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dc.contributor.authorArnestad, Mads Nordmo
dc.contributor.authorEriksen, Kristoffer Wigestrand
dc.contributor.authorKvaløy, Ola
dc.contributor.authorLaurila, Bjørnar
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-06T08:38:34Z
dc.date.available2021-08-06T08:38:34Z
dc.date.created2021-07-14T17:10:17Z
dc.date.issued2021-05
dc.identifier.citationArnestad, M.N., Eriksen, K.W., Kvaløy, O., Laurila, B. (2021) Effort Provision in a Game of Luck. Frontiers in Psychology, 12, 1-10.en_US
dc.identifier.issn1664-1078
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2766723
dc.description.abstractIn some jobs, the correlation between effort and output is almost zero. For instance, money managers are primarily paid for luck. Using a controlled lab experiment, we examined under which conditions workers are willing to put in effort even if the output (and thus their employer’s earnings) is determined by pure luck. We varied whether the employer could observe the workers’ effort, as well as whether the employer knows that earnings were determined by luck. We find that, workers believed that the employer will reward their effort even if their effort does not affect earnings. Consequently, workers work harder if the employer could observe their (unproductive) effort. Moreover, even when the employer only saw earnings and not effort, workers labored harder if the employer did not know that earnings were determined by luck.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFrontiers Media S.Aen_US
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.subjectøkonomien_US
dc.subjectarbeidsliven_US
dc.titleEffort Provision in a Game of Lucken_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.rights.holder© 2021 Arnestad, Eriksen, Kvaløy and Laurila.en_US
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210en_US
dc.source.pagenumber1-10en_US
dc.source.volume12en_US
dc.source.journalFrontiers in Psychologyen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.3389/fpsyg.2021.637339
dc.identifier.cristin1921785
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode1


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