Browsing UiS Brage by Journals "Economics Letters"

Now showing items 1-3 of 3

    • Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007)
      A game with multiple equilibria and incomplete information, which allows for reputation building, is repeated infinitely many times. Increasing differences in patience contribute to a greater likelihood of cooperation. As ...

    • The battle of the sexes when the future is important 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2005)
      Contrary to the widespread belief that game repetition induces conciliatory behavior, in a repeated battle of the sexes where player 1 values the future and player 2 is myopic, player 1 is more inclined through conflicting ...

    • Work motivation and teams 

      Häckl-Schermer, Simone Valerie; Sausgruber, Rupert; Tyran, Jean-Robert (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2024)
      This paper presents a novel technique to measure motivation for working on a task using deviations from the money-maximising benchmark in a real-effort experiment. Although we find that average output increases in response ...