• Production, safety, fighting, and risk 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011)
      Two agents make a trade off between production and safety investment, fighting for joint production. Ceteris paribus, if agent 1 has a higher unit cost of production, lower emphasis on safety causes more fighting and higher ...
    • Protection vs. separation in parallel non-homogeneous systems 

      Hausken, Kjell; Levitin, Gregory (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2009)
      The article considers strategic defense and attack of a system consisting of N functionally identical parallel elements of n types distinguished by element’s performance. The elements can be separated in order to reduce ...
    • Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007)
      A game with multiple equilibria and incomplete information, which allows for reputation building, is repeated infinitely many times. Increasing differences in patience contribute to a greater likelihood of cooperation. As ...
    • Risk limits, conflict, and equilibrium selection in games with multiple equilibria 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2009)
      A risk limit conflict measure is developed as the product of the two players’ maximum probabilities of being recalcitrant when pursuing a preferred equilibrium. Although the justification for it is different, the measure ...
    • Risk, price, and reimbursement 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2010)
      The article offers five hypotheses for the inverse relationship between risk and price in terms of first and second derivatives, establishing ranges of convexity, linearity, concavity. Negative price means reimbursement. ...
    • Risk, production and conflict when utilities are as if certain 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2010)
      The article analyses a production and conflict model of risk, supplementing the common rent seeking analysis. Agents differ in attitudes toward risk, productive efficiencies, fighting efficiencies and resources for production ...
    • Security Investment, Hacking, and Information Sharing Between Firms and Between Hackers 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2017-05)
      A four period game between two firms and two hackers is analyzed. The firms first defend and the hackers thereafter attack and share information. Each hacker seeks financial gain, beneficial information exchange, and ...
    • Shield versus sword resource distribution in K-round duels 

      Hausken, Kjell; Levitin, Gregory (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2010-06)
      The paper considers optimal resource distribution between offense and defense in a duel. In each round of the duel two actors exchange attacks distributing the offense resources equally across K rounds. The offense ...
    • Stochastic Theories and Deterministic Differential Equations 

      Moxnes, John Fredrik; Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2010-05)
      We discuss the concept of “hydrodynamic” stochastic theory, which is not based on the traditional Markovian concept. A Wigner function developed for friction is used for the study of operators in quantum physics, and for ...
    • Stubbornness, power, and equlibrium selection in repeated games with multiple equilibra 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007-03)
      Axelrod’s [(1970), Conflict of Interest, Markham Publishers, Chicago] index of conflict in 2 × 2 games with two pure strategy equilibria has the property that a reduction in the cost of holding out corresponds to an increase ...
    • Terrorism risks, civil liberties, and privacy concerns 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2012-10)
      Transportation of people plays a major role in our critical infrastructures. The article seeks to determine our willingness to protect our infrastructures balanced against sacrificing civil liberties. Respecting civil ...
    • The battle of the sexes when the future is important 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2005)
      Contrary to the widespread belief that game repetition induces conciliatory behavior, in a repeated battle of the sexes where player 1 values the future and player 2 is myopic, player 1 is more inclined through conflicting ...
    • The impact of the future in games with multiple equilibria 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007-08)
      The article shows that in a game with multiple equilibria, where one player estimates that there is at least a minuscule probability that the other player acquiesces, then conflict is inevitable if both players value the ...
    • The stability of anarchy and breakdown of production 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2006)
      In Hirshleifer’s (1995) model for unitary actors, combined fighting/production abruptly breaks down when inter-group decisiveness of fighting is above a certain value (above one) or income requirements are not met. Accounting ...
    • Universitetenes rangering, markeder og målesystemer 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article, 2006-12)
      At Norges beste universiteter rangeres lavere enn universiteter i flere U land tilkjennegir at Norge utdanner kompetanse med for lav vitenskapelig kvalitet. Norge som nasjon, norsk konkurransedyktighet, norsk industri og ...
    • Using the power balance model to simulate cross-country skiing on varying terrain 

      Moxnes, John F.; Sandbakk, Øyvind; Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2014-05)
      The current study adapts the power balance model to simulate cross-country skiing on varying terrain. We assumed that the skier’s locomotive power at a self-chosen pace is a function of speed, which is impacted by friction, ...
    • Whether to attack a terrorist’s resource stock today or tomorrow 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2008-11)
      A terrorist defends an asset which grows from the first to the second period and is attacked. With large asset growth, the terrorist's first period outcome is low caused by a large attack. With no expenditure constraint, ...
    • Whether to attack growing assets and enterprises today or tomorrow 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2010)
      An asset possessed by a defender grows from the first to the second period and is attacked in both periods. With large growth, there is no attack in the first period. Conflict is eliminated. The attacker postpones the ...