National Security or Personal Security? – What is the effect of winning coalition size on arms import?

Abstract

What determines a states’ decision to import weapons? Is it to ensure national security or is it to secure the leader and his winning coalition against whoever might try to challenge their leadership? This study investigates the effect of winning coalition size on arms importation, addressing a notable gap in the existing literature on arms trade and institutional structures. Utilizing a time-series cross-sectional dataset of up to 171 countries from 1950 to 2022, the analysis employs ordinary least squares regression with fixed effects to explore this relationship. The initial findings suggest a significant negative relationship between winning coalition size and arms imports. However, this relationship does not hold up when additional control variables are introduced. The study further examines the impact of winning coalition size on arms imports within authoritarian regimes, finding no statistically significant relationships. A notable finding is the significant negative effect of the number of alliances on arms imports, indicating that countries with more alliances tend to import fewer arms, likely due to domestic production capabilities.

What determines a states’ decision to import weapons? Is it to ensure national security or is it to secure the leader and his winning coalition against whoever might try to challenge their leadership? This study investigates the effect of winning coalition size on arms importation, addressing a notable gap in the existing literature on arms trade and institutional structures. Utilizing a time-series cross-sectional dataset of up to 171 countries from 1950 to 2022, the analysis employs ordinary least squares regression with fixed effects to explore this relationship. The initial findings suggest a significant negative relationship between winning coalition size and arms imports. However, this relationship does not hold up when additional control variables are introduced. The study further examines the impact of winning coalition size on arms imports within authoritarian regimes, finding no statistically significant relationships. A notable finding is the significant negative effect of the number of alliances on arms imports, indicating that countries with more alliances tend to import fewer arms, likely due to domestic production capabilities.