dc.contributor.author | Hausken, Kjell | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-05-16T09:11:44Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-05-16T09:11:44Z | |
dc.date.created | 2017-01-31T19:04:07Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Hausken, K. (2017) Government Protection against Terrorists Funded by Benefactors and Crime: An Economic Model. International Journal of Conflict and Violence. 11(5) | nb_NO |
dc.identifier.issn | 1864-1385 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2498325 | |
dc.description.abstract | We model a game involving a terrorist, the terrorist’s benefactor, and a government protecting against terrorism. The terrorist generates terrorism effort using its own resources, funding from a benefactor, and crime. Crime can be lucrative for a terrorist but may deter benefactors, thus causing a strategic dilemma. The model accounts for resources, costs of effort, valuations of terrorism by the three players, and crime production characteristics. We determine how a variety of model parameters, the government, and the benefactor influence a terrorist’s terrorism and crime efforts, and relative ideological orientation along a continuum from ideological to criminal. We determine which factors impact government protection, for example that it is inverse U shaped in terrorism effort. We determine the implications of letting the benefactor choose optimal funding and/or punishment for crime, for example eliminating punishment if both are chosen optimally. The model parameters are estimated for sixty-five terroristgroups using the global terrorism database and the fragile states index. | nb_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | nb_NO |
dc.publisher | University of Bielefeld | nb_NO |
dc.relation.uri | http://www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/view/451/pdf | |
dc.rights | Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/deed.no | * |
dc.subject | terrorisme | nb_NO |
dc.subject | terror | nb_NO |
dc.subject | risiko | nb_NO |
dc.subject | terroristorganisasjoner | nb_NO |
dc.subject | organisert krim | nb_NO |
dc.subject | ideologi | nb_NO |
dc.title | Government Protection against Terrorists Funded by Benefactors and Crime: An Economic Model | nb_NO |
dc.type | Journal article | nb_NO |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | nb_NO |
dc.description.version | publishedVersion | nb_NO |
dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Social science: 200 | nb_NO |
dc.source.pagenumber | 37 | nb_NO |
dc.source.volume | 11 | nb_NO |
dc.source.journal | International Journal of Conflict and Violence | nb_NO |
dc.source.issue | 5 | nb_NO |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.4119/UNIBI/ijcv.451 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1444286 | |
cristin.unitcode | 217,7,5,0 | |
cristin.unitname | Institutt for medie- og samfunnsfag | |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | original | |
cristin.qualitycode | 1 | |