Tackling strategic simultaneity: What NATO could do to adapt to the new multitude of threats

Abstract

NATO is facing an unprecedented geostrategic environment characterized by simultaneous threats: Russian revisionism, the rise of China, the related problem of coping with threats in the cyber domain, and persistent challenges emanating from the southern flank. This article applies insights from the literature on organizational ambidexterity to provide a fresh perspective on how NATO could adapt to strategic simultaneity. Exisiting organizational ambidexterity literature focuses on the corporate challenge of striking a balance between exploiting existing markets and technologies, and exploring new ones altogether. In essence, strategic simultaneity demands that NATO do the same. NATO must cope with well-known and less-known threats and strike the right balance between effectiveness in handling known problems and innovation in coping with new ones. The article extracts three key categories from the strategic ambidexterity research: unified senior leadership; separate organizational units for exploitation and innovation; and a strategic approach to pursuing innovation through external partnerships. Applying these to NATO, it argues that, in order to become more ambidextrous, the organization’s major countries must unite around a vision that both places simultaneity at the center and is conducive to a balanced investment in tackling all four major challenges. While Allied Command Transformation (ACT) must be maintained as a distinct organizational unit, much stronger bridges must be built between ACT and the other commands. Further, NATO Centers of Excellence and external partnerships must be used in a more targeted way as sources of innovation and new ideas.