On the impossibility of deterrence in sequential Colonel Blotto games
Journal article, Peer reviewed
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http://hdl.handle.net/11250/184353Utgivelsesdato
2012-06Metadata
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Originalversjon
Hausken, K. (2012) On the impossibility of deterrence in sequential Colonel Blotto games. International Game Theory Review, Vol. 14(2) pp. 293-305 10.1142/S0219198912500119Sammendrag
A sequential Colonel Blotto and rent seeking game with fixed and variable resources is
analyzed. With fixed resources, which is the assumption in Colonel Blotto games, we
show for the common ratio form contest success function that the second mover is never
deterred. This stands in contrast to Powell’s (Games and Economic Behavior 67(2),
611–615) finding where the second mover can be deterred. With variable resources both
players exert efforts in both sequential and simultaneous games, whereas fixed resources
cause characteristics of all battlefields or rents to impact efforts for each battlefield.
With variable resources only characteristics of a given battlefield impact efforts are to
win that battlefield because of independence across battlefields. Fixed resources impact
efforts and hence differences in unit effort costs are less important. In contrast, variable
resources cause differences in unit effort costs to be important. The societal implication
is that resource constrained opponents can be expected to engage in warfare, whereas
an advantaged player with no resource constraints can prevent warfare.
Beskrivelse
Hausken, K. (2012) On the impossibility of deterrence in sequential Colonel Blotto games. International Game Theory Review, Vol. 14(2) pp. 293-305. Coyright 2012, with permission from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. http://www.worldscientific.com/worldscinet/igtr