• A strategic analysis of information sharing among cyber hackers 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2015-08)
      We build a game theory model where the market design is such that one firm invests in security to defend against cyber attacks by two hackers. The firm has an asset, which is allocated between the three market participants ...
    • Active vs. passive defense against a strategic attacker 

      Hausken, Kjell; Levitin, Gregory (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011)
      The article analyzes how a defender determines a balance between protecting an object (passive defense) and striking preventively against an attacker seeking to destroy the object (active defense). The attacker analogously ...
    • Choosing what to protect when attacker resources and asset valuations are uncertain 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2014-07)
      The situation has been modelled where the attacker’s resources are unknown to the defender. Protecting assets presupposes that the defender has some information on the attacker’s resource capabilities. An attacker targets ...
    • Cooperation and between-group competition 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2000-07)
      Introducing competition between groups may induce cooperation to emerge in defection games despite considerable cost of cooperation. If the groups can confine themselves to a cooperative sector, either by providing incentives ...
    • Game theoretic analysis of two-period-dependent degraded multistate reliability systems 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011)
      A system of two components is analyzed as a two-period game. After period 1 the system can be fully operational, in two states of intermediate degradation, or fail. Analogously to changing failure rates in dependent systems ...
    • Governments' and terrorists' defense and attack in a T-period game 

      Hausken, Kjell; Zhuang, Jun (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011-01)
      We analyze how a government allocates its resources between attacking to downgrade a terrorist’s resources and defending against a terrorist attack. Analogously, the terrorist allocates its resources between attacking a ...
    • Migration and intergroup conflict 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2000-12)
      Two groups in conflict produce and appropriate internally generated consumable output in a two-stage game assuming equal within-group sharing and endogenous group sizes. It is shown how agents leave groups with high ...
    • Policy Makers, the International Community and the Population in the Prevention and Treatment of Diseases: Case Study on HIV/AIDS 

      Hausken, Kjell; Ncube, Mthuli (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2017-01)
      A four-period game is developed between a policy maker, the international community, and the population. This research supplements, through implementing strategic interaction, earlier research analyzing "one player at a ...
    • Protection vs. separation in parallel non-homogeneous systems 

      Hausken, Kjell; Levitin, Gregory (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2009)
      The article considers strategic defense and attack of a system consisting of N functionally identical parallel elements of n types distinguished by element’s performance. The elements can be separated in order to reduce ...
    • Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007)
      A game with multiple equilibria and incomplete information, which allows for reputation building, is repeated infinitely many times. Increasing differences in patience contribute to a greater likelihood of cooperation. As ...
    • Risk limits, conflict, and equilibrium selection in games with multiple equilibria 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2009)
      A risk limit conflict measure is developed as the product of the two players’ maximum probabilities of being recalcitrant when pursuing a preferred equilibrium. Although the justification for it is different, the measure ...
    • Security Investment, Hacking, and Information Sharing Between Firms and Between Hackers 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2017-05)
      A four period game between two firms and two hackers is analyzed. The firms first defend and the hackers thereafter attack and share information. Each hacker seeks financial gain, beneficial information exchange, and ...
    • Shield versus sword resource distribution in K-round duels 

      Hausken, Kjell; Levitin, Gregory (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2010-06)
      The paper considers optimal resource distribution between offense and defense in a duel. In each round of the duel two actors exchange attacks distributing the offense resources equally across K rounds. The offense ...
    • Sociological game theory: Agency, social structures and interaction processes 

      Burns, Tom R.; Roszkowska, Ewa; Machado, Nora; Corte, Ugo (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2021-08)
      This article presents two sociological theories, alternatives to classical game theory. These social science-based game theories discussed here present reformulations of classical game theory in applied mathematics (CGT). ...
    • Stubbornness, power, and equlibrium selection in repeated games with multiple equilibra 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007-03)
      Axelrod’s [(1970), Conflict of Interest, Markham Publishers, Chicago] index of conflict in 2 × 2 games with two pure strategy equilibria has the property that a reduction in the cost of holding out corresponds to an increase ...
    • The impact of the future in games with multiple equilibria 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007-08)
      The article shows that in a game with multiple equilibria, where one player estimates that there is at least a minuscule probability that the other player acquiesces, then conflict is inevitable if both players value the ...