Trojan Spoofing: A Threat to Critical Infrastructure

Abstract

This article explores the phenomenon of location spoofing – where the spoofer is able to ‘teleport’ systems in and out of defined locations, either for the purpose of infiltration into no-go zones or for the ‘teleportation’ out of real, defined zones in the physical world. The research relied on a qualitative methodology, utilising academic research findings, media reports, hacker demonstrations, and secondary data from these sources, to situate the spoofing threat in the context of international security. This conceptual, argumentative essay finds that signal spoofing, the methods of which can be followed via online scripts, allows users the ability to overcome geographically-defined territorial restrictions. This, as this article finds, allows violent actors to weaponise systems such as unmanned ariel systems (UAS), potentially leading to the escalation of political tensions in extreme but unfortunately ever-frequent episodes. The article concludes that, while Trojan Spoofing (in particular) poses a real and an existential threat to international security, it is only a sum-of-all parts in considering other threats to critical functions in society. If geofences are to be used as a single point of security to protect assets against hostile actors, managers need to be aware of the vulnerability of intrusion and the resulting geopolitical consequences.