| dc.description.abstract | Heads of state are an all too overlooked and forgotten factor when it comes to the analysis of political and constitutional crises in post-war democratic states. Be they executive presidents, ceremonial presidents, or especially constitutional monarchs, their real role and powerful influence on the course of crises is often overlooked and ignored. With the important, if often forgotten role these symbols of the state play, the question arises which of these three systems handles a crisis best and produces the best outcome for constitutional democracy. A range of arguments for executive presidencies, ceremonial presidencies, and constitutional monarchies will be utilised. They will be compared, analysed, and set in a context of real historic cases of crisis, from across the globe, to test their real-world application. The results seem to suggest a deep flaw in the executive presidential model in its concentration of executive and constitutional power in the hands of one individual. The ceremonial presidential system appears also flawed, with misaligned incentives leading to a head of state who serves to empower, rather than guard against, a wayward government. By contrast, constitutional monarchies appear to successfully act politically independent and to fulfil their role as constitutional guardian. As a result, this paper argues that, contrary to what one might inherently think, constitutional monarchy still has an important role to play in modern constitutional democracy as a protective force. | |
