Now showing items 1401-1420 of 1640

    • The stability of anarchy and breakdown of production 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2006)
      In Hirshleifer’s (1995) model for unitary actors, combined fighting/production abruptly breaks down when inter-group decisiveness of fighting is above a certain value (above one) or income requirements are not met. Accounting ...
    • Whether to attack growing assets and enterprises today or tomorrow 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2010)
      An asset possessed by a defender grows from the first to the second period and is attacked in both periods. With large growth, there is no attack in the first period. Conflict is eliminated. The attacker postpones the ...
    • Protection vs. separation in parallel non-homogeneous systems 

      Hausken, Kjell; Levitin, Gregory (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2009)
      The article considers strategic defense and attack of a system consisting of N functionally identical parallel elements of n types distinguished by element’s performance. The elements can be separated in order to reduce ...
    • Risk limits, conflict, and equilibrium selection in games with multiple equilibria 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2009)
      A risk limit conflict measure is developed as the product of the two players’ maximum probabilities of being recalcitrant when pursuing a preferred equilibrium. Although the justification for it is different, the measure ...
    • Active vs. passive defense against a strategic attacker 

      Hausken, Kjell; Levitin, Gregory (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011)
      The article analyzes how a defender determines a balance between protecting an object (passive defense) and striking preventively against an attacker seeking to destroy the object (active defense). The attacker analogously ...
    • Production, safety, fighting, and risk 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011)
      Two agents make a trade off between production and safety investment, fighting for joint production. Ceteris paribus, if agent 1 has a higher unit cost of production, lower emphasis on safety causes more fighting and higher ...
    • Production, safety, exchange, and risk 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011)
      Two agents convert resources into safety investment and production while exchanging goods voluntarily. Safety investment ensures reduction of costly risk. High unit cost of safety effort reduces both productive effort ...
    • Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007)
      A game with multiple equilibria and incomplete information, which allows for reputation building, is repeated infinitely many times. Increasing differences in patience contribute to a greater likelihood of cooperation. As ...
    • The battle of the sexes when the future is important 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2005)
      Contrary to the widespread belief that game repetition induces conciliatory behavior, in a repeated battle of the sexes where player 1 values the future and player 2 is myopic, player 1 is more inclined through conflicting ...
    • Production versus safety in a risky competitive industry 

      Hausken, Kjell (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2012)
      Each of two firms has a resource that can be converted into safety versus productive investment in the first stage, with Bertrand competition on price in the second stage of a two-stage game. The firms produce differentiated ...
    • Jack Hirshleifer: a Nobel prize left unbestowed 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2006)
      Jack Hirshleifer (1925–2005) contributed to investment theory, information economics, conflict, and bioeconomics, clarified the foundations of investment and capital theory in the spirit of Fisher, and made basic contributions ...
    • Risk, price, and reimbursement 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2010)
      The article offers five hypotheses for the inverse relationship between risk and price in terms of first and second derivatives, establishing ranges of convexity, linearity, concavity. Negative price means reimbursement. ...
    • Game theoretic analysis of two-period-dependent degraded multistate reliability systems 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011)
      A system of two components is analyzed as a two-period game. After period 1 the system can be fully operational, in two states of intermediate degradation, or fail. Analogously to changing failure rates in dependent systems ...
    • Risk, production and conflict when utilities are as if certain 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2010)
      The article analyses a production and conflict model of risk, supplementing the common rent seeking analysis. Agents differ in attitudes toward risk, productive efficiencies, fighting efficiencies and resources for production ...
    • Income, interdependence, and substitution effects affecting incentives for security investment 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2006)
      Firms in cyber war compete with external intruders such as hackers over their assets. Each firm invests in security technology when the required rate of return from security investment exceeds the average attack level, or ...
    • Information sharing among firms and cyber attacks 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007)
      As the Sarbanes-Oxley Act strengthens internal controls, and the government encourages information sharing, accounting gains significance through secure representation, storage, and transfer of information, and by laying ...
    • Whether to attack a terrorist’s resource stock today or tomorrow 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2008-11)
      A terrorist defends an asset which grows from the first to the second period and is attacked. With large asset growth, the terrorist's first period outcome is low caused by a large attack. With no expenditure constraint, ...
    • En nytteforventningsanalyse av kriminalitet og straff 

      Hausken, Kjell (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2007)
      Kriminell atferd bør analyseres ut fra motiv om forventet fordel veid opp mot forventet kostnad i form av straff. I Norge har kriminaliteten økt med en faktor 9 fra 1956-2002 mens fengsling har økt med faktor 1,3. ...
    • Organisatorisk sikkerhet, finnes teoriene i praksis? 

      Tjørn, Birte (Masteroppgave/UIS-SV-IMKS/2011;, Master thesis, 2011)
      Sikkerhet har lenge stått høyt oppe på dagsorden hos virksomhetene, og det har etterhvert også blitt mer og mer fokus på dette i hele samfunnet. Men hvordan kan ulykker fremdeles oppstå? Denne avhandlingen tar for seg ...
    • Disharmonized regulation of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) in Europe - implications for patient safety 

      Wiesener, Solveig (Masteroppgave/UIS-SV-IMKS/2013;, Master thesis, 2013)
      3 Summary 3.1 Research question and Objectives Patient safety is a highly prioritized area within the provision of public and private health care services in both the European Union (EU) as a whole, member states, as ...