• Exchange, raiding, and the shadow of the future 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2008-04)
      A two-period exchange model is developed where production decisions in the first period determine the amount of resources available in the second period. Each agent allocates resources to defend its production and attack ...
    • Jack Hirshleifer: a Nobel prize left unbestowed 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2006)
      Jack Hirshleifer (1925–2005) contributed to investment theory, information economics, conflict, and bioeconomics, clarified the foundations of investment and capital theory in the spirit of Fisher, and made basic contributions ...
    • Migration and intergroup conflict 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2000-12)
      Two groups in conflict produce and appropriate internally generated consumable output in a two-stage game assuming equal within-group sharing and endogenous group sizes. It is shown how agents leave groups with high ...
    • Production and conflict models versus rent-seeking models 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2005-04)
      Aproduction and conflict (P&C) model and a rent-seeking (RS) model are compared for one group, two groups and K groups. Adding a newagent enlarges the pie in the P&C model, but causes the fixed size pie to be allocated ...
    • Production versus safety in a risky competitive industry 

      Hausken, Kjell (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2012)
      Each of two firms has a resource that can be converted into safety versus productive investment in the first stage, with Bertrand competition on price in the second stage of a two-stage game. The firms produce differentiated ...
    • Production, safety, exchange, and risk 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011)
      Two agents convert resources into safety investment and production while exchanging goods voluntarily. Safety investment ensures reduction of costly risk. High unit cost of safety effort reduces both productive effort ...
    • Production, safety, fighting, and risk 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011)
      Two agents make a trade off between production and safety investment, fighting for joint production. Ceteris paribus, if agent 1 has a higher unit cost of production, lower emphasis on safety causes more fighting and higher ...
    • Risk, production and conflict when utilities are as if certain 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2010)
      The article analyses a production and conflict model of risk, supplementing the common rent seeking analysis. Agents differ in attitudes toward risk, productive efficiencies, fighting efficiencies and resources for production ...
    • The stability of anarchy and breakdown of production 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2006)
      In Hirshleifer’s (1995) model for unitary actors, combined fighting/production abruptly breaks down when inter-group decisiveness of fighting is above a certain value (above one) or income requirements are not met. Accounting ...