| dc.contributor.author | Hausken, Kjell | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-01-30T16:32:38Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-01-30T16:32:38Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2007-08 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Hausken, K. (2007) The impact of the future in games with multiple equilibria. Economics Letters , 96(2), pp. 183-188 | no_NO |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/184337 | |
| dc.description | This is an electronic, author accepted copy of an article from Economics Letters, copyright Elsevier, 2007, made available here with permission. The original article is here : http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.027 | no_NO |
| dc.description.abstract | The article shows that in a game with multiple equilibria, where one player estimates that there is at least a minuscule probability that the other player acquiesces, then conflict is inevitable if both players value the future sufficiently highly. | no_NO |
| dc.language.iso | eng | no_NO |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | no_NO |
| dc.subject | game theory | no_NO |
| dc.subject | conflict | no_NO |
| dc.subject | economy | no_NO |
| dc.subject | discounting | no_NO |
| dc.title | The impact of the future in games with multiple equilibria | no_NO |
| dc.type | Journal article | no_NO |
| dc.type | Peer reviewed | no_NO |
| dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Social science: 200 | no_NO |
| dc.source.pagenumber | 183-188 | no_NO |
| dc.source.volume | 96 | no_NO |
| dc.source.journal | Economics letters | no_NO |
| dc.source.issue | 2 | no_NO |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.027 | |
