| dc.contributor.author | Hausken, Kjell | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-01-30T17:02:10Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-01-30T17:02:10Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2000-12 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Hausken, K. (2000) Migration and intergroup conflict. Economics Letters, 69(3), pp. 327–331 | no_NO |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/184333 | |
| dc.description | This is an electronic, author accepted copy of an article from Economics Letters, copyright Elsevier, 2000, made available here with permission. The original article is here : http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00326-8 | no_NO |
| dc.description.abstract | Two groups in conflict produce and appropriate internally generated consumable output in a two-stage game assuming equal within-group sharing and endogenous group sizes. It is shown how agents leave groups with high productive efficiency and migrate to groups with high appropriative and defensive capabilities. | no_NO |
| dc.language.iso | eng | no_NO |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | no_NO |
| dc.subject | economics | no_NO |
| dc.subject | game theory | no_NO |
| dc.subject | conflict | no_NO |
| dc.subject | competition | no_NO |
| dc.subject | production | no_NO |
| dc.subject | appropriation | no_NO |
| dc.title | Migration and intergroup conflict | no_NO |
| dc.type | Journal article | no_NO |
| dc.type | Peer reviewed | no_NO |
| dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Social science: 200 | no_NO |
| dc.source.pagenumber | 327–331 | no_NO |
| dc.source.volume | 69 | no_NO |
| dc.source.journal | Economics letters | no_NO |
| dc.source.issue | 3 | no_NO |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00326-8 | |
