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dc.contributor.authorHausken, Kjell
dc.date.accessioned2013-11-21T14:15:19Z
dc.date.available2013-11-21T14:15:19Z
dc.date.issued2012-06
dc.identifier.citationHausken, K. (2012) On the impossibility of deterrence in sequential Colonel Blotto games. International Game Theory Review, Vol. 14(2) pp. 293-305no_NO
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/184353
dc.descriptionHausken, K. (2012) On the impossibility of deterrence in sequential Colonel Blotto games. International Game Theory Review, Vol. 14(2) pp. 293-305. Coyright 2012, with permission from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. http://www.worldscientific.com/worldscinet/igtrno_NO
dc.description.abstractA sequential Colonel Blotto and rent seeking game with fixed and variable resources is analyzed. With fixed resources, which is the assumption in Colonel Blotto games, we show for the common ratio form contest success function that the second mover is never deterred. This stands in contrast to Powell’s (Games and Economic Behavior 67(2), 611–615) finding where the second mover can be deterred. With variable resources both players exert efforts in both sequential and simultaneous games, whereas fixed resources cause characteristics of all battlefields or rents to impact efforts for each battlefield. With variable resources only characteristics of a given battlefield impact efforts are to win that battlefield because of independence across battlefields. Fixed resources impact efforts and hence differences in unit effort costs are less important. In contrast, variable resources cause differences in unit effort costs to be important. The societal implication is that resource constrained opponents can be expected to engage in warfare, whereas an advantaged player with no resource constraints can prevent warfare.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherWorld Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.no_NO
dc.subjectBlottono_NO
dc.subjectmultiple rentsno_NO
dc.subjectfixed resourcesno_NO
dc.subjectvariable resourcesno_NO
dc.subjectrent seekingno_NO
dc.titleOn the impossibility of deterrence in sequential Colonel Blotto gamesno_NO
dc.typeJournal articleno_NO
dc.typePeer reviewedno_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Social science: 200no_NO
dc.source.pagenumber13 pagesno_NO
dc.source.volume14no_NO
dc.source.journalInternational Game Theory Reviewno_NO
dc.source.issue2no_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1142/S0219198912500119


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