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In All But Name:

U.S. Informal Imperialism in Latin and South America

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Introduction

When thinking about U.S. Cold War intervention in Latin and South America the most common examples are of direct and military meddling in other countries, such as the Bay of Pigs, Nicaragua's contra operation and the invasion of Grenada. The history of U.S. intervention in Latin and South America is however filled with other examples of more subversive and indirect actions to influence another country's political climate. This is what the paper will focus on and seeks to illustrate. The thesis statement of the text can best be summarized as: to what extent were the Monroe Doctrine, the policy of containment and the OAS charter used to defend and excuse U.S. intervention, and how did the usage of informal imperialism shape U.S. hegemonic control over the western hemisphere.

This paper will examine the coups in Guatemala and Chile as case studies to analyze how U.S. intervention in Latin and South American countries could be defended through the foreign policy guidance of the Monroe Doctrine. Together with the policy of containment and the OAS charter, the U.S. could excuse intervening in domestic political situations of other nations in the region. The measures of intervention will be judged through the theory of informal imperialism and aims to show the means in which the U.S. imposes control over the western hemisphere in hegemonic imperial ways. The theory of informal imperialism can best be summarized as a control over an empire through indirect means such as economic or political reliance but will be explored further in this paper.

This paper will start off with some brief introductions to most critical terms followed by the two case studies which have a summary of events first and analysis second. This text intends to elucidate the inexplicit ways in which the U.S. involved itself in other countries' political environment to cause changes in line with their strategic interests. To cause change where needed to keep control over the western hemisphere while keeping their hands relatively clean. Hence the limits of this text reserves itself to the Guatemalan coup of 1954 and the Chilean coup of 1973, which on the surface were coups consisting of the country's own military overthrowing the government, however subversive U.S. intervention was prevalent. The measures used by the U.S. in the coups will be evaluated through the theory of informal imperialism and how they relate to U.S. capitalist and hegemonic control of Latin and South America. The Monroe Doctrine and

Policy of Containment will be examined in order to see how the interventionist measures could be defended through semantics and recontextualizing its purpose, goals, and how righteous the crusade against communism was. In order to further examine how this defense and recontextualization looks like we'll be analyzing the Organization of American States (OAS) primary documents such as its original charter of principles, the Rio Pact signed just before its creation, and Meetings of Consultations of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Historiographical Review

The Monroe doctrine has been well explored within academia concerning U.S. foreign policy and has been looked at from various angles. However, when discussing it there is a tendency to write about the doctrine from 'start to finish' and providing a complete chronological review of the rise of the American hegemony up until present day. Other researchers have taken the approach in which they focus on drawing long lines of American foreign policy both changing and unchanging and how it evolved throughout numerous examples.^{1 2 3}

Academic literature within this scope of research predominantly focus on the effectiveness of OAS, potential areas of improvement, with many examining it through the lens of post-cold war OAS.^{4 5 6} The level of involvement OAS had in the various political situations isn't of particular interest to this text but rather the theoretical and principal frameworks put forth by OAS and how it sets up a defense for U.S. imperialism. There is an academic article that looks at something similar to the angle this text aims to analyze, however that is a legal review. It

¹ Brian Loveman, *No Higher Law: American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere since 1776* (USA: The university of North Carolina Press, 2010)

² Gretchen Murphy and Donald E. Pease, *Hemispheric Imaginings: The Monroe Doctrine and Narratives of U.S. Empire* (USA: Duke University Press, 2005)

³ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications." *Presidential Quarterly* vol.36, no.1 (2006) 5-16

⁴ Craig Arceneaux and David Pion-Berlin, "Issues, Threats, and Institutions: Explaining OAS Responses to Democratic Dilemmas in Latin America." *Latin American Politics and Society* Vol.49, no.2 (2007)

⁵ Betty Horwitz, *The Transformation of the Organization of American States: A Multilateral Framework for Regional Governance*. (London: Anthem Press, 2010)

⁶ Andrew Cooper and Thomas Legler, *Intervention Without Intervening?: The OAS Defense and Promotion of Democracy in the Americas*. (USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)

concentrates on the actual legal consequences, looks at the uses of UN's legal framework, and was written in 1970, before the Chilean coup discussed later in this work.⁷

Literature concerning U.S. intervention in Guatemalan predominantly focus on the communist threat that Arbenz posed and the U.S. reaction thereafter.⁸ There tends to be focus on U.S. and CIA covert action used in effecting the regime change and its subsequent consequences.⁹ The coup in Chile has a notable amount of historiography behind it, but also focuses on the clandestine means used to affect the regime change. The CIA, Henry Kissinger, and various diplomats are topics of interest, but direct mentions of U.S. empire are lacking, and the closest analysis would be the discussions around controlling the region.^{10 11} There are preexisting discussions and analyses examining the ideology behind the regime changes, however rarely been explored through the theory of informal imperialism.¹²

The historiography surrounding the theory of informal imperialism has largely focused on definitional debates as to what an empire is, how it works and what is needed to be label it as such.¹³ The usage of the theory in specific examples has generally been limited to analyzing the empires of European powers, which were empire more in line with the literal and territorial version of imperialism.¹⁴ The historiography around viewing the U.S. intervention in Latin and South American through the lens of the informal imperialism is considerably lacking, especially

⁷ Ann Van Wynen Thomas and AJ Thomas Jr, "The Organization of American States and the Monroe Doctrine - Legal Implications." *Louisiana Law Review* Vol.30, No.4 (1970)

⁸ Melissa Willard-Foster, *Toppling Foreign Governments: A Multilateral Framework for Regional Governance: The Logic For Regime Change* (USA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), 118-120

⁹ Andrew Thomson, *Outsourced Empire: How Militias, Mercenaries and Contractors Support US Statecraft* (London: Pluto Press, 2018), 118-120

¹⁰ Stephen Rabe, *Kissinger and Latin America: Intervention, Human Rights, and Diplomacy* (USA: Cornell University Press, 2020), 52-65

¹¹ Mike Gonzalez, "The Iron Fist: Chile 1973," In *Arms and the People: Popular Movements and the Military from the Paris Commune to the Arab Spring*, edited by Mike Gonzalez and Houman Barekat (London: Pluto Press, 2013) 211-230

¹² Tanya Harmer, *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War* (USA: University of North Carolina Press, 2011) 252-254

¹³ Bernard Attard, "Informal Empire: The Origin and Significance of a key term," *Modern Intellectual History* Vol.20, No.4 (2023): 1219-1250

¹⁴ David Todd, *A Velvet Empire: French Informal Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (USA: Princeton University Press, 2021), 25-71

when using the theory from Gallagher and Robinson.¹⁵ Features of U.S. intervention that could classify as informal imperialist means are referred to often.^{16 17}

Monroe Doctrine

The Monroe Doctrine was developed in 1823 as a foreign policy approach, outlining possible U.S. involvement to deter western imperial powers from intervening in the Western hemisphere.¹⁸ The doctrine was further evolved in the beginning of the 20th century with the Roosevelt Corollary which expanded the possible usage, where the U.S. could intervene in other American countries to avoid involvement from European countries.^{19 20} With the wish of Latin and South American countries the doctrine changed again with Franklin D. Roosevelt replacing it with his “Good Neighbor Policy”, one that stood for supporting fellow American countries but standing firm in the policy of nonintervention.²¹

This started to change in the aftermath of WWII when the remaining superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union became involved in the ideological battle known as the Cold War.²² The Monroe Doctrine resurfaced as the ideological fear and threat of communism spreading to Latin and South America came into play.²³ An international power involving themselves in the western hemisphere made Monroe Doctrine relevant again. This brought back the Roosevelt version where the U.S. could involve itself in the affairs of other American countries for the purpose of keeping the threat of communism at bay.²⁴ The Monroe Doctrine would then work

¹⁵ Keith Griffin and John Gurley, “Radical Analyses of Imperialism, the Third World, and the Transition to Socialism: A Survey Article,” *Journal of Economic Literature* Vol.23, No.3 (1985): 1089-1143

¹⁶ Attard, “Informal Empire.”, 1234

¹⁷ Kris James Mitchener and Marc Weidenmier, “Empire, Public Goods, and the Roosevelt Corollary.” *The Journal of Economic History* Vol.65, No.3 (2005): 658-659

¹⁸ Gilderhus, “The Monroe Doctrine.”, 5-6

¹⁹ Walter Lafeber, “The ‘Lion in the Path’: the U.S. Emergence as a World Power,” *Political Science Quarterly* Vol.101, No.5 (1986): 715-716

²⁰ Mitchener and Weidenmier, “Empire, Public Goods, and the Roosevelt Corollary.” 661-663

²¹ Loveman, *No Higher Law*. 243

²² Murphy and Pease, *Hemispheric Imaginings.*, 147

²³ Tony Smith, *America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy- Expanded Edition* (USA: Princeton University Press, 2012), 221

²⁴ Martin Sicker, *The Geopolitics of Security in the Americas: Hemispheric Denial from Monroe to Clinton* (USA: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2001), 124

together with the policy of containment to defend U.S. intervention in other countries in the region.²⁵

Policy of containment

The policy of containment was a principal strategy of the U.S. political and ideological war to confine the spread of communism to other places as well as weakening the ideological structure of it.²⁶ There was not one strategy of containment but rather a key part of controlling the expansion of communism, meant the use not only military but also economical, diplomatic and other more subversive means to achieving this goal.²⁷ This ideological war often gets simplified into capitalist vs. communist, us vs. them, allies vs. enemies.²⁸ With the early clash of the Korean war it started to become clear, which side was allying with whom. It ends up oversimplifying the political landscape and the true ideology of countries' system of government to nearly a binary line of left and right.²⁹ Subtle differences like democratic socialism not being the same as communism, or totalitarian dictatorships not truly being a problem as long as they're on the right side, as Brian Loveman puts it.³⁰

Furthermore, with this battle of ideologies, countries around the globe could be boiled down to strategic puppet, or proxy pieces which the two superpowers would try to win over to their side, as any state with the opposing ideological system would be considered a threat.³¹ This was especially the case for the U.S. as the many countries in its hemisphere had recently become both independent and democratic which made them more susceptible to communist threats.³²

²⁵ Alan McPherson, *A Short History of U. S. Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Short History* (USA: John Wiley & Sons, 2016), 133

²⁶ Smith, *America's Mission*. 116

²⁷ Thomas G. Mahnken, "Containment." In *The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft*, edited by Hal Brands and Jeremy Suri (USA: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 133-135

²⁸ Murphy and Pease, *Hemispheric Imaginings*, 147

²⁹ Mahnken, "Containment." 137

³⁰ *In the American case, inability or indisposition of policymakers to distinguish between nationalist, anticolonialist, and pro-Soviet movements and governments often put the United States on the side of right-wing dictatorships and military regimes in the name of containment or rollback of 'communism'* Loveman, *No Higher Law*. 255

³¹ Lindsey A. O'Rourke, *Covert Regime Change: America's Secret Cold War* (USA: Cornell University Press, 2018), 108

³² Richard H. Immerman, "Guatemala as Cold War History." *Political Science Quarterly* Vol.95, no.4 (1980): 630

Informal Imperialism

The term, popularized by Gallagher and Robinson in their 1953 paper “The imperialism of free trade”, sets out to challenge the concept of empires and their way expansion to include informal and less direct approaches particularly economic and subversive ones. Empires are not strictly defined as taking direct control of colonies, as explored by Gallagher and Robinson, highlighting how it may be acquired through economic and capitalist cooperation under the direction of the imperial power.³³ As Gallagher and Robinson put it.³⁴

While the focus of their paper is on the British empire in the Victorian era, it can be argued that it is well accustomed to being used in the era of U.S. hegemonic intervention and control of the western hemisphere during the Cold War.³⁵ The economic expansion of the British empire in Gallagher and Robinson’s paper can here be exchanged with the U.S. capitalist control, containment and keeping countries becoming communist.³⁶ Their goal was not to expand but rather remain in control of the region and preserving a democratic and capitalist “New World”.³⁷ In order to further demonstrate U.S. informal imperialism during this period, we’ll be looking at Gallagher and Robinson’s two qualifications of the informal empire.³⁸

OAS Documents

This section will focus on the primary documents of the OAS, which will become important for analysis later in the text. It lays the foundation for several ways of defending,

³³ John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” *The Economic History Review* vol.6, no.1 (1953): 1

³⁴ “*Imperialism, perhaps, may be defined as a sufficient political function of this process of integrating new regions into the expanding economy; its character is largely decided by the various and changing relationships between the political and economic elements of expansion in any particular region and time.*” Gallagher and Robinson. “The Imperialism of free trade” 5-6

³⁵ Gallagher and Robinson. “The imperialism of free trade”, 4

³⁶ Attard, “Informal Empire.”, 1234

³⁷ Loveman, *No Higher Law*, 263-264

³⁸ “*First, imperialism may be only indirectly connected with economic integration in that it sometimes extends beyond areas of economic development, but acts for their strategic protection. Secondly, although imperialism is a function of economic expansion, it is not a necessary function. Whether imperialist phenomena show themselves or not, is determined not only by the factors of economic expansion, but equally by the political and social organization of the regions brought into the orbit of the expansive society, and also by the world situation in general.*” Gallagher and Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade.” 6

reinterpreting and recontextualizing later intervention both implicit and explicit in ways that legitimized U.S. course of action wherever needed or applicable. The Rio treaty of 1947 was signed by a handful of OAS member states to be a supportive treaty aimed at creating solidarity against acts of aggression or threats to peace in the western hemisphere.³⁹ It states that an attack or threats of attack to any of the states should be considered an attack on all of the member states and recognizes the right to self-defense. The charter of the Organization of American states (1948) starts off the first article by stating that one of its core purposes.⁴⁰ ⁴¹ Article 2 also mentions an important listed purpose “*to promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect to the principle of nonintervention.*”⁴² The latter half of the article will prove particularly interesting to dissect. This continues in Article 3 which focuses on OAS’ principles.⁴³ While stated in the beginning of the charter article 3 needs to be kept in mind with the examples of indirect intervention of the USA in other American countries political and economic affairs. Another article that is quite short and could leave room for interpretation is article 15 which states: “*The right of each state to protect itself and to live its own life does not authorize it to commit unjust acts against another state.*” This particular article will be revisited when discussing what it could mean to “protect itself” and what could be signified as a threat. Article 19 builds on what was stated in Article 3 but with even more clarity.⁴⁴

This is more succinct in regards to the principle of nonintervention, this article could conflict with the other mentions of the OAS charter’s purpose of maintaining representative democracy throughout the Americas. Using one article against another to interpret the correct course of action would be key in potential defense of the imperialist tendencies of the U.S.⁴⁵ The OAS fourth meeting of consultation of ministers of foreign affairs was redirected to more

³⁹ “*prevent and repel threats and acts of aggression against any of the countries of America;*” “INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE.”

⁴⁰ “*defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and their independence.*” Charter of OAS

⁴¹ “[OAS powers has no powers outside the ones in this charter] none of whose provisions authorizes it to intervene in matters that are within the internal jurisdiction of the member states.” Charter of OAS

⁴² Charter of OAS

⁴³ “*Every state has the right to choose, without external interference, its political, economic and social system and to organize itself in the best way best suited to it, and has the duty to abstain from intervening in the affairs of another state.*” Charter of OAS

⁴⁴ “*No states or group of states has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the state or against its political, economic, and cultural elements.*” Charter of OAS

⁴⁵ Loveman, *No Higher Law*, 272

specific and urgent matters at the time, specifically the threat of communism. The importance is quite apparent as it was the first thing addressed in the meeting, the need for action and defense against aggressive actions of international communism.⁴⁶ This type of rhetoric continues with the Caracas declaration from the ninth international conference of American States.⁴⁷ As a result, the idea of what constitutes a threat or what constitutes intervention by international states started to become less rigid and more flexible.⁴⁸

The wording of “special and immediate threat to peace and security” is potent in relation to what level of intervention or subversion constituted a threat and is situated to lower the threshold needed for how one could justify intervention. Furthermore, echoes of this type of sentiment came from the fifth meeting of consultation of ministers of foreign affairs.⁴⁹ In and of itself this doesn’t seem all that disagreeable and falls in line with the stricter reading of the previously mentioned statements and articles, however the issue surrounding this comes in its lax application in some situations and complete disregard in others.

Guatemala 1954

After over 80 years of authoritarian leadership Guatemala’s revolution in 1944 led to the election of its first democratically elected leader in Juan Jose Arevalo.⁵⁰ Arevalo and by extension his successor Jacobo Arbenz Guzman spent their time from the late 40’s and early 50’s implementing large amounts of legislation in relation to worker rights and agricultural reforms. These included minimum wage requirements, the right to organize, and standards for working

⁴⁶ “such activities, in disregard of the principle of non-intervention which is deeply rooted in the Americas, disturb the tranquility of the people of this Continent and endanger the liberty and democracy on which their institutions are founded;”. Fourth Meeting of Consultations of Foreign Ministers

⁴⁷ “...international communism, by its antidemocratic nature and its interventionist tendency, is incompatible with the concept of American freedom and resolved to adopt within their respective territories the measures necessary to eradicate and prevent subversive activities.” “Caracas Declaration of Solidarity; March 28, 1954.”

⁴⁸ “The aggressive character of the international communist movement continues to constitute, in the context of world affairs, a special and immediate threat to the national institutions and the peace and security of the American States, and to the right of each state to develop its cultural, political, and economic life freely and naturally without intervention in its internal or external affairs by other States.” “Caracas Declaration of Solidarity; March 28, 1954.”

⁴⁹ “The existence of anti-democratic regimes constitutes a violation of the principles on which the Organization of American states is founded, and a danger to united and peaceful relationships in the hemisphere...” “Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers.”

⁵⁰ Immerman, “Guatemala as Cold War History.”, 632

conditions.⁵¹ These measures were arguably seen as a turning point for Guatemala's future as a modern and contemporary capitalist society.⁵² While these reforms weren't considered any serious points of contention, the agrarian reforms did instigate skepticism around what political direction the country was heading in.⁵³

Arbenz's agrarian reform bill of 1952 included plans around the expropriation and redistribution of land was the beginning of this as it caught the eye of the U.S. considering what effect this bill would have on the United Fruit Company. A company which had long enjoyed great success financially in the country when the labor and agrarian laws were less restrictive for international companies.⁵⁴ The expropriation and redistribution of land would obviously have compensation involved, however it was not to any degree that the United Fruit Company would find remotely satisfactory. This expropriation and redistribution would be where U.S. officials start to have a more nervous look upon what was happening in Guatemala and what it could lead to.⁵⁵ The communist fears would drum up soon after the effects of the bill would result in being made public overseas.

While the agrarian reform wasn't in itself any clear indication that the country was turning in a communist direction, United Fruit Company being hit economically, United Fruit started ramping up politicians and the U.S. public's fears surrounding Guatemala's political future with large lobbying efforts and publicity campaigns.⁵⁶ With the building skepticism and communist fears growing but not quite enough to consider as dangerous, the Guatemalan government and media's negative coverage of what the U.S. were doing during the Korean War raised the issue to a more substantial level. Now there was more supposed evidence that Guatemala was becoming a communist threat and that they must have some sort of soviet or Chinese connection, which in turn would make them a threat to the western hemisphere and a threat to the democratic way of life to the surrounding countries.⁵⁷

⁵¹ Willard-Foster, *Toppling Foreign Governments.*, 107

⁵² O'Rourke, *Covert Regime Change*, 118

⁵³ Joseph Smith, *The United States and Latin America: A History of American Diplomacy, 1776-2000* (UK: Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), 118

⁵⁴ McPherson, *A Short History of U. S. Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean.*, 140

⁵⁵ Smith, *America's Mission*, 193

⁵⁶ O'Rourke, *Covert Regime Change* 119

⁵⁷ Immerman, "Guatemala as Cold War History.", 636

In 1954 the CIA launched operation PBSuccess, which would ultimately lead to the coup that would oust Arbenz. They recruited and trained a small group of Guatemalan mercenaries who under the leadership of Castillo Armas, a military man with longstanding loathing for the revolutionary regimes, would get money, arms and even planes from the CIA through both Nicaragua and Honduras. The early plans of the operation relied on psychological tactics rather than military ones.⁵⁸ In the jungle close to the Guatemalan border, the mercenaries used broadcasts with anti-Arbenz propaganda to weaken the government's support among the people, combined with the use of catholic ministers who would propagate the same rhetoric in their churches caused widespread anxiety and fear as well as weakening trust in the current government.⁵⁹ The ignorance of the size of the forces against him led Arbenz to start looking for more arms in case of this growing threat, however the U.S. weaponry boycott of Guatemala led Arbenz to look to the Soviet Union for arms, to which they gladly supplied them with.⁶⁰

The communist fears that had started the operation in the first place had come to fulfillment, an isolated Guatemala had turned to the communist USSR for help, exactly what the Monroe Doctrine was meant to combat, the hemisphere was now in danger.⁶¹ The continued broadcasts as well as the American planes they had created sufficient fear and uncertainty around Arbenz' control over the country. The mounting fear and pressure of the forces against him, Arbenz gave into the calls for his resignation and fled the country.⁶²

Guatemala Analysis

With the Guatemalan coup as a case study, the many previously mentioned OAS primary documents such as their charter articles and consultations of ministers of foreign affairs will be used to analyze their potential restrictions and uses. The purpose of Article 2 as stated earlier is about promoting democracy while sticking to their principle of nonintervention, furthermore article 3 continues with the fact that every country is free to determine which form of government and policies they consider the best for their own country, without external

⁵⁸ Willard-Foster, *Toppling Foreign Governments*, 115-116

⁵⁹ Thomson, *Outsourced Empire*, 57-58

⁶⁰ Immerman, "Guatemala as Cold War History." 646

⁶¹ McPherson, *A Short History of U. S. Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean*. 143

⁶² Thomson, *Outsourced Empire*, 58

interference.⁶³ Now the interference part of article 3 is left open for interpretation, supposedly it would apply to the principle of nonintervention keep countries like U.S. interfering in their chosen style of government or policies. However it can be argued Guatemala did not choose communism as their form of government but rather they were influenced by the Soviet Union.⁶⁴ The Arbenz government was not communist by any clearly discernible degree, the policies of their agrarian and labor reforms didn't become a problem until the communist allegations began to form around the country in U.S. circles. The reforms in and of themselves weren't an issue until viewed und the light of communist expansion. Much like the McCarthyism /Red scare later that decade, the allegation that something was communist was more about fear and propaganda rather than evidence in the shape of actual policies or ideas held.⁶⁵

When the Guatemalan government and media began criticizing U.S. actions in Korea is where the suspicion and fear began to drum up to a considerable degree. President Eisenhower himself said because Guatemala criticized and had believed the accusation that U.S. had used bacterial warfare in Korea, that they must be in league with either the Soviets or Chinese. This highlights how Guatemala's unwillingness to blindly agree to U.S. narratives made them suspicious to the superpower.⁶⁶ Now that Guatemala was labelled communist, many of the articles of the OAS charter and other documents could be applied differently. As mentioned in the fourth meeting of ministers of foreign affairs, international communism was a threat to the liberty and democracy of the continent, other documents call it a threat to American freedom, as the Caracas declaration describes it.⁶⁷ ⁶⁸ Guatemala now essentially labeled a threat opens the discussion for their treatment. The Rio Pact was made with the purpose of repelling threats, and if Guatemala was seen as a threat to the safety and security of the continent, to what point can article 15 be applied when it comes to any state being able to protect itself. With the label of communist threat label upon Guatemala, the principle of nonintervention becomes muddled because of the fundamental threat it was to the freedom of the western hemisphere and that

⁶³ Charter of OAS

⁶⁴ Sicker, *The Geopolitics of Security in the Americas.*, 108

⁶⁵ "The notable aspect of this putative evidence of communism within the Guatemalan government is its dependence on McCarthy-like techniques to accuse supposed Communist" Immerman, "Guatemala as Cold War History." 636

⁶⁶ Immerman, "Guatemala as Cold War History", 636-637

⁶⁷ Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

⁶⁸ "a special and immediate threat to the national institutions and the peace and security of the American States". "Caracas Declaration of Solidarity; March 28, 1954."

intervening in such a case could be protecting oneself or protecting the region.⁶⁹ The CIA's actions and function in causing the coup of '54 could be seen as less of "...*intervening in the affairs of another state*"⁷⁰ and more as protecting the U.S. and other OAS countries from a regime that "... *constitutes a violation of the principles on which the Organization of American states is founded, and a danger to united and peaceful relationships in the hemisphere.*"⁷¹ This skewed U.S. version of intervention in Guatemala to the angle of acting on behalf of the democracy and security of the continent.

As previously mentioned, there wasn't mountains of evidence surrounding the fears of communism in Guatemala, however through the lens of the policy of containment it starts to make more sense. Communism had long been exclusive to the European continent but quickly became an area of concern with the war in Korea in effect drumming up the fear of communism spreading to other countries. So, the possibility of a Latin American country becoming communist naturally made the U.S. anxious, and like the Monroe Doctrine of the past this could be seen as invasion of the western hemisphere, though only ideological in nature.⁷² The fact that this was happening in the U.S.'s "backyard" made the need to handle this alleged communist threat that much more critical. In the notion of containing the spread of communism, the western hemisphere and its countries could be in danger should this issue not be handled properly. To keep its neighbors from falling into the hands of the Soviet Union, this threat needed to be dealt with. This is where the policy of containment and the resurfacing of the Monroe Doctrine work well together. The concept of the Monroe Doctrine was to keep international powers out of Latin and South America and could under the reading of the Roosevelt corollary allow the U.S. to intervene in other countries to stop this from happening.⁷³ This again circles back to the OAS documents that mentions the spread of communism as a threat to the peace and security of the region and incompatible with the concept of American freedom, and democracy. With this as a defense or explanation for U.S. intervention, the Monroe Doctrine served as a right of passage for involving themselves in other countries when the threat of communism arose, for the purpose of protecting the region against a foreign power, and the peace and security of the surrounding

⁶⁹ Loveman, *No Higher Law*, 271

⁷⁰ Charter of OAS

⁷¹ Fifth Meeting of Consultation Ministers of Foreign Affairs

⁷² Loveman, *No Higher Law*, 263-264

⁷³ Sicker, *The Geopolitics of Security in the Americas*, 123

countries. The policy of containment works within the framework of the Monroe Doctrine as a less abstract way of dealing with the communist threat, whether that be diplomatically, economically, or militarily.⁷⁴

The effective U.S. *modus operandi* was to intervene in a way that tip toes around what actually goes against the principle of intervention. Furthermore, as shown in the Caracas declaration, the threat that communism posed made what counted as intervention much more relaxed because the threat took the front stage.⁷⁵ The sufficient political function and integration of areas under U.S. control links well to the creation of the Organization of American States. With statements around the importance of representative democracy, American ideals of freedom and later inclusions such as the threat and danger international communism posed to the security of member states. A change in relationships and elements of disassociation from the U.S policy against communism, would make that country a danger to all member states and subsequently be isolated so the threat can be contained.

Analyzing to what degree and in which ways informal imperialism was used in the case of Guatemala, we'll begin with Gallagher and Robinson's two qualifications. The first concerning itself with that the imperialism extending beyond economic development and "*acts for their strategic protection.*" Strategic protection in this instance can be synonymous with the protection of the region from communist aggression and intervention, as the Caracas declaration calling it a threat to regional peace and security. Secondly "economic expansion", which here relates to retaining capitalism and containment of the communist threat, and that the function of imperialism is not a necessary function but rather depends on the degree of the threat but also "*...by the political and social organization of the regions brought into the orbit of the expansive society, and also by the world situation in general.*"⁷⁶ That means that the degree to which informal imperialism was executed in Guatemala depends on the strategic protection of surrounding American countries and containing the spread of communism, and the degree to which the communist threat existed within Guatemala's political situation.

⁷⁴ Loveman, *No Higher Law*, 261

⁷⁵ Loveman, *No Higher Law*, 280

⁷⁶ Gallagher and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade.", 6

When Arbenz agrarian reforms and land expropriation began hurting the United Fruit Company, the economic and communist threat seemed minimal, it wasn't until the Arbenz government criticized U.S. actions in Korea that the danger became real.⁷⁷ Guatemala had showed that it wasn't quite under the capitalist control the U.S. had thought and were beginning show signs of questioning U.S. supremacy. That is what led to the need to implement functions of informal imperialism. This distancing from capitalist U.S. hegemony in turn explained the subsequent intervention. This was alluded to in Eisenhower's 1952 explanation of the containment policy.⁷⁸

Supporting the U.S. and its fight against communism was almost a requirement for staying under the American umbrella of the capitalist hegemony in the New World and was expected of the countries in Latin and South America. They were to follow the lead of the U.S. and deviations from this would be questioned as to their allegiance and their commitment to capitalism. Then should a country deviate too far away from U.S. interests it could be seen as a sign of communist subversion and thus a threat to the region. Those unsatisfactory conditions would signify weakness of the U.S. control of the hemisphere and tactics would be deployed to alter the political landscape to a more cooperative situation.⁷⁹

The intervention by the CIA while being informal and indirect was more involved than perhaps necessary considering the ease of Arbenz's resignation, however Guatemala being one of the first communist threats in the region in the very beginning of the cold war seemed to demand that there would no chance of failure in extinguishing the communist danger threatening the regional capitalist control of the U.S. The CIA's use of Guatemalan mercenaries as well as training them, gave the U.S. little direct involvement, while still clearly steering them in the direction they wanted. In the end the coup was ultimately handled by the Guatemalan military and they "chose their own fate", at least in the eyes of the public. The usage of informal imperialist means still works as a function of the Monroe Doctrine while laying low and

⁷⁷ Immerman, "Guatemala as Cold War History.", 636

⁷⁸ "we seek hemisphere solidarity in support of our world policy and for cooperation of the Latin American nations in safeguarding the hemisphere through individual and collective defense measures against external aggression and internal subversion." Loveman, *No Higher Law*, 279

⁷⁹ "It is only when the polities of these new regions fail to provide satisfactory conditions for commercial or strategic integration and when their relative weakness allows, that power is used imperialistically to adjust those conditions." Gallagher and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade.", 6

technically following the principle of nonintervention. The informal imperialism utilized by the U.S. works in the way that countries were allowed their own self-governance given they fall in line, remain capitalist and reflect the U.S.' distain for communism. Those governments could be relied on and the U.S. subsequently would cooperate with, a "stick and carrot" situation pertaining to the right type of political style of governing.⁸⁰

The same can be said for the practice of spreading propaganda, working as a tool to correct the conditions of a country by informal means, using broadcasts as well as respected religious figures to spread anti-Arbenz sentiments. This would create the type of strong anti-Marxist circumstances that led to the military coup and ensuing military dictatorship. The need for imperial control lessened after the fall of the Arbenz regime and the installation of a military dictatorship because of the more favorable circumstances. This type of government would be much more likely to fall under the U.S. capitalist empire since it both, lacks the will or want to change political structure, and U.S. financial cooperation made for a more reliable ally.⁸¹

Another form of informal imperialist tactics used by the U.S. was containment by the way of isolation. When Arbenz government had voiced their distrust and questioned the way the U.S had conducted themselves in the Korean war, Guatemala lost important connections. U.S. military aid had been withdrawn, forcing Arbenz to look to the soviets for military aid during the beginning of the coup. On the other hand, the CIA provided the anti-Arbenz rebels with military arms and even planes.⁸² This created the climate for Arbenz' anxiety when the propaganda and the coup had started making waves, because of the not knowing the extent of the forces against him and how he could face them without a reliable way of defending militarily. The sitting government was slowly being suffocated while, with U.S. guidance, the forces against them was mounting. When a more satisfactory government emerged, the country was once again brought

⁸⁰ *"In fact, throughout the Victorian period responsible government was withheld from colonies if it involved sacrificing or endangering British paramountcy or interests."* Gallagher and Robinson. "The imperialism of free trade", 4

⁸¹ *"...as in weaker or unsatisfactory states it was considered necessary to coerce them into more co-operative attitudes"* Gallagher and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade", 9

⁸² Immerman, "Guatemala as Cold War History.", 648

into the U.S. hemispheric capitalist empire, then they would regain their allowance of self-government as well as international cooperation and support of the U.S.⁸³

Chile 1973

The context behind the 1973 Chilean coup and the U.S. intervention and role in it starts in late 50's - early 60's. The U.S. government and the CIA spent millions of dollars on advertisements through various mediums like television and radio, campaigning for support of their preferred candidate.⁸⁴ This was due to the fear of the candidate Salvador Allende, an outspoken Marxists, who held socialist/communist beliefs, what that could mean should he get in power and the threat he would create a totalitarian dictatorship. Later however, Allende, now with a new Popular Unity coalition behind him, won the election in 1970.⁸⁵ While he held Marxist and socialist beliefs Allende always prefaced that all the changes he wanted to bring to Chile, would happen through the democratic process.⁸⁶

The U.S. still believing that Allende would bring an end to democracy and was a danger to neighboring countries, started scheming. They had already spent almost 1 million dollars on propaganda and bribery of officials in 1970 alone to keep Allende from securing victory.⁸⁷ 1970 was the start of operation FUBELT, a two-step plan to undermine Allende's inauguration, one was based on bribery of politicians and the other to nudge the military into seizing power, none of which worked.⁸⁸ This however didn't stop the U.S. from targeting Chile's economy to weaken Allende's position.⁹⁰ The pressure was being applied with economic aid and Chile's ability to take loans and lines of credit being crippled, and with U.S. economic aid under Allende

⁸³ "Conversely, in proportion as satisfactory political frameworks are brought into being in this way, the frequency of imperialist intervention lessens and imperialist control is correspondingly relaxed." Gallagher and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade.", 6

⁸⁴ Rabe, *Kissinger and Latin America*, 52

⁸⁵ Gonzalez, "The Iron Fist.", 211-212

⁸⁶ "Allende further noted that "as a Socialist and as a man who believed in democratic freedom and pluralism," he sensed a desire for change in Latin America and hoped the United States would not block or frustrate those sentiments." (P.74-75) Rabe, *Kissinger and Latin America*, 74-75

⁸⁷ Goldberg, "The Politics of the Allende Overthrow in Chile.", 98

⁸⁸ Sebastián Hurtado-Torres, *The Gathering Storm: Eduardo Frei's Revolution in Liberty and Chile's Cold War* (USA: Cornell university Press, 2020), 154

⁸⁹ Smith, *The United States and Latin America*, 137

⁹⁰ Thomson, *Outsourced Empire*, 46

being a measly 7.4m USD in comparison to the 260m USD 5 years earlier. The CIA also dissuaded U.S. companies from doing business with Chile and the little economic aid that was given was purposefully put in anti-Allende leaning hands. The economic warfare the U.S. applied worked as the Chilean economy was suffering and together with unfavorable economic policies by the government were bringing the country to ruin.⁹¹ Allende even reached out to the Soviet Union for aid, which was rejected, a choice that would not surprisingly fuel the fire surrounding the communist threat of the Allende government.

The CIA then would fund the strikes that were being planned, to properly paralyze Chile's economy.⁹² With the economic landscape crumbling, the U.S. and the CIA set their sights on the military. Where they spent 33m USD in aid as well as specific anti-Allende propaganda for soldiers.⁹³ Like other coups, the military was the way when overthrowing an unfavorable leader in Latin and South America, and the CIA managed to steer the native military into acting and ending the regime. The last roadblock disappeared when a Chilean General was replaced with Augusto Pinochet, which had contact with U.S. and CIA officials, who would become the leader of Chile when, on 11th of September 1973, Allende was overthrown.⁹⁴

Chile Analysis

It is noticeable that the nonintervention principle stated multiple times in the OAS charter, was recontextualized to be justifiable. To be fair the U.S. involvement in Chilean affairs throughout the Allende government was softer than other examples and they made sure that their intervention wasn't as directly traceable that they were controlling the direction the country was going in, as Stephen Rabe mentions in his book.⁹⁵

The more indirect approach was quite extensive though, spending millions of dollars in propaganda, campaigning for oppositional politicians, and getting an ideological foothold in the

⁹¹ Rabe, *Kissinger and Latin America*, 63-64

⁹² Goldberg, "The Politics of the Allende Overthrow in Chile.", 110

⁹³ McPherson, *A Short History of U. S. Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 158-159

⁹⁴ Sicker, *The Geopolitics of Security in the Americas*, 129

⁹⁵ "Although it would be publicly civil, the administration vowed 'to maximize pressures on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemispheric interests.'" Rabe, *Kissinger and Latin America*, 61

military to guide them in the anti-Marxist direction. Articles 2 and 3 of the charter state the promotion of representative democracy and the right of any country to choose their way of governing. This was clearly what Chile was, Allende fairly won the election and continually expressed his beliefs in the process of a parliamentary democracy. Despite the U.S. propaganda campaign against him Allende had no outside backing, even Henry Kissinger, secretary of state at the time, said so.⁹⁶ The less invasive approach in Chile also differs how one could read article 15 of the charter.⁹⁷ The question of “what is an unjust act?” became blurrier when the defense was the idea that U.S. intervention was for its own and the region’s protection and acting against the communism of the Allende government which was a threat to democracy of the region. Something that could fall under the Rio Pact’s statement that an attack (direct or subversive) on one country was an attack on all OAS member states.⁹⁸

The later OAS anti-communist messages, like the Caracas declaration, work to turn the U.S. act of breaching of the non-intervention principle into justifiable actions in the fight against an international threat and to regain security and democracy to the region.⁹⁹ The fifth meeting of consultation of ministers of foreign affairs, about communist countries in the region, states: *“The existence of anti-democratic regimes constitutes a violation of the principles on which the Organization of American states is founded, and a danger to united and peaceful relationships in the hemisphere...”* and since the communist regimes violate the OAS principles, the U.S. intervention could be seen as a corrective action against a threat to a united hemisphere rather than a breach of other OAS principles. The respective breaches of principles cancelling each other out. In the eyes of the U.S. government all communism was inherently international since tracing it back inevitably ended up at the Soviet Union, and when that’s the case it was a “special and immediate threat” to the region.¹⁰⁰ It could therefore be argued that this threat supersedes article 19 that there is no justifiable reason to intervene in another country.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ *“The election of Allende was an indigenous product; Castro had nothing to do with it. The competence of Allende’s opponents had more to do with it!”* Rabe.,56

⁹⁷ Charter of OAS

⁹⁸ *“The right of each state to protect itself and to live its own life does not authorize it to commit unjust acts against another state.”* Charter of OAS

⁹⁹ “Caracas Declaration of Solidarity; March 28, 1954.”

¹⁰⁰ “Caracas Declaration of Solidarity; March 28, 1954.

¹⁰¹ Charter of OAS

The carefulness the U.S. conducted itself with in the case of Chile points to a less direct example of the Monroe Doctrine than in the Guatemalan example. It was less hands-on and preferred an approach of undermining the sitting president through ideological propaganda and economic warfare. This doesn't take away from the Monroe Doctrine giving the U.S. a moralist grand purpose which basically rectified any form of intervention they could choose, as it places them on the side of righteous protection of the freedom and liberty of the region. The Monroe Doctrine was used as a whitewashing tool for defending whatever imperialist measure the U.S. used to pressure any country to follow the status quo of capitalism under American hegemony and the fight against communism.¹⁰² As mentioned earlier it was expected by the U.S. that its Latin and South American neighbors practice “...*hemisphere solidarity in support of our world policy...*”

The Monroe Doctrine again works to recontextualize actions of intervention. The Monroe Doctrine basically dictates the actions of the U.S. to against communism as protecting democracy and freedom. The “unjust acts” through the Monroe Doctrine lens, are righteous ones.¹⁰³ This is even though the government was not blatantly communist by the nature of its policies but more with the coalitions members including communists and socialists as well as Allende's Marxist leanings. Once again, the labeling of “communist” on governments and people needed little proper evidence and when classified as one the “red scare” fear did the rest. As the Caracas declaration said “...*international communism, by its antidemocratic nature and its interventionist tendency, is incompatible with the concept of American freedom..*” by which as soon as a threat is branded communist the Monroe Doctrine steps in as a justification for direct or indirect force. Under the Monroe Doctrine style of foreign policy, it propped up the U.S. as the righteous defender of freedom, liberty, and security. With this title it essentially gives the U.S. a near limitless amount of leeway in what they could do in this crusade against communism.¹⁰⁴

In the case of Allende, the question of how significant the communist threat was, was less open to interpretation in comparison to Arbenz in Guatemala. He led a coalition with socialist

¹⁰² John C. Dreier, “The Organization of American States and United States Policy,” *International Organization* Vol.17, No.1 (1963), 38-39

¹⁰³ Gilderhus, “The Monroe Doctrine.”, 16

¹⁰⁴ Thomson, *Outsourced Empire*, 43

and communist parties as well as being an outspoken Marxist. However, as mentioned earlier the evidence or reasoning needed for labeling someone or something as a communist threat was meager, it just made it that much easier. The policy of containment started before Allende even made it into office, with numerous propaganda campaigns by the CIA being put in place. Early on, the U.S. and the CIA decided on subversive means to try and get the Chilean people against Allende as well as pushing the military in the direction of taking matters in their own hands and overthrowing Allende. Both tactics of Operation FUBELT did not work out and Allende won the election and was confirmed as the country's president. The ideological strategy that had worked in Guatemala two decades earlier did not achieve the same result.¹⁰⁵

The Allende term in office was then subverted in a different manner as the U.S. changed their approach to containment and started targeting the Chilean economy instead. Limiting the country's access to U.S. economic aid, mostly giving it to groups in opposition to the sitting president. The U.S. also managed to limit the ability of Chile to receive loans from other international organizations, hurting the country substantially.¹⁰⁶ This isolated the country and together with questionable financial policies, the Chilean economy was in deep turmoil. Now that the country was on the brink of collapse, the subsequent CIA propaganda campaigns, especially the ones specifically targeting military officers, had a much greater effect. Showing the failure of Marxist governing and pushing the military in the direction of taking control eventually bore fruit.

Relating back to Gallagher and Robinson's two qualifications for the informal empire, the first being that the imperialism sometimes goes beyond and "acts for their strategic protection." The informal economic pressure applied to Chile under the Allende administration is a function of protecting the region against communist subversion and a threat to the security of surrounding nations. Secondly, imperialism isn't a necessary function but rather determined by other factors of the degree of the communist threat and political viability to follow lines of the empire. This can be seen with the governments before and after Allende, when U.S. intervention was less

¹⁰⁵ Rabe, *Kissinger and Latin America*, 55, 61

¹⁰⁶ McPherson, *A Short History of U. S. Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean.*, 159

intense and more infrequent combined with advantages such as economic aid and favorable trade agreements.¹⁰⁷

In the Chilean case, informal imperialism was far more focused on providing economic pressure on the country to ensure the leadership's public support would lessen and turn against them, the communist threat. The tactic of propaganda usage by the U.S. and CIA can similarly be seen as a usage of informal imperialism by the way of limiting the principle of self-governing and the power of the elected head of state.¹⁰⁸ To protect American interests in keeping the western hemisphere capitalist and following the U.S.' world policy, propaganda usage to change the public attitudes around Allende was a way of taking away the power given to the president by his population. A subversive way of guiding the Chilean people in the "right", capitalist direction and against the Marxist sitting president. This privilege of self-government that is contingent on how well they correspond to American interests seems to also stretch to the thoughts of the people. The propaganda campaigns propagated was in a sense another style of removing the right to self-govern but this way the people were being deceived into opposing the candidate or party which aren't supportive American interests. The informal imperialist approach works as a give and take of where a country is "allowed" to move politically, should a country move outside the lines it is met with corrective actions by the empire.¹⁰⁹ The harsher the deviation, the harsher the corrective actions, and vice versa. The bribery of Chilean officials and politicians further subverts this "choice" as they are being denied the control of their own country's self-determination.

The changing world climate also ensured that the threat in the case of Chile would be considered more severe since the Cuban missile crisis had shown the real possibility for communism taken hold of a country in the western hemisphere. Even more so with Allende's openly Marxist views and socialist-communist coalition actively challenging and threatening the U.S capitalist imperial control of the region.¹¹⁰ When the Chilean government showed that it failed to strategically integrate with the rest of the capitalist countries of the Americas it

¹⁰⁷ "...in proportion as satisfactory political frameworks are brought into being in this way, the frequency of imperialist intervention lessens and imperialist control is correspondingly relaxed."Gallagher and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade.", 6

¹⁰⁸ Gallagher and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade", 4

¹⁰⁹ Gallagher and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade", 6

¹¹⁰ Hurtado-Torres, *The Gathering Storm*, 152

necessitated intervention from an imperial point of view. The country had demonstrated disregard for following the U.S. world policy and simultaneously showing that from an imperialist perspective their government needed to be dealt with.¹¹¹ To ensure the cooperative attitudes toward U.S. interests, their right to self-govern under the U.S. capitalist empire needed to be adjusted. Their political leadership existed as a weakness to the control of the hemisphere and thus the U.S. intervened.¹¹² With this style of informal imperialist tactics, the U.S. sets up the conditions necessary for a “communist” country or leader to fail because of the environment created prevents them from succeeding.¹¹³ Moreover, providing the U.S. with a posterchild for how communism doesn’t work, rallies the population against it which in turn again justifies the Monroe Doctrine as the now disagreeable population is a prime example of what the U.S. is trying to protect.

The economic tactics of minimizing the actual U.S. economic aid being given to the Allende government was another way of containing the threat. Isolating them and clearly using a “stick and carrot” device to attempt to steer the country in the right direction. Furthermore, the U.S. using their position to limit the amount the Chile could take out in loans was a gateway of using economic pressure to affect the political change needed to keep the country in line and under control.¹¹⁴ In the style of informal imperialism, the means utilized to control Chile lessened when a more cooperative government was established. This is most evident by the near instantaneous reintroduction of U.S. economic aid following the Pinochet regime’s ascension to power. When a government had shown itself to align with U.S. interest and follow their world policy, their freedom of governance and international cooperation returned.¹¹⁵

¹¹¹ Loveman, *No Higher Law*, 279

¹¹² Gallagher and Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade.”, 6

¹¹³ Gonzalez, “The Iron Fist.”, 221

¹¹⁴ McPherson, *A Short History of U. S. Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 159

¹¹⁵ Gonzalez, “The Iron Fist.”, 249

Conclusion

Guatemala

The Guatemalan coup in 1954 one of the first cases of U.S. intervention to depose a leader feared to be communist. Its agrarian reform and expatriation of land hit the United Fruit Company but that alone wasn't enough to fear that President Arbenz was taking the country in a communist direction.¹¹⁶ The government and local media's critique of U.S. actions during the Korean war was the point where these fears were realized.¹¹⁷ The CIA started training Guatemalan mercenaries as well as executing a propaganda campaign to turn the people and military against its government.¹¹⁸ With American arms and lessening trust in the leadership, Arbenz stepped down and a military dictatorship was established.

The beginning of the OAS charter states some of its most important principles as preserving democracy and non-intervention. However later documents make it clear that communism represented a threat to the peace and security of the western hemisphere.¹¹⁹ This opens the door for recontextualizing U.S. intervention as moral and for the purpose of protecting the region against an international danger that was the antithesis to American values of freedom. In a way this could almost be judged as the U.S. defending itself, its neighbors and preserving the peace against a subversive international threat.¹²⁰

The Monroe Doctrine in Guatemala once again became relevant as communism surfacing on the American continent was seen as an international power intervening in political landscape of the western hemisphere. This compelled the U.S. to involve itself to keep the region free of intervention from the outside.¹²¹ With the realistic threat communism in Latin and South America being limited in Guatemala, the labelling was enough to excuse U.S. intervention. The Monroe Doctrine gave the U.S. a moral purpose of protecting countries from communist threat. Therefore, the Monroe Doctrine during the Cold War almost gave the U.S. a carte blanche for

¹¹⁶ Smith, *The United States and Latin America*, 118

¹¹⁷ Immerman, "Guatemala as Cold War History.", 636

¹¹⁸ Willard-Foster, *Toppling Foreign Governments*, 115-116

¹¹⁹ "Caracas Declaration of Solidarity; March 28, 1954."

¹²⁰ Loveman, *No Higher Law*, 280

¹²¹ Sicker, *The Geopolitics of Security in the Americas*, 108

which actions they could employ in their fight against communism.¹²² The policy of containment's main strategies involved building up a mercenary group that threat could threaten President Arbenz and a propaganda campaign that over time shrunk the backing from his own people.¹²³ This works to isolate the "communist threat" and lessen the measures available to the president, eventually becoming so suffocating he had no choice but resigning.

In the case study of the Guatemalan coup, informal imperialism was the way of U.S. maintaining control over the western hemisphere. The critique of U.S. measures used in Korea showed that Guatemala was no longer under capitalist hegemonic control nor following the U.S. world policy of fighting communism. This was seen as a weak point of the U.S. regional empire and thus needed to be dealt with. Since the direction of the country was heading in was seen as unfavorable to U.S. control and interests, the Guatemalan privilege of self-governance needed to be adjusted. "*...as in weaker or unsatisfactory states it was considered necessary to coerce them into more co-operative attitudes.*"¹²⁴ The more a country strayed from U.S. control or type of governing, the stricter the corrective actions were necessitated.¹²⁵ The usage of propaganda and Guatemalan mercenaries works as informal tactics as no direct link could be connected back to the U.S. despite the fact that they were steering the Guatemalan people and military in the direction they wanted. The corrective actions and their levels worked as a "carrot and stick" device to incentivize or penalize choices countries under U.S. hegemony to maintain control.

Chile

The overthrowing of Chile's president Allende was a longer endeavor than in Guatemala. The propaganda however was increased in both magnitude and in scope, with the U.S. spending millions in broadcasts through radio and TV along with bribery of government officials.¹²⁶ Allende's outspoken Marxist beliefs and socialist-communist coalition put the U.S. on high alert in terms of fears of Chile turning into a communist totalitarian dictatorship. Due to the higher

¹²² Attard, "Informal Empire.", 1234

¹²³ Thomson, *Outsourced Empire*, 57-58

¹²⁴ Gallagher and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade.", 9

¹²⁵ Gallagher and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade.", 6

¹²⁶ Rabe, *Kissinger and Latin America*, 52

threat level the U.S. also turned to economic warfare to hurt the Allende Government.¹²⁷ Limiting economic aid to a relatively tiny amount to Chile and using their position to restrict international credit and loans, the U.S. isolated Chile and crippled them financially.¹²⁸ Chile's barren economic landscape worked to intensify the effectiveness of the public and military propaganda. This in turn created the conditions for the military turning against Allende and overthrowing him.¹²⁹

The communist threat in Chile was clearer than the previous example as therefore the intervention was more justifiable due to the danger it posed to the region at large.¹³⁰ The U.S. intervention in Chile was seen less as a "unjust act" and relates more to the Rio Pact's defense argument. The communist government's existence was considered a violation of the principles of OAS and posed a "special and immediate threat" to the security and freedom of the western hemisphere.¹³¹ The recontextualization worked to justify U.S. intervention protecting the region from an international danger and securing American values. This defense against a foreign subversive power and threat to the region worked to justify intervention as well as somewhat overruling earlier principles of nonintervention.¹³²

The Monroe Doctrine in Chile worked as a softer, less direct approach compared with Guatemala. The U.S. focused on working with ideological and economic means of intervening in the country to attack the communist threat. The Monroe Doctrine still worked as justifying defense for the U.S. grand purpose and moral crusade against communism. The means available to them in this ideological battle under the Monroe Doctrine seemed endless, and essentially open season on which intervening actions were permissible.¹³³

The amount of involvement didn't change, however. The strategic policies of containment in Chile mainly relying on economic warfare and sustained ideological propaganda against Allende. This involved giving barely any economic aid to the country and most of it going to the opposition. Moreover, restricting the international lines of credit and loans the

¹²⁷ Thomson, *Outsourced Empire*, 46

¹²⁸ Rabe, *Kissinger and Latin America*, 63-64

¹²⁹ Sicker, *The Geopolitics of Security in the Americas.*, 129

¹³⁰ Hurtado-Torres, *The Gathering Storm*, 152

¹³¹ Loveman, *No Higher Law.*,272

¹³² Loveman, *No Higher Law*, 280

¹³³ Gilderhus, "The Monroe Doctrine.",16

country could get, along with failed economic policies, Chile would start to struggle financially.¹³⁴ This strengthened the ideological warfare, with millions of dollars spent on anti-Allende propaganda, campaigning for opposition and bribing government officials.¹³⁵ The specific propaganda targeted at the Chilean military would prove to be the final push, isolating the president from all sides, creating the anti-Marxist environment for the military to enact the coup.

Under the theory of informal imperialism, the level of force imposed on a country is directly linked to the deviation from interests or level of control. This explains the longer and more sustained amount of involvement in Chile as Allende governed with a socialist-communist coalition.¹³⁶ This lack of subservience to U.S. control dictated that the privilege of self-governance needed to be adjusted, hence the economic and ideological warfare. To keep countries under U.S. hegemonic control the interventionist actions used were meant to steer Chile in a more anti-communist direction.¹³⁷ These corrective actions also worked the other way with more favorable government as the Pinochet regime following Allende almost immediately regained the privilege of U.S. economic and military aid. This “carrot and stick” device worked as an informal imperialist way of keeping the countries of the western hemisphere under control and following the U.S. world policy.¹³⁸

¹³⁴ Rabe, *Kissinger and Latin America*, 63-64

¹³⁵ McPherson, *A Short History of U. S. Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean.*, 158-159

¹³⁶ “It is only when the polities of these new regions fail to provide satisfactory conditions for commercial or strategic integration and when their relative weakness allows, that power is used imperialistically to adjust those conditions.” Gallagher and Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade.”,6

¹³⁷ Gallagher and Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade”, 4

¹³⁸ “Conversely, in proportion as satisfactory political frameworks are brought into being in this way, the frequency of imperialist intervention lessens and imperialist control is correspondingly relaxed.” Gallagher and Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade”, 6

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