Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria
Journal article, Peer reviewed
Permanent lenke
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/184331Utgivelsesdato
2007Metadata
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Originalversjon
Hausken, K. (2007) Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria. Economics Letters, 97, pp. 138–144 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.02.033Sammendrag
A game with multiple equilibria and incomplete information, which allows for reputation building, is repeated infinitely many times. Increasing differences in patience contribute to a greater likelihood of cooperation. As one player becomes sufficiently more patient than the other player, both players benefit, and both players' risk limits, and the conflict between the players, decrease.
Beskrivelse
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01651765. Reprinted from Economics Letters, 97, Kjell Hausken, Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria. Pages No. 138-144, Copyright (2007), with permission from Elsevier.