• Stubbornness, power, and equlibrium selection in repeated games with multiple equilibra 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007-03)
      Axelrod’s [(1970), Conflict of Interest, Markham Publishers, Chicago] index of conflict in 2 × 2 games with two pure strategy equilibria has the property that a reduction in the cost of holding out corresponds to an increase ...
    • Terrorism risks, civil liberties, and privacy concerns 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2012-10)
      Transportation of people plays a major role in our critical infrastructures. The article seeks to determine our willingness to protect our infrastructures balanced against sacrificing civil liberties. Respecting civil ...
    • The battle of the sexes when the future is important 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2005)
      Contrary to the widespread belief that game repetition induces conciliatory behavior, in a repeated battle of the sexes where player 1 values the future and player 2 is myopic, player 1 is more inclined through conflicting ...
    • The impact of the future in games with multiple equilibria 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007-08)
      The article shows that in a game with multiple equilibria, where one player estimates that there is at least a minuscule probability that the other player acquiesces, then conflict is inevitable if both players value the ...
    • The stability of anarchy and breakdown of production 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2006)
      In Hirshleifer’s (1995) model for unitary actors, combined fighting/production abruptly breaks down when inter-group decisiveness of fighting is above a certain value (above one) or income requirements are not met. Accounting ...
    • Two-Period Colonel Blotto Contest With Cumulative Investments Over Variable Assets With Resource Constraints 

      Hausken, Kjell (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2023-08)
      Two resource constrained players compete by investing in two assets which may increase or decrease in value over two periods. A player’s investment in period 1 carries over to period 2. If an asset is cheap in period 1, a ...
    • A Two-Period Decision Model for Central Bank Digital Currencies and Households 

      Wang, Guizhou; Hausken, Kjell (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2022-06)
      Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) give rise to many possibilities including those of negative interest rates. A two-period decision model is presented between one central bank and one representative household. The ...
    • A Two-Period Game Theoretic Model of Zero-Day Attacks with Stockpiling 

      Wang, Guizhou; Welburn, Jonathan William; Hausken, Kjell (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2020-12)
      In a two-period game, Player 1 produces zero-day exploits for immediate deployment or stockpiles for future deployment. In Period 2, Player 1 produces zero-day exploits for immediate deployment, supplemented by stockpiled ...
    • Universitetenes rangering, markeder og målesystemer 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article, 2006-12)
      At Norges beste universiteter rangeres lavere enn universiteter i flere U land tilkjennegir at Norge utdanner kompetanse med for lav vitenskapelig kvalitet. Norge som nasjon, norsk konkurransedyktighet, norsk industri og ...
    • Using accelerometer to estimate energy expenditures with four equations in four training sessions 

      Dyrstad, Sindre Mikal; Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2013)
      This study compares estimated energy expenditure (EE) from four equations using accelerometer counts in Zumba, interval 4x4 spinning, interval 4x4 running and pyramid running. The study also characterizes differences in ...
    • Using the power balance model to simulate cross-country skiing on varying terrain 

      Moxnes, John F.; Sandbakk, Øyvind; Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2014-05)
      The current study adapts the power balance model to simulate cross-country skiing on varying terrain. We assumed that the skier’s locomotive power at a self-chosen pace is a function of speed, which is impacted by friction, ...
    • Whether to attack a terrorist’s resource stock today or tomorrow 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2008-11)
      A terrorist defends an asset which grows from the first to the second period and is attacked. With large asset growth, the terrorist's first period outcome is low caused by a large attack. With no expenditure constraint, ...
    • Whether to attack growing assets and enterprises today or tomorrow 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2010)
      An asset possessed by a defender grows from the first to the second period and is attacked in both periods. With large growth, there is no attack in the first period. Conflict is eliminated. The attacker postpones the ...