Executive compensation disclosure, ownership concentration and dual-class firms: An analysis of Swedish data
Peer reviewed, Journal article
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Original versionCieslak, K., Hamberg, M., Vural, D. (2021) Executive compensation disclosure, ownership concentration and dual-class firms: An analysis of Swedish data. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 45, article 100429. 10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2021.100429
We study how executive compensation disclosure (ECD) is affected by the economic incentives of owners and managers in a Swedish setting where agency conflicts are not so much between managers and owners, but between controlling and non-controlling owners. In our sample, control is often enhanced through mechanisms such as dual share classes. The analysis relies on detailed hand-collected ECD data from 2837 annual reports. As expected, disclosure decreases with ownership concentration and the owner’s excess voting rights. In Sweden, overpaid Chief Executive Offices (CEOs) improve ECD quality, but this is not the case when the controlling owner has excess control rights. This suggests that when managers have a bond with controlling owners, ECD is part of the agency problem between controlling and non-controlling owners, and executive compensation plays a different role than in previously studied Anglo-Saxon settings.