Now showing items 21-40 of 50

    • Insurgent attacks, government protection, and international intervention 

      Hausken, Kjell; Ncube, Mthuli (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2019-12)
      A government failing to protect against insurgents may or may not be rescued by the international community. Classifying events during 1961-2012, we find that among the successful interventions, war occurs more often than ...
    • Jack Hirshleifer: a Nobel prize left unbestowed 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2006)
      Jack Hirshleifer (1925–2005) contributed to investment theory, information economics, conflict, and bioeconomics, clarified the foundations of investment and capital theory in the spirit of Fisher, and made basic contributions ...
    • Migration and intergroup conflict 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2000-12)
      Two groups in conflict produce and appropriate internally generated consumable output in a two-stage game assuming equal within-group sharing and endogenous group sizes. It is shown how agents leave groups with high ...
    • En nytteforventningsanalyse av kriminalitet og straff 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007)
      Kriminell atferd bør analyseres ut fra motiv om forventet fordel veid opp mot forventet kostnad i form av straff. I Norge har kriminaliteten økt med en faktor 9 fra 1956-2002 mens fengsling har økt med faktor 1,3. ...
    • On the impossibility of deterrence in sequential Colonel Blotto games 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2012-06)
      A sequential Colonel Blotto and rent seeking game with fixed and variable resources is analyzed. With fixed resources, which is the assumption in Colonel Blotto games, we show for the common ratio form contest success ...
    • Policy Makers, the International Community and the Population in the Prevention and Treatment of Diseases: Case Study on HIV/AIDS 

      Hausken, Kjell; Ncube, Mthuli (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2017-01)
      A four-period game is developed between a policy maker, the international community, and the population. This research supplements, through implementing strategic interaction, earlier research analyzing "one player at a ...
    • Production and conflict models versus rent-seeking models 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2005-04)
      Aproduction and conflict (P&C) model and a rent-seeking (RS) model are compared for one group, two groups and K groups. Adding a newagent enlarges the pie in the P&C model, but causes the fixed size pie to be allocated ...
    • Production versus safety in a risky competitive industry 

      Hausken, Kjell (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2012)
      Each of two firms has a resource that can be converted into safety versus productive investment in the first stage, with Bertrand competition on price in the second stage of a two-stage game. The firms produce differentiated ...
    • Production, safety, exchange, and risk 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011)
      Two agents convert resources into safety investment and production while exchanging goods voluntarily. Safety investment ensures reduction of costly risk. High unit cost of safety effort reduces both productive effort ...
    • Production, safety, fighting, and risk 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011)
      Two agents make a trade off between production and safety investment, fighting for joint production. Ceteris paribus, if agent 1 has a higher unit cost of production, lower emphasis on safety causes more fighting and higher ...
    • Protection vs. separation in parallel non-homogeneous systems 

      Hausken, Kjell; Levitin, Gregory (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2009)
      The article considers strategic defense and attack of a system consisting of N functionally identical parallel elements of n types distinguished by element’s performance. The elements can be separated in order to reduce ...
    • Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007)
      A game with multiple equilibria and incomplete information, which allows for reputation building, is repeated infinitely many times. Increasing differences in patience contribute to a greater likelihood of cooperation. As ...
    • Risk limits, conflict, and equilibrium selection in games with multiple equilibria 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2009)
      A risk limit conflict measure is developed as the product of the two players’ maximum probabilities of being recalcitrant when pursuing a preferred equilibrium. Although the justification for it is different, the measure ...
    • Risk, price, and reimbursement 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2010)
      The article offers five hypotheses for the inverse relationship between risk and price in terms of first and second derivatives, establishing ranges of convexity, linearity, concavity. Negative price means reimbursement. ...
    • Risk, production and conflict when utilities are as if certain 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2010)
      The article analyses a production and conflict model of risk, supplementing the common rent seeking analysis. Agents differ in attitudes toward risk, productive efficiencies, fighting efficiencies and resources for production ...
    • Security Investment, Hacking, and Information Sharing Between Firms and Between Hackers 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2017-05)
      A four period game between two firms and two hackers is analyzed. The firms first defend and the hackers thereafter attack and share information. Each hacker seeks financial gain, beneficial information exchange, and ...
    • The Shapley Value of Coalitions to Other Coalitions 

      Hausken, Kjell (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2020-09)
      The Shapley value for an n-person game is decomposed into a 2n × 2n value matrix giving the value of every coalition to every other coalition. The cell ϕIJ(v, N) in the symmetric matrix is positive, zero, or negative, ...
    • Shield versus sword resource distribution in K-round duels 

      Hausken, Kjell; Levitin, Gregory (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2010-06)
      The paper considers optimal resource distribution between offense and defense in a duel. In each round of the duel two actors exchange attacks distributing the offense resources equally across K rounds. The offense ...
    • Stochastic Theories and Deterministic Differential Equations 

      Moxnes, John Fredrik; Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2010-05)
      We discuss the concept of “hydrodynamic” stochastic theory, which is not based on the traditional Markovian concept. A Wigner function developed for friction is used for the study of operators in quantum physics, and for ...
    • Stubbornness, power, and equlibrium selection in repeated games with multiple equilibra 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007-03)
      Axelrod’s [(1970), Conflict of Interest, Markham Publishers, Chicago] index of conflict in 2 × 2 games with two pure strategy equilibria has the property that a reduction in the cost of holding out corresponds to an increase ...