• Governments' and terrorists' defense and attack in a T-period game 

      Hausken, Kjell; Zhuang, Jun (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011-01)
      We analyze how a government allocates its resources between attacking to downgrade a terrorist’s resources and defending against a terrorist attack. Analogously, the terrorist allocates its resources between attacking a ...
    • Income, interdependence, and substitution effects affecting incentives for security investment 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2006)
      Firms in cyber war compete with external intruders such as hackers over their assets. Each firm invests in security technology when the required rate of return from security investment exceeds the average attack level, or ...
    • Information sharing among firms and cyber attacks 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007)
      As the Sarbanes-Oxley Act strengthens internal controls, and the government encourages information sharing, accounting gains significance through secure representation, storage, and transfer of information, and by laying ...
    • Migration and intergroup conflict 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2000-12)
      Two groups in conflict produce and appropriate internally generated consumable output in a two-stage game assuming equal within-group sharing and endogenous group sizes. It is shown how agents leave groups with high ...
    • Production and conflict models versus rent-seeking models 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2005-04)
      Aproduction and conflict (P&C) model and a rent-seeking (RS) model are compared for one group, two groups and K groups. Adding a newagent enlarges the pie in the P&C model, but causes the fixed size pie to be allocated ...
    • Risk limits, conflict, and equilibrium selection in games with multiple equilibria 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2009)
      A risk limit conflict measure is developed as the product of the two players’ maximum probabilities of being recalcitrant when pursuing a preferred equilibrium. Although the justification for it is different, the measure ...
    • Risk, production and conflict when utilities are as if certain 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2010)
      The article analyses a production and conflict model of risk, supplementing the common rent seeking analysis. Agents differ in attitudes toward risk, productive efficiencies, fighting efficiencies and resources for production ...
    • Stubbornness, power, and equlibrium selection in repeated games with multiple equilibra 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007-03)
      Axelrod’s [(1970), Conflict of Interest, Markham Publishers, Chicago] index of conflict in 2 × 2 games with two pure strategy equilibria has the property that a reduction in the cost of holding out corresponds to an increase ...
    • The battle of the sexes when the future is important 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2005)
      Contrary to the widespread belief that game repetition induces conciliatory behavior, in a repeated battle of the sexes where player 1 values the future and player 2 is myopic, player 1 is more inclined through conflicting ...
    • The impact of the future in games with multiple equilibria 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007-08)
      The article shows that in a game with multiple equilibria, where one player estimates that there is at least a minuscule probability that the other player acquiesces, then conflict is inevitable if both players value the ...
    • Whether to attack a terrorist’s resource stock today or tomorrow 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2008-11)
      A terrorist defends an asset which grows from the first to the second period and is attacked. With large asset growth, the terrorist's first period outcome is low caused by a large attack. With no expenditure constraint, ...