, K. (2012). Which Afghanistan? Military, humanitarian, and state building identities in the Afghan theatre. *Security Studies*, Vol. 21(2), 266-300.

Galula, D. (1964). *Counterinsurgency warfare: Theory and practice*, London, UK: Praeger Security International.

Giustozzi, A. (2009). *Koran, Kalashnikov, and laptop: The neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Giustozzi, A. and Reuter, C. (2010). *The northern front,* Afghan Analyst Network. Briefing Paper 03/2010. Retrieved from http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/20100629AGCR-TheNorthernFront1.pdf

Gjersvik, R. (1993). *The construction of information systems in organizations,*(unpublished doctoral dissertation). Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway.

Goffman, E. (1961). *Asylums: Essays on the social situation of mental patients and their inmates.* New York, NY: Anchor Books.

Goffman, E. (1968). *Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity.* Harmondsworth, UK: Pelican Books.

Gold, R. L. (1958). Roles in sociological field observations*, Social Forces*, Vol. 36(3), 217-223.

Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Sahlin, K. and Suddaby, R. (2008): *The SAGE handbook of organizational institutionalism.* London, UK: Sage Publications.

Gross, E. (2008). *EU and the Comprehensive Approach.* Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). Copenhagen, Denmark. *DIIS Report*, 13.

Grossman, D. (2001). Trained to kill. *Professorenforum-Journal*, Vol. 2(3), 3.

Guba, E. G. and Lincoln, Y. S. (1981). *Effective evaluation: Improving the usefulness of evaluation results through responsive and naturalistic approaches*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Hajjar, R. (2010*).* A new angle on the U.S. military's emphasis on developing cross-cultural competence: connecting in-ranks cultural diversity to cross-cultural competence*. Armed Forces and Society*. Vol. 36(2), 247-263.

Hart, 't P. and Boin, A. (2001). Between crisis and normalcy: the long shadow of post-crisis politics. In U. Rosenthal, A. R. Boin and L. K. Comfort (Eds.), *Managing crises: Threats, dilemmas, opportunities*. Springfield, Illinois, USA: Charles C. Thomas.

Hamilton et. al. (2009). *Alliance reborn; An Atlantic compact for the 21 century.* Paper from the   Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Retrieved from http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/sebin/i/y/nato_report_final.pdf

Hammersley, M. (1990).*Reading ethnographic research: A critical guide.* London and New York: Longman Press.

Hammerslay, M. (1992). *What's wrong with ethnography? Methodological explorations.* London, UK: Routledge.

Hawley, A. (1968) Human ecology. In D.L. Sills (Ed*.) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* 328-37. New York. NY: Macmillan.

Haysome, S. (2013). Civil-military coordination: The state of the debate. *Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN)*, Overseas Development Institute. No 56, January 2013.

Hobbs, D., and Wright, R. (2006). *The Sage handbook of fieldwork,* London, UK: Sage Publications, Inc.

Hoehn, A. and Harting, S. (2010). *Risking NATO, testing the limits of the alliance in Afghanistan.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Santa Monica, USA.

Hofman, S. (2008). *Debating strategy in NATO, obstacles to defining a meaningful new strategic concept.* Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI) (French Institute of International Relations.)

Hoogensen Gjørv, G. (2011). *Irresponsible idealism: The challenges of the Norwegian Approach to civil-military interaction.* Tromsø. Department of Sociology, Political Science and Community Planning University of Tromsø.

Hume, D. (2000). *An enquiry concerning human understanding.* Retrieved from http://site.ebrary.com/lib/hisbib/Doc?id=2001974andppg=1

Huntington, S. (1957). *The solider and the state, the theory and politics of civil-military relations.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

 Inter-Agency Standing Committee (1994). *IASC working paper on definition of complex emergencies.* New York: NY: ISAC.

ICISS (2001). *The responsibility to protect.* Ottawa, Canada: IDRC. Retrieved from http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/

International Monetary Fund (2010). *Sixth review under the arrangement under the poverty reduction and growth facility, request for waiver of nonobservance of a performance criterion, modification of performance criteria, and rephrasing and extension of the arrangement.* Country Report No. 10/22, January 2010.

Jacobsen, P.V., (2008). *NATO's comprehensive approach to crisis response operations- A work in slow progress.* Institut for Internationale Studier/Dansk Center for Internationale Studier og Menneskerettigheder. Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS).

Janowitz, M. (1960).*The professional solider, a social and political portrait.* New York, NY: The Free Press.

Joya, M. (2009). *Raising my voice: The extraordinary story of the Afghan woman who dares to speak out*. London, UK: Ebury Press.

Kaldor,M. (1999). *New and old wars.* Cambridge, Britain: Polity Press.

Kaldor, M. (2007). *New and old wars: Organized violence in a global era*. 2nd Edition. Cambridge, Britain: Polity Press.

Katzman, K. (2013). Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and U.S. Policy. *Congressional Research Service. CRS report for Congress.7-5700.*

Keen, D. (2008). *Complex emergencies.* Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Kilcullen, D. (2006). Counter-insurgency redux. *Survival; Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 48(4), 111-130.

Klingenberg Vistisen, N. (2012). The Missing Operational Level. *Small Wars Journal*, Article of 7th February 2010. Retrieved from; http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-missing-operational-level

Kolodziej, E. (1992). Renaissance of security studies? Caveat lector! *International Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 36, 421-438.

Kristoffersen, L. (2009). *Interesser i norsk engasjementspolitikk.* On defence and security, 04/2009. Oslo, Norway: Institutt for forsvarsstudier (IFS).

Kruke, B. and Olsen, O.E. (2005).Reliability seeking networks in complex emergencies. *International Journal of Emergency Management, 2 (4)*, 275-291.

Kruke, B.I. (2010). *Complicated coordination in a complex emergency,* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway.

Kruke, B. I. (2011). Security incidents and subsequent adaptations of a disaster response in complex humanitarian emergencies. In *Advances in safety, reliability and risk management.* Berenguer, Grall and Guedes Soares (Eds). London, UK: Taylor and Francis Group.

Kuhn, T.S. (1962). *The structure of scientific revolutions*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Kvale, S. (1989). *Issues of validity in qualitative research.* Lund, Sweden: Student litteratur.

Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. (1999). *Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied mind and its challenge to Western thoughts.* New York, NY: Basic Books.

Laugen Haaland, T. (2011). Erfarings basert læring i det norske forsvaret i Afghanistan. *In 8 år i Afghanistan, quo vadis?* Sæveraas and Jensen (ed). Luftkrigsskolens skriftserie. Trondheim, Norway: Tapir Akademisk Forlag.

Lindblom, C. (1959/73). The science of muddling through. In Faludi (Ed.) *A reader in planning theory*. Oxford, UK: Pergamon Press.

Lincoln, Y.S.and Guba, E.G. (1985). *Naturalistic inquiry.* Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications Inc.

Lindley-French, J. (2006). The Capability–Capacity Crunch: NATO's new capacities for intervention. *European Security.Vol.15 (3),* 259-280. Taylor and Francis group. Routledge.

Lindley-French, J. (2006). *The utility of force: The NATO challenge*, lecture and report from Norwegian Defence Staff College, Section for Military Force, Oslo, Norway.

Lindley- French, J. (2007).The utility of force today and tomorrow: The NATO challenge. In *Militærmaktens særtrekk i moderne konflikter*. Den Norske Atlanterhavskomitee (DNAK), Oslo. Norway: Sikkerhetspolitisk Bibliotek No 6-2007.

Linton, R. (1936). *The study of man.* New York, NY: Appleton- Century- Crofts.

Mack, A. (1975). Why big nations loose small wars: the politics of asymmetric Conflict. *World Politics, Vol.27(2).*

Maley, W., Sampford, C., Thakur, R. (2003). *From Civil Strife to Civil Society; civil and military responsibilities in disrupted states.* Tokyo. Japan: United Nations University Press.

Mannheim, K. (1940). *Man and society in an age of reconstruction*. London, UK: Routledge.

March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1984).The new institutionalism: Organizational factors in political life. The *American Political Science Review, 78*, 734-749.

March, J.G. and Weissinger-Baylon, R. (1986). *Ambiguity and command: Organizational perspectives on military decision making.* Marchfield, Massachusetts: Pitman Publishing Inc.

March, J.G. (1994). *A Primer on Decision Making. How Decisions Happen.* New York, NY: Free Press.

March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (2005). *Elaborating the "new institutionalism"*. ARENA working paper WP 11/05, Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway.

March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (2009). *The logic of Appropriateness,* ARENA working paper WP 04/09, Center for European Studies, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway.
Marcus, G.E. (1998). Ethnography in/of the world system: The emergence of multi-sited ethnography (1995). In G.E. Marcus (Ed.): *Ethnography in thick and thin.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Marsden, P. (2009): *Afghanistan, aid, armies and empires.* London, UK: I.B.Tauris.

Maynard, K. A. (1999). *Healing communities in conflict: International assistance in complex emergencies.* New York, NY: Colombia University Press.

McChrystal, S. (2009). *COMISAF Initial Assessment* 21.09.2009. Retrieved from: http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf.

McNerney, M. (2005/2006). Stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan: PRTs a model or a muddle? *Parameters, Winter 2005/2006*, 32-46.

McSweeney, B. (1999). *Security, identity and interests. A Sociology of international relations.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Meyer, J.W and Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structures as myth and ceremony. *American Journal of Sociology, 83 (2)*, 340 – 363.

Miles, M. B., and Huberman, A. M. (1994). *Qualitative data analysis: an expanded sourcebook.* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Minear, L., Chelliah,U., Crisp, J.,MacKinlay,J. and Weiss, T. (1992). *UN Coordination of the International Humanitarian Response to the Gulf crises 1990-92.* The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies. Occupational Paper no 13.

Mukhopadhyay, D. (2009). Warlords as bureaucrats: the Afghan experience. Carnegie Endowment for international peace. Middle East program. Carnegie Paper, No. 101.

Mølling, C., (2008). *Comprehensive approaches to international crisis management.* Center for Security Studies (CSS) Vol.3 (42), ETH Zurich, Switzerland.

Najafizada, E. (2012, July 12). Afghans start to take the money and run. *Bloomberg BusinessWeek.* Retrieved from http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-07-12/afghans-start-to-take-the-money-and-run

Nasuti, M. (2012, November 11). Taliban surges troops while the West surges generals. *Kabul Press,* Retrieved from http://kabulpress.org/my/spip.php?article39416

NATO Strategic Concept (2010). *Active Engagement, Modern Defence;* Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Adopted by Heads of State and Government in the NATO summit in Lisbon, Portugal, 2010.

NATO Political Guidance (2010). *Political guidance on ways to improve NATOs involvement in stabilization and Reconstruction.* , Brussels, Belgium: NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

New York Times (2012, July 20). Afghanistan's economic challenges [Editorial].

Olsen, J.P., (1988). *Statsstyre og institusjonsforming*. Oslo, Norway: Universitetsforlaget AS.

Olsen, B. and Øyan, H. (2007). *Hvorfor skyter de? Konflikt – og kulturforståelse i internasjonale militære operasjoner.* Oslo, Norway: Cappelen Akademisk Forlag.

Palmer, D., Biggart, N., Dick, B. (2008). Is the new Institutionalism a Theory? The SAGE Handbook of Organizational institutionalism. Chap 31, pp 739-768.

Patton, M. Q. (1990). *Qualitative evaluation and research methods.* [2nd ed.] Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications Inc.

Perrow, C. (1981). *Organizational sociology in a society of organizations*. Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association.

Perrow, C., (1991). A society of organizations. *Theory and Society*. Vol. 20(6), 725-762.

Perry, R. and Quarantelli, E.L. (2005). *What is a disaster? New answers to old questions.* International Research Committee on Disasters. USA: Xlibris Cooperation.

Peters, B.G. (1999). *Institutional theory in political science: The new institutionalism.* London, UK: Pinter.

Polman, L. (2010). *Krisekaravanen. Humanitær hjelp i katastrofeområder*. Oslo, Norway: Arneberg Forlag.

Powell, W. W. and DiMaggio, P. J. (1991). *The new institutionalism in organizational analysis*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

PRT Playbook, Handbook 07-34, Sept. 2007, US Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). Retrieved from; http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/07-34/07-34.pdf

PRT Handbook (2009), Edition 4, Kabul: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Retrieved from; http://info.publicintelligence.net/ISAF-PRThandbook.pdf

Rasmussen, J. (1997). Risk management in a dynamic society; a modelling problem. *Safety Science, 27 (2/3), 183-213.*

Reason, J. (1997). *Managing the risks of organizational accidents.* Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Repstad, P. (2007). *Mellom nærhet og distanse, kvalitative metoder i samfunnsfag.* Oslo, Norway: Universitetsforlaget.

Richardson, L. and St. Pierre, E.A. (2005). Writing a method of inquiry. In Denzin,N.K. and Lincoln, Y. S. *The Sage handbook of qualitative research.* [3rd ed.]. London, UK: Sage Publications, Inc.

Rid, T. and Keaney, T. (2010*). Understanding counterinsurgency, doctrine, operations and challenges,* New York, NY: Rutledge.

Rietjens, S. and Bollen, M. (2008). *Managing civil-military cooperation: a 24/7 joint effort for stability.* Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing.

Roberts, H.K. (1990). Some characteristics of high-reliability organizations. *Organization Science, 1*, 160-177.

Rohde, D. (October 5, 2007), Army enlists anthropology in war zones*, New York Times*. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/world/asia/05afghan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

Rodriguez H., Quarantelli E., Dynes R. (2007). *Handbook of disaster research .* New York, USA: Springer Science.

Rosenthal, U., Boin, R. A., and Comfort, L. K. (2001). *Managing crises: threats, dilemmas, opportunities.* Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, Ltd.

Rosenthal, U., Charles, M.T., and Hart, P.T. (1989). *Coping with crises: The management of disasters, riots, and terrorism.* Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, Ltd.

Runge, P. (2009).*The Provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan: Role model for civil-military relations?* Occasional Paper IV. Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC), October 2009, Bonn Germany.

Rynning, S. (2011). *Of Sirens and deceptive virtue: A critical look at NATOs comprehensive approach.* Paper presented at EUSA Twelfth Biennial International Conference, Boston, MA.

Røvik, K.A. (1998). *Moderne organisasjoner: Trender i organisasjonstenkningen ved tusenårsskiftet.* Bergen, Norway: Fagbokforlaget.

Røvik, K.A., (2007). «*Trender og translasjoner.*» Oslo, Norway: Universitetsforlaget.

Sagan, S. and Waltz, K.N. (2002). *The spread of nuclear weapons: A Debate renewed.* New York, NY: W.W. Norton.

Scott, W. R. (1983). Introduction: From technology to environment. In *Organizational environments: ritual and rationality*, J.W. Meyer and W. R. Scott (ed). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Scott, W.R. (1995). *Institutions and organizations.* [1st ed.] Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Scott, W.R. (1998). *Organizations: Rational, natural and open systems. [4th ed].* Englewood Cliffs: N.J., Prentice Hall.

Scott, W. R., and Davis, G. F. (2007).*Organizations and organizing: Rational, natural, and open system perspectives.* Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.

Scott, J. and Marshall, G. (2009). *Oxford Reference Online.* A Dictionary of Sociology (3 rev. ed.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Retrieved

from:http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t88.e1938

Schneider, S. (1995). *Flirting with disaster: Public management in crisis situations*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

Schreer, B. (2010). Political constraints: Germany and counterinsurgency. *Security Challenges Vol.6(1),* 97-108.

Schutt, R.K. (2006). *Investigating the social world. The process and practice of social research.* [5th ed.] Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publishers.

Selznick, P. (1948). Foundations of the theory of organizations. American *Sociological Review, 13*, 25-35.

Selznick, P. (1997). *Lederskap.* Otta, Norway: Tano Aschehoug.

Seybolt, T. (2007). *Humanitarian military intervention: The conditions for success and failure.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Silverman, D. and Marvasti, A. (2008). *Doing qualitative research, a comprehensive guide.* London, UK: Sage Publications.

Simon, H. A. (1979). Rational decision making in business organizations. *American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(4),* 493-513.

Simon, H. (1947). *Administrative behavior. A study of decision-making processes in administrative organization.* New York, NY: The Free Press.

Smith, R. (2005). *The utility of force: the art of war in the modern world,* New York, NY: Knopf.

Sommerfelt, A. (2005). Ikke bland rollene. Perspektiver fra en humanitær organisasjon. Feltprestkorpset*; PACEM Vol. 8:1,* 79-92.

Soeters, J. (1997). Value orientations in military academies: a thirteen country study. *Armed Forces and Society 24 (1) Fall,* 7-32.

Soeters, J. and Manigart, P., (2008). *Military cooperation in multinational peace operations: Managing cultural diversity and crisis response*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Spencer, G. (1982). Methodological issues in study of bureaucratic elites: a case-study of West Point. In Robert G. Burgess (ed.), *Field research: A source book and field manual*. London, UK: Allen and Unwin.

Stene, L. (2005). *Utfordringer i sivil militært samarbeid i internasjonale operasjoner: med utgangspunkt i Afghanistan.* (Unpublished master's thesis). Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway.

Stern, J.C.W. (2011). Civil military operations & military information support operations coordination: A non-kinetic ballast for disciplined counterinsurgency operations. *Small Wars Journal. November 1, 2011.*

Stewart, R. (2007). *The prince of the marches. And other occupational hazards of a year in Iraq.* Orlando, FL: Harcourt Inc.

Strand, A. (2003). *Who is helping who? NGO coordination of humanitarian assistance with special reference to Afghanistan (1985-2001).* (Doctoral thesis),York, UK: University of York.

Strick van Linschoten, A. (2011). *A Knock on the door: 22 Months of ISAF Press Releases.* Afghanistan Analytic Network (AAN) Thematic report 10/2011.

Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE), (2010). *Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive.* 17. Dec 2010, Belgium.

Travis, C. and Aronson, E. (2007). *Mistakes were made (but not by me): Why we justify foolish beliefs, bad decisions, and hurtful acts.* Orlando, FL: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company.

Trotsky, L., (1938). Their morals and Ours. *The New International, Vol. IV(6),* 163-173. http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1938/morals/morals.htm

Turner, B.A. (1976). The Organizational and inter-organizational development of disasters. *Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (3),* 378-397.

Turner, B.A. (1978). *Man-made disasters.* Oxford, England: Wykeham Publications.

Turner, B.A. and Pidgeon, N.F. (1997). *Man-made disasters.* Oxford, England: Wykeham Publications.

Wadel, C. (1991). *Feltarbeid i egen kultur.* Flekkefjord, Norway: Seek a/s.

Walt, S. (1991). The renaissance of security studies, International *Studies Quarterly Vol. 35(2),* 211-240.

Warwick, D.P. (1973). Tearoom trade: Means and ends in social research. *Hastings Center Studies 1*, 27-38.

Weber, M. (1922/71). *Makt og Byråkrati*, Oslo, Norway: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag.

Weick, K. (1998). Foresights of failure: An appreciation of Barry Turner. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 6 (2),* 72-75.

Weick, K. (1995). *Sensemaking in organizations.* London, England: Sage Publications.

Weiss, T. (2005). *Military civilian interactions.* Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Weissman, F. (2004). *In the shadow of just wars, violence, politics and humanitarian action.* London, England: Hurst and Company, in association with Médecins Sans Frontières.

Wendling, C. (2010a). The effects of managing the crisis in Afghanistan on the future of NATO. Paper presented at the SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm, 9-11 Sept 2010.

Wendling, C. (2010b). *The comprehensive approach to civil military crisis management; a critical analysis and perspective.* Paris, France: Institut de Recherche Strategiq de l'Ecole Militaire.

Williams, M.L., (2011). Empire lite revisited: NATO, the Comprehensive Approach and state-building in Afghanistan. *International Peacekeeping, 18:1*, 64-78.

Wolcott, H. F. (2008). *Ethnography. a way of seeing* [2nd ed.], Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.

Wolff, K.H. (1959). *The sociology of Georg Simmel.* Glencoe, Il: The Free Press.

Yin, R. K. (1989). *Case study research. design and methods.* (2nd ed.) Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Yost, D. (2007). NATO the anticipatory force. *International Affairs 83(1),* 39-68.

Østbø, J. (2011). *NATO comprehensive approach; Hvordan legger NATO forholdene til rette for Comprehensive Approach, og hvilke utfordringer møter NATO?* (Unpublished Master's thesis). Norwegian Defence Staff College, Oslo, Norway.

Aase, T.H. and Fossåskaret, E. (2007). *Skapte virkeligheter, - om produksjon og tolkning av kvalitative data.* Oslo, Norway: Universitetsforlaget.

Appendixes

Appendix 1;

List of Figures, Maps and Organization Charts

List of Figures

List of Maps

List of Organization Charts

List of Tables

Appendix 2

Civil Military Coordination Reference Papers

- *MCDA guidelines, retrieved from:*
  http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UN-CMCoord/publications
- *UN Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines 2008, retrieved from:*
  http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eng.pdf
- *UN CM-Coord Handbook (field officer handbook), retrieved from:*
  http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6CC07645B81AF8BEC125740F004B4FA7-ocha_mar2008.pdf
- *UN, Oslo Guidelines, retrieved from:*
  https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Oslo%20Guidelines%20ENGLISH%20(November%202007).pdf
- *OCHA, Orientation Handbook, retrieved from:*
  http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3D153DA3049B322AC1256C30002A9C24- ocha__orientation__handbook_on__.html
- *UNDAC Handbook, retrieved from:*
  http://www.parkdatabase.org/files/documents/2006_undac_handbook.pdf
- *DPKO, Civil-Military Coordination Policy, retrieved from:*
  http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/451ba7624.pdf
- *UNHCR, Working with the military, retrieved from:*
  http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3d5123714.pdf
- *EU, Civil-Military cooperation concept for EU-led crisis management operations, retrieved from:*
  https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/compapp/Documents/European%20Union/CIMIC%20concept%20for%20EU-led%20crisis%20management%20operations.pdf
- *OSCE, Handbook, retrieved from:*
  http://www.osce.org/fsc/86597
- *MC 411/1 NATO Military Policy on CIMIC, retrieved from:*
  http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/mc411-1-e.htm
- *ACO CIMIC Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. Retrieved from:*
  http://www.cpdmz.wp.mil.pl/plik/file/Dokumenty%20normatywne/NATO%20AM_86-1-1.pdf
- *AJP-9 NATO CIMIC Doctrine, retrieved from:*
  http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/ajp-9.pdf *and*
  http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/cfs/CivMilCoop_ratification.pdf
- *NATO CIMIC Field Handbook, retrieved from:*

http://www.cpdmz.wp.mil.pl/plik/file/Dokumenty%20normatywne/cimic-handbook.pdf

- *US Civil Affairs Doctrine, retrieved from:*

http://www.information-retrieval.info/docs/jp3_57_1.pdf and http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_57.pdf

Appendix 3;

COIN Documents and References
COIN references used in IJC and RCN;

- AJP 3.4.4; Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency, NATO Joint Doctrine, February 2011.
- JP 3-24; Joint Publication for Counterinsurgency Operations, US Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2005.
- FM 3-24.2; Tactics in Counterinsurgency, US Headquarters Department of the Army, April 2009.
- FM 3-07; Stability Operations, US Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2008.
- COMISAF COIN Guidance (1 August 2010) A Counterinsurgent's guidebook, issued by Counterinsurgency Training Centre (CTC-A), Nov 2011.
- The ISAF Champaign Plan. 2011.
- David Kilcullen (2006); "Twenty-Eight Articles, Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency"; These Kilcullen articles were later developed and published in a book; Kilkullen (2010); "Counterinsurgency", Hurst & Company, London, which also is a reference for the COIN work of ISAF.
- ISAF Commander (2010) General Stanley McChrystal, COIN guidelines.

Different National COIN references:

- US: "Stability Operations" (FM 3.07),
- US: "Counterinsurgency Operations" (JP 3-24),
- US: "Counterinsurgency Field Manual" (FM 3.24),
- US: "Tactics in Counterinsurgency" (FM-3.24.2).
- UK: JDP 3-40: "Security and Stabilisation: The military contribution," 2009
- UK: Army Field Manual Volume 1 part 10 Countering Insurgency, Army Code 71876, October 2009,
- UK: COIN tactics, techniques and Procedures (TTP)
- UK: "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: The Essentials." Soldiers Booklet.
- Canada: "Counterinsurgency- Operations" (B-GL-323-004/FP-003), 2008.
- Germany: "Preliminary Basics for the Role of Land Forces in Counterinsurgency," training manual, 2010.
- Afghanistan: "Afghan National Army Counterinsurgency and Basic Infantry Manuals," ANA 3-24, 2007.

Internet addresses for COIN documents:

McChrystal COIN guidelines, retrieved from:
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf

See COIN Central: The Counter Insurgency Journal, 29 July 2010, retrieved from:
http://coincentral.wordpress.com/2010/07/29/gen-petraeus-issues-new-coin-guidance-to-isaf-troops/

Army Field Manual Volume 1 part 10 Countering Insurgency, Army Code 71876, October 2009, retrieved from:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_11_09_**army_manual**.pdf

FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC, April 2009. Retrieved from: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24-2.pdf

See Army Field Manual Volume 1 part 10 Countering Insurgency, Army Code 71876, October 2009, retrieved from:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_11_09_**army_manual**.pdf

COIN TTPs can be found at British Army Electronic Battle Box, retrieved from:
http://www.baebb.dii.r.mil.uk/baebb/pages/1_Doc/Nav/AFM.htm

German COIN training manual, retrieved from: http://publicintelligence.net/german-army-office-counterinsurgency-training-manual/

French COIN: See Joint Doctrine JD -3.4.4. Counterinsurgency
N0 253/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 5 Nov 2010, retrieved from:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/55489532/French-Joint-Doctrine-JD-on-COunter-Insurgency-COIN-France-2010

Appendix 4:

ISAF Contributing Countries

International Security Assistance Force:
Troop Contributing Nations

	Country	Troops		Country	Troops		Country	Troops
	Albania	295		Germany	4590		Norway	500
	Armenia	40		Greece	75		Poland	2630
	Australia	1455		Hungary	360		Portugal	250
	Austria	3		Iceland	5		Romania	1750
	Azerbaijan	90		Ireland	6		Singapore	30
	Belgium	575		Italy	3400		Slovakia	300
	Bosnia & Herzegovina	10		Jordan	6		Slovenia	70
	Bulgaria	540		Republic of Korea	270		Spain	1555
	Canada	2830		Latvia	170		Sweden	530
	Croatia	295		Lithuania	245		The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹	240
	Czech Republic	500		Luxembourg	9		Turkey	1740
	Denmark	730		Malaysia	40		Ukraine	15
	Estonia	160		Mongolia	195		United Arab Emirates	15
	Finland	80		Montenegro	30		United Kingdom	9500
	France	3750		Netherlands	380		United States	78430
	Georgia	925		New Zealand	205		Total	119,819

Note on numbers: Totals are approximations and actual numbers change daily. Number of troops should be taken as indicatives.

* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

6 August 2010

361

Map of US and NATO troops in Afghanistan 2010:

Extreme risk
High risk
Medium risk
Low risk

Nato troops
US Enduring Freedom

North
11,000

Kabul
9,000

West
6,500

East
36,500

HELMAND

KANDAHAR

South West
32,000

South
35,000

Military Personnel
130,000 Nato*
Approx
10,000 Enduring Freedom
*November 2010 latest figures

Source: UNDSS March 2010

362

Appendix 5:

Interviewed personnel

No	Date	Rank/Position	Nationality	Branch/Command
1.	15.08.2010	Captain/ TCT leader	German	CIMIC, RCN
2.	28.08.2010	Captain/ Civ.Sit	Latvian	CIMIC, RCN
3.	26.06.2010	Captain/ LNO	German	Fusion Center, RCN
4.	13.07.2010	CDR/ Military Advisor	Norwegian	UNAMA
5.	07.08.2010	Development Advisor	German	GTZ (RCN)
6.	05.08.2010	Lt Colonel /Civ.Sit. (1)	German	CIMIC, RCN
7.	19.02.2011	Lt Colonel/ Civ.Sit. (2)	German	CIMIC, RCN
8.	14.09.2010	Advisor/ SCR	German	SCR Staff, RCN
9.	19.08.2010	Lt Colonel /CAT	American	Fusion Center, RCN
10.	27.06.2010	Lt Colonel / LNO	Croatian	CIMIC, RCN
11.	11.09.2010	Head of Sub Office	Austrian	OCHA/ UNAMA
12.	09.01.2010	Lt Colonel/ Chief	German	CIMIC, RCN
13.	29.06.2010	Major /Current Ops	German	CIMIC, RCN
14.	19.07.2010	Captain/ LNO	German	OCC-R, RCN
15.	22.06.2010	Captain/ TCT	German	CIMIC, RCN
16.	22.02.2011	1 Lieutenant	Hungarian	CIMIC, PRT PEK
17.	22.02.2011	Staff Sergeant	Hungarian	CIMIC, PRT PEK
18.	19.02.2011	1 Lieutenant	Hungarian	PSYOPS, PRT PEK
19.	20.02.2011	Development Advisor	American	USAID (RCN)
20.	28.02.2011	Captain/ CAT	American	Fusion Center, RCN
21.	28.02.2011	Team-leader/ CAT	American	Fusion Center, RCN
22.	28.02.2011	Brig General/ COS	Norwegian	Management, RCN
23.	02.03.2011	Major/ Analyst	Norwegian	Stability section, IJC
24.	23.04.2010	Lt Colonel/ Analyst	Finish	Stability section, IJC
25.	21.02.2011	Captain/ TCT	Croatian	CIMIC, RCN
26.	22.02.2011	Major/ PSYOPS	German	PSYOPS, RCN
27.	20.02.2011	Civilian Analyst/HTT	American	Fusion Center, RCN
28.	24.02.2011	Lt Colonel/ Advisor	German	PSYOPS, RCN
29.	27.02.2011	Security Manager	South African	SMEC
30.	21.02.2011	Major /TCT	Norwegian	CIMIC, RCN
31.	24.02.2011	Senior Consultant/SCR	German	SCR Staff, RCN
32.	23.02.2011	Major/ Advisor	Swedish	RCN
33.	18.02.2011	Lt Colonel/ LNO	German	CIMIC, RCN
34.	18.02.2011	Lt Colonel/ Chief	Norwegian	J5, RCN

35.	18.02.2011	Major/ Planner	American	J5, RCN
36.	21.02.2011	Advisor/ SCR	German	SCR Staff, RCN
37.	24.02.2011	Lt Colonel/deputy	American	CIMIC, RCN
38.	22.02.2011	Major /CIMIC	Finish	PRT MeS
39.	26.02.2011	Protection Delegate	German	ICRC
40.	19.02.2011	Staff Sergeant/ LNO	German	CIMIC, RCN
41.	29.04.2011	Colonel/ Chief	Norwegian	PRT MEI
42.	13.04.2011	Political Advisor	Norwegian	PRT MEI
43.	10.05.2011	Political Advisor	Norwegian	UNAMA
44.	23.04.2011	Major /Trainer	Norwegian	OMLT/ Ghormach
45.	??.08.2010	Advisor/ CAAT	American	Fusion Center, RCN

Plan for Interviews Round Two

PRELIMINARY PLAN FOR CONDUCTING INTERVIEWS IN RCN
Wednesday 16.02. Morning – noon: Arrival MeS , in processing, administrative tasks at NCC (board, accommodation, security etc). Noon - Afternoon: in processing in RCN, establish contact with CJ9 contact person, LtCol Domani, go through plan and do necessary adjustments and further planning.
Thursday 17.02. Morning – noon: Interview with CJ9 Personnel Noon – Afternoon: interview with CJ9 personnel Evening: consolidate/ write out
Friday 18.02. Morning – noon: Interview with CJ9 Personnel. Noon – Afternoon: Interview with Task Force personnel (TCT) Evening: consolidate/ write out
Saturday 19.02. Morning – noon: Interview with German SCR and /or German SCR assistant Noon – Afternoon: Interview with US SCR and/or US SCR assistant Evening: consolidate/ write out
Sunday 20.02. Morning – noon: Interview with representatives from CAAT (COIN analysis and advisory team). Noon – Afternoon: Interview with representatives from CAAT cell /Fusion Centre. Evening: consolidate/ write out
Monday 21.02. Morning – noon: Interview with representatives from CAT (civil affair

teams)/Fusion centre.

Noon – Afternoon: Interview with representatives from CAT/ Fusion centre.

Evening: consolidate/ write out

Tuesday 22.02.

Morning – noon: Interview with representatives from PSYOPS.

Noon – Afternoon: Interview with representatives from Human Terrain Analysts/Fusion centre.

Evening: consolidate/ write out

Wednesday 23.02.

Morning – noon: Interview with UN/OCHA/ UNDSS representative.

Noon – Afternoon: Interview with UN military advisor(s).

Evening: consolidate/ write out

Thursday 24.02.

Morning – noon: Interview with representative from UNICEF and/or NRC (Norw. refugee council).

Noon – Afternoon: Interview with representative from ANSO[264] and/or ACBAR[265]

Evening: consolidate/ write out

Friday 25.02. Morning – noon: Interview with representatives from J5.

Noon – Afternoon: Interview with representatives from J5

Evening: consolidate/ write out

Saturday 26.02.

Morning – noon: Interview with representative from CIVPOL.

Noon – Afternoon: Interview with LEGAD.

Evening: consolidate/ write out

---

[264] ANSO: The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office
[265] ACBAR: Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief

Sunday 27.02. Morning – noon: Interview with GTZ representatives / DEVAD.

Noon – Afternoon: Interview with USAID representatives
Evening: consolidate/ write out

Monday 28.02.

Morning – noon: Interview with CJ3 personnel.

Noon – Afternoon: Interview with CJ3 personnel

Evening: consolidate/ write out

Tuesday 01.03.

Morning – noon: Interview with COS and/or MA COS.

Noon – Afternoon : prepare departure/ out processing

Evening: consolidate/ write out/ packing

Wednesday 02.03.
Return to Norway early morning

Appendix 6:

Interview guide Military Personnel
Interview place / date:
Name / Nationality of interviewee:
Unit / Rank in mission:
Mission experience (number and place):

General:
What is ISAFs mandate and objectives in Afghanistan?
How does ISAF work to accomplish this?
What is the mandate of the UN civilian agencies in your area? What is the mandate of the NGOs in your area? What projects do they run?
What is the main mandate and objects of your unit?
How do you work to accomplish the objectives of your unit?

Coordination:
How do you meet civilian actors? Where? How often?
How are these meetings conducted?
What activities are coordinated with civilian actors in your unit?
Whom do you meet? What do you discuss/work on?
What do you coordinate? Who coordinates with whom? Are the meetings able to decide on what issues to coordinate? Do the members of the meetings have necessary authority to make decisions?
Describe the two or three most important challenges of civil military coordination in your unit.
How do you work to meet these challenges?
What is the strength and weakness in this?

Projects:
What (civil military) kind of projects is conducted in the AOO (area of operation)?
Is there an overview/statistics of projects in the AOO?
What (civil military) projects are conducted in the level of your responsibility?

Is there an overview/statistics of projects at the level of your responsibility?
How does a project start? Who is involved, who decides/ defines; - describe the decision making process and central actors in this.
Who defines the content, objectives and the involved actors of a project? How is this carried out?
How is a project conducted/ implemented? Who participates, who makes decisions etc...
Are there any standard doctrines/procedures or guidelines for implementing a project?
To what extent are these doctrines/procedures or guidelines followed?
Explain the possibility / necessity of personal judgment.
When is a project completed?
Who defines when the job is done? What happens then?
What happens if there is a disagreement?
What is the exit strategy of a project that fails?
Describe the funding mechanisms for your projects. Examples?

Local Population:
In which situations do you meet local authorities? (Shuras/ Jirgas, strongmen, central, district or province GIRoA representatives/ shadow governance representatives etc.)
Where do these meetings take place, how often, who has the lead/ who is chairing? What is the purpose of these meetings?
How do you work together?
What role does the ANSF (ANA and/or ANP) play in civil military coordination?
Are they involved in any projects? Examples?
How do you work together?

Approach:
What is the Comprehensive Approach?
How do you work with this in your unit?
What practical impact does this have in your daily work?

What is the COIN strategy?

How is your daily work connected to the COIN strategy?

What kind of COIN training did you receive before deployment?

NATO CIMIC doctrines:

Do you know them?

How are they relevant in your daily work?

Provincial Construction Teams (PRTs):

What is the mandate of the PRTs?

How are they structured? Who are the PRT actors?

How does the civil and military part in the PRTs coordinate their work?

Is your unit coordinating with the PRTs? More about the relations to the PRTs?

By whom and how is work towards the local civilian environment conducted in the PRTs? (How do they work towards IOs/GOs/NGOs? Local Authorities/Shuras?)

How does the PRT role in civil military coordination differ from the RC level and the IJC level?

Do the PRTs follow NATO doctrines for CIMIC?

Overall question:

What are the two main challenges for ISAF conducting civil military cooperation?

How does this look in different levels? (IJC /RCs /PRTs)

Appendix 7:

Interview guide Civilian Personnel
Interview Guide (civilian personnel; inside/outside military environment)
Interview place / date:
Name / Nationality of interviewee:
Organization / position:
Mission experience (number and place):

<u>**General:**</u>
What is ISAFs mandate and objectives in Afghanistan?
How does ISAF work to accomplish this?
What is the mandate of the UN civilian agencies in your area? What is the
mandate of the NGOs in your area? What projects do they run?
What is the main mandate and objects of your unit?
How do you work to accomplish the objectives of your unit?

<u>**Coordination:**</u>
How do you meet military actors? Where? How often?
How are these meetings conducted?
What activities are coordinated with military actors in your unit?
Whom do you meet? What do you discuss/work on?
What do you coordinate? Who coordinates with whom? Are the meetings
able to decide on what issues to coordinate? Do the members of the
meetings have necessary authority to make decisions?
Describe the two or three most important challenges of civil military
coordination in your unit.
How do you work to meet these challenges?
What is the strength and weakness in this?

<u>**Projects:**</u>
What (civil military) kind of projects is conducted in the AOO (area of
operation)?
Is there an overview/statistics of projects in the AOO?

What (civil military) projects are conducted in the level of your responsibility?

Is there an overview/statistics of projects at the level of your responsibility?

How does a project start? Who is involved, who decides/ defines; - describe the decision making process and central actors in this.

Who defines the content, objectives and the involved actors of a project? How is this carried out?

How is a project conducted/ implemented? Who participates, who makes decisions etc...

Are there any standard doctrines/procedures or guidelines for implementing a project?

To what extent are these doctrines/procedures or guidelines followed?

Explain the possibility / necessity of personal judgment.

When is a project completed?

Who defines when the job is done? What happens then?

What happens if there is a disagreement?

What is the exit strategy of a project that fails?

Describe the funding mechanisms for your projects. Examples?

Local Population:

In which situations do you meet local authorities? (Shuras/ Jirgas, strongmen, central, district or province GIRoA representatives/ shadow governance representatives etc.)

Where do these meetings take place, how often, who has the lead/ who is chairing? What is the purpose of these meetings?

How do you work together?

What role does the ANSF (ANA and/or ANP) play in civil military coordination?

Are they involved in any projects? Examples?

How do you work together?

Approach:

What is the Comprehensive Approach?

How do you work with this in your organization?

What practical impact does this have in your daily work?

What is the COIN strategy?

How is your daily work influenced by the COIN strategy?

NATO CIMIC doctrines: How are they relevant in your daily work?

Provincial Construction Teams (PRTs):

What is the mandate of the PRTs?

How are they structured? Who are the PRT actors?

How does the civil and military part in the PRTs coordinate their work?

Is your unit coordinating with the PRTs? More about the relations to the PRTs?

By whom and how is work towards the local civilian environment conducted in the PRTs? How do they work towards your organization? (Other IOs/GOs/NGOs? Local Authorities/Shuras?)

How does the PRT role in civil military coordination differ from the RC level and the IJC level?

Overall question:

What are the two main challenges for civil military coordination?

How does this look in different levels? (IJC /RCs /PRTs)