dc.contributor.author Hausken, Kjell dc.contributor.author Zhuang, Jun dc.date.accessioned 2013-11-15T14:48:49Z dc.date.available 2013-11-15T14:48:49Z dc.date.issued 2011-01 dc.identifier.citation Hausken K., Zhuang J. (2011) Governments’ and terrorists’ defense and attack in a T-period game. Decision Analysis 8(1), pp. 46-70. no_NO dc.identifier.issn 1545-8490 dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/11250/184357 dc.description.abstract We analyze how a government allocates its resources between attacking to downgrade a terrorist’s resources no_NO and defending against a terrorist attack. Analogously, the terrorist allocates its resources between attacking a government’s asset and defending its own resources. A two-stage game is considered where the government moves first and the terrorist moves second. We show that (a) when the terrorist’s resources are low, the government attacks the terrorist’s resources sufficiently to deter the terrorist from attacking and does not defend; (b) when the terrorist’s resources are high, both the government and terrorist defend and attack. We analyze T periods of the two-stage game between two myopic players. First we assume no linkages between periods. We show that after an attack the government may enjoy incoming resources, which deter the terrorist for some periods. Between periods the terrorist’s resources may change because of arithmetically and geometrically changing incoming funds. We allow the government’s and the terrorist’s resources to be determined randomly in each time period. We also allow the government’s resources in one period to depend on the terrorist’s attacks in earlier time periods for three dynamics, where the terrorist’s resources are drawn from a normal distribution or change arithmetically or geometrically. dc.language.iso eng no_NO dc.publisher Informs no_NO dc.subject terrorism no_NO dc.subject terror no_NO dc.subject threat no_NO dc.subject conflict no_NO dc.subject dynamics no_NO dc.subject game theory no_NO dc.subject multiple-period game no_NO dc.subject contest success function no_NO dc.title Governments' and terrorists' defense and attack in a T-period game no_NO dc.type Journal article no_NO dc.type Peer reviewed no_NO dc.subject.nsi VDP::Social science: 200 no_NO dc.source.pagenumber 46-70 no_NO dc.source.volume 8 no_NO dc.source.journal Decision Analysis no_NO dc.source.issue 1 no_NO dc.identifier.doi 10.1287/deca.1100.0194
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