Active vs. passive defense against a strategic attacker
Journal article, Peer reviewed
MetadataShow full item record
Original versionHausen, K. (2011) Active vs. passive defense against a strategic attacker. International Game Theory Review, Vol. 13(1), pp. 1-12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219198911002812
The article analyzes how a defender determines a balance between protecting an object (passive defense) and striking preventively against an attacker seeking to destroy the object (active defense). The attacker analogously determines a balance between attacking and protecting against the preventive strike. The defender makes its decision about striking preventively based on its estimate of the probability of being attacked. In both cases of preventive strike and no preventive strike, the defender anticipates the most harmful attacker’s strategy. The influence of the ratio between the player’s resources and the contest intensities on the solution of the game is analyzed.
Active vs. Passive Defense against a Strategic Attacker, Kjell Hausken & Gregory Levitin, International Game Theory Review, Vol 13 and Issue No. 1, Copyright @ 2011, made available with permission from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.