FACULTY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

MASTER'S THESIS

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Preface

I began the work with this master's thesis with a great desire and engagement to acquire more expertise in intelligence and the Norwegian Customs as an agency. The journey has been one of continuous development and excitement, leading me to gain valuable insights in both the intelligence field and the Customs Agency. This thesis marks the end of the master's study in Risk Analysis and Governance and my time as a student at the University of Stavanger. The last two years have been educational, challenging, and exciting.

I am deeply grateful for my two supervisors, Marja and Guillaume. Thank you for constructive feedback, discussions, guidance, support, and patience. Your help has been invaluable. Thank you for your great interest, beliefs in the topic, and engagement you have shown in my thesis.

My sincere gratitude is directed towards the Norwegian Customs for granting me the opportunity to use the agency as a case for this thesis. To the respondents in the study, thank you for the insight into the intelligence profession, engagements, conversations, and for sharing your perceptions. I am extremely appreciative that you have set aside time to share your thoughts and knowledge in an otherwise busy and hectic working period. It was a pleasure to meet you all, and this study would not have been possible without your contributions and reflections, neither would it have become a thesis that I am proud to deliver.

Additionally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank my fellow students for good conversations, discussions, and motivation. You have contributed to a fun and comprehensive period during the studies in Stavanger. As well to my colleagues, friends, and family, I would like to say thank you for motivation, continuous support, and great belief that I would reach the finish line.

Stavanger, September 2023,
Magda-Lene

Abstract

This study delved into the relationship between risk management and the intelligence operation within the Norwegian Customs, the role of intelligence in border controls, and explores perceptions of intelligence workers within Norwegian Customs concerning the future of intelligence practices. The purpose of the thesis is to examine how intelligence professionals in the Norwegian Customs work and envision intelligence gathering and analysis to develop further and what resources and strategies they believe will be necessary to effectively meet challenges in the future.

Firstly, the problems are explained based on background information such as a presentation of the Norwegian Customs Agency, intelligence, the current risk and threat picture in our society, and hybrid threats. Furthermore, theoretical frameworks linked to intelligence and the concepts of risk, characteristics of national security are presented, and various figures such as the intelligence cycle, risk management approach, and the compliance pyramid are included.

This study is based on a qualitative method, and to answer the research questions the data was obtained through 5 semi-structured interviews with experts within the intelligence environment in the Customs Agency. After completion, the interviews were transcribed, and thematic analysis was chosen as the method of analysis to interpret the data.

Findings in this study reinforce that, as traditionally, risk management and intelligence are separate domains in the Customs Agency. Intelligence workers in the Norwegian Customs characterise the role of intelligence as a help to customs officers to choose the proper objects and goods in controls, as the importance lies in the intelligence's ability to offer full insight perspectives that go beyond the raw data or other forms of information alone. As the processes to collect, process, and analyse intelligence are strictly confidential, this thesis does not provide any insight into how this takes place in practice. The future perceptions from the experts touch areas such as national security, intelligence work in the future, key characteristics expected from future intelligence workers, collaboration, access to resources, movement of goods, digitalisation, development and technological tools, and the intelligence cycle.

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Abbreviations	Full name
AI	Artificial Intelligence
IT	Information Technology
PST	Norwegian Police Security Service
SRA	The Society of Risk Analysis
TA	Thematic Analysis
TBML	Trade-Based Money Laundering
WCO	The World Costums Organization

1 Introduction

1.1 Background and problem identification

Intelligence is not a new phenomenon that has emerged in recent years, but it has become a more important element in the interaction between different nations and will continue to be so in this digital age (Stenslie et al., 2021; Petersen & Tjalve, 2018). Although intelligence has been a part of human activity for centuries, the digital age is a modern concept (Stenslie et al, 2021). The digital age can emphasise the importance of technology for the better understanding and pursuit of intelligence, which is characterised by a large volume, complexity, and speed of information (Stenslie et al., 2021). With the arrival and appearance of new technologies, spreading news has become almost instantaneous, and information about even the smallest events reaches the most remote locations almost as soon as they occur (Stenslie et al., 2021). The need for intelligence continues to grow, and one is dependent on understanding the purpose. The purpose of intelligence can be linked to the fact that intelligence can provide insights not available elsewhere that can warn of potential threats and opportunities (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, n.d.). Intelligence information is analysed to respond to a need within various aspects in critical areas, such as national security (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, n.d.). Through analysis and threat assessment, intelligence helps in forecasting potential threats. The approach of intelligence allows agencies to better respond effectively and be better prepared for changing circumstances in the future (Etterretningstjenesten, 2022). One of the primary functions of intelligence is to offer early warnings, and this is often required by information from technological and digital developments (Etterretningstjenesten, 2022)

Humans do not have the ability to see into the future and to predict outcomes, but there exists developed tools and principles that allow to have some degree of control over future potential outcomes (Thekdi & Aven, 2023). Manifested in this context is the essence of risk management. Risk management can be referred to as all activities used to address risk, for example, reducing, avoiding, or accepting risk (Thekdi & Aven, 2023). The purpose of risk management is to help influence the likelihood, impact, and probability of risk events (Thekdi & Aven, 2023). By using risk management, one is provided with assistance when dealing with problems of uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (Renn, 2008). Ylönen & Aven (2023) put a new perspective of integration within intelligence and risk management in a custom context. This previous study claims that risk management and intelligence assessments are both vital

components within the customs operations, especially referred to border controls, but these essential tasks are most often carried out independently and across distinct divisions within customs agencies (Ylönen & Aven, 2023). The connection between the two fields makes it interesting to look deeper into the intricate relationship between risk management and intelligence work since both phenomena are related to information about threats and beliefs of the future. Based on this, it was chosen to explore whether risk management is part of the intelligence work in the Norwegian Customs Agency.

1.2 Aim and objectives

In order to stay up to date through technological development and the digital age, it is important that intelligence follows suitably with innovations. Given the rapid progress of technological developments combined with national security threats, this thesis will explore the perspectives of intelligence workers in the Customs Agency of Norway (experts in the field). Specifically, this study aims to examine how these workers envision intelligence gathering and analysis to develop over the next decade, and what strategies and resources they believe will be necessary to effectively meet the challenges of an increasingly complex and interconnected world. This research can contribute to a deeper understanding of the intelligence's role in ensuring national security, in the form of future practice and policy, and how intelligence work contribute to border controls. The purpose targeted by custom intelligence is ensuring security and safety of national borders. For the Norwegian Customs, analysis and data-driven intelligence are crucial together with digitalisation for the agency to be able to carry out targeted control operations to proactively prevent illegal activities within transport of goods and border controls (Tolletaten, 2022h, 00:48). The Customs intelligence plays a role in enhancing border controls by assisting border officers in identifying patterns within huge data sets of border crossings and transactions to help safeguard Norway (Lepperød, 2021; Bjørgum, 2021, 02:58-03:30). The intelligence workers continuously evolve to stay ahead of emerging threats and challenges in border security, and the collaborating between border officers and intelligence professionals offers efficiency of customs operations (Bjørgum, 2021, 02:58-03:30).

Playing a crucial role in control operations, the intelligence professionals in the Customs are committed to enhancing control operations across various aspects, among the utilisation of knowledge, analysis, and intelligence information (Tolletaten, 2020a). Furthermore, they are

actively engaged in the digital development of advanced solutions for analysing substantial data volumes and contributing to more sophisticated and effective border control strategies (Tolletaten, 2020a). The intelligence workers in the Customs help to sharpen border controls, and there is a strict confidentiality clause presented in the Movement of Goods Act § 7-12, which tells that the customs authorities' control work shall be protected, knowledge and information from the Customs Authory's intelligence and analysis activities must be kept secret and prevent access from unauthorised persons (Vareførselsloven, 2022, § 7-12; Lindrup & Meisfjordskar, 2023). Based on previous poor insights into the intelligence profession within the Norwegian Customs Agency, it will be intriguing to discover how the intelligence workers in the Customs Agency themselves characterises the role of intelligence within border control.

The Norwegian Customs previously had an anonymous status in Norway and was associated with uniformed customs officials who stand at border crossings stopping travellers to check the amount of tobacco and alcohol that has been bought while travelling from abroad (Grøndahl, 2004). The media also helps to reinforce this impression of the customs service among the Norwegian population through news reports of confiscations of tobacco, alcohol, and narcotics (Grøndahl, 2004). As recently as July 2023 there has been a major media coverage of the Norwegian Customs over the news, due to one of the biggest cocaine confiscations in Norway (Solheim et al., 2023). The news highlights record-breaking confiscations ensure that cocaine is at the top of confiscations for the first half of 2023, with four confiscations of over 2,2 tonnes of cocaine (Kripos, 2023; Buggeland, 2023).
Also, in recent times, the Norwegian Customs has received a lift in its reputation and is currently relevant with a work reality TV-series "Toll", which shows viewers an insight into the Customs Agency's everyday working life (Tolletaten 2020b; Tolletaten, 2022f). The TV-series has brought a lot of positive attention to the Norwegian Customs and showcases an agency that was previously unknown to many Norwegians (Tolletaten, 2022f). This series has contributed to the Customs Agency being shown in a different light, and citizents in the Norwegian society have gained a better understanding of what the Customs do.

In the springtime of 2021, Norwegian students were given the opportunity for the first time to apply for a bachelor's degree in Customs and Border Management (Tolletaten, 2022g). The study programme is the first of its kind in Norway and surprised many by ranking among Norway's most popular studies that year (Tolletaten, 2022g). Several factors likely

contributed to its popularity, including the TV-series many Norwegians have followed, and the pandemic which created a heightened focus on preparedness and safety (Tolletaten, 2022g; Ertesvåg, 2021). In the past, applicants have turned to the Norwegian Customs Department's internal education, which now has been replaced by the bachelor's programme (Ertesvåg, 2021). The director of the Norwegian Customs, Øystein Børmer (2020), confirmed in a press statement that most Norwegians previously knew little about what the customs officers actually do and what work they do for society. Nevertheless, the Norwegian Customs is financed by and works for the Norwegian population, and at TV-series will therefore show what the agency does on behalf of all Norwegian citizens (Medier24, 2020). The Customs Agency's increased visibility and their knowledge of their sharing efforts for the Norwegian people. The Customs work affects the Norwegian society in more areas than the Norwegian people believe, and this has sparked an interest in the agency. The widespread awareness and understanding of the Norwegian Customs piqued my interest, which serves as a significant motivation for choosing it as the subject for this master thesis. The multifaceted nature of their responsibilities and the impact they have on various aspects of the Norwegian society have captured attention and underscored the importance of studying and understanding the agency. In this thesis, the aim is to contribute to the existing knowledge base while gaining valuable insights into the inner workings of the intelligence work done in the Customs Agency.

As another personal motivation, I recently got employed as an adviser in Norwegian Customs and want to collaborate and learn more from them. Especially about the Intelligence Division and understanding how they work and operate. The Norwegian Customs may benefit from this research by identifying areas for improvement in the future work of its intelligence operations. It can also provide insight into emerging hybrid threats for border security or customs in general. Researching a professional environment within the Customs Agency in a diverse group of employees engaged in various functional areas surrounding the agency's core competence constitutes an exciting background for examining the perceptions regarding the future of the employees who work with intelligence. Understanding how intelligence is conducted and keeping up with the rapid technological changes can be used to combat future threats.

1.3 Research Questions

To answer how intelligence professionals in the Norwegian Customs work and envision intelligence gathering and analysis to develop further and what resources and strategies they believe will be necessary to effectively meet challenges in the future, the following three research questions have been made:

1. To what extent is risk management a part of the operations in the Intelligence Division of Norwegian Customs?
2. How do the intelligence workers of the Norwegian Customs characterise the role of intelligence in border control?
3. What is the perception of the future of intelligence among intelligence workers in Norwegian Customs?

1.4 Structure

This thesis is divided into eight chapters. In Chapter 1 there is accounted for the overall topics, the research problems are defined, the purpose of the thesis, and an overall description of intelligence and risk management. The second chapter presents background information that aims to provide an understanding of the topics for the thesis and provide context. Chapter 3 will give a description of the theory used in the study, based on the chosen topics and with the background of the problem questions. Frameworks such as the intelligence cycle, the risk management process, and the compliance pyramid are presented here, as well as different understandings and definitions of intelligence and risk. Chapter 4 will account for methodological choices, decisions, and present the research design. This chapter deals with and justifies the process of interviews, transcription, and the analysis method that has been chosen for this thesis. Furthermore, ethical concerns, methodological strengths and weaknesses are presented. Chapter 5 provides analysis and findings of the data gathered. The sixth chapter contains discussions of the findings. In Chapter 7 findings are summarised and there is given suggestions for further research. Lastly, Chapter 8 is the reference list that refers to all sources and literature used in the thesis.

2 Background

2.1 Norwegian Customs

Goods are either brought into Norway via customs areas from outside, which is called import, or sent out of these customs areas to other countries, which is understood as export

(Gundersen, 2019). The customs regulations in Norway are established in the Transport of Goods Act and the Customs Duty Act with associated regulations (Gundersen, 2019). The main task of the Norwegian Customs is to administer regulations for customs and the import and export of goods (Regjeringen, n.d). The agency must therefore discourage the illegal transport of goods and facilitate the efficient and correct import and export of goods (Regjeringen, n.d).

The Norwegian Custom is underlying the Ministry of Finance and consists of a directorate with six professional divisions (administration, intelligence, legal, IT, border management, and movement of goods) as shown in Figure 1 (Prop. 1 S (2022-2023), p. 76-77; Tolletaten, 2022b; Store norske leksikon 2005-2007). Over time the Customs Agency has had a need for development and change, and in recent years there has been a great deal of activity within digitisation programs and reorganisation (Prop. 1 S (2022-2023), p. 80). In 2020, the Norwegian Customs was reorganised, and the new setup is important for the agency to develop further within digitisation and automation, in addition to adapting to changes in goods flows (Prop. 1 S (2022-2023), p. 80). The Norwegian Customs has thus changed its organisation from a regional structure to a divisional structure, and this has affected localisation and organisation (Direktoratet for forvaltning og økonomistyring, 2021).



Figure 1, Organisational chart of the Norwegian Customs (Tolletaten, 2022b).

2.1.1 The mission of the Norwegian Customs

Border controls in Norway are placed based on risk assessments and are positioned on these specific locations to best possible perform the Norwegian Customs' mission (Tolletaten,

2022a). Produces and other imported goods worth more than 2200 billion NOK crosses Norway's borders every year, and the responsibility of the Norwegian Customs Agency is to ensure that these values are crossed in a safe and legal manner, but also to ensure that they are registered (Tolletaten, 2022a; Tolletaten, 2022d). The customs officers protect the Norwegian population and society against illegal and dangerous goods, such as weapons, endangered animal species, narcotics, health-damaging goods, and infectious foods (Tolletaten, 2022d). To understand the social mission of the Norwegian Customs and to contribute to having safe and effective border control, it is vital to look at further development regarding the flexibility and ability of mobile and allocation controls (Tolletaten, 2022a). The Norwegian Customs Social Mission is defined as: "[…] ensure compliance with the laws and rules of cross-border movement of goods." (Tolletaten, 2022a). The activities of the Norwegian Customs have several positive effects seen at the societal level. Among other things, by discouraging illegal trade, the Customs contributes to fair conditions of competition for law-abiding actors and by counteracting the illegal import and export of goods in violation of restrictions or prohibitions (Prop. 1 S (2022-2023), p. 76). Additionally, the Customs contribute to a sustainable and safe society, by registering the movement of goods into and out of Norway, and this provides to correct trade statistics (Prop. 1 S (2022-2023), p. 76).

Within critical societal functions, the Norwegian Customs is defined with a dual role as an actor in both respective law and order and security of supplies (Tolletaten, 2023). In respectively law and order the Customs Agency is defined as an actor in border control (Tolletaten, 2023). When it comes to the security of supplies, the function is, in its entirety, to supply critical necessary goods for the population and businesses with responsibility for critical societal functions (Tolletaten, 2023). This responsibility extends throughout the entire value chain from production and import/export, to delivery to the end-user (Tolletaten, 2023).

Both the threat picture and the product flows are changing at a rapid speed (Tolletaten, 2022h, 00:43). To look ahead to the future, with the goal of being able to establish efficient and safe controls, the Customs use intelligence information in their work (Tolletaten 2022a). Data-driven intelligence and analysis together with digitisation are crucial for customs agencies to be able to carry out targeted control operationally and to always be one step ahead of criminals and other threat actors (Tolletaten, 2022h, 00:48). The enormous volumes of goods make the societal mission of Norwegian Customs demanding by having control over the flows of goods going into and out of Norway (Tolletaten, 2022h, 00:12). It is impossible to

physically control all goods (both legal and illegal) therefore the agency is dependent on digital solutions and technology that work around the clock (Tolletaten, 2022h, 00:20). Through screens, cameras, applications, and digital control tools, controls are maintained at all times of the day throughout the country (Tolletaten, 2022h, 00:35).

At the border Norwegian Customs entails collaborative efforts with various industries and authorities, as the Customs work to protect their interests in the movement of goods (Prop. 1 S (2022-2023), p. 79). As a significant unit within the Norwegian society, the Norwegian Customs does not only enforce its own regulations but also ensures compliance with the rules and regulations of 20 government agencies regarding the movement of goods and cross-border transportation, thereby acting on behalf of others (Prop. 1 S (2022-2023), p. 79; Tolletaten, 2022d). The police, Økokrim, the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries, and the Norwegian Food Safety Authority are among the actors that are cooperated with on individual actions or larger issues (Tolletaten, 2022d). In addition, the Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish Customs, together along the borders, form tasks for each other with reference to the border customs cooperation agreements between the countries (Prop. 1 S (2022-2023), p. 76).

2.1.2 Cooperations

The Norwegian Customs is a distinctly cooperative agency (Tolletaten, 2023). Frequently the Customs operates on behalf of other authorities that are tasked with regulations on the export and import of goods (Lindrup & Meisfjordskar, 2023). These authorities may not be directly engaged or involved in the actual handling of cross-border goods (Lindrup & Meisfjordskar, 2023). Instead, their role involves receiving and processing information gathered by the customs authorities and to regulate the movement of goods in their respective areas (Lindrup & Meisfjordskar, 2023).

The police have a regulatory role when it comes to weapons legislation in relation to the Norwegian Customs, and the police have collaborated to assist the Norwegian Customs' need for access to the digital weapons register (Tolletaten, 2023). For instance, Russia's war with Ukraine has highlighted increased cooperation with the police (Tolletaten, 2022f). Furthermore, the customs have close cooperation with the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, which entails a quick response from the Norwegian Customs when new sanctions are introduced against Russia (Tolletaten, 2023).

International cooperation constitutes a fundamental aspect of the Norwegian Customs' operation, serving to facilitate the exchange of information, the advancement and development of regulations, and acquisition of expertise (Tolletaten, 2023). Since June 2021, the Norwegian Customs has represented Norway in the Policy Commissions of the World Customs Organization (WCO), actively engaging and participating in work with WCO's management on long-term priorities and strategic initiatives (Tolletaten, 2023). Through its involvement, the Norwegian Customs Service actively contributes to the ongoing efforts of WCO (Tolletaten, 2023).

2.1.2.1 The pandemic opened up for more collaborations

When the border closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the role of the Norwegian Customs in society became more evident, especially in the area of security of supplies (Prop. 1 S (2022-2023), p. 79). The agency had a central role in coordinating the importation of infection control equipment and delivering data on traffic and goods flows on behalf of the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Fisheries (Prop. 1 S (2022-2023), p. 79). During the pandemic, the Norwegian Customs also collaborated with the police in connection with the introduction of person control at the national borders (Prop. 1 S (2022-2023), p. 79). For the Norwegian Customs, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to interaction between several cooperating agencies, and this became particularly important in 2021 (Prop. 1 S (2022-2023), p. 79). Furthermore, the pandemic led to an increase of uniformed personnel at the border-crossings, which has probably led to criminal actors looking for new ways to avoid the regulations and to have changed their behaviours (Prop. 1 S (2022-2023), p. 79).

2.1.3 Norwegian Custom's Intelligence Division

Intelligence is becoming increasingly important for the Customs Agency. In the Intelligence Division, vast amounts of information are collected, analysed, and processed (Bjørgum, 2021, 2:30-02:50). In order to fulfill their mission, the Norwegian Customs works to obtain better and more information regarding the flow of goods across borders and together with this there is an increased investment in the agency's intelligence community (Tolletaten, 2016; Lepperød, 2021). The Intelligence Division generally conducts intelligence analysis within all subject areas in the Norwegian Customs Agency (Tolletaten, 2020a). As shown in Figure 1, the Intelligence Division consists of three departments: A department for data analysis, a department for intelligence analysis, and current intelligence department, which supplies

analysis products to cover the Norwegian Custom's intelligence needs at all tactical, strategic, and operational levels.

Intelligence workers of the Norwegian Customs work to sharpen controls, with intelligence analysts helping customs officials to discover findings in huge data sets of transactions and border-crossings (Bjørgum, 2021, 02:58-03:30). With the help of intelligence information, the assessments done by the customs officers at the border are given a stronger foundation. The Intelligence Division shall continue contributing more knowledge- and intelligence-based control activities across board-crossing points in Norway (Tolletaten, 2020a). One of the agency's contributions to the national social security is intelligence competence and intelligence networks (Tolletaten, 2023). Developing advanced solutions digitally within analysis and intelligence of more significant amounts of data to drive more and smarter efficient border controls is also a big part of their job (Tolletaten, 2020a).

The Intelligence Division has various collaborates with customs officers stationed at border-crossings (Bjørgum, 2021, 03:39-03:45). An example of this collaboration is Svinesund, where the customs officers work together with the Intelligence Division to handle the large number of trailers passing through daily (Bjørgum, 2021, 04:30-04:42). This collaboration contributed to the development of systems for which trailers give the most results in search (Bjørgum, 2021, 04:30-04:42). These systems are used by the customs officers to stop suspicious trucks and the Intelligence Division wants to gain information from the customs officers who are out and see things, vice versa the customs officers want information from intelligence to help them pick out the right trailers (Bjørgum, 2021, 11:36-11:55). If discoveries are made at Svinesund, the Intelligence Division takes on the task of conveying this information to major international crime cooperation efforts and ensures that the relevant information is integrated within the agency (Bjørgum, 2021, 19:20-19:40.).

2.2 History of intelligence

Intelligence has been established for humans for centuries, and it is one of the oldest organised human activities, sometimes humorously referred to as 'the second oldest profession' (Stenslie et al., 2021; Lowenthal, 2017). Even though intelligence is supposed to be about the future, it has a long past (Lowenthal, 2017). In the beginning, intelligence was seen as the ability to apply and obtain skills and knowledge. This basic form of intelligence

has existed since prehistoric times (Garner & McGlynn, 2018). Irrespective of the field of intelligence analysis, there is consistently a minimum of one unresolved problem at the commencement of the process, which has stuck to it since the beginning (Garner & McGlynn, 2018).

The most widely recognised and best-known form of intelligence among different fields is espionage, involving acquiring related secrets (Etterretningstjenesten, 2022). Revealing hidden information and exploiting this awareness to advantage has over centuries been a fundamental aspect of intelligence (Stenslie et al., 2021). Modern and organised intelligence, as known today, can be traced back to the First World War, a period when technological advancements made it possible to conduct an interception of lines of communication and aerial reconnaissance (Etterretningstjenesten, 2022).

From 1945 to 1991, Europe was divided by the Cold War, and in recent times, the replacements have become non-linear wars, transnational threats, and state-sponsored digital subversion (Hatlebrekke, 2021; Petersen, 2009). Rooted in the Cold War way of thinking and experiences, the idea of intelligence was merely to find consistent truths that the enemies tried to hide and to uncover such secrets (Vaage & Sundal, 2021). After the Cold War, the pride of secrets and collected information by technical and human resources within intelligence work was appreciated (Treverton, 2014).

Furthermore, the invention of the Internet and its technology has helped to contribute to intelligence as other possibilities for interaction and exchange of information, allowing information to flow quicker and more accessible, came to the light of groups and individuals, as well as for intelligence workers (Godzimirski, 2006; Stenslie et al., 2021). When the Internet came and was put into use, new requirements were made regarding information security and safeguarding. Information's colossal volume and speed became one of the Internet's foremost characteristics (Godzimirski, 2006; Stenslie et al., 2021). Such as an increase in information makes it difficult to effectively understand and make decisions when too much information is published (Stenslie et al., 2021).

The intelligence practice has expanded over the last three decades (Chiru et al., 2022). The emergence of a more uncertain threat and risk environment has helped transform intelligence's nature (Petersen & Tjalve, 2018). Previous and traditionally, the practice of

intelligence was a practice of governmental organisations. In today's society, with the use of new technology and other developing changes in the security field, further learning communities and collaborations have been significant (Chiru et al., 2022). The knowledge followed by intelligence also has moved increasingly through history and continues to do so. Today, the intelligence practice is for governmental organisations in a fluid framework with nonstate and various state and private actors (Chiru et al., 2022). Today's risks and threats are limitless and have created a greater space of uncertainty, and a need to reconsider the analysis and collection of intelligence to go far beyond state-to-state matters (Petersen & Tjalve, 2018). The responsibilities need to be shared with a mix of openness and secrecy among these performances in both the private and public sectors (Chiru et al., 2022). In addition, it is becoming more critical that intelligence has a great diversity of knowledge in order to achieve its goals (Kristoffersen & Hatlebrekke, 2022). The Ukraine war shows the complex task of intelligence in terms of understanding and averting dangers and threats that are hidden, situations that can get out of control, being able to point directly to threat actors, and finding patterns in dissonance (Kristoffersen & Hatlebrekke, 2022).

Agrell (2012) has pointed out several factors that can be looked at to identify the transformation and establishment of intelligence as known in the 20th century. The factors that have been presented will not indicate that there are no other relevant factors but that these can be seen from having been involved across various national experiences (Agrell, 2012). For instance, the impact of technology has affected the potential to communicate, collect, and process intelligence information and materials, along with the potential to collect information for further intelligence work (Agrell, 2012).

The history of intelligence has had a growing interest from the beginning of the 21st century (Agrell, 2012). It is unlikely that intelligence work will remain as it is known today. Intelligence and other phenomena, such as technology, will develop within familiar lines and extend the trends of past centuries and years (Agrell, 2012). Further, there has been an awareness that the intelligence field is bound to change and that things will not remain as they are going on forever. With this interest in the history of intelligence, humankind is learning from the past and shaping the future (Agrell, 2012).

2.3 The future of intelligence

Over the last two decades, the intelligence field has undergone significant changes (Vaage & Sundal, 2021). The role of intelligence is likely to expand in the future, as they are called upon to address new and emerging threats such as terrorism and cyber-attacks (Lowenthal, 2017). Ongoing advances in technology and scientific research drive the future. The rise of digitalisation and technology may provide and lead to newer opportunities for analysing and gathering larger information amounts. This may lead to more widespread and sophisticated intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities.

Hare & Coghill (2012) state that it is estimated that information technology will impact intelligence analysis, workflow, organisations, and skills following in the next decades. Furthermore, analysts may need less basic knowledge of subjects and rather more general reasoning skills in the future (Hare & Coghill, 2012). The advanced information technology tools provided in the future can help analysts in the intelligence field to analyse and process data more accurately and quickly. These tools can be an advantage in time-critical intelligence work that needs to be carried out quickly, allowing the analysts to make more informed decisions in a shorter amount of time. Within intelligence work, there is a focus on future employees being constantly provided with opportunities to develop and train to become intelligence specialists (Vaage & Sundal, 2021). Analysts have emerged as a central resource in running and overseeing the execution of intelligence processes by providing guidance to interpreting assignments and collection (Vaage & Sundal, 2021). To achieve this role in the best possible way, analysts must comprehensively understand the strengths and weaknesses inherent in every step of the intelligence process (Vaage & Sundal, 2021).

The technology itself does not create values for a company, and they have to be operationally and leveraged strategically to support your overall business goals (Stensberg, 2021). This is an essential aspect of overall digitalisation, and there will be no point in using technology if there is no clear process for interacting with improvement work and processes (Stensberg, 2021). The work done by the people through well-designed processes creates the improvements, not the technology itself (Stensberg, 2021). Neither analytic techniques nor digital tools, such as artificial intelligence (AI), can replace the expertise of specialists (Vaage & Sundal, 2021).

2.4 The Norwegian Customs' National Threat Assessment 2023

The aim of Norwegian Customs' Threat Assessment can be reflected in their social mission: To ensure that regulations and laws for cross-border transportation of goods are complied with (Tolletaten, 2022e). This threat assessment is a key foundational document for intelligence production and lays the foundation for the superior intelligence needs of the agency (Tolletaten, 2022e). This National Threat Assessment will contribute to management and prioritisation in the agency by assessing threats to the Norwegian Customs defined societal values (Tolletaten, 2022e). The Norwegian Custom's societal values are seen as:

1. A safe and sustainable society
2. Financing of public services
3. Fair competition conditions for law-abiding actors
4. International obligations, safe and efficient world trade
5. Correct trading statistics (Tolletaten, 2022e).

The background for the Threat Assessment 2023 is a cross-border flow of goods and a society still affected by the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic (Tolletaten, 2022e). Additionally, the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine affects trade. (Tolletaten, 2022e). These affects can be seen in sanctions against Russia, the Russian shutdown of gas exports to Europe, and acts of war preventing exports of agricultural goods from Ukraine (Tolletaten, 2022e).

The Norwegian Custom's societal values are evaluated against consequences. In the Threat Assessment, these consequences are defined as unwanted or undesirable effects on the agency's social value (Tolletaten, 2022e). The categorisation of these consequences are:

1. Loss of life and health
2. Loss of safety and security
3. Loss of public revenue and distortion of competition
4. Loss or damage to the environment
5. Loss or damage to cultural values
6. Breach of international obligations
7. Errors in trade statistics (Tolletaten, 2022e).



Figure 2, Threat categories as a share of the overall assessed threat picture for 2023. (Tolletaten, 2022e, p. 6).

Figure 2 presents an overview of all the threat categories, and the categories are weighted against each other by the size of their boxes in relation to the categories' assessed social consequences (Tolletaten, 2022e). The category "Narkotika", which is translated to narcotics, is considered to have the most significant consequences for society and is followed by the categories of "Dyr og planter" animals and plants, and "Strategiske varer" strategic goods (Tolletaten, 2022e).

2.4.1 Narcotic

The content of the word 'narcotics' description has changed over time and is defined differently in various environments and countries. In Norway, it now includes all illegal and prescription intoxicating substances (Narkotikaforskriften, 2013, §3; Legemiddelloven, 1992, §22; Tolletaten, 2022e). Narcotics inflict significant consequences on the society and individuals. On an individual level, abuse of drugs can carry risks of chronic and acute health damage and early death (Tolletaten, 2022e). Public health expenditure imposes large direct costs on society (Tolletaten, 2022e). These costs also include the police, courts, production losses, correctional facilities, NAV, which is a government agency operating under the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion and is responsible for organising and financing labour market measures, social assistance, and social security benefits (Tolletaten, 2022e; Aspøy & Berg, 2009).

2.4.2 Animals and plants

The illegal trade of animals and plants is seen increasing internationally and in Norway (Tolletaten, 2022e). In this context, 'animals and plants' include genetically modified plants, pets, illegal equipment for catching, species covered by The Convention on International Trade with endangered species of flora and fauna (CITES), and unfamiliar biological species (Tolletaten, 2022e). These kinds of illegal trades may lead to major consequences for value creation and the environment and may also affect people's health and lives (Tolletaten, 2022e). Diseases such as the bird flu and the COVID-19 pandemic are examples of this (Tolletaten, 2022e). Furthermore, the destruction of ecosystems can be considered from illegal cross-border trade globally as endangered species and species populations disappear (Tolletaten, 2022e). The Customs Agency is crucial in safeguarding the environment, nature, plants, and animals. These are accomplished through measures such as preventing the introduction of invasive species through imports, halting the export of contaminated goods that can harm the ecosystem, and export of overfishing (Tolletaten, 2022e).

2.4.3 Strategic goods

Under the category of strategic goods, it can be found multi-use goods, defense materials, technology, and goods that could be significant for the development in other countries, applications, or products of military-related use or that can directly serve to develop a country's military capability (Tolletaten, 2022e). It also encompasses goods that have the potential to carry out acts of terrorism (Tolletaten, 2022e). An effect of the threats within strategic goods is international developments, as a result of Russia's warfare in Ukraine, export control received increased attention in many Western countries (Tolletaten, 2022e). Norwegian failure to comply with export control regulations undermines foreign policy and security within Norway through breaking international contractual obligations (Tolletaten, 2022e). The consequences here include increased military capacity by threat actors, that Norwegian goods may be used in acts of war, and loss of reputation for Norwegian businesses and Norway in general (Tolletaten, 2022e).

2.5 Today's threat and risk picture

The rapidly increasing of digitalisation is accelerating within critical infrastructure and is affecting private and public sectors. New trends such as AI and 5G will help further to develop society (Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet, 2019). The security policy situation is also

changing rapidly, this involves complex and new hybrid threats that require new knowledge and security measures (Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet, 2023). With technological development, Norway has become more dependent on the digital international community (Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet, 2019). The danger and risk lie in the possibility that threat actors' use of technology can develop faster than the open democracies' ability to defend themselves (Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet, 2023). New security concepts and hybrid threats are required to meet a worsening threat and risk picture (Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet, 2023).

Digitalisation has led to longer and more intricate value chains, making Norway more reliant on digital solutions (Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet, 2019). These solutions are, in turn dependent on businesses, products, and foreign services, which further exacerbate the challenges posed by security (Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet, 2019). In this modern society, one is dependent on digital technology, and it is undeniable (Cullen & Wegge, 2021). Moreover, the concept of digital vulnerability has taken on a new dimension, and digital technology is stronger and more intertwined than before (Cullen & Wegge, 2021). In addition, digital vulnerability embraces almost every aspect of civil society (Cullen & Wegge, 2021). Altogether, it is essential to remember that national security is not only built on the digital space (Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet, 2020).

In 2022, the general society has gone from experiencing and living in a global pandemic to experiencing a war in Europe. The security policy has changed dramatically over a short period of time (Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet, 2022). Emerging events and incidents can quickly change the overall risk picture, and societal vulnerabilities are becoming more demanding to detect due to all increasingly complex digital value chains (Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet, 2022). Sabotage and digital intelligence operations against essential social functions may have the greatest impact on national security and foreign state search for the state- and high technology secrets, among other things, when carrying out digital intelligence operations against organisations in Norway (Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet, 2023).

Russia's break with the West is a great example of the rapidly changing security policy (Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet, 2023). The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST)'s National Threat Assessment (2023) provides ungraded information on Norwegian society's

threat picture this year. Russian intelligence agencies are expected to be interested in information about Norwegian actors in the administration of Svalbard (Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste, 2023). Svalbard is an archipelago in the Arctic Ocean and a part of Norway, even though it does not belong to mainland Norway. It was designated as a separate customs territory in 2022 with an adopted provision in the Customs Act, historically there has been no control of goods exported and imported from Svalbard (Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste, 2023; Tolletaten, 2023; Regjeringen, 2022). The Norwegian government considered that it was urgent to have controls on goods brought in and out of Svalbard (Regjeringen, 2022). It must be prevented that Svalbard is used to circumvent the sanctions and export control regulations (Tolletaten, 2023). Russia is expected to track Norwegian control activities on the archipelago (Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste, 2023).

The war has also brought fundamental and significant changes regarding the relationship between Western countries, including Norway and Russia (Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste, 2023). These changes affect the threat posed by Russian intelligence services within Norway. Nonetheless, the intelligence threat posed by other nations is characterised and remains consistent (Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste, 2023). Russia is expected to track Norwegian control activities on Svalbard (Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste, 2023). The customs agency plays a key role in implementing a progressively extensive range of sanctions concerning Russia. This aspect becomes particularly significant considering its relevance to the establishment on Svalbard (Tolletaten, 2023).

Regarding the cocaine confiscations of 2023, journalist Buggeland (2023) writes for VG, the biggest Norwegian newspaper, that international and foreign criminal networks and criminal Norwegian networks often operate from abroad (Buggeland, 2023). The threat from international and Norwegian networks operating from abroad are among the biggest threats to Norway regarding crimes (Buggeland, 2023). Concerns are expressed about Norway becoming a transit country for narcotics linked to the four major drug confiscations of cocaine in the first half of 2023 (Buggeland, 2023). Going forward, it will still be important within narcotics smuggling that the police and customs have the capacity and competence to uncover the smuggling (Buggeland, 2023).

2.6 Hybrid threats

Hybrid threats are seen as multidimensional and complex threats, and the phenomenon results from the interconnection and convergence of different elements, which together form a more complex and multidimensional threat that aims to exert influence and make processes at state or regional level (European Parliament, 2015). Current threats and risks have created a greater space of uncertainty. They are more limitless than ever, and hybrid threats, a combination of means and methods, can exploit vulnerabilities (Petersen & Tjalve, 2018; Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet, 2020). The new reality has influenced the security concept around the globe, and today's society is living in an era of hybrid influencing (Herciu, 2019). At the same time, systems capable of processing large amount of collective data is developed, a challenge for the intelligence analyst to discover hybrid attacks at their very early stages (Cullen & Wegge, 2021). This is primarily due to the limitless potential scenarios that can arise in a hybrid threat context (Cullen & Wegge, 2021). One of the most severe threats to national security lies in hybrid threats that weaken the trust between the authorises and the population (Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet, 2023).

As a concrete example of a hybrid threat within the customs area, one can consider trade-based money laundering (TBML). In the simplest form, money laundering is categorised as transferring of money criminals seek to legitimise through legal sources of income (Cassara, 2015; Tolletaten, 2022e). Money laundering is often used to hide income from criminal activity and to carry out tax evasion (Tolletaten, 2022e). TBMLs are used by criminals seeking to legitimise funds, here they fraudulently or genuinely sell and buy trade goods using various techniques that very effectively transfer value in ways that sometimes can bypass customs authorities and financial intelligence reporting requirements (Cassara, 2015). Cassara (2015) defines TBML as "The process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value via trade transactions in an attempt to legitimize their illicit origin" (p. 223). By using the global financial system, TBML is seen as a hybrid threat because it considers a complex methodology within money laundering and operates across national borders (Cassara, 2015). The TBML is often combined with other money laundering techniques and may use shell companies and is, therefore, quite challenging to separate from value transfers of legitimate activities (Cassara, 2015).

2.7 Development tools and technological aids

In the intelligence field, there are possibilities of machine learning algorithms that are trained to recognise patterns and perform tasks that would be too time-consuming for human or even too complex. These tools may benefit the Customs and intelligence industry in the future. The modern systems provide analytical tools and information storage, allowing border inspectors and customs agencies to use information from import declarations better to further predict the probability that a given shipment transported into the country is non-compliant (Hillberry et al., 2022).

In a news article from Aftenposten, a widespread Norwegian newspaper, journalist Furuly (2018) writes about decisions to be considered with implementing algorithms in the Norwegian Customs that analyse big data and use AI to check border-crossers against intelligence reports. This work can meet challenges in complying within regulations and limits when analysing and matching data about potential smugglers, even if there is a technological possibility to retrieve information outside the limits (Furuly, 2018). The usage of such technological tools will require ongoing investment in development and research and a commitment to incorporating emerging technologies. In Norway, authorisation is necessitated to collect and use data this way. Thus, it is possible to face challenges in staying within the regulations and the self-imposed limits when analysing data matches about potential smugglers. In the future possibilities for implementing a collection and analysis of data from the web and social media, AI might be used to flag more suspicious people, groups, or businesses (Furuly, 2018).

2.7.1 Artificial intelligence (AI)

In technical communities, a development in computers to explore instructions for assignments or algorithms based on the interpretation and processing of data, known as AI, can be used and there is considerable optimism around this (Haugom et al., 202; Kommunal- og distriktsdepartementet 2020). Systems based on AI intend to achieve a given goal, the systems adapt through analysis, and some can even consider previous actions (Kommunal- og distriktsdepartementet 2020). Such systems can be trained to include various techniques and approaches, such as specific methods in robotics, machine reasoning (planning, optimisation, and search), and machine learning (Kommunal- og distriktsdepartementet 2020). When computer programs become able and better to analyse, gather and communicate information

this technology will likely be utilised for these purposes (Haugom et al., 2021). Modern computers have the storage and necessary capacity to handle larger volumes of data than before, and data quantities are essential for enabling machine learning (Haugom et al., 2021). Furthermore, digitalisation has enhanced the availability of accessing large datasets (Haugom et al., 2021). Presently, machines can effortlessly access billions of examples to support the learning process. With the help of AI, it can be designed and developed analysis to connect machine processes together with humans (Haugom et al., 2021). To understand the AI and human work as complementarity, it is crucial to identify human strengths together with the areas that could be more successful and with these areas use technology to help create an interaction between human and computer (Haugom et al., 2021).

Perhaps the most primary reason for employing AI in intelligence analysis is AI's ability to simplify tasks of managing large quantities of information, retrieving relevant data, and presenting it in a structured way, which makes it easier for the analyst to handle the information (Haugom et al., 2021). However, analysts have to be aware of the downsides of AI as well. For example, the overview of information has become more complex in the digital age. It has led to uncontrolled and frequent information, and the term information overload has become remarkably in character and easily influenced by the Internet and social media (Stenslie et al., 2021; Haugom et al., 2021). Information overload describes the difficulty of admitting the existence of a problem and effective decision-making when there is too much information (Stenslie et al., 2021). When the amount and volume of information rise, this situation occurs, resulting in constraints for both individuals and organisations with limited processing capacity (Stenslie et al., 2021). For the analysts this means disinformation to relate to, questions arise regarding future intelligence workers and analysts within their capability to navigate the information landscape without using technology, such as AI, that not only facilitates information retrieval but also detects misinformation while establishing connections among data from various sources (Haugom et al., 2021).

AI has been developed to interpret data, for example, from cameras, microphones, or sensors (Kommunal- og distriktsdepartementet 2020). The system analyses the data, performs actions, and makes its own decisions (Kommunal- og distriktsdepartementet 2020). The fact that the system makes decisions and performs actions raises several ethical questions, such as the quality of the training data used in AI-supervised learning. This data may contain biases such as human judgment errors or historical biases (Kommunal- og distriktsdepartementet 2020). A

balance between the advantages and disadvantages of AI technology must be found, without breaking the law, in order to use these tools in intelligence and other contexts.

2.7.2 Digitoll

In order to ensure that the cross-border transport of goods takes place as efficiently as possible, a digital tool was developed for better information flow related to the cross-border transport of goods (Tolletaten, n.d). Digitoll was made based on a new act relating to customs duties (Customs Duty Act) and a new act of the importation and exportation of goods (Movement of Goods Act) from January 1st 2023 (Tolletaten, 2022c). Previously, it was possible to declare goods up to ten days entering the country, but now digital custom registration will become mandatory for all transport moving goods into Norway within March 2025 (Tolletaten, 2022c; Tolletaten, n.d).

The concept around Digitoll shall support the transmission of digital information and be fulfilled by advance notification, declaration, information, and presentation. These are considered the duties of the actors in Norwegian industries (Tolletaten, n.d). Digitoll will provide a more efficient and automated border crossing and provide the Norwegian Customs Agency with information for future risk assessments and object selections (Tolletaten, n.d). Providing digital information about goods before, or at the latest, at the border-crossing contributes to advantages such as more efficient border-crossings, protecting the Norwegian society from environmental, terrorist, and health threats, counteract illegal imports, and clarification of responsibilities and obligations (Tolletaten, 2022c).

2.7.3 Kvoteappen

In addition to having a solid investment in developing user-friendly solutions for the Norwegian industry business, Norwegian Customs has also made similar investments to benefit private individuals (Tolletaten, 2021). A free phone app, Kvoteappen, has been developed to make it easier for travellers to customs declare goods and calculate the quota they bring into Norway (Tolletaten, 2021). This app helps contribute to easy customs clearance and registration for travelers entering Norway.

If a traveler doubts whether they are within the value limit or the quota when arriving in Norway, they can check the Kvoteappen. This app is designed for travellers to ensure the

goods they process are in compliance with the value limit and quota. When using the app, if the top field in the app is green, it means that they are within both the quota and the value limit (Tolletaten, 2021). If the traveler exceeds the quota or the value limit, the top field in the app turns yellow and indicates what must be paid in the app, and they can receive a receipt after paying the given amount (Tolletaten, 2021). The last option after entering their goods in the app is for the top field to turn red, which means that the traveler has entered more goods than is allowed to be taken with them (Tolletaten, 2021). Making it easier for the app user, the travellers, also help the Customs Agency's resources at the borders to focus on other things and work more efficiently going forward. This can, for example, be seen in the context of those who do not pay tax for the goods they bring to Norway are fined. Therefore, the Customs is working with tools to make it easier for the Norwegian business industry and travellers (Prop. 1 S (2022-2023), p. 80).

3 Theoretical foundation

3.1 What is intelligence?

There is no generally accepted definition of the term 'intelligence', and the term continues to be a subject that is widely discussed (Etterretningstjenesten, 2022). However, most definitions in use point to either the business, the organisation, the final product, or even all three of these aspects (Etterretningstjenesten, 2022). WCO describes intelligence as an essential weapon helpful for fighting against illegal activities, such as drug smuggling or commercial fraud (World Customs Organization, 1992; Ylönen & Aven, 2023). Another definition of intelligence by Garner & McGlynn (2018) is "The ability to obtain and apply knowledge and skills" (p. 7). In reality, this becomes more apparent, and each organisation or individual has a different definition of the term (Garner & McGlynn, 2018).

Hatlebrekke (2021) defines intelligence as "secretly generated wisdom beyond the limits of way reasoning that makes uncertain estimates less uncertain, and that consequently generates political, strategic and operational advantage over adversaries" (p. 265). Further, Hatlebrekke (2021) emphasises that intelligence can only partially solve the problem of induction. It can only reduce the problem by making uncertain estimates less uncertain, thus decreasing the level of uncertainty. It is typical to direct matters affecting state security, and one of the critical tasks in intelligence is to alert key civilian, military, and political decision-makers to

potential threats, such as terrorism, cyberattacks, or other countries' military power (Stenslie et al., 2021).

Intelligence is related and linked to information and data about threats, and therefore, an obvious link exists between risk and intelligence (Ylönen & Aven, 2023). The intelligence work involves beliefs and statements about an uncertain future. It aims to direct future crime prevention and is based on incomplete images of the present (Ylönen & Aven, 2023). Another intelligence referring can, therefore, be the processing, sharing, dissemination, collection, and analysis of information on threats (Ylönen & Aven, 2023). This definition is what intelligence in this thesis is referred to as well. The choice of this reference is based on the relevance of the Customs Agency and a more general description of phenomena than, for example, Hatlebrekke (2021)'s definition, which may appear somewhat coloured by the fact that he has worked in the field of state intelligence.

Even though intelligence is closely linked to different forms of hidden information, it would be a mistake to reduce the entire intelligence activity to only its collection methods (Stenslie et al., 2021). The concept of intelligence does not only surround hidden information but also the organisations, knowledge, and activities involved and generated through these processes (Stenslie et al., 2021).

3.1.1 The secrecy of intelligence

The lack of agreement concerning intelligence also proves to influence intelligence analysis. There does not exist a broadly agreed-upon definition of intelligence analysis either. The analysis process can be explained as "the process of breaking a concept down into more simple parts, so that its logical structure is displayed" (Blackburn, 2005, p. 13). The ability to think the unthinkable is a cornerstone of intelligence work (Kristoffersen & Hatlebrekke, 2022).

The goal of intelligence analysis is to foresee the future. The analyst(s) seek to predict the future by using a formal process that offers comprehension of the past and present (Hatlebrekke, 2021). It also involves prediction and estimation (Hatlebrekke, 2021). Thus, intelligence analysis is based upon different characteristics and aspects, such as processes where information is collected and used to answer a tactical question about predicting the future or a current operation (Garner & McGlynn, 2018). Intelligence analysis can be viewed

as more flexible than, for example, risk analysis, as it can be attacked from different angles and in a different order. One can go back and forth in the process, and what is contained in it can vary depending on who is carrying it out.
Although intelligence analysts cannot accurately predict the future, they are responsible for assigning probabilities to certain events and outcomes. These are based on the most reliable and recent information (Gustafson, 2021). The intelligence analyst may determine, for example, that it is probable that "[…] country "R" will attack its neighbouring country "G" within time frame "T"." (Gustafson, 2021, p. 106). Using various scenario-generation techniques and examining the underlying assumptions, the analyst(s) can better understand potential events and outcomes and expand their linear predictions (Gustafson, 2021).

3.3 Intelligence Cycle

In order to carry out intelligence work, solid routines are required. Before the routines are put into a cycle, a precise assessment of the information needs is required (Kristoffersen & Hatlebrekke, 2022). Regardless of the intelligence field, at the beginning of every process, there is always at least one unsolved issue or one unanswered question (Garner & McGlynn, 2018). These problems or questions are seen as an intelligence requirement (Garner & McGlynn, 2018).

The routines following the intelligence requirement can be presented in a cycle of information gathering, analysis, and dissemination since intelligence work consists of several dimensions, and this cycle can and may later be extended (Kristoffersen & Hatlebrekke, 2022). In intelligence, there is a known cycle to use for this purpose. This cycle is called the intelligence cycle and focuses on turning information into intelligence and to distinguish between the different functional elements of the process, such as analysis and collection (Grana & Windell, 2021; Stenslie et al., 2021). The intelligence cycle is a widely recognised framework that has evolved over time and takes on different forms depending on who uses it. While there are plenty of variations on the intelligence cycle, this chapter will explore and focus on one of the most relevant, well-known, and widely used intelligence cycles. Initially, it is essential to consider that there exists some variation in the fundamental elements of what makes up the intelligence cycle (Davies et al., 2013).



Figure 3, The intelligence cycle (Stenslie et al., 2021, p. 4).

As shown in Figure 3, intelligence requirements are presented with an arrow that starts before the other steps in the cycle are started. If the need for intelligence is misunderstood, this may be due to a weak definition in requirements, and it is therefore, essential to have a dialogue back and forth before the process starts to ensure that both the intelligence analyst and the consumer have a common understanding (Graner & McGlynn, 2016). The intelligence analysts and the consumer must thoroughly understand the requirements. Therefore, an arrow points both ways at the top of the model to symbolise communication and shared understanding (Graner & McGlynn, 2016).

3.3.1 Steps of the Intelligence Cycle

Step 1: Direction

It involves identifying the need for intelligence and planning (Grana & Windell, 2021). The intelligence service gets a request that calls for intelligence and helps define how the result will be clarified in this step by prioritising various intelligence needs (Stenslie et al., 2021; Grana & Windell, 2021). Further, collection and production plans are developing (Stenslie et al., 2021).

Step 2: Collection

This step involves collecting data and relevant information to the subject in question (Stenslie et al., 2021; Grana & Windell, 2021). Within this step, the analyst also needs an understanding of why the intelligence information for this specific task is needed and what is

exactly being asked to properly deal with the collection requests (Grana & Windell, 2021). It typically entails the comprehensive accumulation of the data and evaluation of preceding intelligence. A mass collection of reviews and information, both old and new information, needs to be addressed to ascertain their pertinence, importance, and precision (Grana & Windell, 2021).

Step 3: Processing

The third step involves filtering information from the collection into organised and usable formats for further analysis (Grana & Windell, 2021). The data are summarised, systematised, and analysed into products (Stenslie et al., 2021). This involves the collected information being converted into actionable intelligence that can be disseminated in diverse formats (Grana & Windell, 2021). In some intelligence cycles, the analysis part has its own step called 'Analysis'. These cases are sorted for relevance and priority to make the analysis part easier (Grana & Windell, 2021).

Step 4: Dissemination

This step has multiple layers to it, which is regarding the sharing of information (Grana & Windell, 2021). It needs to be decided on who the intelligence will be conveyed to, and how much of it shall be shared. The most reasonable form of communication for conveying the analysed intelligence, whether through spoken or written communication, is selected (Stenslie et al., 2021; Grana & Windell, 2021). A big part of this step is communicating the product as understandable for the retriever and ensuring that it is understood correctly (Stenslie et al., 2021).

3.3.2 Criticism of the Intelligence Cycle

The intelligence cycle can be traced back to the expansion of intelligence systems during the Second World War and has been ingrained in international training programs since (Hulnick, 2014). However, this has led to significant challenges for intelligence professionals and workers transitioning from training to fundamental operations. Often, the actual scenarios they encounter do not align with their anticipated expectations (Hulnick, 2014). Although there is a shared agreement that the intelligence process does not always work as a cycle in practice, the intelligence cycle is still the most common model used to describe the intelligence process (Moen, 2020).

According to Hulnick (2006; 2014), the cycle of intelligence is not a good model because the pattern in the cycle does not describe what really happens in the process. Further, he states that decision-makers do not wait for the intelligence force's delivery before making accurate policy decisions in reality (Hulnick, 2006). As a result, intelligence officers often need help implementing their training when they begin working in the field since real-world situations often do not align with their expectations and training (Stenslie et al., 2021; Hulnick, 2014). In the context of the digital age, the traditional intelligence cycle no longer serves as a process description (Stenslie et al., 2021). With the emergence of rapidly evolving threats, the traditional linear sequence of collection and processing steps often needs to be parallel. Instead, intelligence work is carried out in parallel with greater flexibility and the ability to skip steps when necessary to work on emerging threats effectively (Stenslie et al., 2021). In other words, the intelligence cycle does not reflect intelligence work as it is today. Since the beginning of intelligence and the presented intelligence cycle, work has emerged and changed, which can complicate the use of the traditional intelligence cycle.

Warner (2013) describes that the usefulness and effectiveness of any tool should enhance the acuity of the analyst or student utilising it and the cognitive flexibility. Furthermore, he claims that a good learning tool should not need more explanation than the model itself to be used and that this can lead to incorrect use of the aid (Warner, 2013). The intelligence cycle is not a model for carrying out intelligence work in the real world, and it can potentially do more harm than good (Warner, 2013).

3.3.3 The Intelligence Cycle in the context of measures

The Norwegian police department has made its own version of the intelligence cycle as a basis model to visualise the intelligence process by attempting to include some of the factors missing in the traditional intelligence cycle. This figure is used and developed as decision support for priorities and management related to the police's social mission (Politidirektoratet, 2020). However, it is also used frequently and is known to other agencies in Norway. In addition to the original intelligence cycle, the process of measures is visualised in this model. The model, here presented as Figure 4, is often referred to as "åttetallet", which can be directly translated to English as "the number eight" because of the look of the model (Politidirektoratet, 2014, p. 52 in Moen, 2020). The connection between prioritisation, management, measures, and the intelligence process is visualised in the figure below (Politidirektoratet, 2020).



Figure 4, The intelligence process in the context of measures. (Politidirektoratet, 2020, p. 52).

Figure 4 presents and visualises the connection between the two different processes: the intelligence cycle and a cycle of measures (Moen, 2020). This connection is linked to the management exercise through prioritisation (Politidirektoratet, 2020). The bottom yellow circle in the figure illustrates the intelligence process. The intelligence shall provide a decision-making basis for tactical, operational, and strategic decisions, while managers must implement various measures illustrated in the top blue circle (Politidirektoratet, 2020). Emphasis is placed on presenting the measuring process to illustrate the connection with knowledge before implementing these various measures (Politidirektoratet, 2020).

3.4 Risk Science

'Risk science' is defined as the most justified and updated knowledge within the risk field, and this includes risk fundamentals, principles, methods, approaches, and concepts on how to characterise, communicate, assess, govern, manage, and understand risk (Aven & Thekdi, 2022). The knowledge provided by risk science can help further develop and summarise knowledge about risk (Aven & Thekdi, 2022). The field of risk science, particularly concerning security applications, gained significant momentum in the aftermath of the

September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks (Thekdi & Aven, 2023). This particular risk event spurred communities, nations, individuals, and businesses to make more concerted efforts to safeguard values and protect them from threats that endanger the values (Thekdi & Aven, 2023). As a result, experts and academics from around the globe and across academic fields have dedicated their attention to developing best practices, methods, and approaches for comprehending and understanding risk and effectively managing that risk (Thekdi & Aven, 2023).

Usually, people have no control over the forces that impact them. Forces like the economy and strategic initiatives for the decisions of others or organisations are among those that cannot be controlled (Thekdi & Aven, 2023). For example, in the future, the economy may lead to reduced job opportunities, and these forces will impact all people somehow (Thekdi & Aven, 2023). When managing risk, it must be considered how uncertainties relate to consequences involving some things of value (Thekdi & Aven, 2023). Uncertainty and risk may lead to problems, but these forces may also introduce new opportunities (Thekdi & Aven, 2023).

3.4.1 Definition of risk

'Risk' is a broad term understood and used differently in different settings, professional environments, and fields (Lupton, 2013). SRA's glossary defines risk as "a future activity [interpreted in a wide sense to also cover, for example, natural phenomena], for example the operation of a system, and define risk in relation to the consequences (effects, implications) of this activity with respect to something that humans value. The consequences are often seen in relation to some reference values (planned values, objectives, etc.), and the focus is often on negative, undesirable consequences. There is always at least one outcome that is considered as negative or undesirable." (SRA, 2018, p. 4). This is the definitions of risk used throughout this thesis. This specific risk definition is used as it captures the multifaced nature of risk and well presents the key components (a future activity, values, uncertainty, and consequences of the potential activity linked to something humans value).

Risk's epistemological and ontological status varies depending on the disciplinary perspective one adopts. These perspectives vary on how people estimate, study, and approach the concept of risk (Lupton, 2013; Renn, 2008). For instance, in medicine and science, risk is an objective reality that can be measured, managed, and controlled using mathematical models to measure

and predict the risk. (Lupton, 2013). With reference to psychologists, the concept of risk perception becomes relevant in understanding individual responses to risks. Risks are regarded as both a cognitive phenomenon and a behaviour (Lupton, 2013; Renn, 2008). The field of engineering refers to risk as a functional relationship between consequences and probabilities (Renn, 2008). In law, risk refers to fault of conduct, perceived as an event leading to disorder and incurring costs, and is an object necessitating legal intervention (Lupton, 2013).

Within the field of Customs, there can be provided an example of cross-border transport and movement of goods (Ylönen & Aven, 2023). If one looks at Customs' societal values, these can be affected by activities such as smuggling into Norway. The values to be affected by these activities may be a safe and sustainable society, fair competition conditions for law-abiding actors, international obligations, and safe and efficient world trade (Tolletaten, 2022e). These values can be seen together with the consequences of loss of life and health, loss of safety and security, loss or damage to the environment, loss or damage to cultural values, and breach of international obligations (Tolletaten, 2022e).



Figure 5, Self-made figure: The basic features of the risk concept. Based on Aven & Thekdi (2022, p. 10).

It is crucial to recognise the distinction between risk and related terms, such as hazards (Hohenemser et al., 2000; Renn, 2008). Hazards represent threats to humans and the things they hold valuable and describe the potential for harm, while risks involve quantifiable assessments of the consequences of hazards and describe the potential of the effect and if the hazard is likely to cause a specific outcome (Hohenemser et al., 2000; Renn, 2008). Hazards can also be seen as a risk source where the potential consequences relate to harm (SRA, 2018; Aven & Thekdi, 2022). Activities that violate customs regulations or trade laws, such as smuggling, pose hazards because they may harm the environment, public health, or safety, to mention some values. These potential outcomes align with the concept of hazards because they present potential harm and threats to Norwegian society. In the Norwegian Customs

Threat Assessment (2022e), threats are identified as irregular or illegal export or import of goods with consequences for one or several of the societal values defined by the Norwegian Customs Agency. Threats can be seen as goods imported or exported by actions that influence goods carriers' traffic flows (Tolletaten, 2022e). This definition provides hazards by mentioning the illegal import or export of goods because these activities can potentially harm societal values. It is essential for the Customs to mitigate and identify hazards to maintain safety and security, as well as compliance within the import and export processes.

3.4.2 Risk Analysis

A risk analysis is simply an analysis of risk. The analysis deals with issues related to security, for example, when it comes to sabotage and terror, or accidents (Aven et al., 2017). Risk analysis is often used to establish a risk picture, determine the effect different measures have on the risk, or identify activities of great importance to the risk (Aven et al., 2017). By carrying out a risk analysis, it is possible to find the correct balance between various considerations (for example, safety and economy) and primarily concerned with the impact of specific events (Aven et al., 2017). The process covers identifying opportunities, threats, hazards, and risk sources and understanding the consequences of how these may occur (Aven & Thekdi, 2022). Risk analysis is defined as a "Systematic process to comprehend the nature of risk and to express the risk, with the available knowledge" in SRA (2018, p. 8). This definition is used throughout this thesis as it highlights the nature of risks and identifies the factors contributing to risk. The definition shows the recognition that the analysis is built on available knowledge.

By carrying out a risk analysis, one can identify conditions that have significant meaning concerning the risk, identify potential risk and hazard, establish a risk picture, and determine what effect different tasks can have on risk (Aven et al., 2017). The purpose of such an analysis is to provide a basis for decisions and to find the best possible measures and solutions in keeping with the goals that have been set (Aven et al., 2017). The strengths of the risk analysis can be seen in the fact that it systematises the uncertainties related to the phenomenon under consideration and available knowledge (Aven et al., 2017). The analysis will not give the analyst a solution but decision-making support by finding out what can go wrong, why, and what the consequences of this are (Aven et al., 2017).

3.4.3 Risk Management

SRA (2018) defines 'risk management' as "Activities to handle risk such as prevention, mitigation, adaptation or sharing" (p. 8). This definition will be used throughout this thesis as it is a comprehensive view of risk management, leaves little room for ambiguity, and is easily understood across different fields.

Risk management is seen as a multifaced process that includes various activities, such as formulating rules and procedures for making decisions, conducting risk assessments, and determining the most suitable decision, course of action, or investment to address and reduce the risk and uncertainties (Aven & Thekdi, 2022). The work with risk analysis is central to risk management work, and risk management deals with all activities, events, and conditions that can affect an organisation and its ability to achieve its visions and goals (Aven et al., 2017). For example, one can distinguish between the costs and benefits of risk reductions and then choose a tolerable risk level (SRA, 2018).



Figure 6, Self-made figure: Risk management process. Based on Aven et al. (2017, p. 22).

Figure 6 presents the risk management process and includes three main stages in the process: *Planning*, *risk assessment*, and *risk handling* (Aven et al., 2017). To visualise the distinction between the three central concepts of risk analysis, risk evaluation, and risk assessment, one can see in the model that the total of both risk analysis and risk evaluation is the risk

assessment (Aven et al., 2017). At the beginning of the risk management process, the risk analysis results are evaluated. In order to achieve a good risk management process, the risk assessment must be thorough and accurate. To solve risk problems with risk management and to understand risk, broad risk analysis and competence in risk science are required (Aven & Thekdi, 2022). In the planning part, it is therefore important to obtain and organise information and identify problems (Aven et al., 2017). At this stage, it is necessary to implement measures to modify risk, such as to optimise, avoiding, reducing, retaining, or transferring the risk (Aven et al., 2017). Following the next part, risk assessment, the first step is to identify the possible events as dangers, threats, or opportunities. Further, both consequence and cause analysis are needed to provide a clear picture of the risk (Aven et al., 2017). This is done based on the previous identification of possible inciting events (Aven et al., 2017). With risk handling alternatives are compared, and measures are identified and assessed in addition to the management's decisions and assessments are included (Aven et al., 2017).

In order to succeed in implementing risk management, a company can arrange and adopt this overarching strategy (Aven et al., 2017). Here, principles are used for how the company will continue to work with management, and questions to be asked for this aim is the goal: Is the goal to follow minimum requirements and regulations or to be the best at what they do? (Aven et al., 2017). Here, the company must also consider routines and formal processes that must be followed (Aven et al., 2017). Communication is also an important part of the process so that understanding, motivation, and competence in the organisation can be raised. Here, it is vital to develop and internalise the risk management culture (Aven et al., 2017). Finally, the last important step is establishing a management culture with different responsibilities and roles to anchor the process in the organisation (Aven et al., 2017).

3.4.4 Risk Management and Border Control

The flow and movement of goods are affected by Russia's war against Ukraine and the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic (Tolletaten, 2022e). In order to adapt to the threat and risk picture that continues to affect border controls and customs officers' work, risk management is adopted and used as a strategy for selecting shipments of important classes for inspection at borders (Hillberry et al., 2022). The customs officers protect the Norwegian society and the population against illegal and dangerous goods, such as health-damaging medicines, infectious food, and narcotics (Tolletaten, 2022d). Every day, vehicles, boats,

goods, people, and luggage are checked to ensure that the goods crossing the Norwegian border are within international and Norwegian laws and regulations (Tolletaten, 2022d). For these border inspectors, a challenge that can be found is the uncertainty related to their conditional forecast of the probability of a particular import good or shipment complies with import regulations (Hillberry et al., 2022). Both now and in the future, fatal damage can occur within the economy, human and animal health protection, and law enforcement with just a single non-compliant import shipment (Hillberry et al., 2022; Lindrup & Meisfjordskar, 2023). By using a risk management approach in border inspections, the focus is put on shipments that are at high-risk for lack of compliance with import regulations. At the same time, the inspection burden is reduced on low-risk shipments (Hillberry et al., 2022). Risk management is considered the best practicable strategy for oversight of international goods trade (Hillberry et al., 2022). It can help customs offices control the wide range of shipments containing potential harm with products included (Hillberry et al., 2022).

3.5 National Security

The Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security defines 'national security' as a limited part of a social security area and state security area which is of significant importance for the state's ability to safeguard national security interests (Meld. St. 5 (2020–2021), p. 11). In order to understand this definition, it must be seen in the context of the Norwegian Security Law (2018), which defines national security interests as "Norway's sovereignty, territorial integrity and democratic system of government, and general political security interests related to

a) the activities, security and freedom of action of the highest state bodies
b) defence, security and contingency preparedness
c) relations with other states and international organisations
d) economic stability and freedom of action
e) fundamental societal functions and the basic security of the population" (Sikkerhetsloven, 2018, §§ 1-5).

Various tasks carried out by the Norwegian Customs hold potential significance for national security including contributing to maintaining societal functions by preventing economic crimes, such as smuggling, and ensuring proper export and import declarations. The agency supports fair trade practices essential for economic stability (Tolletaten, 2022a; Tolletaten,

2022d; Tolletaten, 2022e; Regjeringen n.d). The Norwegian Customs ensure that imported goods comply with national regulations and quality standards (Tolletaten, 2022e; Regjeringen, n.d; Regjeringen, 2022). Custom officials inspect goods and shipments and contribute to stopping goods that are not supposed to enter Norway with the help of technological tools and intelligence information (Tolletaten, 2022h, 00:12; Tolletaten, 2022h, 00:20; Tolletaten, 2023).

Customs authorities monitor and regulate the import of goods that could pose health and safety risks to the population. For example, failing to monitor and regulate imports and exports that present health risks could lead to adverse outcomes such as loss of life and health or safety and security for the population (Tolletate, 2022e; Regjeringen, n.d.) According to the Norwegian Customs National Threat Assessment (2022e), trading across borders is considered an important influencing factor in species spreading to foreign habitats, which can cause destruction in ecosystems and direct effects on human life and health. The Customs also protect cultural heritage and the environment by regulating the import and export of goods with cultural or environmental significance. This includes, among other goods, animals and plants, regarding wildlife and endangered species (Tolletaten, 2022e).

3.6 The Compliance Pyramid

The compliance pyramid can be split into four parts: The disengaged, resisters, triers, and supporters, as shown on the right side of Figure 7. The OECD (2004) presents the pyramid and shows a spectrum of taxpayers' attitudes to compliance (p. 41). With a link to the Customs, the compliance pyramid goes beyond taxpayers and can be applied in a customs context, considering smugglers and those who adhere to the rules when crossing borders. Viewing this pyramid from that perspective provides insights into compliance within the customs domain rather than solely focusing on taxpayers and tax avoidance.



Figure 7, A spectrum of taxpayer attitudes to compliance (OECD, 2004, p. 41).

This compliance pyramid can be used as a compliance in customs context if you look at smugglers (the persons who have decided not to comply) and supporters (those who are willing to do the right thing and follow the law) through this pyramid. On the figure's left side, factors influencing taxpayer behavior are seen, other factors influence smugglers and these activities. For instance, this may be the market or the prerequisite for goods, with a low risk of being discovered and a high return if successful. For example, in criminal networks, the risk is spread throughout the network. If someone were to be arrested, it is unlikely that it would have a lasting consequence for the functionality of the network (Koser, 2008). Alternatively, it can be financial factors such as seeking to save money, variable and large price differences, an opportunity to launder money, and criminals seeking to make money, including taking advantage of tax differentials (Soon & Manning, 2018; Tolletaten, 2022e).

At the top of the pyramid, exposing criminal activities such as smuggling can be found. In the next step, those who are uncommitted will be discouraged, these may be those who need to be more engaged in following regulations or norms, and the aim of Customs here will be to deter them. Furthermore, at the second bottom of the pyramid, those who are willing but may need a better understanding can be found. The customs can contribute to help, and at the bottom, the significance of facilitation and simplification is essential. In addition, it is principal for the people who meet the border officials at crossing points that it is easy to comply with laws and regulations (Tolletaten, 2016).

4 Method

Based on the specific research questions and overall topics, as the purpose of this research project is to uncover perceptions among workers within intelligence in the Norwegian

Customs, the focus of this project is not on measurable data but rather on data that can contribute to understanding and clear opinions from the respondents. Therefore, a qualitative research method is chosen for this study. In addition to this, intelligence is a phenomenon I have limited prior knowledge about, and my intention is to gain a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. This aspect can be seen as another motivation for selecting a qualitative method, as highlighted by Johannessen et al. (2010), that the qualitative method is particularly appropriate when studying a phenomenon one does not know much about and wants to understand more thoroughly.

There are several data collection methods in qualitative studies, including interviews, focus groups, document analysis, analysis and recording of sound or images, and participant and non-participant observation (Fangen, 2015; Grønmo, 2009a). Since one of the project's aims is to find out what the perceptions of intelligence workers in the Norwegian Customs are about the future, it is natural to talk to a selection of these workers, as interviews are well suited when you want to explore individual feelings, different points of view, thoughts, perspectives, and how they act and justify their actions in different situations (Kvernmo, 2010; Thagaard, 2018). Qualitative interviews can be seen as a conversation between the interviewee and the researcher, which is guided by the topics the researcher wants to learn more about and gain insight into (Thagaard, 2018; Andresen, 2020). Interviews were chosen as the collection of information because interviews can provide richer data and better freedom to express themselves for the respondents, than what a survey would do in this case (Dalland, 2017; Gripsrud et al., 2016; Moe, 2021; Johannessen et al., 2010). When one selects to use interviews for data collection, it requires preparation to conduct the interviews, followed by efforts to analyse, process, and interpret the gathered information (Kvernmo, 2010). In this case, the starting point and key data for the qualitative interviews is the conversation.

4.1 Research design

This study of future intelligence is based on five individual interviews of workers related to intelligence work in the Norwegian Customs. None of the departments or sections the respondents work in will be presented in this thesis to preserve their anonymity. The interviews were conducted one-to-one (individually) and took from 30 – 90 minutes to conduct per interview. The respondents were informed that the interviews could be conducted in either English or Norwegian, and all the respondents chose Nowegian, since this was their

preferred language. Thus, all direct quotes from the interviews will in this thesis be presented in Norwegian to avoid tampering with the content of the quotes. However, the core messages of the quotes are explained throughout the analysis and in the analysis table (see Appendix 5).

Since the individuals being interviewed have a requirement of anonymity, it was essential to confirm that the anonymity of each person was managed by sending out an information letter. This information letter (see Appendix 1) contained the purpose of the research, who is responsible, what participation entails, and the storage and use of personal data collected. The information letter was sent out to and signed by the interviewees.

4.2 Semi-structured individual interview

The selected interview type was a semi-structured individual interview. This type of interview has questions written before the actual interview and is often used to see differences in answers from different interviewees (Moe, 2021). Another notable advantage of conducting these interviews is that the situation allows the interviewer to ask secondary questions to ensure that the conversation develops within the relevance of the research questions (Kvernmo, 2010).

Semi-structured interviews are often used in qualitative studies, as the structure is flexible (Thagaard, 2018). These types of interviews contain a large amount of individual information, and there are no influences from other people (Gripsrud et al., 2016). The structure's flexibility is often shown through the fact that questions can be included within the various themes presented in the interview guide that were not previously planned (Thagaard, 2018; Sandy & Dumay, 2011).

4.3 Interview guide

The interview guide (see Appendix 2) was designed based on finding answers to the research questions and contains questions regarding intelligence work, future intelligence, technology, security, risk management, digitalisation, cooperation, and the interviewees' perceptions and thoughts. Since the semi-structured interview involves prepared questions within identified themes that are asked systematically to elicit more elaborate answers, the respondents, with the help of the interview guide, received approximately the same questions in the same order (Sandy & Dumay, 2011). When the questions have been thought through in advance, it is also

easier to make the interviewee confident in both the conversation and you as a researcher (Moe, 2021). In order to keep the interviews relevant to the research questions, the interview guide was a good aid as it allowed a limited number of response categories, and the different respondents were asked various follow-up questions where it was natural in the conversation even though the same interview guide was used across all interviews (Sandy & Dumay, 2011).

The questions in the interview guide were formulated as open questions so that it was natural for the respondents to answer other than yes or no. According to Thagaard (2018), to ensure that the data collection will be of good quality, it is important to ask questions encouraging the interviewee to provide complementary and concrete descriptions of the researched topics. Therefore, the questions in the interview guide that do not have this open format have been connected with additional questions that make the respondent give a fuller answer. In order to bring out the respondents' thoughts and perceptions, most of the questions concerning their thoughts and reflections are formulated with "do you think", "do you mean", and "in your opinion".

After the first interviews, it became easier to ask additional questions and hold a direct conversation rather than an interrogation. By gaining more experience as well as exposure to the subject matter, the ability to ask additional follow-up questions improved. I became more familiar with the flow of conversations and became better acquainted with the questions from the interview guide. Also, the interview guide was adjusted throughout the interview process based on insights and experiences from the first interviews. These adjustments were to change some interview questions to be more specific, as they were misunderstood or required an in-depth explanation in the first interviews, and some questions were seen as redundant or not as important for the research questions and therefore removed from the interview guide.

4.3.1 Procedure and selection of informants

A strategic selection of informants was made for this study. A strategic selection is characterised by the researcher selecting specific participants based on their relevance, alignment, and is well suited and interesting for the research questions or problem statement (Dalland, 2017; Aanesen, 2020; Grønmo, 2009b). The researcher can accomplish this by thinking through which target group can participate in collecting the necessary data for the project, while the next step is to select people from this target group to participate in the

research (Johannessen et al., 2010). This could, for example, be people who share affiliation in a profession or have the same specific characteristics that the researcher will address in the project (Aanesen, 2020). In this study, a strategic selection was made within the intelligence environment in the Norwegian Customs Agency, as it was desirable that the research took place within this specific environment and network.

The external supervisor from the Norwegian Customs provided with the interview objects based on certain criteria set beforehand. This was done with the assumption that the external supervisor was best equipped to find appropriate participants. I received the e-mail addresses for five people, all of whom were relevant interviewees, and sent an e-mail to each of them where I introduced myself and the research project. To the e-mail, it was attached an information letter that had to be signed to confirm participation in the interviews and the study. In order to ensure informed and clear consent from the respondents, the information letter provided precise details about who is responsible, the purpose of the project, information regarding the right to withdraw consent, and the types of personal data to be collected (Datatilsynet, 2019). These inclusions aimed to present the project specifically in order to enable respondents to make well-informed decisions (Datatilsynet, 2019). In privacy regulations, there are precise requirements for what information must be contained, which were taken into account when writing the information letter.

All five of these possible respondents accepted to participate in the research project. Furthermore, the interviews were carried out. Three of them were conducted face-to-face, and two were carried out digitally with the help of Microsoft Teams for those who could not participate in person. Audio recordings were made of all the interviews, and these were further transcribed.

4.4. Description of interview situations

Prior to the first two interviews, nervosity was experienced. Previously, I was not used to the interview situation and, therefore, did not quite know what to expect. However, over time, I became more comfortable by gaining experience from the first interviews and learned how the interviews could be conducted in the best possible way. The insights gained from the first interviews helped to reduce nervousness and made it easier to ask relevant follow-up questions in the later interviews. The respondents were easy to talk to and open throughout

the interviews. It also appeared that it was easier to maintain connections and involvement in the physical interviews, although both types of interviews were comprehensive.

The difference in the atmosphere during the interviews was particularly noted between face-to-face and online interviews. The main difference here was some experiences of image delays and lag during the online interviews. In the event of delays with visuals, it was a challenge to interpret the body language or facial expressions of the respondents. The quality of audio was not affected in the video calls, what was said by the respondents was captured on the audio recordings, and there was a clear audio connection throughout the conversations. Furthermore, a difference noted in the online interviews is that there is a different opportunity to maintain eye contact with the respondent while they talk. During digital interviews, one could be looking into the camera to create the appearance of eye contact. However, then it was harder to capture body language and facial expressions from the screen while they talked. Eye contact was a more important detail for face-to-face interviews that could not be carried out in the same way in the digital interviews.

One of the physical interviews was affected by a time-pressured situation. This was because the interviewee had an important meeting right after the scheduled time for the interview. The atmosphere in the interview was affected by this and felt rushed. Moreover, it was repeatedly mentioned that the interviewee should tell me if they had to leave to attend or prepare for the following meeting. Despite this, the questions that were supposed to be asked were asked, but there was thus less time for additional questions and more descriptive examples in that interview. Although, the respondent took their time to explain and think through specific questions. Apart from this interview, a longer time frame was set aside in case the other interviews was to go over the precalculated time frame presented in the information letter.

4.5 Transcription

Verbatim transcriptions were used as the transcription process, and this process is used to word-for-word description of what was said in the interviews (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006). The exact words that were said in the interviews were written down with the help of audio recordings. The five audio recordings from the interviews were transcribed into written text. By transcribing these recordings myself, I became more familiar with the datasets, insights, and perspectives in the interviews, remembered how the situations were experienced in the

interviews, and dedicated time to review the material thoroughly. A total of 45 pages of transcribed data were collected from the five interviewees.

While transcribing, blackening of information from the direct quotes was used when interviewees discussed recognisable details, and thereby I anonymised this information as it is a requirement that recognisable details be anonymised (Fangen, 2015). The same blackening was done for confidential information. As the researcher on this project, I am solely responsible for any interpretations made during the interviews and in the transcribed data and for withholding confidential and identifiable information (Sandy & Dumay, 2011). It was important that these interpretations were correct and accurate, but also to show the respondents that the recognisable information was anonymised. Therefore, an offer to all interviewees was made for them to read over their interview transcript (Sandy & Dumay, 2011). The respondents who wanted to read over their transcribed interview were sent this by email.

In considering transcription and the use of verbatim transcriptions, it is important to note that the interview captures a wealth of information that may not be fully captured or included in either the audio recording or the transcription. Therefore, transcribing can be subject to restrictions that may be difficult to follow (Drageset & Ellingsen, 2010). For example, there is a lot that is communicated in silence, with the help of body language, sighs, the intonation of voice, laughs, looks, psychical setting, pauses between words, and other factors that affect the tone of the interviews and these will be absent with verbatim transcription (Poland, 1995; Halcomb & Davidson, 2006; Drageset & Ellingsen, 2010). The transcription process is open to various human errors, such as differences in classification and cultural understanding and misinterpretation of content (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006). Such complexities may add considerable cost in terms of time (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006). As Poland (1995) presents a table with alternative abbreviated instructions for transcribers, I took inspiration in decisions that were implemented in the transcription of the interviews, where I, for example, if the interviewee took pauses or if they interrupted themself in the middle of a sentence it was written as parentheses with a series of dots "(...)" (p. 302). This measure was implemented to ensure clarity, enhance readability, and make the analysis process more precise by capturing details such as pauses, interruptions and overlapping.

Additionally, I adhered to Poland's (1995) recommendation of the significance of maintaining the verbatim nature of qualitative research transcripts, without any editing to make sentences or paragraphs sound better or make other attempts to enhance their quality. The concept of transcription error is in terms of the discrepancy between the written transcript and the original audio recording of the research interview, which is derived from the written transcript (Poland, 1995). Consequently, the concept of a verbatim transcript is constrained to an exact replication of the audio recording. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that a significant portion of the emotional context and nonverbal communication throughout the interviews are not captured in the audio recordings (Poland, 1995).

4.6 Ethical aspects

Ethical problems can arise if the study includes people (Johannesen et al., 2016). This study involves people, for example, through one-to-one interviews. The project was submitted with the interview guide and information letter to Sikt and then approved (see Appendix 3). The submission and approval were considered necessary as personal data is processed in this study. The study shall not harm the organisation or the individuals contributing to the study. This involves taking necessary measures to prevent the disclosure of sensitive or identifying information that could harm the organisation and participants or violate their rights. Thereby, the interviewees' names or other information that could help to identify them must be hidden from the published material, hence also in the transcriptions.

Furthermore, Johannesen et al. (2016) state the importance of informed consent and anonymity in the research process. The respondents in this study were sent an e-mail containing the purpose of the project, information about the audio recording of the interviews, and an information letter containing a consent form. It was also stated that participation in this research project is voluntary and that one can withdraw the consent at any time during the process. With this consent form in the information letter, the informants were not asked about sensitive or confidential information. The only requirement was their signature and their voice in the audio recordings. In addition, it was informed that all personal data would only be processed by me throughout the process and deleted after transcribing and the project's end. From the beginning of this research project, it was clear that it was desirable to hold informants anonymous. However, complete anonymity for the informants in this project was not achievable. The basis here is that they all are employed by the Norwegian Customs and

work with intelligence for the agency and, therefore, are not completely anonymous. This specific selection also means that the number of possible informants has been narrowed down. The reasoning for narrowing it down was that the research questions and aim of this study are linked to intelligence work.

Throughout the research process, informed consent and confidentiality have been fundamental themes through the design and implementation of the interviews. Although the research questions and the study itself did not deal with personally sensitive information, the signed information letter and the audio recordings contained information worth shielding for the interviewees' personal data. In cases where there is a small sample regarding the number of respondents involved in studies, it is recommended that the researcher ensure that the interviewee's personal details are kept secret (Sandy & Dumay, 2011). By anonymising information, not mentioning identities, working departments or sections of the respondents, or other identifiable information, this research project contributes to keeping the interviewees' personal data secret. Further, after the end of the research project, all personal data from the respondents is deleted, such as audio recordings and signed information letters.

4.7 Analysis method

This research project employs thematic analysis (TA). By focusing on meaning across a data set, the thematic analysis allows researchers to view, interpret, perceive, and make sense of the shared or collective experiences and meanings (Braun & Clarke, 2022). The TA method is well-suited for analysing small data sets, and it is particularly effective when uncovering the rich contents of experiences, understandings, and perceptions (Herzog et al., 2019). The method is applied for systemically organising and identifying. It offers insight into patterns of themes across a data set and is a highly accessible approach for finding patterns of meaning from qualitative data sets (Braun & Clarke, 2022; Herzog et al., 2019). The relatively broad emphasis on finding and identifying themes and patterns enables TA to be used in a broad spectrum of research topics. The main components of analysis done with TA as the method are collecting codes under themes or subthemes, coding, and comparing or examining the clusters of emerged codes in relation to the entire data set or to each other (Vaismoradi et al., 2016). Texts could involve various interpretations or meanings and a range of understandings, and the identification requires the researcher's effort in the analysis process. Meanings are communicated through terms of themes (Vaismoradi et al., 2016). Each of these themes may

have some subthemes as subdivisions to obtain a comprehensive view that uncovers a pattern in the dataset (Vaismoradi et al., 2016). A crucial aspect of achieving a precise description involves employing deduction, induction, and abduction processes to identify themes and explain how they respond thoughtfully to the research questions (Vaismoradi et al., 2016). Since the TA finds its optimal utility in research projects focused on uncovering patterns and similarities across datasets, it is a helpful method for researchers to understand meanings expressed in beliefs, opinions, and thoughts. TA, therefore, makes it particularly useful for this research project involving personal perceptions, beliefs, and thoughts from the respondents in the study.

4.8 Methodical concerns, strengths, and weaknesses

4.8.1 The quality of sources

A fundamental requirement for data used in research projects must be relevant to the research questions. This applies to people who are sources of information and search for data in the literature (Dalland, 2017). The data for analysis in this research project is mainly based on human sources, the respondents. This approach ensures that the collected data provides valuable insight into the Norwegian Customs intelligence community and aligns with the research objectives. In addition to the data collected from the respondents, various supporting documents such as the national threat assessment, the official website of the Norwegian Customs, and various scholars, books, and articles on theory such as risk, intelligence, and intelligence operations have been gathered. The combination of firsthand sources from the respondents in interviews and information from documents, websites, books, articles, and scholars enhanced the breadth and depth of the analysis conducted in this research project.

As a researcher, one always carries subjective interpretations, attitudes, background, and background knowledge (Dalland, 2017). These factors affect how the researcher interpret and process the data in the studies (Dalland, 2017). Since I am already employed by Norwegian Customs and share the values and possibly thoughts brought up during the interviews, I have tried to remain objective to the best of my ability to prevent bias. Conversely, the outcomes and results of this study have been interpreted and analysed by me. It can be contended that a weakness of mainly using primary data and sources can introduce bias through the researcher's interpretations and subjective viewpoints.

4.8.2 Reliability

Reliability is about questions related to whether the data material is reliable and whether the data processing process is accurate and trustworthy (Thagaard, 2018; Johannessen et al., 2016). A pivotal move to ensure the reliability of the study was to make audio recordings of the interviews so that the quality of the research process can be ensured. Recording audio rather than writing during the interviews ensured that information, verbal communication, and significant details remained the same before the transcription was carried out. Reports written under the interview often only refer to a fraction of what was said and happened during the interview, in addition to only addressing the factors that the researcher thinks are most important to remember during the interview (Johannessen et al., 2016).

4.8.3 Limitations of data

The collected dataset only covers a few of those who work with intelligence in the Norwegian Customs and lack insight and statements from some departments. These departments will not be presented due to the privacy related to which departments the respondents work in. However, it is important for me to include that not all departments within the Customs Agency that work with intelligence have been included and covered in this study.

With a smaller dataset of interviews, it may contain more detailed information and a deeper understanding of each participant in the research project. Also, it is a more feasible option for researchers with a limited budget or time. For example, it can be easier to manage and process a smaller number of interviews, allowing for a more focused analysis. Conducting a small number of interviews requires less resources and time. In qualitative research, it is often required that the researcher is immersed in the field by interviewing the respondents about their perceptions. It can often be easier for the researchers to get a close connection with their respondents with a smaller sample (Crouch & McKenzie, 2006).

This thesis mainly focuses on intelligence on a general basis by explaining the concept of intelligence without going further in depth. It is worth noting that there are countless methods of obtaining intelligence that are not given much importance in this thesis, nor is an emphasis placed on going through the different forms and types within the intelligence world. As a result, different types of intelligence have not been examined in depth, different collection methods for intelligence services have not been presented in this study, nor has a distinction been made between different types of intelligence. In this thesis, the focus is on the

intelligence work that is general in the Norwegian Customs Agency. By considering intelligence as a general term instead of untying all forms of intelligence contributed to me as a researcher going more in-depth on specific topics instead of providing superficial information.

5 Analysis and findings

One crucial step in the analysis involves getting to know the data material and getting an overall impression of it (Johannessen et al., 2010). Following the interviews, the audio recordings were transcribed shortly after the completion of each interview. Since I transcribed the audio recordings myself without using a generator, I got to know the data material in a more useful way. After transcribing and reading through the interviews was finished, important themes and keywords were summarised using a mind map.

To uncover the themes when working with the analysis, they were already placed in different categories related to the research questions in the interview guide and within my mind map. These categories made it easier to narrow down themes in the analysis process and also in the interviews to get information about these topics from the respondents. From the interview transcripts, I looked for patterns, categories, and similarities in the dataset. These patterns formed a foundation for developing the themes and were filtered for the specific aims of the study until the key themes were found.

All 45 pages of interviews were printed out, and different themes were coded and marked in different colors using marker pens. According to Thagaard (2018), data coding provides a basis for comparing different statements in the interviews. The coding was done by splitting up the text and limiting sections by marking them in different colors and categories, as it is easier to find different meanings in different places in the text with the help of code designations (Thagaard, 2018). This was of great help in separating themes, finding patterns, and getting a good overview of all mentions within each theme in each transcribed interview. These codes were categories under seven different themes: 1) national security, 2) the intelligence cycle, 3) digitalisation, 4) risk (management), 5) movement of goods, 6) border control, and 7) future perceptions.

With a focus on the research questions, national security is relevant for “To what extent is risk management a part of the operations in the Intelligence Division of Norwegian Customs?”

and “What is the perception of the future of intelligence among intelligence workers in Norwegian Customs?” because of concerns in the future in effectiveness with safeguarding borders, also national security concerns may drive risk management decisions within the agency. The intelligence cycle is essential to address in the context of future perceptions of intelligence and intelligence work about how this well-known model of intelligence will be used in the future. Digitalisation can be seen as a helpful category to answer about the future work of intelligence and intelligence workers within future perceptions and to discuss development tools.

In effort to present the future-related perceptions of the interviewees, the research question “What is the perception of the future of intelligence among intelligence workers in Norwegian customs?” is divided into four categories:

1) Intelligence work and workers in the future

Within this category, the focus lies on respondents’ perceptions of the future of intelligence work and workers. It is pointed out as its own category to address issues intelligence workers and agencies will face in the future and reflect on these.

2) Better collaborating

This category focuses on Norwegian Customs’ further collaborations and is called better collaborating because several respondents believed that collaboration is a factor that can be improved. Since collaboration with other agencies or governmental organisations often requires multiple perspectives, knowledge, and skills to solve challenges and complex problems. Therefore, this category was essential to include.

3) Access to resources

This category relates to the future access to recourses. This is an essential point because concerns about future resources have been presented. Assessing future access to resources is vital for the Norwegian Customs as technology continues to grow, so does the labour market.

4) Use of the intelligence cycle

In the analysis, this category is already highlighted as its own topic in the analysis table and further presented in this chapter. In the future perceptions, it was essential to address the respondents’ opinions on further use of the model in intelligence work. This category was included to emphasise thoughts and reflections on why the intelligence cycle is an outdated model to apply as a user manual in intelligence work.

The various direct quotes were put into a table for each theme within the analysis process, and the core messages were presented and interpreted to answer the research questions. This table (see Appendix 5) is based on methods presented by Vaismoradi et al. (2016). The table presents a categorisation of various themes, which is defined based on the data gathered from the interviews and the research questions. The table is divided into three other columns called "Citations", "Core Messages", and "Interpretations". In the column of "Citations", direct quotes from the interviews are included. To enhance readability and ensure clarity regarding the speakers' identities in direct quotes, I have used a
blackening in stations where recognisable information is told and codes of who is saying what in the direct quotes in a practical manner. These blackening and codes help indicate who speaks in the quotes while maintaining anonymity. Each interviewee is represented in the table by a letter, and a corresponding number is assigned to differentiate their quotes. This system allows for easy reference and separation of the direct quotes, emphasising simultaneously and showing that these are not said in context or simultaneously in the interview. For instance, A3 denotes the third quote from interviewee A, while E6 represents the sixth quote from interviewee E. The sentences or parts of sentences that are blacked out in this column have been intentionally masked to maintain the anonymity of the respondent or to hide confidential information. It is also added [...] to present that it has been cut down in direct quotes, regarding wishes and anonymity, to stay concrete and avoid long oral descriptions as this may affect recognition of the interviewees.

"Core message" describes the situation, core aspect, and simplifies what has been said. Lastly, the interpretive section of the table involves a more abstract analysis. Wherein the theory is linked with the circumstances of the direct quotes, elucidating the implications for
the research questions.

5.1 National security

Already by being presented with the social mission of the Norwegian Customs, one can think that the agency is relevant for national security. The Norwegian Customs Agency (2022e) describes in their National Threat Assessment that narcotics and animals and plants constitute a significant threat. Here, it is further emphasised that this threat is related to the economy and public health, as narcotics contain a risk of early death or other diseases. At the same time, animals and plants can bring diseases into the country. In the threat assessment, "A safe and sustainable society" is mentioned as the first of the agency's societal values (Tolletaten,

2022e). This also shows how important the Customs Agency's work is and that it is within national security interests.

Intervieweee A answers the following to a question regarding if they believe that the intelligence work carried out in the Norwegian Customs is relevant to national security: *«Jeg tror det er viktig for den nasjonale sikkerhet, det fikk vi egentlig belyst under både pandemien og krigsutbruddet. Vi fikk egentlig belyst en av svakhetene med sektorprinsippet, sektorprinsippet er for så vidt greit nok, men vi har ikke gode nok kanaler på deling av informasjon mellom oss.»* According to interviewee A, the intelligence work conducted in the Customs Agency holds significance for national security, so this part of the agency is also involved in maintaining and protecting national security. It is asserted that the Intelligence Division handles intelligence requests across various ministries and collaborates closely with other government entities involved in security matters. This claim is backed up against all the other interviewees as well, interviewee E says the following: *«Vi har jo eksempler på det, vi jobbet nå senest nå nettopp, jeg kan ikke si hva vi jobbet med, men vi jobbet med sanksjonerte varer/strategiske varer på områder som har beviselig tilknyttinger til nasjonale interesser og sånn som vi forstår nasjonale sikkerhetsinteresser.»*

In the interview with interviewee D, a new example comes up in this case. In their explanation of the example surrounding this, there are goods that, combined with other goods or components, may pose a risk to national security: *«Nå vil man importere mer av enkelt komponentene som sammen kan bli noe farlig, både ut og inn. Så det kompliserer jo vår jobb fordi de enkelt komponentene vil ikke være regulert før de blir satt sammen til å bli noe så farlig.»* According to Hillberry et al. (2022), having an overview of the large number of imports with a focus on potential harms is crucial. These are linked to thousands of different products from countless countries and can describe that the customs officers placed at border-crossing points must look for different types of goods in imports from different locations and that ambiguous products or goods may come from different countries and contain different threats.

The Customs Agency's ability to monitor is essential because goods can contribute to a capacity that can create a threat. This emphasises that it does not have to be only the product itself that creates a threat. The Norwegian Customs' intelligence assessments can help confirm or disprove existing hypotheses when viewed in a broader context and in

collaboration with entities like PST or other agencies and companies with a significant focus and importance for national security. For the customs officer at the border-crossing points, it is essential to see a connection between these goods and the components that together can carry out a threat to national security and, therefore, have an acute understanding of the implications of various components passing through the Norwegian border. For instance, while individual goods may appear harmless, customs officers must be vigilant in recognising connections or patterns between different shipments. In order to find such patterns, intelligence work is helpful, and these components, which can potentially be a significant threat to national security, are included in their cooperation with the customs officers at border-crossing points. It can be described that the Norwegian Customs are the first line of defense at the Norwegian borders. As the sole authority for seeing the Norwegian border, the customs possess vital knowledge concerning the incoming. Thus, as the only agency that sees what comes in and out of Norway, the customs agency is involved in the security work around national security by preventing such dangerous components from entering the country.

Interviewee A provides an example of an international cooperation, which is also briefly mentioned without going into detail in an online news article by Lepperød (2021). Interviewee A talks about substances in the form of falsely produced pills that came across Norway's borders. By interviewee A, it is claimed that this is not something you want to bring into the country at all. Intelligence work was carried out and led to a police operation that made a huge confiscation and took down the entire network that dealt with these pills, as they were produced in a garage in Hungary. What was seen after the confiscation in Hungary was that these pills disappeared utterly. Interviewee B also provides an example within the dental industry. Dentists use various products that can be harmful and dangerous, such as bleaching products. If such fake products enter the country, it will cost society enormous sums of money because the population will get bad teeth. The Customs Authority are the only authorities who can get a complete overview of products and pills that cause such problems. This again shows that the Norwegian Customs and intelligence officers here can help influence confiscations and provide security through cooperation.

5.2 The intelligence cycle

The traditional intelligence cycle comes into conflict with increasing demands for intelligence operations. The processes of working with intelligence flow in multiple directions rather than follow a specific order. Interviewee A says *«Jeg mener at e-syklusen eller e-hjulet er en*

modell, og forsåvidt en god modell på hvordan man jobber med etterretning. Men jeg tror ikke man skal se på den som en lærebok på hvordan drive med etterretning for det er den ikke ment som, det er en forenkling av virkeligheten, det er fint at de har tegnet den opp, men det er ikke revolusjonerende.» It is explained in majority of the interviews that the intelligence cycle process can be useful to carry out intelligence work forward, but that the model itself should only be seen as a helpful tool. Further intrerviewee D points out «*Det handler egentlig om at disse prosessene går hele tiden, det er ikke bare et hjul som går en retning. Det er ting som skal gå frem og tilbake.»* Thus, the intelligence cycle is a good process to take further as a starting point, but one must not lock in the order and steps presented in the model going forward with intelligence work.

Even though the intelligence cycle outlines the intelligence analysis and gathering process, there are different versions of it. It can be an obstacle since no universally accepted version of the intelligence cycle exists. For instance, some may use a four-step intelligence cycle, and others may use a five or six-step cycle. Some organisations may have added additional steps or combined common steps from the different cycles to adapt their process better. If one looks at the Norwegian police directorate's version of the intelligence cycle, which contains measures in addition to intelligence. Interviewee C explains: «*Men jeg tror man er kanskje tvunget til å tenke litt mer på tiltakene, enn det vi gjorde før.*» The Norwegian Customs and other Norwegian agencies have adapted their work to the police directorate's figure of the number eight rather than the traditional intelligence cycle. This has been done based on bringing the measures into the intelligence process and works.

Hulnick (2006; 2014) presents that the intelligence cycle is not an excellent model to start from because it does not describe what actually happens during the process. Furthermore, Stenslie et al. (2021) describe that the traditional intelligence cycle is no longer as good a project description as there are often more significant rapid threats evolving in linear sequences. Furthermore, according to Stenslie et al. (2021), it is better to work with the intelligence cycle as a background tool where you can skip specific steps and adapt to the problem effectively in the work against the threats. The respondents in this research project agree that the intelligence cycle is a helpful tool for visulising the intelligence process, but it should not be given more weight than a tool. Interviewee E emphasises this by saying: *«Så det er nyttig å ha med seg videre, men man må ikke blir for, mange blir for boksete.»*

The concepts of the traditional intelligence cycle share similarities with ideas emerging in the academic field of psychology, particularly scientific descriptions of the human mind (Warner, 2013). This is recognised by interviewee B when they are asked about the usability of the intelligence cycle: *«100%. Egentlig i livet generelt er det en god ting å gjøre, samle inn og bearbeide og formidle og revurdere, det er det man må eller burde gjøre hver dag.»* Herman (1996) has also described the intelligence cycle as a metaphor for the classic feedback loop concept (in Davies et al., 2013). Further, Interviewee B describes: *«Det er en menneskeligprosess egentlig, bare at det er fint å få det ned på papiret og at man tydelig gjør de ulike fasene gjerne når man jobber med det enten med seg selv eller i team. Det er nyttig.»*

For intelligence work today and in the future, the focus should not be on the cycle itself but on the working individuals performing intelligence tasks. For these intelligence workers, a day at the office is not perceived as being steps in a cycle. Instead, it encompasses a series of work processes linked to, for example, technology and the threat landscape (Stenslie et al., 2021). As well, it can be emphasised by interviewee D who states the following about the intelligence cycle: *«[...] Det handler egentlig om at disse prosessene går hele tiden, det er ikke bare et hjul som går en retning. Det er ting som skal gå frem og tilbake.»* and additionally adds: *«Det er bare en visualisering av en prosess, for prosessen vil jo løpe heletiden. Det er ikke slik at nei nå har jeg passert den, da kan jeg ikke gå tilbake igjen. Jo, da skal du gå tilbake igjen. Du skal aldri slutte, for det hjulet lever jo hele tiden. Og det går ikke slik at først det så det, jo det er en mental tilnærming, men i praksis vil det innebære at du får mer informasjon etter hvert så det må man analysere.»* Thus, it becomes clear that visualisation of the intelligence cycle is a process that intelligence workers carry in the back of their minds. However, it goes in different directions when work related to the cycle is used, and additional information through dialogues in the process can be included after starting the analysis process.

The respondents in this study believe that the cycle is a model that one can take with them further, as the process around ordering an intelligence product is taken up. Some respondents also present that the intelligence cycle in the context of measures is a standard they would look at instead of the traditional intelligence cycle. Furthermore, the respondents are critical of placing more emphasis on the intelligence cycle than that it is a helpful model to keep in mind regarding processes. However, this should not be used as a definition of what intelligence work is or what the process contains. Nor should one in the future follow the step-

by-step from the model since the model does not contain all the steps in intelligence work. The process of working with intelligence is more sequential than presented in the countless versions of the cycle. In summary, there is a broad agreement among the interviewees that intelligence work toward the future should not have a major focus on the intelligence cycle.

5.3 Digitalisation

For the respondents in this study, it is important towards the future to get both sides of the technological and digital development by connecting people and technology in a better manner. Interviewee A describes: *«Hvis du får teknologien, men ikke satser på etterretning så er det egentlig bare et verktøy som ikke så mange utnytter. Og satser du på etterretning, men ikke teknologien til dagens tjenester, så vil du sitte med Word og Excel og tenke at dette er egentlig ikke nok. Den kombinasjonen vi har gjør egentlig at jeg føler at vår arbeidshverdag kommer til å bli bra, og vi kommer til å både utnytte verktøyene på en god måte, men tilpasse oss de trendene og endringene som kommer også.»* It is pointed out that technological tools that are not utilised to their full potential are not enough, therefore great focus is placed on combinations in the form of people and technology in everyday work at the Intelligence Division of the Norwegian Customs Agency. This shows agree upon the respondents and Stensberg's (2016) allegation on the fact that technology itself does not create values for the company and that it need to be put and seen in a together with other aspects. Also, according to Haugom et al. (2021) digital and technological developments have made it possible work with and relay more on computers and machines. It is pointed out that machine algorithms and technology can provide valuable support for the analysts and intelligence workers, but not replace them completely (Haugom et al., 2021). Future intelligence work relay on harmony in the work between human and machines and there is great agreement among the respondents around human and technology in interaction.

Going forward, interviewee A claims that the digital tools will be used well but that the Customs Agency needs to adapt to the changes and trends that will come in the future. Much of the intelligence work takes place digitally and with the help of technological tools, such as big data analysis. It is important to note that digitalisation will not solve all challenges for Norwegian Customs but will be a crucial part of how to best solve upcoming tasks in the future (Tolletaten, 2023). This also applies to intelligence.

For intelligence workers, both presently and in the future, it is vital to understand digitalisation, digital tools, IT (information technology) and technology. Based on the data collected for this study, there is a broad agreement that the Norwegian Customs have gained access to better technological and digital tools. These can benefit the agency and contribute to advantages if used correctly. For example, it is stated from interviewee C *«Men en ting jeg ville tenkt at også kunne være forskjeller er at jeg har drevet med sånne kulturgjenstander. Nå er det sånn (...) det er et papir, du kan gjenbruke det, altså jeg tror hvis du får en del, det som heter restreksjonsbelagte varer, at tillatelsen er digital, jeg tror det er noen fordeler med det.»* Written documents have moved from paper to digital documents. This is an important part, especially for the customs officials at the border, so that the process can flow better and there is more credibility in the documents the customs officers review. In the long run, it will also help intelligence workers when more sources are available digitally because it can save them a lot of manual processes to obtain a paper document to register them digitally. According to interviewee C, one of the critical aspects of digitalisation is enabling customers to digitally register products before interactions with customs officers when reaching the border-crossing points: *«Jeg tror det viktigste jeg ville tenkt med digitalisering er at, hvis man ser fremover, den der at informasjonen skal komme inn på forhånd eller ved grensepassering.»* With the help of Digitoll, information related to border crossings will be available for the Customs either at the border crossing or in advance (Tolletaten, 2022c). In addition, the Customs Agency has developed an app for more straightforward customs clearance, Kvoteappen, and the introduction of goods for travellers crossing borders or coming to Norway for or from a holiday, which can be a useful aid for customs officers. This is used for customs clearance for goods such as alcohol, clothing, and similar products that you can register in the app and pay before crossing the border (Tolletaten, 2021).

It is known that digital aids and tools, such as AI, can be influenced by who defines the issues (Kommunal- og distriktsdepartementet 2020). It is about how who defining the problem or search, such as on the Internet, which questions or problem statements are given to the tool. Interviewee D believes that it will, therefore, be very important to go backward and see where the references come from and that the information that is obtained from data that is generated through various aids is checked up, in addition to the fact that there must be an understanding of how decisions have made have been. It appears clear that technological and digital development has made it possible and easy for machines to handle time-demanding and heavy tasks (Haugom et al., 2021; Kommunal- og distriktsdepartementet 2020). With AI and other

digital development tools, the analysts can focus on the work that machines cannot, for example, ensure that the results are correct (Haugom et al., 2021). The respondents mention multiple times the importance of humans together with technology. Technology and machine algorithms can support analysts and intelligence workers but not replace them (Haugom et al., 2021).

According to Cullen & Wegge (2021), in this modern society, technology is undeniable. One is more dependent on digital technology than ever before, and it is agreed upon by the respondents that there is a growth in the help of digital tools within the intelligence community but also from threat actors and criminals. Using an example, respondent B says: *«Hvorfor ikke kjøre undervannsdrone fra Danmark? Man løper alltid litt etter teknologien som myndighet. De første som bruker det er pornobransjen og de kriminelle, sant?»* It is the case that on the threat actor's side, the technology and digital tools will be used, learned, and explored before they come to the authorities. Digital vulnerability has, therefore, taken on a new dimension. The technological tools are stronger and more intertwined than ever before (Cullen & Wegge, 2021). These technological tools can be exploited by threat actors who want to get ahead of the Customs and use the technology against them. For an agency, it is a much longer implementation process, which also costs money and must be adapted to the budget, while for a threat actor, there are no restrictions on being able to do this.

For intelligence workers in the Norwegian Customs, seeing a connection between roles and information in the larger systems is essential. To exploit this to the fullest, the tools and technology must be used correctly, which will have potentially significant effects. The respondents envision that technology's role will help increase the effects in their intelligence work going forward, together with human input from the workers and analysts.

5.4 Risk (Management)

Distinguishing between risk and intelligence is crucial and essential to recognise and understand the shared methodologies between these domains. The respondents agree that there are existing parallels between risk management and intelligence. However, emphasis is placed on the fact that these two professional fields contain different strategies and approaches, which are believed to account for the similarities. The respondents agree with the statement in Ylönen & Aven (2023), which focuses on intelligence and risk as two fields with various traditions and focuses. To sum up, several of the respondents in this study believe that

risk management and intelligence are connected but that one must still distinguish between them. Interviewee E states the following: *«Så tenker jeg innenfor etterretningsverden er vi tilbake på fokusområdet som er litt viere hos oss, så kan vi ta med oss metodeverket fra anerkjente standarder for risikohåndtering tenker jeg, inn i måten å jobbe med etterretning på. Det er ikke noe konflikt i det, det er mye læring i det.»*

An example explained by interviewee D includes that intelligence must point forward in time, and vulnerabilities, which are a vital aspect of risk, tell something about what the situation in which one is standing has: *«Etterretning skal peke frem i tid, mens sårbarheter sier noe om hva har og hva situasjonen du står i. Du kan jo definere ting som kan øke, men du predikerer ikke da på samme måten som etterretning. Med sårbarheter så strekker du deg så langt, mens i etterretning så skal du tørre å ha meninger.»* It is also pointed out in the interview with interviewee C that vulnerability falls under risk and not intelligence. Intelligence has more focus on potential threats than vulnerabilities. Consequence analysis and cause analysis are included in the risk management process, in addition to identifying possible events in the risk assessment, which will give the risk analyst an overview of the vulnerability field (Aven et al., 2017). This does not apply to intelligence, as there is a distinction between these environments within the Customs Agency. In the Norwegian Customs, risk assessments and risk management are worked on in other parts of the agency than the intelligence. Intelligence information and work can help to ensure that the risks that have previously been focused on can be handled or reduced.

5.5 Movement of goods

One of the main tasks of intelligence in the Customs Agency is to manage to control what is important for society and its safety at the border crossings, and this is what interviewee C emphasises: *«Men hovedoppgaven vår er å få Tolletaten til å kontrollere det som er viktig for samfunnet at vi kontrollerer.»* Intelligence information can be seen as an aid for the Customs Agency to control the right objects and use the right resources to stop shipments with a significant impact on national security interests. With the help of intelligence information, the selection of goods and shipments can be made more efficient and correct.

Interviewee E explains the movement of goods as complicated, as it contains an unimaginable number of goods categories to keep track of. One misstep or loophole can be enough to cause entire systems to collapse (Lindrup & Meisfjordskar, 2023). To prevent this, several different

regulations and laws have been drawn up for control measures and provisions on the Norwegian Cutsom's controls (Lindrup & Meisfjordskar, 2023). The respondents mention that the more precise the regulations around controls and product descriptions are, the easier it is for the customs officers to do their job. Regulations and rules have a significant influence on the handling process of goods. As an example of this, interviewee D says: *«Det er mye enklere å drive med å kontrollere mot narkotika enn hvitvasking, for hvor stammer pengene fra da?»* When it comes to money laundering, criminals use countless methods and techniques to avoid being detected by customs. Figure 2, *Threat categories as a share of the overall assessed threat picture* shows that 'valuta' (currency) is the fourth largest identified category (Tolletaten, 2022e). Currency is often used by criminals as a part of money laundering when it comes to illegally acquired financial gain, and this contributes to continuity and tax evasion within other criminal activities (Tolletaten, 2022e). To detect such money laundering through trade, incorrect customs value can indicate such money movement for taxable profit (Tolletaten, 2022e). A major and hybrid threat within money laundering is TMBL. By exploiting the legitimate movement of goods activities, criminals move value within trade transactions in an attempt to legitimise their money (Cassara, 2015).

Regarding the transportation of goods, present and future, interviewee E underscores that the war against Russia and Ukraine could affect the flow of goods, potentially affecting Norway as well. Trade of goods and importation of goods between Eastern Europe is becoming increasingly isolated from Russia. Intervieew E tells: *«[redacted] Russlandkrigen, [redacted] Men der har vi redusert risikoen betydelig, vi har økt fokus på det. Så selv om trusselen er stor så har vi lukket sårbarheten, vi har jobbet med å få ned sårbarheten knyttet til akkurat det temaet. Så vi kan jo si sånn sett at vi har redusert risikoen ganske betydelig.»* Nothing specific was discussed about what has been done or how it has been done due to confidential information. However, interviewee E tells that several measures have been taken related to the war to reduce vulnerabilities that can affect the Norwegian Customs, the Norwegian society, and goods handling in Norway.

In some areas, Customs cooperate with other agencies and departments on various tasks related to movement of goods. An example told by interviewee C here presents that fish exports are worked on jointly through a partnership developed with the Norwegian Customs Agency, the Norwegian Tax Agency and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries. Here the Customs have a say in trade and export parts and the Tax Agency has control over

economic factors, while the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries contributes to sustainable management of the fisheries and aquaculture industry together with their focus on trade (Regjeringen, 2021). Interviewee B states the following on fish exports: *«Jeg tror det er blitt mindre fiskesmugling ut. Det har jeg ikke noe statistikk på, men vi har vært flinke på å drive forebyggende, regelverket har blitt tydeliggjort og den store mengden tyskere har sluttet å så mye fisk ut av Norge. Det er den eneste trusselen jeg kommer på som faktisk har blitt litt mindre.»* In addition to operating preventively, it may appear that the cooperation between the Tax Authority, Customs Agency, and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries has contributed to the fact that fish smuggling out of Norway has decreased as a trend.

Changes in laws and regulations influence the movement of goods as what are the most significant threats coming from criminal and smugglers' environments. Intervieew A provides an example of this by telling: *«Stort sett så ser vi at trendene er tilpasset regelverket i det landet man er fra. Jeg vet at et nordisk land var veldig opptatt av snus-smugling, som var noe man ikke så i det heletatt i Norge. Så å samarbeide med trusler er av og til (…) stort sett så går det veldig fint, men man ser jo at det er tilpasset de regelverkene man har i de landene man kommer fra.»* Laws and regulations from different countries are essential factors smugglers consider, for example, by reducing the risk and punishment for being caught. Threat actors are going to adapt, and if it is most profitable to smuggle or bring in goods or components that are less likely to get them convicted, then crime will adapt to that. Furthermore, interviewee A explains an example of this in Norway in previous years. The price per kilo for glass eel was about a quarter of the price per kilo for cocaine, plus the prison sentences for smuggling glass eel were nowhere near what you got for producing or smuggling cocaine. Then the Customs saw that the organised criminal networks started smuggling glass eel instead of cocaine, as there was less risk and almost the same profit for this product.

From interviewee D, examples have also been given within strategic goods that information and communication have developed to be better within the Agency, focusing on information related to types of goods. In their Threat Assessment (2022e), the customs have made a clear definition of strategic goods. Customs officers at border crossings require precise definitions to do their job correctly. This also applies to other parts of the agency. However, those who control must have this knowledge to produce a shared understanding and definition of

strategic goods and a theme management was established.

5.6 Border control

In accordance with border control, the intelligence's task is to provide information and answer what should be prioritised. Intelligence information must be able to say something about what has major societal consequences, what does not have such significant societal consequences, and what the customs officers at the border should emphasise in their work with controls. Interviewee A describes intelligence work as: *«I sin enkleste form så mener jeg at alt etterretningsarbeid egentlig er støtte til å ta en beslutning. Altså en beslutning som egentlig uten etterretning vil bli tatt på et litt tynnere grunnlag enn hvis man hadde etterretning som støtte. Også vil jeg ikke skille på nivåer egentlig, men det er ulike former for beslutninger man skal ta. Så i Tolletaten ville det være tolldirektørens vurderinger av hvilke trusler som er de største, altså hvor man må sette inn innsatsen, helt ned på objektsnivå – Hvilken bil man skal stoppe eller hvilke passasjer som skal kontrolleres.»* Interviewee A believes that working with intelligence is one of the tools that the Norwegian Customs Agency has to uncover slightly more complex smuggling attempts as it comes down to assessments of the biggest threats at the time. The intelligence should focus on the Norwegian Customs social mission in order to give the agency most possible gains.

Interviewee B says the following regarding intelligence and border controls: *«Etterretning vil jo kunne gi mer trusselvurdert og lik plukk. Enten på type varer eller på varebærer som vi kaller det.»* Among all the respondents, there is agreement that intelligence should help sharpen the control by getting the customs officials at the border to select the right objects for control by helping and giving intelligence information and support to answer what should be prioritised. Since Norwegian Customs aims to ensure that goods transports are crossed legally and safely, intelligence information can be used at border crossings to give customs officers valuable insights. In order to carry out border control in its most effective and successful form, intelligence information is needed for the correct selection of shipments and goods.

In order to make customs controls more efficient and to make it easier for the users/travellers, the Customs Agency has introduced various technological aids, for example, Kvoteappen (Tolletaten, 2021). Interviewee C presents that significant volumes of goods and shipments come over the Norwegian borders, and ideally, intelligence should help control the right thing. Furthermore, it is pointed out that those who have not done anything illegal or are not

carrying illegal goods should not be controlled. When it comes to compliance with imports and exports, one can see that one of the Customs' slogan "Det skal være lett å gjøre rett" (Tolletaten, 2021; Tolletaten, 2016), translated to "It should be easy to do it right", this reflects the compliance pyramid in addition to the fact that it is known to all parties that those to be controlled are those who have done something illegal and have brought illegal goods into Norway. As in the compliance pyramid, Figure 7, those at the top are people who do not want or intend to follow the law or to comply, and thus, these are attacked the hardest with the full force of the law. Additionally, supposedly looking at the bottom of the pyramid, those who are willing to do the right thing can found, and these will receive a compliance strategy from the customs officers, making it easy for them to continue in this way. This also applies to the ones who try but only sometimes succeed, there should not be used full force of the law with them but willingness to assist them. The Customs want to facilitate those who want to do things legally and right so that the authorities can concentrate their activities on those who do not have such good intentions. As mentioned, Kvoteappen contributes to efficient border controls, and for the customs officers, it is easier to see those who actually follow the laws and rules when the population frequently uses this app.

5.7 Future perceptions

Through future perceptions, it comes up in the interviews that important characteristics for future intelligence workers include, among other things, a broad portfolio of knowledge, openness to development, intelligence-related professional competence, good knowledge of technology and IT, understanding problems surrounding limitations in digital tools, be adaptable and critical of sources, as well as ability to familiarise oneself with new phenomena. Furthermore, it holds significance to employ both intelligence workers with techniques and accompanying tools, seeing the synergy between technological advancements and human expertise. There is great agreement on these perspectives from the respondents. According to Vaage & Sundal (2021), there is a need to focus on future employees within intelligence to be followed up with opportunities for development and training to achieve the goal of becoming a specialist within the intelligence field. At the bottom lies the knowledge and the other presented future intelligence worker values presented by the respondents in the study. With training and development for future workers, it is essential to have core knowledge and willingness at the bottom. The intelligence work is more demanding than ever before. Vaage & Sundal (2021) presented, with an agreement among the respondents, that a

future intelligence analyst should be a worker with familiarity and adaptability to methods, measures, and working tools.

Within intelligence work in the Norwegian Custom, it should also be gaining weight to the communication between the intelligence worker and whom ordering an intelligence product. Interviewee D talks about the process of ordering an intelligence product and clarifies that good orders and good mission dialogue are required to design an appropriate intelligence product. For intelligence workers, it is not about getting an order in and just answering it, when the order comes in for intelligence products the process starts with a discussion. The intelligence worker looks at what has been ordered and how the order is written or worded and must talk to the client to get confirmation as to whether he or she has understood the assignment correctly through his or her interpretation. The importance of clear dialog and communication to avoid miscommunications and intelligence failure will be further significant, as the requirements of the intelligence product should hold a shared understanding (Graner & McGlynn, 2016). Suppose the client believes they have been clear and precise in their order and the intelligence worker misunderstands what is being ordered. In that case, they often end up answering something completely different from what was ordered, which cannot be used as intelligence due to misunderstandings in the purpose of the assignment. Interviewee D presents this as a classic intelligence failure. Intelligence failure in this specific example can be avoided with the help of clear dialogue, communication, and discussion between the parties connected to the intelligence product.

In Lowenthal (2017), it is claimed that the need for intelligence is likely to expand in the future. The broader distribution of intelligence underscores the significance of collaborating among different intelligence sectors, environments, and agencies. There is a growing demand for heightened intelligence products and information to concur the criminal landscape, which is becoming more professionalised effectively. As interviewee C claims, organised criminal entities are becoming increasingly inclined to cross national borders, and the multi-criminal actors operate in several industries simultaneously. A step further for venture against different crimes internationally could be ideal for the Customs Agency to decide to be involved. Interviewee B answers about professionalisation of criminal environments to the question, "Can you imagine that there are any threat actors that you think could become bigger either by how they adapt or how they work now towards the future?": *«Jeg tror på en økende profesjonalisering av kriminelle miljø, dessverre. Sånn som muligens kokainbransjen*

fungerer nå sånn som aksjeforetak, at folk kjøper deler av en last og får gevinsten av lasten hvis den lykkes. Rett og slett en oppstikking av kriminaliteten der, at man har investorer som er langt vekke i fra det hele. Det er kanskje litt sånn i dag, men jeg tror den trenden sterkes. Avhengig av hvordan for eksempel kryptovaluta, hvordan det utvikler seg, hvis det blir mer utbredt så sliter vi tror jeg. Hvis usynlig kryptovaluta som vi ikke kan kontrollere, da er det farlig for oss.» The threat actors coming in and towards the future will actively search for the weaknesses of the Customs and goods handling in order to get the good flows to go where they want. As criminal networks, both international and Norwegian, continue to professionalisation it is seen as a significant threat to Norway and pointed out here, especially within the factors of crime and narcotics (Buggeland, 2023). There are expressed concerns that Norway may become a transit country for narcotics, which has a basis in the four record confiscations of cocaine in 2023 (Buggeland, 2023). The development within threat actors and criminal networks is also considered faster than the agency and intelligence work. Furthermore, Interviewee B uses the example of cryptocurrency. If it develops and becomes more widespread, it could lead to a potential difficulty in the work of the Customs Agency. In any case, cryptocurrency develops to become more invisible and cannot be traced back or even controlled. To counteract this form of crime and be in the front of development before the potential threat actors and criminals, future collaboration among the Norwegian Customs, Kripos, and Økokrim will hold paramount significance (Buggeland, 2023). It is vital for both the Customs Agency and the intelligence within the agency to expand on further development among threat actors. When threat actors act more professionally and innovatively, efforts must be made to find new methods to detect them.

Various perspectives that surface during the interviews are access to resources and the growth of threat actors. Regarding a lack of resources, most interviewees specifically mention a lack of personnel. There will be competition for intelligence workers because countless intelligence environments are emerging and growing that offer jobs for intelligence workers. A lack of customs officers at the border will make it difficult for the Customs Agency to carry out its social mission. In addition, it is also mentioned that the customs officers must have faith in intelligence and use the intelligence products in their work. Interviewee C says: *«Også antall tollere, også etterretning oppfattes som altså en hjelp, noe man må ha tro på, ikke noe som bare er overstyring. Sånn at man beholder motivasjonen til de som skal kontrollere, det tror jeg er veldig viktig.»* The Customs' Annual Report for 2022 also highlights the ongoing challenge of recruiting and retaining skilled employees and the agency's financial situation (Tolletaten, 2023). It underscores how the agency's ability to fulfill its social mission is being

hindered by its progressively constrained financial situation, and this situation necessitates expensive interventions, including the adoption and procurement of new technology, the replacement of outdated equipment, and the continued advancement of IT solutions under the agency's purview (Tolletaten, 2023).

The war in Ukraine is relevant within the threat and risk picture today. This is reflected in the Norwegian Customs Authority's Threat Assessment for 2023 (Tolletaten, 2022e) and The Norwegian National Security Authority's presentation of the risk picture (2022). In the transport of goods now and in the future, interviewee E points out that future goods flows are affected by an ongoing war in Ukraine, which could also affect the transport of goods in Norway. The growth linked to the war in Ukraine and a sanctions regime that is becoming more complicated may be a significant factor linked to future trends in the movement of goods.

6 Discussion

This chapter will discuss the main findings and selected theories. The three research questions in the thesis will be discussed, in addition to national security and digitalisation. These discussions are based on the conducted analysis and interpretations.

6.1 To what extent is risk management a part of the operations in the Intelligence Division of Norwegian Customs?

Risk management is not primarily regarded as intelligence work within the Intelligence Division of the Norwegian Customs Agency. In the Intelligence Division, these factors belong outside their professional environment. Hence, other professional environments within the Customs Agency work with these areas of risk management. The intelligence workers focuses on potential threats and works in controlled process where assessments and hypotheses predict the future. Furthermore, the intelligence work is also about providing context and decision-making support to all levels of the agency.

However, risk management and security factors are central for guiding information to support safeguarding national security interests, where these different professional environments work together to achieve the best possible results. Also, incorporating established risk management standards into intelligence operations within the Norwegian Customs can prove advantageous, as these standards inherently emphasise similar domains of interest.

Although the intelligence work in the Norwegian Customs does not carry out risk assessments and work with risk management themselves, this is an important part of the general work done in the agency within other divisions. By looking at a risk management approach, it can be helpful for intelligence experts to address and better understand the complexity around the risks associated with border crossing, and from there, more developed and effective strategies can be made to protect public safety and national security. Using a risk management approach, especially to clarify the customs values, and recognise threats regarding these values, is an important step for the future. Reducing the unwanted effects on the agency's social values is curtailed for mitigating potential risks, aligning organisational values with strategic goals and objectives, and ensuring sustainable and ethical practices.

6.2 How do the intelligence workers of the Norwegian Customs characterise the role of intelligence in border control?

The Customs' intelligence efforts may play a crucial role in either challenging or validating existing hypotheses, such as hypotheses of narcotics or tobacco smuggling. Their importance lies in their ability to offer full insight perspectives beyond the raw data or other forms of information alone. It can also be easier for the parties who are not as technically minded to understand the actual raw data that the intelligence workers extract to work on turning it into an intelligence product. Without the complete product, understanding and accurately interpreting information derived, for instance, from a customs officer, may be challenging, as it lacks the full potential and content inherent in the comprehensive intelligence product.

The purpose of intelligence information in the context of border control is that the information should provide guidance and answer what should be prioritised. The intelligence information used in this context must be able to say something about what has major consequences for society, what the customs officers on the border should emphasise during their work, and what does not have such major societally consequences. Ideally, the intelligence in the Customs Agency should help the officers at border-crossing points to choose the right objects. With the help of intelligence products and information, customs officials will also gain a better insight into various components that, when combined, can pose a threat. Intelligence will contribute to simplifying the work of the customs officials at the border, and intelligence aims to help the Customs carry out more targeted controls.

Without intelligence information in border controls, it could have been more challenging to pick out what was the most important and most appropriate shipments and good to control at border-crossing points. In this way, intelligence also contributes to placing resources in custom areas and crossing points in an efficient manner. Moreover, border controls based on intelligence information enable the Customs Agency to stay ahead of evolving threats, such as smuggling, by focusing on placing resources where they are most needed.

6.3 What is the perception of the future of intelligence among intelligence workers in Norwegian Customs?

6.3.1 Intelligence work and workers in the future

The first perception that comes up in the interviews is the intelligence workers of the future. Within intelligence work in the future, those who work with it and new workers in the field must have a general broad portfolio of knowledge. Here, the aim is to have good background knowledge of technology, professional competence, source criticism, and adaptability. The ability to think innovatively and take knowledge easily when working in new ways is also an important quality for intelligence workers in the future. Another perception within future intelligence work is that there will be larger amounts of data. Source criticism and groupings also become important with more significant amounts of data. There are many false sources in intelligence work today, and it will grow. The need for seeing conflicting hypotheses and testing these out will also be a growing need, as it is essential to distinguish data that is not credible and to answer hypotheses as accurately as possible. The Intelligence Division relies on and depends on the customs officers recognising intelligence as a valuable aid and source of information, are crucial for customs officers to perform their duties as best as possible.

Assuming that there are deficiencies in the desired knowledge and other factors that are important for future work and workers within intelligence, this could contribute to consequences for both the Customs and other intelligence communities in the country. A consequence of desired skills or knowledge would require more training and extended time, and there will be a need to invest more resources in training to fill the knowledge gaps. Knowledge deficiencies may pose risks and lead to quality issues and safety concerns within the intelligence environment. Since IT and technological tools are a large part of the job, security breaches and human errors may occur, consciously or unconsciously, when the tools

and technology are not known to the user. Examples of such security breaches may be poor security on computers and other devices, the opening of links or attachments containing harmful substances, failure to maintain security patches, and incorrect use of software and other aids that lead to an increased risk of maintaining information and digital security. Within these areas, it may be an idea to place greater emphasis on future education within the IT field for new employees.

The importance of communication between the intelligence worker and whom ordering an intelligence product may avoid intelligence failure in the future by the intelligence worker starting a dialogue and discussion after receiving the product description.

Intelligence work, in general, has relations to the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia. This has and will also be felt by the Customs' intelligence workers. The expansion tied to the ongoing Russian war involves complexities of the sanction regime. As a result, Norwegian Customs must look at goods from this area or a further extension of what may be organised crime in the area around the transport of goods in the future.

Within intelligence work, there will probably not be a shortage of sources in the future, and AI is highly probable to become even more accessible. With the amount of information found on the web, false information can be part of the digital age and can also be found online. A greater use of information carries the risk of sources containing false or inappropriate information. Data reliability can be a significant challenge, mainly when dealing with data obtained from external sources (Lowenthal, 2017). When looking forward to the future, it is vital to question whether the data has been tampered with or influenced in any way, and how one can verify its accuracy.

6.3.2 Better collaborating

Norwegian Customs is already recognised as a cooperative agency, acting on behalf of other authorities to enforce regulations concerning the import and export of various shipments (Tolletaten, 2023; Lindrup & Meisfjordskar, 2023). In the future, various agencies and parts of the government in Norway should become even better at data-sharing amongst them. The Customs Agency plays a critical role in these collaborations since it is only the agency that has information regarding what crosses the Norwegian borders.

Global international crime networks grow bigger as their operations are conducted across several borders. International cooperation could extend across national borders, and Norwegian Customs should be involved, as well as other countries' customs organisations should be. Intelligence cooperation among international actors in collaboration with the Norwegian Customs also proves to be essential for the movement of goods and illegal products entering Norway. Here the example of intelligence information leading to a police operation in Hungary, which led to illegally produced pills disappearing completely when the criminal network was taken down. In this context, this example is relevant and points to that by being involved in such intelligence sharing and collaboration on an international scale, the Customs Agency can contribute to extensive efforts aiding the nation to prevent illegal goods from coming into Norway.

The processes within intelligence are trust-based, and it is conceivable that very few would abuse the trust-based arrangements within intelligence. Due to the importance of secrecy around information and sources is important to keep in mind what one share and whom one share it with. A duty of confidentiality and information binds intelligence professionals, and other workers in government organisations are shared for working purposes. It is essential to be clear about this in the future and to continue information sharing.

Future digitalisation in the digital age means that Customs and other businesses interact and collaborate in new ways. Importance of communication between the intelligence worker and whom ordering an intelligence product may avoid intelligence failure in the future by the intelligence worker starting a dialogue and discussion after receiving the product description. As well as a clear dialogues and discussions with collaborating partners will continue to be necessary. An example could be the digitisation process when implementing Digitoll, and new requirements for information about goods and cargo of transport digitally. Due to increased expectations for accessibility, digitalisation, and service and a strong and containerised growth in goods flows, a meaningful change was to register all goods digitally for declaration at the latest when crossing the border (Tolletaten, n.d). With the help of the information received by the Customs Agency, focus was placed on object selection and risk assessments in addition to a more efficient and automated border crossing (Tolletaten, n.d). Digital registration from other cooperative agencies, industries, and businesses contributes to the selection of shipments for border inspection. Together with these actors, the Norwegian Customs Authority as a control agency will have control advantages, and such collaborations

will become even more critical in the future. Such cooperation contributes to more efficient border-crossings and protection of Norwegian society and makes the interaction between customs and collaborative businesses more efficient (Tolleten, 2022i).

The Norwegian Customs Agency is a large organisation with many different divisions, departments, and sections. Internal interaction is a key qualification that needs to be in place throughout the agency to facilitate collaboration. To exchange information-needs, it would be useful to include a process or description of information-needs and whom should be contacted to answer these needs. There is potential for even better interaction. One example from the agency, mentioned by Interviewee D, is that it was previously unclear what could be defined as strategic goods because an overall definition of them was not established. Clear definitions and product categories are needed for the customs officer at the borders. This also applies to other parts of the agency, but it is critical that those who control have this type of knowledge. Within this strategic goods example, a theme management has been established for strategic goods, and a common definition for strategic goods has also been communicated.

In line with the use of digital tools and digitalisation, ethical considerations often arise, and one of these considerations can be privacy concerns. When using AI and other aids, for example cameras with video surveillance, the basic considerations of privacy must be understood and protected. Within the Custom Agency, cooperation can be formed between intelligence professionals and legal professionals. When it comes to privacy, it can easily be thought that social benefit or security is given more weight in such assessments, but in practice, there should not be a dilemma between security and benefits against privacy and personal data. These factors should be seen in context, and the boundary between what is unreasonable or illegal surveillance and information gathering is essential to uncover. With the further development of digital help tools in the movement of goods, such as Digitoll and the use of AI, such cooperation between intelligence and legal professionals can contribute to the correct use of tools that obtain detailed descriptions of people in the information they develop and provide clear distinctions and guidelines for monitoring as a tool to uncover smuggling and other security breaches. Legal professionals may also contribute by pointing to additional sources of law that can help solve other problems regarding law that may arise since the regulations are so dynamic and rapidly developing in conjunction with the digitisation of services (Lindrup & Meisfjordskar, 2023).

Given unforeseen situations, there may be future benefits in including robustness around internal and external collaborations. It was shown when the borders were closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, that the Customs Agency carried out controls together with the police, and this probably led to criminals looking for new ways to avoid the regulations and change their behaviour (Prop. 1 S (2022-2023), p. 79). Given unforeseen situations, there may be future benefits in including robustness around such collaborations.

Continuing to focus on intelligence, information can be prepared on new smuggling methods, criminals, and threat actors. Various collaborations with organisations and industries outside the agency, such as between the police and the Norwegian Customs, help to prevent crime. Together with the police, the Norwegian Customs Agency also has an underlying cooperation agreement, with the purpose of both the Norwegian Customs Service and the police's social mission linked to border-related tasks (Tolletaten, 2023). Internally, such collaborations can contribute to robustness in the agency. If, through various emergency plans, one is prepared to clarify responsibility roles, it will be easier to use aids and digital or supporting tools in an emergency situation. Today's risk and threat picture is changing rapidly, and one must be prepared to be hit by future situations and crises within various scenarios. If one is far ahead in digital development, this will be useful in a future situation. It is critical that the Customs Agency can deliver its services (e.g., control the flow and shipments of goods) under an unforeseen situation. By working together across the agency, it will be possible to find solutions to deliver services in unforeseen situations by, for example, developing preparedness cooperation between intelligence, risk, and various areas in the Border Management Division to look at potential risk scenarios of the future that may arise at the various control areas and be prepared for how the work is to be carried out in the event of an accident.

6.3.3 Access to resources

Access to resources may become difficult and potentially problematic in the future. In particular, a lack of personnel. The need for resources is essential to carry out the job of border controls and comply with the Customs' social mission. In this case, the focus is both on the border officials and intelligence workers. Custom workers at the border crossings and intelligence workers cannot use automation and technology to replace the people who work, even if personnel shortages occur. It is known that the movement of goods only increases, while the number of customs officers at the borders is too few compared to this growth.

Physical controls need people, in addition to digital tools, to function properly, and the same applies to intelligence within the Customs Agency. In order to be able to conduct border controls in a controlled, broad, and targeted manner, the interaction between people and technology is a recurring and essential factor. If the lack of resources, either digital or human, weakens in the future, this will become more difficult for the Customs Agency.

The Customs' intelligence environment may also help place resources based on intelligence information. It may be efficient to allocate human resources when intelligence information contributes to prioritising specific goods or shipments to target. If there is a shortage of customs officers at the border in the future, intelligence information can help to use available resources effectively and purposefully. It may be easier to place resources when intelligence information has helped to present what goods or shipments should be focused on and which controls should be targeted.

The job market is evolving, and it will probably continue in the future. Therefore, it is also relevant that customs officers and intelligence workers in the Customs Agency are presented as attractive workplaces in the future, with the new customs education at the University of Stavanger, which in recent years has been among the studies most applied for (Tolletaten, 2022g). It has been presented that growth in the flow of goods combined with a more complex threat picture is helping to increase the need for more customs officers (Tolletaten, 2022g). In addition, more customs officers will retire in the coming years, and the Norwegian Customs Agency has realised that there is an increased need for more customs officers at the border (Tolletaten, 2022g). This seems to be going in the right direction and are well handled and though for from the Agency. One of the measures the Norwegian Customs has taken to expand on this is to increase the number of study places on the bachelor's programme in Customs and Border Management from 35 to 60 study places (Tolletaten, 2022g). It may also be necessary for the Customs to continue to market themselves to the students of this bachelor's programme, as the Customs Agency is one of many (not the only) relevant workplaces for newly graduated students for this programme.

When it comes to a lack of new technological aids and development tools, this may affect the Norwegian Customs in a negative direction. Suppose there is a lack of equipment to efficiently and improve intelligence work and border work. In that case, customs controls will not be optimised and can be utilised to their fullest potential when conducting their social

mission. This can lead to an increase in risks for hazards, such as shipments containing goods, that should not enter the country for reasons of national security interests.

The Norwegian Customs Agency should focus on personnel and other resources to best prepare for future intelligence work. With the focus on intelligence, countless intelligence environments are emerging and competing for intelligence workers. In the big picture, the Customs Agency is one of many agencies in Norway and has an annual budget distributed among the various divisions. A consequence of this can be a lack of new technological tools and employees due to costs. Priority has already been given and should continue to be in the future, to resources that are essential to the functionality of the customs agency.

6.3.4 Use of the Intelligence Cycle

Another important aspect about future intelligence work that the respondents shared is the use of intelligence cycle. With the increasing demands for intelligence operations, there is a growing need for parallel working operations rather than sequentially, as large amounts of information or data can arise rapidly. The flexibility of working in parallel gives agility in responding to rapid changes in the situations and allows multiple steps to be worked on simultaneously. Resilience can be provided with parallel operations. For example, suppose a specific step of the intelligence process contains more significant challenges. In that case, one is not locked into this, but it is rather conceivable to function as the process goes back and forth.

The intelligence cycle is the most well-known and used visual presentation of the intelligence process (Moen, 2020). It may be useful for future intelligence workers to be familiar with the model, but emphasising it in the actual work with intelligence appears to be old-fashioned. As mentioned, intelligence and its operations will have to work in parallel going forward because intelligence work in the digital age differs from previous times. For instance, information is disseminated and generated at a more unprecedented tempo than before. Intelligence work is often about handling complex hybrid and multidimensional threats, and these threats need a more multifaceted approach that includes analysis, monitoring, response, and data collection. This shows that the variations and volume of data available to intelligence workers have grown exponentially. Therefore, with parallel operations, it may be possible to optimise resources instead of dedicating all resources to one phase of intelligence work and moving on

to the next. Additionally, parallel operations enable intelligence workers to adapt quickly to the changing circumstances within the risk and threat picture, as situations can evolve rapidly.

Dialogue and communication around ordering intelligence products is not a clearly presented case if the traditional intelligence cycle is followed. Therefore, it shows the importance for future intelligence workers to not get hung up on the process explained in the model. In the cycle, communication between the client and the person carrying out the intelligence order is shown but not clearly explained or given much weight since it is placed in the model only as a single arrow that goes both ways.

In the case of ambiguities in a model, such as aids or tools, it can, for example, create uncertainty about the process's purpose, what the various steps contain, and how the intelligence product that comes out of the cycle should be provided. The end product resulting from using models such as the intelligence cycle can, therefore, contain deficiencies and inaccuracies in the intelligence data, shortcomings, and errors in the intelligence information, leading to the product failing to reach its goal or being sufficient.

6.4 National security

Generally, for the entire Customs Agency, there will be consequences if their contribution to maintaining social functions of economic crimes, such as smuggling, fails. The consequences may be a loss of safety and security in Norway, a breach of international obligations, or errors in trade statistics (Tolletaten, 2022e). Breach of maintaining societal functions can also negatively impact Norway’s reputation and credibility and loss of security, including crime and insecurity (Tolletaten, 2022e). By establishing Svalbard as a separate customs area in 2022, control of the movement of goods will help reduce cross-border crime by preventing Svalbard from being used to circumvent the export control and sanctions regulations (Regjeringen, 2022). In addition, Norway’s foreign trade is regulated by several agreements and regulations, including laws that stipulate the conditions under which services or goods can be sold, here, for example, which taxes apply and customs rates (Tolletaten, 2016).

Since intelligence operations must ensure confidentiality, it can be reflected as security factors in the sensitive nature of the information being handled. The intelligence work carried out by the Norwegian Customs Agency to sharpen controls must be kept secret so it does not affect

smuggling or other actors who may benefit from this information becoming known (Vareførselsloven, 2022, §§ 7-12; Lindrup & Meisfjordskar, 2023). If this information is presented or known to unauthorised persons, it will be a threat to national security. For example, by leading to the misuse of goods flows and transports, with contraband or smuggler goods, through customs control and growth of harmful goods, such as narcotics, into Norway.

6.5 Digitalisation

In this digital age, there is potential for data reliability issues, especially when the Intelligence Division is working with data from outside the community or their company (Lowenthal, 2017). The data contained always needs to be verified as accurate. The area of data will remain uncertain. There is no answer to how much data there is and will be in the future. The ability to manage information from cyber space effectively and critically is the component of successful intelligence gathering. Another risk that needs to be addressed is the potential for hostile and cooperative actors' ways of using cyber tools for intelligence gathering. Intelligence environments should prepare for newer software, servers, and other technological aids to keep up to date with the invasion of new goods and systems used to handle digital information.

Another problem that can arise within digitalisation and the development of technology is hardware. As hardware becomes obsolete, many outdated devices will not allow parched and security measures. Updating these measures and the hardware is essential but not a proof solution to all cybersecurity challenges. For example, if users of intelligence equipment fail to keep their software and hardware up to date, this can be a vulnerability to exploit by attackers. A potential consequence of a successful cyber attack on intelligence equipment could be severe as it could contain sensitive and classified information and processes used in border controls.

As earlier presented, the threat and risk picture, as well as, the flow of goods, are changing rapidly. Intelligence work is crucial for the Customs Agency to be able to carry out targeted controls (Tolletaten, 2022h, 00:48). There is a pressing need for the Norwegian Customs, as well as other intelligence environments in Norway, to innovate and adapt their tools, strategies, and methods to address the current and future security challenges effectively. For digital development tools, such as AI, it is not just the amount of data that is important, and

there should, therefore, be quality and structure behind the data used in the tool. If there are errors in the data, the analyses will be affected (Kommunal- og distriktsdepartementet 2020). It must be possible for the users of these tools to document and understand how decisions have been made or what underlies the analysis. Therefore, in the future, with the help of such aids, it will be essential to entrust certain decisions and the initiation of action or measures. It will be important that people are involved. These tools can, for example, make visible dilemmas that are ultimately to be taken by the analyst or the worker.

It will also be necessary, due to the potential extent of damage, to discuss what is desired and responsible development and use of AI, in addition to emphasising what can be done to prevent a development that goes in an undesirable direction (Kommunal- og distriktsdepartementet 2020). The perception of AI is often that these tools can solve everything. This is not the case in reality. It appears much safer with humans in addition to technology, for example, to prevent bias and for decisions.

7 Conclusion

The purpose of the thesis was to examine how intelligence professionals in the Norwegian Customs work and envision intelligence gathering and analysis to develop further and what resources and strategies they believe will be necessary to effectively meet challenges in the future. Based on the research questions, I have tried to uncover whether risk management is a part of the intelligence work carried out in the Norwegian Customs, what role intelligence has on Norwegian border control, and future perceptions related to intelligence within the intelligence environment in the Norwegian Customs Agency.

The findings point to that risk management and intelligence are separate domains in the work carried out in the Norwegian Customs and that the intelligence workers are not the ones to conduct work regarding risk management. Intelligence plays a role in border controls by contributing to simplifying the work of the customs officials at the border when it comes to targeted and efficient controls. By providing intelligence information as a basis in customs controls, resources are placed in efficient manners, and by cooperating across countries, the intelligence information from customs agencies can help prevent the spread of illegal goods that are, for example, harmful to human health. The future perceptions of the respondents in the study are among intelligence work, collaborating in external and internal manner, and achieving resources in the future. These collaborations explore internal manners, such as

between the intelligence and other parts of the agency, and external manners, for example, cooperation between the Customs Agency and the police. Having better collaboration is pointed out as crucial to further explore the benefits and challenges of digital registrations of goods for the Norwegian business industry. Access to further resources include concerns about future human resource and assessing technological tools. The use of the intelligence cycle highlights considerations and reflections regarding why the intelligence cycle may no longer be a suitable model to use in intelligence operations because of an increased need for working parallel, and the intelligence cycle presents some but does not include all the steps in intelligence work.

7.1 Future research

This thesis is limited to exploring intelligence in a general way and with future perceptions within the Norwegian Customs. It could also be interesting to do the same type of study with other intelligence companies or divisions in other organisations based in Norway. This may reveal whether this study's findings correlate with reality in other intelligence environments. Broader research into other intelligence environments can be of interest as it will be able to include professionals with a more varied background, different competence, basis of experience, and understanding of intelligence.

Regarding the Norwegian Customs Agency, it may be useful to look further into the challenges and benefits of information sharing and collaboration with customs agencies and unions in different countries. This type of effort aims to address the multifaceted challenges posed by hybrid threats impacting the transport of goods, such as trade-based money laundering. Notably, it is worth highlighting that this field currently lacks the existing research on this, thus making it an area suitable for further investigation and analysis.

8 Reference list

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Appendix

Appendix 1 – Information letter

INFORMASJONSSKRIV

Vil du delta i forskningsprosjektet
"Preparing for the Future: An Analysis of Norwegian Customs Intelligence Workers' Perspectives on Intelligence"

Dette kommer som et spørsmål til deg om å delta i et forskningsprosjekt hvor formålet er å undersøke hvordan etterretningsarbeid i Tolletaten utvikler seg for å tilpasses fremtiden. I dette skrivet ønskes det å gi deg informasjon om målene for prosjektet og hva en deltakelse vil innebære for deg.

Formål
Formålet med dette prosjektet er å undersøke hvordan ansatte i etterretningsdivisjonen i Tolletaten ser for seg at etterretningsarbeid og analyse vil utvikle seg i løpet av det neste tiåret, og hvilke strategier og ressurser det menes å være nødvendig for å effektivisere og møte utfordringene i en mer sammenkoblet og kompleks tid.

Hvem er ansvarlig for forskingsprosjektet
Marja Katariina Ylönen.

Hva innebærer det for deg å delta?
Jeg ønsker å intervjue deg i kraft av din posisjon i etterretningsdivisjonen i Tolletaten. For å belyse forskningsspørsmålene vil kvalitativ metode, her av semistrukturert individuelt intervju, bli benyttet. Intervjuet vil ta ca. 1-1,5 time, og vil omhandle dine kunnskaper, tanker, vurderinger og fremtidsperspektiver rundt risiko, sikkerhet og etterretning. Opplysningene vil bli registrert med lydopptak og transkriberes, og oppbevares på to ulike digitale enheter.

Det er frivillig å delta
Det er frivillig å delta i dette prosjektet. Hvis du velger å delta, kan du når som helst trekke samtykke ditt tilbake uten å oppgi noen grunn. Alle opplysninger som omhandler deg, vil bli anonymisert. Det vil ikke ha noen negative konsekvenser for deg hvis du ikke ønsker å delta eller senere velger å trekke deg.

Ditt personvern – Hvordan vi oppbevarer og bruker dine opplysninger
Jeg vil bare bruke opplysninger om deg til formålene som er fortalt i dette skrivet. Opplysningene vil bli behandlet konfidensielt og i samsvar med personvelregelverket. Opplysninger som kan brukes til å identifisere deg vil bli anonymisert i masteroppgaven. Det vil kun være meg (*Magda-Lene*) som har tilgang til lydopptak, og dine personopplysninger under prosessen. Lydopptakene fra intervjuet blir overført fra en passordbeskyttet mobil til en passordbeskyttet PC, videre til en ekstern harddisk som vil bli bevart innelåst. Lydopptakene blir slettet umiddelbart etter transkribering, og all data vil bli slettet etter ferdigstilt oppgave. Informantene vil ikke kunne gjenkjennes i en publikasjon.

Dine rettigheter
Så lenge du kan identifiseres i datamaterialet, har du rett til:

- Innsyn i hvilke personopplysninger som er registrert om deg,
- Å få rettet personopplysninger om deg,
- Få slettet personopplysninger om deg,
- Få utlevert en kopi av dine personopplysninger (dataportabilitet), og
- Å sende klage til personvernombudet eller Datatilsynet om behandlingen av dine personopplysninger.

Hva gir rett til å behandle personopplysninger om deg?
Opplysningene vil bli behandlet baser på ditt samtykke.

Hvor kan jeg finne ut mer?
Hvis du har spørsmål til forskningsprosjektet, ønsker gjennomlesning av sitater fra deg og øvrig data basert på ditt intervju, eller vil trekke deg fra prosjektet:

- Faglig ansvarlig for forskningsprosjektet, Marja Katariina Ylönen: marja.k.ylonen@uis.no / tlf: 518 31 506
- Magda-Lene Kvam Saltvik tlf: 477 04 635
- Sikt, personverntjenester@sikt.no / tlf: 73 98 40 40

Med vennlig hilsen

(student) (veileder)

Samtykkeerklæring
Jeg har mottatt og forstått informasjon om prosjektet [*Preparing for the Future: An Analysis of Norwegian Customs Intelligence Workers' Perspectives on Intelligence*], og har fått anledning til å stille spørsmål. Jeg samtykker til:

- ❑ Å delta i intervju

Jeg samtykker til at mine opplysninger behandles frem til prosjektet er avsluttet.

(Signert av prosjektdeltaker, dato)

Appendix 2 – Interview guide

Intervjuguide *"Preparing for the Future: An Analysis of Norwegian Customs Intelligence Workers' Perspectives on Intelligence"*
– norsk

- Presentere meg selv og prosjektet.
- Presentasjon av respondenten.
- Informere om og minne om anonymitet.
- Kan det benyttes direkte sitater fra intervjuet i oppgaven? (Med anonymisering).
- Informere om start av lydopptak.

Etterretning

1. Hvordan vil du definere etterretningsarbeid?

2. Hvilke spesifikke ferdigheter og eller kompetanse mener du vil være viktig for fremtidige etterretningsarbeidere?

3. Mener du at etterretningsarbeid er større utbredt nå enn tidligere? Hvorfor/Hvorfor ikke?

Teknologi og digitalisering

4. Hvordan ser du for deg at teknologiens rolle vil utvikle seg innenfor etterretningsarbeidet i Tolletaten de neste 10 årene?

5. Kan du nevne noen spesifikke teknologiske verktøy eller fremskritt som har påvirket etterretningsarbeidet de siste årene, og hvordan Tolletaten tilpasser seg disse endringene?

Sikkerhet og nasjonal sikkerhet

6. Vil du si at sikkerhetsarbeid er med på å forme etterretningsarbeid, hvordan er sikkerhetsarbeid en del av etterretningsarbeid?

7. Mener du at etterretningsarbeidet som blir gjort i Tolletaten er relevant for nasjonal sikkerhet? Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?

8. Kan du gi en beskrivelse av hvordan etterretningsarbeid hjelper til med å skjerpe grensekontroller?

Risiko og teknologi

9. Etter din mening er risk management en stor del av etterretningsarbeid i Tolletaten? Hvorfor/Hvorfor ikke?

10. Hvilken ulike typer risiko og hybride trusler er i voksende trend, og hvilke mener du kan forventes i fremtiden?

11. Er det noen typiske risikoer som har blitt redusert og dermed lettere å håndtere nå enn før? Er det eventuelt noen risikoer som er eliminert? Eksempler.

12. Kan du nevne noen spesifikke teknologiske verktøy eller fremskritt som har påvirket etterretningsarbeidet de siste årene, og hvordan Tolletaten tilpasser seg disse endringene?

Fremtidsrettet

13. Ser du for deg at den pågående digitaliseringen har mye å si for ditt fremtidige arbeid? Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?

14. Hvilke trusselaktører tenker du at kan bli større innenfor etterretningsarbeid i fremtiden? / Kan du se for deg at det er noen trusselaktører som du tenker at kan bli større enten ved måten de tilpasser seg eller med hvordan det jobbes nå mot

fremtiden?

15. Ved å ta for seg trusler og ulovlige produkter som kommer til Norge, tror du at det vil fortsette å utvikles nye metoder for å smugle disse?
    Hvis ja – Hvordan forestiller du deg at sikkerhetsarbeidet her vil utvikles for å prøve å stoppe dette?

16. Hva er etter din mening de største utfordringene Tolletaten vil møte med å tilpasse seg den fremtidige utviklingen i etterretningsarbeidet?

17. Hvilke grep mener du Tolletaten bør ta nå for å forberede seg få fremtidens etterretningsarbeid?

18. Har du noen erfaringer med etterretningssyklusen (e-hjulet), og mener du dette er et godt eller dårlig verktøy å bruke videre fremover i etterretningsarbeid?

Samarbeid

19. Til slutt, kan du gå noe inn på de nasjonale og internasjonale samarbeidene etterretningsdivisjonen i Tolletaten kan ha nytte av, som allerede er etablert eller ønskes å etablere i fremtiden?

- Noe mer å tilføye?
- Takke for at det ble stilt opp.

Appendix 3 – Project approval from Sikt

Vurdering av behandling av personopplysninger

Referansenummer	Vurderingstype	Dato
586700	Standard	15.05.2023

Tittel
Preparing for the Future: An Analysis of Norwegian Customs Intelligence Workers' Perspectives on Intelligence

Behandlingsansvarlig institusjon
Universitetet i Stavanger / Det teknisk- naturvitenskapelige fakultet / Institutt for sikkerheit, økonomi og planlegging

Prosjektansvarlig
Marja Katariina Ylönen

Student
Magda-Lene Kvam Saltvik

Prosjektperiode
01.01.2023 - 15.06.2023

Kategorier personopplysninger

- Alminnelige

Lovlig grunnlag

- Samtykke (Personvernforordningen art. 6 nr. 1 bokstav a)

Behandlingen av personopplysningene er lovlig så fremt den gjennomføres som oppgitt i meldeskjemaet. Det lovlige grunnlaget gjelder til 15.06.2023.

Kommentar
OM VURDERINGEN
Sikt har en avtale med institusjonen du forsker eller studerer ved. Denne avtalen innebærer at vi skal gi deg råd slik at behandlingen av personopplysninger i prosjektet ditt er lovlig etter personvernregelverket.

KOMMENTAR TIL INFORMASJONSKRIV
NSD har byttet navn til Sikt og har også endret kontaktinformasjon. Vi foreslår at du oppdater informasjonsskrivet til f.eks: "Hvis du har spørsmål knyttet til vurderingen som er gjort av personverntjenestene fra Sikt, kan du ta kontakt via: Epost: personverntjenester@sikt.no eller telefon: 73 98 40 40". Du må legge til disse punktene i informasjonsskrivet før du gir dette til forskningsdeltakerne dine. Du trenger ikke å laste opp den oppdaterte versjonen i meldeskjemaet.

FØLG DIN INSTITUSJONS RETNINGSLINJER
Vi har vurdert at du har lovlig grunnlag til å behandle personopplysningene, men husk at det er institusjonen du er ansatt/student ved som avgjør hvilke databehandlere du kan bruke og hvordan du må lagre og sikre data i ditt prosjekt. Husk å bruke leverandører som din institusjon har avtale med (f.eks. ved skylagring, nettspørreskjema, videosamtale el.)
Personverntjenester legger til grunn at behandlingen oppfyller kravene i personvernforordningen om riktighet (art. 5.1 d), integritet og konfidensialitet (art. 5.1. f) og sikkerhet (art. 32).

MELD VESENTLIGE ENDRINGER
Dersom det skjer vesentlige endringer i behandlingen av personopplysninger, kan det være nødvendig å melde dette til oss ved å oppdatere meldeskjemaet. Se våre nettsider om hvilke endringer du må melde: https://sikt.no/melde-endringar-i-meldeskjema

OPPFØLGING AV PROSJEKTET
Vi vil følge opp ved planlagt avslutning for å avklare om behandlingen av personopplysningene er avsluttet.
Lykke til med prosjektet!

Appendix 4 – Approval from Sikt regarding change in project deadline

Vurdering av behandling av personopplysninger

Referansenummer	Vurderingstype	Dato
586700	Standard	27.06.2023

Tittel
Preparing for the Future: An Analysis of Norwegian Customs Intelligence Workers' Perspectives on Intelligence

Behandlingsansvarlig institusjon

Universitetet i Stavanger / Det teknisk- naturvitenskapelige fakultet / Institutt for sikkerheit, økonomi og planlegging

Prosjektansvarlig
Marja Katariina Ylönen

Student
Magda-Lene Kvam Saltvik

Prosjektperiode
01.01.2023 - 15.09.2023

Kategorier personopplysninger

- Alminnelige

Lovlig grunnlag

- Samtykke (Personvernforordningen art. 6 nr. 1 bokstav a)

Behandlingen av personopplysningene er lovlig så fremt den gjennomføres som oppgitt i meldeskjemaet. Det lovlige grunnlaget gjelder til 15.09.2023.

Kommentar
Personverntjenester har vurdert endringen i prosjektsluttdato. Endringen består av en forlengelse i prosjektperioden. Vi har nå registrert 15.09.2023 som ny sluttdato for behandling av personopplysninger. Hvis det blir nødvendig å behandle personopplysninger enda lengre, så kan det være nødvendig å informere prosjektdeltakerne. Vi vil følge opp ved ny planlagt avslutning for å avklare om behandlingen av personopplysningene er avsluttet.
Lykke til videre med prosjektet!

Appendix 5 – Full analysis table

Themes	Citations	Core Messages	Interpretations
National security	«Jeg tror det er viktig for den nasjonale sikkerhet, det fikk vi egentlig belyst under både pandemien og krigsutbruddet. Vi fikk egentlig belyst en av svakhetene med sektorprinsippet, sektorprinsippet er for så vidt greit nok, men vi har ikke gode nok kanaler på deling av informasjon mellom oss.» (A1) «Vi jobbet med et legemiddel, hvor vi Tolletaten i Norge bidro til et internasjonalt samarbeid der, og en svær aksjon i Ungarn mot et firma som produserte Rivotril – et berogiende middel. Hypotesen var at det kom ganske mye stoff eller mye av dette her til Norge, og dette var falsk produserte varer. Det var egentlig produsert i en garasje, så ikke noe man har lyst til å ha inn i Norge i det heletatt. Det etterretningssamarbeidet vi hadde der førte til en politiaksjon som tok et kjempe beslag og knakk hele det nettverket som drev	The customs have a unique ability to identify and assess goods that threaten national security and the well-being of the Norwegian society. In addition, these goods may have significant economic implications. They are the sole authority overseeing the Norwegian border and have crucial knowledge about incoming goods. Given their role in national security, collaboration with other agencies becomes	Concerning national security interests, the customs agency has a unique insight into the flow of goods that cross Norway's borders. The overall operations of the Norwegian Customs protect the Norwegian society and population against illegal and dangerous goods (Tolletaten, 2022d). Already here, it is presented that the Customs has a key role in national security. With the help of

	med de pillene. Konsekvensene av det, som vi så i etter tid, var at et annet offentlig organ, [redacted] Oslo universitetssykehus som så på mengde av dette stoffet, narkotiske stoffer i blodet til folk de tar blodprøver av. Det man så etter det beslaget i Ungarn var at dette Rivotril-virkestoffet forsvant helt etter at beslaget var tatt. Det betyr at, jeg tror at, Tolletaten kan også være med på å påvirke egentlig slike ting som man trodde var umulig å stoppe.» (A2) «For et par år siden var det det samme innen tannlegebransjen. Tannleger bruker blekemidler, og andre ting, som rett og slett er farlig. Dette koster samfunnet enorme summer, alle får dårlige tenner. De eneste som kan få oversikten over problemet skikkelig er oss, så ja på den nasjonale sikkerheten.» (B1) «Corona gjorde oss oppmerksomme på hvordan mye foregikk, at veldig mye var ekstremt profesjonalisert. *Crime as a service*. De fleste kriminalitetsområdene fortsatte, men mye kriminalitet flyttet seg online og har kanskje blitt der. Jeg tror nok kanskje kundene våre, altså både de som smugler og de som ikke smugler, lærte mer enn det vi lærte.» (B2) «Vi jobber selvfølgelig med å forebygge og avverge. Også jobber vi med regelverkseiere, som for eksempel at man sier til Miljødirektoratet at vi står der vi står det er dette vi ser. Det er for eksempel en del etater som ikke er vant til å drive kriminalitetsforebyggende. De er mer tilsyn som går ut ifra at folk i utgangspunktet prøver å gjøre det riktige.» (C1) «Jeg tror jeg ville sagt ja, men da hvis jeg skal presisere ville jeg tenkt at vi driver jo først med eksportkontroll, av våpen og sånn *jewel juice* og sånn. [...] Import av stoffer det kan lages bomber av. For det ble jo blant annet omtalt i den der 22.juli rapporten, vi figurerte jo der.» (C2) «På visse områder så er det tilbakemelding om at informasjonen og våre vurderinger kan bekrefte eller avkrefte allerede hypoteser, eller er vesentlig for å berike allerede eksisterende ting.» (D1) «Det er igjen vurderingene våre som er interessante, ikke informasjonen vår. Så det å bare gi rådata, vi er best i stand til å gjøre vurderinger på vår egen informasjon, selvfølgelig informasjonen vil jo følge med i	important as these other agencies lack insight to border-crossings and activities. The customs work with goods in areas that have demonstrable links to national interests, and the customs agency's ability to monitor it plays an essential role in ensuring national security, as goods can have the potential to be a contributing factor to capacities that can create a threat. Street clinics, fake products, and pills are examples that have come to light and impact national security and the Norwegian economy. Here, the customs agency and their intelligence information can play a significant role in avoiding such products being imported to Norway. A part of the intelligence work related to national security often comes as feedback, as the Customs' intelligence information or assessments, which can confirm or deny already existing hypotheses. Their assessments are often more interesting than just the information obtained. Suppose intelligence workers give up raw data or information. In that case, the information can become more challenging to assess for the counterparty who will receive this information, as the	intelligence information, customs officials can select and assess goods that are a threat to the nation alone or assembled from several components. In a news article, Lepperød (2021) mentions the uncovering of an illegally produced European Rivotril network and that this was one of the missions the Intelligence Division was heavily involved in. This suggests that interviewee A provides the same example with criminal networks and Rivotril. As the Norwegian Customs' national threat assessment points out, "a safe and sustainable society" is number 1 on their societal values (Tolletaten, 2022e). This helps to show how important the tasks of the Norwegian Customs Agency with links to national security are. Furthermore, the threat assessment also describes narcotics and, animals and plants as major threat categories (Tolletaten, 2022e). These help to create a threat to national security, among other things, in the area of public health and the economy, when, for example, the risk of early death from drug use or diseases that can travel into the country together with animals and plants (Tolletaten, 2022e). The compliance pyramid (OECD, 2004) is reflected in the work of the customs authorities, presented by the

	en viss forstand, men det er vurderingene av konfidensen på den vurderingen.» (D2) «Og man samarbeider da med PST eller/og andre på sikkerhets (...) ting som kan påvirke nasjonal sikkerhet da. Hvor vår evne til å monitorere er vesentlig da, fordi varer kan være en medvirkende årsak til en kapasitet som kan skape en trussel.» (D3) «Vi har jo eksempler på det, vi jobbet nå senest nå nettopp, jeg kan ikke si hva vi jobbet med, men vi jobbet med sanksjonerte varer/strategiske varer på områder som har beviselig tilknyttinger til nasjonale interesser og sånn som vi forstår nasjonale sikkerhetsinteresser. Så sånn sett er vi innenfor liksom det å verdivurdere type inntektnivå så er vi der, på det området.» (E1)	intelligence workers are best able to assess intelligence information. The customs agency contributes to preventive work and warding off smuggled goods, the emphasis is placed on threat actors or criminals who smuggle, and more consideration is taken. The Custom contributes to helping those who are initially trying to do the right thing and follow the law.	respondents, which will aim to make it easier, facilitate and help those who want to follow the law and do the right thing.
The intelligence cycle	«Jeg mener at e-syklusen eller e-hjulet er en modell, og forsåvidt en god modell på hvordan man jobber med etterretning. Men jeg tror ikke man skal se på den som en lærebok på hvordan drive med etterretning for det er den ikke ment som, det er en forenkling av virkeligheten, det er fint at de har tegnet den opp, men det er ikke revolusjonerende.» (A3) «Jeg har ingenting imot å se på den, men jeg tenker at jeg tror ikke fremtiden kommer til å være basert rundt at man tar en og en del av hjulet og lager organisatoriske elementer som skal svare det ut, som man tidligere har gjort til en viss grad» (A4) «Ja, men det tenker jeg at den er, som en modell. Men jeg ville ikke tillat den for mye vekt som noe annet enn en modell.» (A5) «100%. Egentlig i livet generelt er det en god ting å gjøre, samle inn og bearbeide og formidle og revurdere, det er det man må eller burde gjøre hver dag.» (B3) «Det er en menneskeligprosess egentlig, bare at det er fint å få det ned på papiret og at man tydelig gjør de ulike fasene gjerne når man jobber med det enten med seg selv eller i team. Det er nyttig.» (B4) «Jeg tror man er kanskje tvunget til å tenke litt mer på tiltakene, enn det vi gjorde før.» (C3) «Jeg er kanskje litt skeptisk til at man tror man kan gjøre grep på å ikke ha bias, jeg er ikke sikker på om det er så enkelt. [...] At man har en virkelighetsforståelse da.» (C4) «Man må forstå hjulet, for hjulet er en tegning fra 50-tallet for å prøve å illustrere noe. Det handler egentlig om at disse prosessene går hele tiden, det er ikke bare et hjul som går en retning. Det er ting som skal gå frem og tilbake.» (D5)	It is important to have a realistic understanding of how the intelligence cycle and the number eight work together. If one emphases these tools as just tools, they are usable. It should not be given more weight than the fact that the tools are just a visualisation of processes. Do not give more importance to the intelligence cycle than that it is a helpful tool or framework. These processes go in all directions, and one do not follow the intelligence wheel from A to Z. Focus on conveying the message and deciding on measures. Using the intelligence cycle as a tool, it is a good tool to keep in mind in the process of working on intelligence, but also in daily life. Have an understanding and knowledge that several variations of the	Hulnick (2006) argues against giving the intelligence cycle too much weight, stating that it does not capture the actual dynamics of the intelligence process. The interviewees agree with this argument. Hulnick (2006) also argues that the intelligence cycle is not a good model. Additionally, (Stenslie et al., 2021) suggest that the traditional intelligence cycle may not sufficiently address the complexities of rapidly evolving threats that often manifest in nonlinear patterns, since the cycle is ment to be followed in a specific direction during the work with intelligence. Moreover, (Stenslie et al., 2021) recommend viewing the intelligence cycle as a tool, allowing flexibility to bypass certain stages and approaches to effectively address specific threats. The participants in this research project concluded that while the intelligence cycle

	«Det er bare en visualisering av en prosess, for prosessen vil jo løpe heletiden. Det er ikke slik at nei nå har jeg passert den, da kan jeg ikke gå tilbake igjen. Jo, da skal du gå tilbake igjen. Du skal aldri slutte, for det hjulet lever jo hele tiden. Og det går ikke slik at først det så det, jo det er en mental tilnærming, men i praksis vil det innebære at du får mer informasjon etter hvert så det må man analysere.» (D6) «Kan jo si krypinn som med all metodeutvikling hviler på.» (E2) «Noen forenkler det enda mer, og noen lager flere dingser på det. Men mye av diskusjonen går i rundt det hjulet og prosessen etterretning. Så med litt sånn forbehold at det er ulike varianter av e-hjulet også, men alle er egentlig innenfor samme verden.» (E3) «Så det er nyttig å ha med seg videre, men man må ikke blir for, mange blir for boksete.» (E4)	process are presented in the intelligence cycle.	remains a valuable resource seen as a tool, it should be regarded only as a tool rather than an overarching framework.
Digitalisation	«Hvis du får teknologien, men ikke satser på etterretning så er det egentlig bare et verktøy som ikke så mange utnytter. Og satser du på etterretning, men ikke teknologien til dagens tjenester, så vil du sitte med Word og Excel og tenke at dette er egentlig ikke nok. Den kombinasjonen vi har gjør egentlig at jeg føler at vår arbeidshverdag kommer til å bli bra, og vi kommer til å både utnytte verktøyene på en god måte, men tilpasse oss de trendene og endringene som kommer også.» (A6) «Min arbeidshverdag tror jeg kommer til å være det samme som leverandør input til datamaskin som skal gi meg noe tilbake. Menneske mellom dataene holdte jeg på å skulle si.» (B5) «Hvorfor ikke kjøre undervannsdrone fra Danmark? Man løper alltid litt etter teknologien som myndighet. De første som bruker det er pornobransjen og de kriminelle, sant?» (B6) «Men en ting jeg ville tenkt at også kunne være forskjeller er at jeg har drevet med sånne kulturgjenstander. Nå er det sånn (...) det er et papir, du kan gjenbruke det, altså jeg tror hvis du får en del, det som heter restreksjonsbelagte varer, at tillatelsen er digital, jeg tror det er noen fordeler med det.» (C5) «Jeg tror kanskje at på kulturminner at du ville vært sikker på at det var en (...) nå er ikke jeg toller da, men jeg tror bare at du kunne vært sikrere på at tillatelsen for eksempel hvis den kom fra utlandet da, var ekte kanskje.» (C6)	A key point is to utilise both the tools effectively and optimise their use, but also adapt to the coming changes and trends - people and technology together, intelligence and technology together. The customs agency can improve on continuous learning by using the different platforms that are put into use. Moving from paper to digital documents can help the customs officials at the border to see the credibility of the written document. This can be further helpful for the customs officers at the border since their work is often based on trust. After the pandemic digitalisation of interaction became greater and more widespread in the agency. The tools of	As the respondents mentioned in the interviews, it is crucial to combine the technology with the people who work in the agency. It is clear that technological and digital development have made it possible and easy for machines to handle time-demanding and heavy tasks (Haugom et al., 2021). With AI and other digital development tools, analysts can focus on the work that machines cannot, for example, ensure that the results are correct (Haugom et al., 2021). The respondents mentioned multiple times the importance of humans together with technology. Technology and machine algorithms can support analysts and intelligence workers but not replace them (Haugom et al., 2021). As Stensberg (2016) claims, technology itself does not create values for

	«Jeg tror det viktigste jeg ville tenkt med digitalisering er at, hvis man ser fremover, den der at informasjonen skal komme inn på forhånd eller ved grensepassering.» (C7) «Metodemessig så jobber man ikke annerledes etter coronaen, men man jobber mer på Teams og andre områder. Etterretningssamarbeid fungerer veldig dårlig på Teams, for etterretning handler om å ha tillitt til hverandre (...) Kan si at jeg da deler med alle, men det er tillitsbasert.» (D7) «Forhåpentligvis vil digitaliseringa øke kvaliteten, hvis ikke så bommer vi.» (D8) «Om pandemien har medført nye prosesser så må det være mer samhandling på Teams. Digital samhandling.» (E5) «Vi har jo tilgang til bedre verktøy. Vi har mulighet til bedre samhandling også.» (E6) «Tidligere var det utfordringer for eksempel på maske-regler at det ble støyet ned, enten det var enkelt tollerene som sto for det eller om det var direktoratet var ansvarlig og gjorde det. Nå sitter vi midt på en plass også satte dette i system, og vi kan jo rigge det også slik at vi har noen roller som gjør at vi kan samspille bedre med andre divisjoner også på det området. Så jeg tenker hvis dette brukes riktig nå da, så tenker jeg at vi har potensielt store effekter. Men hvis vi roter dette til nå, så blir det, det det blir.» (E7)	digital interactions, such as Teams, were used more frequently than previously after the pandemic. One of the most essential things in digitisation is the possibility for customers to register products before they reach the point of border crossing and meet the customs officers. In order to maximise the results and continue to use digitisation in a sensible direction, further work must be done in this area. It must be used correctly and have potential major effects. The Norwegian Customs has gained access to better digital and technological tools. This contributes to advantages such as better interaction with other divisions. Digitisation can potentially lead to major effects, but it must be used and maintained correctly.	a company, and it has to be seen in a context together with other aspects and factors, such as the digitalisation tools that are fitted for the operational and leveraged support for the agency. The implements technical tools that are taken use of must have an overall meaning for the company that implements it for use. For example, in the context of Customs and intelligence, the product or service must have a specific meaning for the intelligence work and be usable by the workers who will use it. It is also important to remember that human interaction with technology plays a key role, as it is the work behind the processes that carry out improvements, not the technology or the tool itself (Stensberg, 2016). To enable customers to register their products in advance of reaching the border checkpoint, where they will encounter customs officers, the help of developed aids, such as Digitoll, this will become a requirement by March 2025 (Tolletaten, 2022c; Tolletaten, n.d). Cullen & Wegge (2021) say that in our modern society, one is more dependent on digital technology and its tools than ever before. Technology is undeniable. Also, among the respondents, there is

			talked about the growth of digital tools within the intelligence community and from the threat actors. Intelligence works, and the agency must continue to work towards keeping the focus on using these technological aids correctly going forward, as threat actors will also make use of the opportunities provided by technology. For example, the Customs Service has gained access to better digital and technological tools, and this can be used as an advantage in the future with better interaction between other agencies in addition to being one step ahead of the criminal actors.
Risk (Management)	«Jeg mener jo at det henger sammen. Så må jeg være den første å innrømme at jeg ikke er den beste på risk management, jeg pleier egentlig å være i trinnene før. Vi jobber jo overordnet risikovurdering for Tolletaten, og etterretningsarbeidet er noe av det som skal bidra til at vi kan håndtere eller ta ned risikoen. Jeg mener det henger godt sammen, men jeg føler ikke at vi er helt i mål enda. Siden dette er et fremtidsrettet spørsmål så tror jeg at det kommer til å henge bedre sammen i fremtiden.» (A7) «Vi ser egentlig bare på trusler vi, og nå for første gang i vår nasjonale trusselvurdering skal vi skrive litt om sårbarheter.» (C8) «Nei det er ikke etterretning. Men det er viktig å jobbe med det. Og du bruker mange av de samme metodene, de vil påvirke. [...] Men du må ikke putte det inn i etterretning fordi du kommer med noe (...) Etterretning skal peke frem i tid, mens sårbarheter sier noe om hva har og hva situasjonen du står i. Du kan jo definere ting som kan øke, men du predikerer ikke da på samme måten som etterretning. Med sårbarheter så strekker du deg så langt, mens i etterretning så skal du tørre å ha meninger.» (D9) «Så tenker jeg innenfor etterretningsverden er vi tilbake på fokusområdet som er litt viere hos oss, så kan vi ta med oss metodeverket fra	In the Customs, there is important to separate risk and intelligence, but also understand that many of the same methods are used in both parties. The intelligence work should contribute to the management of risk. Based on the respondents' explanations of risk and understanding of risk management, it appears in the interviews that vulnerability analysis is not a large part of the intelligence work that is carried out in the Norwegian Customs. Vulnerability analysis falls under risk, not intelligence. Intelligence has more focus on potential threats. The intelligence work could contribute to the Norwegian Customs	Several of the respondents in this study believe that risk management and intelligence are connected but that one must still distinguish between them. As respondent D claims that one must be able to distinguish between risk-related and intelligence work, but the methods used in both works are similar. Respondent E believes that the focus area for intelligence work is further at the customs agency than dealing with risk management. However, they can again take inspiration from recognised standards for risk management with them in their way of working with intelligence. According to Ylönen & Aven (2023)

	anerkjente standarder for risikohåndtering tenker jeg, inn i måten å jobbe med etterretning på. Det er ikke noe konflikt i det, det er mye læring i det.» (E8) «Det henger i sammen innenfor det fokusområdet man har. Innenfor etterretning identifiserer man et risikoområde og kanskje helt ned til, for å si det næringslivsaktør da, ned til næringslivsaktør, som er noe du skal gjøre noe med. [redacted] om hva skal vi gjøre med det i neste felt, og det virkemiddel og tiltakene som handler basert på identifisert risiko.» (E9)	being able to handle or reduce the risk at certain points. Taking works from recognised standards for risk management can help the intelligence work, as these focus on roughly the same focus area.	risk and intelligence are two different fields, which is strongly agreed among the respondents of this study. The essence of risk management is to use developed tools and principles that allow to have some degree of control over potential outcomes (Thekdi & Aven, 2023). The border controls in Norway are placed at different boarding crossing points based on risk assessments (Tolletaten, 2022a). Although the Intelligence Division and intelligence workers within the customs agency do not carry out such risk assessments themselves, it is an essential part of the general task of other divisions and workers in the Norwegian Customs Agency.
Movement of goods	«Jeg tror endringer i regelverk vil påvirke hva vi ser på som de største truslene og, også i noen grad hvordan vi klarer å håndtere. [...]Vi har vært litte grann i media om medisinsk cannabis for eksempel, så hvis det blir besluttet at det blir lov å ta inn cannabis til medisinsk bruk så håndhever vi jo reglene sånn som de er. Men det vil jo da kanskje endre hvordan varene kommer inn til Norge og dermed også trusselen.» (A8) «Stort sett så ser vi at trendene er tilpasset regelverket i det landet man er fra. Jeg vet at et nordisk land var veldig opptatt av snus-smugling, som var noe man ikke så i det heletatt i Norge. Så å samarbeide med trusler er av og til (…) stort sett så går det veldig fint, men man ser jo at det er tilpasset de regelverkene man har i de landene man kommer fra.» (A9) «Smuglerne er klar over at det er folk som er ute etter de, så tror jeg også at de er kjent med at de ikke mister så mye til offentlige myndigheter. Risikoen for et stort organisert kriminelt miljø er jo ganske liten, hvert fall siden de stort sett bruker «små soldater» inn i	Well-defined and clear regulations and rules regarding different goods can significantly influence their handling process. Changes in the regulations affect what are the most significant threats coming from criminal environments, as well as goods for smugglers. When regulations and rules are more precise and straightforward, customs officers at the border have an easier job, such as being able to perform their duties more efficiently.Regulations and rules also affect	Analysed intelligence information is focused on answering a need. One of these needs may be to within different areas in critical areas such as national security. Intelligence information from the Norwegian Customs Agency can provide insight that may not be available elsewhere, and the advantage of this is to stop illegal flows of goods from coming to Norway (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, n.d.). As pointed out in the interview with interviewee C, the main task of the intelligence divisions in the

	arbeidet. Men det er helt åpenbart at de kommer til å tilpasse seg det, hvis det er mest lønnsomt å ta inn ett eller annet som er mindre farlig eller mindre sjanse for at du blir dømt for, så kommer kriminaliteten til å tilpasse seg det.» (A10) «For noen år siden, jeg tror det er tre år siden kanskje, så hadde Europol en stor aksjon mot glassål, kiloprisen for glassål var ca. en fjerdedel av kokain, og fengselsdommene var ikke i nærheten av det du fikk for å produsere kokain. Da så de at organiserte kriminelle faktisk begynte å smugle glassål istedenfor kokain.» (A11) «Vi forvalter regelverket for så mange etater, og de er egentlig hjelpeløse. Miljødirektoratet, arbeidstilsynet og legemiddelverket vet egentlig ikke hva som skjer. De vet ikke hva som krysser grensen. Det er vi de eneste som vet.» (B7) «Jeg tror det er blitt mindre fiskesmugling ut. Det har jeg ikke noe statistikk på, men vi har vært flinke på å drive forebyggende, regelverket har blitt tydeliggjort og den store mengden tyskere har sluttet å så mye fisk ut av Norge. Det er den eneste trusselen jeg kommer på som faktisk har blitt litt mindre.» (B8) «For eksempel brun sneglen dukket opp i Norge de siste 10 årene, det er på grunn av at den har krysset grensen med noen varer som vi skulle kontrollert og stoppet og kastet ut brun sneglen. Det ble ikke gjort, nå er brun sneglen her. Hvor mye det koster, det kan man regne på sant. Spørsmålet er hva er neste brun snegl og hvor dyrt og farlig blir det i forhold til næringsmidlene, dyrehelse eller menneskehelse til syvende og sist. Vi bruker kanskje veldig mye energi på 10kg kokain i forhold til hvor mye vi leter etter brun sneglen.» (B9) «For vi trenger liksom å vite hva mener dere det er viktigst å gjøre noe med, hva er det som er sånn ja, det er kanskje sånn i utlandet, men er det sånn her? En del av disse her stedene kan ha fagmyndighet, men de vet ikke nødvendigvis så mye om import og eksport. [...] Men for eksempel så har vi at toll, fisk og skatt sammen ser på fiskeeksport. Fordi der er det helt opplagt at du kan ikke eksportere fisk du ikke har fanget holdt jeg på å skulle si, det går en verdikjede for eksempel først var Fiskeridepartementet på ballen, så kom Skatteetaten som har med salg å gjøre, så	what type of goods smugglers use, and smugglers are fully aware that they are doing something illegal and that customs and police are out to catch them for doing this. Therefore, smugglers networks often use middlemen to prevent those at the top from being caught. More precise regulations and rules make it easier for customs officers at the border to select samples, carry out confiscations, and generally carry out checks at the borders. It also makes it easier for tourists and others who want to follow the law if the legislation is clear to them, as it cannot be easily misunderstood or perceived differently. Fish smuggling is an example presented by two interviewees in different areas. Interviewee B points out that there has been less fish smuggling out of Norway. While interviewee C talks about collaboration between Norwegian Customs Agency, the Norwegian Tax Agency, and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, which plays a significant role within fish smuggling. The main task of the intelligence divisions is to get the customs officers at the borders to control goods and objects that are most important for society	Norwegian Customs is to get the customs officers at the borders to control goods and objects that are most important for society and national security. With the job of controlling goods and values that cross the border, the agency operates on behalf of other authorities as well since these authorities are not directly engaged or involved in the actual handling of cross-border goods (Lindrup & Meisfjordskar, 2023). Strategic goods may be seen as multi-use goods and be linked together with components that can pose a significant threat to society when put together with other components. The consequences of not controlling such goods may result in increased military capacity by threat actors or foreign countries and loss of reputation for Norwegian businesses (especially the Customs Agency) (Tolletaten, 2022e). The use of digital aids has helped to make it easier for travellers to clear customs goods and thereby make border control more efficient (Tolletaten, 2021). One loophole is sufficient for the entire control system to collapse. To prevent this from happening, a number of regulations have been drawn up that deal with control measures and provisions on the customs

	kommer toll til slutt, så man kan se på ting sammen.» (C9) «Men hovedoppgaven vår er å få Tolletaten til å kontrollere det som er viktig for samfunnet at vi kontrollerer.» (C10) «Vi fikk kritikk fordi vi ikke kontrollerte strategiske varer fordi hva er det da? Hvordan finner jeg det riktige der?» (D10) «Også har vi den ryggen, vi har fått temaledelse på strategiske varer, så da har vi laget en rygg for strategiske varer.» (D11). «Det er mye enklere å drive med å kontrollere mot narkotika enn hvitvasking, for hvor stammer pengene fra da?» (D12) «Nå vil man importere mer av enkelt komponentene som sammen kan bli noe farlig, både ut og inn. Så det kompliserer jo vår jobb fordi de enkelt komponentene vil ikke være regulert før de blir satt sammen til å bli noe så farlig.» (D13) «Vareførsel er komplisert og det er ufattelig mange varetypekategorier.» (E10) «[redacted] Russlandkrigen, [redacted] Men der har vi redusert risikoen betydelig, vi har økt fokus på det. Så selv om trusselen er stor så har vi lukket sårbarheten, vi har jobbet med å få ned sårbarheten knyttet til akkurat det temaet. Så vi kan jo si sånn sett at vi har redusert risikoen ganske betydelig» (E11) «Jeg kan begynne med eksternmiljøet da, [...] i og med at tolldirektøren har bestemt at strategiske varer er et viktig fokus område.» (E12).	and national security. The controls must be carried out and kept targeted. One of the challenges that will possibly grow in the future when it comes to the movement of goods is the import of individual components. Put together, these individual components can contribute to a threat, and thus, this complicates the job for the Norwegian Customs that these goods will not be regulated until they are put together. A general definition of strategic goods needs more focus, as unclear definitions can cause confusion among customs workers, and it will be difficult to control a type of product that the customs officers do not know what it means. Since in the wake of the unclear definition, team management has been set up within strategic assets, it points forward in the right direction. In the customs agency, work has been done to reduce vulnerabilities linked to the ongoing war, as vulnerabilities that would have had an effect on Norway, the customs agency, and the movement of goods in, out, and through Norway.	authority's controls (Lindrup & Meisfjordskar, 2023). When it comes to the customs officer at the border, clarity in rules and regulations is significant for them to operate with greater efficiency and benefit tourists and others who aim to comply with the law, as it cannot be easily perceived or misunderstood differently. For money laundering, techniques and methods are often used within criminal circles to prevent various customs authorities from discovering it (Tolletaten, 2022e; Cassara, 2015). Around different nations with different regulations, criminals send money and goods to make it appear that the money comes from legitimate sources.
Border control	«I sin enkleste form så mener jeg at alt etterretningsarbeid egentlig er støtte til å ta en beslutning. Altså en beslutning som egentlig uten etterretning vil bli tatt på et litt tynnere grunnlag enn hvis man hadde etterretning som	Intelligence support as the basis behind the choices of what is controlled, based on which threats are the	In Norway the border controls placements are based on risk assessments (Tolletaten, 2022a). Based on intelligence

	støtte. Også vil jeg ikke skille på nivåer egentlig, men det er ulike former for beslutninger man skal ta. Så i Tolletaten ville det være tolldirektørens vurderinger av hvilke trusler som er de største, altså hvor man må sette inn innsatsen, helt ned på objektsnivå – Hvilken bil man skal stoppe eller hvilke passasjer som skal kontrolleres.» (A12) «Finansdepartementet fant ut at de skulle satse på etterretning i Tolletaten i 2016/17. De la inn i tildelingsbrevet at dette skulle Tolletaten satse på, [redacted], men jeg mener det å jobbe mer med etterretning må bli et av virkemidlene vi har for å avdekke litt mer komplekse smuglingsforsøk, og teknologi selvfølgelig.» (A13) «Etterretning vil jo kunne gi mer trusselvurdert og lik plukk. Enten på type varer eller på varebærer som vi kaller det.» (B10) «Ideelt sett så er det så store volum som kommer over grensen, ideelt sett skal det hjelpe at vi liksom kontrollerer det riktige, og at de som ikke har gjort noe ulovlig ikke skal bli kontrollert.» (C11) «Vi har da på to nivåer da, at vi, første er at vi liksom skal på en måte gi styring til informasjon. Da til ledere om hva man bør prioritere. Fordi historisk så har Tolletaten, [redacted], at man har i stor grad har bestemt selv som toller. Hvis du da for eksempel er veldig opptatt av (...) av hunder da for eksempel, så kunne du ha litt sånn eget privat fokus på ulovlig valpeimport. [...] Da er meningen at etterretning skal være med på å (...) litt få frem hva som har store samfunnskonsekvenser, og hva som ikke har så store samfunnskonsekvenser.» (C12) «[redacted] knyttet til etterretning også andre ting enn kun etterretning, sant? [redacted] Men der har vi nå etablert nasjonale masker, der vi mangler teknologien til å gjøre dette sånn som det vil, skulle ønske det skjedde magisk. Men vi legger inn lenker der som gjør at vår korte analysevurdering til den kontroll, men også hvis det er behov for veiledning til kontroll er linket i masketilslaget. Så da vil jo en toller, hvis han i det tilfelle er vant til å jobbe med narkotikatyper og kommer til en problemstilling er ukjent for vedkommende, vareførsel er komplisert og det er ufatteligmange varetypekategorier og regelverkseier får umiddelbar tilgang til den vurderingen som ligger bak.» (E13)	biggest right down to object level. Respondent A believes that working with intelligence is one of the tools that the Norwegian Customs Service has to uncover slightly more complex smuggling attempts. Intelligence information will give the customs officers a more targeted assessment of individuals to be subject to control based on potential threats. Ideally, intelligence in the customs agency should help the inspections and the custom officers to select the right objects.	assessments and support, it is the basis behind the choice of what is controlled. The Norwegian Customs Service aims to ensure that values are crossed in a safe and legal manner and that these values are registered (Tolletaten, 2022a). In respectively order and law, the agency is defined as an actor in border control (Tolletaten, 2023). Customs officers gain valuable insights into this process by using intelligence information at border crossing points. Intelligence and digitalisation are critical for the Customs to ensure that targeted control operations are carried out (Tolletaten, 2022h, 00:48). The compliance pyramid (OECD, 2004) indicates that it should be easy for actors within legal crossings of the border to get into the country effectively. In contrast, those who try to import illegal goods or shipments are the ones who are hit hardest by the forces of the law.

Future perceptions	«Jeg vil si at man må ha god kunnskap om teknologi, egentlig åpen for at ting utvikler seg uten at man nødvendigvis kan alt om den utviklingen som utvikler seg på forhånd, så tilpasningsdyktighet og evnen til å ta inn nye måter å jobbe på.» (A14) «Jeg tror, dette er ikke bare Tolletaten sitt problem, egentlig et samfunnsproblem, vi må bli enda flinkere til å dele store datamengder mellom ulike deler av staten, ikke bare en mer-rapport eller en vurdering av oss til noen andre, men egentlig: Hvordan skal vi samarbeide om dataene på en god måte?» (A15) «Jeg nevnte jo ikke at jeg tror personell blir en utfordring i fremtiden, det er jo veldig mange etterretningsmiljøer som dukker opp, men jeg ser jo at vi er en attraktiv arbeidsplass.» (A16) «Jeg ser for meg at kunstig intelligens kommer susende og at den kompetansen som i dag, med at man i toll spesifikt, har enten veldig fagkompetanse på en ting eller en bred kunnskapsportefølje.» (B11) «Jeg tror IT, selve spesialkunnskapen med programmeringen, ikke selve arbeidet med IT, kommer til å bli mindre viktig egentlig. Men at man forstår begrensningene i IT, altså *shit in – shit out* problematikken eller at dumme spørsmål gir dumme svar.» (B12) «At det blir bedre og bedre utenat vi merker det. Og med større og større datamengder og kobling av større og større data (…) Jeg driver fremdeles og håper på enten *augmented reality* eller *virtual*. [...] Å se på en skjerm og jobbe på en skjerm slår meg som gammeldags egentlig, når man skal koble tredimensjonalt og store datamengder. Så større datamengder, og nye interessante måter å koble de på.» (B13) «Ja garantert, med forskjellige plattformer og kontinuerlig læring [redacted]. Det må vi bli flinkere til, ellers skal ikke vi bruke alle de nye nyhetene vi får da. Min arbeidshverdag tror jeg kommer til å være det samme som leverandør input til datamaskin som skal gi meg noe tilbake. Menneske mellom dataene holdte jeg på å skulle si». (B14) «Jeg tror på en økende profesjonalisering av kriminelle miljø, dessverre. Sånn som muligens kokainbransjen fungerer nå sånn som aksjeforetak, at folk kjøper deler av en last og får gevinsten av lasten hvis den lykkes. Rett og slett en oppstikking av kriminaliteten der, at man har investorer som er langt vekke i	For the future intelligence worker, the perceptions from the interviewees are based on the fact that they must have a good knowledge of technology, intelligence-related professional competence, understand problems surrounding limitations in IT and digital tools, a broad portfolio of knowledge, openness to development, ability to familiarise oneself with new phenomena, be critical of sources, and be adaptable. Furthermore, it is important to use both the rate of intelligence and the tools that go with it, humans together with technology. The future is not built towards continuing to use the intelligence cycle in the same way as it has been done in the past. The future will not be based around the cycle as was done earlier in the history of intelligence. Going forward, it will be necessary for the Intelligence Division and Norwegian Customs to collaborate better and share acquired data across organisations to exploit more opportunities. Internal cooperation between the various divisions, departments and sections will also be essential. As personnel in particular, access to	*Future for intelligence work and intelligence workers*: Hare & Coghill (2012) state that in the future, intelligence analysts may need less basic specialist knowledge and rather more reasoning skills. There is agreement among the respondents in this study that future intelligence workers need good background knowledge together with knowledge and technology, IT competence, professional competence, being critical of sources, and a general broad portfolio of knowledge. The respondents' presentations of future characteristics related to intelligence industry workers also show agreement with Vaage & Sundal's (2021) presentations of future workers: Constant learner, adaptability, and familiarity with measures, methods, and working tools. As Treverton (2014) mentioned, human and technical resources were prided after the Cold War when collecting information. As in several of the respondents' accounts, emphasises humans and technology in interaction. In addition, the respondents show agreement about humans and technology in interaction, and digital tools and aids, such as AI, cannot replace the worker or the analysis in the future. It is also presented by

	fra det hele. Det er kanskje litt sånn i dag, men jeg tror den trenden sterkes. Avhengig av hvordan for eksempel kryptovaluta, hvordan det utvikler seg, hvis det blir mer utbredt så sliter vi tror jeg. Hvis usynlig kryptovaluta som vi ikke kan kontrollere, da er det farlig for oss.» (B15) «Jeg vil tro ressurser. Vi har allerede en veldig liten etat som ikke har fått mye ressurser, staten må spare penger.» (B16) «Så hoved trusselen er manko på folk og manko på kompetanse på de nye verktøyene, og kostnad for de nye verktøyene.» (B17) «Toll er på grensen, men egentlig alt internasjonalt samarbeid trengs og kanskje i de områdende som jeg nevnte faunasikkerhet eller matvaresikkerhet, at der må vi hjelpe til å styrke det samarbeidet. Fordi det er kun vi som ser hva som går over grensen, det gjør ingen andre.» (B18) «Mange av disse truslene vi forholder oss til er organisert kriminalitet, eller det er jo først og fremst dem vi skal gå etter og da (...) Vi er jo ikke i EU, men vi er opptatt av det Europol sier, ikke sant? Det der med at disse organiserte blir mer og mer grenseoverstridene og at de er multikriminelle og driver i flere bransjer. Og jeg tror kanskje at vi ville sagt, [redacted], men det ser ut som vi også, der hvor jeg sitter, at vi i større og større grad bør hekte oss på innsats som gjøres i Europol da. Eller sånn at hvis EU-landene har en satsning mot forskjellig kriminalitet, så bør vi i større grad (...) i iallfall ta stilling til å bli med.» (C13) «Jeg så bare, [redacted], at det var antall ansatte det siste årene hvor mye det har gått ned da. Så det, det er helt opplagt at hvis vi skal lykkes så må vi ha de som kontrollerer.» (C14) «Også antall tollere, også etterretning oppfattes som altså en hjelp, noe man må ha tro på, ikke noe som bare er overstyring. Sånn at man beholder motivasjonen til de som skal kontrollere, det tror jeg er veldig viktig.» (C15) «Kildekritikk. Det er kanskje noe av det viktigste, det er ikke mangel på kilder.» (D14) «AI vil jo at det blir enda mer tilgjengelig, men hvis du bare bruker data uten (...) Altså, behovet for ACH-metoden, for motstridende hypoteser, blir enda sterkere.» (D15) «Det er måten du googler på, eller måten du søker kilder. Det er så mange falske positive og blir mer av det der ute. At da det å være	resources will be considered a challenge in the years ahead. One factor influencing this is that threat actors possibly have access to more money than the budget for the agency. Looking deeper into the future, the customs officers on the border must consider intelligence as a help and motivation to carry out their job as best as possible. The Intelligence Division is dependent on customs officers using their information. The customs officer sees what comes across the border and a great deal more than what the intelligence workers behind a desk sees, further forward the Intelligence Division depends on the customs officer. Digitisation, AI, drones - growth of digital tools for threat actors and the intelligence community. Intelligence must focus on using these tools correctly, again, humans and technology. It is essential to be aware that digital aids are influenced by who uses them and how they are used. Another perception brought to light is the professionalisation of the criminal environment. The threat actors coming in and towards the future will actively search for the weaknesses of the Customs and goods	Kristoffersen & Hatlebrekke (2022) that the diversity of knowledge among intelligence and intelligence workers has a growing importance for achieving future goals. Today's threat picture is coloured by the war in Ukraine (Tolletaten 2022e, Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet 2022). This war will likely affect the movement of goods, border controls, and other tasks of the Norwegian Customs. Since digital tools like AI can be influenced by the way issues are defined and searched for, it is crucial to check up on sources of references and verify information obtained from various data sources (Kommunal- og distriktsdepartementet 2020). Respondent D also comments on this and states that it is a way of searching that is important when using such tools and aids, in addition to checking information and the sources that come out with this help. Technological advancements have enabled machines to handle time-consuming tasks, allowing analysts to focus on tasks that require human judgment. However, people are still an essential part of such operations and analysis processes because of ensuring the accuracy of results.

	kildekritisk og gå bakover og hvor dette egentlig stammer ifra er kjempe viktig, det å ha referanser bakover. Det ser vi at man tar informasjon også gjør man det, og jo flere ganger det nevnes jo sannere blir det. Det er jo ikke sånn.» (D16) «Største utfordringen er å få etterretning til å (...) altså at det ikke blir bare etterretning, men at det blir til noe som kan teste ut og bruke aktivt. Fordi hvis noen spør oss i dag hva er effekten av etterretningen? Så kan ikke vi svare på det i det heletatt.» (D17) «Sånn generelt på trussel så vil for landet så er oppkjøp av utenlandske bedrifter det er jo et voksende problem. Nå vet jeg at det jobbes med fenomenet, men er jo en kompleks (...) Hvis du tar Bergen Engines saken, det er et klassisk eksempel på hvor man da prøver å få kjøpt en vare, så får man ikke kjøpt varen og ender opp med at man prøver å kjøpe selskapet isteden. Fordi når man har fått kontroll på selskapet så kan man deklarer på en sånn måte at du får varen forbi vår kontroll. Så det handler om hvem sitter med makta og styringa i et selskap. Det er fremdeles selvdeklareringsprinsippet og du kan mistenke så mye du vil, men det handler om (...) det er tillitsbasert da.» (D18) «Internett har kommet for å bli, det er lett å få tak i ting, men det betyr jo ikke at vi skjønner hvordan og hvorfor de gjør det. Gjør de det fordi de ikke fikk tak i det? Eller gjør de det for å lure et system? Eller hva ligger bak? Jeg tror fremover så vil det være veldig viktig med veldig bred kompetanse da, og evne til å sette seg inn i nye fenomener.» (D19) «Ja, altså gode bestillinger og god oppdragsdialog da. For det handler ikke om å få en bestill også bare ja nå svarer vi ut. Da begynner den diskusjonen da, ja okei, jeg ser du har skrevet dette, forstår jeg det riktig når. Hvis ikke du gjør den, så svarer antageligvis får han feil svar. Fordi han tror han har vært veldig tydelig, du tror det er veldig tydelig, da ender du opp med å svare på noe annet enn det han spurte om også dette kan jeg ikke bruke. Det er en klassisk etterreningssvikt da.» (D20) «For min del så er mye av veksten knyttet til at det er krig i Ukraina og det er et sanksjonsregime som begynner å bli komplisert også knytter det seg til litt større trender, som verden i endring, sant? Som gjør at jeg tror vi må også se mer på varer fra Kina, varer frasendt fra Kina i fremtiden. All den tid, det landet har også dukket mer og mer opp	handling to get the goods flow to go where they want. Within the intelligence community, there are perceptions related to methods for conflicting hypotheses, and respondent D believes this will become even more important in the future. It is essential to start the work at the bottom by creating several different hypotheses, not getting hung up on one hypothesis and following only this further. The work carried out at border controls and with movement of goods is based on trust. One factor that could become a growing threat to the future of goods transport within these frameworks is the acquisition of foreign companies. It is also important to have a clear dialogue for intelligence needs, in the form of the intelligence workers and the person ordering an intelligence product. This is to avoid intelligence failures, as the communication may need to be clarified from one of the given parties. The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine affects the movement of goods. The sanctions regime might significantly influence forthcoming trends in the flow and transport of goods.	The importance of dialog with the consumer when working on an intelligence product is highlighted: With interviewee D's statement and in Graner & McGlynn (2016), the importance of clear dialogues and communication around ordering and working with intelligence products is presented in order to prevent intelligence failure and misunderstandings throughout the process in the intelligence work. *Better collaborating:* During the COVID-19 pandemic, one particularly important thing was that the Norwegian Customs was led to interaction between themselves and several cooperating agencies (Prop. 1 S (2022-2023), p. 79). Organised crime grows across several borders and becomes a cross-border threat. As these criminal networks grow, it is important for Norwegian Customs to expenditure to get involved to a greater extent in the efforts made in international customs and trade communities, and more cooperation across national borders. According to Lowenthal (2017), the need for intelligence will likely expand in the future because of emerging and new threats. The factor of broader distribution of intelligence helps to make cooperation between different

	i trusselvurderinger. Og ha blikket også på politisk ledelse. Så tror jeg på trussel siden, så det vi har fått mer av den siste tiden av krigen i Ukraina er at vi blir introdusert i større grad til avansert pågående trusselaktører, statlige, eller forlengelse av de som kan være organisert kriminalitet på vareførselsområdet.» (E14) «Nå henger vi så tett sammen i noen systemer som ICS2 eksempelvis så er det hele EU som samspiller, og hvis vi da tar dårlig data inn der så ødelegger vi for alle, og det gjelder alle stater. Så jeg tror denne kampen mot datakvalitet blir viktig.» (E15)		intelligence environments and agencies important. An increasing professionalisation of the criminal environment also requires increasing intelligence products and information to stop the relevant threat actors. Linked to interviewee B's statement about concern for further professionalisation of the criminal environment, multi-criminals often operate in several networks simultaneously. The concern for Norway is particularly related to narcotics and that Norway may become a transit country in the future (Buggeland, 2023). The newspaper article by Buggeland (2023) puts light on combating this type of crime and to be able to stop factors that contribute to Norway becoming a transit country. It will be important in the future for cooperation between Økomkrim, Kripos, and customs (Buggeland, 2023). Furthermore, Norwegian Customs should also gain access to more resources, especially in the form of more customs officers, as previously mentioned by all the respondents. *Access to resources:* It has been brought up repeatedly in the interviews that the respondents see a lack of personnel as a challenge in the future, especially with a focus on the customs officials at the border. According to Norwegian Customs

			(2022g), there will be more customs officers who will retire in the upcoming years (and combined with that a more complex threat picture and the growth of the movement of goods) makes a crucial need for more customs officers. The labor market and the agency's challenge in recruiting and retaining qualified employees are explained in the Customs Agency's annual report for 2022 (Tolletaten, 2023). Here it is presented that the agency has implemented initiatives to ensure recruitment and competence, with the help of the new bachelor's program and measures to recruit personnel with other relevant education who will receive customised intensive customs education (Tolletaten, 2023). The Norwegian Customs Agency's annual report for 2022 (2023) emphasises that the social mission's future solution is challenged by the increasingly tight financial situation the agency is in. This points to costly interventions such as replacing old equipment, utilising and acquiring new technology, and further developing IT solutions managed by the agency.