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dc.contributor.authorHausken, Kjell
dc.date.accessioned2013-08-14T11:41:13Z
dc.date.available2013-08-14T11:41:13Z
dc.date.issued2008-11
dc.identifier.citationHausken, K. (2008) Whether to attack a terrorist’s resource stock today or tomorrow. Games and Economic Behavior, 64(2), pp. 548–564no_NO
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/184319
dc.descriptionReprinted from Games and Economic Behavior, 64/2, Kjell Hausken, Whether to attack a terrorist’s resource stock today or tomorrow, Pages No. 548–564, Copyright (2008), with permission from Elsevier.no_NO
dc.description.abstractA terrorist defends an asset which grows from the first to the second period and is attacked. With large asset growth, the terrorist's first period outcome is low caused by a large attack. With no expenditure constraint, the terrorist's total outcome is positive. With equal attack and defense inefficiencies, when the terrorist as defender requires his first period outcome to be positive, the attacker eliminates the asset in the first period when asset growth multiplied with the square roots of the terrorist's and attacker's discount parameters exceed 4/√ 3. This gives maximum conflict in the first period. Growth and the two discount parameters are strategic complements. The range for the attack inefficiency divided by defense inefficiency, which causes negative first period outcome for the terrorist, increases with asset growth. The attacker refrains from asset elimination in the first period due to strength (weakness) if the ratio is below (above) the range.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherElsevierno_NO
dc.subjectterrorismno_NO
dc.subjectthreatno_NO
dc.subjectconflictno_NO
dc.subjectattack inefficiencyno_NO
dc.subjectdefense inefficiencyno_NO
dc.subjectcontest success functionno_NO
dc.titleWhether to attack a terrorist’s resource stock today or tomorrowno_NO
dc.typeJournal articleno_NO
dc.typePeer reviewedno_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Social science: 200no_NO
dc.source.pagenumber548–564no_NO
dc.source.volume64no_NO
dc.source.journalGames and Economic Behaviorno_NO
dc.source.issue2no_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.001


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