Parliamentary Government and Corporatism at the Crossroads: Principals and Agents in Norwegian Agricultural Policymaking
Journal article, Peer reviewed
Accepted version
![Thumbnail](/uis-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2492299/Parliamentary_government.pdf.jpg?sequence=6&isAllowed=y)
View/ Open
Date
2017-12Metadata
Show full item recordCollections
Original version
Rommetvedt, H., Veggeland, F. (2017) Parliamentary Government and Corporatism at the Crossroads: Principals and Agents in Norwegian Agricultural Policymaking. Government and Opposition. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2017.32. 10.1017/gov.2017.32Abstract
The article analyses the interplay between agency problems at various stages in the parliamentary chain of delegation and external constraints related to corporatist negotiations in Norwegian agricultural policymaking. The combination of minority government and MPs tending to have more extreme preferences than the voters, and corporatist integration of specialized interests, may lead to an accumulation of agency costs. However, the study shows that we need to specify carefully the conditions under which this will occur. The article is based on official policy documents and a survey of citizens.
Description
This version is made available in accordance with publisher policies. It is the author’s last version of the article after peer-review, usually referred to as postprint, or accepted version. Please cite only the published version.